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(in two parts)

Part 1

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PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

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>
> b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
>
> c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
>
> d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
>
> e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

This volume was initially prepared under the general supervision of Fredrick Aandahl and, at a later stage, of William Z. Slany, his successor as General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. John P. Glennon assisted in final preparation. Charles S. Sampson compiled all the documentation on Germany except for that on the German Democratic Republic which was compiled by David M. Baehler. John A. Bernbaum compiled the documentation on Austria.

Vicki E. Futscher and Rita M. Baker of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief) performed the technical editing. The index was prepared by the Twin Oaks Indexing Collective.

WILLIAM Z. SLANY
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Editor's Note—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AC, Allied Council for Austria
ACA, Allied Control Authority
ACC, Allied Control Council for Germany
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
ADN, *Allegemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst* (General German News Service in the Soviet Zone of Germany)
AFP, *Agence France Presse* (French Press Agency)
AGSec, Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany
AHC, Allied High Commission for Germany
AK, Allied Kommandatura for Berlin
ALCO, Allied Commission for Austria
AP, Associated Press
AR, annual review
AS, Austrian Schilling
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BHE, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (League of Expellees and Disfranchised)
BN, series indicator for telegrams sent from Berlin by military channels
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
B/P, balance of payments
Bud Bur, Bureau of the Budget
C, Counselor of the Department of State
ca, circular airgram
CA, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
CC, Control Commission (Council)
Cdt, commandant
CDU, *Christlich-Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)
CE, Council of Europe
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CG, Commanding General
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, United States Army in Europe
COCOM, coordinating committee
Coled, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community
Cominform, Communist Information Bureau
C/P, counterpart
CPR, Chinese People's Republic
CRALOG, Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany
CSC, Coal and Steel Community
CSU, *Christlich-Soziale Union* (Christian Social Union)
DA, Department of the Army
DAD, Department of the Army detachment
DDR, Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)
DDSG, *Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft* (Danube Shipping Company)
Deptel, Department of State telegram
Deutschland Vertrag, German Treaty, popular name for the Convention on General Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany
DF, direction finder
DFD, *Dienst für Deutschland* (Service for Germany, a German youth service organization)
DGB, *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (German Federation of Trade Unions)
DIA, East German Interzonal and Foreign Trade Organization

DKV, *Deutsche Kohleverein* (German Central Coal Sales Agency)
DM, *Deutschemark*
DP, *Deutsche Partei* (German Party)
DP, displaced persons
DPA, *Deutsche Presse Agentur* (German Press Agency)
DRS, Division of Research for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Department of State
DS, Division of Protective Services, Department of State
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
E, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EAD, Eastern Affairs Division, Department of State
EB TCC, Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee
EC, executive committee
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
EDC, European Defense Community
Edcol, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community
EDF, European Defense Force
EDS, Economic Defense Staff, Department of State
EDT, eastern daylight time
EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Emdes, Embassy despatch
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EPC, European Political Community
EPU, European Payments Union
ERP, European Recovery Program
EUCOM, European Command, United States Army
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
E–W, East-West
FDGB, *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (Free German Trade Union League)
FDJ, *Freie Demokratische Jugend* (Free Democratic Youth)
FDP, *Freie Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party)
FE, Far East
FedRep, Federal Republic of Germany
FinMin, Finance Minister
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FonAff, Foreign Affairs
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
ForMin, Foreign Minister
FSO, Foreign Service officer
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Deputy Under Secretary of State
G–3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
GAI, Office of German Public Affairs, Department of State
GARIOA, Government Assistance and Relief in Occupied Areas
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDB, *Gesamtdeutscher Block* (All-German Bloc)
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GEA, Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State
GER, Bureau (from 1953, Office) of German Affairs, Department of State
GFR, German Federal Republic
GFY, German fiscal year
GNP, gross national product
GOAG, Government Operations and Administration in Germany
GPA, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State
H, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HICOG, United States High Commission(er) for Germany
HICOM, High Commission(er)
HMG, Her (His) Majesty's Government
HQ, headquarters
HVA, *Hauptverwaltung für Ausbildung* (Main Administration for Training)
IAW, in accordance with
IBS/NY, International Broadcasting Service (at New York), United States International Information Administration, Department of State
IPC, Information Projects Committee
IZT, interzonal trade
JAMAG, Joint American Military Advisory Group
JC, Joint Chiefs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JEIA, Joint Export-Import Agency
JIC, Joint Intelligence Committee
KPD, *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany)

KVP, *Kasernierte Volkspolizei* (People's Garrison Police)

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/E, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

L/GER, Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State

LDP, *Liberal-Demokratische Partei* (Liberal Democratic Party)

LOC, line of communication

MAAC, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee

Macto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States delegation at the Tripartite Working Group

MC, military committee

MDA(P), Mutual Defense Assistance (Program)

MID, Military Intelligence Division

MN, Monetary Affairs Staff, Department of State

MSA, Mutual Security Agency (Act, assistance)

MSA/W, Mutual Security Agency/Washington

MSB, Military Security Board

Musto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mutual Security Agency in Washington to its missions abroad

NA, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

NAC, National Advisory Council

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)

niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night

NNRC, Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

Noforn, no foreign nationals (distribution)

NRW, *Nordrhein-Westfalen* (North Rhine-Westphalia)

NSC, National Security Council

NSRB, National Security Resources Board

NWDR, *Nordwest Deutsche Rundfunk* (Northwest German Radio)

OC, occupation costs

OCB, Operations Coordinating Board

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSP, offshore procurement

ourtel, our telegram

OVP, *Österreichische Volkspartei* (Austrian People's Party)

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

PA, public affairs

PAD, Public Affairs Division

PAO, Public Affairs Officer

PB, planning board

PC, participating country; political conference

PEPCO, Political and Economic Projects Committee, HICOG

Pol, Poland

Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

PP, People's Party

presstel, press telegram

PSA, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

PSB, Psychological Strategy Board

PTS, proposed talks with the Soviets

PUB:PS, Policy Staff of the Office of Public Affairs, HICOG

R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State

RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State

RAF, Royal Air Force

R and O, rights and obligations

reftel, reference telegram

reurtel, regarding your telegram

RIAS, *Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor* (United States Radio in the American Sector of Berlin)

RO, regional office(r)

ROK, Republic of Korea

S, Secretary of State

S/A, Ambassador at Large, Department of State

S/AE, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

SC, Security Council of the United Nations

Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences

SED, *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party), the Communist Party in East Germany

SG, standing group

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe

SP, Socialist Party

SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Social Democratic Party)

SRE, Special Representative in Europe

SRP, *Sozialistische Reichspartei* (Socialist Reich Party)

SSD, *Staatssicherheitsdienst* (State Security Service)

TCC, Temporary Council Committee

TDY, temporary duty

Tedul, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington

Telac, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington

TNC, Tripartite Naval Committee

TO/E (TO and E), Table of Organization and Equipment

Tomac, series indicator for telegrams to the United States delegation at the Tripartite Working Group

Tomus, series indicator for telegrams to the Mutual Security Agency

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences

Tousfo, series indicator for telegrams and airgrams to the Foreign Operations Administration

TRUST, United States troops in Trieste

U, Under Secretary of State

UN, United Nations

UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State

UNC, United Nations Command

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

unn, unnumbered

UNO, United Nations Organization

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

URAS, *Union des Republicains d'action Sociale*, French political party

urtel, your telegram

USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe

USCOA, United States Command, Austria

USCOB, United States Command (Commander, Commandant), Berlin

USDel, United States delegate (delegation)

USFA, United States Forces in Austria

Usfoto, series indicator for telegrams and airgrams from the Foreign Operations Administration

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIA, *Upravleniye Sovetskogo Imushchestva v Avstrii* (Administration for Soviet Property in Austria)

USPolAd, United States Political Adviser

USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VDU, *Verband der Unabhängigen* (League of Independents)

VFC, Volunteer Freedom Corps

VOA, Voice of America

Vopo, *Volkspolizei* (People's Police)

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State

WG, working group

LIST OF PERSONS

Editor's Note—The identification of the persons in this list is generally limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. Historical personages alluded to, officials noted in documents but not actively participating in substantive discussions, and individuals only mentioned in passing are not identified here. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary. Where no dates are given, the official held the position throughout the period covered by this volume. Many of the participants in the Berlin Conference are not identified here, but an extensive listing of the four delegations is printed on pages 806–809.

Achenback, Ernst, Free Democrat member of the Nordrhein-Westfalen *Landtag*.

Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State until January 1953.

Achilles, Theodore C., Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council; Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France from April 1952; Chief of Mission from September 1952; Minister of Embassy in France from October 1954.

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and, from March 1951, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Aldrich, Winthrop W., Ambassador in the United Kindgom, from February 1953.

Allen, Edgar P., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

Allen, Ward P., Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs and International Relations Officer in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Alphand, Herve, French Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council until September 1954.

Anderson, Frederick L., Deputy Special Representative in Europe at Paris from March 1952.

Anderson, Robert, Deputy Secretary of Defense from April 1954.

Anspacher, John N., staff member of the Psychological Strategy Board until 1953; thereafter Chief of the Policy Staff, HICOG.

Appling, Hugh G., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from August 1953.

Armstrong, W. Park Jr., Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State.

Arnold, Lieutenant General William H., Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in Austria, from 1953.

Attlee, Clement R., former British Prime Minister and Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition.

Auchincloss, John W., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until June 1953; thereafter International Relations Officer, Office of German Affairs.

Ausland, John C., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until 1953; thereafter Office of German Affairs.

Barbour, Walworth, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until May 1954; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Barnard, John L., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until November 1952; thereafter Assistant United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs.

Barnes, Nathan S., Chief of the Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, until January 1955.

Bathurst, Maurice E., Legal Adviser to the British High Commissioner for Germany, 1952.

Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until October 1952.

Beam, Jacob D., Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union from November 1952; member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from June 1953.

Begougne de Juniac, Gontran, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until 1955.

Bérard, Armand, French Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.

Bidault, Georges P., French Minister of National Defense until March 1952; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, 1952; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January–June 1954.

Binns, Brigadier General John J., EUCOM Representative for discussions with the Federal Republic of Germany concerning contractual relations, 1952.

Bischoff, Norbert, Austrian Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Blank, Theodor, unofficial personal adviser to Chancellor Adenauer; *Rapporteur* for the Federal Republic of Germany for talks with the Allied High Commission regarding a German financial contribution to Western defense.

Blankenhorn, Herbert A.H., Director of the Political Affairs Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany from March 1951; member of the German Steering Committee on Contractual Relations, 1952.

Bluecher, Franz, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Minister for Economic Cooperation.

Boeker, Alexander, official in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Bohlen, Charles E. (Chip), Counselor of the Department of State until March 1953; thereafter Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Bonbright, James C.H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Permanent Representative in Europe at Paris.

Bonsal, Philip W., Counselor of Embassy in France until 1952.

Bowie, Robert R., Chief of the Office of the General Counsel, HICOG, until May 1953; thereafter Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 1953.

Brentano, Heinrich von, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union faction in the Bundestag; also Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community and Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Brosio, Manlio, Italian Ambassador in the United Kingdom from March 1952.

Browne, Mallory, staff member of the Psychological Strategy Board from 1952.

Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador in France until March 1952; Under Secretary of State, April 1952–January 1953; consultant to the Secretary of State until February 1953; thereafter Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community and Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community.

Burgess, W. Randolph, Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury from January 1953; Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs from August 1954.

Burin des Roziers, Étienne, Technical Counselor in the Cabinet of the French Prime Minister, January–June 1953.

Byington, Homer M., Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1953; thereafter Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

Byroade, Henry A., Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, until April 1952.

Caccia, Sir Harold A., British High Commissioner for Austria until February 1954; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Calhoun, John A. (Arch), Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until December 1952.

Carlson, Delmar R., Office of German Affairs, Department of State, from May 1953.

Cherne, Leo, Chairman of International Rescue.

Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China.

Chuikov, General of the Army Vasiliy Ivanovich, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany and Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission until June 1953.

Churchill, Winston S. (Sir Winston from April 24, 1953), British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.

Coleman, Major General C. F., British Commandant for Berlin.

Collins, Varnum L., Jr., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until June 1954.

Conant, James P., former President of Harvard University; United States High Commissioner for Germany from February 1953.

Connors, W. Bradley, Assistant Administrator of the Office of Plans and Policy, United States Information Agency, until 1953.

Cox, Henry B., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until August 1952.

Crouy-Chanel, Étienne de, French Minister in the United Kingdom.

Cutler, Robert, Administrative Assistant to President Eisenhower from January 1953; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from March 1953.

Dalton, Hugh, Labour Party member of the British Parliament.

Daridan, Jean, First Counselor in the French Embassy in the United States until 1954.

Davies, John P., Jr., Director of the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG, in 1952.

Dawson, Laurence A., Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Department of State, until July 1953; thereafter Chief of the Escapee Program.

Dayton, Kenneth, Deputy Director of the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG, 1952.

de Beaumarchais. *See* Delarue Caron de Beaumarchais.

De Gasperi, Alcide, Italian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs until August 1953.

de Guiringard. *See* Guiringard.

Dehler, Thomas, Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany and, from October 1953, Chairman of the Free Democratic Party.

de Juniac. *See* Begougne de Juniac.

Delarue Caron de Beaumarchais, Jacques, Officer in Charge of Saar Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, from 1952.

de Margerie. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.

del Balzo, Giulio, Director General of Foreign Policy, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1952–November 1954.

Dengin, Major General Segei Alexeyevich, Soviet Commandant for Berlin, until June 1953.

Dertinger, Georg, Foreign Minister of the German Democratic Republic until January 1953.

Dibelius, Otto F.K., Bishop of the Evangelical Church of Germany, Berlin-Brandenburg Diocese.

Dibrova, Major General P.A., Soviet Commandant for Berlin from June 1953.

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador in France from March 1953.

Dixon, Sir Pierson J., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission.

Donnelly, Walter J.; United States High Commissioner for Austria until July 1952; United States High Commissioner for Germany, July 1952–January 1953;

Dowling, Walter C. (Red), United States Deputy High Commissioner for Austria until June 1953; thereafter United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.

Draper, William H., Jr., Special Representative in Europe and Representative on the North Atlantic Council until June 1953.

Dulles, Allen, Director of Central Intelligence from January 1953.

Dulles, Eleanor L., International Relations Officer, Department of State, from December 1952; Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of German Affairs from April 1954.

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State from January 21, 1953.

Dunn, James C., Ambassador in Italy until March 1952; Ambassador in France until March 1953; thereafter Ambassador in Spain.

Eckhardt, Felix von, Chief of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Eddy, Lieutenant General Manton S., Commanding General, United States Army, Europe.

Eden, Anthony (Sir Anthony from 1954), British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Eggerath, Werner, State Secretary in the Office of the Minister-President of the German Democratic Republic and Chief of the Agency for the Coordination and Control of the Functions of the Administrative Organs of the German Democratic Republic.

Ehlers, Hermann, President of the Bundestag until October 1954.

Eichler, Willi G., member of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and Bundestag member until September 1953.

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until May 1952; President of the United States from January 20, 1953.

Eisler, Gerhart, Chief of the Information Office of the German Democratic Republic.

Elbrick, Charles B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from December 1953.

Elfes, Wilhelm, Chairman of the "German Assembly".

Erhard, Ludwig, Minister for Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Erler, Fritz K.G., member of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and Bundestag member.

Fechteler, Rear Admiral William M., United States Chief of Naval Operations until August 1953; thereafter Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

Federer, Julius, Justice on the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ferguson, John H., Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 1953.

Figl, Leopold, Austrian Chancellor until April 1953, from November 1953 Foreign Minister.

François-Poncet, André, French High Commissioner for Germany.

Franks, Sir Oliver S., British Ambassador in the United States until February 1953.

Frechtling, Louis E., Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs from June 1952.

Freund, Richard B., Officer in Charge of Italian and Austrian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from November 1953.

Friedenau, Thee, Chairman of the Committee of Free Jurists.

Fuller, Leon W., Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from June 1952; member of the Policy Planning Staff from September 1954.

Gerstenmaier, Eugen, Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee and Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Gifford, Walter S., Ambassador in the United Kingdom until 1953.

Goes van Naters, Marinus van der, Dutch Labor Parliamentarian and Council of Europe *Rapporteur* on the Plan for the Europeanization of the Saar.

Graf, Ferdinand, State Secretary in the Austrian Ministry of the Interior.

Grandval, Gilbert, French High Commissioner to the Saar until January 1952; thereafter Ambassador to the Saar.

Grewe, Wilhelm, Head of the Office for Changing the Occupation Statute through Contractual Relations, Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Grotewohl, Otto, Minister-President of the German Democratic Republic and Co-chairman of the Socialist Unity Party.

Gruber, Karl, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs until November 1953; from March 1954 Ambassador in the United States.

Gruenther, Lieutenant General Alfred M., Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe until July 1953; thereafter Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Guiringard, Louis de, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, French Foreign Ministry, until June 1952.

Hadsel, Fred L., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until 1953.

Hallstein, Walter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Harriman, W. Averell, Director for Mutual Security until January 1953, also Chairman of Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until January 1952.

Harris, Michael S., *Rapporteur* for the Allied High Commission in negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany for a German contribution to Western defense, also Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in Germany and Director of the Office of Economic Affairs, HICOG.

Harrison, Geoffrey W., British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Harvey, William K., Chief of the Department of the Army Detachment, Berlin.

Hay, John, Foreign Affairs Specialist in the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until March 1954; thereafter Political Officer at Bonn.

Hedtoft, Hans, Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic Party.

Heine, Friedrich, Press Chief of the German Social Democratic Party.

Heinemann, Gustav, former Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany and cofounder of the Society for the Peace of Europe.

Herrnstadt, Rudolf, former editor of *Neues Deutschlands* and member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party until July 1953.

Hertz, Paul, Berlin Senator for the Marshall Plan and Credits until October 1953.

Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Hans-Heinrich, Chief of Protocol of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Heusinger, Lieutenant General Adolf E., Military Adviser to Chancellor Adenauer.

Heuss, Theodor, President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Hickerson, John D., Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs.

Hillenbrand, Martin J., Officer in Charge of Government and Administration in the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until September 1952; thereafter Economic Officer at the Embassy in France.

Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Hoffman, Johannes, Minister-President of the Saar.

Holmes, Julius C., Minister in the United Kingdom until December 1953.

Honnen, Major General George, United States Commandant for Berlin from August 1954.

Hoppenot, Henri, French Permanent Representative at the United Nations Security Council.

Hughes, John C., United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from June 1953.

Hulick, Charles E., Chief of the Political Division, Eastern Element, HICOG, Berlin, until July 1953; Political Officer at Berlin until March 1954; thereafter Office of the Operation Coordinator, Department of State.

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 1953.

Ilichev (Ilychev, Ilyetschev), Ivan Ivanovich, Soviet Ambassador in the German Democratic Republic until June 1953; thereafter Soviet High Commissioner for Austria.

Jackson, C.D., Special Assistant to President Eisenhower until March 1954.

Jacquin de Margerie, Christian, French Political Counselor at Berlin from 1953

Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Jebb, Sir Hubert M.G., British Ambassador in France from April 1954.

Jessup, Philip C., Ambassador at Large, 1952.

John, Otto, Head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the Federal Republic of Germany until July 1954.

Jones, John E., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from November 1953.

Jones, Judson C., Chief of Finance in the Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State, until 1953; thereafter Financial Expert in the Office of German Affairs.

Kaiser, Jakob, Minister for All-German Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Kamitz, Reinhard, Austrian Minister of Finance from 1952.

Kellermann, Henry J., Director of the Office of German and Austrian Public Affairs, Department of State, until 1953; Public Affairs Adviser, Office of German Affairs, from November 1953.

Kennan, George F., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, May–September 1952.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1953.

Kidd, Coburn B., Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from June 1952; Officer in Charge of German Affairs, Office of German Affairs, from September 1954.

Kilb, Hans, Personal Assistant to Chancellor Adenauer.

Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone A., British High Commissioner for Germany, until November 1953; thereafter Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from November 1952; thereafter Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat.

Knight, Ridgway B., Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until August 1953; Acting Director until January 1954; thereafter Deputy Assistant High Commissioner for Germany.

Kraft, Waldemar E., Minister of Commercial Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany from September 1953.

Kreisky, Bruno, Secretary of State in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1953.

Krekeler, Heinz H.L., Head of the Federal Republic of Germany Diplomatic Mission in the United States until 1953; thereafter Ambassador in the United States.

Kyes, Roger M., Deputy Secretary of Defense, February 1953–May 1954.

Laniel, Joseph, French Prime Minister, June 1953–June 1954.

La Tournelle. *See* Le Roy de la Tournelle.

Laukhuff, Perry, Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until July 1952; Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs until fall 1953.

Lehr, Robert, Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany until September 1953.

Leishman, Frederick J., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from September 1953.

Lemmer, Ernst, Editor of the Berlin *Kurier* and Chief of the Christian Democrat faction in the Berlin Assembly.

Lenz, Otto, Christian Democrat Member of the Bundestag and, from September 1953, State Secretary in the Federal Chancellery.

Le Roy de la Tournelle, Guy, Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry.

Leroy-Beaulieu, Michel, Economic Adviser to the French High Commissioner for Germany.

Letourneau, Jean, French High Commissioner for Indochina from April 1952; Minister for Relations with the Associated States, January–May 1953.

Lewis, Geoffrey W., Deputy Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State until October 1953; Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs until February 1954; thereafter Deputy Director.

Linder, Harold F., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, December 1952–May 1953.

Linse, Walter, Economic Expert on the Committee of Free Jurists.

Lloyd, John Selwyn (Brooke), British Minister of State; Minister of Trade from October 1954.

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., Ambassador to the United Nations, from January 1953.

Loewenthal, Max, Austrian Ambassador in the United States until March 1954.

Lovett, Robert A., Secretary of Defense until January 1953.

Luebke, Heinrich, Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag and, from October 1953, Minister for Food, Agriculture, and Forestry of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Lukaschek, Hans, Minister for Refugees of the Federal Republic of Germany until September 1953.

Lyon, Cecil B., Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG, until the end of 1953; Director of the Office of German Affairs from February 1954.

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Counselor of Embassy in France and Adviser on International Affairs to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe until October 1952; Counselor of the Department of State from March 1953.

Macmillan, Harold, British Minister of Housing and Local Government until October 1953; thereafter Minister of Defense.

Maier, Rheinhold, Free Democrat member of the Bundesrat until September 1953; thereafter member of the Bundestag.

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until December 1952; Ambassador in the United States from January 1953.

Malenkov, Georgiyi Maksimilianovich, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers until March 1953; Chairman of the Council of Ministers until 1955; member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1953.

Malik, Yakov Aleksandrovich, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister until March 1953; thereafter Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

Mallet, Sir Victor A.L., British Ambassador in Yugoslavia.

Maltzan, Freiherr Vollrath von, Head of the Economic Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Margolies, Daniel F., Director of the Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State until 1953; Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of German Affairs from November 1953.

Markgraf, Paul, Officer in Charge of Highway and Bridge Security in the Ministry of Transportation of the German Democratic Republic from May 1952.

Martin, Edward M., Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State until September 1952; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until June 1953; thereafter Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Massigli, René, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

Matern, Hermann, Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party Central Control Commission and member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party.

Mathewson, Major General Lemuel A., United States Commandant for Berlin until December 1952.

Matthews, H. Freeman (Doc), Deputy Under Secretary of State until September 1953; thereafter Ambassador in the Netherlands.

Mautner, Karl F., HICOG Liaison Officer with the Berlin City Government.

Mayer, René, French Prime Minister, January–June 1953.

Maynard, David M., Deputy Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG, and Director of the Mutual Security Agency Mission at Berlin until January 1954.

McBride, Robert H., Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs in the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1954.

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from January 1953.

McCloy, John J., United States High Commissioner for Germany until July 1952.

McDermott, Michael J., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations until December 1952.

McElhiney, Thomas W., Chief of the Economic Bureau of the Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, from April 1952.

McFall, Jack K., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until September 1952; Minister in Finland until May 1953; thereafter Ambassador in Finland.

McWilliams, William J., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until August 1953.

Mellies, Wilhelm, Social Democrat member of the Bundestag; and, from September 1952, Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Party.

Merchant, Livingston T., Deputy Special Representative in Europe at Paris from March 1952; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from March 1953.

Markatz, Hans Joachim von, German Party member of the Bundestag and State Secretary in the Federal Republic of Germany Ministry for Bundesrat Affairs.

Millar, Sir Frederick R. Hoyer, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council until September 1953; thereafter British High Commissioner for Germany.

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 1953.

Montenegro, Daniel W., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, until January 1954.

Morgan, George A., Acting Director of the Psychological Strategy Board from January 1953.

Morris, Brewster H., Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from July 1952; Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, November 1953–June 1954.

Muehlenfeld, Hans, German Party member of the Bundestag until September 1953.

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from December 1953.

Nash, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 1954.

Nes, David G., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until December 1953.

Niemoller, Martin, Pastor of the Evangelical Church of Germany.

Niklas, Wilhelm, Minister for Food, Agriculture, and Forestry of the Federal Republic of Germany until September 1952.

Nitze, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until April 1953.

Nolting, Frederick R., Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs from August 1953; Special Assistant from January 1954.

Nuschke, Otto, Deputy Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.

Nutting, (Harold) Anthony, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1953; thereafter Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

O'Connor, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State from January 1953–February 1954; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

Ohly, John H., Deputy Director for Program Coordination in the Mutual Security Agency from March 1953; Deputy Director for Programs and Planning in the Foreign Operations Administration from October 1953.

Ollenhauer, Erich, Social Democrat member of the Bundestag and, from September 1952, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party.

O'Neill, Con Douglas W., First Secretary and Political Director in the Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany, 1952.

O'Shaughnessy, Elim, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union until June 1954.

Pabsch, Anton F., Political Affairs Officer in the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG, in 1953.

Page, Edward, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in France from June 1953.

Parkman, Henry, Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG, from January 1954.

Parodi, Alexandre, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry.

Parsons, James G., Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until May 1952.

Pauls, August, Assistant to State Secretary Hallstein.

Payart, Jean, French High Commissioner for Austria.

Pella, Giuseppe, Italian Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Budget, August 1953–January 1954.

Perkins, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until January 1953.

Pferdmenges, Robert, Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag.

Pfleiderer, Karl G., Free Democrat member of the Bundestag.

Phillips, Joseph B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until October 1952; Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, HICOG, until June 1954; thereafter Director of the Office of Public Affairs.

Pieck, Wilhelm, President of the German Democratic Republic.

Popper, David H., Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State, until October 1954; thereafter Director.

Preusker, Viktor-Emanuel, Free Democrat member of the Bundestag and from October 1953, Federal Republic of Germany Minister of Housing Construction.

Pushkin, Georgiyi Maksimovich, Soviet High Commissioner for Germany and Ambassador in the German Democratic Republic, 1954.

Raab, Julius, Chancellor of Austria from April 1953.

Rau, Heinrich, Deputy Premier of the German Democratic Republic and member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party.

Raymond, John M., Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State.

Reber, Samuel Jr., Director of Political Affairs in the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG, until July 1953.

Reilly, D'Arcy Patrick, British Minister in France from June 1953.

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Counselor of Embassy in France.

Reinstein, Jacques J., Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, until November 1953; thereafter Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Reuter, Ernst, Lord Mayor of West Berlin until September 1953.

Riddleberger, James W., Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, May 1952–July 1953.

Ridgway, General of the Army Matthew B., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, June 1952–May 1953; thereafter Chief of Staff, United States Army.

Ridsdale, William, Head of the News Department in the British Foreign Office until 1954.

Roberts, Frank K. (from June 1953, Sir Frank), British Under Secretary of State until November 1952; thereafter British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Commission.

Rodionov, Georgiyi, First Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom in 1954.

Rose, Edward M., Political Officer in the Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany.

Ruchti, James R., Political Officer in the Berlin Element, HICOG, from May 1952.

Rumbold, Horace A. C. (from June 1953, Sir Horace), Counselor of the British Embassy in France until May 1954; thereafter Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Rummler, Gerald, Press Officer in the Foreign Ministry of the German Democratic Republic until April 1952.

Rutter, Peter, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until November 1953.

Salisbury, Lord (Robert A.J.G. Cecil), Acting British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June-October 1953.

Sandifer, Durward V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs until February 1954.

Sauvagnargues, Jean, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry until May 1952; thereafter Counselor for Foreign Affairs.

Schaefer, Hermann R., Free Democrat member and Vice President of the Bundestag until September 1953; thereafter Minister for Special Tasks of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Schaeffer, Fritz, Minister of Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Schaerf, Adolf, Vice Chancellor of Austria.

Schirdewan, Karl, member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party from July 1953.

Schoener, Josef, Director of the Political Department in the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Head of the unofficial Austrian Delegation to the Berlin Conference.

Schreiber, Walter C.R., Deputy Mayor of West Berlin until September 1953; thereafter, Mayor.

Schroeder, Gerhard, Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag and, from October 1953, Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Schumacher, Kurt, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party until August 1952.

Schuman, Robert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until January 1953.

Schumann, Maurice, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until June 1954.

Schwartz, Harry H., Office of the Counselor of the Department of State until May 1953.

Seebohm, Hans-Christoph, German Party member of the Bundestag and Minister for Communications of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Selbmann, Fritz, member of the Central Committee of the German Democratic Republic and Minister for Mines until 1953; for Heavy Industry, 1953-1954.

Semichastnov, Ivan F., First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany, 1952.

Semyonov, Vladimir Semyonovich, Political Adviser to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany until June 1953; Soviet High Commissioner for Germany until July 1954.

Seydoux de Clausonne, François, Head of the European Affairs Section of the French Foreign Ministry.

Shuckburgh, Charles A.E., Private Secretary to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden until May 1954; thereafter British Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Smith, Walter Bedell, Director of Central Intelligence until February 1953; Under Secretary of State until October 1954.

Staats, Elmer B., Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board from September 1953.

Stassen, Harold E., Director for Mutual Security from January 1953; Director of Foreign Operations from August 1953.

Steere, Loyd V., Director of the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG, May 1953–May 1954.

Stein, Eric, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State.

Steinhoff, Karl, Minister of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic until May 1952.

Stikker, Dirk U., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs until September 1952.

Stoph, Willi, Minister of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic from May 1952 and member of the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party.

Straus, Richard, Office of German Public Affairs, Department of State, until November 1953; thereafter Acting Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of German Affairs.

Strauss, Franz-Josef, Christian Social member of the Bundestag and, from October 1953, Minister for Special Tasks of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Strauss, Admiral Lewis L., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from June 1953.

Suhr, Otto, President of the Berlin House of Representatives.

Susin, A.F., Deputy Berlin Representative of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany in 1952.

Sviridov, Colonel General Vladimir Petrovich, Soviet High Commissioner for Austria and Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Occupation Forces in Austria until June 1953.

Taylor, Edmond L., Office of Plans and Policy, Psychological Strategy Board, until September 1953.

Teitgen, Pierre Henri, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, June 1953–June 1954.

Thedieck, Franz, State Secretary in the Ministry for All-German Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Thompson, Llewellyn E., United States High Commissioner for Austria from September 1952.

Thorp, Willard L., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until November 1952.

Thurston, Ray L., Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until May 1954; thereafter Director.

Tillmanns, Robert, Christian Democrat member of the Bundestag and, from October 1953, Minister without Portfolio of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Timberman, Major General Thomas B., United States Commandant for Berlin, January 1953–July 1954.

Tomlinson, William M., Finance and Economic Adviser at the Embassy in France until August 1952; thereafter Deputy Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

Trevelyan, Humphrey, Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany until 1953.

Trueheart, William C., Intelligence Staff Officer in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence until August 1954.

Truman, Harry S., President of the United States until January 20, 1953.

Twining, Lieutenant General Nathan F., Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, until 1953.

Tyler, William R., Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from March 1954.

Ulbricht, Walter, Deputy Minister President of the German Democratic Republic and Deputy Chairman and member of the Politburo and Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party.

Van Naters. *See* Goes van Naters.

Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuaryevich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs until March 1953.

Ward, John G., British Deputy High Commissioner for Germany, until June 1954; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Wehner, Herbert, Chairman of the Bundestag Committee on All-German Affairs.

Wellington, Rebecca G., Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Berlin Element, HICOG, until February 1952; thereafter Attaché at the Embassy in France.

Williamson, Francis T., Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until July 1952; Director of the Planning Staff of the Office of Western European Affairs until January 1953; thereafter Counselor of Embassy in Italy.

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense from January 1953.

Winterton, Major General Sir John, British Military Governor and Commander of the Free Territory of Trieste until October 1954.

Wolf, Joesph J., Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, from July 1952; Special Adviser for North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs from July 1954.

Wollweber, Ernst, Chief of State Security in the German Democratic Republic.

Wooldridge, Rear Admiral Edmund T., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy.

Yost, Charles W., United States Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, August 1953–August 1954.

Zaisser, Wilhelm, Minister of State Security in the German Democratic Republic and member of the Politburo and Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party until July 1953.

LIST OF SHORT TITLES

Acheson, *Present at the Creation:* Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York: W.W. Norton Company, Inc., 1969.

Adenauer, *Erinnerungen:* Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1953-1955*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlangs-Anstalt, 1968.

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AFP: United States Department of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, 2 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957.

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Cmd. 8571: *Conventions between the Governments of the United States of America, the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the one part and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other with accompanying instruments, Bonn, 26th May, 1952, Germany No. 6 (1952)*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, May 1952, Cmd. 8571.

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Souveranität der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik am 25 Marz 1954. Berlin: Rutten & Loening, 1957.

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Schaerf, *Österreichs Erneuerung 1945–1955:* Adolf Schaerf, *Österreichs Erneuerung 1945–1955. Das Erste Jahrzehnt Zweiten Republik,* Vienna: Verlag de Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1955.

Senate Q and R: United States Senate, 82d Senate, 2d Session, Executives Q and R, *Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952 and a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Paris on May 27, 1952,* Washington: Government Printing Office, June 2, 1952.

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Ulbricht, *Zu Fragen der Parteiarbeit:* Walter Ulbricht, *Zu Fragen der Parteiarbeit,* Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1960.

LIST OF SOURCES

ALCO Records, Lot 62 F 9

Consolidated collection of official records of the Allied Commission for Austria (ALCO) for the years 1945–1955, as maintained by the Embassy in Vienna. (96 ft.)

Bonn Embassy Files, Lots 57 F 24 and 58 M 27 (311)

The "McCloy Project": Files of the United States High Commissioner for Germany for the years 1949–1952, as a subsequently maintained as a segment of the files of the Embassy at Bonn.

CFM Files, Lot M-88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancilliary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the German and Austrian peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. (254 ft.)

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documents on certain official visits of heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (13 ft.)

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documents on certain official visits of heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences for the period 1953–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. This file is a continuation of Lot 59 D 95. (25 ft.)

EUR Files, Lot 59 D 233

Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945–1957. (6 ft.)

GER Files, Lot 57 D 344

Top secret control file of the Office of German Affairs for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Office of German Affairs. (1⅓ ft.)

MSA-FOA Telegram Files, Lots W 130 and W 131

Serial telegram files of incoming and outgoing MSA and FOA cables for the period January 1953–June 1954, as maintained by the Administrative Services Division of the MSA and FOA and subsequently retired by FOA. These files, which are presently administered by the Agency for International Development, are a part of Federal Records Center Accession No. 55 A 374. (30 ft.)

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (17 ft.)

PPS files, Lots 64 D 563

Master files of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1947–1953. (42 ft.)

PPS files, Lots 65 D 101

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1954. (8 ft.)

PSB Files, Lot 62 D 333

Master file of minutes and papers of the Psychological Strategy Board for the years 1951–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 ft.)

Secretary's Letters, Lot 56 D 459

Correspondence of the Secretary of State for the years 1945–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (5/12 ft.)

Secretary's Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444

Comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda, memoranda of conversations, and memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (15 ft.)

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (7 ft.)

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949–1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State for the years 1951–1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (1 ft.)

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (20 ft.)

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 ft.)

Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States for the years 1953-1961. This collection, which was maintained by Ann Whitman and has subsequently been called the "Whitman Files," has several major parts, including the National Security Council file, the International Meeting file, and the International file.

Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Papers of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State for the years 1953-1959. Also included are materials for the year 1951-1952 when he acted as a consultant to Secretary of State Acheson. This material is divided into folders covering various topics in international affairs.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

I. PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN TRIPARTITE AND QUADRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS ON ESTABLISHING CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY [1]

A. DISCUSSIONS LEADING TO THE SIGNATURE OF THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS, JANUARY–MAY 1952

No. 1

Editorial Note

The documentation that follows presents the major lines of United States policy regarding the negotiations which led to the signature of the contractual agreements at Bonn on May 26, 1952. Because of the extensive amount of materials in Department of State files on contractual relations, the editors have been constrained to limit their presentation to the most important documents reflecting the interest of the United States in these negotiations. At the same time that the talks on contractual relations were proceeding in Bonn, negotiations were also taking place at Paris on the treaty for a European Defense Community, and the compilation on these negotiations in volume V should be read in this connection since the two issues were considered as parts of a whole European security arrangement.

The largest collection of materials on contractual relations in Department of State files for 1952 is in CFM files, lot M–88, boxes 161–162 and 184–195. The first two boxes contain extensive records dealing with the signing ceremonies and the meetings of the Foreign Ministers at Bonn in May 1952. The remaining twelve boxes present papers and documents arranged topically on the various conventions comprising the contractuals, subtopics within the several conventions, and telegrams related to the negotiations on the contractuals. These records include collections of the drafts of various proposals, summaries of meetings during the negotiations, and ancillary correspondence pertaining to the negotiations. Supplementing the CFM files are files 662A.00 and 762A.0221, which have extensive records dealing with contractual relations, but which are not arranged according to topic or convention as are the files in lot M-88.

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1583 ff.

In 1953 the Historical Division of the Executive Secretariat of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany prepared a "History of the Negotiations of the Contractual Agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany". A copy of this 451-page study, which considered the contractuals both chronologically and topically, is in file 662A.00/12-3153.

No. 2

662A.00/1-352

Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 5, 1952.

Subject: Current Status of Negotiations for Contractual Relationship with Germany

The attached telegram was received today from Mr. McCloy. It contains an account of progress in the negotiations for the contractual arrangements with the Federal Republic (No. 943, January 3 from Bonn[2]). The message is long and detailed, but I think the following points will be of interest to you:

Mr. McCloy offers a "reasonable hope" that, with the possible exception of some portions of the Agreement on Financial Contribution, the remaining conventions can be finished in time for the next NATO meeting.[3] The Germans are anxious to complete the agreements by that date, but the British appear to have lost some of their sense of urgency, and Mr. McCloy suggests that it might be helpful to ask Mr. Churchill to instruct the British High Commissioner to press ahead all along the line.

Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal. The latest draft shows substantial Allied-German agreement on all except a few issues. There is no indication that these will present any exceptional difficulty.

Agreement on Acts and Interests of the Three Powers. This agreement covers a number of unrelated subjects, some of which have nearly been completed and some of which require further negotiation. The greatest difficulties with the Germans are in the fields of deconcentration, composition of the supreme restitution court, reparation, and foreign interests. It is, however, the American opinion that the entire agreement can be completed by the end of this month; the British and French informally estimate that completion is possible by February 10.

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[1] The source text bears the handwritten notation "Sec saw".

[2] No copy of telegram 943 was found attached to the source text; however telegram 943 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1614.

[3] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February 1952, see vol. V, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.

Agreement on Status of Forces. The greater part of this agreement (quantitatively speaking) has been settled, but several major questions are still outstanding; one of these is the status of dependents, with special reference to their subjection to German criminal jurisdiction. Mr. McCloy believes the core of controversial issues will be ready for direct discussion with Adenauer in the week of January 14.

Agreement on Rights of the Forces. This agreement has to do with the rights of the forces with respect to accommodations, facilities, etc. The German comments are expected today, and no particular difficulties are anticipated, with the exception of the problem of allocating radio frequencies.

Agreement on Financial Contribution. A report on this subject is expected shortly.

Security Safeguards. This subject has been discussed by Schuman and Adenauer. They have not reached a conclusion, but believe they can work out a solution which will be acceptable to them and also to the British and ourselves. According to Hallstein, the issue is largely a formal one, since the Germans do not intend to produce any of the weapons now under discussion. It is understood that the French will instruct their High Commissioner to continue the conversations with the Chancellor, keeping the British and American High Commissioners informed. Mr. McCloy proposes to encourage these discussions and intervene only at a later stage if circumstances require.

No. 3

762A.0221/1-1452: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BONN, January 14, 1952—7 p.m.

1107. Subject: Allied costs in Germany—"second year". Inform Def in accordance with FonMin Rome decision[2] convention on fin contribution will provide for FedRep continuing obligation beyond first year in respect of EDC and support Allied forces. Both UK and EUCOM skeptical as to availability local currency from Ger for support Allied forces in second year and beyond in spite of most recent TCC and Paris conf costing date for Ger forces. Data calls for costs inside Ger for Ger forces considerably less than envisaged total contribution in coming years.

We must now formulate language for the convention to cover Allied cost not only for first year but beyond. US policy must be clarified in order to be properly reflected in language adopted. We are assuming no problem with the Fr since their troop costs in Ger will presumably be satisfied through EDC and common budget, although at this stage their attitude resembles Br as described below.

Convention (protocol) can contain fixed amts for first year only, GFY 1952-53. Therefore nothing more than gen obligation obtainable for second year.

Brit attitude of concern to us. We believe US on balance shld await developments, say 6-9 months from now, before reaching judgment on desirability German support US UK forces in second year. Brit apparently plan to pad their share of fixed amt in first year and stretch expenditure of this sum well into second year. This wld prejudice if not defeat objective of getting full resource contribution in first year from Gers of amt finally agreed for total contribution. For this and other reasons believe portion Ger contribution devoted support Allied forces shld be on cash or expenditure basis with no provision at least initially for carry-over into second year. Even more compelling reason for expenditure rather than obligation basis is budgetary mechanics and resultant polit repercussions. In order for provisions for carry-over to be made FedRep budget wld have to contain much larger amt for Allied support than amt agreed to meet obligations actually falling due during initial twelve months. No amt of Allied public relations cld explain this one away. Same problem failed in negots with Germans on 1950-51 occupation cost budget.

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[1] Repeated to London for Spofford and to Paris and EUCOM.

[2] During conversations at Rome, Nov. 27-28, 1951, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to a German financial contribution to Western defense of DM 13 billion for the fiscal year 1952-1953. This amount was further discussed before the Temporary Council Committee of NATO (TCC) and at the Paris Conference of the Foreign Ministers of those countries involved in the negotiations for a European Defense Community (EDC) at the end of December.

Although US and UK military people wld prefer firm understanding on this question now, EUCOM already making nec preparation 50 budget for its troop costs in full in second year from US funds. This action precautionary only but implies EUCOM ready if necessary commence pay-as-you-go after first year if demonstrated to be in US interest, pursuant to policy enunciated in NSC 115.[3] This planning action does not abandon principle of continuing support from FedRep for nominal "out of pocket" costs such as former Reich properties (Kassenes, etc). Our main reason for recommending wait and see is desire maximize progress creation 12 Ger divisions. Much too early to judge optimum composition Ger contribution in second year with such issues as recruitment, security controls relaxation, enduse military aid, etc, in such state as to defy realistic appraisal of ultimate outcome regarding timing and degree or amount.

In absence compelling argument from Brit or instructions to contrary from Dept we will take wait and see line proposed in this cable in discussions and will formulate appropriate language therefor in convention.

McCloy

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[3] For NSC 115, see the memorandum to the President, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 849.

No. 4

662A.00/1-1652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 16, 1952—6:33 p. m.

1103. Fr Emb on Jan 14 gave Dept fol account of conversation Jan 7 between Berard and Hallstein re security safeguards.[2] Hallstein had indicated that he personally preferred including any restrictions in an agreement rather than unilateral declaration. He felt agreement wld indicate restrictions had been required by Allies and wld be easier for Chancellor politically than unilateral statement which wld open Chancellor to charge he had given undertakings for which there was no need. Hallstein felt restrictions shld be based on Germany's strategic position and shld be temporary. He did not feel agreement cld be worked out in EDC context. He asked several questions which brought out fact that proposal wld involve prohibition of gun barrels over 105 mm, propellants and civil aircraft. Hallstein offered no objection to first two. Berard told him temporary arrangement wld not be satisfactory to Fr opinion.

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[1] Drafted by Reinstein. Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] A memorandum of de Juniac's conversation with Lewis and Reinstein on Jan. 14 is in file 662A.00/1-1452.

On Jan 15 Emb conveyed to Dept FonOff view that Hallstein's attitude on agreement and absence of objection to restrictions in field of heavy equipment give promise of possibility of successful negot.[3] FonOff believed this cld be assisted by US and Brit reps at Bonn informing Gers that their Govts attach importance to solution of question in manner acceptable to Fr opinion. Emb requested Dept instruct US element to this effect.

Emb also asked what procedure US envisaged for concluding agreement. FonOff assumed matter wld eventually be dealt with on tripartite basis but that this wld be merely "formality".

Dept officers told Emb they did not feel Dept cld comply with Fr request. US had authorized Fr to say proposal was being made with US knowledge and consent. While US wld view with sympathy any arrangement which Gers and Fr cld work out, it cld not undertake to accept agreement without consideration. Account of conversation which had been recd by Dept was sketchy and covered only part of field. It was quite unclear on question of duration, on which US SecState had made proposals at Paris Mins mtg.[4] Dept officers expressed view that it wld be difficult for US reps to express opinions to Gers without resumption full tripartite conversations. They suggested Fr continue to explore question directly with Gers and keep US informed. They asked that McCloy be kept fully informed by Fr reps in Ger.

ACHESON

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[3] A memorandum of de Juniac's conversation with Lewis and Reinstein on Jan 15, to which is attached an *aide-mémoire* outlining the French position, is in file 662A.0012/1-1552.

[4] For documentation on Secretary Acheson's proposals concerning German security controls, presented at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Paris, November 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1701 ff.

No. 5

Editorial Note

On January 29 Foreign Minister Schuman sent to Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden a letter in which he stated, *inter alia,* that the Federal Republic seemed to be trying to settle both the problem of arms manufacture and the cost of maintaining Allied troops in Germany within a European framework, rather than within the contractual negotiations then being held at Bonn. Schuman continued that it was indispensable that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France should induce the Federal Republic to sign commitments in these areas which would be annexed to the general convention. For text of Schuman's letter, which deals mainly with the relationship of the EDC to contractual relations, see volume V, Part 1, page 7.

No. 6

662A.00/2-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 3, 1952—9 p.m.

4699. 1. Fol is report on tripartite meeting on Ger security controls Sat afternoon at FonMin. Parodi opened meeting with review of progress of negots between Fr and Gers on security controls agrmt. Last apparent step forward had been Berard-Hallstein conv of Jan 7 (see Deptel 4120, Jan 17 [2]). Hallstein had assented that EDC agrmt was not sufficient and that Ger declaration or Ger-Allied agrmt wld be acceptable providing that restriction be made temporary, that they be justified by exposed Ger position, and that scientific research, merchant marine and construction of civil aircraft not be restricted. Since then, further Fr approaches to FedRep have been treated evasively.

2. Parodi reiterated his govt does not feel EDC security guarantees sufficient to satisfy Fr public opinion that Ger menace will be removed. He then brought forward proposal that Ger make declaration on lines of fol Fr draft which wld be attached to contractual agrmt between FedRep and 3 powers. He pointed out that Art 26 of Ger basic law gave FedRep full powers to enforce any required se-

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Not printed.

curity restrictions. Fol is translation of Fr proposed protocol to be annexed to contractual convention:

"1. Allied controls over Ger armament industries will be lifted on the date of the present convention. The military security office will be dissolved. No qualitative or quantitative restrictions shall be imposed on the activities of Ger industry.

"2. In order to demonstrate its willingness to give a strictly defense character to participation of the FedRep in defense (and taking account of the international sit), the Fed Govt declares that in the exercise of the powers at its disposal in conformity with Art 26 (2) of the basic law, it will not permit production on the federal territory of materials listed below and will take all measures necessary to prohibit scientific research on experimental models or on any other form of the materials in question.

"(a) Atomic, chemical and biological weapons.
"(b) Guided missiles.
"(c) Aircraft, including civil aircraft.
"(d) Naval vessels with a tonnage exceeding 1500 tons.
"(e) Propellants and artillery tubes exceeding a caliber of 105 millimeters.

"3. In the same spirit, the Fed Govt will not permit the creation of military or para-military forces on its territory outside those which constitute its contribution to the European def community. Police forces directly subordinated to the Fed Govt, of which the maximum strength is fixed at (blank), will be organized, equipped and trained in a manner to fulfill most effectively their mission which must be exclusively that of internal security."

4. [*sic*] Fol Parodi's reading, discussion was limited to procedure, and substance of restrictions in quoted proposal was not discussed. Brit rep stated strong feeling of his govt that FedRep wld not accept such statement as part of contractual agrmt. He referred to Jan 22 meeting between HICOM and Adenauer in which Adenauer, in Brit opinion, made abundantly clear his stand. [3] Brit member had instructions from his govt to return to original Brit proposal that declaration he made by FedRep at the same time as contractual convention but formally independent of convention. I stated that, from what info we had, it was also our impression that attempts to get security agrmt into contractual convention wld be fruitless. At this point, Parodi said disparingly that he did not know what to do next.

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[3] McCloy had reported on Jan 23 that in the meeting the preceding day Adenauer had stated that the EDC discussions in Paris had produced a satisfactory formula on security safeguards and hence there was no need to discuss them in Bonn. When pressed by François-Poncet Adenauer stated further that the Allies would never find a Chancellor who would sign a discriminatory armaments declaration. (Telegram 1224 from Bonn, 262.0041/1-2352)

5. I thereupon suggested we rely on judgment of HICOM who are closer to sit and can better judge Ger temper. I mentioned second possibility of relying EDC control. Parodi pointed out that here question arises, which is concern to Fr, whether commissariat of EDC can discriminate against Ger in framework of community. I suggested that perhaps discrimination cld be supported by specific or implied ref in EDC treaty to Ger unilateral declaration if latter is determined to be effectively binding.

Brit member said they agreed with Fr that some form of security guarantee was necessary, and problem was on question of form. Parodi then asked me if unilateral declaration by Ger on such matters as atomic weapons control would satisfy us. I said, so far as I knew, this would probably be sufficient.

6. We had evidently reached impasse with Brit member maintaining his govt's stand that only practicable solution was to permit Ger unilateral declaration outside convention, and Parodi saying this was unacceptable to his govt. Brit member then proposed awaiting next meeting Tues between HICOM and Adenauer to see if any progress is made on Fr proposal. If problem not resolved, cld then ask Adenauer to make counterproposal which wld be sufficiently binding on FedRep to satisfy Fr. Parodi assented to this. [4]

BRUCE

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[4] For a report on the High Commissioners discussion with Adenauer on Feb. 5, see telegram 1437, *infra*.

No. 7

762A.0221/2-652: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 6, 1952—11 a. m.

1437. Dept pls pass Defense. Fol is brief summary report discussion concerning security safeguards between HICOMers and Adenauer held 5 February. Summary cable other matters discussed follows next consecutively numbered cable. [2]

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] Telegram 1438 from Bonn, Feb. 6, reported the High Commissioners discussion with Adenauer on delays in the contractual negotiations, equalization of burdens taxation, compensation to German nationals, exemption of Allied forces from taxation, Soviet military missions, the Supreme Restitution Court, the upcoming London Foreign Ministers meeting, and war criminals. (662A.00/2-652)

1. French Proposal

At preliminary allied mtg, Poncet said he was under instructions to seek Fed Govt approval to a protocol (along lines quoted in para 2 of Paris sent Dept 4699, Bonn 368, London 1281 of 3 Feb [3]) which cld be annexed to contractual conventions. Kirkpatrick maintained (a) matter was still at govt level and therefore HICOM had no authority to take action this time, and (b) he did not have instructions on matter in any event. I said, however, that in view of desirability resolving question before London or Lisbon mtgs, [4] I wld be willing, as chairman, to sound Adenauer out employing such approach. Accordingly, I handed Adenauer memorandum based on Fr proposal without list of items and with para relating to police so defined so as not to tie our hands on training of border police. [5] I carefully explained to Adenauer that although text might serve as useful basis exchange of ideas, it had not been approved by allied govt and therefore was only tentative.

2. Adenauer Reply

Adenauer responded immed and with great vigor to effect that he could not agree to any further commitment than one already given in EDC convention and which had been agreed by all EDC nations including France. He did not understand why Quai d'Orsay position was in constant conflict with that taken by Fr rep at EDC discussion. He repeated arguments employed in 22 Jan (see para 4 of Bonn sent Dept 1224, rptd info Paris 368, Berlin 167, London 308 [6]) and in previous mtgs and reviewed fol difficulties facing him in Bundestag debate set for Thursday, 7 Feb e.g. negative SPD attitude, dissension these issues within coalition, Niemoller-Heinemann and Communist activities, opposition West Ger mothers "who did not want to see sons in uniform again," etc. In addition to these considerations, and in answer to statements of Poncet referred to below, he gave fol reasons, among others, for rejection proposal outlined above:

(a) It was impossible to proceed with establishment EDC in atmosphere of such distrust of FedRep as witnessed by ref to past Ger behaviour and fear of resurgence Ger militarism. Best possible assurance against such resurgence wld be participation 400,000 Ger youth in EDF under over-all SHAPE command. Such action rather than any paper guarantees. Further, it was nonsense to talk about threat to Fr security as long as there were half a million US UK troops in Ger.

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[3] *Supra*.

[4] For documentation on the London Foreign Ministers meeting and the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb 20–26, see vol v, Part 1, pp 36 ff and 107 ff.

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] See footnote 3, *supra*.

(b) Attempts shld not be made by allies to set ban in advance specific prohibitions, as EDC Commissariat may, at some future time, ask FedRep to produce such war materials.

(c) Talk in foreign press, particularly in France, of so-called Ger attempt to employ Saar and NATO issues as blackmail media greatly disturbed him. On the contrary, his instructions to Hallstein on NATO agenda item reflected what he considered to be Fed Govt moral responsibility to ensure that there wld be some FedRep link with NATO, even in interim period. This was necessary as SHAPE wld be making decisions which wld involve deployment of Ger contingent.

(d) Ref in section 3 to use of police was introduction of a new and equally unacceptable element. If there were to be any restrictions re police or border guards, they must be incorporated in EDC conventions and applied equally to other five signatory powers thereto.

(e) He had hoped to get Bundestag adoption after full debate which starts on Thurs of resolution "which even SPD wld find difficult to reject." Resolution wld ask identification FedRep interests with western community and wld permit him to continue his negots to that end. He was so shaken by attitude taken at current mtg he was now at loss to know what approach to adopt Thurs debate. Either western community must place confidence in Ger and move forward in positive and vigorous manner, or, alternatively, must scrap EDC concept for present and merely sit back to await events. Forthcoming period wld be most decisive and unless proper attitude adopted all parties concerned, "work of past year wld come to nothing."

3. Poncet's Remarks

Poncet stressed:

(a) Allies had full confidence in Adenauer but required some assurance with respect to continuation these policies by any successor govt, allies were only asking in writing what Chancellor had frequently stated verbally.

(b) Schuman's difficulties with Fr Parliament were just as great if not greater than those of Adenauer. Schuman wld have to give assurances Fr Parliament that FedRep wld not use rights in this field which had been given her as part of "non-discrimination policy" incorporated in EDC convention. Allies deplored "all or nothing" attitude displayed in Gers in current negots.

(c) However one may try, it was impossible, particularly for Fr public, to formulate policy without taking into account past experiences with Ger.

4. US and UK Statements

Kirkpatrick, while expressing greatest sympathy for Chancellor's position, stated that confidence on part of various allied countries toward Ger cld not be created by wishful thinking or instantaneously. Confidence wld however certainly be enhanced by such gesture on FedRep's part, i.e. making declaration on lines outlined above. He pointed out that UK, in order to gain confidence in certain areas, had on several instances given unilateral guarantees, that she wld not maintain armed forces in particular regions.

In an attempt to bring consideration this issue into proper perspective, I said I thought we were momentarily, but only momentarily, in a valley. In view of the enormous task ahead of us and the stakes involved, we must let nothing stand in way of successful conclusion of our experiment. One of the best ways to build confidence was for youth of western nations to "rub shoulders" in NATO-EDC endeavors. When this process took place, problems which now loom so large wld disappear. History wld never excuse us if we allowed such problems as we have been discussing to block such action. We can not afford to be discouraged or less than ingenious in our attempt to find a solution. I did point out, however, that one of the factors which gave great momentum to our efforts in the past year was statements which Adenauer and Blank had made to the effect that FedRep did not desire to see such armaments produced in Ger. It was important not only to meet Fr but also US and UK sensibilities on this matter.

5. Another Possibility

During course above discussion, Adenauer indicated he considered he was already affording an adequate security guarantee to France and that he was not prepared nor was it necessary to repeat the same guarantee to France within any other framework. He might, however, be ready to make some form of declaration to satisfy US and UK. Perhaps this cld be done by means exchange of ltrs in which he cld draw attention to FedRep's commitments in EDC convention and reaffirm that these safeguards had general application. I believe there may be some way out of our difficulties through employment some such device as this. Yet—in spite nature Adenauer remarks, at end and after mtg, he appeared to be in good and reasonably hopeful spirits.

McCloy

No. 8

Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met in London, February 13-19 to discuss matters of mutual concern. They were joined at the end of their meeting by Chancellor Adenauer to consider questions affecting Germany. A large part of their discussions with the Chancellor concerned contractual relations, in particular security controls, a German financial contribution to Western defense, and the future treatment of war criminals. In the course of these discussions agreement was reached on the method of handling a German commitment on security controls, but not on the list of items which would not be produced in the Federal Republic. Shortly before the Ministers met in London the Executive Bureau of the NATO Temporary Council Committee had decided that the German financial contribution would amount to DM 11.25 billion. This figure was communicated to the Chancellor, who stated that he could not agree to the figure without consulting his Cabinet, but that he would make every effort to settle on it. Finally the Ministers agreed on a paper which outlined the future treatment of war criminals when jurisdiction over them was transferred to the Federal Republic.

Documentation on the meeting in London, including preparations for the sessions, a report by the Allied High Commission on the status of contractual relations (HICOM/P (52) 10/Final, February 12), two papers on security controls (MOG/3 Final, February 16 and the Agreed Paper on Security Controls, February 19), the agreed article on war criminals, dated February 18, and the records of the Foreign Ministers discussions with Chancellor Adenauer, is printed in volume V, Part 1, pages 1 ff.

On March 1, in a joint communiqué issued at Lisbon and Bonn, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany announced that agreement had been reached on a German financial contribution for 1952–1953 of DM 11.25 billion. For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1952, pages 423–426. Regarding further discussion of contractual relations at Lisbon, see volume V, Part 1, pages 251 ff.

No. 9

662A.00/3-1452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 14, 1952—7:12 p. m.

2068. In course of gen discussion in Dept Hallstein observed that provisions which impair Ger legislative sovereignty will offer greatest obstacle to Bundestag approval contractual arrangements. We understand from your 1806 Mar 3 rptd London 486 Paris 81 [2] and your 1898 Mar 10 rptd London 509 Paris 609 [3] that fol questions are most important of this kind:

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[1] Drafted by Auchincloss and cleared with Margolies, Raymond, and Calhoun. Repeated to London and Paris.

(1) Gers object to requirement that FedRep undertake promulgate legis along particular lines or maintain certain occupation legis in effect. We agree Allied position that maintenance of certain legis or its equivalent is essential factor in proposed agreements. Your 1898 indicates solution this difficulty may be found in recognition by Bundestag that such measures fall within scope "technical liquidation measures" referred to in para 3 of Sixth Bundestag Res. This wld appear sensible result.

(2) Difficulty also arises from Allied proposal to give Arbitration Tribunal legislative power. This wld be exercised in situation where FedRep refused comply with Tribunal decision, either by failing to repeal or annul certain laws or even (in unusual case) by failing to enact certain legis. Dept has already taken position that three powers shld not have legislative capacity in this kind of situation (Deptels 415 Nov 26 and 840 Dec 29 [4]) and still believes Allied right to legislate wld be inconsistent with new contractual relationship. We have come to doubt whether essential for Arbitration Tribunal to have legislative power, because we are not convinced this power wld be effective in hands of Tribunal, or at least effective enough to be worth pressing in final stage of negots. Issuance of Tribunal decree with force of legis wld only occur if orig decision completely disregarded. If polit situation such as to cause this, a further decree repealing or enacting legis wld probably be attended by such resentment on part of Gers that it too wld be disregarded. For example, Ger law might well remain on books in spite of Tribunal's decree, and Ger auths might fail to punish individuals for taking action permitted by such law. Problem is one of enforcing Tribunal decisions, and we do not see how this problem wld be solved, after a particular decision had been flouted, by translating that decision into legislative decree which wld in turn raise question of enforcement over Ger reluctance. Since Tribunal will deal with sovereign govts it cannot be expected to have as effective enforcement of its decrees as domestic courts which deal with individuals and which have executive arm of same govt charged with obtaining compliance from such individuals. To endow Tribunal with legislative capacity will not result in giving it executive enforcement power as well. Dept inclined believe, therefore, even in absence of alternative procedure, that legislative power of Tribunal is

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[2] Not printed. (662A.00/3–352)

[3] Not printed. (740.5/3–1052)

[4] Neither printed. (662A.0011/11–2251 and 12–2451)

not sufficiently important for our purposes to insist upon it over serious Ger opposition and at possible risk to early agreement on final Ger ratification.

ACHESON

No. 10

662A.00/3-2852: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, March 28, 1952—7 p. m.

2181. Inform Defense. Reurtel sent Bonn 935, rptd info Paris 3895, dated 7 January. [2] Fol is text of draft tripartite protocol on joint action by Ambassadors submitted today by Fr:

"1. In implementation of Art I, sect 3 of gen convention on relations between three powers and FedRep, [3] Ambassadors of France, Great Brit and US accredited to Fed Govt (hereinafter called the three Ambassadors) will exercise jointly, in name their govts, rights and responsibilities which devolve upon three powers under provisions of gen convention and related conventions concluded on (blank) between them and FedRep.

"2. In particular, three Ambassadors will exercise jointly rights of three powers re: a. Stationing of armed forces; b. State of emergency; c. Berlin; d. Germany as a whole, including unification of Ger and peace settlement.

"3. Three Ambassadors will be considered as successors of Commanders-in-Chief and of High Commissioners in relations of allied authorities with Sov C-in-C. They will have final responsibility for all questions re relations with Sov occupation authorities, both civil and military.

"4. a. Three Ambassadors will jointly give instructions in name of their govts, to Allied Kommandatura in Berlin re exercise of its powers.

"b. This in no way modifies previous decisions re stationing of allied forces in their respective sectors of city of Berlin.

"5. In principle it is responsibility of three Ambs, acting jointly in name of three powers, to submit to arbitrary tribunal disagreements with FedRep resulting from implementation of conventions concluded on (blank). However:

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Telegram 935 reported that the French had agreed to discuss in the Allied High Commission the activities of the three future Ambassadors to the Federal Republic, but had insisted that any agreement on the role of the Ambassadors must be approved by the three governments. (662A.00/1-752)

[3] For the General Agreement as approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany at Paris, Nov. 22, 1951, see Annex A to HICOM/P (51) 91, Nov. 17, 1951, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1592.

> "a. If only two powers consider themselves to be involved, their Ambs may submit such disagreement to arbitrary tribunal after having notified their intention to do so to Amb of third power;
>
> "b. If only one power considers itself to be involved, its Amb may submit disagreement to arbitrary tribunal after having consulted two other Ambs and unless latter are mutually opposed such submission.

"6. Provision to be inserted on relationships between Ambs and Commanders-in-Chief."

Paper has not been discussed in committee. In gen it appears satisfactory in terms of Dept reply to Fr *aide-mémoire* (Deptel 253, November 9 to Bonn [4]). We have, however, fol preliminary comments. Assume Dept wld prefer agreed minute in place of protocol but Fr will probably insist on latter.

Para 4. Suggested procedure of joint instructions to kommandatura is in line with present practice and with provisions of para 3.

Para 5. Paper fails to make provision for decision, whether unanimous or by majority vote, when three powers are concerned in submission to arbitrary tribunal. Wording shld be altered to read "disagreements with FedRep arising under conventions concluded on".

Para 5. b. We believe any one of three powers shld be permitted to submit question to arbitrary tribunal even if other two are opposed.

Wld appreciate Dept's comments soonest.

McCloy

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[4] See telegram 2930 to Frankfurt, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, p. 1575.

No. 11

662A.00/3-2852 Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 2, 1952—6:49 p. m.

2372. Dept has fol comments on Fr paper sent your 2181 rptd Paris 676 [2] re joint action by three powers after contractual arrangements become effective:

(1) Although paper emphasizes tripartite action it does not provide how decisions for such action are to be reached. Accordingly presume Fr intend all decisions to be taken by unanimity. See our views para (11) below.

(2) Para (1) provides in effect all rights and responsibilities of three powers under all conventions will be exercised jointly. Appears to Dept, however, Allied rights and responsibilities will not necessarily require joint action, and that it will be awkward in practice and politically unwise make such action mandatory. Even under HICOM Charter [3] regulating exercise Allied controls distinction was made between subjs tripartite and unilateral concern.

(3) Re para (2) right station armed forces in Ger has been held and exercised by three powers individually and cannot be subjected to requirement joint decision reached by either unanimous or majority vote.

(4) We have no objection substance para (4) except it must not impair right of individual govt give unilateral instrs to its Commandant when appropriate. 4 (b) shld be clarified to indicate what decisions are referred to.

(5) Re para (5) our views set forth in cables beginning Deptel 2319 to Frankfort Oct 10 and culminating Deptel 1104 to Bonn Jan 16, [4] authorizing acceptance. Brit proposal that one power may submit dispute to Tribunal only if other two not opposed. Realize you may be committed to this position, and if so will have accept some provisions along lines Fr draft this pt. However, agree with you desirable one power shld be free submit disagreement to Tribunal even if other two are opposed, and wld be glad see you raise this question again. This position is consistent with present language Art IX para 2(a) of Charter (SPCOM/P(51)20 Fifth Revi-

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[1] Drafted by Auchincloss, cleared with Raymond and by Margolies and Lewis, and initialed by Calhoun and Laukhuff. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For the Charter of the Allied High Commission for Germany, see *Germany 1947–1949*, pp. 92–97.

[4] Neither printed. (662A.0011/10-951 and 1-852)

sion [5]), so if it were accepted no tripartite agrmt on subj wld be required.

(6) Re para (6) we consider relations between ambs and Commanders-in-Chief are natl, not tripartite, questions. Do not see why these matters need be subj tripartite agrmt.

(7) Believe paper reflects Fr lack confidence their ability deal with Gers if latter are accepted as equals Allies. Evident to us Fr purpose is preserve continuity joint action and make each issue arising from contractual conventions tripartite matter, so that in every negot any consequence three powers will be together on one side and Gers will be alone on other. Unfortunate result will in our opinion create org of ambs equivalent HICOM to maintain atmosphere of occupation, and thereby encourage feeling of distrust between Gers and Allies. Such dealing at arms length is contrary our conception new relationship in which FedRep will be equal partner, and we fear agrmt this nature which must inevitably become known Gers will seriously impair good effects we hope obtain from terminating occupation.

(8) We realize Art I Sec 3 Gen Convention provides Allied ambs "will act jointly in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern" under various conventions. Realize further Dept *aide-memoire* 14 Nov 1951 to Fr Emb (enclosed with A–9 to Bonn Nov 19 [6]) stated three powers might agree informally that their reps in Ger shld act together "in matters of common concern" which might be described "in gen terms" and that some provision might "if necessary" be made re voting procedure. These statements do not commit us accept Fr proposal for joint action all matters.

(9) You are already aware our preference for least formal agrmt on minimum nr pts. (Deptel 808 Dec 28 rptd London 3087 Paris 3704. [7]) We wld really favor no agrmt at all. Problem raised by Fr paper seems to us consist basically two issues. One is extent to which we shld define matters which are of "common concern" and therefore appropriate for joint action. Other is whether voting procedure shld be established at all, and if so to what subjs it shld apply.

(10) Re first issue we are reluctant define matters of common concern in detail. Joint action re such matters already agreed in principle. Besides, conventions are so lengthy and complicated in

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[5] No copy of SPCOM/P(51)20 (5th Revision) has been found in Department of State files; however, copies of SPCOM/P(51)20 (4th Revision), Oct. 23, 1951, and SPCOM/P(51)20 (6th Revision), Mar. 27, 1952, and several other drafts from November and December 1951 are in CFM files, lot M–88, box 187, "Draft Convention, Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal."

[6] Neither airgram A–9 nor the U.S. *aide-memoire* is printed. (662A.00/11–1351)

[7] Not printed. (662A.00/12–2851)

comparison Occupation Statute[8] and it is so difficult to predict how they will work out in practice we think it is not worthwhile to examine all their provisions with view determining which are suitable for joint action and which are not. This may have been useful exercise in Art V of HICOM Charter, but we do not think it appropriate in period normal relations when Allied admin is supposed to have terminated.

(11) Re voting procedure our basic objection is any arrangement of this kind will do great deal transform three ambs into equivalent HICOM. We do not believe voting procedure necessary and wld prefer let three powers reach decisions as circumstances require. In particular we think voting procedure for ambs wld be unsuitable re exercise of powers retained Art II Gen Convention. Stationing troops will involve SHAPE and EDC and decisions this subj will undoubtedly be made by govts rather than ambs. Protection security troops cannot be subj voting procedure because we do not believe US Govt wld subordinate its right act on behalf of its own troops to decision of another nation. Powers re Berlin and Ger as whole are in essence powers re Sov Union and are so broad in their implications major decisions re their exercise must in any event be made by govts acting independently, but of necessity in concert.

(12) While we do not underestimate firmness of Fr position this subj, we do not see how Fr draft can be satis to us even as basis for discussion. Is it possible induce Fr abandon their proposal or reduce it to limits acceptable to us? Are Brit still willing act with us to "forestall any Fr plan to formalize relations of three ambs" as reported London's 2313 Nov 13 to Dept rptd Bonn 52 Paris 1030?[9]

(13) Foregoing are Dept views which have not been cleared with Defense.

ACHESON

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[8] For text of the Occupation Statute, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, p. 179; regarding its revision in 1951 and the text of the revised Occupation Statute, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1410 ff.

[9] Not printed. (662A.00/11-1351)

No. 12

662A.00/3-3152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 5, 1952—1:53 p. m.

2420. For McCloy. We are increasingly concerned with slow progress Bonn contractual negots and Paris EDC negots since Lisbon mtg. [2] Although difficult to judge such matters from here, prospects for completing both negots by end Apr seem dimmer. This impression has been confirmed by report of Adenauer announcement re mid-May Bonn mtg of FonMins (London's 4354 Mar 31, rptd Paris 2028, Bonn 450 [3]). Delays in both Paris and Bonn seem to certain extent to be interrelated and it is therefore difficult to judge how and where logjam cld best be broken. Wld appreciate your and Paris' comments on this point.

Our concern with delay in completing both sets of agreements is deepened by cumulative effect of current exchange of notes with Sovs on Ger unity question. [4] For this reason alone we must press forward. We have been considering ways in which we might be helpful in stimulating progress. One thought, prompted in part by Adenauer's reported announcement re Bonn mtg, wld be to send a personal message from the Secy to Eden, Schuman and Adenauer, (and possibly Italian, Benelux FonMins) suggesting the public announcement of a specific time and place for signing of contractual conventions and EDC Treaty. We consider it essential to maintain interrelationship both sets of agreements and therefore wish to avoid being drawn in by Adenauer proposal for signing of contractuals only at Bonn. Our view continues to be that Strasbourg is logical and best site for signature of EDC and contractuals, chiefly because of its symbolic significance in move towards new Europe and appeal which holding of ceremony there wld have for European opinion generally. Strasbourg as site wld also be a convenient means for avoiding signature in one of capitals. Re last sentence London's reftel, we had not heard Paris mentioned as possible site before and wld not favor it. Although not strongly opposed to Bonn, we believe signature of agreements there might later be exploited by opposition in Ger. Furthermore, EDC countries wld probably not favor Bonn for signing of EDC Treaty. For all these reasons Strasbourg seems ideal place. We realize Adenauer may be disappointed if his public proposal for Bonn is not accepted. If this is the case we could consider whether you might indicate to him that Secy will try to come to Bonn for a visit of one or two days immediately after signing at Strasbourg.

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[1] Drafted by Calhoun and cleared by Lewis, Perkins, and Matthews. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] For documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC), see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.

[3] Telegram 4354 reported that Adenauer had discussed this question with Eden during the latter's visit to Paris, Mar. 19-21, but that nothing had been said concerning an announcement. (662A.00/3-3152)

[4] For documentation on the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union concerning all-German elections and German unity, see Documents 65 ff.

We note that Adenauer suggested mid-May for date of signature for contractuals. We wld hope that this cld be moved up to early May and, as stated above, consider it must be coupled with signature of EDC Treaty.

In addition to comments requested para 1, wld appreciate your views on timing and place of signature with particular respect to feasibility concluding both sets of negots by end of April, and also whether setting date now would serve as stimulus to conclusion of negotiations.

ACHESON

No. 13

762A.0221/4-552: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, April 5, 1952—5 p.m.

2273. Dept pass Defense. Supplementing report of HICOM mtg with Chancellor,[1] fol summarizes last night's discussion of pre-emergency clause:

During Feb London Mtg Chancellor was given draft text of provision authorizing mil commanders to take such direct action for estab or removal of def installations and such measures prior to declaration of emergency required for effective mil operation and security of forces as commander determines to be essential for common def in fulfillment of SAC Eur directive.[2] Dept will recall importance attached to such provision by EUCOM.

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[1] In telegram 2274 from Bonn, April 5, McCloy reported that at a special meeting with Adenauer on the preceding day, lasting from 3:30 to midnight, agreement in principle had been reached between the High Commissioners and the Federal Chancellor on 11 of the 16 points considered. (662A.00/4-552)

[2] The draft text under reference has not been identified further. The records of Chancellor Adenauer's conversations with Foreign Ministers Acheson, Eden, and Schuman during the meetings at London, Feb. 13-19, are printed in vol. v, Part 1, pp. 59 ff.

Chancellor had on previous occasions expressed willingness to accept some such clause, stating he understood necessity therefor. Last night, however, he, Gen Heusinger and Grewe explained that in Ger opinion adequate protection was afforded mil commanders by emergency provisions of Art V of Gen Convention, particularly para 7. Furthermore, draft laws relating to provision of goods and services, protected areas and maneuvers now under consideration in Bundestag, wld assure Ger cooperation in fulfillment of allied mil requirements. Ger negotiators considered allied draft went considerably beyond emergency clause of Art V which called for consultation with FedRep and gave latter possibility of appeal and wld enable mil commanders to control civil administration. In addition, since action taken under it wld not be subj to arbitration, it wld mean a further reservation of allied rights. Gers further stated this provision wld give allied commanders more auth than wld be conferred upon EDC commander. Gen Heusinger pointed out that measures allied commanders wld wish to take wld require cooperation of civil auths and could not be carried out merely by mil order.

On allied side we explained way must be found to give mil commanders right to take precautionary def measures without necessity of invoking state of emergency and stressed necessity of giving mil commanders adequate auth to enable them to discharge their responsibility to provide for security of their troops and def of area. As Chancellor's principal objection appeared to be that mil commanders wld have right to take such measures unilaterally without bringing in civilian auth we agreed to give further study to ways and means to assist fed auths in such measures. On US side it was suggested that language might be inserted so that commanders in all cases wld do their utmost to obtain consent of civil auths and wld act only in case of utmost urgency prior to obtaining cooperation of civil auths. Further discussion of clause will take place between Gens. Heusinger and Hays early next week. Brit and Fr are not fully in agreement as to necessity of such provision but are prepared to accept whatever agreement can be reached between Gers and ourselves.

McCloy

No. 14

662A.00/4-752: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, April 7, 1952—4 p.m.

2278. Re urtel 2420 to Bonn April 5. [2] Due slowness complete contractuals, I made strong reps last week to Chancellor, Kirkpatrick and Poncet in which I demanded we adopt a conf procedure whereby all wld work continuously at the job until completed and that particularly we must not let Easter holidays interfere. Result was last Thurs mtg which went from 3 o'clock until midnight, where we cleaned up about half of all questions, [3] agreeing to dispose of remainder beginning 10 a.m. Wed this week with no let-up until finished. [4] I am confident that most remaining items can be finally disposed of then, exclusive of financial agreements with one or two subsequent mtgs in April to dispose of all dregs.

Recent delays have in my judgment been due to (1) no set date for completion, (2) tendency of certain of our colleagues to linger over points, and the introduction of Schaeffer in the negots who acts as Bavarian cow trader over the taxes he wld like to collect from Allied personnel. The resolution of tripartite positions frequently takes as long as the Ger negot. Apart from financial aspects, there is nothing here that cld not be resolved, with a reasonable give and take, within two weeks. I propose, unless instructed to the contrary, to cut corners in the negots rather than face further delays.

Last Sat Blank reported his complete unwillingness accept Fr formula on propellants and I believe Chancellor finds equal difficulty as its implications become clearer. I warn that this aspect of the contractuals and the EDC negots will cause trouble.

As for site of mtg, Chancellor has made strong plea to me for Bonn. He urges his position as firm upholder of Western integration with Ger as a partner justifies this step, and moreover indicates that it is necessary in order to consolidate Ger opinion in strong support of the concept. Strasbourg, he says, has no symbolic importance. In fact he feels it has a poor connotation because thus far its debates and decisions have been so equivocal, he feels Strasbourg might weaken rather than strengthen movement. In short, he urges Bonn or other Ger site as a matter of need for the success of the policy that is something more than mere prestige. I will communicate your views at once to Chancellor though I know he feels strongly on the subj. He wld strongly oppose Paris. My idea of date wld be the first half of May but staff suggest middle of month largely because of substantial time needed for clearing texts, translations, etc, and the concern they have of likely snags in the financial aspects over which we do not have full control.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] Document 12.

[3] Regarding this meeting, see footnote 1, *supra*.

[4] On Apr. 9 McCloy reported that excellent progress had been made at the Wednesday meeting and that two more meetings with the Chancellor were planned for Apr. 21 and 24. (Telegram 2320 from Bonn, 662A.00/4-952) Telegrams 2322 and 2360, Apr. 9 and 10, both from Bonn, reported in detail on particular aspects of the meeting. (762A.0221/4-952 and 662A.00/4-1052)

McCloy

No. 15

662A.00/4-752

Memorandum by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET

Washington, April 8, 1952.

Three cables in today's log add to my growing concern over the lack of progress in completing the EDC arrangements and some of the decisions which have to be taken at Bonn in connection therewith. These are the cables from Douglas MacArthur, Paris, no. 6127, April 5; McCloy's telegram of April 5, Bonn, no. 2278; and Gifford's of April 7, London, no. 4478. [2] The first two of these urge the necessity of getting some sort of a deadline. The last one reports the Foreign Office's doubts as to the wisdom of a deadline and the fact that one cannot think about setting a deadline for a couple of weeks.

I think we should give this whole matter urgent attention having the following questions in mind:

Is it true that we can keep the EDC and the contractual arrangements linked together if the latter get hopelessly bogged down? It seems to me that the same forces which led to the necessity for winding up of the occupation in Japan are also operating in Germany, and that we are going to be faced with a strong demand in Germany to go through with the regime provided for in the contractuals whether or not the EDC is ready. It seems unlikely to me that the renewal of the correspondence with the Soviet Union over

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[1] This memorandum was directed to Bruce, Matthews, Perkins, and Lewis.

[2] Telegram 2278, *supra*; telegrams 6127 and 4478, not printed. (740.5/4-552 and 662A.00/4-752)

Germany will accelerate this tendency. This will produce all sorts of problems with France and may end us in a first-class mess.

In the second place, have we made careful plans for having the Senate consider and approve the German arrangements? If the Congress is going to get out of Washington by the end of June there will be very little time for hearings and consideration if the signature of these documents drags on until the end of May. People are now talking about the middle of May. If the Senate does not approve them, including the agreement to the North Atlantic Treaty, then it may not get around to considering them until January 1953, with all the delay and uncertainty that that involves.

Will you please give this matter your most urgent attention and let me have your recommendations.

D A

No. 16

662A.00/4-752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 11, 1952—12:34 p.m.

2523. For Chief of Mission personal from Secy. I am gratified at progress recently made at Bonn in speeding up conclusion contractual negots as result McCloy's efforts (Bonn's 2278, rptd Paris 711, London 605 [2]). As time has continued to slip by since Lisbon with slower progress in Paris on EDC treaty and in Bonn on contractuals than we had anticipated, I have become increasingly concerned to find some means of successfully completing these arrangements.

Deptel 2420, rptd London 4999, Paris 5925, [3] expressed the conclusion to which I have more and more come that a deadline for signing must be set and must be met or we shall be faced with the prospect that all our efforts to bring about the EDC and to estab new relationships with Ger will founder. I note similar conclusion reported Paris' 6127, [4] giving MacArthur's and SHAPE's views. I recognize and have weighed carefully the dangers inherent in establishing a deadline as set forth by Roberts of Brit FonOff (London's 4478, rptd Paris 2092, Bonn 479) but am firmly convinced risks involved in not doing so far outweigh them. Probable trend of Ger opinion under pressure of Sov proposals on Ger unity appealing to their natl instincts causes us anxiety. Some EDC countries appear to be increasingly hesitant to take final decision to join with Ger in EDC. In addition, Congressional attitude toward MSA appropriations, which will probably be under full consideration by mid-May, cannot be predicted if real success in uniting Eur defense efforts cannot be reported. Furthermore, this session of Cong will certainly end by Jul 3 at latest, and possibly earlier. If contractuals are not submitted sufficiently far in advance of that date there can be no ratification before 1953, except in the very unlikely event of a brief autumn session of the Cong. Any such delay wld represent a severe check to our plans.

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[1] Drafted by Calhoun and Laukhuff on Apr. 10; cleared by Perkins, Jessup, and Bohlen; and signed by Secretary Acheson. Also sent to London, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Document 14.

[3] Document 12.

[4] Not printed, but see the first paragraph of Secretary Acheson's memorandum, *supra*.

Will you therefore pls present the fol personal msg from me to the FonMin of the Govt to which you are accredited without delay:

Begin Message.

"At the various mtgs in London and Lisbon last Feb, I was encouraged by the progress made and was led to hope that problems of concluding the treaty for the Eur Defense Community and the various contractual agreements with the Ger FedRep cld be speedily resolved. Since then I have been increasingly concerned by the slow rate of progress, which I believe is gravely imperiling all our plans. I therefore wish to make this appeal to you to join with me and our other colleagues in the countries concerned to make a supreme effort to conclude the various treaties and agreements in time for signature on a definite date in the near future.

You are, of course, well aware of the risks which delay will cause in Europe. You are perhaps less well aware of certain grave difficulties which will be encountered in the US with respect to Congressional action if there is further delay. The proposed appropriations for Mutual Security Assistance will be under active consideration by the Cong by mid-May at the latest. The Govt will be very hard pressed to present effective arguments for the voting of such appropriations in the absence of a successful conclusion of the efforts being made to establish a Eur Defense Community. Further indefinite promises of progress in this field wld, I fear, be regarded by the Cong as discouraging evidence of inability to achieve a unified defense effort in Europe.

I also wish to point out that this session of Cong will end at the very latest by Jul 3 and possibly several days earlier. If the contractual agreements with Ger are to be ratified at this session they must, therefore, be laid before the Senate by the middle of May at the very latest. Even this date wld make action by the Senate difficult. If the agreements cannot be completed and submitted to the Senate in time for action at this session they will have to go over until the session which begins in Jan 1953. I do not need to impress upon you the grave jeopardy in which such a lengthy delay wld place the entire Western policy with regard to the common defense and with regard to Ger.

All of these considerations have persuaded me that there is no alternative but to set for ourselves a specific date now for signing the contractuals and the EDC treaty and such other docs as must be signed simultaneously. I wld hope that we could set May 9 as the date for signing both sets of agreements. I stress the point of signing both sets of agreements, as I believe it is highly important not to permit the EDC and the contractual arrangements to be separated chronologically.

I have given a good deal of thought to the question of the place of signing. The contractual agreements cld, of course, be signed at Bonn, but I question the desirability of having the EDC treaty signed there. Paris has been suggested for the signature of the latter treaty but I consider it wld be unfortunate if the contractual agreements were to be signed in any of the three Western capitals. The signing of the two sets of agreements in different places not only is awkward from the point of view of physical arrangements for moving Ministers back and forth on the same day, or even on successive days, but likewise wld be a regrettable loss of an opportunity which it seems to me we shld grasp to make an impressive and historic ceremony of the simultaneous signing of both sets of agreements. I therefore suggest that we consider selecting The Hague. Prominently associated as it is with ideals of peace, and containing the Peace Palace where the ceremony cld occur, it wld seem to me to be an ideal site.

Most important, however, in my thinking, is the necessity for setting a date, preferably May 9, and making a public announcement of that fact without delay. This wld, of course, mean that the draft EDC treaty and the contractual conventions wld have to be initialed by the negotiators by Apr 30 at the latest in order to permit final governmental consideration of them before signing. I appreciate that this means renewed and untiring efforts on the part of the negotiators in Paris and Bonn. From the info I have at hand, however, I conclude that with such efforts on the part of the reps of every govt, the remaining points at issue can be settled during Apr. I am instructing the US reps at Bonn to cooperate to the utmost in achieving the result we aim at and I urge you to similarly instruct your reps at Paris [and/or Bonn].[5]" *End Message.*

Paris for MacArthur: Pls inform Gen Eisenhower of above and of my earnest request that he continue his already helpful efforts to speed up negots.

The Hague: Secy went over substance this msg with Stikker in great detail but did not mention Hague as place of sig nor specify May 9 as date.[6] Pls deliver substance to FonOff.

ACHESON

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[5] Brackets in the source text.

[6] Stikker had visited Washington Apr. 3 and 10 for talks with United States officials on questions of mutual concern.

No. 17

762A.0221/4-1452: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, April 14, 1952—5 p. m.

2371. Re CINCEUR's SX-4215, to Bonn, rptd Dept of Army, Apr. 11.[2]

Difficulty in obtaining EUCOM's position re pre-emergency powers due to fact that any statement of right of commander to take such measures as he deems necessary or advisable to secure troops involves potential take-over of govt functions as well as lesser measures. We have sought unsuccessfully to employ language limiting character of measures and we have concluded that it is the concept rather than the language which presents the difficulty. In effect, EUCOM's concept means continuation of the occupation statute. This we have, insofar as pol realities permit, through the emergency clause whereby limited or full emergency can be declared, but Gers argue we cannot expect to have what are in effect the same powers provided for in the emergency clause repeated in another clause irrespective of an emergency. We have been able to obtain the statement of extensive security powers and when we bear in mind that the power of self-help exists and is not expressly excluded in the event the promised cooperation shld fail, my feeling is we have a good position.

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[1] Repeated to Heidelberg and SHAPE.

[2] Telegram SX-4215 reported that EUCOM believed it was necessary to insure in the contractuals the authority of military commanders to take preemergency action to provide for the security of their forces. EUCOM maintained further that this authority should be in the form of a reserved right and not subject to arbitration. (CFM files, lot M-88, box 192, "Convention—Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces, etc." (SPCOM/P (52) 6))

To repeat we have: (1) The emergency clauses and the strong leverage the threat of calling into effect these clauses wld have in the event of any recalcitrance; (2) The right reserved to the commanders in the case of immed self-def (Par VII, Art 5); (3) The obligation of the gen convention imposed on the FedRep to cooperate with the allied forces in the execution of their def mission; (4) The manoeuvre and exercise clauses quoted in our 2322 to the Dept; [3] (5) The new pre-emergency proposals which provide that in case of secret or security need the forces can themselves erect or adapt any necessary installations after prior consultation, and we have the provision that in special situations "mil and civil measures of protection can be implemented by the forces and the Ger auths efficiently and without delay". (I read this to mean "both by the forces and the Ger auth") conceding that the emphasis is on Ger cooperation in the new clauses rather than on a reserved right the latent right to act either through the emergency clauses or after failure of cooperation by direct action remains. Due to reduced personnel we are now largely dependent in fact upon Ger cooperation if we undertake to assume large powers. Moreover, given the existing situation in relation to Ger Govt, we are in effect compelled, and it is to our advantage politically to act in cooperation with FedRep subj only to the case of an emergency for which we have provided.

In short, under our whole pol scheme for Ger contribution this emphasis on cooperation is advisable and better adapted to our objectives even though we do at the same time hold the right and power to act in the event of emergency or non-cooperation. In the case of the emergency declaration there is no arbitration provided. In the additional pre-emergency clauses the emphasis upon cooperation renders arbitration inappropriate in the usual situation. To provide specific exclusion of recourse to arbitration from these clauses wld be pol diff to achieve and conceivably unwise as, in certain circumstances it might be useful to have recourse to arbitration ourselves in event failure to cooperate in non-emergency periods did occur.

As this is one of the very important points still outstanding as time is running out and as we have recd strong indication that we shall not gain any support for more extensive powers from our allies, I urge Dept to seek Defense's prompt concurrences.[4]

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[3] Telegram 2322 transmitted the text of a proposal by Adenauer which was designed to satisfy EUCOM's request for authority to take preemergency measures. (762A.0221/4-952)

McCLOY

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[4] On Apr. 25 McCloy was informed that the Department of Defense still attached great importance to having the authority to take preemergency action, but recognized that in certain instances political considerations might be overriding. Since Article V of the general convention gave the military commanders the right to act, McCloy was authorized to accept the German proposal (telegram 2322) if he became convinced that the Germans would not agree to the position taken by CINCEUR. (Telegram 2766 to Bonn, 762A.0221/4–1452)

No. 18

740.5/4–1752

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

I fully share the desire, which you expressed in your message,[2] to hasten as much as humanly possible the conclusion of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community and the contractual agreements with the German Federal Republic. I am grateful to you for explaining so clearly the difficulties which further delay would cause for you with the United States Congress.

Her Majesty's Government have just announced the proposed guarantee by the United Kingdom of the E.D.C. Treaty. Our decision to take this action has been warmly welcomed by the governments participating in the E.D.C. conference and should, I think, greatly help them in bringing their work to an early conclusion.

As regards the German contract, you will have heard that the three High Commissioners have been discussing the future programme with the German Federal Chancellor. These discussions suggest that the earliest date on which we could hope to have the various documents ready for signature would be between May 15th and 20th. Like you I wish it could be earlier. But there are still several important questions to be resolved. In particular, we must allow ourselves time to get the very important financial provisions fully agreed. Any attempt to set too early a date would result in disappointment, if a postponement becomes inevitable. It might also encourage the Germans to believe that we might be brought to accept some very general assurances only in the financial field and to leave over for later settlement the necessary concrete provisions such as the amounts to be allocated between the allied forces and the German contingents. It would not be possible for Her Majesty's Government to agree to such an arrangement. I hope therefore that you will feel able to accept a date between May 15th and 20th as our target and that you will also agree that we should not commit ourselves publicly to any date until we can see our way rather more clearly, more especially on finance.

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[1] According to a note dated Apr. 18, attached to the source text, Eden's message was delivered to the Department of State by an official of the British Embassy on Apr. 17. The note also states that the message had been seen by Bruce and Acheson. The source text bears the heading "Text of a message dated 16th April, 1952, to Mr Acheson from Mr. Eden"

[2] Transmitted in telegram 2523, Document 16.

I agree with you that the German contract and the E.D.C. Treaty should be signed at about the same time since they are in effect two parts of the same settlement. I recognise that it might be more convenient if they could all be signed at the same place and I have considered your proposal of the Hague. This is a matter in which we shall have to take full account of the wishes of the other governments concerned. But it does not seem to me very appropriate that the German contract should be signed in the capital of a country which is not a party to it. It would also be well to mark the fact that Paris has been the centre for the negotiation of the E.D.C. Treaty. Moreover it is possible that we may have to have further tripartite and quadripartite meetings of Ministers before signature, in order to reach final agreement on the financial provisions of the contract, and these would have to take place in one of the capitals concerned, e.g. Paris. My own preference thus still is for signature of the E.D.C. Treaty in Paris and of the German contract in Bonn. I should have thought that the latter would have great psychological significance in Germany, a factor of real importance at a time when the Soviet Government are wooing German public opinion. I therefore feel that the advantages of separate signature in the two capitals outweigh the inconveniences to which you refer.

I have since heard that the Chancellor has informed Mr. McCloy that he is agreeable to signature of both instruments in the Hague.[3] But I still think that there is much to be said for Paris and Bonn and that we should probably be well advised to arrange signature in these two capitals. I am thinking particularly of the future. Germany's new participation with the West should surely be completed on German soil.

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[3] On Apr. 15 McCloy had also reported that Adenauer was willing to accept The Hague as the place for signing both the EDC and the contractuals. (Telegram 2379 from Bonn, Apr. 15, 662A.00/4-1552) The following day McCloy reported that the High Commissioners had met with Adenauer to discuss the timing for the signing of the EDC and the contractuals and that both Kirkpatrick and François-Poncet felt that May 20 was the earliest possible date. (Telegram 2391 from Bonn, Apr. 16, 662A.00/4-1652) Apparently these reports constitute Adenauer's answer to Secretary Acheson's message, since no formal reply has been found in Department of State files.

I am sending copies of this reply to the other recipients of your message.

WASHINGTON, 17th April, 1952.

No. 19

662A.00/4-2152

Foreign Minister Schuman to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, April 19, 1952.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: Thank you for calling my attention to the problems raised, from point of view of ratifying contractual agreements, by the ending of the present session of American Congress around July 3.

I am in complete agreement with you as to necessity making maximum haste in concluding negotiations now in progress and I am instructing our Reps accordingly.

We must however have due regard for facts of situation. There are still important questions to be settled and the desire to finish must not lead us to be satisfied with inadequate solutions. Moreover although Chancellor himself has given evidence during his recent conversations with High Commissioner of a relatively conciliatory attitude, I am bound to state that the German experts both in Paris and Bonn is probably that factor more than any other that is likely to prolong discussions.

However from info at my disposal it wld appear that by putting forth a still greater effort it wld be possible to arrive at final result around May 20 I feel that there wld be no advantage in publicly setting a date for conclusion of agreements. We wld in fact run risks of encouraging German del to hold to their positions and of placing ourselves in a delicate situation if date set cld not be complied with.

As regards question of signature, it seems to be preferable that European Defense Community which was proposed by French Govt should come into being in Paris. Likewise I believe that from point of view of German public opinion it wld be of greatest value if charter which is going to define new status of Federal Republic were signed at Bonn. Doubtless signature of two series of agreement in different places will involve certain amount of inconvenience from a practical point of view; but this seems to me amply compensated for by the significance inherent in signature of European Army Treaty and contractual agreements at Paris and Bonn respectively.[2]

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 6451 from Paris, Apr. 21, with the information that it was a translation of Schuman's reply to Secretary Acheson's message transmitted in telegram 2523, Document 16.

I am transmitting copies of this letter to Mr. Eden, De Gasperi as well as to our Benelux colleagues and am asking Mr. Francois-Poncet to forward a copy to Chancellor Adenauer.

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[2] Following further discussions the several parties involved agreed that the contractuals should be signed at Bonn and the EDC and related documents should be signed at Paris. The date of the signing was not fixed pending further developments in the negotiations at Bonn and Paris. Documentation on these discussions is in files 662A.00 and 740.5.

No. 20

762A.0221/4-1952

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 19, 1952.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have noted with satisfaction that the many complex issues relating to the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany are rapidly approaching resolution. I am also gratified to note your recent proposal that these agreements as well as the treaty establishing the European Defense Community be completed and signed by May 9, 1952.[1]

In this connection, however, I believe that we should clearly recognize the additional financial burdens to the United States which underlie the contractual agreements and the negotiations relating thereto. In particular, I am concerned about the reaction of Congress should it become necessary to seek supplemental appropriations, the need for which were not apparent at the time of submission of our budget estimate.

At the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Lisbon, a broad general agreement was made with the German Federal Republic on the overall level of the contribution to be made by the Federal Republic to Western defense during the initial defense period.[2] However, as I recall, no understanding was reached which expressly relieved the Federal Republic from its responsibility for liquidation of obligations incurred for the benefit of the Allied Forces during the occupation period. On the other hand, I am informed that the Bureau of German Affairs of the State Department interprets the intent of the Lisbon Agreement as placing a ceiling of 850 million DM per month from the effective date of the contractual agreement to 30 June 1953 as the total contribution which the German Federal Republic can be called upon to make during the initial defense period.

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[1] See the message from Secretary Acheson, transmitted in telegram 2523 to Bonn, Document 16.

[2] For the exchange of letters between Chancellor Adenauer and the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at the time of the NAC meeting at Lisbon, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 258 ff.

If it were possible to do so consistently with the position taken by the United States in connection with the Lisbon Agreement, and if it were otherwise politically feasible to do so, it would, in the opinion of the Department of Defense, be desirable to call upon the German Federal Republic specifically to undertake the payment of the unliquidated balance of obligations incurred for the benefit of Allied Occupation Forces during the period prior to the coming into effect of the contractual agreements.

I believe you will agree with me that it would be undesirable to have the Congress gain the impression that our dollar burden will be increased now or in the future, either directly or indirectly by reason of the failure of the Federal Republic to retire obligations incurred during the occupation period. Manifestly it would be difficult, if not impossible to meet the contention that dollar appropriations might be used, directly or indirectly, to liquidate obligations incurred during occupation.

In any event the problem confronting both our Departments, with respect to obtaining dollar support from Congress for the U.S. Forces in Germany, is wholly dependent on the amount of DM made available to the U.S. Forces. I understand that discussions are currently proceeding at Bonn and Paris on the division of the Federal Republic's contribution between German contingents to the EDC and the Allied Forces. Considering all the ramifications involved in the division as I see it, there is no assurance that the amount of DM to be made available to U.S. Forces will fully cover their minimum requirements for the first defense year. Furthermore, the effective and economical utilization of the U.S. share can only be accomplished if funds available can be properly programmed. It is the view of this Department that to accomplish this end this Government must insist that the Finance Convention include a positive commitment on the part of the Federal Republic to the effect that the portion of the contribution made available to the U.S. Forces will remain available until fully expended.

I would appreciate an early expression of your views on the considerations covered herein; particularly I would appreciate your suggestion as to appropriate language for incorporation in the Finance Convention to accomplish the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

Faithfully,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

No. 21

662.00/4-1952

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) [1]

SECRET PERSONAL WASHINGTON, April 19, 1952.

DEAR JACK: A serious problem has arisen here in connection with that paragraph in the Preamble to the General Convention which reads: "*Whereas,* the Federal Republic shares with the three powers a determination to abide by the principles of the universal Declaration of Human Rights." There is in the Japanese Peace Treaty a somewhat similar phrase which reads: "*Whereas,* Japan for its part declares its intention . . . [2] to strive to realize the objectives of the universal Declaration of Human Rights." It will be noted that this language is considerably weaker than that in the Preamble of the General Convention in that it does not even imply a commitment on the part of the United States with regard to human rights. Nevertheless, this clause caused a great deal of trouble in connection with ratification of the Japanese Treaty. I think the difficulty is perhaps best expressed in the following language from the report of the Foreign Relations Committee:

> "The Committee wishes to make clear that there is nothing in the Treaty that makes human rights a matter of international contract, nor which gives any Allied nation the right to interfere in Japanese internal affairs in order to enforce such rights.
>
> "The Committee also wishes to make emphatically clear that the United States in ratifying the Treaty in no way undertakes any commitment with respect to human rights. The statement in the Preamble is for unilateral Japanese announcement. It is not even a commitment for Japan, much less so for the United States."

The above passage reflects the concern of many Senators as binding the United States to an international agreement relating to human rights. This concern was further evidenced by the strong support of the so-called "Bricker" Resolution (S.J. Res. 130), which would amend the Constitution of the United States so as to prohibit treaties or agreements respecting the rights of citizens under the Constitution or which would vest in any international organization any of the powers vested in divisions of the United States Government, and for other purposes. The resolution has received the announced support of 58 Senators, many of whom, such as Saltonstall, Lodge, Wayne Morse, Gillette, Wiley, Smith and Flanders are looked to as reasonable leaders. This resolution is now in the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and has not been reported.

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[1] Drafted by Lewis on Apr. 18 and cleared by Matthews. Attached to the source text was a note bearing the following handwritten notation: "I believe that this is about the best that can be done in regard to this very unsatisfactory matter. D[avid] B[ruce]"

[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

I have become very much concerned lest the reference to the Declaration of Human Rights in the German General Convention which is stronger than that in the Japanese Treaty cause similar or even greater difficulties when this document is laid before the Senate. We have taken a few highly confidential soundings on the Hill and these have strongly confirmed my fear that if the clause in the General Convention is left as it now is it will in all probability prevent Senate approval of the General Convention without a reservation.

That is the domestic political problem which is posed here. On the other hand, I am well aware of the situation in which we will be placed if we seek to eliminate or change this clause. I realize that it is inadvisable to reopen any provision of the General Convention without very good cause indeed, as this may lead any or all of the other three parties to propose the reopening of other provisions. I am also aware that many people in this country (the Jewish Groups have been especially vocal) feel very strongly that the Germans should express their intention to abide by the principles of the Declaration of Human Rights. A less practical but more substantial reason for not tampering with the particular clause in question is the embarrassing and unflattering light in which such a move would place the United States. Bearing in mind our past traditions and recent German history, I do not like the prospect of going to the Germans and asking them to remove or modify the clause in which they express their intention of respecting human rights, because of a strong political opposition in the United States to anything which remotely appears to suggest that the United States itself is committed to the observance of human rights.

After careful consideration of the pros and the cons I think you should approach the other parties to the Convention on a highly confidential basis and ask their agreement to change the language of the Convention to conform with that in the Japanese Treaty or to remove the clause altogether. In doing so you would, of course, have to give them an indication of the reason for our request. I realize that I am asking you to do a very difficult thing at almost the last minute. I should not do so were I not greatly concerned at the difficulties we will face in the Senate when the Convention comes before it.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

No. 22

662A.00/4-2552

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

SECRET . PERSONAL BAD GODESBERG, April 25, 1952.

DEAR DEAN: Upon receiving your letter of April 19[1] concerning the clause on human rights in the Preamble to the General Convention, I took this problem up with the Chancellor privately yesterday and discussed with him the possibility of omitting the clause entirely. I decided it was preferable to make this suggestion rather than to propose the language of the Japanese Treaty as the latter might encourage the Germans to suggest a substitution of other language from this treaty for some of the other provisions in the contractual agreements.

I explained to the Chancellor that the United States Senate had not yet considered the latest UN draft on human rights and consequently would be reluctant to accept any wording which might imply commitment in respect of this important matter before the Senate had had an opportunity to deal with its substance. I touched on some of the difficulties to which the language of the Japanese Treaty had given rise and told Adenauer that you greatly regretted the necessity of having to reopen any agreement already reached.

The Chancellor readily accepted the political necessity for your suggestion and agreed to delete the phrase, adding that he did not feel this in any way implied the United States had lost interest in protection of human rights. He asked, however, that we write him a letter which could explain the reasons why a clause of this nature does not appear in the agreements. He would not use the letter if it could be avoided, but it is obvious that he wishes to be protected against any criticism that Germany was not prepared to give assurances regarding respect for human rights.

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[1] *Supra.*

I also spoke very confidentially to Kirkpatrick and François-Poncet, both of whom are recommending to their governments to agree to drop the clause without publicity or unnecessary argument. The latter will discuss this in Paris with Schuman next week in order to avoid telegraphic exchanges, and Kirkpatrick is writing Eden directly.

Although it seems likely that we can without much difficulty obtain this modification of the Preamble, I believe our difficulties will come less from governments than from Jewish and other groups, particularly at home. On repeated occasions they have insisted that the new contracts with Germany should contain specific clauses regarding the protection of human rights as was done in the case of the Italian and satellite peace treaties. We have been able to meet this pressure by indicating that in the treaty Germany will recognize this problem and give some commitment even though it might be in the form of an expression of policy rather than a specific clause. I fear, therefore, that when the treaty is published, this omission will not pass unnoticed and the storm of criticism may be heavy. As your letter indicates, however, you are aware of this aspect of the problem.

I will let you know as soon as I can obtain answers from the British and French governments.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. McCLOY

No. 23

662A.00/4-2852: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, April 28, 1952—9 p. m.

2551. Fol is merely for your information as a general report on the status of our final negotiations. Requires no action.

We made good progress today with Chancellor,[2] but I sense that we are entering into a period when the Communists, SPD and neutralist propaganda is reaching its highest intensity. There has already appeared evidence of an undercover campaign taking form of threats of what might happen to Berlin and generally if the contractuals and EDF agreements are signed. This is paralleling the current peace and unity campaign. Result of this may be some FedRep pressure to moderate or modify provisions to which the Chancellor has already agreed as the outside pressure rises, but thus far Chancellor has indicated he would seek only modifications of form. Chancellor is clearly concerned over southwest state defection which complicates his position in Bundesrat.[3] I am also advised that Blank has refused in Paris to recognize the effect of the Chancellor's acceptance of the Fr proposal re propellants and perhaps other items in list II. I believe in this, Blank has the strong support of the military advisers and certain important polit leaders, and I fear that it is about to blossom into a tough obstacle.

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] McCloy reported on the meeting with Adenauer on Apr. 28 in telegrams 2553 and 2564 from Bonn. (662A.00/4-2852 and 262.0041/4-2952)

McCloy

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[3] On Apr. 25 the formation of a new coalition government in the South West German State resulted in the loss of control of the Bundesrat by the Adenauer government.

No. 24

662A.00/5-152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 1, 1952—10 p. m.

2614. Inform Defense (AgSec from Slater). Fol is brief summary report HICOMers/Chancellor mtg held 1 May 1952. Report on war criminals, fin discussion and executive session fols separate cable.[2]

1. General points.

In opening remarks I pointed out that we were behind schedule with all conventions which were to have been completed by 1 May. In particular on acts and interests and rights and obligations conventions there were a number minor points required settlement. I urged that experts be directed to have these conventions finalized and ready for initialling within next two days with instrs to reps on both sides to facilitate agreement by compromise. Chancellor then introduced two major points on form and presentation of conventions. First, he repeated arguments about inability of Bundestag reps to see forest for trees (see Para 1 of Bonn sent Dept 2553 of 28 April and 2507 of 25 April[3]) and then proposed that certain provi-

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Draper and MacArthur, and to London and Heidelberg.

[2] See Part I of telegram 2658, Document 28.

[3] Telegram 2553 reported, *inter alia*, that the Federal Republic would submit a list of specific points in the related conventions which would require Bundesrat ap-

Continued

sions which he described as negative in tone be revised to bring out positive aspect first with negative exceptions to appear at end of provisions. Wherever poss, he added, details of provisions shld be extracted from conventions and incorporated in separate admin agreements. Second, he produced rather extensive list[4] (copies being air-pouched Dept) of points in all conventions, except fin convention, affecting laender auth, agencies, procedures and revenues which wld require specific Bundesrat approval. Fed Govt's difficulties were increased in this connection he said, by broad interpretation Bundesrat gives to Art 84 of basic law. His fear was that on ratification SPD might seize on any one of these points as device to block ratification in Bundesrat. He mentioned incidentally that there were at least two similar points involving Bundesrat approval in EDC convention which he wld ask the Ger Del in Paris to examine.

On these points mtg agreed:

(a) That effort reach decision on outstanding points in convention shld proceed without delay and acts and interests and rights and obligations conventions be wound up as I proposed;

(b) After decision on outstanding points had been made, effort at high level wld be made to meet Chancellor's request for more positive expression certain provisions. Chancellor promised proposals on presentation by next Monday;

(c) Points of poss diff with Bundesrat will be assigned appropriate *rapporteur* groups for study. However, after cursory study list we informed Chancellor that whereas we cld meet him without diff on some points there remained others, such as, equalization of burdens tax exemptions, custody of common criminals, clemency, restitution, extradition and expulsions on which we cld not agree to separation from related conventions or basic modification. Such changes wld only involve risk of refusal of allied parliaments to ratify agreements.

With ref reports coalition leaders wld require postponement signature conventions to permit them time make intensive study of provisions, Chancellor said emphatically that conventions cld be signed by 20 May even taking into account any action which might be required as result of his proposals reported above.

2. Application and revision of rights and obligations convention.

Yesterday Gers circulated fol proposal:

"(1) This convention shall not apply to forces, either of three powers or of any other power, which form part of EDC.

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proval. Telegram 2507 reported that Adenauer had opened a meeting with the High Commissioners on Apr. 24 by commenting on the difficulties he was having in his Cabinet and coalition over the contractual conventions. (662A.00/4-2852 and 762A.0221/4-2552)

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

"(2) Subj to provisions of Art X of gen convention this convention shall be reviewed.

a. As soon as FedRep directly accedes to NATO.

b. If development of EDC appears to furnish appropriate reasons for uniformization of legal status of all forces stationed in fed territory."

With respect to Para 1, after considerable discussion between Berard and Adenauer, it was agreed Fr and Ger experts wld work out agreement covering provisions for Fr and Belg forces in transitional period between entry into force of contracts and full operation of EDC procedures. Adenauer was adamant that EDC convention shld confirm this agreement. Berard stated experts had agreed 30 June 1953 was reasonable expectation as to date of establishment EDC procedures.

With respect to Para 2, Chancellor finally agreed not to press for reference to FedRep membership of NATO. Mtg agreed to inclusion only of simple statement to effect that this convention shall be reviewed after two years.

3. Provision of information.

HICOMers agreed to drop specific requirement provision in rights and obligation convention for mutual exchange of info and statistics between Ger auths and forces relevant to performance and respective obligations under this convention.

[Here follows a discussion of transport services, hunting and fishing, customs exemptions, the preemergency clause, construction services, and the date of the next meeting.]

McCloy

No. 25

662A.00/4-2552

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy)[1]

SECRET AND PERSONAL WASHINGTON, May 2, 1952.

DEAR JACK: I deeply appreciate the steps you have so promptly taken as reported in your letter of April 25[2] to obtain agreement by Chancellor Adenauer and the British and French to the elimination from the Preamble to the General Convention of the clause on human rights. I understand your reasons for deciding to seek agreement to eliminating the clause rather than changing it to conform to that in the Japanese Treaty. I also understand the Chancellor's desire to have a letter explaining the omission of such a clause for use if he should be pressed hard on this point by elements in Germany.

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[1] Drafted by Lewis and Cates and Green of UNA and approved in draft by Matthews, Sandifer of UNA, and McFall of H. In a memorandum dated May 1, Secretary Acheson noted that he had that day discussed the paragraph on human rights with President Truman. This letter was drafted along the lines indicated below.

[2] Document 22.

I must confess, however, that I look with considerable concern upon the idea of thus recording in a letter which might well be published our reasons for wishing to see no mention of human rights in the contractual agreements. Furthermore, the Chancellor himself seems well aware of the implication of the omission of such a clause. For these reasons I have been casting about for an alternative which would eliminate the necessity for a letter to the Chancellor and at the same time avoid duplicating the language in the Japanese Treaty.

I have hit upon an alternative, which is to omit the present human rights clause and substitute in the preceding "*whereas*" clause the phrase "human rights" for "rights of the individual"; so the whole clause would read "*Whereas* the Federal Republic has developed free and responsible political institutions and is determined to maintain the liberal-democratic federal constitution which guarantees human rights and is enshrined in its Basic Law;"

This change has the merit of simplicity, should eliminate the need for a letter to the Chancellor, does not alter to any degree the meaning of the clause and inserts in the General Agreement a reference to human rights which would at least allay the criticism which will probably be voiced if specific mention of the term is not made.

A second alternative would be to substitute the following language for the clause now in the Preamble:

> "*Whereas* Germany recognizes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement and declares its intention to promote respect for those rights and freedoms;"

By the above language Germany would simply acknowledge the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, as did the Members of the United Nations in adopting this Declaration by a General Assembly resolution on December 10, 1948. The pertinent language in the Preamble of the Declaration reads as follows:

> "*The General Assembly,*
>
> *Proclaims* this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by

progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction."

Thus the Germans would be acknowledging a responsibility, no greater and no less than the members of the United Nations themselves. This would eliminate any implication of inequality of treatment for the Germans, which is, I know, a sore subject with them. In effect they would be doing in the general convention what they would have done had they been members of the UN and thus able to vote in favor of the General Assembly Resolution.

I cannot guage the difficulties which may face you in approaching other parties to the contractual agreements with another request in regard to the human rights clause. I prefer the first and simpler alternative. However, I leave to your judgment which one to use in the light of conditions there, with which you are more familiar than I.[3]

I am truly sorry to have to add this problem to all the others with which you are faced just now.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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[3] In discussions on the paragraph on human rights, which followed receipt of this letter in Bonn, McCloy was able to obtain agreement on the procedure proposed by Secretary Acheson in the third paragraph. For text of the convention on general relations with the agreed paragraph, see Document 51.

No. 26

662A.00/5-252: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 2, 1952—6 p.m.

2620. The fol release will be made simultaneously by EUCOM and HICOG at 1400 hours, Saturday, May 3.

"European Command Headquarters made the fol release today:

"'Embodied in the early planning for the establishment of the EDC and the contractual agreements with the Ger Fed Rep, plans were developed to terminate the occupation mission of the US forces in Ger and to effect a transition from an occupation status to a status of mutual defense in which milit forces of the Fed Rep wld participate.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

" 'The termination of occupation naturally embraces the discontinuance of certain support activities and services customarily rendered occupation forces by the indigenous economy. In anticipation, therefore, of the signing and ratification of the contractual agreements, it has been the intention of the US forces to initiate the phased reduction and final termination of certain of these support activities. It had been hoped that the recommendations of this command, to accomplish this intention which were initiated on a tripartite basis during Oct 1951, could have been agreed tripartitely prior to this date. This tripartite action has not yet taken place, and after consultation with the Dept of Def, it has been decided to initiate unilateral action at once by the US forces in Ger.

" 'In contemplation of an early signing and ratification of the contractual agreements, Headquarters' EUCOM is directing that steps be initiated at once to reduce, according to an orderly phased program designed to effect the termination of these activities by 30 June of this year, certain support services which do not meet US milit appropriations standards and which are furnished the US forces in Ger from indigenous resources of the Fed Rep. Support affected compromises several categories, principally for personal services, clubs, messes, etc. This action is being taken prior to the termination of occupation in the hope that it will in a measure advance the contribution of Ger milit forces to her own and the common defense of free nations.' "

"Commenting on this statement, the US High Commissioner for Ger, John J. McCloy, said:

" 'I am glad that a satisfactory solution of this matter can now be announced. General Handy and I have always had an understanding that such a step wld be taken in due course. It was hoped that it could be taken on a tripartite basis. Due to the difficulty of exact comparisons between the costs of the US forces and other Allied troops in Ger, a precise tripartite agreement on this matter could not be achieved at this time. However, even in the absence of such tripartite action in respect to these items it has been felt that the US should proceed unilaterally as it seemed clear the time for such action had arrived. EUCOMs announcement is very welcome and is in keeping with the policy of the US forces in Ger to keep costs to the minimum necessary for the accomplishment of their mission here.

" 'I am aware that this step represents substantial modification of certain conveniences and comforts which have been enjoyed in the past and I appreciate the real cooperation which this step evidences.' "

McCloy

No. 27

662A.00/5-252: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 2, 1952—8 p.m.

2631. Opposition to contractual agreements has sharply increased (see ourtel 2515 Dept, 791 Paris, 676 London, pouched Rome, Moscow, Berlin, April 25[2]) as coalition leaders were more fully informed about details of treaties. First major public outburst came with publication of article in FDP press service to effect that the party despaired "of the possibility of answering for present version of contracts" before the German people. In a press interview, DP joined FDP in criticizing contracts and there was increasing private CDU pressure against initialling contracts in present form.

In private conversation April 30, DP faction chief Muehlenfeld stated categorically that his party wld never approve contractual agreements in present form. While admitting that detailed study of already available portion of text had not yet been completed, Muehlenfeld nevertheless said it was clear by now that contracts contained so many obviously discriminatory provisions as to make acceptance by his faction impossible.

He warned against noticeably increasing optimism in Allied circles re early signature of contracts and predicted that "even Chancellor's well-known persuasive ability together with facilitating time factor, US Senate ratification wld not suffice to overcome strong opposition part all coalition parties."

Muehlenfeld explained that parliamentary experts were enumerating about twenty objectionable or unacceptable provisions allegedly contained in contracts. This list may be ready by May 6 and only then cld coalition leaders assess final position of their respective parties in order to determine specifically what portions of contracts shld be renegotiated or reformulated. To establish even semblance of equality, he hinted that "major changes" were necessary with respect to emergency and re-examination clauses, troop treaty and war criminals.

Muehlenfeld considered that opposition to contracts on part of DP were not owing to narrow-mindedness but "serious concern over future German democracy and European integration". He maintained that no responsible German politician cld support contracts which "resembled Versailles Treaty." This he added wld surely revive German nationalism in worst form and destroy growing democracy as well as European idea. Muehlenfeld thought that his party, while fully cognizant overall importance speedy west integration, was convinced that acceptance present contracts wld retard rather than promote this development. He concluded his remarks somewhat dramatically by insisting that he wld "rather see Russians march in than assist voluntarily in reducing Fed Rep to status of puppet." Undoubtedly he did not really mean this but it does reflect atmosphere now existing in entire coalition.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Rome, London, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 2515 reported that the first sign of possible coalition opposition to the contractuals had appeared in an article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, a leading conservative paper, on Apr. 24 which stated that many members of the FDP Bundestag faction were strongly opposed to parts of the conventions. (662A.00/4-2552)

Fol FDP Vorstand meeting May 1, which was mainly called for purpose of examining contractual agreements, Maier and Achenbach, both highly influential FDP leaders, expressed views to us which were practically identical with those of Muehlenfeld. Both Maier and Achenbach set forth, among others, the fol objections on those specific parts of the contractuals which they insisted wld never be accepted by coalition parties because of their humiliating and discriminatory nature:

(1) Emergency clause was found unacceptable because discriminatory, since other signatory powers not obliged to recognize same limitations.

(2) Fed Rep's responsibility to aid Berlin is willingly accepted by all Germans, but express imposition of this obligation in contracts humiliating and must be deleted.

(3) It shld not even be implied in contracts that the three Ambassadors can act collectively as has been case with HICOM. In an emergency this possibility wld be self-evident.

(4) All mention of stationing of troops shld be eliminated from general contract since troop convention fully provides for this.

(5) Additional financial burdens shld not be added to those already agreed upon in Paris; for example, payment for damages caused by occupation troops.

(6) German authorities shld not be obliged to carry out unconstitutional act of administering war crimes sentences imposed by foreign tribunals.

(7) It wld be "huge political blunder" to insist that rights as well as responsibilities established in contracts for Fed Rep applied in principle to a united Germany since Soviets cld make similar treaties with east zone govt and thus perpetuate division of Germany.

(8) "Petrification of occupation law" in forms of continuing in force individual Allied occupation laws until replaced by German legislative action violates Hague convention and amounts to encroachment upon freedom of Bundestag to legislate.

(9) Many provisions now contained in contracts shld be deleted and reserved for settlement in peace treaty. This applies especially to the settlement concerning German foreign assets.

(10) Term "West Europe" in contracts shld be changed to read merely "Europe" so as to avoid any misleading geographical limitations, especially as regards Soviet zone.

Maier and Achenbach gave as further reason for FDP objection to contracts in present form their party's belief that present version of contracts is not consistent with principles of Sept 1951 Washington declaration three Foreign Ministers.[3] Both leaders made it abundantly clear that FDP's answer if confronted with take it or leave it on present version of contractuals wld have to be, "no". Maier informed us that Finance Minister Schaeffer had threatened the Cabinet with his resignation if additional financial burdens were imposed by contractuals.

We believe vehement opposition to contracts caused mainly by a complex of the fol motives, relative importance of which cannot as yet be properly evaluated:

(1) Genuine concern over actual effect of contracts on future of Germany as an independent state.

(2) Anxiety as to the severe strain to which the coalition will be subjected arising from popular reaction to present form of treaties.

(3) Irritation of parties over Chancellor's failure to consult them during negotiations.

(4) Normal desire of parties to demonstrate their German patriotism.

(5) Desire to pressure Western powers into last minute concessions.

In evaluation foregoing, it shld be borne in mind that though leaders interviewed stated categorically that present version contracts completely unacceptable to their parties, they did not by any means despair of an eventual solution, and appeared confident that agreement cld be reached and ratification achieved.

We will be better able to evaluate seriousness of opposition next Tuesday when parties will have drawn up detailed list of objections.[4]

McCLOY

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[3] Documentation on the tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington, Sept. 10-14, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.

[4] For a report on the meeting on May 8 to consider this list, see telegram 2749, Document 29.

No. 28

662A.00/5-452: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, May 4, 1952—8 p. m.

2658. Dept inform Defense. Ref Bonn sent Dept 2614, rptd London 711, Paris 832, Heidelberg 481. [2] In view several important developments in connection FedRep defense contribution, are summarizing meeting Chancellor/HICOMers May 1 (part I), memo submitted by Chancellor to HICOMers [3] (part II), conversation McCloy/Schaeffer/Binns (part III), and comments on fin charges to FedRep which Adenauer memo states were not taken into account by EB of TCC (part IV).

Part I.

1. *Rapporteur* group had referred to May 1 HICOMers/Chancellor meeting Art 8 (A) parallel column text (payments by FedRep to satisfy claims for occupation damages shall not be chargeable against defense contribution that FedRep wld satisfy claims outside defense contribution). Chancellor requested this be deferred to Exec session to discuss general financial situation FedRep.

2. Chancellor opened discussion Exec session saying FedRep in precarious financial positions, that cash situation endangered by large expenditures for occupation costs in Mar, and that Chancellor was seriously alarmed over unfavorable trend. He said Schaeffer had sent him a memo analyzing FedRep's financial position, the cumulative effect of various contractual commitments on FY 1952/1953 position, and stating Schaeffer's belief situation so alarming as to convince Schaeffer he cld not in good faith, be held responsible for disastrous financial position he was convinced wld develop.

3. Adenauer said he recognized Schaeffer's tendency to exaggerate, but in view of Schaeffer's dire predictions, he had independent survey made which was then read to HICOMers. Adenauer remarked that although independent survey not as extreme as Schaeffer's memo, it nevertheless essentially verified Schaeffer's views.

4. I said that we wld study the statement and discuss it with the Chancellor shortly. I felt that I cld not make a detailed reply but desire to call his attention to fact that while I was surprised in rate

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Draper and to London and Heidelberg.

[2] Document 24.

[3] No copy of the memorandum has been found in Department of State files, but its contents are summarized in Part II below.

of expenditure in Mar, I nevertheless believe it did not represent any extravagances and was a consequence of the low rate of payments made in previous months. Mar expenditures for FY 1951/1952, including Mar, were within the occupation cost budget. FinMin had deluded itself if it believed that low rate of payments cld continue for prolonged period of time. I told the Chancellor all of the Allies have made substantial efforts to keep their costs down and to honor the commitment made by the ForMin. Adenauer said he did not want to question the justice of the Mar payments at this time but will investigate. However, even if these payments were justifiable, it did not alter the fact that the FedRep was approaching a dangerous financial condition. We concluded by requesting that the memo be given extremely limited distribution.

Part II.

1. Memo submitted by Chancellor contains two main points:

(a) Occupation costs at rate DM 1.4 billion Mar (actual), DM 850 million (estimated) April and average DM 600 million in subsequent months to July 31 justified to FedRep by HICOM will result in deficits which cannot be covered without raising DM 1.5 credit ceiling with Central Bank. This is impossible because of inflationary result.

(b) As result TCC hearing, FedRep was prepared to make defense contribution DM 11.25 billion, divided DM 10.2 billion for cost Ger contingents and Allied troop support costs; and DM 1.05 billion for other public expenditures of defense character. Allied positions and already agreed sections of general agmt and conventions wld mean additional burden of almost DM 2 billion in FY 1952/1953 over and above DM 11.25 contribution (occupation damages, resettlement of occupation evicted persons personal restitution, compensation of persecutees, exemptions from indirect taxation and high cigarette/coffee rations. (See part IV below for details.)

FedRep in agreeing to DM 11.25 billion contribution was not prepared to assume additional burdens and, in fact, cannot because econ capacity limitations.

2. Solutions offered are point (a) reduction occupation costs in pre-contractual period, modification conventions on points (b) and/or provision of foreign aid. Otherwise FedRep must apply to TCC for re-assessment on ground points under (b) not previously taken into consideration and that econ expansion is not meeting TCC expectations.

3. Fol are analyses current situation:

Point (a) examination of FedRep's budgetary prospects indicates that if occupation costs are limited to DM 600 million monthly average for Apr-July period as agreed HICOM (see our 2430[4]) Fed budget will at least balance and probably show surplus.

(DM million)
(Figures are in five columns entitled "April, May, June, July, total period April-July")
Federal expenditures

(A) Occupation costs: 850, 500, 550, 500, 2400.
(B) Non-recognized OC: 28, 30, 30, 32, 120.
(C) Other: 930, 978, 1050, 950, 3908.

Total: 1808, 1508, 1630, 1482, 6428.

(DM million)
Federal revenues

(A) Federal taxes: 1170, 1310, 1360, 1230, 5070.
(B) Shared taxes: 190, 150, 520, 190, 1050.
(C) Other: 95, 106, 155, 126, 482.

Total: 1455, 1566, 2035, 1546, 6602.
Deficit (minus) or surplus (plus): Minus 353, plus 58, plus 405, plus 64, plus 174.

(Estimate assumes no change in tax or expenditure laws, revenues slightly lower than previous period and expenditures slightly higher). If govt bill changing FedRep income tax share to 40 percent from present 27 percent effective by June 1, revenues and surplus will be DM 300-350 million higher for period. In event large deficit arising (which is inconceivable given our present info) FedRep had Mar 31, DM 854 million left under credits ceiling 85 Central Bank (Apr 30, DM 485 million according to memo) and already planned to sell at least DM 150 million in coins to Central Bank before July 31.

Past history of special non-rediscountable treasury certificates (these do not fall under DM 1.5 billion credit ceiling) leads us believe even further funds could be made available through new issue in spite of argument in memo to effect that Central Bank having difficulty refunding those already outstanding.

4. Keystone of favorable outlook presented above is the matter of giving effect to our DM 600 million average monthly limitation beginning Apr 1. AgSec (52) 331 dated 8 April[5] to Chancellor announcing limitation was phrased "issue payment documents" rather than actual expenditures as agreed HICOM (HICOM/M (52) 6 date 3 Apr[5]) and earlier HICOM-EUCOM agmt (our 1878[6]). This

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[4] Telegram 2430 reported that at a meeting on Apr. 16 Schaeffer had protested about the occupation expenditures for March which had risen to DM 1,368 million as compared to DM 577 million for the previous month. (762A.0221/4-1852)

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] Telegram 1878 reported that at a meeting on Mar. 5 EUCOM and HICOG had agreed to limit U.S. occupation costs to DM 1020 million for the 4-month period beginning Apr. 1. (740.5/3-752)

done to protect against FedRep delaying payment on bills at end of pre-contractual period so that payment wld have to [be] made under Allied defense costs. FedRep apparently believes, as indicated memo, that limitation does not apply to Apr expenditures up to 25th day when Federal accounts on 1951/1952 occupation budget close since orders for these payments presumably issued in Mar. Have already secured UK agreement that limitation agreed HICOM was for all expenditures from this or previous years budgets by Ger payment offices between Apr 1 and July 31. If Fr agreement received, HICOM can clear up FedRep misunderstanding and satisfy fears expressed in memo on pre-contractual period without giving away anything not already conceded.

Part III.

1. At meeting Schaeffer/McCloy/Binns May 2, we stated that we on our side are also very surprised at expenditure figure for Mar of DM 1 billion 460 million. We pointed out that liquidation or reduction of carryover in itself created a healthier situation and that we wld do everything in our power to keep occupation cost expenditure within the four months period Apr 1 to July 31 to total of DM 2.4 billion on an average monthly rate of DM 600 million regardless of fact that Apr expenditure amounted to DM 900 million. We pointed out that a carryover from the occupation period into defense period was politically much more difficult for us than carryover from one defense period to another defense period.

2. Min Schaeffer stated that when he gave his agreement to the Ger defense contribution of 850 DM million per month, he had done so on basis of his assumption that occupation costs wld be about DM 500 million per month and that he was justified in making that assumption because average expenditure in the past years had been at that rate and that an increase in troop strength wld be counter-balanced by economies. He had assumed that the carryover from the last occupation cost period wld be handled in the same way as in previous years and that there wld not be an accelerated liquidation. His agreement was further based on assumption that there wld be no additional expenditure of a defense nature outside the DM 850 million per month which are now contained in occupation costs budgets or in budgets for non-occupation costs. He thought that we now had only two alternatives:

a. To accept the fact that there was no meeting of the minds at the time of the previous agreement on defense contribution and to reopen the discussion or,

b. To invoke the clause that the FedRep can request aid if conditions do not permit her to fulfill the obligations.

3. We pointed out that we cld not accept his contention that there had been no meeting of minds since we had emphasized at the time of the agreement that occupation costs wld probably be as high as DM 600 million per month and that the responsibility for his political difficulties rested on him because of his published statements, contrary to the info we had given him, that occupation costs wld be limited to DM 500 million per month.

In regard to second alternative FedRep cld, of course, request additional aid but we cld make no statement as to whether such a request wld be received favorably. We pointed out, however, that in our view situation not in accord with that envisaged in Adenauer/ForMin Lisbon agreement,[7] since in that agmt FedRep cld request aid if FedRep ran into serious financial difficulties in defense period as result its defense contribution. Since defense period had not even commenced we cld offer Schaeffer no encouragement.

Part IV.

1. Comments on charges which memo states were not taken into account by TCC.

(a) Occupation damages. FY 1953 DM 400 million. Total DM 1500 million. Understand State/Defense have agreed these charges not to be included as part Ger defense contribution. A major objective is to avoid payment dollars for liquidation occupation. Ger estimates being reviewed by forces.

(b) Non-recognized OC. FY 1953 DM 450 million. Main category is resettlement charges for persons evicted from property taken over by Allied forces. Gers desire charge this against (a) Allied support costs or (b) global contribution. So far we have insisted neither possibility acceptable.

(c) Restitution claims. FY 1953 DM 150 million. Total DM 1500 million. Preliminary check indicates figures conform Allied estimates. Charge spread over ten years.

(d) Persecutee claims. FY 1953 DM 350 million. Total DM 3000-3500 million. Understand Laender scheduled to bear about 2/3 rd's burden. Ten year spread.

(e) Tax exemption and smuggling by forces. Imputed tax loss FY 1953 is DM 500 million. Not properly classifiable with (a)–(d).

2. Foregoing figures wld give actual FedRep burden not taken into account by TCC of about DM 1235 million. If defense period commences later than 30 June 1952, amount wld be correspondingly reduced; also defense burden itself wld be less than DM 11250 million.

3. While in our judgment prospective short-run fin position does not give rise to alarm, we are somewhat less sanguine in respect to entire FY 1952/1953. However, believe it too early to make any

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[7] See footnote 2, Document 20.

judgment now because of many variables including fact that any delay in ratification beyond June 30 will reduce defense contribution below DM 11250 million.

Danger in situation lies in fact that Schaeffer and memo essentially correct in stating that EB of TCC had not considered additional burdens enumerated above in assessing FedRep's fin capacity (because FedRep had not agreed to assume all these obligations at time of TCC hearing FedRep had not brought all of them out). In view Adenauer's alarm over situation and Schaeffer's determination to obtain some relief it may become advisable for us to agree to some form of non-recognized occupation costs in defense contribution, probably in Allied share thereof. This might fend off likelihood of FedRep request for new TCC hearing, request for additional aid, or attempt by Schaeffer to get Chancellor to repudiate Lisbon agmt as bargaining device to reverse AHC/Chancellor's agmts on claims, restitution: et cetera.

McCLOY

No. 29

662A.00/5-952 Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 9, 1952—3 p. m.

2749. At meeting High Commissioners/Chancellor on 8 May, revised German list points in conventions requiring Bundesrat approval (copy air pouched Department) was presented. [2] List divided in two parts; first, provisions certainly requiring Bundesrat approval; second, provisions where need Bundesrat approval matter of interpretation. Lists included at least five items of major importance from Allied point of view: re constitution, exemption from *Laender* taxes, decartelization, use of *Laender* property and services, equalization of burdens.

After considerable discussion, Chancellor proposed that all provisions requiring Bundesrat approval should be separated from conventions and made subject of separate treaty which would be presented for ratification simultaneously with general agreement and related conventions. When pinned down, however, he would not agree to any provision whereby entry into effect of general agreement and related conventions would be dependent upon ratification of second treaty with items requiring Bundesrat approval.

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[1] Repeated to London and to Paris for Draper and MacArthur.

[2] This meeting took place at 11 a. m. No copy of the list has been found in Department of State files. In addition to the list the Chancellor and the High Commissioners discussed damage claims and a tripartite reply to the Soviet note on German unity of Apr. 9. McCloy reported on these discussions in telegrams 2744 and 2742 from Bonn, May 9 and 8. (740.5/5-952 and 662.00/5-852)

We informed Chancellor that while we were prepared to accept minor changes in present texts conventions to meet possible difficulties with Bundesrat, we could not agree to separation of provisions on five major items referred to above and possibly others for independent or subsequent ratification. We pointed out: (a) undesirability on agreements of this importance of adopting any procedure aimed at circumventing Federal Republic constitutional arrangements; (b) that effect of isolating points requiring Bundesrat approval, which include many financial and other unpopular requirements in one treaty would be to enable opposition to concentrate fire on these items at time of ratification; (c) that it appeared tactically more advantageous to present agreements to Parliament in one package so that fact that positive features of settlement outweigh negative ones would be apparent. I pointed out that US Congress would never ratify in this session two independent treaties, leaving open possibility that later German Parliament might accept first treaty favorable to it and reject second.

Berard informed Chancellor that Schuman, while willing to make minor amendments in texts agreements to meet Chancellor, would not accept at this stage any major changes. Furthermore, procedure suggested by Chancellor would not be acceptable to French Parliament. UK member indicated he also had instructions not to accept any modification of substance on these points at this time although in meeting Chancellor asked High Commissioners to raise his proposal with their governments, later in private session he agreed to drop his proposal for the two treaty approach; however, he said he would submit proposals for dealing with the five major points cited above. I indicated that while Allies would insist that these points be contained in the conventions, we would give up points which are not important to us.

High Commissioners meeting Chancellor again 1430 hours 9 May.[3]

McCloy

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[3] For a report on this meeting, see telegram 2766, Document 33.

No. 30

762A.00/5-952: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 9, 1952—9 p. m.

2760. Last night I met with some of those influential coalition leaders who have been mostly concerned with contractual agreements and who are known to be rather critical of certain provisions contained in contracts. [2] Mtg was arranged at request of Gerstenmaier and attended on German side by Brentano, Gerstenmaier, Strauss, CDU/CSU, Schaeffer and Preusker, FDP, Muehlenfeld and Merkatz, DP.

General treaty. Germans voiced unanimous and strong misgivings with respect to Article V, paras 2 and 3. [3] Though they fully recognized necessity of protecting security of Allied troops stationed in FedRep, they felt present formulation violated principle of equality and was incompatible with idea of true partnership. Germany urged reformulation of entire article for purpose of completely separating what they called external and internal emergencies. With respect to former, i.e., emergencies caused by open aggression, Germans agreed to accept present formula. As regards internal emergencies caused by disorder, strikes, etc., they insisted that govt shld be given veto right which wld limit Allied powers to protection of security of their own forces alone. Germans also recommended in case of such veto that govt be given right immediately to file appeal with NATO which wld promptly render final decision together with EDC commissioner. Proposal to include EDC commissioner in NATO arbitration body motivated primarily by desire to give Germans indirect voice on arbitration board.

Re Article VII, para 2, [4] Germans fully agreed in principle but considered it politically unwise to attempt to commit possible future all-German Govt to accept general contract prior to formation of such a govt. They expressed anxiety that opposition wld severely attack this provision and claimed that it wld impede German unity and encourage Soviets to conclude similar restrictive treaty with GDR. Though Germans realized that this article had been included in contracts at Chancellor's request, they felt it was completely superfluous and shld either be deleted or drastically revised.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] The meeting was held at 10:30 at Reber's house.

[3] Article V of the general convention dealt with the rights of the Allies to protect the security of their armed forces in the Federal Republic.

[4] Article VII dealt with the final peace settlement and German unity.

FDP leaders strongly urged that term "Allied powers" shld be replaced throughout contracts by "signatory states" or by name of govt concerned if necessary, and all signatories be named in the text as equal and individual entities freely negotiating with one another rather than on three to one basis. They pointed out that this wld in no way limit right of Ambassadors to consult jointly but wld greatly improve outward appearance of treaties. CDU and DP leaders urged acceptance of this proposal.

Provisions on war criminals were criticized primarily by DP and FDP. CDU dels seemed to have no major reservations and gave only weak support to their colleagues. DP leaders recommended *inter alia* early release of war criminals of type of Manstein and Kesselring as gesture of good will. However, I gained impression that DP and FDP objections to war criminal provisions were not really fundamental and that review board procedure, if instituted at an early date, wld placate them.

Economic restrictions, particularly on DKV, deconcentration, distribution of shares in newly reorganized companies, etc., encountered some opposition from FDP and DP leaders. They recommended that these provisions shld be included in transitional agreement but not in general contract and repealed as soon as Schuman Plan authority starts to function.

Discussion broke up at 1:30 p. m. [*a. m.*?] and Germans undoubtedly had other reservations with respect to subsidiary convention, especially as regards troop treaty, financial contribution, and several provisions which they claimed belonged in final peace treaty rather than in contracts. There was no time to discuss these in detail. I told Germans that I wld consider their objections where possible but made it very clear at same time that I cld make no commitment of any kind to them because of delicate balance of interests necessary for ratification of treaties as contribution to long-term international objectives and as proof of permanence of US interests in Europe. I underlined latter point by explaining vital importance of early Senate ratification. I left mtg with feeling that opposition to treaties had been considerably diminished through this first opportunity to discuss matter personally with us.

McCloy

No. 31

762A.0221/4-1952

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for the expression of your interest, in your letter of April 19, [2] in the early completion of the negotiations of the contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic and of the treaty to establish the European Defense Community. There are still a number of questions remaining to be solved in the contractual arrangements, particularly in the field of the German financial contribution to defense and the support of the Allied forces in Germany. The solution of these questions will undoubtedly require the closest collaboration between our respective Departments.

Your letter refers to two questions in this particular field. The first has to do with the unliquidated balance of obligations incurred by the Allied forces which will exist at the time of the entry into force of the contractual arrangements. I understand that since the date of your letter, this matter has been the subject of conversations between representatives of our respective Departments, and of Mr. Harriman's office.

The establishment of the total German financial contribution to defense during the NATO fiscal year 1952/53, which was finally resolved in the agreement reached between the Foreign Ministers of the three occupying powers and Chancellor Adenauer during the Lisbon Conference, [3] proved to be one of the most difficult problems encountered during the negotiations of the contractual arrangements. As you may recall, Chancellor Adenauer requested that the amount which the Germans should spend for defense should be fixed on the same basis as that of the NATO countries and under a similar procedure. The German desires in this respect appeared to the three governments to be reasonable, and we requested the members of the Executive Bureau of the TCC to consider the German case and recommend a total contribution for Germany which would be comparable to that of the other principal countries participating in Western defense. After two hearings of representatives of the Federal Republic and an intensive study of the German economic and financial position, the members of the

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[1] Drafted by Reinstein on Apr. 28 and retyped on May 9. According to another copy attached to the source text, it was cleared by Lewis and Matthews.

[2] Document 20.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 20.

Executive Bureau recommended a total contribution of DM 11.2 billion. The Germans were quite reluctant to accept this figure, which was considerably in excess of their own estimate of the maximum figure which the German economy could sustain and which it would be possible for the Federal Government to finance. However, Mr. Eden, Mr. Schuman and I pressed Chancellor Adenauer very strongly to accept the figure, and the High Commission eventually, with considerable difficulty, worked out a formula based upon the recommendation of the members of the Executive Bureau, which it was possible for both the Germans and the three powers to accept. The agreed formula was that the Germans should pay an average of DM 850 million per month from the effective date of the EDC Treaty and the contractual arrangements until June 30, 1953 for the support of Allied forces and the German contribution to the EDC, in addition to certain other defense expenditures which will be carried in the ordinary German public budgets.

I think it was the clear intent of the recommendation to the four governments by the members of the Executive Bureau, and of the agreement made at Lisbon, to establish the total amount which would be paid by the Federal Government for defense expenditures during the NATO year 1952/53, once the contractual arrangements have come into force. Any such expenditures during that period must come out of the agreed total of DM 850 million per month. Any other approach to the problem would mean that we would be asking the Germans to pay more than an objective study of their economic position, which has been accepted by the three governments, had indicated they could pay. I think this would obviously be a very difficult position for us to take and one which, it seems to me, would be prejudicial to the rapid conclusion of the negotiations.

It follows from this that the expenditures made for the benefit of the forces once the contractual arrangements come into force, regardless of the date at which obligations were incurred, must be paid out of the sums made available to the forces from the German defense contribution. This has already been agreed by the Allied High Commission.

While the sum to be made available for the support of the Allied forces during the NATO year 1952/53 has not yet been agreed, it seems to me that the funds which are likely to be made available for the benefit of the United States forces should be adequate to pay for any expenditures which may be required to liquidate obligations undertaken prior to the contractual arrangements. I understand that no figures are available on the amount of obligations outstanding at the present time, but I recall that in earlier discussions, representatives of the United States forces in Germany estimated the carryover at the beginning of the current German fiscal year would amount to approximately one billion Deutsche Marks.

Your letter also suggests we should obtain an undertaking from the Germans that any funds made available for the United States forces out of the United States contribution should remain available until expended. The Department has instructed Mr. McCloy to seek German agreement to this proposal. I think that the drafting of appropriate language for such an understanding can best be left to the negotiators in Germany.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

No. 32

762A.0221/5-952

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Reinstein)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1952.

Subject: Financial Support of British Troops in Germany

Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States
The Secretary
Mr. James C.H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. Jacques J. Reinstein, GER

Sir Oliver read to the Secretary instructions which he had received from Mr. Eden on the subject of the German contribution to defense and its effect on the British position. He said that these instructions had been conveyed to him after the problem had been considered by the Cabinet.

In the first place, the British Government was anxious that the United States Government should be fully cognizant of the longer-term implications of conclusion of the contractual arrangements with respect to the British position. It was clear from the studies which have been made at Paris that the cost of building up the German contingents would rise very rapidly in the NATO Fiscal Year 1953-1954. In consequence, there is little prospect that all or a substantial part of the cost of support of the British Forces in Germany after June 30, 1953, can be met from the German contribution. The British Government is most anxious to carry out the commitments which it made at Lisbon with respect to the stationing of British Forces in Germany, to which it attaches great strategic importance. At the same time, in the light of the hard realities of the British economic position, a very serious problem will be posed. An increase in the United Kingdom's defense budget would involve very serious strains. Beyond this, the situation involves the most serious implications from the view point of the British balance of payments situation. The Ambassador indicated that the British Government does not wish at this time to do more than to impress these facts upon the American Government. They will have to be taken up in the next NATO review.

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[1] Drafted on May 13. Copies were sent to Paris, London, Bonn, the Departments of Defense and the Treasury, and to the Mutual Security Agency

The Ambassador said that the British Government is also concerned regarding the development of the shorter-term problem of the support costs for the year 1952-1953. In the light of the discussions which have been going on in Bonn and Paris, the British Government questions whether the Germans can in fact spend the sums of money which have been suggested in these discussions. It is concerned that the United States may, in an effort to bring about a speedy conclusion of the negotiations, press for a reduction in the figure of Allied support costs. Economies have been made in the expenditures of the United Kingdom Forces in Germany; some additional economies may be possible, but they will be marginal. In any event, they are likely to be swallowed up by costs which have not been budgeted for, such as the possible re-deployment of British Forces in response to the requirements of SHAPE. The United Kingdom Forces would need their full share of the DM 6.8 billion which had been agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers in London.[2] The British Government hopes that the United States will support this position in the negotiations now under way. The Ambassador pointed out that a reduction in the funds available for the United Kingdom forces would, in effect, cause the longer-term problem to which the British Government had referred to arise during the year 1952-1953.

The Ambassador said that it was not to be inferred from these representations that the British Government was not anxious to proceed to the conclusion of the contractual arrangements as soon as possible. This is, in fact, its desire.

Mr. Acheson said that we were quite aware of the longer-term problem to which the Ambassador had referred. It had been agreed at London that it would be difficult at this time to reach any conclusion as to what should be done after June 30, 1953. The matter had therefore been left for later discussion when there would be more clarity as to what the Germans could do, the British situation and other factors.

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[2] The records of the Foreign Ministers discussions at London, February 13-19, are printed in vol. v, Part 1, pp. 36 ff.

Mr. Acheson said that we had been looking into the problem of dividing the German contribution for the first year. The cost of the German contingents during the year 1952-1953 has been estimated by the Allies as DM 4.2 billion, and by the Germans at DM 7.7 billion. This represented a narrowing of the previous difference, which had been between DM 9 billion on the German side and DM 3.1 billion on the Allied side. The German estimates were probably still excessive. Mr. Acheson pointed out that if, as now seemed likely, the EDC treaty were not ratified until the fall, the last quarter of the year would, in effect, be shifted into the following fiscal year. This would involve a considerable reduction in the estimated costs of the German contingents, since the costs were proportionately much larger in the last quarter. The figure for the last quarter, according to the Allied calculation, is DM 1.8 billion, which would reduce the Allied figure to DM 2.4 billion for nine months. The German estimate for the last quarter is DM 3.4 billion, which would reduce the total for nine months, on their calculation, to DM 4.3 billion.

Mr. Acheson said that in the light of these considerations the problem appeared to be of manageable proportions. However, reconciling the figures would involve a very tight fit. Mr. Acheson pointed out that the DM 6.8 billion figure for Allied troop support which the Foreign Ministers had agreed at Lisbon was a maximum figure and was to be subject to reductions. Non-defense expenditures, for example, were to be taken out. He felt that an effort should be made to see what could be done in the way of reducing costs in the field of defense expenditures. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that, in the discussions in the Tripartite Group on Germany prior to the Paris and Rome meetings in 1951, the British had proposed a flat cut in the troop support budgets for the first defense year of twenty to twenty-five per cent below the occupation cost budget for 1951-1952.

The Ambassador said he would report this conversation to his Government.

On May 10, the Ambassador called on Mr. Bonbright and Mr. Reinstein to ask whether, in the event the EDC treaty and the contractual agreement were not ratified until the fall, the German contribution for the NATO Fiscal Year 1952/53 would still be DM 10.2 billion. He said that, if the contribution were reduced say to DM 7 1/2 billion, a substantial problem would still remain. The Ambassador assumed that under these circumstances the Allied troop cost figure would still be DM 6.8 billion.

It was explained to the Ambassador that the contribution, by agreement between the Foreign Ministers and Chancellor Adenauer, had been fixed at DM 850 million per month from the effective date of the treaties until June 30, 1953. However, the troop support cost figure would also be reduced by something like DM 600 million per month, since we would continue to receive occupation costs until the treaties became effective.

The Ambassador was satisfied with this explanation.

No. 33

662A.00/5-1052: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 10, 1952—8 p.m.

2766. Inform Defense.

1. At mtg High Commissioners/Chancellor on May 9, discussion continued points in conventions requiring Bundesrat approval. [2] See ourtel to Dept 2749, rptd info London 766, Paris 886. [3] Hallstein stated Gers had reconsidered certain important items and now felt equalization of burdens exemption did not require Bundesrat approval.

2. Hallstein also stated necessity Bundesrat approval cld be obviated on two other major points as follows:

(a) On use of *Laender* property by the forces, Fed Govt cld undertake to furnish such property free of charge, thus assuming responsibility to make arrangements with the *Laender* and to pay any rent or other charges. Fin Min proposed this provision shld be in separate ltr but after discussion agrmt was reached for inclusion provision in convention.

(b) On tax exemption of forces and their members Fin Min proposed convention provide specific exemption from all taxes of character not in fact requiring Bundesrat approval; agrmt of Fed Govt to introduce special legis exempting from taxes in which *Laender* or municipalities shared; and agrmt that legis so submitted wld govern certain agreed exemptions etc. Fin Min indicated this method followed in EDC treaty proposal.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Harris, Draper, and MacArthur and to London.

[2] At their meeting on May 9 the Chancellor and the High Commissioners also discussed guided missiles, the Finance Convention, the preemergency clause, the possibility that the contractuals might take effect before final ratification, and the Acts and Interests Convention. McCloy reported on these discussions in telegrams 2764, 2765, 2767, 2763, and 2770, May 10 and 11, from Bonn. (Telegrams 2764 and 2765, 740.5/5-1052; 762A.00/5-1052, 662A.00/5-1052, and 762A.0221/5-1152)

[3] Document 29.

Possibility advanced that agrmt might state exemption from income taxes and corporate taxes, in which laender share, on ground such exemption in accordance principals intl law for troops temporarily in foreign territory.

Pressed for coverage for period prior to adoption law granting exemption Chancellor finally agreed undertaking by Fed Govt to reimburse for *Laender* and municipal taxes exacted during each period.

When pressed Fin Min agreed such tax reimbursement shld not be credited against FedRep def contribution but wld affect its "incapacity to pay" and therefore shld be considered in the future. We pointed out that involved no net payment out of Ger economy and obviously had no effect whatsoever on FedRep capacity.

3. Believe proposals out[lined above?] avoid Bundesrat problem and furnish basis for working out suitable contractual provisions.

4. Regarding contractual provisions affecting "procedure" of laender auths, new proposals were presented on restitution and certain rights and obligations provisions. These under study.

McCloy

No. 34

662A.00/5-1452: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 14, 1952—8 p.m.

2823. Adenauer in 13 May session with High Commissioners reported results of weekend mtgs with Cabinet and reps of coalition parties at which time he was asked to raise fol seven major points with High Commissioners. [2]

(A) Declaration of State of Emergency:

Chancellor said SPD was centering on Art 5, gen convention as one of main issues in campaign against contractuals. He stressed importance attached by coalition to this art and need for making distinction between emergency created by external attack and one brought on by internal disturbance. He also said art cld be made more acceptable in appearance and extraordinary measures taken only where FedRep and EDC are not in position to deal with situation. Chancellor said Ger proposals mainly involved matters of form rather than substance. Kirkpatrick and I replied that deletion of phrase "if they find that" in para 2 present text involved major change of substance, particularly in view fact this phrase had been employed in text from outset. I stated further that any change this key art wld require most careful consideration and asked for submission Ger draft. This draft (text of which being cabled separately [3]) rearranges order of paras and provides, *inter alia*, that when Ger EDC contingents are formed, FedRep wld have right of objection to declaration state of emergency with final decision taken by NATO Council together with EDC commissariat. We agreed to discuss matter further at mtg with Chancellor Thurs. [4]

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Draper and MacArthur and to London.

[2] On May 11 McCloy had transmitted an account given him by Blankenhorn of an 11-hour meeting on May 10 between Adenauer and his Cabinet and the leading coalition leaders. Although the outlook in the meeting at first seemed very dark, Blankenhorn stated that the Chancellor was convinced at the end that he had made real progress in overcoming objections to the contractuals, even though only the general convention and parts I and II of the acts and interests convention had been discussed. (Telegram 2768 from Bonn, 762A.00/5-1152)

(B) Deconcentration:

See immed fol cable report this subj, Bonn to Dept 2822 rptd London 922, Paris 912. [5]

(C) Exemption from equalization of burdens taxation:

Question of exemption of UN companies from equalization of burden taxation was reopened and Schaeffer proposed procedure whereby companies wld pay tax and UN shareholders these companies wld be reimbursed. I replied that we had considered this proposal on previous occasions and found it too complex and, therefore, not practical. Kirkpatrick outlined Allied arguments for exemption and stressed unfavorable reaction of Allied govts to change in view fact that companies had been informed settlement already reached on this point. Chancellor then asked for ltr from High Commissioners stating reasons for rejection proposal, implying that on this basis he was willing to let matter drop.

(D) War Criminals:

Mtg discussed problems procedure to be followed by clemency board and arrangements for custody. (See Art VI paras 8 and 11 of SPCOM/P (52) 23 (A) of 10 May 1952 [6]). (Reported separate cable [7]).

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[3] Telegram 2824 from Bonn, May 14. (662A.00/5–1452)

[4] On May 16 McCloy reported that at their meeting with the Chancellor on Thursday, May 15, the High Commissioners rejected the German proposal and presented certain counterproposals designed to meet as far as possible the desiderata of the Federal Republic. Adenauer accepted this counterproposal as did the Department of State. McCloy's report was transmitted in telegram 2857 from Bonn. (662A.00/5–1652) The Department of State acceptance was transmitted in telegram 3194 to Bonn, May 17. (662A.00/5–1652) For the agreed text of Article 5, see Document 51.

[5] This telegram and telegram 2816 from Bonn, both dated May 14, reported on the discussions on May 13 concerning the acts and interests convention. (862A.054/5–1452 and 662A.00/5–1452)

(E) Nondiscrimination by Ger authorities:

Chancellor referred to provision in rights and obligations convention that "no person shall be prosecuted or prejudiced in his civil rights or econ position by action of Ger courts or authorities solely on ground that has sympathized with or aided policies and interests of any one or more of three powers, or that he has, within scope of gen convention or related convention, or within scope of cooperation and assistance envisaged in Art 4 of this convention, furnished info or services to forces, auths, or agencies of any one or more of three powers, or a power concerned, or to any person acting under authority of any of them." He said that on Ger side phrase "within scope of gen convention or related conventions" was not understood and that it seemed to introduce element of distrust into what he described as "honest partnership". Kirkpatrick explained purpose of inclusion this phrase was to accommodate FedRep by placing limitation on application of this provision. After further discussion, Chancellor said he wld consider it again and might be able to suggest clearer formulation for consideration Thurs.

(F) Occupation Damages:

After brief discussion on issues cited in para 3, Bonn sent Dept 2770, rptd Paris 896, London 775 of 11 May,[8] mtg agreed to consider this matter after discussions regarding division of FedRep contrib to def were further advanced.

(G) Rights and Obligations of Unified Ger:

Mtg agreed to fol Ger proposal for amendment Art VII of gen convention:

"1. (No change).

"2. Pending the peace settlement, the three powers and the FedRep will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a unified Ger enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the FedRep, and integrated within the Eur community.

"3. The three powers and the FedRep agree that a unified Ger shall be entitled to the rights and be bound by the obligations of the FedRep under the present convention and the related conventions and the treaties for the formation of an integrated Eur community, as adjusted according to their terms or by agmt of the parties thereto.

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[6] Not printed (CFM files, lot M-88, box 187, "Convention—Agreement on Acts etc Part I—General Provisions")

[7] Telegram 2808 from Bonn, May 14 (662.0026/5-1452)

[8] Not printed. Paragraph 3 states that payments by the Federal Republic in satisfaction of damage claims could be charged against the German defense contribution (762A.0221/5-1152)

"4. (No change)." [9]

(Mtg agreed to certain minor amendments to gen convention proposed by Gers to give it more public appeal. Text being airpouched). [10]

McCloy

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[9] For final text of Article 7, see Document 51.

[10] In addition to the subjects covered here and referenced in the above footnotes, the Chancellor and the High Commissioners discussed the date of the signing of the contractuals. McCloy reported on this discussion in telegram 2826 from Bonn, May 14. (662A.00/5-1452)

No. 35

662A.00/5-1452

Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs (Raymond) to the Deputy Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Lewis)

SECRET [Washington ,] May 14, 1952.

Subject: Status of Contractual Arrangements

There is set forth below the latest information regarding the current status of the several conventions of the contractual arrangements.

General Convention

(1) The Germans have suggested changing the title to "Convention on Germany". The Department has concurred but it is not known whether it has been finally agreed.

(2) The Department has raised the question of elimination or modification of the preamble dealing with the Declaration of Human Rights. It is understood there has been partial agreement on how to deal with the point but as far as is known there is not yet complete agreement.

(3) There remains to be drafted some reference in the preamble to the Schuman Plan and the EDC.

(4) The question of whether any reference is to be made in Article IV to the restrictions on military production and research is still unresolved.

(5) The Department has requested amendment of Article XI to include reference to "instruments of approval" as well as "instruments of ratification". This matter has not yet been agreed.

(6) No reference is made to FDP objections set forth in Bonn 2673.[1]

Charter of Arbitration Tribunal

(1) It has been suggested the title be changed to "Supreme Arbitration Tribunal". This has not yet been agreed.

(2) The Department has asked slight modification of Article II to avoid granting U.S. member complete immunity from any judicial process in the U.S. Appropriate modification has been proposed but not yet agreed.

(3) It is uncertain whether the provision regarding the appointment of neutral members can stand inasmuch as the president of the International Court has not agreed to assume this function. A new president is about to take office and the matter cannot be resolved until he can be consulted.

Material Aid to Berlin

This declaration which is to be annexed to the General Convention, has not been revised since 7 February. As of April 16 it was reported that paragraphs a, d, e and g were still disagreed.

Acts and Interests

Part I

(1) The war criminal article has been unsettled by recent German proposals. They have now declined to take custody at this time but at the same time wish the clemency board to be established and start functioning as soon as Germany ratifies the conventions, even though the rest of the conventions have not come into force. The Department has been unable to give HICOG its position as Defense is heavily interested and is waiting to hear from EUCOM. This issue will probably have to go to Ministers.

(2) A provision for immunities and privileges of Allied members of boards and tribunals established by the conventions remains to be drafted.

(3) The article requiring most-favored nation treatment on any subject in the convention has been elimnated but specific most-favored nation provisions may have to be drafted in connection with specific provisions of the convention.

(4) Article VIII dealing with radio frequencies is not yet agreed.

Part II

There is a final *rapporteur* draft, but there are two unsettled questions: (1) The DKV problem, which may have to go to Ministers, and (2) A question reserved by the French regarding the drafting of the provision making cross-reference to the Schuman Plan.

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[1] Telegram 2673 transmitted a list of FDP objections to the general convention as formulated by the party's Executive Committee and Bundestag faction. A copy of the list was also sent to Chancellor Adenauer. It was based partly on substance and partly form which the FDP likened to a treaty of submission. (662A.00/5-552)

Part III

Only two points appear to be disagreed, both relating to the question of ten to one conversion of Reichsmark claims.

Part IV

There is a final *rapporteur* draft with no disagreement.

Part V

There is a final agreed draft revised by the Editorial Group, with no disagreement.

Part VI

This draft has been agreed at the High Commissioner-Chancellor level subject only to confirmation by Governments of the statement that the Three Powers will at no time assert a reparations claim against current production. Government confirmation has not yet been secured, as far as known.

Part VII

There is an agreed draft revised by the Editorial Group.

Part VIII

There is an agreed draft revised by the Editorial Group.

Part IX

The only disagreement relates to the federal assumption of responsibility for claims against JEIA and their agreement to hold us harmless. It is believed, however, this is agreed in principle.

Part X

There is a final *rapporteur* draft, but Article VI, paragraph 6 remains to be redrafted by experts.

Part XI

There is a final *rapporteur* draft, completely agreed, although one drafting point remains.

Part XII

There is a final draft revised by the Editorial Group, completely agreed.

Charter of the Arbitral Commission

(1) The question of the appointment of the neutral members by the president of the International Court raises the same problem as in the case of the arbitration tribunal.

(2) The section on immunities and privileges for the members remains to be drawn.

(3) The Department raised the point that the jurisdiction provision as now drafted deprives all U.S. courts of jurisdiction of any matter that might be presented to the tribunal. HICOG is attempting to straighten this out

(4) There is an Allied dispute as to whether this is one of the related conventions or whether it is a separate document. It is not known just what is involved in this argument.

Rights and Obligations of Forces

Part I (General), Part III (Jurisdiction and Procedure in Criminal and Non-Criminal Proceedings) and Part IV (Public Order) are agreed as far as possible. Some further provisions will have to be inserted or redrafted after the rest of the convention has been finalized.

GEA has primary responsibility for Part II which is largely logistic support.

Adenauer has recently raised a basic question that this agreement should not apply to forces of members of the EDC. The method meeting his point has not yet been settled.

No. 36

662A.00/5-1652: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 16, 1952—3 p. m.

2870. Inform Defense; pass MSA. On May 14 I had long informal discussion with Schaeffer and Pferdmenges on remaining issues in financial convention. [2] Schaeffer repeated his standard argument that Germany must have the majority share this year's contribution for her own build-up. He said he would not agree to solution which gave him a majority by an optical device, such as increasing his budget by means of a joint construction budget. He supports the idea of a joint construction budget, but if this results in increasing Germany's share it must be an increase above the actual majority share which Germany desires. He argued most vehemently that the contract would not be approved by the Bundesrat if, after questioning, the Bundesrat would discover that the Allies received more for support costs than did Federal Republic for its own build-up. In terms of figures he said that even the proposed DM 5.6 for the Federal Republic would cause serious misgivings and would be interpreted to mean that the Allies were not really interested in building up the 12 divisions. He was sure that the Bundesrat would place the worst possible construction on Germany's commitments to raise 12 divisions in contrast to the meagre amount left her to finance them.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] The discussion took place at McCloy's home at Bad Godesberg following dinner at 10 p. m.

I argued that the real question was to increase total western strength and that the problem should be tackled not on the basis of who gets how much, but in terms of meeting the real requirements of the troops now in being and the troops to be organized. I said that, as he was well aware, the US was vitally interested in the build-up of EDC contingents of German origin and that we believed it was possible in the first year to satisfy their real requirements in conformity with SHAPE's recommended build-up. I pointed out that the supply of military equipment was limited and that this, taking also into account the long lead time required for construction, administrative organization, etc., convinced me that Germany could not spend the amount she requested unless she were to lavish it on administrative equipment rather than hard goods.

Unfortunately, we do not have a tripartite position as yet and I could not talk about a specific counter-proposal and had to confine myself to a generalized argument. While Pferdmenges was visibly impressed, particularly with the information which I gave then on US end item assistance (this previously given me by Nash), and told Schaeffer that in his view this appeared to him to be a cogent argument for the Bundestag, Schaeffer would not retreat.

Schaeffer also raised the subject of costs to be charged against the monthly contribution. He desires to charge against the DM 850 million per month as much as possible and is most obsessed with the question of claims. We made no progress on this issue either, but enough was said to convince me that if we can find an acceptable formula on the division of the contribution we will be able to settle the claims issue with some concession which I hope can be kept as small as possible.

Surprisingly, Schaeffer supported Blank's position, previously cabled you from Paris,[3] that the German build-up should start in advance of ratification of the EDC treaty by all EDC countries. Schaeffer argued at great length and with considerable conviction that early effective date was absolutely vital for Germany. Point of greatest danger would arise the summer of 1953 and the training and preparation of facilities for German forces would therefore have to start summer of 1952. He suggested that convention contain a clause making the convention and EDC treaty effective between the four powers and between France and Germany respectively on ratification between four powers. He visualized ratification by US in June, by Germany in July, and by France before the end of July, and certainly before the parliamentary vacation. He felt that if French delayed until after the parliamentary vacation it might prove fatal. Such an arrangement, in his view would provide the legal basis to pay the full contribution on ratification by the four powers and in advance of the EDC coming into full force and effect. I told him this clause now absolutely out of question and suggested that the same purpose could be accomplished if the amount earmarked for the EDC contingents were used for capital works and passed through the occupation cost budgets. (French have already suggested this and their formal proposal, which will be cabled separately, embodies this suggestion.[4])

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[3] This telegram has not been identified further

I said it was impossible to spend any funds for German EDC contingents before EDC treaty in force unless it were agreed tripartitely and by EDC Steering Committee with the funds passing through the occupation costs budget. I could not visualize expenditures for actual organization of troops or procurement of military hardware, but saw no reason why capital works could not be commenced under these conditions and pointed out that these were the items requiring longest lead time and must be prepared before troops recruited.

Schaeffer bitterly opposed increasing occupation cost budgets for this purpose. He said this would be misunderstood and interpreted as an extravagant, unnecessary increase in occupation cost and not as an attempt to assist organization German EDC contingents. He also said his method alone provided the legal basis for defense contribution coming before EDC treaty in full force.

We explored all of these points in great detail, the meeting not breaking up until 3 a. m. I am convinced that Schaeffer will be a real problem. While I did not give him the precise terms of the US position adopted in Paris last Sunday, we did discuss several of its component features. He rejected many of them and I am convinced that this formula cannot be sold to the Germans. This problem is difficult and complicated, but I believe it can be resolved within a broad outline of a policy designed to meet the real requirements of the Germans and provide us with maximum protection. We must have room to maneuver, not only with Germans, but also with the British and French. As difficult as the problem is, I believe it can be resolved within these broad outlines, but am skeptical of any rigid proposal. I am meeting with Frank Nash and later with the other High Commissioners today to try and get some tripartite position in the hope that we can put it to the Chancellor immediately. I fear time element and repeat need of real latitude to operate in hope we can avoid going to Foreign Ministers with wide open question which in the short time available to them they may not be able to settle and almost certainly could not settle equitably.

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[4] Telegram 2869 from Bonn, May 16. (740.5/5-1652)

McCLOY

No. 37

662A.00/5–1652: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 16, 1952—4 p. m.

2866. Fol is summary report discussion mtg HICOMers and Chancellor 15 May on outstanding points gen agreement and security controls.[2]

(1) Title of gen agreement.

We considered various alternative wordings of title of gen agreement to shorten it and give it more public appeal. Chancellor was particularly concerned to get short title which wld be readily adopted by press and public and have propaganda value. We explained that *Deutschland Vertrag* which he had suggested earlier wld be misleading as official title. We proposed "Agreement between the three powers and FedRep of Ger", although this does not quite seem to fit the bill. We pointed out that in any case public will probably give colloquial name to agreement; e.g., *Bonner Vertrag* or similar short title. We finally agreed give matter more thought. Chancellor expressed preference for "convention" over "agreement" as he felt latter term did not have status in legal usage appropriate to importance of document. We agreed to recommend that "convention" be used for all parts in order to insure that in Ger eyes they shld have same legal validity.

(2) State of emergency, Art 5.

Although making it clear we had not yet had opportunity to clear with our govts, we proposed certain amendments to Art 5 to meet preoccupations of Chancellor reported in Bonn to Dept 2823 of 14 May.[3] He accepted this proposal, text forwarded separately in Bonn to Dept 2857 of 16 May.[4]

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Draper and MacArthur and to London and Heidelberg.

[2] The meeting began at 11 a. m. on May 15 and continued until 5 a. m. on May 16. In addition to the topics reported here the High Commissioners and the Chancellor considered the agreement on acts and interests and the agreement on the rights and obligations of Allied forces. McCloy reported the substance of these discussions in telegrams 2874 and 2867 from Bonn, both dated May 16. (662A.0026/5–1652 and 662A.00/5–1652)

[3] Document 34.

[4] See footnote 4, *ibid.*

(3) Entry into force of agreements.

At 10 [*15?*] May mtg, Chancellor had re-raised his proposal that contractual agreements shld enter into effect before EDC treaty had been completely ratified and indicated that he might wish raise this point with FonMins.

At this mtg we proposed that, when contractual agreements had been ratified by four parliaments and Ger and France had ratified EDC treaty, there shld be consultation between Chancellor and allied reps to determine those parts of contractual arrangements which cld be put into effect without disturbing provisions of EDC treaty. Chancellor said this arrangement wld be satisfactory on understanding that it was made subj of exchange of ltrs, to which we agreed.[5]

(4) Guided missiles.

In preliminary tripartite mtg Kirkpatrick had proposed compromise by which guided missiles less than one meter fifty in length wld be excluded from definitions on list two in return for which Chancellor wld give commitment to three FonMins or HICOM chairman that if EDC commissariat shld decide to place order for manufacture these weapons in Ger, FedRep wld ensure that they were not manufactured east of Rhine. Berard, on instructions his govt, could not agree present this compromise to Chancellor. Effort at mtg with Chancellor was therefore confined to obtaining his agreement to proposal for retention guided missiles on list two with foll letter to be sent to him by three govts:

> "The three powers agree that the FedRep may, within the framework of the Eur Def Community and outside the strategically exposed areas, proceed to develop and manufacture guided missiles of less than one meter fifty in length for anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense.
>
> "Consequently, the three powers consider it desirable for these weapons to be produced in cooperation under the sponsorship of the EDC and undertake to seek a solution of these bases.
>
> "The three powers are prepared for the competent Ger technicians and scientists to meet as a working party to draw up the initial documents to serve as a basis for the contemplated collaboration."

Blank supported by Chancellor argued throughout mtg that security posit was adequately protected by provision under Article 106 of EDC treaty that production of weapons on list one cannot take place in any case outside decision of EDC commissariat. Chancellor also stressed importance to FedRep in event mass air attack on its cities of having large stock anti-aircraft missiles available and said that location manufacture these missiles in places possibly remote from fed territory wld make supply lines too long.

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[5] The Chancellor had originally raised this question at the meeting on May 9. For a report on that meeting, see telegram 2766, Document 33.

Berard said that according to opinion French experts latest developments in smaller type guided missiles were such as to make impractical any real distinction between defensive and offensive weapons. French Govt was prepared for FedRep to join in program of joint Eur development and manufacture these weapons but was adamant against removing these weapons from list two. In these circumstances, he could only report discussion and Chancellor's posit to his govt.

Unless there is modification in French and/or Ger position in next few days, this point will probably have to be resolved by FonMins.

(5) Atomic energy.

Decision this issue reported separately Bonn to Dept 2865.[6]

(6) Statement on US milit end-item assistance for Ger with ref Dept to Bonn 3143 of 15 May[7] (which arrived after mtg). In response to Chancellor's request as to what reply he could give to members of Parliament who were concerned as to whether Ger contingents wld be armed in same way as forces of other members of EDC, I pointed out that under EDC treaty arms wld be shared out under EDC commissariat and then made statement referred to in reftel.

McCloy

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[6] Telegram 2865 reported that Chancellor Adenauer had agreed to the text of a letter on atomic energy. (740.5/5–1652)

[7] Telegram 3143 is not printed. The statement under reference reads:

"In accordance with US policy of assisting in the defense preparations of the countries of Western Eur, the deliveries of US mil end-item assistance for the period from the time the contractual relations go into effect up to June 30, 1953 will provide the Ger EDC contingents with the full training equipment as will be required to meet the phasing of material approved by SHAPE with the possible exception of aircraft, which may be in a shortfall condition until the end of calendar 1953. It is assumed that the priorities recommended by SHAPE will permit the foregoing." (740.5/5–2252)

No. 38

662A.00/5-2052: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 20, 1952—2 p. m.

2935. Fol is one of series summary reports mtg HICOMers, Chancellor on 19 May.[2]

1. *Title of convention on relations.*

Chancellor asked that to the official title "Convention on relations between the three powers and the FedRep" should be added in parenthesis "*Deutschland Vertrag*" stressing importance of this addition for its popular appeal and propaganda purposes. When we informed him that for reasons already reported this would not be appropriate, he said he would wish to discuss point with Foreign Ministers.

2. *Entry into force of agreements* (Ref para 3 Bonn to Dept 2866[3]).

Chancellor raised this question again and we referred to our agrmt with him on 16 [*15*] May reported in reftel. He said however he still wished discuss this point with FonMins.

3. *Memo of agrmt—Art 4—rights and obligations.*[4]

Chancellor referred to today's AP press report this agrmt and said that he would surely be questioned on it by Foreign Affairs Committee. Since he had to be in a position to tell committee that he had negotiated no secret agrmts, best he could do at present juncture was to give us statement that he recognized that in due course an understanding on this matter would have to be reached.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Draper and MacArthur and to London and EUCOM.

[2] No other report on the meeting with Chancellor Adenauer on May 19 has been found in Department of State files. However, meetings were held May 16, 17, and 18 either among the High Commissioners or between the High Commissioners and representatives of the Federal Republic. On May 16 the High Commissioners discussed the distribution of the German financial contribution. (Telegrams 2889, 2890, and 2891 from Bonn, May 17, 740.5/5-1752) On May 17 the High Commissioners discussed the financial contribution with Schaeffer and Blank (telegram 2911 from Bonn, May 18, 740.5/5-1852), and on May 18 the High Commissioners continued their discussion on the financial contribution with Schaeffer alone. (Telegram 2912 from Bonn, May 18, 740.5/5-1852) No final agreement was reached through these discussions.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] Article 4 of the rights and obligations convention dealt with reciprocal assistance and security. Paragraph 2 of Article 4 stated that the reciprocal assistance would be extended in accordance with an understanding that would be reached between the appropriate authorities, presumably the High Commissioners and the Federal Chancellor. No copy of the text of this memorandum as agreed on at the expert level has been found in Department of State files.

Although text memo is agreed at expert level subject to one point, there appears to be no immediate prospect of obtaining signature.

4. *Non-discrimination by Ger authorities.*

(Ref para 6 Bonn to Dept 2823 of 14 May [5]). After Chancellor reported that on reflection he was unable find satisfactory formulation provisions Article 6 rights and obligations convention and repeated argument that provision this kind had no place in "partnership agreement", HICOMers agreed to withdraw this article. Part of this provision can perhaps go into operating arrangements under Article 4 of this convention and part will have to depend on general provisions for cooperation and security.

5. *Organizations serving forces, Art 15 rights and obligations.*

After long discussion agreement finally reached text this art which will permit assimilation of organizations to forces (a) if they are non-commercial organizations, (b) enterprises providing technical or professional services for forces after notification to Ger authorities, and (c) in other cases after consultation with Ger authorities. Employees of organizations also assimilated in cases (a) and (b) but not (c). I believe this agreement, which Gers have been most unwilling to concede, will cover requirements of forces.

6. *Direct construction Arts 16 (B) and 16 BB, R and O.*

Chancellor and Schaeffer accepted direct procurement of construction services on basis letter I will send Schaeffer giving him assurance as to manner in which this right will be exercised by US forces.

7. *Expulsions from fed territory—Art 39 R and O.*

Gers pointed out with respect paras 2, 3, 5 and 6 this article that although FedRep and *Laender* have current jurisdiction under basic law in field expulsions; under present legislation this is matter for laender. Therefore these provisions involve difficulty of committing laender and require Bundesrat approval. We agreed retain paras 1 and 4 and leave remainder provisions for inclusion in memo of agreement under Art 4.

8. *Application and revision clause Art 1* (Ref para 3, Bonn to Dept 2867 of 16 May [6])—Poncet read statement he was directed to make on this matter by Schuman, gist of which was that Gers had been fully informed in Paris of French and Belgian need to be covered logistically as well as financially until 30 June 1953; that financial coverage to June 1953 without corresponding logistical support was meaningless; that in the French view there had been an understanding on this point between Blank and Alphand; that it would be impossible for French Govt to defend before Parliament

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[5] Document 34

[6] See footnote 2, *supra*.

contractual agreements which did not have interim provision for French needs; finally that Ger attitude this matter was putting whole negotations in danger. Chancellor replied that while he quite agreed there had to be some transitional arrangement for logistical support French troops, French were in fact asking for a great deal more than justified, which he said would put them in an advantageous position vis-à-vis other EDC countries when EDC treaty came in effect. He insisted problem be settled—within EDC framework.

Poncet then requested Chancellor to inform Blank and Hallstein of his agreement that some transitional provision be made for French logistical needs and said he hoped problem could be settled in Paris.

9. *General clause in rights and obligations convention referring to EDC treaty.*

Chancellor submitted following text this clause for inclusion in rights and obligations convention: "The rights and obligations of the contracting parties to the EDC treaty set forth in that treaty shall not be disturbed".

We informed Chancellor it would be necessary to study this draft in connection EDC treaty, particularly with reference question of priorities.

10. *Observance of German law—Art 2 R and O.*

After weeks of discussion and redrafting this article, Gers were still insisting on phrase "forces shall observe Ger law" in para 1. We were prepared agree "respect Ger law etc.," but after discussion Chancellor finally said he thought whole para 1 unnecessary. This para now dropped.

11. *ACA legislation—*

(Ref para 4 of Bonn to Dept 2867)—

At Chancellor's request we agreed send letter indicating our willingness to deprive of effect proclamation number two and CC laws numbers 10, 23 and 25, with exception certain definition in Law 101.

12. *Accommodation—Article 16 A—rights and obligations.*

Mtg agreed that quarters vacant for six months shall be automatically released (this was primarily UK not US problem). Schaeffer requested that local joint boards on accommodation should be continued in next period and in fact expanded.

13. *Tax exemption of members of forces—Article 30—rights and obligations.*

Meeting continued attempt to devise language which would prevent laender taxation of forces and at same time would not require specific Bundesrat approval. After considerable discussion it was agreed that Fed Govt would introduce as soon as possible legislation to secure exemption of forces and their members from *Land*

and other local taxation. Pending entry into force of such legislation Fed Govt shall take, in consultation with *Laender* authorities, all measures necessary to protect forces and their members from levying such taxes. Fed Govt will give allies letter on above lines. Schaeffer feels certain Bundesrat will pass adequate law as matter of international comity, so long as it is not part of the complex of contractual agreements, as if it were it might jeopardize ratification entire package. If Fed Govt fails to pass such a law, Schaeffer said he would undertake not only to make members of forces "harmless" from taxation by payment to or reimbursement of *Laender*, but in addition would put through Bundestag a separate treaty which would require Bundesrat approval guaranteeing continuous payment or reimbursement to *Laender*. (Agreement, of course, provides for exemption from fed taxes.) Schaeffer did not want to include this commitment in present agreement because that might constitute open invitation to Bundesrat to reject legislation referred to above.

14. *Berlin statement of principles.*

Copy of declaration on Berlin was transmitted to Adenauer.[7]

15. *Atomic Energy.*

In accordance with Dept to Bonn 3199 rptd info Paris 6826, London 6026 of 18 May[8] and after discussions with other HICOMers, I informed Adenauer that we could tentatively agree to review limitations on production and acquisition nuclear fuel in 18 months rather than three years but that this decision would have to be confirmed at his meeting with the FonMins. (Possibility this matter may be cleared up before FonMins meeting.)

16. *Guided missiles.*

In view of discussions in Paris this matter, subject was not raised this meeting.

17. *Next meeting.*

1000 hours 21 May to discuss finance convention.[9]

McCLOY

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[7] For text of the declaration on Berlin, see Document 538.

[8] Telegram 3199 stated that there was no objection to a review of the limitations on the production and acquisition of nuclear fuel in 18 months rather than 3 years. (740.5/5-1652)

[9] See telegram 2986, Document 41.

No. 39

740.5/5-2052: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 20, 1952—8 p.m.

2951. Dept pass MSA, Paris pass SRE, inform Defense. Ref: Bonn to Dept 2936 rptd Paris 960 London 836.[2] During dinner after yesterday's mtg between HICOMers and Adenauer,[3] I discussed informally distribution first year's contribution with Chancellor and Schaeffer. I stressed our argument that we did not believe FedRep could spend wisely the funds which they seek and again said that we wld not agree to div which gave FedRep funds which it could not translate into men and weapons. I cited several examples of US experience and pointed out that even Ger estimates showed that deliveries of equip could not take place within time period envisaged between the effective date of treaty and June 30, 1953. Chancellor appears to have very little knowledge of problem and seemed most sympathetic to this argument.

Schaeffer was in a conciliatory mood and in principle seemed to assent to my suggestion that the distribution should reflect actual expenditure possibilities. Schaeffer said he was working out chart which wld demonstrate the ascending requirements of FedRep. He implied he was prepared to take lower figure for first few months providing it is recognized that FedRep's requirements will increase and division based thereon. This seems to provide some possibility for agreement prior to FonMin mtg.

Unfortunately, greatest difficulty is still with Brit. They have adopted firm position that they cannot go below the proposal outlined in Bonn to Dept 2911, rptd Paris 953, London 830.[4] Their concern now seems to be chiefly with second year. They are fearful that decreasing amt for Allies as suggested in Bonn to Dept 2889 rptd Paris 940 London 818[4] will prejudice distribution of second year's contribution by tacitly admitting Allies can get along with comparatively small amt. Therefore, they are committed to flat unchanging rate per month for Allies.

In our view their position extremely shortsighted. If we grant Ger her full minimum requirements exclusive of heavy equip and make allowances for prefinancing, etc., for first six month period, we wld have recd DM 593 million per month and for third quarter DM 291 million per month, totaling for the nine month period DM 4,431 million. The Brit proposal of DM 511 million per month for nine-month period totals DM 4,599 million.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] Not printed.

[3] See telegram 2935, *supra*.

[4] See footnote 2, *supra*.

We are calculating that treaty will be effective at earliest on Oct 1, 1952 and more probably sometime between that date and January 1, 1953. If effective date is Dec 1, leaving a seven-month period, under sliding scale DM 3,849 million. Adjustments can be made in the amt allotted to Gers so that the nine-month total under either method will be equal. Our point is that by having higher figure for first six-month period, we not only will obtain more funds in event treaty is effective after Oct 1, but we will also be able to relate distribution to Ger requirements giving us a more forceful argument with Gers.

It is, of course, possible to adjust the figures so that the disparity between amt we receive in first six months and amt for last three will be smaller. Unfortunately, an adjustment of this sort is limited because we have already proposed to Gers a flat monthly rate of 511 million per month and this is tantamount to admission that we can get along on this amt. Despite this we might propose 54 million for first 6 months and 420 million for the last three. While the disparity between the two figures is less, we wld still obtain a greater total amt in event effective period prior to June 30, 1953 is only 6 months.

Equally impt is fact that as long as we negotiate for flat monthly rate we have no room to bargain. It appears Gers simply will not accept split of 511 million for US and 339 million for themselves and only bargaining we can do is downward. Other system provides much more flexibility. The Brit here concede this argument. However, they are bound by their instructions not to reduce Allied budgets below 10 percent which may be necessary and to oppose a lower rate for the last three months for fear it will be admission that Allies can get along on this low rate and thus prejudice our case in second year. We believe this reasoning unsound because no matter what distribution is for first year Ger requirements in second will increase substantially.[5]

McCLOY

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[5] On May 20 Frank Nash, who had arrived in Bonn during the second week in May to assist McCloy with the discussions of a German financial contribution, met with Schaeffer at the latter's request to continue the talks on this subject. The two officials discussed the entire problem at some length in what Nash characterized as "a generally business like and friendly" conference, but no agreement was reached. (Telegram 2959 from Bonn, May 20, 740.5/5–2052) The financial agreement was discussed again on May 21 and 22, and at the latter meeting the Chancellor and the High Commissioners reached agreement on a recommendation to be presented to

Continued

No. 40

511.00/5-2152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 21, 1952—3 p.m.

2967. For Kellermann. Public affairs guidance No. 174. [2]

Contractual Agreements.

This guidance is not intended to provide an exhaustive report on contents and background of contractual agreements. It is, rather a summation of political considerations and aims which should be useful in dealing with German newspaper reports and with texts of conventions upon their publication at time of signature. Further background and summaries of terms and contents of conventions will be issued at time of signature.

In dealing with discussion of contracts, foll points should be observed by US media and liaison officers.

1. Contracts and other agreements concluded at same time, EDC and agreements on its relationship with NATO, must be considered together. They constitute an entity which is designed to liquidate many outstanding problems created by the war and the occupation and at same time to achieve German partnership entirely, [and?] are of an unprecedented character. They end controls of occupation before conclusion of final peace settlement. They create an association which has been worked out in exhaustive negotiations on basis of equality and which, in effect, goes beyond scope of traditional alliance. It is the purpose of this association, which includes all major western nations, to insure the political freedom and economic well-being of participating nations and, through their joint defensive efforts, the peace and security of our world. It is, in effect, an alliance for peace.

2. The terms of this association, which define the role and obligations of member nations and, through contractual agreements, of Germany, naturally result from these overall aims as well as from requirements of world situation in light of present Soviet menace. It is this menace which creates special problems in case of Germa-

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the Foreign Ministers. Under the terms of this agreement Allied forces would receive DM 474 million a month while the German contingents would receive DM 376 million a month. McCloy reported on these meetings in telegrams 2987 and 3007, May 22 and 23, from Bonn (762A.0221/5-2252 and 740.5/5-2352)

[1] Transmitted in two sections.

[2] Public affairs guidance telegrams were sent from Bonn on a regular basis to give background on events in Germany.

ny. Many normal provisions of a peace settlement, such as final determination of Germany's borders, must remain in abeyance. Other provisions, going beyond those of peace treaty and in fact constituting close alliance, have become essential to security and well-being of the country. From these problems result a number of agreements concluded between German Federal Republic and western powers simultaneously with transfer of authority over German domestic and external affairs to Federal Republic. German Govt, in particular, agrees to retention of special rights by western allies relating to stationing of armed forces in Germany and protection of their security, to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including unification of Germany and a peace settlement.

While Federal Republic must abstain from any action prejudicing these rights and agree to facilitate the exercise thereof by three powers, the latter, in return, undertake to consult Federal Republic in respect of their implementation.

The retention of the Allied position in Berlin and presence of western troops on territory of Federal Republic constitute only existing safeguards for freedom of West Berlin and for security of German people. These authorities, in combination with equally-retained authority of western powers with regard to unification of Germany, also safeguard right of western powers vis-à-vis Soviet Union to insist on unification of a free and democratic Germany in a final peace settlement. The retention of these rights was never a matter of controversy. It was agreed upon as necessary to protect interests of Germany and to advance common purposes of association of which Federal Republic will be an equal part.

It is in spirit and in peaceful purpose of this association that western powers agree that unified Germany and freely-negotiated peace settlement for whole of Germany will be considered essential aims of their common policy with German Federal Republic. In event of unification of Germany, draft agreement, as it now stands, provides for review by four govts and for adjustment of these conventions by agreement. Under this provision, terms of agreement shall be reviewed at the request of one of the four states in event of German unification, creation of European federation, or any other occurrence which four states jointly recognize to be of fundamental significance. The parties shall then open negotiations with a view to modifying agreements to extent necessary to take into account changes that have occurred in the situation.

3. The stationing of western armed forces in Germany and German participation in western defense raise a number of problems with regard to security, facilities and financing. Necessary provisions have been made in emergency clause of "agreement on general relations" and in conventions concerning the "rights and

obligations of foreign forces," and on "economic and financial participation of Federal Republic in western defense." [3]

Most of problems concerning building of facilities, requisitioning, relationship with population, etc. are similar to problems met by American troops in other countries of Western Europe. Naturally, their solutions will be similar though not necessarily identical. The exposed position of country makes necessary stationing of larger numbers of troops in Germany than in other countries. These contingents, which at present contribute to Germany's only defense, are in fact operational rather than garrison troops. They require training facilities, secure line of communication and, in case of need, adequate freedom of action. These are met by above-mentioned conventions and emergency clause in general agreement.

The construction of facilities for western forces requires sizeable expenses during the first year of new association. Obviously, spending on the establishment of German contingents will hit its full stride only at a later time.

It is fortunate and equitable that a sizeable part of German contribution to joint defense establishment can be applied to needs of western protective forces in Germany during initial period. All participants must bear heavy military burdens and Germany is just being asked to contribute her commensurate share, which has been determined by same criteria and considerations applied to other nations for the common effort.

4. A large number of transitional provisions had to be agreed upon and have been embodied in a convention. These cover such topics as deconcentration and decartelization, internal and external restitution, compensation of victims of Nazi persecution, care for displaced persons and refugees, reparations, foreign interests in Germany, and civil aviation. Most of these subjects have been the object of occupation programs. It is in line with purpose of conventions that implementation, administration and adaption of these policies is now transferred to German Federal Govt.

With this end in view, provisions are made for continued validity of Allied legislation, subject to a right of the German authorities to amend, repeal or deprive it of effect. This right is limited only where its exercise would prejudice rights of three powers under general convention, or on matters where contracting parties have decided otherwise, for some particular reason. For example, AHC laws 27 and 35 are maintained in force until deconcentration of coal, iron and steel industries and of I.G. Farben group are completed. Provision is also made for terminating occupation courts having criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for continued validity of judgments given by them.

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[3] For texts of the Convention on General Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Finance Convention, see Documents 50 ff.

Some of these policies have been controversial and subject to criticism from German quarters. Nevertheless, they have become reality of German public life, in addition to constituting essential aims of western powers in Germany. It would be just as unrealistic now to expect Western powers to disavow these interests as it would be unpsychological and unfair to expect the Germans to accept limitations of their authority not in agreement with the spirit and purpose of alliance for peace. Psychological requirements for the success of this alliance must be taken into account on both sides, and all govts have to consider parliaments and public opinion of their respective countries.

5. This is particularly true in connection with problem of carrying out sentences and deciding on future fate of war criminals. If Germany finds it difficult to carry out sentences passed by foreign courts, it has not always been understood in German circles that attacks on the legality and fairness of Allied justice are unacceptable to Allied nations and will not facilitate the solution of this controversial matter. The establishment of a joint German western clemency board appears to provide an equitable instrument for handling this issue.

6. The reparations problem is a typical case where it would have been impossible to reach a final settlement now. Many countries other than three powers who took part in war against Germany and whose rights would have to be considered in final peace settlement are not a party to the present agreements. In preserving legal *status quo* and thereby rights of western powers, section on reparations in contractual agreements serves the purpose of strengthening western bargaining position and thereby protecting German interest vis-à-vis claims which may be advanced by Soviet Union in future settlement. As a matter of fact, there is very imporant provision which is final and not subject to revision at peace settlement, namely an agreement by three powers that they will at no time assert any claim against the current production of Federal Govt on matter of former German external assets, three powers have assumed responsibilities under international agreements, notably agreement on reparations concluded in Paris on January 24, 1946,[4] which preclude the three powers from agreeing to the un-

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[4] For text of the Paris reparations agreement, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1655.

limited right of Federal Republic to negotiate with other countries concerning foreign assets. Nevertheless, there is a provision permitting extensive freedom of negotiation with former enemies of Germany which were not signatories of Paris agreement, and there is some freedom to negotiate with signatories.

7. General convention provides for establishment of an arbitration tribunal to settle disputes arising from conflicting interpretations of conventions. Tribunal is composed of nine members selected from highest judges and most eminent jurists. Three members are appointed by Federal Republic; three by three powers; and three others, called neutral members, by agreement between three powers and Federal Republic and may not be members of any of the four signatory states. The nine members elect a president from the neutral members for a term of two years.

8. Provisions have also been made to regulate and assure facilities for embassies and consulates which, after revocation of occupation statute and abolition of high commission, will conduct the relations of the western powers with Federal Republic. These missions will have similar duties and privileges as have diplomatic and consular missions to other states.

9. It is obvious that different kinds of provisions and obligations have had to be established for participating countries. These countries find themselves confronted by a common danger. However, their situations are different. This, in turn, creates different needs and different opportunities for actions and contributions. Equality cannot be found in identical action and obligations vis-à-vis non-identical needs and situation. This is basically true for the different contributions of all members of the western community. Equality is to be found in the conclusion and implementation on an equal basis of agreements on the different obligations required for the achievement 0of the common good.

10. It should be recognized that the concept of sovereignty in twentieth century is not analogous to that of traditional definition. In these days of international cooperation, nations are called upon to relinquish parts of their sovereignty in the common interest (UN, NATO, EDC). It should be kept in mind that all alliances limit the freedom of decision of the participating powers and place certain obligations upon them and, thereby, constitute factual limitation to sovereignty. The limitations in the case of the German Federal Republic are based on a joint appraisal by German and western statesmen of the situation in which Germany finds herself and have been freely agreed upon by all parties. The obligations placed by the peace alliance on the other members of the EDC and of NATO i.e. the contribution of European national forces to a European army under a single command and, in case of US, agree-

ment to keep American troops stationed in Europe, are of an equally unprecedented nature. These contributions must be understood in the light of the common danger and of the great opportunity which the alliance offers to all nations for the insurance of peace and well-being on the basis of mutual aid and cooperation.

McCLOY

No. 41

662A.00/5-2152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 21, 1952—midnight.

2986. Inform Defense. At private meeting with Chancellor this morning he informed HICOMers cabinet and coalition leaders at yesterday's meetings [2] raised two further questions, both respecting Art 7 para 3 of general convention. As regards the first, they argued three powers should make it clear reservation their rights re Ger as a whole should not include the auth or power to diminish FedRep's rights under convention. When asked whether present wording of Art 1 and 7 did not establish this without doubt, he said it was important to assure party leaders the reservation could not be interpreted in such a way as to "include the power to change to the disadvantage of the FedRep its legal status foll upon the ratification" of the conventions and EDC treaty. Considerable fears were expressed, according to the Chancellor, that negots between the three powers and Sov might be resumed which would lead to the re-establishment of four power control prior to the establishment of a unified Ger whose rights were adequately protected under Article 7, para 3. Chancellor desires to protect against abuse of this "gap period" as a preliminary to extended negots on unification.

We agreed to consider possibility of a letter from FonMins which would reassure Chancellor that our reservation re Ger as a whole does not permit us to alter obligations we have assumed vis-à-vis the FedRep in conventions. Text as agreed with Chancellor for recommendation to govts folls:

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] The meeting began at 10:30 a.m. In addition to the subject reported here, the Chancellor and the High Commissioners discussed an intelligence memorandum and the finance convention. The former was transmitted from Bonn in telegram 3003 (762A.0221/5-2252); regarding the latter, see footnote 5, Document 39.

"In the course of our recent conversations, you asked us to confirm that the right relating to Ger as a whole reserved by the three powers in Article 2, para 1 (C) of the convention on relations between the three powers and the FedRep, cannot be interpreted as permitting them to affect adversely the relations established between themselves and the FedRep by the conventions signed today.

"I have the honour to inform you that we do not interpret the right in question as permitting the three powers to derogate from their undertakings to the FedRep in the convention signed today." [3]

The other question raised by cabinet related to desirability of suppressing Article 7, para 3 altogether from convention as giving SPD opportunity to claim it blocks unification or at least freedom to negotiate. Whereas Chancellor recognizes this argument, he and majority of cabinet are prepared to retain text if Allies consider it desirable. In these circumstances, we made no change. Opposition comes from Kaiser and DP ministers.

McCLOY

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[3] In telegram 3300 to Bonn, May 22, McCloy was informed that the Department of State accepted this text. (662A.00/5-2152) For text of the letter as transmitted from the High Commissioners to Chancellor Adenauer on May 26 at the time of the signing of the contractual agreements, see Document 60.

B. MEETINGS AT BONN OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE WITH CHANCELLOR ADENAUER, MAY 23-26, 1952

No. 42

Editorial Note

Secretary Acheson, accompanied *inter alia* by Battle, Jessup, and Perkins, left Washington on the *Independence* at 8 p.m. May 22, arriving in Bonn at 5 p.m. on May 23 where he was met by Lewis, Reinstein, and Calhoun who had preceded him. At 6 p.m. he was briefed on the Berlin situation by Lyon and General Mathewson after which there was an exchange of views with McCloy and his staff. Following dinner at McCloy's home a general briefing was held at 9:30 during which Article 6 of the rights and obligations convention was discussed. At the same time the United States Delegation drew up a list of questions which would be raised with the British and French and subsequently with Adenauer, as well as a list of items which the Chancellor might wish to discuss. These lists were transmitted in Actel 2 from Bonn, May 24. (662A.00/5-2452)

The Foreign Ministers meetings began on May 24 as agreed. The first tripartite meeting began at 9:30 a.m. and lasted with interruptions until 2 a.m., May 25. The early part of this meeting, attended only by the Foreign Ministers and the High Commissioners, considered various changes in the Tripartite Declaration on the strength and integrity of the European Defense Community (EDC) which were proposed by the French. For documentation on the revisions proposed by the French to the Tripartite Declaration, see volume V, Part 1, pages 571 ff. Following a luncheon and a meeting between Secretary Acheson and Chancellor Adenauer on intelligence matters (reported on in telegram 3061, May 25, in file 662A.00/5-2552), the tripartite meeting resumed at 2:30 with a discussion on the contractual arrangements. For the minutes of this part of the meeting, see *infra*. The tripartite meeting recessed again at 4:15 for a quadripartite meeting with Chancellor Adenauer at 4:45, the minutes of which are printed as Document 45. After this meeting Secretary Acheson called on President Heuss (see the memorandum of conversation by Jessup, Document 45) before returning to the tripartite meeting at 10:30. For a report on the final part of the tripartite meeting, see telegram 3053, May 25, Document 46.

The proceedings on May 25 began with another meeting between Secretary Acheson and Chancellor Adenauer, this time to consider Israeli and Jewish claims for restitution. For a record of this meeting, see telegram 3059, Document 47. This meeting was followed by the second quadripartite session held at 10:30 a.m. For the minutes of this meeting, see Document 48. After a luncheon at McCloy's home and a dinner given by Chancellor Adenauer for the Foreign Ministers at 10:30 p.m., Secretary Acheson met with members of the United States, the United Kingdom, and French Delegations to consider further changes proposed by the French in the Tripartite Declaration. A record of this meeting is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108. Further documentation on French efforts to revise the Tripartite Declaration is printed in volume V, Part 1, pages 571 ff. At the end of all these meetings Secretary Acheson cabled President Truman giving his impressions briefly on the status of the contractuals and at length on the status of the European Defense Community. The text of this message is printed *ibid.*, page 680.

On May 26 the contractual agreements were signed at 10 a. m. in the Bundesrat. Following their signature the Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor held a short press conference, had lunch, and then departed for Paris for the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty and related documents. For Secretary Acheson's statement at the press conference, see Document 49. The texts of the statements by Adenauer and Eden and of Schuman at the press conference were transmitted in telegrams 3076 and 3081, respectively, from Bonn, May 26. (662A.00/5-2652) For text of the documents signed and the letters exchanged at Bonn on May 26 and

Adenauer's letter to Secretary Acheson on atomic energy, see Documents 50 ff.

In addition to the general documentation cited in Document 50, the following sources have been used in the preparation of the documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings and the signing ceremonies at Bonn: CFM files, lot M-88, boxes 161-162 which contain minutes of the meetings, briefs for Secretary Acheson, various drafts of the several conventions and letters to be exchanged, and background papers prepared for the Ministerial meetings, indicated by their series designator SCEM. This documentation is largely duplicated in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108-110 which also have copies of the telegrams to and from Bonn concerning the meetings. The "McCloy Project", lots 58 M 47 and 57 F 24, subsequently preserved as part of the Bonn Embassy files contains McCloy's diary of the daily activities during the meetings and records of the meetings held at Bonn. The largest collection of documentation in the decimal files of Department of State, small by comparison to the lot files mentioned above, on these meetings is in file 662A.00. For two personal accounts of the meetings at Bonn, May 23-26, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 643-647, and Adenauer, *Memoirs*, pages 413-427.

No. 43

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May 24, 1952, 2:30 p. m. [1]

SECRET

There were present:

United States	*France*
Mr. Acheson	M. Schuman
Mr. McCloy	M. Francois-Poncet
Mr. Jessup	M. Alphand
Mr. Perkins	M. Berard
Mr. Lewis	M. Seydoux
Mr. Reber	M. Leroy-Beaulieu
Mr. Harris	M. de Guiringaud
Mr. Reinstein	M. Sauvagnargues
Mr. Calhoun	M. Patey
Miss Kirkpatrick	

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[1] There is no indication on the source text to show who prepared these minutes. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 3049 from Bonn, May 25. (662A.00/5-2552)

United Kingdom
Mr. Eden
Sir Ivone
Kirkpatrick
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Ward
Mr. Trevelyan
Mr. O'Neill
Mr. Bathurst
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Ridsdale

[Here follows an eleven-point index to the minutes.]

1. Opening of the Meeting

Mr. Acheson extended a welcome to his colleagues and inquired how they wished to organize the meeting. Mr. Eden proposed, and M. Schuman agreed, that Mr. Acheson should take the chair.

2. Title of Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic

The Ministers agreed to propose to the Chancellor that the official title of the agreement to be concluded with the Federal Republic should be "Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic." They further agreed to inform the Chancellor that, whereas they felt no official recognition could be given to the title "Deutschland Vertrag" in connection with this convention, there could be no objection to its internal colloquial use in Germany.

3. Special Arrangements for the Entry into Force of Parts of the Contractual Arrangements Prior to Complete Ratification of the EDC Treaty

Mr. Acheson said that he understood the Chancellor wished to obtain agreement that certain provisions of the conventions might come into force in advance of the complete ratification of the EDC Treaty, should the latter be delayed and if the conventions had been ratified by all the parties to it and the EDC Treaty by France and the Federal Republic. He said that it would not be possible to accept this proposal, but suggested that the Ministers might propose to the Chancellor that if there were an extended delay in ratification of the EDC Treaty, a meeting should be held between the three Governments and the Federal Government to consider the situation. M. Schuman said that he was in general accord with Mr. Acheson's suggestion and pointed out that the accepted inter-relationship between the two agreements could not be broken down prior to ratification in order to meet the Chancellor's request. However, consideration might be given to arrangements for putting into effect certain provisions to meet the Chancellor; for example, the procedure for granting clemency to war criminals. It was agreed that the High Commission's proposed letter on this subject should be revised in the light of this discussion.[2]

4. Text of a Letter to be Sent by the Federal Chancellor to the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments on Atomic Energy

The Ministers agreed to propose that, as a compromise, the review of restrictions on the production of nuclear fuel in the Federal Territory should take place at the end of two years from the time of ratification of the contractual arrangements, rather than three years as provided in the draft letter, or eighteen months as proposed by the Chancellor.[3]

5. Exercise of Clemency Toward War Criminals

The Ministers agreed, if the matter were raised by the Chancellor, to give him an assurance that during the period until the contractual arrangements were in operation, they would continue to take clemency action with respect to war criminal prisoners as provided under present procedure.

6. French Reservation on Reparations

M. Schuman referred to the provision in Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of Chapter Six of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation,[4] whereby the Three Powers "undertake that they will at no time assert any claim for reparations against the current production of the Federal Republic." He said that this question had been the subject of frequent debate in the French Parliament and that from a psychological point of view it would be very difficult at this time and prior to the conclusion of a final peace treaty to obtain parliamentary agreement to a formal renunciation of reparations from current production. He therefore preferred that any mention of reparations from current production should be omitted from the conventions.

Mr. Eden pointed out that his government had all along taken a position against reparations from current production and reminded

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[2] For text of the letter from the three Foreign Ministers to the Federal Chancellor concerning the entry into effect of certain provisions of the general convention, see Document 56.

[3] A copy of the draft letter under reference, dated May 16, is in CFM files, lot M-88, box 193, CA: Security Controls, Atomic Energy. For the final text of this letter as agreed by the Chancellor and the three Foreign Ministers, see Document 64.

[4] For text of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War, see Cmd. 8571, pp. 75–135.

M. Schuman that the Three Powers had already stigmatized the Soviet Government for their practice in this regard.

Mr. Acheson then suggested that a three-power statement now waiving all further claim to reparations from current production would constitute a strong propaganda point against the Soviets. He said that it should be borne in mind that in this matter we would be giving the Chancellor something that he very much wanted in order to ease his own internal political situation and which would cost the Allied Governments nothing, since none of them had any intention of taking such reparations anyway. He suggested that a concession on this point to the Chancellor might facilitate an agreement in connection with Article 7, Paragraph 3 of the general agreement.[5]

To M. Schuman's suggestion that the provisions regarding reparations from current production should be deleted from the convention altogether, Mr. Eden replied that the remaining part of this section of the convention consisted of undertakings which the Allies were asking the Federal Republic to give, and that M. Schuman's proposal would result in the elimination of the only Allied undertaking given in return.

After further discussion of possible compromise solutions, the Ministers agreed that M. Schuman should present the point of view of his Government on this question to the Chancellor.

7. *Definition of Weapons in Annex to Article 107 of EDC Treaty—Guided Missiles*[6]

Mr. Eden said that although his Government had shared the French anxiety with regard to the production of the so-called short-range guided missiles, it had reached the conclusion as the result of exhaustive study by British experts that there was, in the main, no direct connection between the production of short-range and long-range guided missiles, because the technical problems applicable to the production of the two types of weapons had no bearing on each other. He then proposed the adoption of the following wording for paragraph IV (d) of Annex 2 to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty:

> "Proximity fuses, and short-range defensive anti-aircraft guided missiles of less than two metres in length with target-seeking heads (diameter of missile twelve inches, Mach No. 2, ground range 20 miles and war-head not exceeding 50 lbs) shall be deemed to be excluded from these Definitions."

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[5] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

[6] For text of the European Defense Community Treaty, signed May 27 at Paris, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116-162.

This meant, he explained, that the German proposal to add the words "long-range" in paragraph IV (a) could not be accepted, as short-range missiles, other than those defined in the U.K. draft of paragraph IV (d) would remain in Annex 2.

Mr. Acheson said that the position of the U.S. Government was that it was important that the Germans should not produce long-range guided missiles. Since current research indicated, however, that the short-range guided missile would be the most effective weapon against tanks and planes, his Government considered that it would be unfortunate if the Germans were not allowed to produce these weapons and were obliged to rely upon outdated defensive weapons.

M. Schuman said that he was ready to accept Mr. Eden's formula, but that he wished it to be understood that his acceptance represented a distinct concession on the part of the French Government and that he hoped the Chancellor would recognize this.

Mr. Eden then raised the question as to whether the Chancellor should be asked to give an undertaking by letter that the production of guided missiles contemplated in the U.K. formula should not be permitted east of the Rhine River. There was some discussion on this point, but at a later stage in the meeting it was agreed to propose that the manufacture of these weapons should be handled in the same manner as the manufacture of propellants under the terms of the EDC Treaty.

8. *Article 50 of the Convention on Rights and Obligations of the Forces*[7]

Mr. Acheson said that he understood discussion on this problem was still in progress between the French and German delegations.

M. Schuman said that the negotiations in Paris between M. Alphand and Professor Hallstein had not been successful, but that there had been some progress in discussions in Bonn in the past few days. He then outlined some of the difficulties in connection with this article. He requested the support of his British and American colleagues in this matter, pointing out that if the French troops, which composed the largest single element in the European land forces, were to be placed in an adverse position as regards their logistic support in Germany prior to the time of the effective operation of the EDC arrangements, it would be impossible to obtain ratification of the contractual arrangements by the French Parliament.

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[7] Article 50 dealt with transitional provisions for the armed forces of EDC. For the full text of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, see Cmd. 8571; see Document 53 for an extract from the convention.

Mr. Acheson then inquired as to the manner in which the United States and United Kingdom Governments could give this assistance. M. Schuman replied that he felt that the U.S. and U.K. delegations should not become involved in the details of the negotiation on this problem, but should lend their general support to the French case, which should lead to a settlement in the interest of all concerned.

9. *Federal Republic's Finance Contribution to Western Defense*

The Ministers agreed to accept a recommendation agreed between the High Commissioners and the Chancellor that the Federal Republic's support for Allied forces after the entry into effect of the contractual agreements should be fixed for the first six-month period at DM 551 million per month and for the next three-month period at DM 319 million per month, or an average of DM 474 million per month for nine months, with the condition that the Federal Republic would agree to meet the cost of acquiring and evacuating land sites for the Allied forces.[8]

Mr. Eden suggested that a tripartite decision should be reached, prior to the signature of the agreements, on the allocation of the sum for troop support among the Allied forces. He thought that the division might be made on the basis of the proportions already established or a like formula. Mr. Acheson agreed. M. Schuman asked that discussion of this point be deferred until the next day, but agreed that the settlement should be reached before signature of the agreements.

M. Schuman drew attention to the fact that the German delegation wished to exclude the EDC countries from the scope of Article 3 of the Finance Convention, which provided for an obligation on the part of the Federal Republic to make a total contribution to Western defense each year comparable to that of the other principal Western countries, and from Article 7 of this convention, which provided that a variety of specified services should be furnished to Allied forces without charge. Mr. Eden said that he understood the French concern with respect to the provisions of Article 7, and that he felt that the French and Belgian troops should have the benefit of these services until 30 June 1953. Mr. Acheson said that he also supported the French position in this matter.

M. Schuman thanked his colleagues for their support. He said that the considerations with regard to Article 3 were largely legal and political, and that he would reconsider his position on this article after it had been discussed with the Chancellor.

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[8] For text of the Finance Convention, see Document 55.

10. *German War Criminal Suspects in France*

Mr. Acheson said that the Chancellor might raise the question of the disposition of cases of German war criminals in France. M. Schuman replied that he would be prepared to discuss this point with the Chancellor.

11. *Close of the Meeting*

The meeting adjourned at 4:15 p. m.

No. 44

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France With the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 24, 1952, 4:45 p.m. [1]

SECRET

There were present:

United States
Mr. Acheson
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Reber
Mr. Harris
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Calhoun
Miss Kirkpatrick
United Kingdom
Mr. Eden
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Ward
Mr. Trevelyan
Mr. O'Neill
Mr. Bathurst
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Ridsdale

France
M. Schuman
M. François-Poncet
M. Alphand
M. Berard
M. Seydoux
M. Leroy-Beaulieu
M. de Guiringaud
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Patey

Federal Republic
Dr. Adenauer
Herr Schaeffer
Prof. Hallstein
Herr Blankenhorn
Prof. Grewe

[Here follows a seven-point index to the minutes.]

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[1] There is no indication on the source text to show who prepared these minutes. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 3050 from Bonn, May 25. (662A.00/5-2552)

1. Opening of the Meeting

It was agreed that Mr. Acheson should act as Chairman. Mr. Acheson welcomed the Chancellor and asked him if he would care to make a general statement before consideration of the agenda began.

The Chancellor said that he had no general statement to make, other than to extend a welcome to the Foreign Ministers and to express the hope that the following Monday would see the completion of the first part of a very great undertaking.

2. Title of Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic

The Chancellor accepted the proposal of the Three Ministers conveyed by Mr. Acheson that the official title of the Convention should stand as proposed, but that each country might be free to adopt its own version of a short title for unofficial use.

3. Special Arrangements for Entry into Force of Parts of the Contractual Agreements Prior to Complete Ratification of the EDC Treaty

Mr. Acheson said that a suggestion had been made that certain provisions of the conventions might enter into force when they had been ratified by the Four Powers and when the EDC Treaty had been ratified by certain but not all of the powers party to this agreement. The Ministers felt that this arrangement was inadvisable because owing to the close interrelationship of the two treaties many complications would result. The best solution would be for all the nations concerned to press for the earliest possible ratification. It was the intention of the United States Government to place the contractual agreements before the United States Senate during the course of the next week and he hoped that other Governments would take similar steps designed to ensure ratification at the earliest possible date. If, however, hopes for speedy ratification were not achieved because of the failure of one of the parties to the EDC Treaty to act, a new situation would be created. The Ministers agreed that in this event a meeting with representatives of the Federal Republic should be held to consider the situation. A draft letter to this effect had been prepared for the Chancellor to consider.[2]

The Chancellor replied that he fully recognized the difficulties created by his suggestion for the prior entry into force of parts of the contractual agreements. At the same time he felt bound to draw attention to the difficulties which would confront the Federal

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[2] The draft of this letter has not been identified further. For the final text, see item 2, Document 48.

Republic and other Western European countries if the EDC Treaty were not promptly ratified. The Federal Government would seek ratification of the agreements by the end of July and for this purpose the Bundestag would probably extend its sessions at least a fortnight beyond the normal closing date. He reminded the Ministers that the Schuman Plan Treaty, signed fourteen months ago, had not yet been ratified by all the signatories. He had also been informed that the Netherlands Government had stated that it would not be able to ratify the EDC Treaty until December.

The prospect of delay caused him concern not only as regards the contractual conventions, but also in connection with the forces which were to be raised and made available for Western defense by the Federal Republic. Twelve divisions were to be raised by July 1954. In view of the lack of any existing military establishment, it would be difficult to do this unless ratification were prompt.

As to the internal political situation, unless the contractual arrangements came into effect quickly, the benefits which they conferred on Germany would not have been felt by the German public prior to the 1953 national elections, and this situation would have a serious effect on those elections.

With respect to the draft letter, he asked that phrasing should be added to indicate that the three Governments were prepared to meet with the Federal Government, not only to consider the situation created by delay in ratification of the EDC Treaty but also to consider whether certain of the provisions of the contractual arrangements could then be put into effect.

Mr. Eden said that he could agree to this suggestion.

M. Schuman said the Chancellor's proposal might be acceptable, but added that such a statement of intention would have only a theoretical value until the difficulties which might exist at that future date were known and agreement were in fact reached on just what parts of the conventions might be put into effect. He said that Parliamentary prerogatives had to be kept in mind and therefore that only those provisions which did not require ratification could be applied in advance. He also stressed the fact that there could be no question of whole parts of the agreements being applied. Only certain measures could be put into effect in advance and a special agreement would have to be concluded for this purpose. The Chancellor said that he could agree to a wording of the statement which would take M. Schuman's point into account. It was agreed that experts should be asked to redraft the letter in the light of the discussion.

Before continuing to the next item, Mr. Acheson said that he wished once again to emphasize the importance which the United States Government attached to what the Chancellor had said about the necessity for early ratification. He also was disturbed by the Netherlands' decision to defer ratification to December and would make this known to the Netherlands Government. Another important point to bear in mind was that by January 1953 it was probable that there would be a change in the principal officials concerned with the foreign policy of the United States Government. Although this would not mean a basic change in American foreign policy, it would be unfortunate if the new officials were obliged to deal with complicated political and technical problems arising from more than a year of negotiations, the background of which would be completely unfamiliar to them.

4. *Text of a Letter to be Sent by the Federal Chancellor to the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments on Atomic Energy*

The Chancellor accepted the Ministers' proposal that the review of restrictions on the production of nuclear fuel in the Federal Territory should take place at the end of two years from the coming into effect of the conventions.[3]

5. *Definition of Weapons in Annex to Article 107 of EDC Treaty—Guided Missiles*

Mr. Acheson read to the Chancellor the text of the definition of these weapons agreed upon by the Ministers at their meeting earlier that day (see Minute 7 of the record of this meeting.[4]) He added that this text had been prepared by the UK delegation and asked Mr. Eden whether he had any comment. Mr. Eden then said that the proposed definition involved the understanding that short range missiles would not be produced in exposed areas. The Chancellor agreed.

Mr. Acheson then said that he understood that it was the Allied proposal that the undertaking on this matter should be treated in the same manner as that for the manufacture of propellants, i.e., in an annex to the EDC Treaty. The Chancellor said this would be satisfactory to him.

6. *French Reservation on Reparations*

Mr. Acheson called on M. Schuman to make a statement on this matter. M. Schuman said that he recognized that this problem was one of as great importance to the Chancellor as it was to the French Government. At Potsdam, agreement had been reached on only two categories of reparations and a third category, reparations out of current production, remained to be settled at the time of a final peace treaty with Germany. It was, of course, not to be expected that the three Allied powers would have recourse to such reparations under present conditions. However, it would be difficult at this time to include in the contractual agreements a formal statement renouncing such reparations without provoking great opposition in the French Parliament. He felt that the best solution would be to avoid making an issue of this matter now and suggested a formula by which the second sentence of Article 1 of Chapter Six (Reparations) of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and Occupation would be omitted and a new Article 6 added in which the Allied powers would agree not to claim from the Federal Republic reparations from current production pending a peace treaty.[5]

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[3] For text of the letter from the Chancellor to the three Foreign Ministers on atomic energy, see Document 64

[4] *Supra.*

The Chancellor asked whether this Allied undertaking would apply only until the time of the peace treaty. If so, that would imply that the Allied powers reserved the right at the peace treaty to revise the undertaking and claim reparations from current production. M. Schuman replied that the question would, in fact, remain to be settled in the final peace treaty which, however, would be discussed with the Federal Government as an equal partner in the negotiations.

The Chancellor said that the omission of the undertaking on reparations from current production constituted a basic change of the text. He had already shown the text of the article as agreed upon by the experts to leading members of the coalition parties in the Bundestag in order to counteract in part the violent press attacks which had been made on the Government in connection with other provisions of the agreement. He said that opposition to the conventions had recently reached a new degree of heatedness and referred to Schumacher's statement of 24 May that anyone who signed the agreement could no longer claim to be a German. No matter what intention lay behind the formula proposed by M. Schuman, the German public would interpret the wording as a reservation of an Allied right to claim reparations from current production in the peace treaty. He reminded the Ministers that the previous British Government had already declared that the reparations question was settled with the completion of dismantling and the seizure of German assets abroad. He then appealed to M. Schuman to join in finding a new formulation on this point which would help him (the Chancellor) with his internal political difficulties. The Chancellor indicated that if M. Schuman could meet him on this issue he would be prepared to make concessions which would satisfy French requirements on the application to the French forces of the provisions of the convention on the status of troops.

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[5] For text of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and Occupation, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 25-88 or Cmd. 8571, pp. 75-135.

M. Schuman said that he was moved by the Chancellor's appeal, but he had to point out that his Government had already met the Chancellor on a great many points. In this matter he had already gone beyond the limits of his instructions in an effort to meet the Chancellor's needs. The whole difficulty was mainly a problem of formulation, because the French Government had never demanded reparations from current production and did not intend to do so at the time of the peace treaty. It was obvious that the party who had to pay reparations should be sensitive on the point, but it was equally true that those who had suffered damage should have strong feelings. The Communists in France were now creating agitation among persons who had suffered war damage by telling them that those who had suffered losses from the war in Russia had been adequately recompensed while the French Government refused to seek reparations with which to help its own people. He appealed again to the Chancellor to accept his formula.

7. Close of the Meeting

The Meeting adjourned at 6:45 p. m.

No. 45

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, May 25, 1952.

Participants: His Excellency Theodor Heuss, President of the German Federal Republic
His Excellency Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
Also present: Mr. Adenauer, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Von Herwalt

The Secretary accompanied by Mr. McCloy and Mr. Jessup called on President Heuss at 6:45 on Saturday afternoon, May 24. Chancellor Adenauer was also present as was Mr. Von Herwalt, who acted as interpreter.

The Secretary began by saying that he brought from President Truman a message of cordial greetings and good wishes to President Heuss. The President believed that the Secretary and the Chancellor working together would be able to bring the present negotiations to a successful conclusion. President Heuss interrupted to say he appreciated this message and he shared this expectation. The Secretary continued that he did not wish to minimize the important cooperation and good will of his French and British colleagues, but he did feel the United States and the Federal Republic cooperating together were in a position to make a major contribution. President Heuss again agreed. President Heuss and the Chancellor expressed their appreciation of the cooperation which they had received from Mr. McCloy. The Secretary referred to our hope that the Senate would be able to ratify the Convention before its adjournment, to which President Heuss replied that he hoped their ratification could be concluded in July or August.

The call was brief and formal but characterized by an atmosphere of great cordiality.

PHILIP C. JESSUP

No. 46

662A.00/5-2552: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 25, 1952—noon.

3053. From the Secretary. Three-hour tripartite session began 10:30 last night with discussion reparations problem. Eden stated if Adenauer put question to him he would have to say that UK rejected Fr position. He reminded Schuman that Adenauer had offered agreement on Article 50 [2] in exchange for agreement on reparations and advised Schuman to take this substantial value in place of maintaining theoretical objection. Schuman said he preferred that US UK clearly state that they were opposed in principle to reparations from current account and Fr cld take note of it. This would be clearer for the Fr and in that case they cld accept the text of Article 1 as it stands. [3] The explanation cld be put in a protocol. Br draft revised by Fr and further revised by Secretary in the direction of stating US UK position as reaffirmation of previous view then agreed as fols:

> "The US and UK Govts declare that they have not asserted and do not intend to assert any claim for reparations out of current production. They have consistently opposed, and intend to oppose the exaction of such reparations by any other power. Fr Govt takes

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] For text of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 89–130 or Cmd. 8571, pp. 17–58. For an extract from this convention, see Document 53.

[3] For full text of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 25–88, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 75–135.

note of the situation of fact and therefore associates itself with Article 1 of Chapter XI of the convention on settlement of matters arising out of war and occupation."

It was agreed that in putting this up to Adenauer it shld be stated as a bargain in exchange for his agreement on Article 50 and agreement to Fr proposals on the application of finance convention to EDC forces. McCloy reported Adenauer had told him that evening that he wld overrule Hallstein on those questions. Fitzpatrick [*Kirkpatrick*?] confirmed that he had received same info.

Conferees then discussed Article 7 (3).[4] Secretary reported Adenauer said that if we had a provision that united Germany succeeds to rights and duties he wld be confronted with two propaganda difficulties. First SPD and Commies say we are trying to bind a Germany which does not exist and second they argue we make impossible any agreement with the Sovs. On other hand, Adenauer felt he wld escape these difficulties if provision was made to say Federal Republic may not in any negotiation concerning a united Germany escape its obligations, etc. Secretary believed such a provision wld say the same thing in a different way and if Adenauer felt it met his domestic difficulties we should try to go along. McCloy confirmed by Fitzpatrick [*Kirkpatrick*?] reported Adenauer's willingness to withdraw the substitute text which he had submitted in afternoon. Eden noted comparable problem raised in Parliament. After general discussion following text in alternate forms agreed for consideration overnight:

"Alternate A"

"Upon assumption by a unified Germany of the obligations of Federal Republic towards three power or any of them under the present convention and related conventions and treaties for the formation of an integrated European community, the three powers will extend to such a unified Germany the rights which the Federal Republic enjoys under those conventions and will for their part agree that its rights under those treaties shall be similarly extended. Except by common consent of all parties to this convention Federal Republic shall not conclude any agreement or enter into any arrangement which wld impair the rights of three powers under those conventions and treaties or lessen the obligations of Federal Republic thereunder."

"Alternate B"

"The three powers shall, in the event of the unification of Germany, extend to a unified Germany the rights which the Federal Republic has under the present convention and related conventions and will for their part agree that the rights under the treaties for the formation of an integrated European community should be similarly extended, upon the assumption by such a unified Germany of (it being understood that a unified Germany assures) obligations which Federal Republic owes to three powers or to any of them under those conventions and treaties. Except by common consent of all parties to this convention Federal Republic shall not conclude any agreement or enter into any arrangement which would impair the rights of the three powers under those conventions and treaties or lessen the obligations of Federal Republic thereunder."

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[4] For text of the Convention on the Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

[Here follows discussion on changes in the Tripartite Declaration on the strength and integrity of the European Defense Community.]

[McCloy]

No. 47

262.84A4/5-2552: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, May 25, 1952—8 p.m.

3059. From the Secretary. Secretary saw Adenauer this morning re Israeli and Jewish claims. [2] Stressed importance US attaches to having a settlement of this matter reached which is satisfactory to both sides. Emphasized fact that it is primarily a moral issue. Expressed disappointment at reports that Gers seemed to be hoping for US aid to assist them in settling the claims and pointed out that Gers wld be evading moral responsibility if they relied on such a solution. Made clear Gers cld expect no aid from US for this purpose.

Chancellor in reply noted that resignation of Boehm, chief Ger negotiator in talks with Israeli and Jewish reps had been withdrawn and Boehm was now discussing claims in Paris with Nahum Goldmann, who is acting as rep for Israeli as well as Jewish material claimants. Chancellor said he had heard these discussions are going well.

Secretary expressed satisfaction this report and said he hoped Gers wld make every effort to reach prompt and satisfactory settlement.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, The Hague, and Tel Aviv.

[2] The meeting probably took place immediately before the quadripartite meeting reported on *infra*.

New subj: Suggested reply from Secretary to Sharett's letter (Paris tel 894, May 23 to Bonn) will be telegraphed shortly for Dept approval.[3]

McCLOY

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[3] No copy of this telegram, which apparently was not repeated to Washington, has been found in Department of State files. The letter under reference from Israeli Minister Sharett, copies of which were also sent to the British and French, asked that Israeli claims be brought to the attention of the Federal Republic.

No. 48

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

Minutes of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France With the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 25, 1952, 10:30 a.m.[1]

SECRET

There were present:

United States
Mr. Acheson
Mr. McCloy
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Reber
Mr. Harris
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Calhoun
Miss Kirkpatrick

United Kingdom
Mr. Eden
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Ward
Mr. Trevelyan
Mr. O'Neill
Mr. Bathurst
Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Ridsdale

France
M. Schuman
M. Francois-Poncet
M. Alphand
M. Berard
M. Seydoux
M. Leroy-Beaulieu
M. de Guiringaud
M. Sauvagnargues
M. Patey

Federal Republic
Dr. Adenauer
Herr Schaeffer
Prof. Hallstein
Herr Blankenhorn
Prof. Grewe

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[1] There is no indication on the source text to show who prepared these minutes. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the meeting in telegram 3062 from Bonn, May 25. (662A.00/5–2552)

[Here follows a five-point index to the minutes.]

1. French Reservation on Reparations; Application of Article 50 of Rights and Obligations Convention; Outstanding Financial Questions

Mr. Acheson said that, as a result of discussions which had taken place in the interval since the last meeting, the Allied Ministers were now ready to make proposals on the basis of which it should be possible to reach a solution of these problems as a group. As to the question of reparations, it was proposed that Article 1 of Chapter Six of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation [2] should be allowed to stand without modification and that the French position would be covered by the following protocol:

> "The U.S. and U.K. Governments declare that they have not asserted and do not intend to assert any claim for reparations out of current production. They have consistently opposed, and intend to oppose the exaction of such reparations by any other Power. The French Government takes note of the situation of fact and therefore associates itself with Article 1 of Chapter Six of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation."

M. Schuman intervened to say that the French concession on this point was dependent on agreement being reached on the whole group of these problems. Mr. Acheson said that he had been about to make this point and hoped that the Chancellor and M. Schuman could settle between them the remaining points at issue regarding the application of Article 50 of the Forces Convention and the question of the application of Articles 7 and 3 of the Finance Convention. [3] In that event, the three Governments were prepared to confirm the recommendation made by the High Commissioners for the division of the Federal Republic financial contribution to defense. [4] After some discussion, it was agreed that French and German experts should retire in an attempt to resolve the outstanding issues with regard to the application of Article 50.

The experts upon their return reported that they had been able to agree on a revised text for Article 50, except for a German reservation that the EDC Commissariat should have a right of intervention in matters of logistic support prior to 30 June 1953. M. Schuman said that he objected to this reservation on several grounds. In the first place, the problem was not now within the competence of the EDC Commissariat and in any event the rights of the French and Belgian troops involved would be covered by the convention for only a few months. The cost of support of these troops would not be within the control of the EDC Commissariat and it would be illogical to give the EDC any responsibility in the matter of material support. Finally, the introduction of yet another date into the steps leading up to the adoption of a common budget would create great fiscal difficulties.

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[2] For text of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 25-88, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 75-135.

[3] For text of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 89-133, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 17-58. An extract from this convention is printed as Document 53; for text of the Finance Convention, see Document 55.

[4] Regarding the High Commissioners' recommendation, see point 9, Document 43.

The Chancellor replied that he believed that giving the EDC Commissariat a right in this matter would perhaps be reassuring to certain other member countries of the EDC, but added that he placed no very high value on the point and would be willing to concede it. M. Schuman thanked the Chancellor and indicated that he would be willing to concede to the Chancellor's position on Article 3 of the Finance Convention if the Chancellor would accept his position on Article 7 of that convention. The Chancellor agreed.

On Mr. Acheson's proposal, the Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor then confirmed the division of the Federal Republic's financial contribution as proposed by the High Commissioners.

2. *Special Arrangements for Entry into Force of Parts of the Contractual Arrangements Prior to Complete Ratification of the EDC Treaty*

The four Ministers confirmed agreement to the following text of the letter to be addressed by the Foreign Ministers to the Chancellor on this subject:

> "During the discussions on the conventions which have been signed today, you have raised the question whether certain provisions of these conventions might be put into effect before the time provided for in the conventions themselves.
>
> We wish to inform you that when the conventions have been ratified by all the parties to them our Governments will be prepared if there is any undue delay on the part of other parties in ratifying the Treaty on the Establishment of the EDC to hold a meeting with the Federal Government to consider the situation, and to determine whether arrangements may be made to put certain provisions contained in the conventions into effect prior to the entry into force of the conventions."

3. *Article 7, Paragraph 3 of Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany* [5]

Mr. Acheson referred to the difficulties which Paragraph 3 of Article 7 of this convention had raised for the Chancellor. Members of the three Allied delegations had consulted amongst themselves and with representatives of the Chancellor and were now in a position to propose a new draft of this paragraph which they hoped would meet these difficulties.[*] He explained that the new draft incorporated two ideas. The first was that the Three Powers in the event of unification of Germany would extend the rights of the Federal Republic under the present conventions to the government of a unified Germany upon the assumption by such a government of the Federal Republic's obligations under the conventions. The second was that the Federal Government should not enter into any agreement which would impair the rights of the Three Powers under the conventions.

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[5] Document 51.

After the text of the paragraph had been read to the Chancellor in full, he said that the second sentence contained a commitment on the part of the Federal Republic which the Three Powers were not called upon to reciprocate. The Federal Republic was asked not to conclude any agreement or enter into an arrangement which would impair the rights of the Three Powers, but the Three Powers were not undertaking a similar obligation toward the Federal Republic.

Mr. Acheson said that this question had been previously discussed in connection with Article 2, Paragraph 1, of this convention under which the Allies had reserved powers concerning Germany as a whole including the question of unification and the peace settlement. The question had arisen as to whether under this reservation of power the Three Powers could take action which would impair the rights of the Federal Republic.

The Allied experts had prepared the draft of a letter which stated that the Three Powers did not interpret this reserve power as permitting them to derogate from their undertakings to the Federal Republic. [†]

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[*] The text of this draft read as follows:

"The Three Powers will, in the event of the unification of Germany, extend to a unified Germany the rights which the Federal Republic has under the present Convention and the related Conventions and will for their part agree that the rights under the Treaties for the formation of an integrated European community should be similarly extended, upon the assumption by such a unified Germany of the obligations of the Federal Republic toward the Three Powers or to any of them under those Conventions and Treaties. Except by common consent of all parties to this Convention the Federal Republic will not conclude any agreement or enter into any arrangement which would impair the rights of the Three Powers under those Conventions and Treaties or lessen the obligations of the Federal Republic thereunder." [Footnote in the source text.]

[†] The text of this letter is: "In the course of our recent conversations you asked us to confirm that the right relating to Germany as a whole reserved by the Three Powers in Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be

Continued

Mr. Eden said that as he saw it the last sentence of Article 7 (3) dealt with rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and this proposed letter contained the counterpart obligation on the part of the Three Powers. M. Schuman said that he agreed with Mr. Eden and approved the text of the letter.

After further discussion as to whether the new draft of Article 7 (3) and the proposed draft letter constituted fully reciprocal undertakings, the Chancellor indicated that he would accept the drafts with a modification of Article 7 (3) to provide for the possibility of mutually agreed adjustments to the conventions.

4. Clemency for War Criminals

Mr. Acheson recalled that the Chancellor had asked the Allied Governments not to suspend clemency action with respect to war criminals during the period between the signature and ratification of the contractual conventions. He could inform the Chancellor on behalf of all three of the Governments that such action would not be suspended, during this period. The Chancellor thanked Mr. Acheson for his statement, but added that his request had gone somewhat further. He had hoped that advantage might be taken on the occasion of the signature of the conventions to extend clemency on an increased scale. Such action need not be taken immediately, but should come within the near future so that the public would understand that it was connected with the signature of the conventions and the coming into effect of the new relationship. The Ministers said that they would bear the Chancellor's remarks in mind.

M. Schuman said that the number of prisoners in the French Zone had been progressively reduced to about 100. The French Government was considering general clemency measures, although he was not in a position to commit himself on this subject. By general clemency measures he did not mean immediate release of the prisoners, but that special consideration would be given to individual cases.

Mr. Eden said that since the Chancellor had visited London,[6] the U.K. Government had undertaken an extensive review of its cases. The number of prisoners had been reduced from about 200 to 100. He was inclined to feel that the best way of proceeding would be as at present by a periodic review which would eventually result in reducing the number of prisoners to a small core. Mr. Acheson

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interpreted as permitting them to affect adversely the relations established between themselves and the Federal Republic by the conventions signed today.

"We have the honor to inform you that our Governments do not interpret the right in question as permitting the Three Powers to derogate from their undertakings to the Federal Republic in the conventions signed today." [Footnote in the source text. For the final text of this letter, see Document 60.]

[6] Adenauer participated in the London Foreign Ministers meeting, Feb. 13–19.

pointed out that the U.S. Government had already caused a careful and far-reaching review to be made and that review would continue.

The Chancellor expressed his appreciation for these remarks. Although he realized that little could be done at the present moment when the conventions were about to be signed, he asked whether any steps could be taken to improve conditions at the Spandau Prison. He mentioned particularly the case of von Neurath and asked whether at the right time something could not be done to alleviate his condition. M. Schuman said that he understood that the Three Powers intended to take this problem up with the Soviet authorities. He also agreed, at the Chancellor's request, that joint discussions between France and the Federal Republic should be held in the near future on the status of German war criminals in France.

5. Close of the Meeting

The Chancellor said that he wished to pay a particular tribute to the High Commissioners whose efforts and understanding had done so much to make the conclusion of the agreements possible. The U.S. High Commissioner, on behalf of his colleagues, praised the Chancellor for his great contribution to the success of the negotiations. Mr. Acheson, on behalf of the Foreign Ministers, concluded by expressing their appreciation to the officials and experts who had for many long months worked on the texts of the conventions which had now been completed.

The Meeting adjourned at 1:15 p.m.

No. 49

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

Department of State Press Release

[WASHINGTON,] May 26, 1952.

No. 415

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON SIGNING OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS WITH GERMANY

Following is the text of a statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on the occasion of the signing at Bonn today of the Contractual Agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany:

The agreements that have been signed today are of great importance for each of the four countries represented here. The Federal Republic is attaining the independence in foreign affairs and authority in domestic matters which befit a free state. The United Kingdom, France and the United States, together with the other free nations, are welcoming a new partner in their great effort to establish peace and security in the world.

Let us take a moment to examine what these agreements mean and what they are intended to accomplish.

The relations which follow from these agreements are fundamentally such as exist between countries closely associated in peace and friendship. When the agreements enter into effect, the occupation will come to its formal close, and the Federal Government will deal with other governments on a normal basis. The United States Government is convinced that the agreements are just because problems arising from the war must be settled, and it is right to settle them in this fashion. The purpose of the agreements is to bring the occupation to an end, and this will be their effect.

There are still certain powers reserved to the United Kingdom, France and the United States. But the important thing to remember about these powers is that they are not retained for any reasons which have to do with the Federal Republic alone. They are related to other factors entirely-to the necessity for the presence in Germany of troops whose mission is the defense of German peace and freedom and of peace and freedom throughout the free world, and to the unhappy fact that Germany is still a divided country. When these conditions no longer exist, the powers retained to deal with them will be withdrawn.

It is a matter of great regret and concern to the American government that the task of restoring Germany as a whole is not completed. I feel deeply the absence on this occasion of those who might have represented the people of that part of Germany which is still under Soviet occupation. It would have been a more joyful occasion if they had been permitted to join us.

One of the great aims of the Western world, one of the great themes of its culture, and one of the great achievements of its people, has been freedom. Political and social freedom of the individual, freedom of his conscience and speech, have been what the West holds most dear. Since the end of the war the three powers have consistently worked to establish freedom throughout Germany, and their efforts have been met with invaluable cooperation on the part of the people of Western Germany and Berlin. Together we have succeeded in bringing freedom to the greater part of Germany, but until freedom can be extended to the entire country, and until all Germans—east and west—are reunited in freedom, the goal will not have been reached.

I can assure you of my Government's continued determination to press steadily towards this goal, until the unity of Germany in freedom has become a reality.

In anticipation of the day when these agreements will have been accepted by the legislative bodies of our countries and will enter into effect, I wish to congratulate the Federal Republic on its new place among nations of the world. We have difficult problems ahead, and we can solve them only by working together. We are glad to have a new partner in this great cause. On behalf of the President of the United States and the American people, I welcomed the Federal Republic on its return to the community of nations.

C. DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MAY 26, 1952

No. 50

Editorial Note

The contractual agreements signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, comprise four major conventions with annexes, one agreement, and a score of letters exchanged between the Chancellor of the Federal Republic and either the High Commissioners for Germany or the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Of these documents three of the conventions and several of the letters are printed here either in part or *in toto*. In addition three more letters were exchanged with the Chancellor at Paris on May 27. One of these is printed here. The editors have been unable to find any single source which has the text of all the documents comprising the complex of the contractual agreements, however, Cmd. 8571 and *Senate Q and R* have a large majority of them, albeit not the same ones. Additionally the complex of these agreements is summarized in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, pages 888–895. On June 5, 1952, the Allied General Secretariat of the Allied High Commission for Germany prepared a list of documents comprising the complex of contractual agreements (AGSEC/MEMO (52) 8). This list includes some items comprising the conventions, annexes, agreements, letters, and acknowledgments signed at Bonn (including the three signed at Paris). A copy is in Bonn Embassy files, lot 58 M 27, D (52) 1317/A.

The contractual agreements were submitted to the United States Senate on June 2 and ratified on July 1. In the United Kingdom a similar speedy ratification was accomplished by August 1. The Federal Republic of Germany ratified the agreement on March 19, 1953, thus leaving French ratification as only impediment to the entering into force of the agreements. The French National Assembly was however so concerned with the European Defense Community Treaty, which was presented to it with the contractuals, that when it finally voted against the EDC in September 1954, the contractuals were rejected as well and never went into effect.

The question of contractual relations then became part of the general problem of the restoration of German sovereignty which was discussed, *inter alia,* at the Nine-Power Conference at London in September and October of 1954. For documentation on the proceedings of this conference including the Paris Agreements which outlined the manner in which the Federal Republic would achieve sovereignty and join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see volume V, Part 2, pages 1294 ff.

No. 51

Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany [1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OF THE OTHER PART:

Whereas a peaceful and prosperous European Community of nations firmly bound to the other free nations of the world through dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations can be attained only through united support and defence of the common freedom and the common heritage;

Whereas it is the common aim of the Signatory States to integrate the Federal Republic on a basis of equality within the European Community itself included in a developing Atlantic Community;

Whereas the achievement of a fully free and unified Germany through peaceful means and of a freely negotiated peace settlement, though prevented for the present by measures beyond their control, remains a fundamental and common goal of the Signatory States;

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R,* pp. 9–22.

Whereas the retention of the Occupation Statute[2] with its powers of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Federal Republic is inconsistent with the purpose of integrating the Federal Republic within the European Community;

Whereas the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (hereinafter referred to as "the Three Powers") are therefore determined to retain only those special rights of which the retention is necessary, in the common interest of the Signatory States, having regard to the special international situation in Germany;

Whereas the Federal Republic has developed free and responsible political institutions and is determined to maintain the liberal-democratic federal constitution which guarantees human rights and is enshrined in its Basic Law;

Whereas the Three Powers and the Federal Republic recognize that both the new relationship to be established between them by the present Convention and its related Conventions and the Treaties for the creation of an integrated European Community, in particular the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Community for Coal and Steel and the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, are essential steps to the achievement of their common aim for a unified Germany integrated within the European Community;

Have entered into the following Convention setting forth the basis for their new relationship:

ARTICLE 1

1. The Federal Republic shall have full authority over its internal and external affairs, except as provided in the present Convention.

2. The Three Powers will revoke the Occupation Statute and abolish the Allied High Commission and the Offices of the Land Commissioners upon the entry into force of the present Convention and the Conventions listed in Article 8 (hereinafter referred to as "the related Conventions").

3. The Three Powers will thenceforth conduct their relations with the Federal Republic through Ambassadors who will act jointly in matters the Three Powers consider of common concern under the present Convention and the related Conventions.

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[2] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 179–181. Regarding the revision of the Occupation Statute, see *ibid.*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1410 ff.

ARTICLE 2

1. The Three Powers retain, in view of the international situation, the rights, heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to (a) the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, (b) Berlin, and (c) Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement.

2. The Federal Republic, on its part, will refrain from any action prejudicial to these rights and will cooperate with the Three Powers to facilitate their exercise.

ARTICLE 3

1. The Federal Republic agrees to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and with the aims defined in the Statute of the Council of Europe.

2. The Federal Republic affirms its intention to associate itself fully with the community of free nations through membership in international organizations contributing to the common aims of the free world. The Three Powers will support applications for such membership by the Federal Republic at appropriate times.

3. In their negotiations with States with which the Federal Republic maintains no relations, the Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic in respect of matters directly involving its political interests.

4. At the request of the Federal Government, the Three Powers will arrange to represent the interests of the Federal Republic in relations with other States and in certain international organizations or conferences, whenever the Federal Republic is not in a position to do so itself.

ARTICLE 4

1. The mission of the armed forces stationed by the Three Powers in the Federal territory will be the defence of the free world, of which the Federal Republic and Berlin form part.

2. The Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic, insofar as the military situation permits, regarding the stationing of such armed forces in the Federal territory. The Federal Republic will cooperate fully, in accordance with the present Convention and the related Conventions, in facilitating the tasks of such armed forces.

3. The Three Powers will obtain the consent of the Federal Republic before bringing into the Federal territory, as part of their forces, contingents of the armed forces of any nation not now providing such contingents. Such contingents may nevertheless be

brought into the Federal territory without the consent of the Federal Republic in the event of external attack or imminent threat of such attack but, after the elimination of the danger, may only remain there with its consent.

4. The Federal Republic will participate in the European Defence Community in order to contribute to the common defence of the free world.

Article 5

1. In the exercise of their right to protect the security of the armed forces stationed in the Federal territory, the Three Powers will conform to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article.

2. In case the Federal Republic and the European Defence Community are unable to deal with a situation which is created by

an attack on the Federal Republic or Berlin,
subversion of the liberal democratic basic order,
a serious disturbance of public order or
a grave threat of any of these events,

and which in the opinion of the Three Powers endangers the security of their forces, the Three Powers may, after consultation to the fullest extent possible with the Federal Government, proclaim a state of emergency in the whole or any part of the Federal Republic.

3. Upon the proclamation of a state of emergency, the Three Powers may take such measures as are necessary to maintain or restore order and to ensure the security of the Forces.

4. The proclamation will specify the area to which it applies. The state of emergency will not be maintained any longer than necessary to deal with the emergency.

5. The Three Powers shall consult the Federal Government to the fullest extent possible while the state of emergency continues. They will utilize to the greatest possible extent the assistance of the Federal Government and the competent German authorities.

6. If the Three Powers do not terminate a state of emergency within thirty days after a request by the Federal Government to do so, the Federal Government may submit a request to the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to examine the situation and consider whether the state of emergency should be terminated. If the Council concludes that continuance of the state of emergency is no longer justified, the Three Powers will restore the normal situation as promptly as possible.

7. Independently of a state of emergency, any military commander may, if his forces are imminently menaced, take such immediate

action appropriate for their protection (including the use of armed force) as is requisite to remove the danger.

8. In all other respects, the protection of the security of these forces is governed by the provisions of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany referred to in Article 8 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 6

1. The Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic in regard to the exercise of their rights relating to Berlin.

2. The Federal Republic, on its part, will cooperate with the Three Powers in order to facilitate the discharge of their responsibilities with regard to Berlin. The Federal Republic will continue its aid to the political, cultural, economic and financial reconstruction of Berlin and, in particular, will grant it such aid as is set out in the annexed Declaration of the Federal Republic (Annex A to the present Convention).

ARTICLE 7

1. The Three Powers and the Federal Republic are agreed that an essential aim of their common policy is a peace settlement of the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation for a lasting peace. They further agree that the final termination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

2. Pending the peace settlement, the Three Powers and the Federal Republic will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the European Community.

3. In the event of the unification of Germany the Three Powers will, subject to such adjustments as may be agreed, extend to a unified Germany the rights which the Federal Republic has under the present Convention and the related Conventions and will for their part agree that the rights under the Treaties for the formation of an integrated European community should be similarly extended, upon the assumption by such a unified Germany of the obligations of the Federal Republic toward the Three Powers or to any of them under those Conventions and Treaties. Except by common consent of all the Signatory States the Federal Republic will not conclude any agreement or enter into any arrangement which would impair the rights of the Three Powers under those Conventions and Treaties or lessen the obligations of the Federal Republic thereunder.

4. The Three Powers will consult with the Federal Republic on all other matters involving the exercise of their rights relating to Germany as a whole.

ARTICLE 8

1. The Three Powers and the Federal Republic have concluded the following related Conventions which will enter into force simultaneously with the present Convention:

Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany; [3]
Finance Convention; [4]
Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation. [5]

2. During the transitional period provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 6 of Chapter One of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, the rights of the Three Powers referred to in that paragraph shall be deemed to be included within the exception set forth in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 9

1. There is hereby established an Arbitration Tribunal which shall function in accordance with the provisions of the annexed Charter (Annex B to the present Convention).

2. The Arbitration Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic under the provisions of the present Convention or the annexed Charter or any of the related Conventions which the parties are not able to settle by negotiation, except as otherwise provided by paragraph 3 of this Article or in the annexed Charter or in the related Conventions.

3. Any dispute involving the rights of the Three Powers referred to in Article 2, or action taken thereunder, or involving the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 7 inclusive of Article 5, shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal or of any other tribunal or court.

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[3] For text of this convention, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 89-130, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 17-58; an extract from the convention is printed as Document 53.

[4] Document 55.

[5] For text of this convention, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 25-88, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 75-135.

ARTICLE 10

The Three Powers and the Federal Republic will review the terms of the present Convention and the related Conventions

(a) upon the request of any one of them, in the event of the unification of Germany or the creation of a European federation; or

(b) upon the occurrence of any other event which all of the Signatory States recognize to be of a similarly fundamental character.

Thereupon, they will, by mutual agreement, modify the present Convention and related Conventions to the extent made necessary or advisable by the fundamental change in the situation.

ARTICLE 11

1. The present Convention and the related Conventions shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited by the Signatory States with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The present Convention shall enter into force immediately upon

(a) the deposit by all the Signatory States of instruments of ratification of the present Convention and of all the Conventions listed in Article 8; and

(b) the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community.

3. The present Convention and the related Conventions shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each Signatory State with certified copies thereof and notify each such State of the date of the entry into force of present Convention and the related Conventions.

In faith whereof the undersigned representatives duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments have signed the present Convention.

Done at Bonn this twenty-sixth day of May 1952 in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
DEAN ACHESON

For the French Republic:
ROBERT SCHUMAN

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
ANTHONY EDEN

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
ADENAUER

Annex A

Declaration of the Federal Republic on Aid to Berlin

(Agreed Translation)

In view of the special role which Berlin has played and is destined to play in the future for the self-preservation of the free world, aware of the ties connecting the Federal Republic with Berlin, and motivated by the desire to strengthen and to reinforce the position of Berlin in all fields, and in particular to bring about insofar as possible an improvement in the economy and the financial situation in Berlin including its productive capacity and level of employment, the Federal Republic undertakes

(a) to take all necessary measures on its part in order to ensure the maintenance of a balanced budget in Berlin through appropriate assistance;

(b) to take adequate measures for the equitable treatment of Berlin in the control and allocation of materials in short supply;

(c) to take adequate measures for the inclusion of Berlin in assistance received by the Federal Republic from outside sources in reasonable proportion to the unutilized industrial resources existing in Berlin;

(d) to promote the development of Berlin's external trade, to accord Berlin such favoured treatment in all matters of trade policy as circumstances warrant and to provide Berlin within the limit of possibility and in consideration of the participation of Berlin in the foreign currency control by the Federal Republic, with the necessary foreign currency;

(e) to take all necessary measures on its part to ensure that the city remain in the currency area of the Deutsche Mark West, and that an adequate money supply is maintained in the city;

(f) to assist in the maintaining in Berlin of adequate stockpiles of supplies for emergencies;

(g) to use its best efforts for the maintenance and improvement of trade and of communications and transportation facilities between Berlin and the Federal territory, and to cooperate in accordance with the means at its disposal in their protection or their reestablishment;

(h) to facilitate the inclusion of Berlin in the international agreements concluded by the Federal Republic, provided that this is not precluded by the nature of the agreements concerned.

Annex B

CHARTER OF THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL

PART I—COMPOSITION, ORGANISATION AND SEAT OF THE TRIBUNAL

Article 1

1. The Tribunal shall be composed of nine members who shall have the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices or shall be lawyers of recognized competence in international law.

2. The nine members of the Tribunal shall be appointed as follows:

(a) Three members, appointed by the Governments of the Three Powers, one by each Government;
(b) Three members appointed by the Federal Government;
(c) Three members (hereinafter referred to as "the neutral members") appointed by agreement between the Governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government, none of whom shall be a national of any one of the Three Powers or a German national.

3. The Governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government shall make known their first appointments not later than sixty days after the entry into force of the present Charter. Within the same period the Governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government shall agree upon the three neutral members. If, after the expiry of such period, one or more of the neutral members shall not have been appointed, either the Governments of the Three Powers or the Federal Government may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint such neutral member or members.

4. Appointments to fill vacancies shall be made in the same manner as the appointment of the member to be replaced. However, if a vacancy to be filled by the Government of one of the Three Powers or the Federal Government is not so filled within one month of its occurring, either the Governments of the Three Powers or the Federal Government may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make an interim appointment to the vacancy of a person who shall not be a national of any one of the Three Powers or a German national and who shall serve for a period of six months or until the vacancy is filled in the normal manner, whichever is longer. If the member to be replaced is a neutral member, the Governments of the Three Powers or the Federal Government may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make such appointment, if the agreement envisaged by sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article has not been reached within one month of the vacancy occurring.

5. The Tribunal may, by majority vote, declare a vacancy if, in its opinion, a member has, without reasonable excuse, failed or refused to participate in the hearing or decision of a case to which he has been assigned.

Article 2

1. The members of the Tribunal shall be appointed for four years. They may be reappointed after the expiration of their terms of office.

2. A member whose term of office has expired shall nevertheless continue to discharge his duties until his successor is appointed. After such appointment he shall, unless the President of the Tribunal directs otherwise, continue to discharge his duties respecting pending cases in which he has participated until such cases have been finally decided.

3. Members of the Tribunal shall not engage in any activity incompatible with the proper exercise of their duties, nor shall they participate in the adjudication of any case with which they have previously been concerned in another capacity or in which they have a direct interest. Differences of opinion regarding the applicability of this paragraph shall be resolved by the Tribunal.

4. (a) During and after their term of office, the members of the Tribunal shall enjoy immunity from suit in respect of acts performed in the exercise of their official duties.

(b) The members of the Tribunal who are not of German nationality shall, moreover, enjoy in the Federal territory the same privileges and immunities as are accorded chiefs of diplomatic missions. If sittings or official acts take place in the territory of one of the Three Powers, the members of the Tribunal who are not of the nationality of the country in which the sitting or act takes place shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities in such country.

5. Every member of the Tribunal shall, before taking office, make a declaration at a public session that he will exercise his duties impartially and conscientiously.

6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 1 of the present Charter, no member may be dismissed before the expiry of his term of office, or before the termination of his duties in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, except by agreement between the Governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government; or, in the case of a member appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice, by agreement between the Governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government, with the consent of the President of the International Court of Justice.

Article 3

The Tribunal shall elect from the neutral members a President and two Vice-Presidents to serve as such for two years.

Article 4

1. The Tribunal, presided over by the President or one of the Vice-Presidents, shall sit either in plenary session or in Chambers of three members.

2. A plenary session shall, in principle, include all the members of the Tribunal. A quorum of five members shall suffice to constitute a plenary session; it shall be composed of an uneven number of members and in any case shall consist of an equal number of the members appointed by the Governments of the Three Powers and of those appointed by the Federal Government, and at least one neutral member.

3. Chambers shall be composed of one of the members appointed by the Governments of the Three Powers, one of the members appointed by the Federal Government and one neutral member.

4. The Tribunal in plenary session shall nominate the members of such Chambers, define the categories of cases with which a Chamber will be concerned or assign a particular case to a Chamber.

5. Any decision of a Chamber, on a case assigned to it, shall be deemed to be a decision of the Tribunal.

6. The final decision on a case assigned to a Chamber must be taken by the Tribunal in plenary session, if one of the parties so requests before the Chamber itself has pronounced a final decision.

Article 5

The Tribunal shall sit in public unless it decides otherwise. The deliberations of the Tribunal shall be and shall remain secret as shall all facts brought to its attention in closed session.

Article 6

1. A Registrar shall be responsible for the administration of the Tribunal; he shall have the necessary staff at his disposal. The Registrar shall handle the transmission of documents, keep a record of petitions submitted to the Tribunal and be responsible for the archives and accounts of the Tribunal.

2. The first Registrar shall be appointed by agreement between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. The Registrar shall be a permanent official subject to dismissal and replacement only by the Tribunal.

Article 7

The seat of the Tribunal shall be located within the Federal territory at such place as shall be determined by a subsidiary administrative agreement between the Governments of the Three Powers and the Federal Government. The Tribunal may, however, sit and exercise its functions elsewhere, when it deems it desirable to do so.

Article 8

Questions pertaining to the operating costs of the Tribunal, including the official emoluments of members, as well as arrangements for securing the inviolability of the premises of the Tribunal, shall be regulated by the subsidiary administrative agreement referred to in Article 7 of the present Charter.

PART II—COMPETENCE AND POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL

Article 9

1. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic under the provisions of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "the Convention") or the present Charter or any of the related Conventions listed in Article 8 of the Convention, which the parties are not able to settle by negotiation, except disputes expressly excluded from its jurisdiction by the provisions of the Convention or the present Charter or any of the related Conventions.

2. (a) The Tribunal shall, moreover, have jurisdiction in respect of any question as to the extent of the competence of the following authorities:

The Board of Review referred to in Chapter Two of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation;
The Supreme Restitution Court referred to in Chapter Three of that Convention;
The Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany referred to in Chapters Five and Ten of that Convention.

(b) A question as to the extent of the competence of these authorities may be raised at any time after the institution of proceedings before them and also after a final decision.

(c) The decisions of the Tribunal on these questions shall be binding on the authorities whose competence has been questioned.

3. The decisions of the authorities specified in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of this Article shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and to the provisions of subparagraph (a) of para-

graph 5 of Article 11 of the present Charter only to the extent contemplated in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of this Article, unless the contrary is expressly provided in one of the related Conventions.

4. Decisions of the authorities provided for or referred to in the related Conventions, other than those specified in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of this Article, shall be subject to review by the Tribunal, whether on questions as to extent of competence or on the merits, only to the extent contemplated by paragraph 1 of this Article, unless the contrary is expressly provided in one of the related Conventions.

5. Only the Governments of one or more of the Three Powers, on the one hand, and the Federal Government, on the other, may be parties before the Tribunal. If the Federal Government brings a complaint against one or two of the Governments of the Three Powers, or if one or two of the Governments of the Three Powers brings a complaint against the Federal Government, the other Government or Governments of the Three Powers may apply to the Tribunal to be joined as parties.

Article 10

The Tribunal shall render its decisions in the form of judgments or directives which shall be binding on the parties.

Article 11

1. Signatory States undertake to comply with the decisions of the Tribunal and to take the action required of them by such decisions.

2. The Tribunal may set a period of time for the execution of its decisions.

3. If a judgment of the Tribunal establishes that the provisions of a law or ordinance, applicable in the Federal territory, are in conflict with the provisions of the Convention or the present Charter or the related Conventions, it may order the party which has enacted such provisions to deprive them of effect, in whole or in part, in the Federal territory. Should this party fail to comply with the judgment of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may, at the request of the successful party, declare the provisions null, in whole or in part, in the Federal territory, with binding effect.

4. If a judgment of the Tribunal establishes that an administrative measure applicable in the Federal territory, is in conflict with the provisions of the Convention or the present Charter or the related Conventions, it may order the party which has taken such measure to annul it, in whole or in part, in the Federal territory. Should this party fail to comply with the judgment of the Tribunal, the Tribunal may, at the request of the successful party, declare

the measure null, in whole or in part, in the Federal territory, with binding effect.

5. (a) If a judgment of the Tribunal establishes that a judicial decision, enforceable in the Federal territory, is in conflict with the basic principles of the Convention or the present Charter or the related Conventions it may annul such decision, in whole or in part, in the Federal territory. In such case the judicial proceedings shall be restored to the position in which they were before the judicial decision was given; in further proceedings the Tribunal's findings of fact and law shall be binding in the Federal territory.

(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall not apply to decisions of Service Tribunals.

6. If a judgment of the Tribunal establishes that a party has failed to take action which it is obliged to take by the Convention or the present Charter or the related Conventions, the Tribunal may, in its judgment or, on the application of a party, in a second judgment, specify special measures which must be taken by the unsuccessful party in order to remedy the situation in compliance with the judgment. Should this party fail to take such special measures within the time specified by the Tribunal, the Tribunal may, on the application of the other party, authorize the latter to take appropriate measures to remedy the situation in compliance with the judgment. If, however, the measures which the unsuccessful party fails to take consist in the issue of legal provisions, the Tribunal may embody in its judgment provisions, not inconsistent with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic, creating rights and obligations for all persons and authorities in the Federal territory.

Article 12

1. The Tribunal or, in case of urgency, the President shall have the power, by the issue of directives, to take such measures as may be necessary to conserve the respective rights of the parties pending the judgment of the Tribunal. Any directive issued by the President under this Article may be confirmed, amended or annulled by the Tribunal within seventy-two hours after the notification thereof to the parties.

2. The parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard prior to the issue of any directive by the Tribunal or by the President under this Article.

3. In the absence of the President, his powers under this Article shall be exercised by one of the Vice-Presidents to be designated by the President for this purpose.

PART III—PROCEEDINGS

Article 13

The official languages of the Tribunal shall be French, English and German.

Article 14

Proceedings before the Tribunal shall be instituted by a written petition filed with the Tribunal which shall contain a statement of the facts giving rise to the dispute, reference to the provisions of the Convention or the present Charter or the related Conventions which are invoked, legal argument, and conclusion.

Article 15

1. The parties shall be represented by agents. They may be assisted by counsel.

2. Such agents and counsel shall enjoy immunity from suit in respect of acts performed in the exercise of their duties.

Article 16

1. The presiding member may summon the agents in order to be informed of their wishes concerning the time limits and conduct of the proceedings.

2. The presiding member shall set the time limits for the submission of pleadings and shall prescribe all the measures necessary for the conduct of the proceedings.

3. Certified copies of all documents submitted by either party shall be immediately forwarded to the other party through the Registrar.

Article 17

The proceedings shall consist of two parts: written and oral. Oral proceedings may be dispensed with if both parties so request.

Article 18

1. Written proceedings shall consist of a statement of the complainant's case, the defendant's answer and, unless the Tribunal directs otherwise, a reply and a rejoinder.

2. Counterclaims shall be permissible.

Article 19

1. Oral proceedings shall consist of the complainant's argument, the defendant's argument and, unless the Tribunal directs otherwise, a reply and a rejoinder, as well as hearings of witnesses and experts.

2. The Tribunal shall have power to demand the production of evidence, documentary or other, to require the attendance of wit-

nesses to testify, to request expert opinion, and to direct inquiries to be made.

3. In the event that a party does not produce evidence which in the opinion of the Tribunal is relevant to the issues before it and which such party possesses or is in a position to procure, the Tribunal shall proceed to give its decision notwithstanding the absence of such evidence.

4. The presiding member or any other member of the Tribunal may put questions to the parties, witnesses and experts.

5. A written record of the oral proceedings shall be kept and shall be signed by the presiding member and the Registrar.

Article 20

All decisions of the Tribunal shall be based on the Convention, the present Charter and the related Conventions. The Tribunal shall, in the interpretation of such Conventions, apply the generally accepted rules of international law governing the interpretation of treaties.

Article 21

1. The Tribunal shall decide by majority vote.

2. Judgments shall state the reasons on which they are based.

3. Judgments shall be signed by the presiding member and by the Registrar.

4. Judgments shall be final and not subject to appeal.

5. In the case of a difference of opinion as to the meaning or scope of a judgment, the Tribunal may construe it by an interpretative judgment, on the application of either party and after having heard both parties.

Article 22

The revision of a judgment may not be requested of the Tribunal except upon the grounds of the discovery of a fact which is of such a nature as to exercise a decisive influence, and of which the Tribunal and the party requesting revision had been unaware before the pronouncement of the judgment always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence on the part of the party requesting the revision.

Article 23

1. Unless the Tribunal directs otherwise, each party to proceedings before the Tribunal shall pay its own costs.

2. The Tribunal shall bear the costs in respect of witnesses whose attendance it has required and expert opinions and inquiries which it has ordered.

Article 24

The Tribunal shall determine its own rules of procedure consistent with the present Charter.

PART IV—ADVISORY OPINIONS

Article 25

1. The Tribunal may, at the joint request of the Governments of the Three Powers and of the Federal Government give an advisory opinion on any matter arising out of the Convention or the present Charter or the related Conventions, with the exception of those questions with which it would not have been competent to deal if they had been referred to it in the form of a dispute.

2. The Tribunal may, at the request of an authority referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the present Charter or at the request of the presiding member of such an authority, give an advisory opinion on the competence of such authority.

3. Advisory opinions shall not be binding.

No. 52

Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation

Bonn, May 26, 1952.

[The text of this convention, including the Charter of the Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany which is attached to the convention as an annex, is not printed here. For full text and the annex, see *Senate Q and R*, pages 25–88, or Cmd. 8571, pages 75–135.]

No. 53

Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany[1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OF THE OTHER PART, AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

PART ONE—GENERAL

Article 1—Definitions

In the present Convention and the Annexes hereto the following terms shall be given the meanings hereinafter indicated:

1. *The Federal territory:*

The territory in which the Federal Republic exercises jurisdiction, including its waters and the air space over such territory and waters.

2. *The Three Powers:*

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic.

3. *Other Sending State:*

Any Power, other than one of the Three Powers, which, by agreement with the Three Powers or any one of them, has Forces stationed in the Federal territory on the entry into force of the present Convention; and any other Power which may in future by such agreement have Forces stationed in the Federal territory, so far as such Power does not, with the consent of the Three Powers, conclude a separate Convention with the Federal Republic concerning the status of its Forces.

4. *The Power concerned:*

That Power whose rights and obligations are concerned in the particular case, namely:

(a) in the case of one of the Three Powers, that Power;
(b) in the case of another Sending State,

(i) that one of the Three Powers which has been named as the Power concerned on the basis of an agreement, to be notified to the Federal Government, between the Sending State and the Three Powers or any one of them; or

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, pp. 89-100. Only Parts I and II of the convention are printed here. For full text, including Annexes A, B, and C, see *ibid.*, pp. 89-130, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 17-58.

(ii) the Sending State itself to the extent to which it assumes vis-à-vis the Federal Republic, by an agreement concluded with the Three Powers or any one of them, after ascertaining the views of the Federal Government, all or certain of the rights and obligations arising out of the present Convention, and gives the Federal Government formal notification thereof; for the remaining rights and obligations, one of the Three Powers to be notified to the Federal Republic in accordance with item (i) of this sub-paragraph.

5. *The Forces:*

The armed Forces of the Three Powers and of other Sending States stationed in the Federal territory.

6. *The authorities of the Forces:*

The authorities of the Forces of the Power concerned.

7. *Members of the Forces:*

(a) Persons who, by reason of their military service relationship, are serving with the armed Forces of the Three Powers or other Sending State and are present in the Federal territory (military personnel);

(b) Other persons who are in the service of such armed Forces or attached to them, with the exception of persons who are nationals neither of one of the Three Powers nor of another Sending State and have been engaged in the Federal territory; provided that any such other persons who are stationed outside the Federal territory or Berlin shall be deemed to be members of the Forces only if they are present in the Federal territory on duty (followers).

The following are considered "members of the Forces": dependents, who are the spouses and children of persons defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph or close relatives who are supported by such persons and for whom such persons are entitled to receive material assistance from the Forces. The definition "members of the Forces" shall include Germans only if they enlisted or were inducted into, or were employed by, the armed Forces of the Power concerned in the territory of that Power and at that time either had their permanent place of residence there or had been resident there for at least a year.

8. *Germans:*

Germans within the meaning of German law.

9. *Accommodation:*

Land, including all property permanently attached thereto, and all rights of use related to land, including such property, used or to be used by the Forces within the Federal territory.

10. *Installations:*

Land, buildings or part thereof, and all property permanently attached thereto, which, pursuant to the provisions of the present Convention, are allotted for the exclusive use or occupancy (*im* *ausschliesslichen Besitz)* of the Forces. This definition shall not apply to Article 20 of the present Convention.

Article 2—Observance of German Law. Political Activity

1. The members of the Forces shall observe German law, and the authorities of the Forces shall undertake and be responsible for the enforcement of German law against them, except as otherwise provided in the present or in any other applicable Convention or agreement.

2. The members of the Forces shall abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present Convention and shall in particular refrain from any political activity.

Article 3—General Obligations

1. In asserting the rights and immunities accorded to them under the present Convention, the Forces shall give due consideration to German interests, public and private, particularly by taking into account the capacity of the German economy and the essential domestic and export requirements of the Federal Republic and West Berlin.

2. The German authorities shall exercise the powers which they have under the Basic Law in the fields of legislation, administration and judicial action so as to ensure the protection and security of the Forces and their members and of the property of the Forces and their members, and to ensure the satisfaction of the requirements of the Forces and the performance of the obligations of the Federal Republic as provided in the present Convention.

3. The provisions of Annex A to the present Convention shall enter into force simultaneously with the present Convention. They shall apply also to offences committed in the Federal territory against the Armed Forces of the Three Powers stationed in Berlin. The Federal Republic shall not reduce the legal protection afforded by the provisions of this Annex.

4. The German authorities shall not subject or, within the scope of their powers, permit the subjection of the Forces and their members, or the property of the Forces and their members, to prejudiced or less favourable treatment, other than that which is, in accordance with international law and practice, established by law with respect to aliens ordinarily resident in the Federal territory.

Article 4—Reciprocal Assistance and Security

1. The authorities of the Forces and the German authorities shall extend full co-operation and assistance to each other to further and safeguard the security of any Power concerned and of the Federal Republic and that of the Forces stationed in the Federal territory,

and their members, and of the property of the Forces and their members.

2. Such co-operation and assistance shall extend, in accordance with an understanding to be reached between the appropriate authorities, to the collection, exchange and protection of the security of all pertinent information.

Article 5—Liaison

The authorities of the Forces and the German authorities shall take appropriate measures to ensure close and reciprocal liaison.

PART TWO—JURISDICTION

Section I: Criminal Proceedings

Article 6—Criminal Offences: Jurisdiction and Applicable Law

1. Except as otherwise provided in the present Convention, the authorities of the Forces shall exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of the Forces. A death sentence shall not be carried out in the Federal territory by the authorities of the Forces as long as German law does not provide for such penalty.

2. Where, under the law of the Power concerned, the service tribunals are not competent to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a member of the Forces, the German courts and authorities may exercise criminal jurisdiction over him in respect of an offence under German law committed against German interests, in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) No criminal proceedings, other than those provided for in Article 7 of the present Convention, or urgent preliminary investigations, after consultation, as far as practicable, with the authorities of the Forces, shall be instituted by the German courts or authorities until the authorities of the Forces have been consulted by the appropriate German authorities and been given the opportunity, within twenty-one days from the receipt of information as to the facts involved, to make representations and recommendations in regard to the effect upon the security of the forces of any such criminal proceedings; any such representations and recommendations shall be given due weight by the German courts or authorities. Such consultation shall, however, not be required where the alleged offence is one the penalty for which, under German law, is merely detention for not more than six weeks or a fine not exceeding DM 150 (*Uebertretung*), unless the German authorities consider that the security of the Forces is or might be involved in the case in question;

(b) The German courts and authorities shall, within the discretionary powers conferred on them by German law, abstain from prosecution in any case in which

(i) such abstention is permitted by German law; or

(ii) the offender has been suitably punished by disciplinary action of the authorities of the Forces;

(c) The German courts and authorities shall decide upon questions of arrest, detention and execution of punishment in accordance with the provisions of German law. The authorities of the Forces shall execute any warrants of arrest and detention. An accused person so taken into custody by the authorities of the Forces shall remain in their custody until, by virtue of a final (*rechtskraeftig*) judicial decision, he is released or sentenced. The authorities of the Forces will take appropriate measures to prevent any prejudice to the course of justice (*Verdunkelungsgefahr*). They will hold an accused person so taken into custody at the disposal of the German courts and authorities, will grant access to him at any time by the German courts and authorities and on request present him to the German courts and authorities for the purposes of investigatory proceedings, trial and the serving of any sentence which may be imposed. Where an accused person is not taken into custody, the authorities of the Forces will take measures to ensure that he is at the disposal of the German courts or authorities for the purposes aforesaid;

(d) Any sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a German penal institution.

For the purposes of this paragraph, the expression "offence under German law committed against German interests" shall mean any offence under German law other than an offence directed against the Forces, their members, or the property of the Forces or their members.

3. The exclusive jurisdiction of the German authorities over persons who are subject to German criminal jurisdiction shall include those cases in which the criminal offence is directed against the Forces, their members, or the property of the Forces or their members.

4. With the consent of the German authorities, the authorities of the Forces may transfer to German courts or authorities, for investigation, trial and decision, groups of, or particular, cases for which they are exclusively competent under paragraph 1 of this Article.

5. With the consent of the authorities of the Forces, the German authorities may transfer to the authorities of the Forces, for investigation, trial and decision, particular cases of the nature described in paragraph 3 of this Article in which the alleged offender is not a German.

6. In cases under paragraphs 1 and 5 of this Article, the authorities of the Forces will apply their own law. If such cases involve acts which are punishable under German law, but not under the law of the Power concerned, German law shall apply.

7. In cases under paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, German law shall apply.

Article 7—Arrest, Search and Seizure

1. Members of the Forces who properly identify themselves by means of an identity document issued under Article 24 of the present Convention shall not be subject to arrest by German authorities.

2. German authorities may, however, take into custody a member of the Forces, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine of arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Forces

(a) when so requested by the authorities of the Forces;

(b) in the following cases in which the authorities of the forces are unable to act with the necessary promptness;

(i) when apprehended *in flagrante delicto*

(1) for the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence which results or might result in serious injury to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally protected rights (*Rechtsgueter*); or

(2) insofar as this appears necessary to abate an already existing serious disturbance of public order;

(ii) if there is danger of flight, for the commission or attempted commission of espionage to the prejudice of the Federal Republic.

3. (a) The German authorities may search a member of the Forces or the property in his immediate possession

(i) when so requested by the authorities of the Forces;

(ii) if he is taken into custody under paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent necessary to disarm him or to seize any item constituting proof of the criminal offence for which he is taken into custody.

(b) The provisions of the fourth sentence of paragraph 5 of Article 35 of the present Convention shall not be affected.

(c) The official quarters of a member of the Forces, or where there are none the residence occupied by him with permission of the authorities of the Forces, may not be searched by German authorities, except at the request of the authorities of the Forces. If such residence of the member of the Forces is not an installation, either his consent or that of the authorities of the Forces to be searched shall be sufficient.

4. The German authorities shall notify the appropriate authorities of the Forces of the arrest of any person working in the service of the Forces.

5. The appropriate authorities of the Forces may

(a) arrest members of the Forces;

(b) take into custody a person who is subject to German criminal jurisdiction, without subjecting him to the ordinary routine or arrest, in order immediately to deliver him, together with any weapons or items seized, to the nearest appropriate German authorities

(i) when so requested by the German authorities;

(ii) in the following cases in which the German authorities are unable to act with the necessary promptness:

(1) when apprehended *in flagrante delicto* for the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offence against the Forces, their members, or the security, property or other legally protected rights (*Rechtsgueter*) of the Forces or their members; or

(2) if there is danger of flight, for the commission, or attempted commission, of a criminal offense under Sections 1 to 9 inclusive of Annex A to the present Convention;

(iii) within an installation, when there are reasonable grounds to believe (*dringender Verdacht*) that his presence is unauthorised or that he has committed a criminal offence within the installation.

6. Where the authorities of the Forces believe that a person subject to German jurisdiction has been guilty of a criminal offence under Sections 1 to 11 inclusive of Annex A to the present Convention, the following special provisions shall apply:

(a) If the suspect is to be arrested by the German authorities, the authorities of the Forces shall, if practicable, be given timely notification and may designate investigators to be present at the arrest. The latter may also be present at any searches or seizures undertaken in connection with the investigation. The authorities of the Forces shall have the exclusive right for a period not to exceed twenty-one days following the arrest, to conduct interrogations of the suspect concerning any offences of which he is suspected and related matters. For this purpose their investigators shall have access to the suspect at any time. An official designated by the German investigating authority may be present at the interrogation, of the conduct of which such authority shall be given timely notification. The German investigating authority shall take appropriate measures to prevent any prejudice to the course of justice (*Verdunkelungsgefahr*) and shall refrain from any investigation activity of its own unless the investigators of the Forces request such investigation. During the interrogation by the investigators of the Forces, it shall, at their request, make the applications provided for in the German Code of Criminal Procedure and shall see to it that the judicial decisions suited to promote the investigation proceedings are issued and that the measures ordered in such decisions are carried out. At the conclusion of the investigation by the investigators of the Forces, in any event not later than twenty-one days after the arrest, the interrogations and the other investigation proceedings shall be continued by the German investigating authority. The investigators of the forces shall deliver to the German investigating authority all evidence collected in the course of the investigation, unless security considerations require otherwise;

(b) If the suspect is not a German, the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall apply, subject to the following proviso.

> The appropriate authorities of the Forces may take the suspect into their own custody for a period of twenty-one days and may themselves conduct all interrogations and other investigations. For the judicial measures required for this period, a member of the Forces authorised to exercise judicial functions shall be assigned to the competent German courts as an assessor not entitled to vote.

7. The authorities of the Forces may search a person who is subject to German jurisdiction or the property in his immediate possession

(a) when so requested by the German authorities;

(b) if he is taken into custody under sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of this Article, to the extent necessary to disarm him or to seize any item constituting proof of the criminal offence for which he is taken into custody.

8. The constitutional immunities of the Federal President and the members of the German Federal and Land legislative bodies shall not be impaired by the provisions of this article.

Article 8—Procedure and Co-operation in Criminal Proceedings

1. The authorities of the Forces shall take such measures against members of the Forces who have committed criminal offences against German interests as they would take if such offences had been committed against the Power concerned, the Forces or their members, or their property.

2. The German authorities shall take such measures against persons subject to their criminal jurisdiction for criminal offences against the Forces, their members, or the property of the Forces or members as they would take if such offences had been committed against the Federal Republic, its Laender or its nationals, or their property.

3. (a) The authorities of the Forces shall at the request of the German authorities notify the latter of the arrest of any person for a criminal offence described in paragraph 1 of this article.

(b) The German authorities shall at the request of the authorities of the Forces notify the latter of the arrest of any person for a criminal offence described in paragraph 2 of this Article.

4. Trial of a member of the Forces for a criminal offence described in paragraph 1 of this Article, committed within the Feder-

al territory shall be held within that territory except in cases of military exigency. When military exigency requires that the trial of such an offence be held outside the Federal territory, the authorities of the Forces shall so inform the German authorities with particulars of the time and place of trial. The German authorities shall be entitled to have observers present unless security considerations require otherwise and shall be informed of the result of the trial.

5. The German authorities and the authorities of the Forces shall extend mutual co-operation in the prosecution of criminal offences under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. Unless security considerations require otherwise, they shall permit representatives of the appropriate authorities to attend the trial and, within the applicable regulations, grant them the opportunity to present their views on questions of law and fact. In addition to the cases provided under German criminal procedure, the Forces or their members shall also have the right to appear as co-prosecutors (*Nebenklaeger*) before German courts, to the extent that the criminal offence is directed against the security or the property of the Forces or their members or is one of the offences listed in Annex A to the present Convention. On request the German authorities and the authorities of the Forces shall inform each other of an intent to initiate, to refrain from initiating, or to discontinue a prosecution of disciplinary proceeding and of the decision.

Section II: Non-Criminal Proceedings

Article 9—Jurisdiction and Procedure in Non-Criminal Proceedings

1. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention and any other applicable agreement, German courts and authorities shall exercise jurisdiction over members of the Forces in non-criminal proceedings.

2. Unless proceedings in non-criminal matters are commenced on the application of a member of the Forces, the German courts and authorities will serve upon the member concerned the written documents or court order whereby the proceedings are commenced even if such service is not required by German law and regulations.

3. The German courts and authorities shall grant members of the Forces sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights. If a member of the Forces is unable because of official duties or authorised absence to protect his interests in a non-criminal proceeding in which he is a participant, the German court or authority shall at his request suspend the proceeding until the elimination of the disability, but for not more than six months. The existence of the disability shall be established (*glaubhaft machen*) by the member of the

Forces. A certificate of the ground and duration of the disability issued by the appropriate authorities of the Power concerned shall be given due weight by the court of authority. The proceeding need not be suspended if the interests of the member of the Forces can adequately be protected by a person authorized to represent him before a court or other representative entitled to safeguard his rights.

4. The members of the Forces shall enjoy the same rights as Germans in respect to the right to free judicial assistance (*Armenrecht*). They shall not be obligated to post security for costs of any kind in cases where Germans are free from such obligation. Certificates required to establish the right to free judicial assistance shall be issued by the appropriate consular authorities after they have made the necessary investigations.

Article 10—Enforcement of Judgments, Decisions and Orders

1. The authorities of the Forces shall, insofar as service regulations permit, take all appropriate measures to aid in the enforcement of judgements, decisions and orders (*vollstreckbare Titel*) of German courts and authorities in non-criminal proceedings.

2. If the enforcement of such judgment, decision or order is to be effected within an installation of the Forces, the German court or authority shall request the authority of the Forces responsible for the administration of the installation to enforce or permit the enforcement of the judgment, decision or order. The authorities of the Forces shall, if possible, comply with the request. The authorities of the Forces shall deliver to the appropriate German authority property taken by themselves for satisfaction of the judgment, decision or order.

3. Property of a member of the Forces which is certified by the appropriate authority of the Forces to be needed by him for the fulfillment of his official duties shall be free from seizure for the satisfaction of a judgment, decision or order, together with other property, tangible and intangible, which under German law is not subject thereto.

4. The personal liberty of a member of the Forces shall not be restricted by a German court or authority in a non-criminal proceeding, whether to enforce a judgment, decision or order, to compel an oath of disclosure, or for any other reason.

5. No payment due to a member of the Forces from his Government shall, except to the extent permitted by the laws and regulations of the Power concerned, be subject to any attachment, garnishment or other form of execution ordered by a German court or authority.

Section III: Provisions Common to Criminal and Non-Criminal Proceedings

Article 11—Presence in Court. Witnesses. Service of Process

1. The authorities of the Forces shall, unless military exigency requires otherwise, secure the attendance of members of the Forces whose presence is required by a German court or authority, provided that such appearance is compulsory under German law. If military exigency prevents such attendance, the authorities of the Forces shall furnish a certificate stating the basis and duration of such disability.

2. German courts and authorities shall, in accordance with the provisions of German law, secure the attendance of persons whose presence as witnesses or experts is required by a service tribunal or other authority of the Forces.

3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to all proceedings requiring the production of evidence.

4. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention or any other applicable agreement, the privilege and immunities of witnesses and experts before German courts or authorities, and service tribunals or authorities of the Forces, shall be those accorded by the law of the court, tribunal or authority concerned. Appropriate consideration shall also be given to the privileges and immunities which the witness or expert would have before a German court if he is not a member of the Forces, or if he is a member of the Forces before a service tribunal of the Power concerned.

5. The authorities of the Forces shall permit, or themselves effect, the service of process upon any person inside an installation, and upon members of the Forces. In all other cases service shall be made or permitted by the appropriate German courts or authorities.

6. Service by German courts and authorities on members of the Forces shall not be effected by publication or advertisement.

Article 12—Obstruction of Justice

Perjury, attempts to obstruct justice, any other criminal offenses and contempts, committed before or against a German court or authority or a service tribunal or authority of the Forces, and failure to comply with process duly served in accordance with Article 11 of the present Convention shall be dealt with by the court or authority having criminal jurisdiction or disciplinary authority over the person concerned, according to its own law, as if the act had been committed before or against its own courts or authorities.

Article 13—Attorneys

1. Nations of any Power concerned and German attorneys shall not be hindered from acting as defence counsel before service tribunals in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed for such service tribunals.

2. A person admitted to practice as an attorney in the country of one of the Powers concerned may, in proceedings in which a member of the Forces is involved, in association with a German attorney who is authorized to represent the member of the Forces in such proceedings, appear before German courts to make statements (*Ausfuehrungen*).

3. Except as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, foreign nationals may act as legal consultants, and appear before German courts, in the Federal territory only in accordance with the provisions of German law.

Article 14—Exclusion of Public. Transfer of Proceedings

The provisions of Section 172 of the German Judicature Act on the exclusion of the public from hearings of criminal and non-criminal proceedings, and of Section 15 of the German Code of Criminal proceedings. Procedure on the transfer of criminal to a court of a different district, shall be applied *mutatis mutandis* in cases before German courts or authorities where there is a threat to the security of the Forces or their members.

Article 15—Disclosure of Information

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article,

(a) no German court or authority shall, in any proceeding before it, require or allow any person to disclose information which would or might prejudice the security of the Forces or the Power concerned, except with the consent of the appropriate authority of the Forces or the Power concerned;

(b) no court or authority of the Forces shall, in any proceeding before it, require or allow any person to disclose any German state or official secret, except with the consent of the appropriate German authority.

2. If during proceedings it appears that the disclosure of such information or secret might result, the court or the authority, unless it is decided to dispense with the disclosure, shall, before hearing or dealing with such information or secret, request a written decision of the appropriate authority as to whether the consent required by paragraph 1 of this Article will be given. The consent will not be refused if, under the terms of the present Convention or any other agreement between the parties, the giving of information to the appropriate courts or authorities is required.

3. The provisions of this Article shall not be applied in such a manner as to limit the constitutional rights of a party to a proceeding to testify or make a factual or legal statement on his own behalf.

Article 16—Official Acts

1. Whenever, in a criminal or non-criminal proceeding before a German court or authority, it becomes necessary to determine whether the act or omission which is the subject of the proceeding occurred in the performance by the person concerned of official duty for the Forces, the German court or authority shall suspend the proceeding and shall promptly notify the authorities of the Forces, stating the facts of the case. The appropriate authority of the Forces shall investigate the case and within twenty-one days after receipt of the notification transmit to the German court or authority a certificate describing the scope of the official duties of the person concerned at the relevant time and place. The certificate shall be signed by the highest ranking representative of the Forces having personal knowledge of the matter. The authorities of the Forces shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the certificate is compiled conscientiously as to form and content. After receipt of the certificate, but no later than twenty-one days after receipt by the authorities of the Forces of the notification, the proceeding shall be continued.

2. The authorities of the Forces may also submit such certificate to a German court or authority without having received a notification from such court or authority.

3. Such certificate shall be evidence only on the scope of official duties of the person concerned and shall be conclusive to this extent. The person who issued such certificate may, however, be called as a witness to explain or amplify its contents; and further, the provisions of this paragraph shall not be applied in such manner as to limit the constitutional rights of a party to a proceeding to testify or make a factual or legal statement on his own behalf. The German court or authority shall give to the fact that the act or omission constituted the performance of official duty such legal weight and effect as it is entitled to under German law.

4. The provisions of the Article shall not apply to cases under Article 8 of the Finance Convention.

[Here follow Parts III and IV and Annexes A, B, and C which deal respectively with rights and obligations, transitional and final provisions, penal provisions, radio frequencies, and the transitional regulations for the armed forces of the European Defense Community.]

Done at Bonn this twenty-sixth day of May, 1952 in three texts, in the English, French, and German languages, all being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
DEAN ACHESON
For the French Republic:
ROBERT SCHUMAN

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
ANTHONY EDEN
For the Federal Republic of Germany:
ADENAUER

No. 54

Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and Their Members

BONN, May 26, 1952.

[The text of this agreement is not printed here. For full text, see *Senate Q and R*, pages 131–133.]

No. 55

Finance Convention [1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, OF THE ONE PART, AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OF THE OTHER PART, AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE 1

1. In the present Convention the following terms shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the same meanings as are given to them in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "the Forces Convention"): [2]

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, pp. 135–150.

[2] For full text of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, see *ibid.*, pp. 89–130, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 17–58. For an extract, see Document 53.

The Federal territory;
The Three Powers;
Other Sending State;
The Power concerned;
Authorities of the Forces;
Members of the Forces;
Accommodation.

2. In the present Convention the following additional terms shall be given the meanings hereinafter indicated:

(a) *Authorities of the Power concerned:*

The authorities of the Power concerned, including the authorities of its Forces.

(b) *The Forces:*

The armed forces of the Three Powers and of other Sending States stationed in the Federal Territory; provided that the term shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8 of the present Convention, apply only until 30 June 1953 to the Forces stationed in the Federal territory of Powers concerned which have become contingents of the European Defence Force under the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community. [3]

(c) *Funds for the support of the Forces:*

That part of the defence contribution of the Federal Republic which is to be made available to the Powers concerned to assist in meeting the costs of the Forces stationed in the Federal territory and their members.

ARTICLE 2

The authorities of the Powers concerned and the German authorities shall extend to each other full cooperation and assistance to further the purposes of the present Convention, shall exchange all information available to any of them which may be necessary for the implementation of the present Convention, and shall afford to each other the services of any of their respective agencies to assist in the satisfactory implementation of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 3

1. The Federal Republic undertakes to make a continuing annual contribution to the costs of defence. This contribution will represent a use of German national resources which, under the criteria of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is comparable to the use by other principal Western countries of their national resources for defence, including expenditures for defence measures outside Europe.

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[3] For text of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116-162, or *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 1107-1150.

2. In respect of the period after 30 June 1953, the defence contribution of the Federal Republic shall be established under principles and procedures corresponding to those applicable to the establishment of defence expenditures of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

3. The undertakings in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not result in a discrimination against the Federal Republic as compared to the other principal Western countries.

4. The Federal Republic shall fulfil its undertaking to contribute to defence by adhering and contributing to the European Defence Community in accordance with the agreements and arrangements pertaining to the Community and by assisting to meet the costs of the Forces of the Powers concerned which are not members of the European Defence Community, and the members of such Forces, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article.

5. (a) The part of the Federal Republic's defence contribution which, subsequent to 30 June 1953, will be used to assist in meeting the costs of the Forces of the Powers concerned not members of the European Defence Community, and the members of such Forces, shall be established at the appropriate time by negotiations in which the Community, the Federal Republic and the Powers not members of the Community with Forces in the Federal territory shall participate.

(b) The part of the Federal Republic's defence contribution referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall transit the budget of the European Defence Community; it shall not constitute an obligation of, or a charge to, the Community and shall not be subject to the control of the Community. The Community shall have no further obligation than to transmit the agreed amounts to the Forces, in a manner to be agreed by the Community, the Federal Republic and the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 4

1. The provisions of this Article shall apply from the entry into force of the present Convention until 30 June 1953.

2. The Federal Republic shall make an average monthly defence contribution of DM 850 million to be devoted exclusively to its contribution to the European Defense Community and for the funds for the support of the Forces.

3. Out of the sum of DM 850 million referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, funds for the support of the Forces shall be made available according to the following schedule:

(a) For each of the six months following the date of entry into force of the present Convention and falling prior to 30 June 1953, an amount of DM 551 million;

(b) For each of the three months following the period specified in the preceding sub-paragraph and falling prior to 30 June 1953, an amount of DM 319 million;

(c) For each of the months following the period specified in the preceding sub-paragraph and falling prior to 30 June 1953, an amount to be determined by negotiation between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers.

Funds to be made available for one period of time may be utilized in other periods in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article. The Three Powers will be responsible for allocating or reallocating among the Powers concerned, after consultation with the Federal Government, the amounts made available under this paragraph. The provisions of Article 5 of the present Convention shall apply to the expenditure of these funds except to the extent that such funds are expended in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 5 of this Article.

4. The funds for the support of the Forces referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall transit the budget of the European Defence Community; they shall not constitute an obligation of, or a charge to, the Community and shall not be subject to the control of the Community. The Community shall have no further obligation than to transmit the agreed amounts to the Forces, in a manner to be agreed by the Community, the Federal Republic and the Powers concerned.

5. The only expenditures chargeable to the funds for the support of the Forces made available in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article shall be

(a) amounts expended on payment authorizations issued after the entry into force of the present Convention to satisfy liabilities for accommodation, goods, materials or services procured or ordered before the entry into force of the present Convention by the authorities of the Powers concerned as a charge to occupation costs or mandatory expenditures;

(b) amounts expended on payment authorizations issued on or before 30 June 1953 under the Deutsche Mark budgets of the Powers concerned established for the period before that date in accordance with Article 5 of the present Convention. To the extent that the funds provided under paragraph 3 of this Article have not been fully expended to meet payment authorizations issued before 1 July 1953, they will remain available to the Forces until 30 June 1954 for the liquidation of liabilities outstanding on 1 July 1953 which are chargeable to the funds for the support of the Forces; and

(c) amounts expended for such other purpose as may be agreed between the Federal Republic and the Three Powers.

ARTICLE 5

1. Funds for the support of the Forces shall be expended exclusively for that purpose. The Three Powers undertake to keep the costs chargeable to these funds to the minimum compatible with the military efficiency of the Forces of the Powers concerned, and to utilize the funds efficiently and economically.

2. Budgets will be established by each of the Powers concerned, and the expenditure of funds for the support of the Forces shall be in accordance with such budget categories and within such limits of amount as are established in the estimates prepared by the Powers concerned at the time of the agreement on the sum to be made available under the present Convention. Each of the Powers concerned may freely transfer amounts among the different categories of its budget provided that such transfers result in a change of not more than 10 percent in the amount originally established for any major category. Advance notice of such transfers will be given to the Federal Republic in order to enable it to make its recommendations. Transfers which result in a change of more than 10 per cent may be affected by agreement between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic.

3. The Powers concerned and the Federal Republic may, by special agreement, consolidate in a special budget the expenditures for construction in the Federal territory of

(a) accommodation for the Forces of the Powers concerned or for the forces of German origin,
(b) the installations and works referred to in Article 20 of the Forces Convention,

and the expenditures for the acquisition of sites therefor. Expenditures under such budget from the funds for the support of the Forces shall transit the budget of the European Defence Community and the Community shall exercise no control over them.

ARTICLE 6

1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the present Convention and the arrangements made thereunder for effecting the transit of the funds through the budget of the European Defence Community, the Federal Republic shall take all steps necessary to make available, as required, the funds for the support of the Forces.

2. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this Article, such funds shall be disbursed by the appropriate German payment offices on the basis of payment authorizations issued by the appropriate authorities of the Forces. These payment authorizations shall certify that payment within the appropriate budget category of the Power

concerned is authorized in accordance with the terms of the present Convention, and appropriate documentation of services rendered shall be attached. In the amount specified by the payment authorization, the appropriate German payment offices shall, after presentation of the payment authorization, effect the payment so certified. The authorized representatives of the Power concerned may examine the German records relating to the payments made by the appropriate German payment offices.

3. Accounts of expenditures and receipts shall be kept by each Power concerned, on the one hand, and by the Federal Republic, on the other hand, and shall conform with uniform nomenclature agreed by the Three Powers and the Federal Republic. If the accounts of the Federal Republic and those of any of the Powers concerned are not in agreement, after each has been audited in accordance with the procedures applicable under German law or regulations or the law or regulations of the Power concerned, as the case may be reconciliation shall be made under procedures to be established by the Co-ordinating Committee to be set up pursuant to Article 14, of the present Convention. Reports of expenditures and receipts shall be made periodically to the Co-ordinating Committee.

4. The Powers concerned may obtain from German payment offices funds for payment through their own agencies of

(a) minor expenditures in accordance with the regulations of the Power concerned or

(b) any other expenditures which it is agreed require such procedure.

These expenditures shall be certified and documented in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.

ARTICLE 7

1. The following types of facilities and services shall be used or enjoyed by the Forces, for themselves and for their members, without charge:

(a) Administrative services or assistance of German public agencies, unless agreed to be of a special character warranting payment;

(b) Roads, highways, bridges;

(c) Navigable waters, unless fees for services rendered are payable under German regulations applicable from time to time to military users;

(d) German police, public health and fire protection services, unless agreed to be of a special character warranting payment;

(e) Other public services and facilities normally enjoyed by residents of the Federal territory without payment of a specific charge;

(f) Meteorological, topographical and cartographical facilities and services, unless agreed to be of a special character warranting payment;

(g) The following types of property, except in respect of repairs and maintenance:

(i) property belonging to the Federal Republic, other than property administered by the German Federal Railways or Federal Post, unless it is agreed that an exception should be made in the case of property acquired after the entry into force of the present Convention for the use for purposes other than defence;

(ii) property previously owned by the former Reich which is subject to the administration of the Federal Republic in accordance with the Law for a Provisional Settlement of the Legal Status of Reich Property and the Prussian Shares of 21 July 1951 (Bundesaesetzblatt Teil I Seite 467) and the Ordinance for the Implementation of Article 6 of that Law of 26 July 1951 (Bundesaesetzblatt Teil I Seite 471), other than property administered by the German Federal Railways or Federal Post;

(iii) property which has been constructed or procured by expenditures either from occupation costs or mandatory expenditures or from the defence contribution of the Federal Republic, except that

(1) where property, other than property used without charge under items (i) (ii) of this sub-paragraph, has been reconstructed by such expenditures, rent shall be paid in an amount to be reduced in the same proportion as the cost of reconstruction bears to the total value of the property; and

(2) ground rent shall be paid for sites which are not the property of the Federal Republic.

2. If property of any of the *Laender* is used by the Forces, for themselves or their members, the Federal Republic undertakes to ensure that the Forces are relieved from liability for any claims of the *Land* concerned to compensation for such use under German law.

3. With respect to property used free of charge under sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 1 and property referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the Federal Republic will satisfy the owner's liability, if any, under German law to pay land taxes.

4. Members of the Forces shall in their own right receive or enjoy free of charge such services or facilities as are normally enjoyed by other persons in the Federal territory without charge.

5. Military aircraft of any Power concerned (including aircraft operated under the control of the Forces of such Power) shall not be charged a fee for landing on, or departing from, civil airfields in the Federal territory, unless, in the case of airfields not owned or administered by the Federal Republic, fees are payable under

German regulations applicable from time to time to military users. No fee shall be charged for landing by such aircraft in distress.

6. In general the cost of the construction, repair and maintenance of transport and communications facilities, installations and equipment, and public utility facilities, which serve common civilian and military use shall not be charged to the defense contribution of the Federal Republic. Where, however, these facilities are not revenue producing and the civil use is small or where there are any other special circumstances which justify a departure from the general rule, the extra costs attributable to the military requirements will by prior specific agreements be shared or borne, as the case may be, by the Forces.

ARTICLE 8

1. Subject to the provisions of Article 9 of the present Convention, claims in respect of loss or damage caused, after its entry into force, by acts or omissions of the Forces in the Federal territory shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this Article and shall not be asserted otherwise than in accordance with such provisions.

2. The following shall be deemed to be acts or omissions of the Forces:

(a) An act or omission of a member or employee of the Forces, or of a person working for the Forces pursuant to Article 44 or 45 of the Forces Convention, in the performance of his official duties;

(b) An activity of the Forces;

(c) An act or omission causing damage in excess of fair wear and tear to accommodation or movable property made available for use by the Forces in accordance with the Forces Convention, where such damage occurs in the course of such use;

(d) An act or omission of a member of the Forces taking part in manoeuvres of the Forces causing damage to immovable property.

3. Damage caused to accommodation or movables which have been made available for use by the Forces shall be deemed to be caused on the date of its release by them, and the claim shall be deemed first to arise on that date.

4. In determining whether and to what extent compensation shall be paid for loss or damage caused by acts or omissions of the Forces, the appropriate agencies of the Forces shall give due consideration to the provisions of German law which would determine the liability of the Federal Republic in similar circumstances. Claims shall be determined without regard to the exemptions from German traffic regulations to which the Forces are entitled under paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 17 of the Forces Convention.

5. No claim shall be dealt with under this Article in respect of

(a) damage to public roads, highways, bridges, navigable waterways and other traffic facilities resulting from their use by the Forces, their members or employees for normal traffic purposes;

(b) loss of, or damage to, any property used by the Forces free of charge under item (iii) of sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the present Convention;

(c) loss or damage arising under contracts or quasi-contractual relationships.

6. A claimant shall be deemed to have waived his claim against the Forces if he does not file it within ninety days of the time when he first knew of the loss or damage, unless there was reasonable excuse for his failure to file the claim within such period, particularly if he did not know against whom the claim should be asserted. Any claim not received by the agency of the Forces within one year of the date of the incident causing the loss or damage or, in the case of loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of this Article, within one year from the release of the property shall not be dealt with.

7. Claims shall be filed with the appropriate German agencies in a form to be agreed between the German authorities and the Forces of the Power concerned.

8. The German agency shall

(a) immediately forward to the appropriate agency of the Forces of the Power concerned such particulars of the claim as the latter agency may require; and

(b) investigate the claim within a reasonable time and make a reasoned recommendation thereon to the agency of the Forces.

9. The agency of the Forces shall consider whether and to what extent compensation should be paid for the loss suffered. It shall notify the claimant and the German agency of its decision. If the claimant accepts in full satisfaction of his claim the amount of the compensation awarded by the agency of the Forces, payment shall be made in accordance with procedures to be agreed between the Federal authorities and the Forces of the Power concerned.

10. If the claimant does not accept the compensation offered, or does not agree with the rejection of his claim, he may, within two months after he has been notified of the decision, bring an action upon his claim in the ordinary German courts against the Federal Republic.

11. The appropriate agencies of the Forces shall make available to the German authorities, upon request, information and evidence in their possession which would assist in the defence of such an action, insofar as they may do so under the regulations of the Power concerned.

12. The appropriate agency of the Forces may, if it so desires, participate in any such action against the Federal Republic by

(a) requiring the Federal Republic to plead certain defences or to appeal, or

(b) appearing as a third party defendant (*Nebenintervenient*) in accordance with the provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure.

13. The appropriate German agency shall notify the agency of the Forces of the judgment in any such action and the grounds given therefor. Should the judgment of the court differ from the decision of the agency of the Forces, then

(a) if the authorities of the Forces participated in the action against the Federal Republic as provided in paragraph 12 of this Article, the decision of the agency shall be modified so as to accord with the judgment; but

(b) if the authorities of the Forces did not participate in the action, the agency of the Forces shall, upon request of the German authorities, reconsider its decision taking into account the judgment of the court. If upon such reconsideration the agency intends to adhere to its original decision, it shall inform the German authorities of that intention and shall give the German authorities an opportunity to state their views.

Any compensation payable upon a final decision taken in accordance with this paragraph shall be paid under the procedures referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article.

14. Compensation awarded under a decision of an agency of the Forces shall, for the period ending 30 June 1953, be chargeable to the funds for the support of the Forces of the Power concerned, unless otherwise agreed between the Federal Republic and the Power concerned. An agreement between the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in that regard and in relation to ancillary procedure is annexed to the present Convention as Annex A. The financing of payments made after 30 June 1953 shall be considered in the negotiations mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 5 of Article 3 of the present Convention.

15. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Article, claims in respect of damage caused to accommodation or movables which have been made available for use by the Authorities of the Power concerned before the entry into force of the present Convention, and are released by them after 30 June 1953, shall be determined by the German authorities and shall not be charged to the funds for the support of the Forces, or to the Power concerned.

16. Claims of inhabitants of the Federal territory against persons who are members of the Forces by reason of a military service rela-

tionship or employees of the Forces who are nationals of the Power concerned, which arise from acts or omissions outside the performance of official duties for the Forces, may be asserted, determined and satisfied in accordance with paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14 of this Article. The normal remedies of the claimant against the person who caused the loss or damage shall remain unaffected, unless the claimant accepts payment of an award made by an agency of the Forces in final settlement of the claim. The first sentence of this paragraph shall not apply to claims for which the person causing the loss or damage is covered by a contract of liability insurance or pays compensation out of his own means.

17. If in any civil action before a German court involving any claim covered by this Article it is necessary to decide whether or not an act or omission occurred in the performance of official duties, a certificate on such question shall be obtained from the appropriate agency of the Forces. Upon request of the court or the German authorities in a particular case, the agency of the Forces will review the certificate. Any certificate given shall be conclusive on the question involved.

18. The provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 4 to 13 inclusive, 16 and 17 of this Article shall not apply to loss or damage caused by acts or omissions of the Forces of the Powers concerned which are members of the European Defence Community.

ARTICLE 9

1. Each Power concerned, for its part, and the Federal Republic, for its part, waives all claims against the other for loss of, or damage to, any property in the Federal Territory owned by it caused after the entry into force of the present Convention by activities, acts or omissions of agencies or persons, for whose acts or omissions the other is legally responsible, in the performance of their official duties. This waiver shall not apply to loss of, or damage to, property of the German Federal Railways or Federal Post, or to loss or damage for which those organizations are responsible.

2. In application of the principle expressed in paragraph 1 of this Article, claims for loss or, damage to, property used by the Forces free of charge pursuant to items (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (g) of paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the present Convention, and claims arising from increases in the value of such property, shall be deemed to cancel each other out.

3. The Federal Republic undertakes to ensure that each Power concerned is relieved of liability for claims of any Land of the Federal Republic arising from acts or omissions of the Forces as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the present Convention.

Each Power concerned undertakes to renounce in favour of the Federal Republic all corresponding claims which it may have against any Land of the Federal Republic. Each Power concerned further undertakes to renounce in favour of the Federal Republic claims in respect of improvements leading to an increase in value of the property referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 10

1. Payments by the Federal Republic in satisfaction of any claims referred to in Article 3 of Chapter Nine of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation [4] may be charged to the funds for the support of the Forces only to the extent agreed between the Federal Republic and the Powers concerned.

2. Any claims referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article which the agencies of the Power concerned have not determined before the entry into force of the present Convention shall be submitted to the appropriate agencies of the Federal Republic.

ARTICLE 11

1. Receipts arising from the following sources shall accrue to the Federal Republic and shall be duly accounted for:

(a) The disposal of any movable property which so far as can be ascertained was purchased from Reichsmark or Deutsche Mark occupation costs or mandatory expenditure funds;

(b) Payments by third parties of amounts in consideration of improvements which lead to an increase in value of their property as a result of expenditure from Reichsmark or Deutsche Mark occupation costs or mandatory expenditure funds;

(c) Repayment claims against third parties arising out of overpayments from Reichsmark or Deutsche Mark occupation costs or mandatory expenditure funds.

2. The Deutsche Mark value of receipts arising from the following sources shall accrue to the Power concerned and shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the present Convention on the basis of supplementary Deutsche Mark budget estimates to be agreed between the Power concerned and the Federal Republic.

(a) The disposal of any movable property purchased by expenditure from funds for the support of the Forces. Any amounts accruing pursuant to this sub-paragraph shall be the sale price of the property concerned if it is sold, less the costs of disposal, or if the property is not sold, a value to be fixed by impartial valuation in accordance with conditions to be agreed between the Federal Republic and the Power concerned;

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[4] See *Senate Q and R*, pp. 25–88, or Cmd. 8571, pp. 75–135.

(b) Any receipts in Deutsche Mark or in kind arising out of the use by the Forces of accommodation, goods, materials and services provided under the present Convention or the Forces Convention, provided that any Deutsche Mark amounts received from persons or agencies not members of the Forces, as compensation for the use of accommodation in connection with services performed for the Forces and their members, shall accrue to the Federal Republic;

(c) Payments by third parties of amounts in consideration of improvements which lead to an increase in value of their property as a result of expenditure from funds for the support of the Forces. However, such payments by *Laender* of the Federal Republic shall accrue to the Federal Republic;

(d) Repayment claims against third parties arising out of overpayments from funds for the support of the Forces.

3. The Federal Republic shall with due diligence assert and prosecute such claims as fail to be made under sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 2 of this Article. The authorities of the Power concerned may require that they be consulted in due time before the assertion of any claim under sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 or subparagraph (d) of paragraph 2.

ARTICLE 12

1. Payments for accommodation, goods, materials or services provided for the Forces and their members shall be subject to the provisions of this Article.

2. Subject to the effect of the tax and customs exemptions provided in the Forces Convention or any other applicable agreement, the prices paid in satisfying the requirements of the Forces shall conform in principle to price and wage levels prevailing from time to time in the Federal territory, but the authorities of the Power concerned shall receive terms and conditions not less favourable than those afforded to comparable purchasers. When the requirements of the Forces are satisfied through procurement by the German authorities, or other expenditures chargeable to funds for the support of the Forces are made by the German authorities, the amount to be paid shall be determined in agreement with the authorities of the Power concerned. Except in the case of goods procured for consumption by persons normally resident in the Federal territory, the Power concerned shall not benefit from any subsidies granted by the Federal Republic to lessen the price of goods in the interest of the individual German consumer. The procedures for implementation of the preceding sentence shall be established by the subsidiary agreements provided for in Article 17 of the present Convention.

3. Compensation for accommodation, goods, materials or services obtained for the Forces by requisition under the Federal legislation referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 37 of the Forces Convention shall be determined by the appropriate German authorities, in consultation with the authorities of the Power concerned, in accordance with the provisions of that legislation and the principles expressed in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of this Article. Until the entry into force of such Federal legislation, the existing basis for assessment of compensation for accommodation, goods, materials and services requisitioned for the Forces shall remain in force.

4. The wage and salary rates for civilian personnel referred to in Article 44 of the Forces Convention shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 5 of that Article. The amounts chargeable to the funds for the support of the Forces shall include the employer's contribution to social insurance funds and the premiums for statutory accident insurance payable under German law.

5. The transport facilities and services afforded to the Forces and their members under the agreements mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 41 of the Forces Convention shall be paid for at the rates established in those agreements. Before the expiry of the said agreements, other tariff agreements consistent with the principles of paragraph 2 of this Article and Article 41 of the Forces Convention shall be concluded as provided in the latter Article.

6. The facilities and services of the German public posts and telecommunications agencies afforded to the Forces and their members under Article 42 of the Forces Convention, and any facilities made available by the Forces to the German authorities under paragraph 5 of that Article, shall be paid for at rates established in accordance with paragraph 1 of that Article. Timely agreements shall be concluded, consistent with the principles of paragraph 2 of this Article and Article 42 of the Forces Convention, for rates to be effective from 30 June 1953.

ARTICLE 13

1. Except in special cases which may be the subject of agreement between the Powers concerned and the Federal Republic the expenditure of funds for the purpose of capital works shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

2. Prior to 30 June 1953, the following costs for construction of accommodation shall be chargeable to the funds for the support of the Forces:

(a) all material, labour and other costs of construction, including the cost of preparation of the site;

(b) the cost of constructing transport, communications and public utility facilities and installations on, or leading to, the site, provided that such facilities are furnished exclusively to serve the accommodation concerned;

(c) the cost of replacing or re-routing to a standard not higher than that previously existing, transport, communications or public utility facilities and installations no longer available for public use by reason of the construction of the accommodation concerned.

In the case of costs referred to in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph which are incurred by the German authorities on behalf of the Forces, the amount of expenditures to be charged to the funds for the support of the forces shall be determined in agreement with the authorities of the Forces. Where the facilities and installations referred to in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph are revenue producing, or may constitute or form part of improvements included in a German development plan, the costs thereof shall be chargeable to the funds for the support of the Forces in the proportion agreed between the Powers concerned and the Federal Republic.

3. Until 30 June 1953, the cost of the installations and works referred to in Article 20 of the Forces Convention shall be chargeable to the sum mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the present Convention and paid from the funds for the support of the Forces to the extent that provision is made therefor in the budgets of the Powers concerned. If installations and work should be carried out for which no provision has been made in such budgets, their financing shall be determined by prior agreement between the Federal Republic, the European Defence Community and the Powers concerned.

4. Any expenditures, other than those provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, made prior to 30 June 1953 and related to the acquisition and evacuation of accommodation for the Forces shall not be charged to the funds for the support of the Forces mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the present Convention or to the Powers concerned.

5. The financing after 30 June 1953 of the expenditures covered by paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article shall be determined in the negotiations mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 5 of Article 3 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 14

A permanent Co-ordinating Committee composed of representatives of the Three Powers and of the Federal Republic shall be established to carry out the tasks assigned to it under the present Convention, to coordinate the implementation of the present Convention, and to consider and make recommendations to the Signatory States concerning the removal of any doubts or difficulties arising in connection therewith which cannot be resolved directly by consultation between the competent authorities and services concerned. Representatives of the Commissariat of the European Defence Community may take part in the discussions of the Committee, whenever the interests of the Community are involved.

ARTICLE 15

The Powers concerned may expend also in Berlin any funds made available to them under the present Convention for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of Article 5.

ARTICLE 16

At the request of any of the Signatory States discussions may be opened to amend or abrogate any of the Articles of the present Convention, especially if agreements between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defence Community make such modification necessary or desirable.

ARTICLE 17

1. The Three Powers, or any Power concerned, and the Federal Republic will conclude, where necessary or desirable, subsidiary agreements regarding the implementation of the present Convention, particularly the provisions of Article 6.

2. The negotiations and implementation of these subsidiary agreements shall be co-ordinated through the Co-ordinating Committee established pursuant to Article 14 of the present Convention.

ARTICLE 18

1. The provisions of Article 3 of the present Convention shall not apply as between the Federal Republic and the French Republic.

2. The provisions of the present Convention shall apply to the Forces of other Sending States which are not members of the European Defence Community, and to the members of such Forces, except where excluded or modified by any agreement which may be made between any of such other Sending States and the Federal Republic.

ARTICLE 19

The Arbitration Tribunal established by the Convention on the Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany[5] shall not have jurisdiction

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[5] Document 51.

(a) over any dispute arising between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic under the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 4 of Article 4, or paragraph 3 of Article 5 of the present Convention,

(b) to determine questions as to the extent of the competence or to review the decisions of the German agencies and agencies of the Forces referred to in Article 8 or of the Co-ordinating Committee to be established under Article 14 of the present Convention.

In faith whereof the undersigned representatives duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments have signed the present Convention, being one of the related Conventions listed in Article 8 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Done at Bonn this twenty-sixth day of May, 1952 in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:
DEAN ACHESON

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
ANTHONY EDEN

For the French Republic:
ROBERT SCHUMAN

For the Federal Republic of Germany:
ADENAUER

Annex A

In the case of the Forces of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the Forces of Belgium, Denmark and Norway the provisions of Article 8 of the Finance Convention shall be implemented in accordance with the following provisions:

SECTION 1

The functions of the appropriate agency of the Forces set out in paragraph 9 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention shall in respect of these Forces be delegated to the Federal Republic.

SECTION 2

1. The appropriate German agency shall inform the appropriate agency of the Forces of any claim lodged with it and shall append such particulars as the latter agency may require.

2. After receipt of these particulars, the appropriate agency of the Forces will forward as soon as possible to the appropriate German agency such information and evidence in its possession as is necessary for dealing with the claim insofar as the making avail-

able of such information and evidence is permissible under the regulations of the Power concerned.

3. In the case of claims to which sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention apply, the agency of the Forces shall in particular make available within twenty-one days of receipt of notification under paragraph 1 of this Section any information or evidence in its possession which would support the rejection of the claim in whole or in part. In such case the German agency shall assess and pay compensation only in the full light of such information and evidence and in any case of doubt shall refer to the agency of the forces before making any payment.

SECTION 3

1. Where a claim to compensation is based on an allegation of loss or damages caused by an act or omission in the performance of his official duties of a member or employee of the Forces or of a person working for the Forces pursuant to Article 44 or 45 of the Forces Convention or is alleged to arise from an activity of the Forces, the appropriate agency of the forces will certify whether or not such act or omission occurred in the performance of the official duties of the person concerned or an activity of the Forces was involved as the case may be.

2. The German agency shall not assess or pay any compensation unless the appropriate agency of the Forces has issued a certificate that the act or omission causing the loss or damage occurred in the performance of official duties or that the loss or damage was caused by an activity of the Forces.

3. If during investigations of a claim circumstances appear which would lead to an inference different from that contained in the certificate on the question whether an act or omission occurred in the performance of official duties or an activity of the Forces is concerned, the appropriate agency of the Forces will on the request of the appropriate German agency review its certificate taking into account the representations made by the German agency.

SECTION 4

If a claimant brings an action in the ordinary German court against the Federal Republic pursuant to paragraph 10 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention, the German agency will forward to the appropriate agency of the Forces a copy of the plaint. Should the German agency deem it necessary in the light of the plaint to obtain from the agency of the Forces supplementary documents or evidence to be used in the defence of the action, it will so inform the agency of the Forces as early as possible.

SECTION 5

Should the legally enforceable judgment of a Court in an action brought under paragraph 10 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention differ from the decision of the German agency taken under Section 1 of this Annex, the decision shall be modified so as to make it accord with the judgment; this shall apply whether or not the authorities of the forces exercised their right to participate in the action against the Federal Republic under paragraph 12 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention.

SECTION 6

To enable that part of the compensation awarded by the German agencies or Courts which under Section 7 of this Annex is to be charged to the funds for the support of the Forces of the Power concerned to be charged, the German agency shall by the fifteenth day of each month furnish to the appropriate agency of the Forces a list showing the amounts of compensation paid during the previous month.

SECTION 7

It is agreed, as provided for in paragraph 14 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention, that 75 per cent of the compensation awarded by the appropriate German agencies or by the ordinary German courts shall be charged to the funds for the support of the Forces made available under the Finance Convention. The remaining 25 per cent of the compensation shall be borne by the Federal Republic.

SECTION 8

The provisions of this Annex shall not affect the provisions of paragraph 16 of Article 8 of the Finance Convention.

SECTION 9

If any of the Forces to which this Annex relates are or become part of the Forces of the European Defence Community, the above provisions shall apply to such Forces only so far as is consistent with the applicability of Article 8 of the Finance Convention to those Forces.

No. 56

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic [1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

MR. CHANCELLOR: The Three Powers advise you that, in the exercise of their rights relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement, referred to in Article 2 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, [2] they will require that the following legislation of the Control Council be not deprived of effect in the Federal territory by the Federal Republic: Proclamation No. 1 and Directives Nos. 1, 2, 4-7, 11-13, 17, 20, 21, 34, 36, 42, 43, 49, 51 and 53.

Nothing in this letter is intended to or shall be construed as modifying in any way the new relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic established by the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and the related Conventions.

DEAN ACHESON
Secretary of State, United States of America
ROBERT SCHUMAN
Foreign Minister of the Republic of France
ANTHONY EDEN
Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, p. 151.
[2] Document 51.

No. 57

The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [1]

[Translation]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 May 1952. [2] The Federal Government notes that, in the opinion of the Three Powers, the maintenance of the Control Council Provisions listed in that letter is necessary in connection with their rights relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. The Federal Government is of the opinion that these provisions for the most part represent provisions of internal procedure of the Control Council which cannot be the subject of German legislative authority and which, therefore, cannot be deprived of effect by German legislative bodies. The Federal Government recognizes that the remainder of these provisions, which relate to interzonal traffic, fall within the right of the Three Powers relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole.

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, pp. 151-152.
[2] Document 56.

ADENAUER

No. 58

The High Commissioners for Germany of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

MR. CHANCELLOR: As we have already advised you during our discussions on the Conventions between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic which have been signed today, the reservation made on 12 May 1949 by the Military Governors concerning Articles 23 and 144 (2) of the Basic Law [2] will, owing to the international situation, be formally maintained by the Three Powers in the exercise of their right relating to Berlin after the entry into force of those Conventions.

The Three Powers wish to state in this connection that they are nonetheless conscious of the necessity for the Federal Republic to furnish aid to Berlin and of the advantages involved in the adoption by Berlin of policies similar to those of the Federation.

For this reason they have decided to exercise their right relating to Berlin in such a way as to facilitate the carrying out by the Federal Republic of its declaration attached to the Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic [3] and to permit the Federal authorities to ensure representation of Berlin and of the Berlin population outside Berlin.

Similarly, they will have no objections if, in accordance with an appropriate procedure authorized by the Allied Kommandatura, Berlin adopts the same legislation as that of the Federal Republic, in particular regarding currency, credit and foreign exchange, nationality, passports, emigration and immigration, extradition, the unification of the customs and trade area, trade and navigation agreements, freedom of movement of goods, and foreign trade and payments arrangements.

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, pp. 154-155.

[2] For text of the Military Governors letter to the President of the Parliamentary Council, May 12, 1949, see *Germany 1947-1949*, pp. 279-280.

[3] Document 51.

In view of the declaration of the Federal Republic concerning material aid to Berlin and the charge on the Federal budget of the occupation costs of the Three Powers in Berlin in accordance with the provisions of existing legislation, the Three Powers will be prepared to consult with the Federal Government prior to their establishment of their Berlin occupation cost budgets. It is their intention to fix such costs at the lowest level consistent with maintaining the security of Berlin and of the Allied Forces located there.

For the Government of the United States of America:
JOHN J. McCLOY
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany

For the Government of the Republic of France:
A. FRANCOIS-PONCET
French High Commissioner for Germany

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
IVONE KIRKPATRICK
U.K. High Commissioner for Germany

No. 59

Bonn Embassy files, lot 58 M 27, D(52)1317

The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to the High Commissioners of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France

BONN, May 26, 1952.

AGSEC/Memo (52)7 Appendix "D" (2)

MR. HIGH COMMISSIONER: I have the honour, in reply to your letter of 26 May 1952 [1] to confirm that your letter, and the list enclosed with it, constitute the communication referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of Chapter One of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation. [2]

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[1] For the High Commissioners' letter of May 26 and the attached list of technical agreements or understandings with foreign countries made by one or more of the three occupying powers on behalf of one or more of the Western zones of Germany, see Cmd. 8571, pp. 144-172.

[2] See *ibid.*, pp. 75-135, or *Senate Q and R*, pp. 25-88.

In the course of the negotiations, my representatives have declared that the inclusion in this list of treaties and international agreements referring to the Saar, and the consequent assumption of certain undertakings by the Federal Republic with regard to these treaties and international agreements referring to the Saar, does not imply any recognition by the Federal Republic of the present status of the Saar. I repeat this declaration and would be grateful if you would confirm that the inclusion in the list of certain treaties and agreements referring to the Saar does not constitute any recognition by the Federal Republic of the present status of the Saar. [3]

ADENAUER

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[3] On May 26 the High Commissioners sent this reply to the Chancellor's letter: "We have the honour, in reply to your letter of 26 May 1952, to confirm that the Governments of the Three Powers agree that the inclusion in the list of certain treaties and agreements enclosed with our letter of 26 May 1952, referring to the Saar, does not constitute any recognition by the Federal Republic of the present status of the Saar." (Bonn Embassy files, lot 58 M 27, D(52)1317)

No. 60

The High Commissioners for Germany of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

MR. CHANCELLOR: In the course of our recent conversations you asked us to confirm that the right relating to Germany as a whole reserved by the Three Powers in Sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1A of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be interpreted as permitting them to affect adversely the relations established between themselves and the Federal Republic by the Conventions signed today.

We have the honor to inform you that our Governments do not interpret the right in question as permitting the Three Powers to derogate from their undertakings to the Federal Republic in the Conventions signed today.

For the Government of the United States of America
JOHN J. MCCLOY
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, p. 155.

For the Government of the Republic of France
A. FRANCOIS-PONCET
French High Commissioner for Germany

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
IVONE KIRKPATRICK
U.K. High Commissioner for Germany

No. 61

Editorial Note

Among the letters exchanged between the three Foreign Ministers and the Federal Chancellor on May 26 was a letter concerning the entry into force of the contractual agreements. For text of this letter, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers with Chancellor Adenauer, Document 48.

No. 62

The Chairman of the Allied High Commission for Germany to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany [1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

MR. CHANCELLOR: I refer to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 4 of the Finance Convention [2] and to say that the three High Commissioners consider it desirable to state that their understanding of these provisions is as follows:

Amounts due under payment documents issued before the entry into force of the Finance Convention will not be charged to the amounts specified in paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Convention unless at the date of its entry into force the goods or services covered by such payment documents have not actually been delivered or rendered.

In this connection the three High Commissioners wish to reaffirm the statement made in their letter of 10 May 1952 (AgSec (52) 430 [3]) with regard to anticipatory payments made prior to 31

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, p. 158. In his letter of confirmation, dated May 26, Adenauer quoted the text of the letter from McCloy and acknowledged its receipt. For the Chancellor's letter, see *ibid.*, pp. 158–159.

[2] Document 55.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

March 1952, which statement conforms to the principle of the understanding stated above.

I shall be glad if you will confirm this understanding.

I beg Your Excellency to accept [etc.]

JOHN J. MCCLOY

No. 63

The Chairman of the Allied High Commission for Germany to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany[1]

BONN, May 26, 1952.

MR. CHANCELLOR: I refer to paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Finance Convention[2] which provides that the appropriate German authorities shall, after presentation to them of a payment authorization issued by the Forces, effect the payment in the amount shown in the payment authorization. It is agreed to be in the interest of all concerned that payment shall be made as early as possible.

Accordingly, I understand it has been agreed that the appropriate German authorities will deal with such payments as follows:

1. Except as provided in paragraph 3, payment shall be made within fifteen days after presentation of the payment authorization.
2. Payment of wages and salaries shall be effected within one week after presentation of the payment authorization.
3. In exceptional cases the payment period referred to in paragraph 1 may be exceeded if the appropriation authorities of the Forces do not object. The German authorities will give prior notice to the authorities of the Forces of the necessity for such an extension of the period and the reasons therefor.

I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding.

I beg Your Excellency to accept [etc.]

JOHN J. MCCLOY

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, p. 159. On May 26 Adenauer transmitted to McCloy a letter acknowledging receipt of the High Commissioners' letter and agreeing with its contents. For the Chancellor's letter, see *ibid.*, p. 160.

[2] Document 55.

No. 64

The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Secretary of State [1]

[Translation]

PARIS, May 27, 1952.

MR. SECRETARY: In the name of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, I have the honor to inform you of the following:

As no effective control of atomic weapons can be accomplished without the overall control of the atomic energy field, the Federal Government undertakes to maintain controls in this field beyond production of such weapons. Therefore, the Federal Government will, by legislation, prohibit:

(a) the development, production and possession of atomic weapons as defined in Annex II to Article 107 of the European Defense Community Treaty; [2]

(b) the import or production, by whatever process, of nuclear fuel in quantities exceeding 500 grams in any one year for the whole of the Federal Republic;

(c) the development, construction or possession of nuclear reactors or other instruments or installations capable either of producing atomic weapons or of producing nuclear fuel in quantities exceeding 500 grams in any year for the whole of the Federal Republic, the capability of producing 500 grams of nuclear reactor [fuel] as corresponding to a heat output equivalent of 1.5 megawatts;

(d) the production or import in the whole of the Federal Republic of uranium in any chemical form in quantities greater than nine tons of uranium element equivalent per year. During an interim period, however, the Federal Republic is entitled to produce a quantity of uranium not to exceed thirty tons of uranium element equivalent for the initial requirements of a reactor;

(e) the storage of uranium in any chemical form other than in non-processed ores in quantities exceeding eighteen tons of uranium element equivalent in the whole of the Federal Republic, in addition to the initial reactor requirements.

The Federal Republic will, legislation comparable to that in force in your countries, control:

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[1] Reprinted from *Senate Q and R*, pp. 161-162. Secretary Acheson replied to this letter on the same day, quoting the body of the letter verbatim and stating that the U.S. Government had noted the Chancellor's assurances with satisfaction. For the full text of Acheson's letter, see *ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

[2] For complete text, see *ibid.*, pp. 167-206, or *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 1107-1150.

(a) the export from the Federal Republic of all articles and products useful in the development of atomic energy in accordance with a list to be mutually agreed amongst the four countries, and

(b) activities including export and import with respect to uranium, thorium and materials containing uranium and thorium.

The Federal Republic will also take all necessary steps to ensure that information of a security nature in the field of atomic energy is not divulged to unauthorized persons.

The Federal Republic understands that your Governments are agreeable to reviewing the limitation stated above on the production and acquisition of nuclear fuel at the end of a period of two years from the date of entry into force of the Conventions signed between your Governments and mine on 26 May 1952.

I take this occasion, Mr. Secretary, to assure you [etc.]

ADENAUER

II. EXCHANGES OF NOTES WITH THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING A GERMAN PEACE TREATY, GERMAN UNITY, AND ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS, MARCH 10-SEPTEMBER 23, 1952

A. THE SOVIET NOTE OF MARCH 10 AND THE WESTERN REPLY OF MARCH 25

No. 65

662.001/3-1052

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

RESTRICTED Moscow, March 10, 1952.

[No. 9]

The Soviet Govt considers it necessary to direct the attention of Govt of USA to fact that altho about seven years have passed since end of war in Europe a peace treaty with Ger is not yet concluded.

With aim of eliminating such abnormal situation Soviet Govt supporting communication of Govt of Ger Democratic Republic to Four Powers requesting that conclusion of peace treaty with Ger be expedited, [2] on its part addresses itself to Govt of US and also Govts of Great Britain and France with proposal to urgently discuss question of peace treaty with Ger with view to preparing in nearest future an agreed draft peace treaty and present it for examination by appropriate international conf with participation of all interested govts. It is understood that such a peace treaty must be worked out with direct participation of Ger in the form of an all-Ger Govt. From this it follows that USSR, USA, England and

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[1] This note, an unofficial translation by the Embassy in Moscow, was transmitted in telegram 1445 from Moscow, Mar. 10. It is the same in substance as the translation printed in *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 60–61 and in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 531–532, or *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 85–88. A copy of the Russian language text was transmitted in despatch 625 from Moscow, Mar. 11 (662.001/3-1152). It was also printed in *Izvestiia*, Mar. 11, 1952 and in *SSSR s GDR*, pp. 200–203.

[2] On Feb. 13 the German Democratic Republic had transmitted identic notes to the four occupying powers requesting the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The text of this note was transmitted in telegram 1028 from Berlin, Feb. 14 (662.001/2-1452). For text of the note and the only reply to it which was made by the Soviet Union on Feb. 20, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 50 and 52.

France who are fulfilling control functions in Ger must also consider question of conditions favoring the earliest formation of all-Ger Govt expressing the will of Ger people.

With aim of facilitating preparation of draft peace treaty Soviet Govt on its part proposes for the consideration of Govts of USA, GB and France the attached draft basis of peace treaty with Ger.

In proposing consideration of this draft Soviet Govt at same time expresses its readiness also to consider other possible proposals on this question.

Govt of USSR expects to receive reply of Govt of USA to the mentioned proposal at earliest possible time. Similar notes have also been sent by Soviet Govt to Govts of GB and France.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT OF SOVIET GOVT OF PEACE TREATY WITH GER

Almost seven years have passed since end of war with Ger but Ger still does not have peace treaty, finds itself divided, continues to remain in unequal situation as regards other govts. It is necessary to end such abnormal situation. This responds to aspirations of all peace loving peoples. It is impossible to assure a just status to legal national interests of Ger people without the earliest conclusion of peace treaty with Ger.

Conclusion of a peace treaty with Ger has an important significance for strengthening of peace in Europe. A peace treaty with Ger will permit final decision of questions which have arisen as consequence of second world war. The Eur states which have suffered from Ger aggression particularly the neighbors of Ger have vital interest in solution of these questions. Conclusion of peace treaty with Ger will aid improvement of internatl situation as whole and at same time aid establishment of lasting peace.

Necessity of hastening conclusion of peace treaty with Ger is required by fact that danger of re-establishment of Ger militarism which has twice unleashed world war has not been eliminated in as much as appropriate provisions of Potsdam conf still remain unfilled. A peace treaty with Germany must guarantee elimination of possibility of rebirth of Ger militarism and Ger aggression.

Conclusion of the peace treaty with Ger will establish for Ger people permanent conditions of peace, will aid the development of Ger as a unified democratic and peace loving govt in accordance with the Potsdam provisions and will assure to the Ger people the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples.

As result of this the Govts of Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France have decided urgently to set about working out a peace treaty with Ger.

The Govts of USSR, USA, Great Britain and France consider that preparations of peace treaty shld be accomplished with participation of Ger in the form of an all-Ger Govt and that the peace treaty with Ger shld be formed on the following basis:

Basis of peace treaty with Ger.

PARTICIPANTS

Great Britain, Soviet Union, USA, France, Poland, Czech, Belgium, Holland and other govts which participated with their armed forces in war against Ger.

POLITICAL PROVISIONS

(1) Ger is re-established as a unified state thereby an end is put to the division of Ger and a unified Ger has possibility of development as an independent democratic peace loving state.

(2) All armed forces of occupying powers must be withdrawn from Ger not later than one year from date of entry into force of peace treaty. Simultaneously all foreign military bases on territory of Ger must be liquidated.

(3) Democratic rights must be guaranteed to Ger people to end that all persons under Ger jurisdiction without regard to race, sex, language or religion enjoy the rights of man and basic freedoms including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction and assembly.

(4) Free activity of democratic parties and organizations must be guaranteed in Ger with right of freedom to decide their own internal affairs, to conduct mtgs and assembly, to enjoy freedom of press and publication.

(5) The existence of organizations inimical to democracy and to the maintenance of peace must not be permitted on the territory of Ger.

(6) Civil and political rights equal all other Ger citizens for participation in building of peace loving democratic Ger must be made available to all former members of Ger army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, excluding those who are serving court sentences for commission of crimes.

(7) Ger obligates self not enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in war against Germany.

TERRITORY

The territory of Ger is defined by borders established by provisions of Potsdam conf of Great Powers.

ECON PROVISIONS

No kind of limitations are imposed on Ger as to development of its peaceful economy, which must contribute to growth of welfare of Ger people.

Likewise Ger will have no kind of limitation as regards trade with other countries, navigation and access to world markets.

MILITARY PROVISIONS

(1) Ger will be permitted to have its own national armed forces (land, air and sea) which are necessary for defense of the country.

(2) Ger is permitted to produce war materials and equipment the quantity and type of which must not exceed the limitations required for armed forces established for Ger by peace treaty.

GER AND UN ORGANIZATION

The Govts concluding peace treaty with Ger will support application of Ger for acceptance as member of UN Organization.

No. 66

662.001/3-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, March 11, 1952—7 p. m.

3964. Prelim FonOff reaction Sov note on Ger [2] at deputy undersecy level fols. FonOff reps believe essential reply be guided by over-riding consideration of preventing delay in contractual and EDC negots. Best we cld hope to accomplish wld be a reply which wld satisfy Ger public opinion but be rejected out of hand by Sovs [garble] but wld appear impossible devise such a reply. Worst that cld happen wld be to get involved at this time in face to face conf with Russians which they cld string out indefinitely.

FonOff reps believe reply must associate West powers at least as strongly as Sovs with necessity for unification of Ger and peace treaty, and since first things come first must concentrate on unification. They were not clear in their own minds whether reply shld incorporate Adenauer's 14 points but did not exclude this possibility.[3]

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

FonOff reps were strongly inclined to believe that reply shld not take up merits of Sovs proposed principles to govern peace treaty but shld take note of Sov expressed readiness to consider other possible proposals on this ques and say that West powers will be prepared to consider principles and advance proposals when essential prelims as to unification settled.

Emb ventures suggest that altho other considerations obviously involved problem of West powers in devising reply to Sov note is in large measure similar to that of FedRep in devising answer to Grotewohl-Volkskammer proposal of Sept 15,[4] which led to formulation Adenauer's 14 points.[5]

GIFFORD

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[3] For documentation on Chancellor Adenauer's 14-point program for all-German elections, made to the Bundestag on Sept. 27, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1747 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Volkskammer proposals of Sept. 15, 1951, see *ibid.*

[5] On Mar. 12 Gifford reported that Eden had invited him and Massigli to lunch that day and had expressed himself along the lines of this telegram. The British Foreign Secretary also suggested that the three powers consult with Adenauer in Paris at the time of the Council of Europe meeting (Mar. 19) to decide on parallel replies to the Soviet note. (Telegram 3987 from London, 662.001/3-1252) The note was also discussed briefly with Hallstein during his visit to Washington in March; for a record of his conversation with Byroade and Acheson, see the memorandum of conversations, Document 143.

No. 67

662.001/3-1452: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 14, 1952—7:41 p. m.

4510. Following is text of draft US reply to Soviet note.[2] Comments follow separately.[3]

"1. The Government of the US in examining note of Sov Govt of March 10 has been motivated by desire to bring division of Germany to an end and to conclude lasting and just peace treaty. This has been fundamental objective of US and Western Powers since beginning of occupation. It is obviously an objective which lies close to the hearts of German people. Working in intimate consultation with freely elected spokesmen of the German people in Federal Republic and in Berlin, the US and its Allies have put forward or supported a number of proposals designed to achieve this primary objective in orderly and practical manner.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared with President Truman, Bohlen, Perkins, Matthews, and Sargeant. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Document 65.

[3] Telegram 4525, Document 69.

"2. Certainly it is the firmly held position of US Govt that no treaty can be imposed on German people but that the peace terms must be worked out in agreement with representative all-German Govt. The US Govt notes the agreement which Sov Govt has now expressed with this thesis. In the circumstances it is clear that it is premature to talk about the terms of possible peace treaty with Germany. It would indeed be cruelly misleading to engage in discussions of peace treaty until a constituent assembly had completed its work and laid the foundation for formation of an all-German Govt. The US Govt accordingly does not intend to enter into detailed discussion of Sov Govt's draft at this stage. As regards the Sov Govt's specific proposals for inclusion in peace treaty, the US Govt notes that the Sov Govt will be ready when the time comes to discuss also other possible proposals in respect of this problem.

"3. In this connection the US Govt cannot be reminded of the seven fruitless years of discussion with Sov representatives about an Austrian treaty. It would be an encouraging augury for future discussions about a German treaty if the Sov Govt were to respond favorably to the new proposals for an Austrian treaty contained in the note of US Govt of March 13.

"4. It is clear to the Govt of the US that an all-German Govt can only be achieved through the holding of free elections throughout the four zones of Germany and Berlin. If such elections are to be held; adequate conditions of freedom must be created in all zones of Germany now, rather than after the unification of the country. The belief of the US, French and UK Govts and of the Govts of the Federal Republic and of Western Berlin that such conditions of freedom do not obtain in the Sov Zone and in East Berlin has been contested by the Sov Govt. It was precisely to resolve this issue and determine the facts that the GA of UN, at the request of the US and other govts created the Commission to investigate relevant conditions throughout Germany. The Allied High Commission for Germany and the German Authorities in the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin have agreed to afford this Commission the necessary facilities to enable it to carry out its task. The Sov Control Commission and the German Authorities in Sov Zone and in Eastern Berlin have so far declined such facilities. In order to prepare the way for the essential first steps, the Govt of US will accordingly be glad to learn whether the Sov Govt now agrees that the UN

Commission should be assisted to fulfill the duties assigned to it by the GA.[4]

"5. The Western Powers and the Federal Republic have repeatedly made concrete proposals for the holding of free and democratic elections throughout Germany under international supervision. The German Federal Parliament has recently enacted an electoral law for all-German elections, which has been communicated to the Chairman of the Sov Control Commission for Germany on Feb 22, 1952.[5] None of these proposals was acceptable to the Soviet Gov nor has it made in its note of March 10 any proposals of its own regarding conditions under which all-German elections would be held. It is to be hoped that in the light of the report of the UN Commission—should the Soviet Govt grant it the necessary facilities—this stalemate may be resolved and conditions created which would permit all-German elections to be conducted, supervised and safeguarded.

"6. It remains for the US Govt to say that the present note has been prepared not only in full collaboration with the Govts of the UK and France but also after a full exploration with the representatives of the German people in the Govts of the Federal Republic and of Berlin. They, too, look to the Sov Govt for some sign of support for the essential first moves which have been proposed in order to bring about all-German elections."

ACHESON

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[4] On Feb. 11 the U.N. Commission To Investigate Conditions for Free Elections in Germany convened at Paris. On Feb. 22, the Commission asked the Allied High Commission and the Soviet Control Commission to arrange meetings in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, respectively, to discuss elections. The Allied High Commission replied on Mar. 1 that it had made the necessary arrangements in the Federal Republic and West Berlin for the period Mar. 15–23, but no reply was ever received from the Soviet Control Commission to this or two subsequent requests. For the texts of the Commission's letter and the Allied High Commission reply, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 55 and 58; for the report of the U.N. Commission on its investigations in the Federal Republic, dated May 1, 1952, see *United Nations General Assembly*, Document A/2122/Add. 1; an extract from the report is printed *ibid.*, pp. 84–85. Documentation on the work of the Commission is in file 320.11.

[5] For text of the letter to the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, see *United Nations General Assembly*, Document A/2122/Add. 1, p. 56; for the electoral law drafted by the Bundestag on Feb. 6, see *ibid.*, pp. 44–46.

No. 68

662.001/3-2152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 14, 1952—7:56 p.m.

4517. ReDeptel 4472, rptd info Paris 5400, Moscow 624, and Bonn 2042. [2] Fol is summary of tel from Eden to Franks copy of which provided by Brit Embassy: Eden's view, shared by US and Fr ambassadors with whom Sov note discussed, is that present Sov initiative shld be regarded as reaction to London and Lisbon mtgs [3] and as confirming wisdom our policy on EDC and Ger contractuals. Imminent prospect of Fed Rep integration with West has induced this tactical move designed to disturb Western public opinion and to prevent conclusion and/or ratification of the two agreements. Since Sov note in both tone and substance marked considerable advance upon previous proposals Sov Govt perhaps now prepared to pay bigger price in order prevent Fed Rep integration with West.

Unless Sov move handled prudently it may have some attraction for Western public opinion particularly in Ger. We ought to reply soon in way which wld assist Fed Rep Govt in mtg opposition criticism. Although concept of neutralizing Ger may have some attraction in Fr Eden gained impression from Fr ambassador and Maurice Schumann who also present at mtg that Sov note has disturbed Fr opinion particularly on left-wing by proposing Natl Ger army with Natl sources of mil equipment without specified control measures. If properly handled effect in Fr of Sov initiative may be to strengthen support for West Ger rearmament within EDC framework.

While our immediate action need not be affected thereby possibility shld be considered that Sov move may be more than tactical one described above. Sovs may even be prepared to allow free all-Ger election to prevent Ger integration with West with intention of stalling on peace treaty after free Ger Govt established in Berlin leaving situation no better than one now existing in Austria.

Eden suggests reply shld concentrate on that part Sov note relating to creation all-Ger Govt and shld make plain that Fed Rep

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[1] Drafted by Hillenbrand. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 4472 reported that Ambassador Franks had been to the Department of State with a message from Eden which would be summarized in a subsequent telegram. (662.001/3-1252)

[3] For documentation on the London Foreign Ministers meeting, Feb. 13-19, and the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb. 20-25, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 36 ff. and 107 ff.

Govt and Western Allies have already made concrete proposals to this end along lines of which any start must be made.

Important for Western European opinion that press shld take cautious but steady line in commenting on Sov note. Eden has arranged for guidance to be given UK press to effect that Sov note will of course be studied by HMG in consultation with US and Fr Govts and Govt Fed Rep, that any Sov note requires careful examination, and that present note which clearly not unrelated to successful progress of Western policies obviously raises important issues.

ACHESON

No. 69

662.001/3-1552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 15, 1952—1:50 p.m.

4525. 1. Draft reply to Sov note sent you in Deptel 4510, Mar 14, (rptd Paris 5437, Moscow 627, Bonn 2071 [2]) will provide basis for your discussions Mon with Eden and Massigli. Its argumentation is very close to that contained in Brit draft and indeed incorporates all language of para 4 of Brit draft and much of language para 3. [3]

2. Such differences as exist, other than pure drafting differences, are chiefly of emphasis, rather than substance. We believe that in expressing our desire for a peace treaty, it is important to avoid overemphasis which might be interpreted in any way as acceptance of discussion of treaty now. Our draft stresses prematureness of such discussion now, which we think wld be deceptive and arouse false hopes in Ger and world opinion. This is position Sec took strongly at 1949 CFM. [4]

3. Our draft also tends to emphasize, slightly more than Brit draft, U.N. Commissions purpose and importance of Sov acceptance of it as first essential step.

4. You will note, too, rptd references in our draft to FedRep and Berlin Govts, and to our cooperation and consultation with them.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Bohlen, Perkins, and Bonbright. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Document 67.

[3] A copy of this 4-paragraph draft was transmitted to London in telegram 4506, Mar 14 (662.001/3-1452).

[4] For documentation on the Sixth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Paris, May 23-June 20, 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 856 ff.

(Brit draft does not mention Berlin in this connection). We believe this is important for Ger consumption.

5. We have devoted good deal of thought to desirability of including references to specific proposals made in past by western side (other than reference to Bundestag electoral law [5]), and sug of favorable Sov action on these as additional sign of sincerity. Finally considered this unwise as possibly tying us too closely to some outmoded proposals. Third and fourth sentences our para 5 designed particularly to give us flexibility on this point by sug we cld still discuss on basis past proposals but leaving us free to move away from them if we wish.

6. Finally we have included reference to Aust Treaty in para 3. We believe this will be helpful reminder in Ger and will strike responsive chord there as evidence by Ger views reported by Bonn's 1964 Mar 13 (rptd Lon 527, Moscow 75, Paris 626.)[6] Have so worded para as to stop short of setting Aust settlement as pre-condition. Believe this incidental reference will serve as useful follow up to our notes of Mar 13.

7. Dept considers that Reuter and Berlin Govt as well as Adenauer and FedRep Govt must be fully consulted on note when tripartite agreement reached.

ACHESON

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[5] See footnote 6, Document 80.

[6] Telegram 1964 reported the views of various governmental leaders concerning the Soviet note. Among these were the views of FDP leader Euler who felt the Soviet offer was insincere and that the best way to demonstrate its insincerity would be to insist on free all-German elections and immediate signing of an Austrian Treaty. (662.001/3-1352)

No. 70

662.001/3-1652: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, March 16, 1952—8 p.m.

1479. Deptel 627, March 14, rptd Paris 5437, London 4510, Bonn 2071.[2] We believe that Sov proposal, when viewed in connection with past policy toward Ger and best estimate Sov strategy in Eur, is propaganda move designed to bolster up current Sov objectives of delaying or preventing Western rearmament and West Ger participation in it. Sov proposal obviously includes hope of leading us into fruitless fourpower negotiations as part their delaying tactics.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Printed as telegram 4510, Document 67.

Emphasis in US draft reply on concrete proposals which we have already made to assure free Ger elections seem to us best answer to Sov draft.

The view set forth by Eden in Deptel 628 [3] and view expressed in Berlin's tel to Bonn 840, Mar 15 [4] that proposal might mean that Sovs now may be more willing to relinquish any part of their control over East Ger seems to us to be similar to views advanced in past few months by a number of Moscow colleagues that Sov's anxiety to prevent or stall Western Ger militarization might lead them to make an actual concession. We find it difficult to follow any line of reasoning which would involve their relinquishment of at least a part, and for at least a time, of Sov control over East Ger. This control we believe to be essential to Sov objectives in Eur. Difficult to imagine their weakening it by allowing free elections which wld jeopardize the very fabric of control. Moreover, Sov policy traditionally has been to hold on to what they have got rather than to engage in trade. [5]

In view internal polit considerations which Fr Govt will have to take into account we foresee difficulty in obtaining early identical draft. Since it desirable that early reply shld be made, suggest that replies from three govts might vary somewhat in text while containing basically identical ideas without weakening effect joint response. [6]

CUMMING

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[3] Printed as telegram 4517, Document 68.

[4] Telegram 840 transmitted preliminary views of the motives and intentions underlying the Soviet note. (662.001/3-1552)

[5] Next to this paragraph in the source text Calhoun had written "Fr view opposite."

[6] Next to the last sentence of this paragraph in the source text, Calhoun had written "No."

No. 71

662A.00/3-1752: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 17, 1952—8 p.m.

5648. From McCloy for Byroade.[2] Believe Sov note should be viewed as presenting us with opportunity for consolidation of Allied policy as well as clarification of it to Ger people and Sov Govt. Sov introduction of national Ger army, free production, release of Nazis and Grotewohl's attitude on Saar[3] have stirred many reluctant elements in France and England to merits of EDC plan. On the other hand, emergence of note at this time is an indication of strength of this policy and should inspire all with a confidence that has heretofore been somewhat lacking. Therefore, I believe reply should embody a bold statement of our objectives so that Germans, Sovs and other nations may clearly see road on which unification of Ger, peace treaty, and stabilization of forces can be reached. Suggest reply should commence by saying Sov note and its tone point to need for a clear statement of Allied policy which is as follows:

(1) We are just as anxious and determined to bring about peace and stability in world as Sov Union. Indeed our actions have given evidence of a far greater sincerity in this respect than has Sov postwar policy.

(2) We actively seek unification of Germany and a definitive peace treaty with Germany and intend to continue our pressure to achieve these objectives. We are gratified that recently Sov Union has evinced such an interest in unification of Germany and apparently places such great importance upon it.

(3) However, we intend to continue with our policy of building a strong Eur community capable of preserving and developing and extending its freedoms within its area and capable of defending itself from aggression or subversion from without. Germany is a west nation operating under a rep form of govt and must be free to enter into such a community. This objective is a desirable one in itself and would be sought even were it not for fact that Sov postwar policy has accented the importance of such a community, witness Czech *coup d'etat* and Korean attack.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and to London for Spofford.

[2] McCloy was in Paris for discussions with General Eisenhower on the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in Western defense.

[3] On Mar. 14, in a declaration of governmental policy, Grotewohl had stated that separation of the Saar from Germany was illegal, that it was an integral part of Germany, and that it must be placed solely under the authority of the German Government. For an extract from the declaration, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol II, pp. 62-63.

(4) We intend to create this community in such a manner and on such a basis that it will constitute only a defense against the attacks on the freedom and welfare of its people and with no element or possibility of aggression itself. When so established and the present imbalances removed, we will be quite prepared to discuss with Sov Union basis for permanent peace via disarmament or whatever other measures may seem desirable.

Believe advisable to throw in ref to Aust treaty delays and statement to effect that if our policy in re to free elections and free conditions under which parties may form and campaign in Germany remains the same and that we feel no good purpose to be derived from commenting upon particular paras of their proposed treaty. We will be prepared at proper time to comment on them and suggest some clauses of our own.

Above are purely my personal views. I have not discussed them with Adenauer, but he telephoned me just before my departure for Paris urging that he be given opportunity to sit down with a few important people, as he put it, to think out proper form of reply to Sov Govt. [4] He indicated he had not made up his mind as to proper reply in all its aspects and wanted to exchange thoughts with those who were composing reply before any crystallization of drafts. He suggested this could best be done in Paris on his arrival here, but he emphasized that he wished to do it on an informal basis, sitting around table with others with similar responsibilities. He asked me to stay in Paris until his arrival, but I must be in Bonn tomorrow for UN commission. [5] Would like your views as to whether you feel my presence in Paris with Adenauer at this time would complicate matters. I do not think he has made similar request to other HICOM's. Will be in Bonn tomorrow. [6]

BONSAL

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[4] For a further expression of Adenauer's views on the reply to the Soviet note, see telegram 2012, *infra*.

[5] McCloy was holding a luncheon for the U.N. Commission on Mar. 18 at the Schloss Enrich.

[6] On Mar. 18 McCloy was informed that the Department of State wished to avoid concentrating the spotlight on the talks in Paris and hence it would be wiser for him to remain at Bonn. He was also advised that the reply to the Soviet note should be free from any suggestion of polemics or propaganda so the draft would contain, perhaps in the first paragraph, only a strong reference to the continuing U.S. policy of European integration. (Telegram 2108 to Bonn, 662A.00/3-1752)

No. 72

662.001/3-1752: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, March 17, 1952.

2012. At close of today's mtg Francois-Poncet asked Chancellor for an expression of his views re Allied reply to Sov note. He said these wld be most helpful to Allies in formulating their reply which wld be subj of further consultation with Chancellor before it is despatched.

Adenauer replied that it was important to avoid holding a four-power conf just for sake of mtg since such conf now wld be senseless and endless, and cld slow down integration and creation of Eur Def Community. On other hand, it was equally important to avoid a complete turn-down as this wld have bad psychological effect in Ger and Allies shld not themselves block possibility of achieving some positive results however remote they might seem at present. To Chancellor an interesting phase of Sov note was its appeal to Ger nationalism. He referred particularly to paras dealing with former Nazis and ex-Gens and creation of a natl Ger Army. Whereas Nationalist movement in Ger was worthy of little attn as it had little substance to it, such movement wld gain in importance if openly supported by USSR.

He believed that Allied reply shld be designed to bring to light real intentions of Sov Union and shld put two questions to it:

(1) Since Sovs envisage necessity for creating an all-Ger Govt which pre-supposes free elections, are they now ready to give UN Comm same facilities in East Ger as it has been granted in West Ger?

(2) What is meany by Sov requirement that Ger shld not enter into any coalitions or alliances directed against any power which took part in war against Ger? Wld this provision exclude Ger from Schuman Plan, EDC, And all moves toward peaceful integration of W Eur?

Altho Chancellor said note shld not refer specifically to Oder-Neisse Line, he wanted to take this occasion again to make clear that no Ger Govt cld accept it as definitive frontier. Fed Rep had agreed that solution of problem of its eastern frontiers should be later sought preferably in agreement with a Free Poland and that in meanwhile friction with Poland over this question shld be avoided in hope of later creating more favorable atmosphere for settlment.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

Kirkpatrick pointed out that ref in Sov note to Potsdam was ambiguous and asked whether reply shld not point out that Potsdam did not define either Oder-Neisse Line or Koenigsberg settlement. Chancellor was inclined to think this wld be useful.

In conclusion Chancellor agreed with HICOMs that whatever happened it was essential that work here on contracts and in Paris on EDC shld not be slowed down in any way but on contrary shld be expedited.

HAYS

No. 73

396.1 PA/3-1752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 17, 1952—7:54 p. m.
NIACT PRIORITY

5476. From the Secretary for Bonsal. Please give this telegram to Ambassador Dunn immediately upon his arrival in Paris: [2]

For the Ambassador: After you have read this telegram and the various messages relating to it which the Embassy will have, will you please telephone Mr. Matthews between 9:00 and 10:00 a. m., Washington time Tuesday (I shall be testifying on the Hill)?

The first question to have in your mind is whether you can represent us in discussions in Paris with Eden, Schuman and Adenauer relating to our proposed joint reply to the Russian note on Germany. We should like you to do this unless you see reasons to the contrary.

The next question to have in mind is what help you would need from here from persons or persons who would have to leave immediately. If you feel, in the circumstances you can take this on, we would send Perry Laukhuff to bring you our latest thinking, and, if you so desire, possibly Julius Holmes, who has been in the tripartite discussions in London.

The problem is this:

Eden apparently wishes to settle on a joint reply this week. (We know too that Adenauer wishes to have a discussion of the problem in Paris.) At present our ideas diverge from the British and French although we started out with fairly parallel views, especially as regards the British. We believe strongly that our main purpose is to drive ahead with the signature and ratification of the EDC and the contractual relations with Germany, and that we should not permit the Russians to accomplish their obvious purpose of frustrating both by delay. We, therefore, wish to make the reply as simple as possible, and in particular we do not wish to get into questions about the status of a united German government if one should be created, nor do we wish to get into arguments about the Russian proposal for a treaty with Germany. Both of these questions, in our judgment, are calculated to bring about a conference or discussions about a conference, both of which would slow up the two matters we are so anxious to hasten.

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[1] Drafted by Secretary Acheson. Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Ambassador Dunn was arriving in Paris to assume his duties as U.S. Ambassador to France.

You will see from Washington cables at the Embassy and London cables our proposed reply, the reasons therefor and the results of today's conference in London, out of which two other proposals emerge. We dislike both of them. We have not seen the actual texts but what we have been told about them is distasteful. [3]

The attitude which we think should be taken with the Germans, French and British is that expressed above plus the argument that a reply to the note should not be indefinitely delayed, and that, therefore, we should center on those matters on which there is tripartite agreement, leaving disputed matters to a later stage in the correspondence, if such a correspondence develops.

If you feel you cannot take this on, you can discuss this with Matthews tomorrow over the telephone and alternative plans can be made. [4]

ACHESON

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[3] On Mar. 17 Holmes met with Eden and Massigli to discuss further the Western reply to the Soviet note. The Embassy in London reported that agreement was reached on terms for the reply which embodied the substance of the U.S. draft (see telegram 4510, Document 67) and the language of the British draft. (Telegram 4093 from London, 662.001/3-1752) The text of the redraft was transmitted in telegram 4094 from London, Mar. 17. (662.001/3-1752) On the following day Gifford transmitted further changes in the agreed draft. (Telegram 4101 from London, Mar. 18, 662.001/3-1852)

[4] On Mar. 18 Dunn replied that he would be glad to represent the United States. This apparently confirmed a conversation with Matthews (no record found in Department of State files) which is referred to in Dunn's reply. (Telegram 5672 from Paris, 396.1 PA/3-1852)

No. 74

662.001/3-1852

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Schuman [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 18, 1952.

Since it is impossible for me to join with you, Mr. Eden and Chancellor Adenauer in discussing the Western reply to the Sov note on Ger, I hope that it will cause you no embarrassment for me to have Amb Dunn represent me in those discussions despite the fact that there will not have been time for him to present the letters formally accrediting him to Fr.

I am sure we all agree on the importance of the problem posed by this Sov note and the desirability that our concerted reply be formulated and dispatched at the earliest possible moment. I feel strongly that our main purpose shld be to drive ahead with the signature and ratification of the EDC and the contractual relations with Ger and that we shld not permit the Russians to accomplish their obvious purpose of frustrating both by delay. It seems to me that we shld to this end make the reply as simple as possible and, in particular, I believe we shld not get into questions about the status of a united Ger Govt if one shld be created nor into arguments about the substance of the Russian proposal for a treaty with Ger. Both of these questions in my judgment are calculated to bring about a conference, or discussions looking to a conference, which would slow up the two matters we are anxious to hasten.

I feel that the discussions concerning the reply, which have already taken place in London, have shown a considerable measure of tripartite agreement and in the interest of avoiding indefinite delay we shld center on those points of agreement leaving disputed matters to a later stage in the correspondence, if such a correspondence develops.

These are my basic views in summary and Amb Dunn will be in a position to expand thereon on my behalf.

I am sending copy of this msg to Mr. Eden for his info.

ACHESON

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 5482 to Paris (repeated to London and Bonn), Mar. 18. Drafted by Barbour, cleared by Laukhuff and Matthews, and signed by Secretary Acheson.

No. 75

662.001/3-2052: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, March 20, 1952—1 a. m.

5715. I have just had two conversations with Schuman and Eden, one at 6:30 and the other after dinner. [2] I was accompanied by Holmes and Laukhuff.

We presented the Dept's position according to instrs and I especially endeavored to emphasize main lines contained in your message to Schuman. [3] He and Eden were firmly insistent, however, on necessity of including in note some mention of (1) status of an interim Ger Govt, (2) freedom which all-Ger Govt must have to join associations of states compatible with UN, (3) frontiers and (4) Ger national forces. I was particularly convinced by Schuman's strong plea (which had Eden's support) for reference to freedom to join associations, frontiers and natl army.

It accordingly becomes abundantly clear to me that since these matters are of vital concern to the Brit and Fr natl positions we cannot hope to gain acceptance of our point of view.

Drafting comite is meeting tomorrow morning for consideration of completed new draft which will include foregoing four points, handled so far as possible in line with our three positions. Schuman and Eden have agreed moreover that Sov acceptance of UN commission must have first and absolute priority and they are prepared to make the other points subsidiary.

BONSAL

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Ambassador Dunn's two conversations with Schuman and Eden took place on Mar. 19.

[3] *Supra.*

No. 76

662.001/3-2052: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 20, 1952—10 p. m.

5754. From Amb Dunn. We have just returned from a meeting with Schuman and Eden at which Adenauer was present. [2] Schuman outlined three points which we have in mind for the reply. First, before there can be an all-Ger govt, there must be elections and he mentioned our intention of emphasizing the role of the UN commission. Second, the Ger govt must be free to carry on in the period between the election and the treaty. Third, we cld not ignore certain points raised by Sovs re: Treaty itself; for example, national forces, restrictions on political liberty of Ger govt etc. He said we did not intend to comment on all points raised by Sov note. He asked Adenauer what he thinks is necessary for Ger public opinion and for his policy. Adenauer referred to the existence of nationalist groups in Ger which, however, in the past had been without financial backing or strong outside support. He thought Sov note wld appeal to these groups in several respects.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Laukhuff's minutes of this meeting are in file 662.001/3-2052.

He also anticipated that these groups wld get financial support from the Sovs in line with apparent modification of Sov policy to support nationalist instead of Communist groups. Adenauer thought reply must clarify the sitn. He felt that conversation must be avoided as that wld give time for the strengthening of nationalist groups. He warned against treating Ger unification as something of no great importance. He urged absolute necessity of rapidly concluding our policy of integrating and strengthening defense.

Adenauer felt it was necessary to emphasize that this policy arises not only from the war but also from Sov policy. We shld point out that aim of west is to guarantee peace. He thought emphasis shld be given to our belief that all-Ger govt can only be elected in conditions of freedom throughout Ger and that UN commission is a necessary condition to dissipated doubts as to conditions in Ger. He stressed desirability of early reply and hoped it cld be sent while commission still in Ger. He thought allies shld say they were ready to follow any promising path to a solution. In reply to a question from Schuman, he expressed opinion nothing shld be said about Potsdam or frontiers except that decisions there had been provisional and not definitive. Finally, felt that we shld make point that the provision that Ger cld not enter coalitions wld end all plans for Eur unity such as Schuman planned and EDC. Addressing himself particularly to Schuman and the French, he said he had no desire for national army and wld not mind hitting at the idea of a national army in the note.

In short mtg after Adenauer left, we three gave final revisions to the draft, which I am sending by separate tel (Embtel 5749[3]). There is no change in substance from the draft we have already sent [4] and we are convinced that this now is at the point where the Brit and French have incorporated the points they feel strongly shld be embodied in the note and from Adenauer's description of his own ideas, it is clear that it also meets in gen with the line he wld like to see followed.

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[3] The draft transmitted in telegram 5749 is the same in substance as that transmitted in telegram 2209 to Bonn, Document 78, with the exception of the final paragraph which is quoted in footnote 4 thereto

We are meeting tomorrow at 11:30 Paris time when a copy of this draft will be shown to Adenauer, subj, of course, to final approval by all three govts.

Both Eden and Schuman are particularly anxious to have us reach agreement on the text as soon as possible as they wish to have it despatched to Moscow before being given out for publication. It wld be their idea to have it published 48 hours after it had been delivered in Moscow. In view of the intense interest of the press in this matter and the wide speculation as to the form of the reply it wld be advisable to have it agreed to as soon as possible.

I feel that in the light of the persistent attitude of Brit and French, together with Adenauer's views as expressed today, the text I am transmitting is about the best we can expect to get.

BONSAL

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[4] In telegram 5731 from Paris, Mar. 20, Dunn reported that the drafting committee had met that morning. This meeting was followed by one with Eden and Schuman at which the text of a draft reply was agreed for consideration at a further meeting in the afternoon. The draft reply was in turn revised and its text submitted to Washington in telegram 5749, see footnote 3 above. (662.001/3-2052)

No. 77

Editorial Note

On March 21 Ambassador Dunn, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman considered further the draft reply and agreed on still another draft. This draft was the same in substance as that transmitted in telegram 5749 (see footnote 3, *supra*) with the exception of the final paragraph which is indicated in footnote 4, *infra*. This text was transmitted to Washington in a telecon during the morning of March 21, and relayed to President Truman the same day with suggested revisions especially in the final paragraph. No copy of the transcript of the telecon has been found in Department of State files; however a message from Secretary Acheson to President Truman, dated March 21, contains the draft text and the suggested revisions. (662.001/3-2152) On March 22 President Truman, who was in Key West, Florida, approved the text of the draft reply subject to the revisions proposed by the Department of State. A telegram containing his approval is attached to the message from Secretary Acheson referred to above.

For text of the reply as approved by the President, with the two different versions of the final paragraph, see telegram 2209, *infra.*

No. 78

662.001/3-2252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 22, 1952—1:49 p. m.

2209. Fol is text referred preceding tel:[2]

"1. US Govt, in consultation with the Govts of UK and France, have given the most careful consideration to the Sov Govts note of 10 Mar[3] which proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Ger. They have also consulted the Govt of the Ger Federal Republic and the Reps of Berlin.

2. The conclusion of a just and lasting peace treaty which wld end the division of Ger has always been and remains an essential objective of US Govt. As the Sov Govt itself recognizes, the conclusion of such a treaty requires the formation of an all-Ger Govt, expressing the will of the Ger people. Such a Govt can only be set up on the basis of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Sov Zone of occupation and Berlin. Such elections can only be held in circumstances which safeguard the national and individual liberties of the Ger people. In order to ascertain whether this first essential condition exists, the GA of the UN has appointed a comm to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic, the Sov Zone and Berlin. The Comm of Investigation has been assured of the necessary facilities in the Federal Republic and in Western Berlin. US Govt wld be glad to learn that such facilities will also be afforded in the Sov Zone and in Eastern Berlin, to enable the Comm to carry out its task.

3. The Sov Govt's proposals do not indicate what the internatl position of an all-Ger Govt wld be. The US Govt considers that the all-Ger Govt shld be free both before and after the conclusion of a

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[1] Drafted by Calhoun and cleared with Barbour. Repeated to Berlin, Moscow, London, and Paris.

[2] Telegram 2208 to Bonn reported that the text of the note transmitted in telegram 2209 had been approved by the President, but as yet had not been approved by Eden or Schuman. (662.001/3-2252)

[3] Document 65.

peace treaty to enter into assocs compatible with the principles and purposes of the UN.

4. In putting forward its proposals for a Ger peace treaty, the Sov Govt expressed its readiness also to discuss other proposals. The US Govt has taken due note of this statement. In its view, it will not be possible to engage in detailed discussion of a peace treaty until conditions have been created for free elections and until a free all-Ger Govt which cld participate in such discussion has been formed. There are many fundamental questions which wld have to be resolved.

5. For example, US Govt notes that the Sov Govt makes the statement that the terr of Ger is determined by frontiers laid down by the decisions of the Potsdam conference. US Govt wld recall that in fact no definitive Ger frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, which clearly provided that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.

6. US Govt also observes that the Sov Govt now considers that the peace treaty shld provide for the formation of Ger natl land, air, and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Ger's freedom to enter into assoc with other countries. US Govt considers that such provisions wld be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergence in Eur of a new era in which internatl relations wld be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the need of a policy of Eur unity, the US Govt is giving its full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Ger in a purely defensive Eur community which will preserve freedom, prevent aggression, and preclude the revival of natl militarism. US Govt believes that the proposal of the Sov Govt for the formation of Ger natl forces is inconsistent with the achievement of this objective. The US Govt remains convinced that this policy of Eur unity cannot threaten the interests of any country and represents the true path of peace." [4]

ACHESON

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[4] The final paragraph of the draft transmitted in telegram 5749, Mar. 20 (see footnote 3, Document 76), reads as follows:

"6. HMG also observe that the Sov Govt now consider that the peace treaty shld provide for the formation of Ger natl land, air and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter into association with other countries. These and other points in the Sov Govt's note call for a clear reaffirmation by HMG of their policies toward Ger and toward Eur. HMG are giving their full support to plans which will secure the cooperation of Ger in a purely defensive Eur community designed to preserve its freedom, to ensure security against aggression, and to preclude the revival of Ger militarism. They are opposed to the formation of Ger natl forces, as proposed by the Sov Govt, which wld endanger the cause of Eur unity. That cause, they are convinced, represents the true path of peace."

Continued

No. 79

662.001/3-2552: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Cumming) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT Moscow, March 25, 1952—5 p. m.

1529. Mytel 1527, Mar 25, rptd London 231, Paris 644, Bonn 44, Berlin 80. [2] Vyshinsky recd me 3 p. m. He was in good form with customary merrily malicious twinkle in his eye and looked ruddy and well though he said he had been ill. After exchange amenities I told him purpose my call and at his request gave him orally full summary note. [3] He took notes and at end my exposition said he wld pass note to his govt; that it required full study to define Sovs future attitude re contents note; at present only necessary say few words in preliminary way:

(1) With regard to question UN Commission, Sov position has been known to US Govt since sixth session General Assembly.

(2) Sov position on question of "participation in organizations not compatible with principles of UNO" well known and in this connection he wished "recall that Sov deleg introduced a resolution that participation of the countries in certain blocs such as, for example, NATO was not compatible with UN"; he thought that "this fact wld give a clue to Sov Govt position on this question".

(3) As to frontier question Vyshinsky said that it seemed to him that Potsdam Conf finally defined Pol and Ger frontiers and therefore statement in US note to contrary seemed to him unfounded.

The final paragraph of the draft transmitted in the telecon on Mar. 21 (see the editorial note, *supra*) reads as follows:

"6. HMG also observe that the Soviet Government now consider that the peace treaty should provide for the formation of German national land, air and sea forces, while at the same time imposing limitations on Germany's freedom to enter into association with other countries. HMG consider that such provisions would be a step backwards and might jeopardize the emergence in Europe of a new era in which international relations would be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. Being convinced of the need of a policy of European unity, HMG are opposed to the formation of German national forces as proposed by the Soviet Government. In the same conviction, they are giving their full support to plans designed to secure the participation of Germany in a purely defensive European community which will preserve freedom and prevent aggression and preclude the revival of German militarism. HMG remain convinced that this policy of European unity cannot threaten the interests of any country and represents the true path of peace."

[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1527 reported that Cumming had an appointment to see Vyshinsky at 3 p. m. (662.001/3-2552)

[3] For final text of the note delivered to Vyshinsky, which is the same except for a few minor textual differences as that transmitted in telegram 2209 to Bonn, *supra*, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 530-531; *AFP*, vol. II, pp. 1797-1798; *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 89-91.

"One shld not confuse final decisions with putting seals on the document."

(4) As to formation Ger armed forces, it was unnatural for a sovereign state to have such forces for its defense. "If I am not mistaken, US Govt took this point of view with regard to Jap at the time the separate peace treaty was concluded, though unlawfully, at San Francisco"; that treaty provided for Jap armed forces "why not then similar forces for Ger as in the case of Ital, Bulg, Fin, et cetera?"

I said that my govt's note spoke for itself and its text contained answers to his comments which I wld, however, report as Mr. Vyshinsky's preliminary observations.

Interview took about 30 minutes and atmosphere entirely relaxed.

CUMMING

No. 80

662.001/3-2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 25, 1952—8:45 p. m.

4744. Re Deptel 2209,[2] Dept believes unlikely Sovs will reject Western reply [3] outright but will reply probably along lines one of fol alternatives: (a) a gen statement in which Sovs disregard or brush aside particular pts made in West note, reiterate position set forth in Sov note of Mar 10 [4] and demand early mtg of four powers possibly with a specified date and place; or (b) rejection and detailed argumentation against particular West pts, ending, however, with demand for "early" mtg.

If Sov reply along lines of (b) above, which Dept inclined think more likely, Dept believes Sovs, along with repetition "proof" Sov efforts achieve Ger peace treaty and Ger unity and West obstruction these efforts, will:

1. Reject inspection by UN Comm as violation various four power agreements and as constituting unwarranted interference internal affairs Ger. (This reaction is strongly suggested among other things by Grotewohl speech Mar 14,[5] position taken in East Ger commen-

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[1] Drafted by Davis of EE and Guthrie and Harvey of DRS, cleared by Bohlen and Calhoun, and signed for the Secretary of State by Barbour. Also sent to Paris, Berlin, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] Document 78.

[3] Regarding the Western reply, see telegram 1529, *supra*.

[4] Document 65.

[5] For an extract from the declaration of governmental policy by Minister President Grotewohl on Mar. 14, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 62-63.

taries since Mar 20, and *Pravda* article Mar 24.) Sovs may well counter with proposition "any inspection necessary" shld be under four power control or even by Gers themselves. Sovs will almost certainly deny they oppose free elections and will contend they have consistently supported formation all Ger Govt "responsive to will of Ger people".

2. Reject West contention formation all Ger Govt must precede four power discussion as simply a delaying tactic. Sovs may take position four power mtg necessary for working out arrangements to effect unity but Dept considers more likely Sovs will continue to leave unclear relation between four power mtg and creation all Ger Govt. It is not excluded that Sovs may adopt East Ger line that estab all Ger Govt is a matter in first instance for Gers themselves to work out and may assert in line recent East Ger statements that basis has already been laid in respective electoral laws of East and West Ger regimes.[6]

3. Probably not dwell on boundaries issue because of necessity tight rope act between Pol and Ger opinion. Dept believes reaction, if any, will be along lines "views Sov Govt well known".

4. Probably react strongly West pts re rights all Ger Govt enter into assocs and especially final para West note relating Ger participation "defensive Eur community". Likely to assert Sovs not opposed assocs "compatible with the principles and purposes of the UN", but will argue that West note seeks to include Ger in "notoriously aggressive" nat which is "spearheaded against the Sov Union and the peoples democracies" and completely incompatible UN charter and principles. Will probably argue natl Ger army as provided Sov proposal wld be solely for defense of Ger, compatible with sovereignty of Ger people and wld not carry threat of aggression because Ger wld be "peace loving and democratic". They will argue further that West pt that Ger army shld be integrated Eur forces under Eur unity plan is designed force Ger participation "aggressive" North Atlantic plan and to insure Ger contribution cannon fodder US dominated West Eur armed forces not as equal but as puppet.

Dept wld appreciate soonest ur own estimate likely Sov reaction West note, ur appraisal significance and implications thereof for Sov policy, and where possible, likely views Govt to which you accredited, without making any official inquiries.[7]

ACHESON

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[6] For text of the draft electoral laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, dated Feb. 6 and Jan. 9 respectively, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 31-37 and 44-46, or *Papers and Documents*, pp. 64-75.

[7] Responses to this telegram showed general concurrence with the analysis presented in this telegram. Berlin expressed its general agreement in telegram 1182, Mar. 27. (662.001/3-2752) Moscow also expressed general agreement with the analysis as did British and French representatives in Moscow who were consulted by the Embassy. (Telegram 1548 from Moscow, Mar. 28, 662.001/3-2852) London reported that the Foreign Office expected the next Soviet note to be more positive in tone than did the United States. (Telegram 4320, Mar. 28, 662.001/3-2852) Bonn shared the views of Berlin subject to minor shades of interpretation. (Telegram 2189, Mar.

Continued

No. 81

662.001/4-252

Memorandum by Louis Pollak of the Office of the Ambassador at Large to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1952.

Subject: Departmental Views on Germany

The following is an attempt to summarize the views on substance and on tactics expressed in the meeting held in Mr. Matthews' office on April 1 to discuss the next steps on the Soviet note on Germany. Those present at the meeting were:

Mr. Matthews
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Bohlen
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Ferguson
Mr. Barbour
Mr. Laukhuff
Mr. Lewis
Mr. Calhoun

I. Ideas on Substance

a. On the question of whether we really want German unification there seemed to be very substantial differences of opinion, and also—at least in terms of our fundamental European objectives—considerable uncertainties of opinion. On the immediate question of whether we presently favor German unification, Nitze was clear that we had put ourselves on record in favor of free elections leading to a unified Germany, and that we could not withdraw from this position.

At the outset, Nitze and Bohlen were in agreement that the preferred U.S. solution of the German situation would be a unified Germany within the EDC. (Nitze and Bohlen were both very doubtful whether the French would buy such a solution; there was no discussion of how the French would feel about a unified Germany outside the EDC, but presumably they would have very grave res-

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29. 662.001/3-2952) The Embassy in Paris reported that the French believed the next Soviet note would attempt to maintain the pressure for further negotiations or exchanges, while the Embassy itself agreed with the Department of State analysis, expecting the Soviet Union to reject the Western note and present detailed arguments against the Western position. (Telegrams 6018 and 6023, Apr. 1, 662.001/4-152)

ervations about this, too, unless very strict controls on German war potentials were maintained.)

Laukhuff and Lewis took no exception to the objective of a unified Germany within the EDC, but they made it clear that their doubts as to the feasibility of accomplishing the objective placed them in opposition to German unity and the preliminary step of free elections at the present time. The Ger position seems to be that it is better to have Western Germany in the EDC than to gamble on a unified Germany which would be free to stay out of or to quit the EDC.

Discussion of the abstract desirability of German unification produced less rather than more conviction that a unified Germany was a desirable goal. Bohlen, while not convinced one way or another, feels that a unified Germany in a Europe which is still divided presents certain very grave dangers of German domination of the Continent or *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. Bohlen feels that the present Soviet bid for a unified Germany is really directed at the right-wing industrialists who support Adenauer rather than at the German Socialists; it is the industrialists whom the Soviet Union could tempt with markets stretching from Eastern Europe to the Pacific (including China)—markets which it would be very difficult for Germany to duplicate in the West.

Nitze shares some of Bohlen's apprehensions about the "unified Germany in a divided Europe" concept; but Nitze prefers what he regards as a more "aggressive" approach to the problem—i.e., that unification of Germany would tend to accelerate the unification of Europe as a whole.

b. There was also no clear agreement as to what the West Germans want—i.e., just how they are likely to respond to possible Soviet and Western moves.

Nitze and Ferguson seem to feel that the West Germans are primarily interested in German unity. Ferguson feels that if faced with the simple choice of West German integration into Western Europe or unification of all Germany, the West Germans would take the second. Nitze agrees that the Soviets can block the contractual arrangements and German participation in the EDC if they are genuinely willing to establish a free and unified Germany—which means liquidating the entire East German investment.

Nitze thinks it unlikely, however, that the West Germans would be confronted with a simple choice between integration and unification; he foresees a choice between unification in the near future and a present integration which would not preclude subsequent unification. Faced with that choice, the West Germans would, in the view of Nitze and also of Ger, take the latter course. Ferguson was very doubtful of this analysis; based on the intelligence reports which he has studied, Ferguson is pretty well convinced that the Germans want unity above all, and would buy what appeared to them a bona fide Soviet offer. Ferguson regards it as very difficult to pursue effectively the parrallel propaganda course suggested by Jessup pursuant to the Nitze analysis—i.e., simultaneous emphasis on German unity and German integration with the West. Bohlen, on the other hand, is inclined to feel that we may be exaggerating the West German pressure for unity; put another way, Bohlen wonders whether the West Germans are not more skeptical of Soviet good faith on the unification issue than we have been inclined to believe.

c. Assuming German integration with the West now, it was not agreed whether such integration would continue after the establishment of a unified German government. Laukhuff, Bohlen, and Ferguson all seemed to feel that we had departed considerably from the concept, recalled by Jessup, that the government of a unified Germany would merely be an enlarged Bonn government which would simply continue whatever obligations had been assumed by the Bonn government as now constituted. (It was pointed out that Adenauer had insisted on inserting a clause in the contractual arrangements which seemed to look toward a continuity of rights and responsibilities for an expanded German government; it was not known whether there was any parallel provision in the EDC treaty.)

There was some feeling that our March 25 reply to the Soviet note had already placed us on record in support of the proposition that a unified German government would be free to affirm or repudiate its obligations under the contractual arrangements for the EDC. This feeling was based on the language in paragraph 3, to the effect that "the United States Government considers that the all-German government should be free both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations."

Jessup suggested that we could take the position that a freely negotiated peace treaty with Germany could effect modifications of the contractual arrangements now under negotiation, and that if Germany and the Soviet Union could present persuasive reasons for such modifications, they would of course be considered in the negotiation of the peace treaty.

There was some separate discussion as to the possibility of an "Austrian situation" in which there would be a unified German government prior to the negotiation of a peace treaty. Perkins feels that any extended repetition of the Austrian pattern would be most unfortunate, but it was agreed that paragraphs 2 and 4 of our note of March 25 envisaged the establishment of an all-German government with which the peace treaty will be negotiated.

II. Ideas on Tactics

a. With regard to the content of our next note on Germany, Bohlen suggested that the following two-point policy would most accurately reflect our objectives, would be the simplest of exposition, and would be the least likely to get us tripped up:

1. We are going ahead on integration.
2. If the Soviet Union is genuinely prepared to permit free elections and the consequent establishment of a unified Germany, we are prepared to let the ultimate all-German government decide whether it wishes to continue its adherence to the integration program.

[In speaking of "integration", Bohlen has in mind not only the EDC, but also the Schuman Plan.][1]

b. On the question of possible talks with the Soviet Union about Germany, there was general agreement that they should be avoided if possible. Matthews, Perkins, and Ferguson addressed themselves specifically to this point.

Laukhuff agreed that it would be nice to avoid talks at the present time, but expressed what was probably a general consensus that we might be put in a position where we could not avoid talks of some sort. Assuming talks are in order, it seems to be the general feeling that they should be on as low a level as possible. Laukhuff, for example, suggests that we propose a meeting of the Allied Control Commission to discuss what the four powers can do (perhaps in conjunction with the UN Commission) to explore the possibility of free German elections. Calhoun, reflecting certain fears about an apparent re-establishment of the Control Commission machinery, suggested a meeting of Deputy High Commissioners.

Jessup asked Bohlen what his reaction would be if the Soviets were to meet the two-point Bohlen proposal with the suggestion that the proposal be discussed at a CFM together with other matters. Bohlen felt that any discussion should be at a lower level, and that we should simultaneously push for completion of our integration program. (As a corollary of Bohlen's feeling that we may exaggerate the West German emphasis on unity, Bohlen is inclined to feel that we always overestimate the extent to which conversations related to German unity may obstruct progress toward integration. Bohlen feels that if the West Germans stop supporting EDC and the contractual arrangements simply because we have exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, we are building our German integration program on shifting sands indeed. Accordingly, Bohlen thinks we should point out to the Germans that any Soviet concessions which give promise of unity are solely based on Soviet fears of German integration, and that further progress on integration is the key to those further Soviet concessions which could make unity a reality.)

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[1] Brackets in the source text

c. There was general agreement that we should step up our propaganda in Germany in accordance with whatever substantive objectives we agree upon. It was specifically suggested by Bohlen, pursuant to his analysis outlined above, that we lay increasing stress on the dangers to Germany of the Soviet armies and the need to counter those dangers by accelerating the intergration program.

As a companion propaganda piece, Jessup suggested that we must try to emphasize the idea that integration is in no way incompatible with German unification. Ferguson repeated his doubts that we could effectively persuade the Germans of this secondary proposition. (Ferguson's propaganda doubts seem to correspond closely with his substantive doubts that we can keep the integration movement going if the Soviets appear to the Germans to be making substantial offers of unity; presumably, and it would seem correctly, Ferguson thinks it is very difficult for us to make effective propaganda on the basis of a position about which we are not ourselves convinced.)

d. It was generally agreed that there should be no talks with the British and French about possible further moves until the Soviet Union has replied to our March 25 note. Bohlen seemed to express the group's sentiment in suggesting that talks which did not focus upon a particular Soviet text would simply tend to rigidify the separate views of the three powers as to a whole range of problems, most of which would turn out to be purely hypothetical. There was no agreement on whether the talks, whenever they take place, should be conducted here or in London or Paris.

III. Immediate Conclusions

The immediate conclusions reached at the meeting were as follows:

1. That Ger should prepare an analysis of the contractual arrangements and the EDC treaty to determine the extent to which those instruments envisage continued participation by a unified Germany. [It was also suggested that it would be well to prepare a time-phased appraisal of our concept of the German unification process—i.e., exploration of free election possibilities leading to free elections leading to a constituent assembly of an all-German government leading to negotiation of a peace treaty between the all-

German government and the four powers. Nobody was assigned to do this Job.][2]

2. Talks with the UK and France should not be undertaken before we have a Soviet reply to our note of March 25.[3]

Louis H. Pollak

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[2] Brackets in the source text.

[3] Attached to the source text was a 2-page "Notes on discussion of Soviet note in Mr. Matthews' Office 4/2/52", prepared by Jessup, which summarized this memorandum in outline form.

B. THE SOVIET NOTE OF APRIL 9 AND THE WESTERN REPLY OF MAY 13

No. 82

662.001/4-1052

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Moscow,] April 9, 1952.

No. 14

In connection with the note of the Government of the USA of March 25[2] of this year the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following.

In its note of March 10[3] the Soviet Government suggested to the Government of the USA and also to the Governments of Great Britain and France that the question of a peace treaty with Germany be discussed without delay in order that an agreed draft of the peace treaty might be prepared at the earliest possible date. With a view to facilitating the preparation of a peace treaty the Soviet Government presented a draft of bases for a peace treaty with Germany, expressing agreement also to discuss any other suggestion.

The Soviet Government suggested in this connection that a peace treaty be worked out with the immediate participation of Germany in the form of an all-German government. In the note of March 10 it was foreseen also that the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and

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[1] The source text is a translation prepared in the Division of Language Services in the Department of State. It was attached to an informal translation prepared in the Embassy in Moscow and transmitted in telegram 1644, Apr. 10, and should be compared for minor textual differences with the text printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 26, 1952, pp. 819-820. The Russian language text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 689 from Moscow, Apr. 15. (662.001/4-1552) It is also printed in *Izvestiia*, Mar. 11, 1952, and in *SSSR s GDR*, pp. 205-207.

[2] Regarding this note, see telegram 1529, Document 79.

[3] Document 65.

France, fulfilling occupation functions in Germany, should review the question of conditions favorable to the earliest possible formation of an all-German government expressing the will of the German people.

Introducing its suggestion with regard to the question of a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German government, the Soviet Government proceeded on the basis of the fact that the solution of these basic questions has great significance for strengthening peace in Europe and corresponds to the requirements of a just attitude toward the legitimate national interests of the German people.

The urgency of the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany creates the necessity for the Governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France to take immediate measures for the unification of Germany and the formation of an all-German government.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the Governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France discuss without delay the question of conducting free all-German elections as was suggested earlier. Recognition on the part of the Governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France of the necessity of conducting free all-German elections will create the full possibility of conducting such elections in the very near future.

With regard to the suggestion concerning the future free all-German elections in the matter of having the UN Commission verify the existence of conditions for such elections, this suggestion is in contradiction to the UN Charter which in accordance with Article 107 excludes UN interference in German affairs. Such a verification could be conducted by the Commission formed by the four powers fulfilling occupation functions in Germany.

The Government of the USA had an opportunity to acquaint itself with the draft of the bases of a peace treaty with Germany proposed by the Soviet Government. The Government of the USA did not express agreement to enter into the discussion of this draft and did not propose its own draft of a peace treaty.

In the meantime the Government of the USA introduced a series of objections to specific points of the Soviet draft of bases for a peace treaty with Germany which involves a further exchange of notes between the governments and a delay in deciding the questions in dispute which could have been avoided by direct discussion between the powers. Inasmuch, however, as such questions are presented in the USA note of March 25, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to dwell on these questions.

In the Soviet draft of bases for a peace treaty with Germany it is stated: "Germany shall obligate herself not to enter into any coalitions or military alliances directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany."

The Soviet Government suggests that such a proposal is in accord with the interests of the powers fulfilling occupation functions in Germany and of neighboring powers, and in equal measures with the interests of Germany itself as a peace-loving and democratic state. In such a suggestion there is no inadmissible limitation on the sovereign rights of the German Government. But this suggestion also excludes the inclusion of Germany in any group of powers directed against any peace-loving state.

In the Soviet draft of a peace treaty with Germany it is stated: "Germany shall be permitted to have those national armed forces (land, air, and sea) of her own necessary for the defense of the country."

As is well known, the Soviet Government introduced similar suggestions also concerning the draft of a peace treaty with Japan. Such a suggestion is in accord with the principle of national sovereignty and equal rights between states. It is impossible to imagine such a position whereby Japan would have the right to its national armed forces designed for the defense of the country while Germany would be deprived of this right and would be placed in a worse position. There cannot be any doubt that in the interest of peace, as well as in the interest of the German nation, it will be much better to create such armed forces than to create in West Germany hireling troops, bent on revenge, headed by Fascist-Hitlerite generals ready to engulf Europe in a third world war.

With regard to the German frontiers the Soviet Government considers quite sufficient and definitive the Potsdam Conference provisions in this connection which were accepted by the Government of the USA as well as by the Governments of the USSR and Great Britain, and to which France acceded.

The Soviet Government proposes anew to the Government of the USA to enter, together with the Governments of Great Britain and France, into a discussion of a peace treaty with Germany and also the question of the unification of Germany and the creation of an all-German government. The Soviet Government does not see any basis for delaying the decision of these questions.

At this very time the question is being decided as to whether Germany will be re-established as a united, independent, peace-loving state, entering into the family of the peace-loving peoples of Europe, or whether the division of Germany and the concomitant threat of war in Europe will remain.

The Soviet Government is simultaneously sending similar notes to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

No. 83

Secretary's Memoranda, lot 53 D 444, "Staff Meetings January-June 1952"

Memorandum of the Secretary of State's Daily Staff Meeting [1]

SECRET
SM N-22

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1952.

[Here follow seven numbered paragraphs in which those present at the meeting discussed the military situation in Korea, Communist propaganda activities, the Japanese Peace Treaty, Bolivia, and countervailing duties.]

Soviet Note on Germany

8. Mr. Jessup explained that there had been no preliminary talks with the French and British because we had decided to wait for the note, [2] rather than theorize on what we might do when the note arrived. The Secretary asked what our general objective was in these series of notes. Mr. Jessup explained that some people feel that if we get started on talks with the Soviets, it will delay things in Germany. Mr. Jessup said that he was not sure that this was true. He felt that perhaps "medium-level" talks would not have a delaying effect on our objectives in Germany.

9. Mr. Bohlen suggested that it might be wise to get a strong statement of our policy on Germany and include this in our next note. Then we might call a meeting of the High Commissioners or their deputies in order to discuss what might be done on Germany. The difficulty in this proposal obviously is our getting a strong statement which would have the proper safeguards in it.

(The Secretary had to leave the meeting at this point.)

10. Mr. Bohlen felt that we would be in a better position propaganda-wise if we were meeting with the Soviets, so that we could make counter points at the same time that they make their proposals. Mr. Bohlen's general reaction to the note was that it did not say anything. Mr. Jessup felt that there was one inconsistency in the note in the third paragraph. He felt that the third paragraph accepted our idea of "stages" and perhaps we should pick up this interpretation of acceptance in our response to the note.

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[1] The source text bears no indication of the drafter of the memorandum or of the participants in the meeting other than those referred to in the numbered paragraphs.

[2] *Supra.*

11. Mr. McDermott stated that the note probably will be published on Friday. He said that it has been suggested to him by correspondents, and he agrees, that Mr. Bohlen, or someone else, might meet with the press and tell them what is in the note and state our general attitude towards it. Mr. McDermott felt that the press needed guidance and if we did not talk to them about the note, they would have a week-end free to offer their various interpretations, which might be unfortunate. Mr. Bohlen explained that the usual practice is to release such notes in Moscow on the evening radio, which might be early Saturday morning our time. He felt that we should not reveal the content until Moscow releases it, because the practice of 48 hours between delivery of notes and releasing the texts is important to us and should be maintained. He suggested that we might send a telegram to Paris and London in an effort to get an agreed noncommittal line which might be expressed. At least, we could explain to the British and French what we plan to do in briefing our press.[3] Mr. Bohlen suggested that we should merely analyze the note, because it is clear that we will not know our position and will not have consulted the British and French by the time of the briefing.

12. There appeared to be general agreement that such a briefing session should be held, if possible, in order to analyze the note for the benefit of the press. It was further agreed that the people in the various offices in the Department should be advised that they should not talk to the press on this matter. A meeting of interested officers was planned for later in the day to discuss the note.[4]

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[3] A telegram along these lines was sent to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow at 3:05 p.m. on Apr. 10. (Telegram 5113 to London, 662.001/4-1052)

[4] No record found in Department of State files.

No. 84

762.00/4-1252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 12, 1952—12:04 p.m.

2544. 1. Next six months and especially next six to ten weeks represent crucial period in our efforts to prevent Sov manipulation of unity issue from checkmating integration of FedRep with West via contractuals and EDC (as well as coal and steel plan). Dept considers that strong coordinated campaign must be made (in full cooperation with Fr and Brit) to support our basic policy and convince Ger opinion of rightness of course FedRep pursuing. Our line of argument must be threefold, as follows.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff, Ausland, Cox, and Straus and cleared by Lewis, Jessup, GAI, and P. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

2. First, the current Sov "proposals" [2] and maneuvers are intended solely to obstruct the bldg of the new Europe and are by no means intended seriously to bring about Ger unification on basis of freedom. We must continue to expose insincerity of Sov proposals and what kind of unity they wld produce. Real nature of Sov proposals is brought out by answering fol three questions:

a. *What kind of united Ger is Sov Union proposing?* Sov Union in its note of Mar 10 stated that a united Ger shld be a "democratic" state. Sov Union means by this an Eastern Eur type "democracy". As SovZone radio said on Mar 26, the regime in SovZone will serve as "a core of a future democratic Ger". Fact that Sovs have finally accepted *principle* of investigation does not necessarily mean they are *in fact* willing to see an *impartial* investigation conducted. If Sovs really wanted to hold election at earliest opportunity, as they say they do, they wld have accepted UN Comm machinery for conducting investigation. Sov reference to Art 107 of UN Charter legal quibbling, with which large majority of UN members in any event in disagreement.

b. *What internatl position is Sov Union proposing for a united "democratic" Ger?* Sov Govt seeks to create impression that it offers Ger an independent "neutral" position. But one of two things wld result. Either Eastern Ger wld continue to be occupied by Sov troops as at present, which wld permit neither independence nor freedom nor neutrality, or else all troops wld be withdrawn by all powers, leaving Sov troops poised on Oder-Neisse line and Western troops holding an uncertain bridgehead in Fr or US troops even withdrawn from Europe altogether. [3] Such a vacuum wld invite aggression and domination from the East and wld permit neither independence nor neutrality. As long as Sov Union holds its present view on world situation, neutrality for Ger is impossible. Sov Union claims world at present divided into two camps: on the one hand a "war camp" led by US and on other a "peace camp" led by Sov Union. This has been their consistent assertion since a speech by Zhdanov at conference in Pol in 1947 which established Cominform. Sovs consider control of Ger key to struggle between these two camps. Until Sovs change this view, Ger neutrality is a delusion. Sov note of Mar 10 says that a united Ger will be a "peace-loving" state. By this, Sovs mean that Ger shld be a member of Sov bloc. As Pieck said on Mar 11, Sov proposal will permit Ger to become "an equal partner in family of peace-loving nations". On other hand, Sov proposals preclude all cooperation by Ger with Western Europe, even membership in Schuman Plan. Grotewohl, on Mar 14, said that Schuman Plan is "entirely void under internatl law as far as Ger as a whole is concerned". [4]

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[2] Presumably a reference to the Soviet notes of Mar. 10 and Apr. 9, Documents 65 and 82.

[3] In telegram 2567 to Bonn, Apr. 15, the Department of State advised that the last eight words of this sentence should be deleted and the following sentence added: "This would create entirely new situation in Europe and implications for policies of NATO countries including US are difficult to foresee at present." (762.00/4-1552)

c. *What then does the "new" proposal by the Sov Union for a Ger Natl Army amt to?* As SovZone radio said on Mar 25 "it is not possible to tear the question of the armed forces out of context of Sov note. The Ger which, according to Sov note, is to have the right to have forces is a democratic peace-loving state . . . ."[5] One shld look at Pol to see a "democratic peace-loving state" with a Natl army (Sov style), whose commander is not only former Sov Chief of Staff but is now vested with such powers as to make the Pol Govt mere puppet in his hand. Sov Union is not proposing Natl army in democratic independent Ger but is proposing to do what they have already done in Eastern Eur: arm the State to the teeth after it has become Sov satellite.

3. Second, close integration of free Western Eur is a worthwhile objective in itself. Ger at very edge of Sov empire is in special danger. Presence of powerful Sov military machine on and near Ger soil and aggressiveness of Sov prop press home to Ger (and Western European) people ever-present threat of Sov intervention and expansion policy. Vis-à-vis this threat it must be aim of every patriotic German to give precedence to policy which will bring Ger protection and security. Integration with Western Eur offers Ger Natl integrity and security. Therefore close integration of free Western Eur contains very guarantee which responsible Ger leadership is seeking today in Natl interest. Emphasis shld also be laid on unique opportunity which now exists to bring to reality ancient Eur dream of unity. If advantage can be taken of this opportunity not only is there promise of new era of peace, strength and prosperity opening up for Eur but jealousies and rivalries which have caused so many wars can be controlled at long last. Ger has everything to gain from such policy and is indeed in excellent position to be leader in it. If it is true that strong undercurrent of Europeanism exists, especially among Ger youth, positive presentation of this policy shld have appeal. Develop theme which is briefly outlined in last para of Western reply to Sov note and in Sec's statement of Mar 26 (Mar 26 Wireless Bulletin EUB 56). [6]

4. Third, bldg of Western strength through integration including Ger is entirely compatible with achieving of Ger unity on livable

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[4] For Grotewohl's declaration of governmental policy on Mar. 14, see Grotewohl, *Reden und Aufsätze*, Band III, pp. 74–94.

[5] Ellipsis in the source text.

[6] For Secretary Acheson's statement on U.S. policy toward Germany made at a press conference on Mar. 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 530–531.

terms, that is, under conditions of freedom, strength and security. Gers must not be allowed to picture themselves as facing choice of integration *or* unity. That is true *only* if we think of unity on Sov terms. Those terms as pointed out in para 2 above wld produce a unity which is certainly not compatible with Eur integration. Unity which the Gers want is unity under conditions of polit and economic freedom, freedom from the strait-jacket of Commie rule and Sov domination, freedom from fear and concentration camps, freedom for religious life. Unity of this nature can be attained and maintained only by efforts of strong united West. The policy of peace through strength is already demonstrating its success, as witness the renewed Sov overtures themselves. If Sovs are willing to make small concessions now, they shld be willing to make even more as Western strength grows. The only choice the Gers face therefore is one between unity on Sov terms which wld leave Ger weak, unprotected and prey to Sov domination, and on other hand policy of bldg strength and obtaining security through unification of Western Europe.

5. We must at same time make clear that US is ready now as ever to establish Ger unity with freedom along lines previously enunciated by us and which wld not leave Ger unprotected and wld not prejudice Europe's hopes for new future. We shld further emphasize that present course of action which seeks to integrate Western Europe and to bring about Ger unity is not only sound course in itself but is only realistic and workable course in face of consistent strategy of obstruction and double-talk of Sov Union.

6. These arguments shld be pressed home vigorously by all US info services and officials at all levels. Wld consider it desirable to circulate this guidance to all consular officers and other local reps. Full Fr and Brit support shld be sought. Maximum use shld be made of statements made by Commie leaders, press and radio which will support our arguments. No effort shld be spared to line up majority Ger support behind current US and Adenauer policy and believe this line shld be taken regardless of form and content of further Sov moves (barring unexpected genuine offer of settlement on our terms).

Foregoing is Dept's thinking for your background information and will form basis for information guidance.

ACHESON

No. 85

662.001/4-1252: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State

SECRET BONN, April 12, 1952—2 p.m.

2368. From McCloy. Although Chancellor had proposed mtg yesterday with HICOMers for prelim exchange of views on Sov note,[1] François-Poncet's instrs precluded his attendance. In place of mtg desired by Chancellor it was then decided that Kirkpatrick as chairman shld call on him to receive a prelim expression of FedRep's views. Kirkpatrick has given us the fol memo of his conversation:

Verbatim text: "The Chancellor thought that the note, which he did not regard as very clever, was aimed primarily at Ger public opinion. It showed that the Sov Govt, after careful thought, had decided in no essential way to modify their previous proposals. But it wld obvious require the most careful exam, and, as it was not addressed to the Fed Govt, they certainly had no intention of [giving?] any opinion about it in public at this stage.

The Chancellor then gave his own prelim views on the treatment of the note. From the point of view of Ger public opinion, it wld be well to emphasize at the outset the intention of the West Powers to promote the reunification of Ger in freedom. Equally important, the West Powers must state that they are fully prepared to hold a Four-Power Conf, but that experience (e.g. over Austria and Korea) proved that a conf served little useful purpose when there was no approximation towards previous agrmt on important questions. In the case of Ger, there were at least three such important questions:

(1) The future full sovereignty of Ger with the right to conclude any alliances she pleased.
(2) Ger's defense forces.
(3) Ger's frontiers.

The Sov note did not help on any of these questions, about which there shld at least be an approach towards agrmt before a conf cld usefully be held. He advised that the above points shld appear at the beginning of the reply since they were points on which public opinion here was sound.

The question of all-Ger elections and the UN Comm, important though it was, shld from the point of view of Ger public opinion come at the end of the reply. It was essential not to give up all idea of using the UN Comm. UNO wld in the future be of great importance to Ger, as an internatl body she cld turn to in place of the Occupying Powers when the latter surrendered their rights after the conclusion of a treaty. Moreover, it was obvious that Four-

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[1] Document 82.

Power control over the elections wld be a farce: The opinion of the Three West Powers which, as regards this question, were already known, wld be in clear conflict with that of the Russians. Finally, the Chancellor hoped that, in the West reply, the question of freedom and all-Ger elections on the one hand and of a peace treaty on the other, cld somehow be separated. There was the risk of them getting mixed up." [2]

We plan to have mtg with Chancellor immediately fol Easter holiday and will explore matter further with particular ref to question raised in your tel 2518. [3]

My present feelings are, however, that we shld not lose this occasion to make a strong positive statement reaffirming our policy of West integration including a free unified Ger in it. It cld be said that the aim of such policy is to create a firm basis for peace in Eur and provide a strong def structure which will menace no peace-loving nation and prevent any possible rise of aggressive nationalism, thus giving a surer guarantee than the existence of natl armies. In making such an affirmation, it is important to underline that the freely-elected Ger Govt fully supports this policy as in the best interests of Ger as well as of Eur as a whole.

Emphasis shld also be laid upon conditions for free elections which are essential to the creation of an all-Ger Govt. The absence of any Sov response to the proposals made in respect of these both by the Allies and by the Bundestag shld likewise be noted and importance attached to this omission. Discussion of procedures for investigating pre-election conditions, however, seems premature at this stage.

McCloy

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[2] On Apr. 17 the Embassy in London transmitted a summary of this meeting which had been given to it by the Foreign Office. It is the same in substance as that printed here. (Telegram 4672, 662.001/4-1752)

[3] Telegram 2518 asked for McCloy's best judgment of the effect in Germany of a reply to the Soviet note along the following lines: (1) a strong reaffirmation of the policy of Western integration including Germany, or (2) willingness to have the High Commissioners or their representatives meet to consider preelection conditions assuming that the U.N. Commission would be used. (662.001/4-1052)

On Apr. 16 McCloy reported that in a further conversation with Adenauer that day the Chancellor had added little to his preliminary views. (Telegram 2392 from Bonn, 662.001/4-1652) For Adenauer's account of this conversation, see *Erinnerungen*, pp. 91–93.

No. 86

662.001/4-1752: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, April 17, 1952—1 p.m.

4673. Herewith foll summary of views on Sov note which Eden intends outline to Cab (Embtel 4667, April 16, rptd Paris 2149, Moscow 147, Bonn 306, Berlin 54 [2]).

Begin summary. Present note, [3] like first Sov note, [4] is primarily designed to delay and impede west plans for association of Ger with common def. It consists mainly of reiteration of proposals in first note. Principal new point is statement that question of conducting free all-Ger elections shld be discussed by four govts and any necessary investigation carried out by Four-Power command not by UN. But when asked whether Sov Govt was proposing establishment of Four-Power comm Vyshinsky was very evasive. Sov Govt still has not committed itself to holding of elections before conclusion of a peace treaty and may still be aiming at formation of provisional non-elected all-Ger Govt.

We must proceed with our present policy of trying to secure signature and subsequent ratification of EDC treaty and Ger contract. We must so handle Sov note as to encourage Ger not only to sign but also to ratify these agreements.

This means we must be careful not to shut door on Four-Power discussions and on reunification of Ger. We must seek to avoid any Four-Power discussions before EDC treaty and contract have been signed, as we now hope, in third week of May. However, while we need not commit ourselves at this stage and shld want to ascertain thru further diplomatic exchanges that a basis for negotiations exists, we shld not exclude possibility of Four-Power discussions, say, in June or July once agreements have been signed but prior to their ratification. Holding of such discussions will probably be a necessary prelude to ratification in Ger and France. We also have to consider public opinion in UK and elsewhere in Europe.

Such discussions, if they are held, shld be for purpose primarily of seeking agreement on holding of free elections throughout Ger.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 4667 reported that Eden favored coordinating the reply to the Soviet note in either Paris or London and stated that Gifford was transmitting in another telegram the views which Eden would present to the British Cabinet concerning the reply. (662.001/4-1652)

[3] Document 82.

[4] Document 65.

But we shld not debar ourselves from raising other relevant topics, such as status of all-Ger Govt after elections.

We must play for time until EDC treaty and contract have been signed. We need not be in hurry to reply to Sov note, but shld send off our answer, say, early in May. In order to gain time, we shld continue in our reply to uphold UN Comm as being right body to investigate conditions for elections. But we shld not place too much emphasis on Comm's merits. Also, we shld emphasize drawbacks of Four-Power approach suggested by Sov Govt, particularly in absence of adequate agreement among Four-Powers on any of main principles of their policy.

Like Sov note, our reply shld take full acct of Ger opinion. Accordingly, we shld endeavor follow as far as possible suggestions made to chairman of AHC by Adenauer.[5] But it is questionable whether we shld give such a secondary place, as Adenauer suggests, to question of free elections. Elections are our first essential condition and will have to form main item on agenda of any Four-Power discussion. Therefore we must keep them in forefront. End Summary.

GIFFORD

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[5] For a report on this meeting, see telegram 2368, *supra*.

No. 87

662.001/4-1252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 18, 1952—7:27 p.m.

5324. We agree to UK proposal that tri consideration of reply to last Sov note [2] be coordinated in Lond. HICOMs shld continue with Ger discussions initiated by Kirkpatrick (Bonn 2368 Apr 12 [3]). Fol are Dept preliminary views for your guidance in Lond conversations pending receipt of fuller reports on Eur reactions importance of which we fully appreciate.

Reply shld contain strong reaffirmation of intention three Govts and Fed Rep to continue present policy designed in interests of Eur peace. On this point we suggest something along fol lines:

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[1] Drafted by Jessup and Laukhuff; cleared by Barbour, Bonbright, Bohlen, and Matthews; and initialed by President Truman and Secretary Acheson. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Document 82.

[3] Document 85.

"US Govt observes with particular regret that Sov Govt does not accept view that an all-Ger Govt will be permitted to associate itself with other freedom-loving Govts in orgs which are compatible with principles and purposes of UN, which exist for purely defensive purposes and which shld not cause concern to any state which does not have aggressive aims. Likewise, the type of proposal for German nat'l armed forces which the Sov Govt now appears to be making wld repeat mistakes of past history in a way that wld be avoided by the forward looking proposal to allow Ger to make a contribution to a common European defense force in the service of a common European policy of peace. In its note of Mar 25, US Govt pointed out that it is giving full support to a policy which will bring into being a peaceful Eur community which will mark beginning of a new era in which international relations will be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. It was also pointed out that it remains conviction of US Govt that fulfillment of this program represents most constructive means to eliminate dangerous tensions in Eur. It is policy of US Govt to foster development of such a Eur community in which Ger will participate, and it cannot accept Sov Govt's denial to Ger of this basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations. US Govt repeats that this policy of Eur unity, which is supported by free nations of Eur, including Fed Rep of Ger, cannot threaten interests of Sov Union or of any country following true path to peace. US Govt will, therefore, not be deflected from its support of this policy.

Sov Govt's attitude on this fundamental question and its insistence on isolating Ger from Western Europe does not augur well for future accord on status and rights of an all-Ger Govt and on terms of a peace treaty to be negotiated with a free, unified Ger."

Note shld also contain brief restatement of our position that Sov contention that Ger frontiers were fixed by Potsdam is erroneous.

On question of UN Commission, we shld again reject specious Sov arguments based on Art 107 of Charter but cannot ignore Sov suggestion for 4-power action.

On this point we suggest note shld contain an argument along fol lines:

"We cannot make progress towards the attainment of our objective of Ger unification so long as the Sov Govt persists in barring the way to participation in genuinely free elections by the 17-million inhabitants of East Ger under conditions similar to those enjoyed by the 50-million citizens of the Fed Rep.

The US Govt has noted the Sov Govt's suggestion that a Comm, formed by the four powers occupying Ger, cld undertake the investigation required to ascertain whether the essential conditions to free elections exist. It was precisely because of the difference of opinion between the US, the UK and Fr on the one hand, and the Sov Union on the other, as to the conditions obtaining in the various parts of Ger, that the establishment of an impartial UN Comm was proposed. Under these circumstances the US Govt cannot be sanguine that satisfactory results wld be reached solely thru the medium of four-power action.

Nevertheless the US Govt is prepared to examine the possibility of reaching agrmt on a means for determining whether conditions of freedom exist throughout Ger which wld make possible the holdin of free elections. Such is indeed a primary purpose of the Comm recently established by the UN. The US Govt has noted with regret the attitude thus far taken by the Sov Govt toward the UN Comm whose establishment was supported by an overwhelming majority of the members of the UNGA. The members of the UNGA thus rejected the Sov Govt's interpretation of Art 107 of the UN Charter as set forth in its note of Apr 9. Art 107 provides: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the govts having responsibility for such action'. This language clearly does not bar consideration by any UN organ of matters relating to states which during World War II were enemies of members of UN. It simply says that nothing in Charter shall preclude or invalidate certain actions by certain states. However even under erroneous Sov interpretation of the Charter there wld be no impediment to agrmt by the four powers to avail themselves of the assistance of the UN Comm which is now available in order to determine what conditions wld make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout Ger."

Since our prime objective must continue to be to avoid any step which wld slow up signing of contractuals and EDC, reply shld avoid suggestion of willingness to participate in any gen four-power mtg such as CFM. You shld however discuss relative advantages and disadvantages of proposing possible mtg perhaps of reps of HICOMs to discuss use of UN Comm by four powers to determine existence of conditions permitting free elections. Such a proposal wld be tied in with line of argument given above relative to UN Comm. We can see some advantages in a mtg at that level which might expose Sov sham. Moreover, such a tri proposal wld take initiative from Sovs who might very well in a further note make specific proposal for type of mtg which wld not be satisfactory to us. We believe mtg at this level and on this restricted subj wld not appreciably diminish Ger willingness to conclude negots but this view shld be checked with opinions of HICOMs.

Believe no necessity for great haste in replying to Sov note but we shld avoid such delay as might be interpreted as reflecting indecision or split in Western front. Meanwhile, we must push ahead with conclusion of negots and arrangements for signature EDC and contractuals.

ACHESON

No. 88

740.5/4-1952: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, April 19, 1952—6 p.m.

Polto 1177. Personal for the Secretary from Draper. In light my past experience in Germany and recent experience in present capacity, I have naturally been giving thought to latest Soviet note on Germany. I am submitting below for what value they may have to you my thoughts on the general line we should take in discussing with the Fr and UK the reply which would achieve maximum advantage to our policies.

First, I believe we should restate formally our policy and our intention to proceed without delay to conclusion of contractual agreements and EDC Treaty.

Secondly, I think we should recapitulate the reasons why these projects are necessary, going back to the failure of the Moscow Conference in 1947, to the Berlin blockade, to the fruitless negots over an Austrian Treaty, and finally to the aggression in Korea and the dragging negotiations for an armistice.

Thirdly, I think we should emphasize that our policies and actions are entirely defensive in character and necessary for the security and peace of the free world which is threatened from only one direction. This has been stated clearly before but it might be reaffirmed that the free world poses no threat of aggression to anyone and that the very character of its institutions testifies to the impossibility of aggressive action.

It then seems to me important that we straighten out once more the Potsdam record on Germany's eastern frontier.

I think we should say that we are unwilling to delude the people of the free world and the people of Germany by entering at this time into a conference to discuss with the Soviets a draft peace treaty for Germany which is so out of harmony with reality and the aspirations of the German people and for which incidentally, the Austrian treaty negots provide an unhappy precedent.

We should, however, state that we have always considered that the unification of Germany should be achieved as soon as possible. Our position on this has been made clear many times. However, we cannot accept unification nor do we believe the German people themselves would favor it if the price paid for unification were domination by an outside power of all of Germany in the same fashion that Eastern Germany is now controlled. Nevertheless, we would be prepared to discuss in the future with the Soviets, in a quadripartite conference, the appropriate bases for free elections in all of Germany as the necessary preliminary steps toward a definitive treaty of peace. Before such a quadripartite conference it would be necessary to receive satisfactory clarification by the USSR of what it means by free elections, as well as satisfactory assurances on inspection. Does it mean the type of "free" elections held in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other satellites? Does it mean the type of election in which there is but one slate of candidates? We might also ask the soviets to specify what parties it has in mind which should be suppressed as anti-democratic and how such ground rules can be considered consistent with the concept of free elections.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, personal for McCloy; to London, personal for Gifford; and to Paris, personal for Dunn.

In conclusion, I believe our reply should state in effect that we intend to pursue the policies which will restore the FedRep to a place in the family of free nations, which will provide the free nations with the security of adequate defenses within the shelter of which they can pursue their overriding objectives of prosperity and peace.

The note, I believe, might end with a statement to the effect that the question of Germany is only one of the problems which exist in the world today by reason of Soviet attitudes and actions. The US, for its part, is willing, as it has stated so many times, to attempt the solution of all of these problems by peaceful means in the UN or within its framework.

Anderson and Merchant concur.

DRAPER

No. 89

662.001/4-2552: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, April 25, 1952—8 p.m.

4863. Herewith fol provision agreed text reply to Sov note on Ger [2] which is being forwarded to govts for comment. Req Dept's views soonest. [3]

Verbatim text: 1. Reply to the Sov Govts note of the 9th Apr HMG wish to invite the Sov Govt's atten to the fol essential considerations governing the election of an all-Ger Govt and the negot of a peace treaty with Ger. It remains the policy of HMG to accomplish both these objectives on terms that will assure unity with freedom and peace with security.

2. HMG are ready to begin negots with the Sov Govt on these issues at the earliest possible date. They must point out however that the Sov Govt's note of the 9th Apr throws a little new light upon their conception of the basis for any such negots. HMG wish to ensure that a new conf shld not encounter difficulties such as have led to the failure of earlier mtgs. They are convinced that careful preparation is more likely to lead to success than to cause delay. They accordingly consider it essential to reach a clear understanding upon the scope of any future convs and upon the fundamental problems to be examined.

3. HMG desire to eliminate once and for all from internatl relations the nationalist and militarist spirit which has been the chief cause of so many conflicts. They have therefore spared no effort since the end of hostilities to estab among the nations, and especially those of Eur, peaceful relations founded upon equality and conceived in a new spirit of full coop. They have no responsibility for the failure to extend this coop beyond the present limits, Ger is divided because Eur is divided. A true unity based upon freedom of choice and mutual interest has to be re-established thruout Eur. In this way the most difficult problems, particularly the Ger probl, can be peacefully resolved. For their part HMG, in close coop with the Fr and US govts, have sought to create such unity first of all in West Eur. Marked progress is at present being made in this direction. In the FedRep important results have been secured which will make possible Ger's free adherence to the peaceful community of Eur nations. While HMG are resolved to continue to carry out this programme which is not directed against any state, and does not

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Document 82.

[3] Tripartite coordination of the reply to the Soviet note had begun in London on Apr. 23. (Telegram 4811 from London, Apr. 23, 662.001/4-2352) At the first meeting British and French draft replies were considered and a compromise draft, transmitted in telegram 4863, agreed on. Texts of the British and French drafts were transmitted in telegrams 4784 and 4788 from London, Apr. 22. (662.001/4-2252)

threaten anyone, they nevertheless remain ready to examine any precise suggestions which wld reduce tension and strengthen peace.

4. HMG still consider that the Sov Govt's proposals for a peace treaty are not likely to promote lasting peace in Eur. These proposals confine Ger within narrow limits while permitting her natl armed forces. They wld thus tend to create a permanent state of tension and insecurity in the centre of Eur. As regards the Ger natl forces and the Sov Govt's erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the Potsdam protocol, HMG have already made known their posit. [US–UK: They do not consider that an analogy can be drawn, as suggested in the Sov note, between Ger and Japan where conditions are entirely different][4] moreover the Sov Govt's stipulation that Ger shld not be included "into one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state" requires clarification. If this stipulation means an obligation similar to those assumed by all member states of the UN, then Ger's membership of the UN wld make any such provision unnecessary. If it means a special and discriminatory obligation, HMG wld require more precise info. They cld not accept a provision which forbade Ger to enter into associations with other states, which one of the signatories of the peace treaty might choose to regard as directed against a peace-loving state.

5. A peace treaty can only be worked out when Ger unity has been re-established and an all-Ger Govt formed. The Sov Govt has failed to state what wld be the posit of the all-Ger Govt during the period before the peace treaty. This is, however, an essential point. In the view of HMG the all-Ger Govt formed as a result of free elections shld itself enjoy the liberty of action necessary to estab its genuinely representative character in internal affairs, and in external affairs to enable it to assume its responsibilties in the discussion of the peace treaty and prepare for its subsequent responsibilities. HMG consider it necessary to know the views of the Sov Govt on this subj.

6. HMG are happy to note that the Sov Govt agree in principle with the proposal which has long been before them in regard to free elections thruout Ger. However, the Sov Govt do not agree that the Intl Commission set up by the GA of the UN shld first carry out an enquiry to estab whether conditions for free elections at present exist thruout Ger. The Sov Govt base their refusal on Art 107 of the UN Charter. But this art in no way precludes the 4 Powers from resorting to the good offices of the UN: This interpretation has moreover been upheld by the UNGA whose decision taken by an overwhelming majority shld be accepted by all members of the organisation. Moreover, the ques is not simply one of procedure. Since the Sov Govt decided on the 20th Mar, 1948 to put an end to the activity of the control council the west and east parts of Ger have evolved in increasingly divergent directions. It is precisely for this reason that an impartial enquiry is needed before elections take place. The Sov Govt have themselves recognised this fact. They stated however that the responsibility for the enquiry cld be entrusted to a commission formed by the 4 Powers. HMG

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[4] Brackets in the source text.

wld be glad of elucidation of the Sov Govt's views in this matter, especially as regards the composition and functions of such a body. A commission composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Ger, who wld thus be both judge and party, wld have difficulty in reaching useful decisions. The elections which the 4 govts desire wld thus be indefinitely delayed. In addit, if a commission of this character were to appear to be preparing to re-estab the 4-Power control system this wld be a step backward out of keeping with constitutional developments in the FedRep. For these reasons HMG maintain their preference for the UN commission; it is already in being, its functions have been laid down and it can take action without delay. HMG are nevertheless willing to examine any other precise proposal which wld permit of a really impartial investigation. They are ready for their part to abide entirely by the conclusions of an impartial Intl Commission. They understand that the Ger Fed Govt are also ready to do so. They wld be glad to know that the Sov Govt are likewise willing, so far as their zone of occupation in Ger is concerned, to ensure that all recommendations made by such a commission will be carried out. [5] *End verbatim.*

GIFFORD

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[5] On Apr. 27 Holmes and Perkins held a telecon during which the former indicated that this draft was preliminary both in form and in substance. No record of this telecon has been found in Department of State files, but it is described in telegram 4912 from London, Apr. 30. (662.001/4-3052)

Two days later McCloy commented that two points which were not clearly stressed in this draft should be featured in any reply. The first was the need for a positive statement of Allied aims in Germany and Europe; the second was the need to stress the importance of free elections. (Telegram 2585 from Bonn, Apr. 29, 662.001/4-2952)

No. 90

662.001/4-2552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 30, 1952—8:01 p.m.

5592. 1. Dept fully appreciates disadvantage at which you were placed in having to deal with complete Brit and Fr draft replies to Sov note while not yourself possessing complete US draft. However, Dept does not find draft text satis (Embtel 4863, Bonn 538, Paris 2217 [2]). It is not in line with suggestions in Deptel 5324, rptd Paris 6157, Bonn 2636, [3] and observations on UK draft in Deptel 5472, rptd Paris 6290, Bonn 2748, Moscow 736,[4] latter of which we realize did not reach you in time for consideration in tripartite discussion. On basis of ideas expressed below and taking into acct UK, Fr and FedRep views, Dept believes note on lines of text in next fol tel[5] wld best serve our common purposes.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared with Jessup, Bruce, G, C, EUR, GER, S/P, P, and UNA; and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 87.

2. Dept believes drafting problem will be simplified if we can first reach agreement on certain principles to govern our reply. We think there are four main principles.

3. First, we shld present the policy of Eur integration strongly and positively but in so doing we shld be careful not to present it as a policy which the three Powers have formulated and are insisting upon, but rather as a policy of the FedRep and other Eur countries which we (US and UK) *support.* This presents some drafting problem as Fr relationship to policy is somewhat different from ours but we believe our suggested text meets needs of all three. Believe this point important as many Gers tend to feel we are forcing Ger down path of *our* choosing.

4. Second, the reply shld not contain any discussion of treaty provisions except what may be considered strictly necessary to maintain positions already taken. Lines of thought and argument shld be simple and concentrated. We took line in first note we wld not discuss treaty provisions now and believe we shld adhere firmly to this position, seeking to force Sov discussion onto ground of our choosing. Accordingly, we omit all reference to questions of natl armed forces, boundaries or even status of Ger Govt. Although we recognize that some reference may be necessary to positions in previous note on these points, we feel these are questions for future; discussion of them now only scatters our fire and detracts from first essential, i.e., investigation of conditions. We have made our point already that we have our own views on these questions and that they must be resolved at various stages. There is of course much valuable material of historical nature, such as reference to Sov walk-out from ACC, our past proposals for elections, etc., but believe this can better be used in press statements at time note sent. We plan to make such use of this material.

5. Third, with regard to unification, we shld seek to center the discussion on, and so far as possible pin the Sovs down to, essential first steps.

6. Fourth, since talks of some sort are probably necessary, it is therefore desirable to take the initiative in proposing them in

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[4] Telegram 5472 transmitted Department of State general observations on the British draft reply to the Soviet note (see footnote 3, *supra*), but stated that it was unnecessary to get into drafting changes at that stage of the discussions. (662.001/4–2252)

[5] Telegram 5593, *infra.*

order to convince Gers we mean business and are not afraid to talk, and to control level, substance and timing of talks. Dept has come increasingly to conclusion in this regard that we have much to gain and nothing to lose by making specific proposal in this reply for talks (see para 9 our text). Timing will be about right so that talks wld not begin until after signature of EDC treaty and contractuals, but early in ratification period. Believe also that talks in Berlin wld have good effect there and provide some protection against any unpleasant Sov moves there this summer. On whole, think it much wiser to take pessimistic line in notes but end with concrete proposal for action than to start with rather enthusiastic utterances in favor of talks but end inconclusively with wide variety of queries and statements disputing what Sovs have said. Draft in Embtel 4863 in placing emphasis on points which need clarification before talks can begin, might lead us into trap of wanting to start talks satisfy Ger and other public opinion before clarification demanded has been obtained.

7. You shld emphasize point which has also been stressed by Adenauer that Sov attempt to disrupt our plans will not cease when agreements are signed but will probably be intensified during ratification period. Accordingly, it is in our interest to expose Sov insincerity at earliest possible date and in any event before legis debates are concluded. We believe mtg at level of HICOMers, or their reps, for restricted purposes is most useful procedure (see our text). If Sovs are really prepared to open Eastern Zone, we shld force their hand. We can *not* allow our plans to be thwarted merely by *speculation* that Sovs may be ready actually to pay a high price.

8. Believe you shld keep clearly before your colleagues need for real consultation with Adenauer and Reuter at earliest possible date, on basis of semi-agreed text as soon as we have one. Reuter seems quite bitter, according our info, over cursory nature of "consultation" with him on first note.

9. Especially desire comments from Bonn as to desirability of proposal for talks in para 9 our text. Would also like Bonn's judgment as to whether a specific date, say June 3, should be proposed. Would proposal of this sort coming shortly before signing of contractuals in any way hold up signing?

ACHESON

No. 91

662.001/4-3052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, April 30, 1952—7:59 p.m.

5593. Fol is draft reply to Sov note, as referred to in our immed preceding tel: [2]

"1. The US Govt has studied the Sov note of Apr 9 carefully in the hope that it wld offer encouragement for believing that the Sov Union was prepared to cooperate to bring about the unification of Ger through free elections, the formation of an all-Ger Govt and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that Govt under conditions which wld advance the cause of peace in Eur. These remain basic objectives of the US Govt. The US Govt, however, considers that the Sov Govt's note throws little new light upon that Govt's conception of the means for reaching these objectives. It remains the policy of the US Govt to accomplish these objectives on terms that will assure unity with freedom and peace with security.

"2. The US Govt observes that the Sov Govt continues to maintain the view that an all-Ger Govt cannot be permitted to associate itself with other freedom-loving Govts in organizations which are compatible with the principles and purposes of the UN and which shld not cause concern to any state which does not have aggressive aims. In its note of Mar 25, the US Govt pointed out that it is giving full support to the efforts which the Ger Fed Rep and other free states of Western Eur are making to bring into being a peaceful Eur community and thus to begin a new era in which internat'l relations will be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. The US Govt welcomes the development of such a Eur community in which Ger will participate. It considers it essential that the Sov Govt shld not deny to Ger this basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes. The US Govt reemphasizes that this policy of Eur unity now being inaugurated and pursued by the free nations of Eur, including the Fed Rep of Ger, cannot threaten the interests of the Sov Union or of any country whose policy is devoted to the maintenance of peace. The US Govt will, therefore, not be deflected from its support of this policy.

"3. The maintenance of the Sov Govt's attitude on this fundamental question and its insistence on isolating Ger from Western

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared with Bruce, G, C, EUR, S/P, P, and UNA; initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Berlin, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 5592, *supra*.

Eur does not augur well for establishing the necessary status and rights of an all-Ger Govt and the appropriate terms of a peace treaty to be negotiated with a free unified Ger.

"4. Nor can progress be made towards the attainment of our objective of Ger unification so long as the Sov Govt does not cooperate in preparing for the participation in genuinely free elections by the 17 million inhabitants of East Ger under conditions similar to those enjoyed by the 50 million citizens of the Fed Rep.

"5. If the Sov Govt had, like the three Govts and the Fed Rep, been willing to facilitate the work of the UN Comm appointed under Gen Assembly Res No. A/L.12 of Dec 20, 1951, [3] that Comm might already have made a report which wld have revealed whether the conditions essential to such elections now exist. If the Comm had found that such conditions do not exist, the four powers cld have already met to discuss the report and to determine what action shld be taken to create the proper conditions.

"6. The Sov Govt's opposition to the UN Comm is stated to have been based on its interpretation of Art 107 of the Charter which reads as follows:

> 'Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the govts having responsibility for such action.'

This language clearly does not bar consideration by any UN organ of matters relating to states which during World War II were enemies of members of UN. It simply says that nothing in Charter shall preclude or invalidate certain actions by certain states. However even under erroneous Sov interpretation of the Charter there wld be no impediment to agrmt by the four powers to avail themselves of the assistance of the UN Comm which is now available in order to determine what conditions wld make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout Ger.

"7. The US Govt has noted the Sov Govt's suggestion that a Comm, formed by the Four Powers occupying Ger cld undertake the investigation required to ascertain whether the conditions essential to free elections exist. It was precisely because of the difference of opinion between the US and the UK and France, on the one hand, and the Sov Union on the other, as to the conditions obtaining in the various parts of Ger, that the estab of an impartial UN Comm was proposed. Under these circumstances, the US Govt cannot be sanguine that satisfactory results wld be reached solely through the medium of Four-Power action. Moreover, if the Sov suggestion contemplates reestablishing the Four-Power control system this wld be a step backward, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the Fed Rep.

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[3] For text of this U.N. resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1824.

"8. Furthermore, no Comm cld advance the cause of Ger unification, unless it were ensured that unsatisfactory conditions in any zone, wld be rectified by the authorities concerned, and unless there cld be some agrmt on the conditions regarded as essential to free elections. There are many questions concerning these conditions, to which every Ger citizen as well as the US Govt is entitled to have a satis answer before there can be any prospect of a solution to the problem of Ger unification.

"9. Nevertheless, the US Govt is ready to examine every possibility of reaching agrmt on a means for determining whether conditions of freedom exist throughout Ger which wld make possible the holding of free elections. It is accordingly prepared to authorize the US High Commissioner in Ger or a representative designated by him to discuss with his colleagues in Ger representing the Govts of the UK, France and the Sov Union, the possibility of arranging for an impartial Comm to carry out the necessary investigation in all of Ger. The reps of the Four Powers cld likewise discuss the functions and prerogatives of the Comm, and cld recommend criteria by which it shld be guided in its investigations. As previously noted even if the Sov Union should persist in maintaining its erroneous legal objection to the authority of the UN to establish a Comm, there wld be no impediment to agreement by the Four Powers to use this Comm as a neutral agent.

"10. If agrmt can be reached on these matters, and if an impartial investigation of conditions throughout Ger is held, the US Govt wld then be prepared to discuss, on the basis of the majority recommendations of the Comm, what further steps wld be required including the creation where nec of appropriate conditions looking toward free nation-wide elections.

"11. In the preparation of its reply, the US Govt has consulted with the Govts of the UK, France and the Ger Fed Rep and with the reps of Berlin." [4]

ACHESON

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[4] On May 1 Gifford reported that he had given copies of this draft to Foreign Office and French representatives. The consensus of the tripartite drafting committee was that the main question raised by the draft was whether the proposed quadripartite meeting would prejudice the signing of the contractuals and the EDC. For this reason the views of the Allied High Commissioners would be sought and, if they approved the proposal, Adenauer would be consulted as well. (Telegram 4953 from London, 662.001/5-152)

No. 92

662.001/5-252: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 2, 1952—11 p.m.

2639. Proposal contained in para 9 Deptel 2850 (London 5593, Moscow 752, Berlin 373, Paris 6418)[2] discussed with Chancellor this afternoon. Chancellor felt such a mtg would be helpful in persuading public opinion western allies sincere in their desire to bring about Ger unity on conditions acceptable to Ger people. He considered it important, however, that scope of mtg be limited purely to discussion of conditions permitting free elections and possibility of investigation by impartial, international commission. If it could be indicated possibly by ref that the Bundestag proposals for free elections would be considered by such a group, this would have most useful effect here Ger. It was important, however, in Chancellor's opinion that mtg in Berlin be handled so as to avoid giving rise to any speculation re revival of four-power control commission. For that reason he thought possibly better if HICOMers themselves did not participate.[3]

In discussing proposal with UK and Fr representatives this afternoon they were in agreement that, while mtg in Berlin might provide some protection from unpleasant Sov activities there, nevertheless there was danger that such a mtg would not be at sufficient high level to provide a real indication of Sov intentions thus defeating our purpose in holding it. Brit express concern that in the present phase of Bundestag opposition to contractual agreements negots would be slowed up by an early offer to talk to the Sovs and signature might not therefore take place before talks began thus delaying it indefinitely. They argue that possibility of early talks may strengthen those elements which are reluctant go ahead and increase the Chancellor's difficulties in obtaining authority to sign. They suggest therefore that a more general offer be made which would not tie us down until the Sovs had accepted our conditions and since quadripartite talks would not thus be as imminent, the more general offer would not have same result in slowing up present negots.

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[1] Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] On May 3 McCloy reported that after further thought Adenauer concluded that the U.S. proposal for a meeting in Berlin would be a mistake. If the meeting were proposed, Adenauer feared that the Federal Cabinet in addition to SPD opposition would insist that the meeting take place before signature of the contractuals and the EDC. (Telegram 2649 from Bonn, 662.001/5-352)

The Fr on the other hand, while less concerned with the immediate effect upon signature, thought that once the negots had been begun on the Berlin level, the Sovs could have every excuse and possibility of so prolonging them that it would be difficult to break them off later and thus endanger ratification. They are also inclined to favor the general offer contained in the original tripartite version instead of our specific suggestion.[4]

Both UK and Fr representatives expressed view that, given the present state of Ger opinion and apparent hesitancy about going ahead with integration, it might not be bad to hint through resumption of quadripartite talks in Berlin that there was the alternative of return to ACC procedure if the Gers refuse to agree to the contracts.

In our opinion Dept's note still somewhat negative and does not take advantage fully of opportunity (and necessity) of restating our objectives and policy. It is an improvement on earlier drafts in concentrating on conditions for free elections.

I recognize there is danger that making any specific offer to talk to the Sovs might slow up the negots here. Nevertheless, I am firmly of the opinion it is important that prior to ratification quadripartite conversations will have taken place which can clearly demonstrate the insincerity of the Sov offer. Otherwise ratification will have been seriously endangered. Furthermore, we have adequate time before the autumn sessions of the European Legislatures to prove our point. To argue conditions for mtg through an extended exchange of notes will not carry same conviction as mtg itself. I agree that we must establish some conditions prior to any mtg and consider this can be achieved by going clearly on record that we demand the liberation of the Sov zone population as a precondition to final peace settlement. I believe that opposition to contractual agmnts has not been stimulated by the Sov offer but is inherent in the terms of the contracts themselves and that therefore if some improvement along the lines suggested by the Chancellor in our mtg yesterday can be made we are all right.[5] It can be argued that the west bargaining position has been strengthened thereby and there will be time enough before ratification for a review of the whole situation if the talks by any chance be productive of real results.

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[4] A reference to the draft transmitted in telegram 4863, Document 89.

[5] For a report on the High Commissioners meeting with Chancellor Adenauer on May 1 to consider contractual relations, see Document 24.

If by any chance as a result of this exchange Sovs shld eventually agree to free elections, we must guard against neutralization of Ger in period after formation of all Ger Govt and the conclusion of the peace treaty when forces will be withdrawn. Even tho as result of peace treaty Ger is given freedom of action, it is difficult to see how, when Sov troops remain in one-third of Ger, it can be fully integrated with west and peace treaty negots can be greatly prolonged. This is, however, a danger of which I am sure you are aware.

McCloy

No. 93

662.001/5-352: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 3, 1952—5 p.m.

5000. Tripartite group drafting reply to Sov note on Ger met this morning to consider HICOM and Adenauer's views re US proposal contained para 9 Deptel 5593 Apr 30. [2] Views of UK and Fr HICOM, as given by Roberts and Crouy-Chanel, were substantially as outlined in Bonn's 2639 to Dept May 2. [3] Kirkpatrick also thought that putting forward proposal wld mean "virtual elimination of UN Comm".

Roberts reported that Eden, with whom he had just discussed subj, had at first favored US proposal. However, after further consideration and in light of Kirkpatrick's report of danger of delaying signature timetable, Eden thought that proposal by west for quadripartite mtg should be made more conditional and formulated in different manner. He felt that we must continue follow program based on signature of various agreements by May 20, and that there is gen agrmt that quadripartite mtg will have to be held before ratification of these agrmts. Therefore Eden believes west shld stick to its logical line that free elections are prerequisite and that essential point is to determine whether conditions for free elections exist. He wanted as we do to seize initiative, and suggests definite proposal to Sovs in final para of note that UN Comm (or any other impartial comm on which Sovs put forward precise and practical proposals) shld proceed with immed investigation electoral conditions. As soon as its report was recd, reps of four powers wld meet to consider report "with view to reaching agrmt on early holding of free elections throughout Ger".

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Document 91.

[3] *Supra.*

Roberts explained that level at which mtg wld be held had deliberately been left vague. Selwyn Lloyd and Nutting were pleased with tenor of Eden's suggestion since they said it wld go long way to take wind out of sails of certain critics of policy re Ger. Roberts then circulated revised draft, gen based on draft contained Embtel 4863 Apr 25, [4] incorporating Eden's suggestion as final para.

Holmes remarked that his first reaction to Eden's suggestion was favorable but that its method of presentation was extremely important. US believed essential that note contain strong and positive statement of our policy in Europe and, putting first things first, [would come?] question of conditions for elections. Wished limit discussion of treaty provisions to minimum. Therefore draft shld be telescoped and sharpened to focus attn on proposal for quadripartite mtg to examine report of investigating comm. Roberts agreed and suggested that revised draft be prepared for discussion at Mon mtg.

Crouy-Chanel said Schuman had not yet commented on US draft but that Parodi had certain reservations particularly re effect on public opinion. Crouy-Chanel, who appeared favor Eden's formula, is flying to Paris today and will obtain official Fr comments for use at Mon mtg.

Both Roberts and Crouy-Chanel thought proposed US draft wld have been suitable as basis for reply if para 9 had been approved by HICOMs and Adenauer. However, in view of reports from HICOMs and new Brit proposal, they preferred work on basis draft contained Embtel 4863. As Dept aware, we are not satisfied with this draft and will press to have it conform with principles set forth in Deptel 5592. [5] Hope to be able forward revised draft Monday.

Since above was drafted, Reber has telephoned Holmes that Adenauer has had second thoughts re para 9 US proposal and now believes that it might jeopardize signature timetable.

GIFFORD

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[4] Document 89.

[5] Document 90.

No. 94

662.001/5–652: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 6, 1952—7 p.m.

5036. Tripartite working group on reply to Sov note on Ger today completed tentative draft text contained next following cable. [2] Crouy-Chanel reported he had spent several hours yesterday with Schuman analyzing problem of framing reply under present conditions and studying Brit text submitted at Saturday's meeting (Embtel 5000, May 3 [3]) which does not differ substantially from Brit revision mentioned Embtel 5009, May 5. [4] Schuman considers that growing difficulties in Ger may, unless checked, be beginning of success for the Soc move. The greatest danger is that Gers may be tempted to seek unity at all costs. Western reply must preserve the possibility of maneuver against contingency that Gers may be further seduced by this hope. Western reply must not encourage it. It would, therefore, be a mistake for the reply to concentrate too much on free all-Ger elections. The Sovs may well be ready to concede much or most of what we would demand. This is a subj on which if the Russians wish, it would be easy to agree quickly, but if elections were held while Four Power control were maintained, Sovs would be in a position to feed out concessions bit by bit, thus maintaining themselves for years in a strong bargaining position. To prevent this situation the Western reply must be directed toward bringing out the fact that it is the Sov purpose to keep Ger under the closest Four Power control possible and therefore to show the Gers that their interests require not only free elections and a reunited Ger, but a free Ger. Slogan of West must be not merely free elections but free elections for a free Ger. Fr therefore propose that the obtaining of suitable guarantees of the freedom of Ger during period after elections and before treaty should be made condition to holding of quadripartite mtg, in addition to condition suggested by Eden that impartial investigation of conditions for holding elections must first be held.

While setting up conditions precedent to holding quadripartite meeting on elections may detract from value of note as seizure of initiative by West Emb nevertheless strongly impressed Adenauer second thoughts as to risk of delays to signature contractuals (Bonn's 2649, May 3 [5]). Emb considers this risk justifies conditions Brit and Fr seek to attach to offer of quadripartite meeting on elections.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 5037, *infra*.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] Telegram 5009 reported that a new British draft had been received, but its text would not be transmitted until the tripartite drafting group had met. (662.001/5–552)

Eden's expression of hope that draft might be ready by Wednesday (Embtel 5009, May 5 and Deptel 5710, May 5 [6]) now obviously impossible.

Emb doubts if Fr and Brit will agree to delivery of Aust note May 8 in absence substantial tripartite agreement April note by end of day May 7. [7] Dept's views therefore urgently requested.

GIFFORD

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[5] See footnote 3, Document 92.

[6] Telegram 5710 stressed, *inter alia*, that the lack of agreement on even the fundamentals of a draft reply made delivery of the note on Wednesday, May 7, impossible. (662.001/5-552)

[7] Regarding the tripartite note of May 9 concerning the Austrian Treaty, see Document 798.

No. 95

662.001/5-652: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, May 6, 1952—8 p.m.

5037. Fol tentative draft text mentioned immed preceding cable. [2]

Verbatim text.

1. In reply to the Sov Govt's note of the 9 Apr, Her Majesty's Govt wish to make the fol observations in regard to the election of an all-Ger Govt and the negot of a peace treaty with Ger. It remains the policy of HMG to achieve both these objectives on terms that will ensure unity with freedom and peace with security.

2. They are ready to begin negots with the Sov Govt on these issues at the earliest possible date. But HMG and the US, French and Soviet Govts must first reach a clear understanding upon the scope of the negots and upon the fundamental problems to be examined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long delays such as led to the failure of earlier mtgs. The Sov Govt's note of the 9th Apr throws little new light on what they

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 5036, *supra*.

consider shld be the means for ensuring the success of any such negots.

3. HMG think it necessary to recall the main principles guiding their policy in regard to Eur and more especially to Ger. They seek to eliminate once and for all from internatl relations the nationalist and militarist spirit which has been the chief cause of so many conflicts. The interests of all peoples call for a true unity based upon freedom of choice and mutual benefit, established by peaceful means throughout Eur. In this way peaceful solutions to the most difficult problems, and particularly the Ger problem, can be reached. Ger is divided because Eur is divided.

4. HMG, in close co-operation with the Fr and US Govts, have encouraged and supported all moves towards unity in West Eur. After three years of fruitless effort to reunite Ger, the three West Zones were unified in 1948 and the freely-elected, democratic govt of the FedRep came into existence in 1949. Further progress has been made since and Ger's free adherence to the peaceful community of Eur nations is now possible. A reunited Ger could now participate in a system conceived not only to protect the peace but to promote econ well-being. HMG are resolved to continue to support this programme. They are more than ever convinced that it represents the true path to peace. It is not directed against any states: Nor does it threaten anyone.

5. HMG have no responsibility for the failure to extend this cooperation beyond its present limits. They remain ready to examine with sincerity and good will any practical and precise suggestions designed to reduce tension and to heal existing divisions.

6. HMG do not, however, think it possible to hold discussions now upon the provision of a Ger peace treaty. Such a treaty can be worked out only when Ger unity has been established and after an all-Ger Govt has been formed, as a result of free elections, to take part in full freedom in such discussions. HMG have already made known their views on some of the Sov Govt's proposals, especially their erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the Potsdam protocol and their intention, while confining Ger in a position of permanent isolation, to allow her to build up armed forces. Their proposals wld mean permanent state of tension and insecurity in the centre of Eur.

7. In their latest note the Sov Govt now stipulate that Ger must not be included "into one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state". Ger's proposed membership of the UN shld surely make any such provision unnecessary. In any case HMG cld not accept any provisions forbidding Ger to enter into an association with other states which one of the signatories of the peace treaty might arbitrarily choose to regard as "directed against

any peace loving state". They cannot admit that Ger shld be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes. They must therefore ask the Sov Govt to state whether they intend to exclude Ger from associations of a purely defensive character.

8. HMG further observe that the Sov Govt have still failed to state what wld be the position of an all-Ger Govt during the period before the peace treaty. This is an essential matter, which is inseparable from the problem of elections. The all-Ger Govt resulting from free elections must itself be free. It must be able to establish its genuinely representative character in internal affairs and, in the external field, to play its full part in the discussion of the peace treaty and to prepare for its subsequent responsibilities. For these purposes it must enjoy the necessary freedom of action. Her Majesty's Govt consider it nec to ask for a precise and early statement of the Sov Govt's views on this point. They must ask specifically whether the Sov Govt consider that an elected all-Ger Govt wld be under four power control until after the conclusion of a peace treaty or whether they agree that it shld enjoy the above freedom of action.

9. HMG are happy to note that the Sov Govt now agree in principle that there shld be free elections throughout Ger. Such free elections can, however, only be held if the nec conditions exist in all parts of Ger and will be maintained not only on the day of voting and prior to it but also thereafter. An essential first step is, therefore, to ensure such conditions. Otherwise no progress can be made. In recent years the West and East parts of Ger have evolved in increasingly divergent directions. This is a principal reason why an impartial enquiry is needed before elections take place.

10. The Sov Govt do not agree, however, that the internatl commission set up by the Gen Assembly of the UN shld carry out such an enquiry throughout Ger. They base this refusal on their interpretation of Article 107 of the UN charter. But this reads as fols: "Nothing in the present charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the second world war has been an enemy of any signatory of the present charter, taken or authorised as a result of that war by the govts having responsibility for such action". This language clearly does not preclude the UN from considering Ger affairs. This interpretation was upheld by the UN Gen Assembly by an overwhelming majority. However, even under the Sov Govt's erroneous interpretation of the charter there is nothing to prevent the four powers from availing themselves of the UN commission in order to determine the conditions in which genuinely free elections cld be held throughout Ger.

11. The Sov Govt suggest instead that responsibility for the enquiry shld be entrusted to a commission formed by the four occupying powers. Before HMG cld feel assured that this suggestion wld result in an impartial enquiry they wld need to know what wld be the composition and functions of such a body. A commission composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Ger wld be both judge and party. Experience during the period of four power control of Ger suggests that it wld not be able to reach useful decisions. Thus the elections which the four govts desire wld be greatly delayed. Nor can HMG overlook the fact that the appointment of a four power commission might be interpreted as a step towards the reestablishment of four-power control in Ger. This wld be a retrograde move, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the FedRep.

12. For these reasons HMG maintain their preference for the UN commission: It is already in being, its functions have been laid down and it can take action without delay. They are nevertheless willing to examine any other precise proposals which wld permit of a really impartial investigation.

13. HMG, in agreement with the US and Fr Govts and after consultation with the Ger Fed Govt and the Ger authorities in Berlin, accordingly make the fol proposals:

i. The UN commission shld begin its investigation at once and report at the earliest possible date whether conditions for genuinely free elections exist in the FedRep, in the Sov Zone of Ger and in Berlin, and, if not, what steps shld be taken to create such conditions.

ii. Alternatively, HMG are ready to consider any other practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of investigation which the Sov Govt may wish to put forward, on the one condition that they are likely to promote the early holding of elections throughout Ger.

iii. Immediately the report of either of the above bodies is available, representatives of the UK, US, Fr and Soviet Govts wld meet to consider it with a view to reaching agreement on:

(a) The early holding of free elections throughout Ger; and

(b) The essential guarantees that the all-Ger Govt formed as a result of these free elections shall enjoy freedom of action during the period before the peace treaty. [3]

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[3] On May 7 Gifford reported that Eden had approved this text subject to minor "tidying-up". (Telegram 5059 from London, 662.001/5-752) The following day Reuter and Adenauer were shown this draft text. Reuter was pleased with the draft and referred to it as "a good one". (Telegram 1323 from Berlin, May 8, 662.001/5-852) Adenauer considered it generally satisfactory, but wanted to consult his Cabinet before giving a final answer. (Telegram 2742 from Bonn, May 8, 662.001/5-852) The Cabinet also expressed its satisfaction on May 9. (Telegram 2751 from Bonn, 662.001/5-952)

End verbatim text.

GIFFORD

No. 96

662.001/5-652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 9, 1952—6:27 p.m.

5807. 1. This msg contains our comments on draft text in Embtel 5037, rpt Bonn 564, Paris 2272, Moscow 181, Berlin 68. [2] Our revised draft contained in next fol tel. [3]

2. Believe objectives mentioned in para 1 London text shld be broadened to include mention of unification of Ger.

3. Our formulation seeks to improve tone para 2 by coupling our readiness to begin negots with necessity for Sov Govt to give evidence of constructive attitude.

4. We consider para 3 to be unwise in its discussion of interrelationship between Ger and Eur unity, implying that latter may be preconditioned to former. Believe this para as well as para 5 shld be eliminated and likewise continue to feel that para 4 remains insufficient statement of value of policy of integration and of our support for that policy. Have, therefore, substituted for paras 3, 4 and 5 a new para 3 which is combination of para 7 of London text with para 2 of last US draft. [4] We believe this revision will particularly meet McCloy's suggestions for better org contained in Bonn's 2742 (rptd London 764, Paris 884, Berlin 274, Moscow 109). [5]

5. We have somewhat revised para 6 of London draft in effort to give greater emphasis to necessity for Ger participation in treaty negot, to correct statement with regard to Sov proposal for Gers isolation and in order to eliminate reference to "allowing" Ger to build up armed forces.

6. Have handled para 7 as stated in point 4 above. Only wish to add our belief that last sentence of para 7 is better as statement of assumption than as question.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared by Bonbright, Matthews, GER, P, and UNA, and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Telegram 5808, *infra.*

[4] Transmitted in telegram 5593, Document 91.

[5] Telegram 274, in addition to reporting Adenauer's reaction to the draft in telegram 5037, *supra*, reported McCloy's suggestions for rearranging several paragraphs in the note. (662.001/5-852)

7. In suggesting revision of para 8 we believe we have fully conserved a point which draft para seeks to make but have somewhat avoided difficulties dealt with in fourth para Embtel 5098 (rptd Paris 2292, Moscow 190, Bonn 574, Berlin 72).[6] We also think our revision is preferable in speaking of maintenance rather than estab of rep character, in eliminating distinction between internal and external fields and in a reference to the necessary "governing powers". On last point Berlin has analyzed available evidence as suggesting Sovs hope to keep all-Ger Govt in powerless position vis-à-vis Eastern Zone between elections and treaty and that they wld, therefore, view independent governing functions with distaste and wld be touchy on this point.

8. Para 9 has one slight modification to emphasize relatively major importance of Western Ger.

9. We believe references to elections "which the four Govts desire" shld be deleted from para 11. See no reason to credit Sov Govt with desire for elections.

10. Consider that second sentence of para 12 is apt to suggest that UN Comm proposal has been written off. Similarly, formulation of sub-points i and ii of para 13 seems open to dual criticism that it reproposes in precise terms something already rejected by Sov Union and then immediately writes off this proposal by inviting alternative proposals. (In addition whole para lays us open to loss of initiative to Sovs but this danger can probably not be avoided in any event.) We have accordingly suggested new language in our para 9 which combines thoughts of your paras 12 and 13 in a way calculated, we believe, to avoid criticisms mentioned above.

11. With respect to sub-point iii(b) of para 13 we suggest a slight modification because we are troubled by the phrase "essential guarantees". We wonder what guarantees cld actually be demanded or given and consider that "assurances" were what para was really driving at.

12. To save time and prevent confusion, we have maintained our draft in form of reply from HMG.

13. Our draft is being submitted for White House clearance and we will send you further message tonight or phone you in morning.

ACHESON

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[6] In this paragraph Gifford reported on the efforts of the tripartite group to devise language that would allow Germany freedom to associate with other states and to negotiate a peace treaty without being subject to duress. (662.001/5-852)

No. 97

662.001/5-952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 9, 1952—6:28 p.m.

5808. Fol is draft reply to Sov note as explained in our immed preceding msg: [2]

"1. In reply to the Sov Govt's note of the 9 Apr, HMG wish to make the fol observations in regard to the unification of Ger, the formation and status of an all-Ger Govt and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that Govt. It remains the policy of HMG to achieve these objectives on terms that will ensure unity with freedom and peace with security.

"2. They are ready to begin negots with the Sov Govt on these issues just as soon as the Sov Govt gives sufficiently precise evidence of its views to offer reasonable assurance that the futility of previous mtgs wld not again result from the Sov attitude. HMG and the US, Fr and Sov Govts must, therefore, first reach a clear understanding of the scope of the negots and of the fundamental problems to be examined. The Sov Govt's note of Apr 9 throws little new light on what they consider shld be the means for insuring the success of any such negots.

"3. In their latest note the Sov Govt now stipulate that Ger must not be included 'into one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state'. Ger's proposed membership in the UN shld surely make any such provision unnecessary. In any case, HMG cld not accept any provisions forbidding Ger to enter into assoc with other states which one of the signatories of the peace treaty might arbitrarily choose to regard as 'directed against any peace-loving state'. They cannot admit that Ger shld be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes and they must assume that the Sov Govt likewise cannot object to Ger's right to enter into defensive agrmts. In their note of Mar 25, HMG pointed out that they are giving full support to the efforts which the free states of Western Europe are making to bring into being a peaceful European community and thus to begin a new era in which internatl relations will be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. HMG welcome the development of such a European community in which

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared with Bonbright, Matthews, Secretary Acheson, Nitze, Hickerson, GER, and P; initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 5807, *supra*.

Ger will participate. HMG reemphasize that this policy of European unity now being inaugurated and pursued by the free nations of Europe including the FedRep of Ger, cannot threaten the interests of the Sov Union or of any country whose policy is devoted to the maintenance of peace. HMG will, therefore, not be deflected from their support of this policy.

"4. A Ger peace treaty can be worked out only if there is an all-Ger Govt formed as a result of free elections and able to participate in full freedom in the discussions of such a treaty. It is plain, therefore, to HMG that it is not possible to hold discussions now about the provisions of a Ger peace treaty. HMG have already made known their views on some of the Sov Govt's proposals, especially their erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the Potsdam Protocol and their intention to confine Ger in a position of permanent isolation from Western Europe in such a manner as to give to Ger no adequate capability of defense. The Sov proposals wld mean a permanent state of tension and insecurity in the center of Europe and permanent shackles upon Ger's rights of internatl assoc.

"5. In connection with the freedom which an all-Ger Govt must have, HMG wish to emphasize that such freedom is essential both before and after a peace treaty has been negotiated. The all-Ger Govt resulting from free elections must itself be free. It must be able to maintain its genuinely representative character, and to assume its responsibilities as the Govt of a reunited Ger and to play its full part in the discussion of the peace treaty. This question of freedom is, therefore, inseparable from the problem of elections. The Sov Govt have still failed to give any indication of their views on this subj. HMG must ask specifically whether the Sov Govt consider that an all-Ger Govt, resulting from an election of a Constituent Assembly, wld be under four Power control until after the conclusion of a peace treaty or whether they agree that it shld enjoy the necessary freedom of action and governing powers.

"6. HMG are happy to note that the Sov Govt now agree in principle that there shld be free elections throughout Ger. Such free elections can, however, only be held if the necessary conditions exist in all parts of Ger and will be maintained not only on the day of voting and prior to it but also thereafter. An essential first step is, therefore, to ensure such conditions. Otherwise no progress can be made. In recent years the Eastern part of Ger has evolved in a direction increasingly divergent from the main path of Ger progress. This is a principal reason why an impartial inquiry is needed before elections take place.

"7. The Sov Govt do not agree, however, that the internatl comm set up by the Gen Assembly of the UN shld carry out such an inquiry throughout Ger. They base this refusal on their interpretation of Art 107 of the UN Charter. But this reads as follows: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the second world war has been an enemy of any signatory of the present charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the govts having responsibility for such action.' This language clearly does not preclude the UN from this consideration of Ger affairs. This interpretation was upheld by the UN Gen Assembly by an overwhelming majority. However, even under the Sov Govt's erroneous interpretation of the Charter there is nothing to prevent the four powers from availing themselves of the UN Comm in order to determine the conditions in which genuinely free elections cld be held throughout Ger.

"8. The Sov Govt suggest instead that responsibility for the inquiry cld be entrusted to a comm formed by the four occupying Powers. Before HMG cld feel assured that this suggestion wld result in an impartial inquiry they wld need to know what wld be the composition and functions of such a body. A comm composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Ger wld be both judge and party. Experience during the period of four Power control of Ger suggests that it wld not be able to reach useful decisions. Thus the elections wld be greatly delayed. Nor can HMG overlook the fact that the appointment of a four Power comm might be interpreted as a step towards the reestablishment of four Power control in Ger. This wld be a retrograde move, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the FedRep.

"9. For these reasons HMG maintain their preference for the UN Comm: It is already in being, its functions have been laid down and it can take action without delay. Nevertheless HMG are ready to examine every possibility of reaching agrmt on a means of determining whether conditions of freedom exist throughout Ger which wld make possible the holding of free elections. Accordingly, HMG, in agrmt with the US and Fr Govts and after consultation with the Ger Fed Govt and the Ger authorities in Berlin, request the Sov Govt, bearing in mind the views on this subj which have been set forth in this note, to give precise answers to the fol questions:

"a. Does the Sov Union agree that an impartial comm shld immed undertake to determine whether there exists in the Sov Zone of Ger, as well as in the FedRep and in all sectors of Berlin, the conditions necessary for the holding of free elections?

"b. Does the Sov Union agree that the four powers exercising responsibilities in Ger shld utilize for this purpose the members of the UN Comm which is presently available?

"If the Sov Union has in mind some specific variation of the procedure contemplated by the UNGA's res what are the specific proposals which wld achieve the impartial and unrestricted investigation which is required?

"c. Is the Sov Union prepared to facilitate the investigation of the impartial comm in the Sov Zone and in the Sov sector of Berlin?

"HMG as well as the Govts of Fr, the US, and the FedRep have already stated their willingness to facilitate such an investigation.

"10. As soon as the report of an impartial Comm as agreed among the four Powers is available, HMG are prepared to designate a rep to meet with reps of the Govts of Fr, the US, and the Sov Union to consider the report of this Comm with a view to reaching agrmt on

"(a) The holding of free elections throughout Ger, including the creation where necessary of appropriate conditions; and'

"(b) The assurances to be given by the four Powers that the all-Ger Govt will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before the coming into effect of the peace treaty."

ACHESON

No. 98

762.00/5-952

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 9, 1952.

At our meeting on Monday last, [1] after going over with [illegible] the main points to be included in a tripartite answer to the Russian note on German elections and a German treaty, you approved the approach outlined. At the time I assured you that after the text had been hammered out with our Allies I would submit to you the language of a proposed reply. This is now enclosed. [2] It is still not in final form since another meeting in London of representatives of the three Powers will be necessary before final agreement. I thought that you would wish to see it in this stage.

With one exception the proposed note follows the principles which you and I discussed. The exception is this. Our proposal had included an offer to meet with the Russians through the High Commissioners in Germany to discuss plans for having the United Nations Commission or some neutral body investigate conditions throughout Germany to see whether free elections were possible in all parts of it and to recommend such rectification of existing conditions as might be necessary. It was the unanimous opinion of Mr. Eden, Mr. Schuman, Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Reuter that so definite a proposal would raise the danger in many quarters in Germany and elsewhere in Europe of postponing the signing of the EDC treaty and the contractual relations with Germany until such a meeting were held. Our representatives in Europe were impressed by the unanimity of this view. It seemed to us that our European friends are better qualified than we are to appraise this danger which must certainly be avoided. We therefore recommend that our original proposal be amended by accepting the European view as it is expressed in this draft.

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[1] No record of a meeting between President Truman and Secretary Acheson on either Apr. 28 or May 5 has been found in Department of State files; however, a memorandum of conversation with the President, drafted by the Secretary of State and dated May 1, reads as follows:

"The President approved the line which we were taking in the Soviet reply. I assured him that after we got down to a more definitive text with the British and French, I would submit it to him." (662.001/5-152)

[2] No enclosure was found attached to the source text. For text of the draft under reference here, see telegram 5808, *supra*.

I know that you will not be able to get to this paper until this evening or possibly tomorrow morning. When you have had a chance to consider it, I should appreciate your instruction so that I may tell our people in London to go forward with a meeting, with the paper as it is or as it may be modified in accordance with your wishes.

I am going to Sandy Spring this evening after dinner and shall be there tonight after nine o'clock and tomorrow. The White House operator knows how to reach me.[3]

Respectfully,

DEAN ACHESON

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[3] According to a White House memorandum, dated May 10 and initialed "H.S.T.", President Truman telephoned Secretary Acheson during the evening of May 9 and approved the suggested deletion and the text of the draft reply. (662.001/5–1052) The President's approval was then transmitted to London in telegram 5825, May 9 at 8:44 p.m. (662.001/5–952)

No. 99

662.001/5-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, May 11, 1952—8 p.m.

5131. After working group agrmt on proposed changes Dept's text draft reply to Sov note (Deptel 5808, May 9 [2]) as contained in Embtels 5129 and 5130, May 10 [3] Roberts took modified draft to Eden in country returning this morning with Eden's instructions. In meantime Crouy-Chanel had also recd instructions from Paris.

At working group mtg today, Roberts stated his instructions were to insist on London draft contained Embtel 5037, May 6, [4] which had already been accepted not only by Fr and Br but by Adenauer and Reuter. He said that Eden was considering instructing Franks to make a strong plea to Secretary to return to London draft. Crouy-Chanel also stated preference of Paris for London draft. Holmes pointed out, among other things, that if Eden held to this position there was no hope of agrmt in time to help him in Commons debate Wednesday.

In discussion which followed it became apparent that principal concern of both Br and Fr was their own and Ger public opinion. They consider reply in order to be effective must speak not only to those who are convinced of rightness of our joint policy of building strength in West Europe but must contribute to silencing the doubts of those who suspect our policy and who constitute a polit problem of first magnitude in Ger and Fr and of growing concern in Br. It must help Eden in his debate next Wednesday. Over longer pull it must help Attlee and Co handle Dalton and Co. It must avoid a tone which both Br and Fr believe many Gers wld find in Dept's draft that in fact their choice is between our policy of integration, and Ger unity. In that case they both fear Gers will choose unity. These are the reasons why both insisted on changes in para 2 and the re-insertion of para 5 from London draft. They feel that both these are necessary to meet Adenauer and Reuter views. When pinned down both agreed that order of Dept presentation was an improvement and much of London draft remained verbatim. Fol proposed changes were then worked out which are in addition to those contained in Embtel 5129 and 5130 including substitution of para 2 from London draft (Embtel 5037, May 6) for para 2 Dept's draft as modified yesterday.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and Berlin.

[2] Document 97.

[3] Telegram 5129 reported that the draft transmitted in telegram 5808 had been generally accepted by the tripartite working group with the exception of paragraphs 9 and 10. It continued that the revised text, which was indicated by the specific comments transmitted in telegram 5230, was the best that the U.S. representative was able to achieve and was also the one most likely to produce early tripartite agreement. (662.001/5-1052)

[4] Document 95.

Roberts now advises us that Eden has accepted Dept's draft with proposed changes agreed this morning and yesterday. Crouy-Chanel believes that it meets objections of Paris and will be acceptable. Br and Fr wiring authority Bonn and Berlin to show to Adenauer and Reuter. Assume McCloy has authority to do same and will notify Lyon.

Clean text containing cumulative changes resulting from yesterday and today's mtgs in next fol msg. [5]

Discussion of proposed changes agreed at today's mtg fols:

[Here follows a list of specific drafting changes in the text of the note.]

GIFFORD

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[5] Telegram 5132 from London, May 11. (662.001/5-1152) For text of the draft submitted in this telegram, see the note from the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Document 101.

No. 100

662.001/5-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 12, 1952—2:01 a.m.

5843. Secy has given most earnest consideration to Eden's plea to get note in final shape by accepting draft as it now stands (urtel 5132 [2]). Explanations urtel 5131 [3] were reinforced by representations of UK and Fr Embassies. [4] Accordingly we will pass over many points in drafting which we would like to discuss.

There are however three points which go to heart of position our three governments have taken and which in our case have been reaffirmed as late as Friday by the President.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] For text of the draft transmitted in telegram 5132, see the note from the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union, May 13, *infra*.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] No record of these representations has been found in Department of State files.

First. We have taken clear position that in light of experience we do not intend to sit down now with the Soviets to negotiate German Peace Treaty before familiar essential prerequisites of elections etc. are met. From outset we have objected to opening note with general statement of willingness or eagerness to start such negotiations. New text of para 2 returns to old formulation and specifically refers to "these issues" which include peace treaty. Secy therefore considers it necessary to return to formulation first sentence para 2 ourtel 5808 [5] or at least variation thereof contained urtel 5129, [6] although we consider our wording far stronger and more effective.

Second. In new para 11 (i) must point out danger of formulation which places in hands of outside Commission power to say what steps must be taken to create conditions necessary for free elections. Its decisions might be entirely inadequate. Western Allies must retain some freedom of decision as to conditions they will demand. First sentence para 11 (i) shld therefore be amended to end "and, if not, shld recommend for consideration by the four powers what steps shld be taken to create such conditions."

Third. We feel it is very important to retain in para 11 (iv)a the clause "including the creation where necessary of the appropriate conditions". It is not enough that this might be considered to be implicit in "agreement on elections". As Secy points out, creation of necessary conditions is essential first step toward which both our notes are pointed. We must not fail to make explicit both to Sovs and the public opinion that this must indeed be first question discussed after report of commission. Omission of phrase particularly serious in London draft when taken together with phrasing of sub-para (i), since it reinforces impression that this question might be decided by Commission rather than four powers. Even with sub-para (i) corrected as we desire, however, Secy considers clause must be maintained in sub-para (iii), not as "addition of final hurdle" as Eden puts it but rather as statement of first and unavoidable hurdle.

Resubmission of these three points to President would involve such amount of time as to upset time schedule to which Secy appreciates Eden attaches such importance. Nor does Secy feel that he could recommend to President revisal his considered views on these points.

In addition Secy believes one additional point is of such importance that it should be taken care of. This involves deletion of modifying phrase after "permanent isolation" in third sentence para 6. Impossible to sustain thesis that Sovs have proposed that Ger be completely isolated on all sides. Their proposals wld in fact only have effect of cutting Ger off from western Europe. Secy believes it necessary therefore to restore phrase "from Western Europe" or to substitute some other similar phrase such as "from the free nations of Europe". Other changes in this sentence acceptable except we wld prefer if possible to substitute "limited" for "her own" and addition of words "of her own" at end of sentence, in order more clearly to suggest inadequacy of what Sov Govt proposes to allow to Ger.

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[5] Document 97.

[6] See footnote 3, Document 99.

We also suggest that impression of writing off UN Commission cld be still further reduced by revising para 9 (iii) to read "Despite their strong preference for the procedure under (ii) above, HMG are ready to consider any variation of that procedure which the Sov Govt may wish to put forward, if it contains practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of investigation and if it is likely to promote the early holding of free elections throughout Ger". You need not insist on this change if Brit or Fr object.

If text can be agreed along above lines, London shld request that HICOMers and Commandants obtain reactions of Adenauer and Reuter. London shld also coordinate with Moscow time of delivery and release, bearing in mind desirability of 24 hour interval between delivery and release, and usual problem of coordinating differing Eur and US needs re press and radio release hours. Believe you shld repeat complete revised text of all paras changed from urtel 5132, as finally agreed, to all addressees, in order avoid any errors.

ACHESON

No. 101

The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs [1]

[Moscow, May 13, 1952.]

1. In reply to the Soviet Government's note of the 9th of April, the United States Government wishes to make the following observations in regard to the unity of Germany, the election of a free all-German government and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that government. It remains the policy of the United States Gov-

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[1] Reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, May 26, 1952, pp. 817–819. It comprises the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 from London, May 11 (662.001/5–1152) and, as indicated in the footnotes that follow, the revisions proposed by the Department of State in telegram 5843, *supra*, and a few other minor drafting changes that were made in London or Moscow to coordinate the text with that of the British and French. The note was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 11 p.m. (Moscow time) on May 13.

ernment to achieve these objectives on terms that will insure unity with freedom and peace with security.[2]

2. It is ready to begin negotiations with the Soviet Government on these issues; and it desires to do so just as soon as it is clearly apparent that it is also the intention of the Soviet Government to avoid the fruitless negotiations of the past. The United States Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union must therefore first reach a clear understanding upon the scope of the negotiations and upon the fundamental problems to be examined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long delays. The Soviet Government's note of the 9th of April throws little new light on what it considers should be the means of insuring the success of any such negotiations.[3]

3. In its latest note the Soviet Government now stipulates that Germany must not be included "into one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state". Germany's proposed membership in the United Nations should surely make any such provision unnecessary. In any case the United States Government could not accept any provisions forbidding Germany to enter into association with other states which one of the signatories of the peace treaty might arbitrarily choose to regard as "directed against any peace-loving state". It cannot admit that Germany should be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes. It must assume that the Soviet Government likewise cannot object to Germany's right to enter into defensive agreements.[4]

4. In its note of March 25,[5] the United States Government pointed out that it is giving full support to the efforts which the free states of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic, are making to bring into being a peaceful European community and thus to begin a new era in which international relations will

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[2] This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 with the exception of the substitution of "United States Government" for "HMG". This substitution was made in all similar instances below.

[3] Paragraph 2 of the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 reads:

"2. They are ready to begin negots with the Sov Govt on these issues at the earliest possible date. But HMG and the US, French and Sov Govts must first reach a clear understanding upon the scope of the negots and upon the fundamental problems to be examined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long delays such as led to the failure of earlier mtgs. The Sov Govt's note of the 9th April throws little new light on what [they] consider shld be the means for ensuring the success of any such negots."

[4] This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 except that "its" and "It" are "their" and "They". Similar changes apply in subsequent paragraphs.

[5] A footnote in the source text at this point indicates that the U.S. note of Mar. 25 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 530-531.

be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. The United States Government welcomes the development of such a European Community in which Germany will participate. Germany is divided because Europe is divided. This policy of European unity cannot threaten the interests of the Soviet Union or of any country whose policy is devoted to the maintenance of peace. The United States Government will, therefore, not be deflected from its support of this policy. It is more than ever convinced that it represents the true path of peace.[6]

5. The United States Government has no responsibility for the failure to extend this cooperation beyond its present limits. It remains ready to examine with sincerity and good will any practical and precise suggestions designed to reduce tension and to heal existing divisions.

6. A German peace treaty can be worked out only if there is an all-German government formed as a result of free elections and able to participate in full freedom in the discussion of such a treaty. It is, therefore, not possible to hold discussions now about the provisions of a German peace treaty. The U.S. Government has already made known its views on some of the Soviet Government's proposals especially its erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the Potsdam protocol and its intention to confine Germany in a position of permanent isolation from Western Europe[7] while obliging her to seek to provide for her defense solely through her own national armed forces. The Soviet proposals would mean permanent shackels upon Germany's rights of international association and a permanent state of tension and insecurity in the center of Europe.

7. The all-German government resulting from free election must itself be free. Such freedom is essential both before and after a peace treaty has been negotiated. It must be able to maintain its genuinely representative character; to assume its responsibilities as the government of a reunited Germany and to play its full part in the discussion of the peace treaty. This question of freedom is, therefore, inseparable from the problem of elections. The Soviet Government has still failed to give any indication of its views on this subject. The United States Government must ask specifically whether the Soviet Government considers that an all-German government, resulting from free elections, would be under four-power control until after the conclusion of a peace treaty or whether they

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[6] Paragraphs 4 and 5 are the same as those transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.

[7] The draft transmitted in telegram 5132 did not have the phrase "from Western Europe".

agree that it should have the necessary freedom of action and powers of government.[8]

8. The United States Government is happy to note that the Soviet Government now agrees in principle that there should be free elections throughout Germany. Such free elections can, however, only be held if the necessary conditions exist in all parts of Germany and will be maintained not only on the day of voting, and prior to it, but also thereafter. An essential first step is, therefore, to insure such conditions. Otherwise, no progress can be made. In recent years the eastern part of Germany has evolved in a direction increasingly divergent from the main path of German progress. This is a principal reason why an impartial inquiry is needed before elections can take place.[9]

9. The Soviet Government does not agree, however, that the international commission set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations should carry out such an inquiry throughout Germany. It bases this refusal on its interpretation of Article 107 of the United Nations Charter. But this reads as follows: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." These words clearly do not preclude[10] the United Nations from considering these aspects of German affairs. This interpretation was upheld by the United Nations General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. However, even under the Soviet Government's erroneous interpretation of the Charter there is nothing to prevent the Four Powers from availing themselves of the United Nations Commission in order to determine the conditions in which genuinely free elections could be held throughout Germany.

10. The Soviet Government suggests instead that responsibility for the inquiry could be entrusted to a commission formed by the four occupying powers. Before the United States Government could feel assured that this suggestion would result in an impartial inquiry it would need to know what would be the composition and functions of such a body. A commission composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Germnay would be both judge and party. Experience during the period of four-power control of

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[8] This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.

[9] This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.

[10] In the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 this sentence began "This language clearly does not preclude".

Germany suggests that it would not be able to reach useful decisions. Thus the elections would be greatly delayed. Nor can the United States Government overlook the fact that the appointment of a four-power commission might be interpreted as a step towards the re-establishment of four-power control in Germany. This would be a retrograde move, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the Federal Republic.[11]

11. For these reasons the United States Government maintains its preference for the United Nations Commission: It is already in being, its functions have been laid down and it can take action without delay. Nevertheless, the United States Government is ready to examine every possibility of determining whether conditions of freedom exist throughout Germany for the holding of genuinely free elections. The United States Government in agreement with the United Kingdom and French Governments and after consultation with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, accordingly makes the following proposals:

(i) An impartial commission should immediately determine whether there exist in the Soviet Zone of Germany, as well as in the German Federal Republic and in all sectors of Berlin, the conditions necessary for the holding of free elections and, if not,[12] should recommend for consideration by the Four Powers exercising responsibilities in Germany what step should be taken to create such conditions. The Four Powers should give the necessary facilities for the investigation of such a commission in the German Federal Republic, in the Soviet Zone, and in all sectors of Berlin. The three Western Powers and the German Federal Government have already stated their willingness to do so.

(ii) The Four Powers should utilize for this purpose the United Nations Commission which is already available. This seems the quickest and most practical course.[13]

(iii) Despite its strong preference for the procedure under (ii) above, the United States Government is ready to consider any other practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of investigation which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward, on the one condition that they are likely to promote the early holding of free elections throughout Germany.

(iv) As soon as the report of such an impartial commission is available, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, French and Soviet Governments would meet to consider it, with a view to reaching agreement on:

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[11] Paragraphs 10 and 11 are the same as those transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above

[12] The draft transmitted in telegram 5132 does not contain the remainder of this sentence, but reads "what steps shld be taken to create such conditions". Additionally that draft uses the term "Four Occupying Powers" throughout the rest of the note in place of "Four Powers".

[13] Subparagraphs ii, iii, and iv are the same as those transmitted in telegram 5132

(a) The early holding of free elections throughout Germany, including the creation where necessary of the appropriate conditions; and [14]

(b) The assurances to be given by the Four Powers that the all-German government, formed as the result of these free elections, will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before the peace treaty comes into effect. [15]

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[14] Subparagraph (a) in the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 reads "(a) The early holding of free elections thruout Ger; and".

[15] This subparagraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132.

C. THE SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 24 AND THE WESTERN REPLY OF JULY 10

No. 102

662.001/5-2552

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

RESTRICTED [Moscow, May 24, 1952.]

In connection with the note of the Govt of USA May 13 [2] this year Soviet Govt finds it necessary to state following:

1. Concerning the urgency of a decision of the German question and the delaying by the western powers of the exchange of written communications in this question. In its note of March 10, 1952, [3] Soviet Govt proposed to the Govts of the USA, Great Britain, France that they examine together the question of the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Germany and of the establishment of an all-German govt. In order to facilitate and expedite preparation of a treaty of peace with Germany the Soviet Govt put forward its draft of this treaty, expressing at the same time its readiness to consider other possible proposals on this question. The Soviet Govt considers it necessary to solve this question immediately, being guided by the interests of the strengthening of peace in Europe and the necessity of satisfying the legitimate national demands of the German people.

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[1] The source text is a translation prepared in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and transmitted in telegram 1880, May 25. It should be compared for minor textual differences with that printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1952, pp. 93-96. No copy of the Russian-language text has been found in Department of State files, but see *Izvestiia*, May 25, 1952, or *SSSR i GDR*, pp. 218-223.

[2] *Supra*.

[3] Document 65.

Inasmuch as there was advanced in the reply of the Govt of the USA of March 25 [4] in connection with the question concerning the formation of an all-German govt a proposal for the study of conditions existing for the conduct of general elections in Germany, the Soviet Govt in its note of April 9 [5] agreed with this proposal, insisting, however, that the study in question should be conducted not by a commission of the United Nations Organization, which is not competent for question of the making of peace with Germany, but an impartial commission of the four powers exercising the occupational function in Germany. At the same time the Soviet Govt once again proposed to the Govt of the USA and likewise to the Govts of Great Britain, [and] France that the consideration of a treaty of peace with Germany should no longer be postponed and likewise the question of unification of Germany and the creation of an all-German government.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Govt accepted the proposal of the Govt of the USA for verification of the presence of conditions for conducting in Germany free general elections and the proposal of the Soviet Govt for appointment of a commission for conducting this verification by agreement between the four powers guarantees the objectivity and impartiality of the commission in question, the decision of the question concerning the peace treaty with Germany and the unification of Germany as demonstrated by the note of the Govt of the USA of May 13 is again postponed for an indefinite period. It is evident from this note that the Govt of the USA is also unwilling to agree that the four powers should proceed finally to the examination of these questions without further delays.

In view of this the Govt of the USA in its note of May 13 advanced a whole series of new preliminary conditions which it had not advanced in its note of March 25 and about which it now proposes to negotiate by means of a continuation of the exchange of notes before proceeding to direct negotiations. Thus in its note of May 13 the Govt of the USA proposes before the beginning of direct negotiations that agreement to be reached "concerning the framework of negotiations and concerning the basic problems to be taken under consideration" and likewise to continue the written exchange of communications concerning the composition and functions of the commission for verification of the conditions to Germany for general elections, etc.

All these facts make evident that the Govt of USA is continuing to delay the conclusion of a treaty of peace with Germany and the decision on the question [of] unification and also the establishment of all-German govt. Only this could explain the fact that in its note of May 13 the Govt of the USA anew introduced whole series of questions for the prolongation of the exchange of notes which, apart from this, has already dragged on for several months, instead of the four powers proceeding to direct negotiations and beginning the joint consideration of a peace treaty with Germany and with all the related questions.

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[4] Regarding this note, see telegram 2209, Document 78.

[5] Document 82.

In these circumstances the opinion cannot fail to be strengthened in Germany as well as beyond its borders that the Government of the USA in reality is not aiming at the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and putting an end to the division of Germany. But without the conclusion of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany a fully equal German govt cannot be restored, a German govt both independent and in full possession of rights and expressing the genuine will of the entire German people.

2. Regarding separate agreements of the western powers with Western Germany and their attempts to avoid conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The Soviet Govt considers it necessary to direct special attention to the fact that simultaneously with the extended exchange of notes the Govt of the USA, together with the Govts of Great Britain, France is conducting separate negotiations with the Bonn govt of Western Germany regarding the conclusion of the socalled "general" contract. Actually this is in no way a "general" contract but a separate treaty which is falsely called "general" in order to deceive the people. Thus the Potsdam Agreement was flagrantly violated by which the responsibility for the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany was placed upon the four powers—USA, Great Britain, France and USSR.

Despite the secret character of the negotiations carried on with the Bonn Govt and despite the fact that the full text of this separate agreement until now has not been published from the information which has appeared in the press the contents of this separate treaty has become known already. From these facts it is evident that the mentioned peace treaty prepared by the Govts of the USA, Great Britain and France with West Germany in no way has as its aim the extension of freedom and independence of Western Germany. Together with formal abrogation of the occupation statute this treaty preserves the regime of factual military occupation keeping West Germany in a dependent and subservient status with regard to the Govts of the USA and of Great Britain and France.

Together with this by means of conclusion of this separate treaty with West Germany the Govts of the USA, Great Britain and France legalize the re-establishment of the German army headed by Hitlerite generals which means that they open the way to the re-establishment of aggressive West German militarism. Actually this treaty is an open military alliance of the USA, Great Britain and France with help of West Germany by means of which the German people are drawn by the Bonn govt into preparations of a new war.

Together with this the Govts of the USA, Great Britain and France achieve the inclusion of West Germany into the group of powers created by them under the name of "European Defence Community": France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. This self-styled "European community" is supposed to become an integral part of the North Atlantic bloc and great and so-called "European army" into which should go the presently created German armed forces in West Germany. It is quite obvious that the aim of the creation of a "European community" and "European army" consist not only of legalizing the remilitarization of West Germany as is taking place in fact, but also to include West Germany in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc.

It is known to all that exactly in recent times the Govt of the USA has attempted to hasten by all means the conclusion of the mentioned separate treaty with West Germany as well as the inclusion of West Germany into the "European community". Likewise it attempts, not only to definitively separate from but oppose one portion of Germany to the other. This means that the Govt of the USA is interested not in the unification of Germany and not in a peace treaty with Germany but by means of the new separate agreement more strongly than before to tie Western Germany and the Western German army now created with the North Atlantic bloc of powers which is incompatible with the possibilities of a peaceful development in Europe.

All this shows that at the present time an agreement is taking place between right wing revanchist circles of Western Germany and the North Atlantic group of powers. This agreement can be based only on the support of the revanchist aspirations of the Bonn Govt of Adenauer which is preparing to unleash a new war in Europe. The restoration now of a West German army under the leadership of Fascist Hitlerite generals can only serve the aggressive aims of the German revanchists. On the other hand, the inclusion of such of West Germany in the so-called European army and consequently in the army of the North Atlantic bloc, even more underlines the aggressive character of the whole North Atlantic group.

In the light of these facts no one can believe that the presently created "European community" and "European army" can represent "a path to peace" as is stated in the American note of May 13. The real meaning of the mentioned agreement of the North Atlantic bloc with the govt of Adenauer can comprise only the further strengthening of the aggressive character of the North Atlantic group of powers presently striving for the direct union with the German revanchists who represent the most aggressive circles in Europe.

The conclusion with the Bonn Govt of West Germany of agreements such as the above mentioned separate treaty or agreement regarding the "European community" places upon this part of Germany new obligations strengthening its dependence on the occupying powers and creating new difficulties for unification with the eastern part of Germany which is not tied by such obligations and is developing in conditions favorable to national unification of Germany into a unified independent democratic and peace-loving state. The desire of the Govt of the USA to conclude as soon as possible the above mentioned separate agreement with West Germany at the same time that negotiations regarding a peace treaty and unification of Germany again and again are postponed, means that it intends by means of the mentioned separate agreements to place the German people before a *fait accompli:* The German people will be placed before the fact of the remilitarization of West Germany and the retention of occupation troops in West Germany. And there will presently arise insurmountable obstacles in the path of the conclusion of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany.

However, it is not possible on one hand to make statements about recognition of the necessity of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany and on the other to do everything to make difficult and to impede the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the restoration of a unified German state. This leads to the undermining of any kind of confidence toward the dual policy of such powers and places the German people in the necessity of seeking its own way to a peace treaty and national unification of Germany.

3. Proposal of the Soviet Govt. Despite the presence of disagreement regarding the peace treaty with Germany and also the unification of Germany and the formation of an all-German govt, the Soviet Govt again proposes to the Govt of the USA and also to the Govts of Great Britain and France to enter into joint discussion of these questions and not to permit extended delay in this matter.

Continued review of these questions by means of further exchange of notes cannot produce the results which might be achieved by direct negotiations and can only make achievement of agreement more difficult. Meanwhile, further delay of decision of the question of a peace treaty and unification of Germany cannot fail to arouse legitimate dissatisfaction of the German people even not mentioning that such sort of delay in this matter is contradictory to the interests of the establishment of normal and permanent relations between Germany and neighboring states as well as the interests of strengthening of general peace.

The Soviet Govt proceeds on the principle that in working out a peace treaty with Germany the Govt of the USSR as well as the Govts of the USA, Great Britain and France will be guided by the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, particularly in the question of the boundaries of Germany as was mentioned by the Soviet Govt in its note of April 9.

As regards the all-German govt and its powers, it is understood that this govt also must be guided by the Potsdam provisions and also after conclusion of the peace treaty by the provision of the peace treaty which serve the establishment of a permanent peace in Europe. In this connection the Soviet Govt continued to consider it the inalienable right of the German people to have its own national armed forces necessary for the defense of the country without which it is impossible to decide the question of the powers of the all-German govt in a just and proper fashion.

Proposing to enter into direct negotiations urgently regarding a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German govt, the Soviet Govt proceeds also from the fact that no kind of separate agreement of one or another part of Germany with govts of other states can impose any kind of obligations and that the all-German govt which will have signed the peace treaty will possess all the rights which the govts of other independent sovereign states possess.

No. 103

662.001/5–2552: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT Moscow, May 25, 1952—1 p.m.

1881. Sov note on Ger, text of which was submitted with my 1880, May 25, rptd Bonn 80 [2] seems to me at first glance remarkable for its weakness, its mild discursiveness, its lack of enthusiasm, its failure to add to discussion any important new element with real appeal to Gers, and finally for tone of plaintive and almost injured sweet reasonableness with which it reiterates propositions most non-Commie Gers wld surely either not believe at all or have long since accepted as true but "so what?" the familiar elements—the charges that we are delaying the exchanges, that we want to create *fait accompli* that this represents separate treaty of peace, that honest Gers are going to find themselves tied to dangerous policies of Atlantic Pact and Ger right-wing revanchists—wld hardly seem to have any shattering effect at this stage. What seems to us main new element—namely Four-Power control à la Potsdam as the answer to all questions concerning transition from elections to peace treaty—can hardly be expected to have any strong appeal anywhere, least of all to Gers, and seem to reflect much less of a dynamic polit attack on Moscow's part than an apprehension of getting caught out in an unshod position on a dangerous subj. The bid for oral negots is perfunctory and without emphasis and no plans are taken to guard in advance against obvious answers from our side.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn for Secretary Acheson who was there for the signing of the contractual agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany.

[2] The text of the note is printed *supra*.

So far as Sov fon policy is concerned, there are several possible explanations for all this, and as usual they are not necessarily mutually contradictory. Among them I wld note fol:

(a) That Kremlin, recognizing poor prospects of success in recent line and danger of loss of prestige to itself in any vigorous continuation of it, is setting about to disengage its own responsibility with respect to coming event in Ger, and preparing to leave dirty work to its Ger stooges. Something of this thinking may lie behind ref in note to Ger people being placed before necessity of "seeking their own paths" to peace treaty and unification. This element is in any case not new in sov approach to Ger. It wld, of course, not preclude extremely vigorous and dangerous actions by East Ger auths with respect to Berlin.

(b) That Kremlin, whose suspicions are always particularly lively with respect to Ger Commies, has been in some way estranged by handling of this matter on part of latter, has gained impression they are going too far and too fast and attempting to exploit Sov support in some way, and is therefore disengaging itself in anger and leaving them with the burden;

(c) That Sov attentions are at present absorbed with plans and undertakings elsewhere, most plausibly in Middle East, possibilities of which loom larger in their eyes than Ger at this moment.

Of equal interest to us here is bearing of note on governmental sitn here in Moscow. This note is not the authentic, terse, collected, menacing voice of Stalin's Kremlin when functioning in high gear and pursuing an important Sov initiative. On contrary, document seems to me to show signs of having been prepared by hacks supplied only with grudging, cryptic and guarded instrs and told to make best of it.

KENNAN

No. 104

662A.00/5-2652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 26, 1952—7:23 p.m.

Telac 9. For the Secretary. [2]

1. We thought you might like to have our prelim thoughts and reactions on Sov note [3] in event you have some exchange of views with other Mins on this subj. In gen we think Moscow's initial analysis (Moscow's 1881, rptd Bonn 81 [4]) was well taken except that we are not fully convinced that note reflects Kremlin anger with Ger Commies handling of unification issue.

2. Dept considers note a feeble effort under the circumstances. With possibly one exception it contains nothing new, limits itself to confirming previous positions, and in gen turns to propaganda language as substitute for any constructive polit proposals. For these reasons we think it shld have little propaganda value for Sov cause in Ger.

3. The one seemingly new element is the reliance upon Potsdam agreement not only for territorial solutions but for peace treaty provisions generally and, even for defining status of all-Ger Govt prior to peace treaty. While this may possibly be a bid for that part of Fr opinion which wld like to continue fon occupation and domination of Ger, we think it will almost certainly leave Gers cold.

4. Dept is particularly struck by lack of renewal of any kind of proposal for investigation of conditions in Ger or any proposals for Ger elections. There is almost complete retreat to position reflected in first Sov note, [5] that is, emphasis on importance of negotiating regarding peace treaty. All this seems to demonstrate an eagerness on part of Sovs to disengage on question of election and almost gives appearance of relief that we did not accept their previous suggestions. We note in passing that present note states that Sovs had previously proposed that investigation of conditions "shld be conducted" by Four-Power Comm, whereas language previously used had seemed something less than outright proposal since it said that such Comm "cld" conduct investigation.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Riddleberger, Bonbright, Barbour, Matthews, Bohlen, and McWilliams. Repeated to Bonn, Moscow, and London.

[2] Secretary Acheson was in Paris for the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty and related documents.

[3] Document 102.

[4] *Supra.*

[5] Document 65.

5. Note generally bears appearance of being written "for the record." They reiterate what they previously proposed and stress our "rejection" of their proposals. They get in some additional licks at Eur Defense Community and "Hitlerite" character of projected Ger rearmament. They end by asserting that there can be no binding quality to any "separate agreement with one or another part of Ger". In this gen context, renewed Sov proposal for talks certainly has, in our opinion, an unconvincing and hollow ring.

6. Dept does not consider that note calls for any immediate response and Dept has not reacted in any way publicly to note. Our thoughts at this time are that an eventual reply might either (a) note Sov rejection of our proposals and break off any further exchange of communications at present or (b) might conceivably suggest some sort of low level talks. We rather incline to former suggestion at present but much will depend on development of Eur, especially Ger, reaction to note, which we do not yet know.

BRUCE

No. 105

662A.00/5-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, May 28, 1952—6 p.m.

7397. From the Secy. Embtel 7355. [2] In tripartite discussion this morning Schuman characterized Sov note of May 24 [3] as deliberately obscure and partially contradictory. He felt it threw no further light on Sov ideas as to commission or elections. He had noted three things. One was that Moscow contemplated no sovereignty for Ger before treaty went into effect; that on contract it advocated return to Potsdam and four-power control. This seemed clearly insincere. Second was that no treaty entered into by FedRep cld bind Eastern Ger after unification. While note did not say so, logical conclusion this argument was that GDR agrmts with Pol and Czech on Oder-Neisse line wld be similarly nonbinding. Third was implied threat to Berlin contained in sentence stating undermining of confidence in policy of Western powers "places Ger people in necessity of seeking its own way to peace treaty and natl unification". This note, instead of referring to a progression of elections, establishment of all-Ger Govt and then conclusion of peace treaty, referred to peace treaty as first objective and therefore posed most difficult problem first.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 7355 suggested that the Department of State might wish to begin preparing a general outline of a reply to the Soviet note in view of the agreement that had been reached with Eden (see footnote 3 below) on May 26. (662A.00/5-2752)

[3] At a meeting during the evening of May 26 Eden and Acheson had discussed, *inter alia*, the reply to the Soviet note and agreed that coordination should take place in Washington following initial agreement in Paris. The two Foreign Ministers had also agreed that Adenauer should be consulted and Secretary Acheson read Kennan's comments (telegram 1881, Document 103), which Eden thought were excellent. This discussion was reported in telegram 7354 from Paris, May 27 (700.00/5-2752).

Secy stated he had noted same points and felt note marked retreat from whole idea of elections and investigation of conditions. Rather than offering anything new, it merely referred to and misquoted earlier proposal. Moscow clearly considered that Potsdam shld determine nature of peace treaty as well as of regime. It wld be badly received in Ger, was a weak note and even its propaganda tone was half-hearted and perfunctory. He thought Western reply shld make three points: (1) that note revealed Sov desire to reimpose four-power control, (2) that lack of progress was due solely to Sov refusal to meet any of points made by West, and (3) that this note wld terminate present exchange or perhaps suggest low-level talks. He wld prefer former.

Eden felt that to date we had won battle of notes. We had gained the initiative and shld maintain it. Reply shld note Sov retreat and say that altho we were sorry Russia had rejected our proposals, we were still prepared to proceed in accordance with them. Secy and Schuman agreed to this line, latter adding reply must avoid giving impression of withdrawing previous offer.

Schuman felt that reply shld be sent soon, that four-week delay in replying to previous one had been too long. Eden agreed present reply cld be drafted more easily and quickly than last, which had been slow but good when finished. He suggested that broad preliminary coordination be effected here and final drafting coordinated in Washn. Secy's offer to have Washn produce draft for preliminary consideration here first of next week was accepted.

After some discussion as to what Ger shld be told and when, it was agreed that they shld at present be told only that three Mins had taken occasion to hold preliminary exchange of views, that preliminary coordination of reply wld be undertaken in Paris next week and final drafting in Washn and that wld be given further info when preliminary coordination achieved. HICOM authorized to do so.

ACHESON

No. 106

662.001/6-252: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, June 2, 1952—2 p.m.

3182. Reply to Sov note. Our recommendations on this score stem from our reading of larger picture of power struggle as seen from Bonn.

As suggested in ourtels 1998 Mar 16 2189 Mar 29[2] we are inclined to opinion first Sov note was a serious move and that important part of note was terms for a peace treaty. Very harshness of these terms, when stripped of Bolshevik cart, gave Sov note a ring of authenticity, a take it or leave it tone. Our impression was and is that Kremlin had therein bluntly indicated basis on which it wld then, now and in indefinite future settle Ger problem by mutual agreement with West.

Altho terms were obviously unacceptable to West, Kremlin may have calculated note as a whole and attendant propaganda wld bemuse FedRep population as to undo our grand design for Europe. This did not occur.

Neither West nor FedRep having taken up Sov offer Kremlin's only positive alternative was to: (1) Strive to outdo in East Ger what we were doing in West and (2) attempt in attendant war of nerves to achieve through intimidation of FedRep and West Europeans what it had failed to accomplish through proposals for Ger unity and neutralization-collapse of integration complex.

Second of these tactics, tough line, has thus far had slight effect in FedRep. It has not reached level discussed in ourtel 2803 May 13[3] necessary to intimidate West Gers. It is however too early to say what effect further GDR and Sov maneuvers will have.

More significant at this juncture is apparent decision to harden East Ger into a thorough going satellite. This is being undertaken through fostering militancy—hence border restrictions and demands for arming youth. End result is serious intensification rather than easing of East-West struggle.

But—and this is an important but—in all of this Kremlin has been careful to appear to leave door open to negotiate solution of Ger problem. That seems to us to be essential part of explanation of last Sov note. Note was more than agitators notebook for propaganda designed to undermine support for Western integration. It was also a protestation for the record of Sov efforts to find a peaceful solution to Ger problem.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

[2] Neither printed. (662.001/3-1652 and 3-2952) For a brief summary of telegram 2189, see footnote 7, Document 80.

[3] Document 145.

Although we appear thus far to have bested Kremlin in this exchange of notes, we feel that larger turn of events warrants no easing of our caution and vigilance. We believe that it cannot be assumed that Kremlin is sobered and incapable of desperate action of one who imagines hostile force slowly closing in on him.

Our only recommendations re reply to Sov note are: (1) Do not let it appear that it is we who terminate exchange of notes or foreclose mtg. (2) Keep to forefront main issue, that it is we who seek peaceful solution of Ger problem.

REBER

No. 107

662A.00/5-2952 Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 3, 1952—7:20 p. m.

7148. In accordance with Tripartite agreement outlined in Paris 7397 rptd London 2076 Moscow 259 Bonn 922 [2] below is text of suggested draft reply to Sov note of May 24 [3] as worked out in Dept. For convenience of reference paras of draft are numbered. Copies being given to Br and Fr Embassies here. After agreement reached in Paris on substance of reply, Dept will be prepared to coordinate final draft with Br and Fr here pursuant to agreed procedure. In view of discussion already held between Sec and other 2 Mins, Dept feels it will not be nec to conduct discussions in Paris on level of Ambs and Fon-Mins but that discussions can be handled by next ranking officials as has been done in previous coordination in Lon.

Draft text fol:

"1. After studying note sent to it by Sov Govt on May 24, 1952, US Govt deeply regrets the lack of concern displayed by Sov Govt with regard to steps which might be taken to bring about free elections in Ger and the consequent unification of Ger. Sov Govt has failed to meet if it has not entirely rejected the 4 concrete and practical proposals made by US Govt in its note of May 13, 1952,[4] the acceptance of which would have made possible a mtg to discuss the specific measures nec to create an all-Ger Govt.

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[1] Drafted by Jessup and Laukhuff, cleared with Bohlen, Perkins, Matthews, and Barbour, and signed by Secretary Acheson. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn. A copy of the draft reply transmitted herein was left with President Truman on June 5. (Memorandum by the Secretary of State, June 5, 662.001/6-552)

[2] Document 105.

[3] Document 102.

"2. The fundamental difference between the position of Sov Govt and that of US Govt is that Sov Govt falls back to its first proposal for immediate negotiations on the terms of the peace treaty before the formation of an all-Ger Govt which cld participate in those negotiations. US Govt on other hand has pointed out that an all-Ger Govt is an essential participant in the negotiation of a peace treaty and that therefore a precondition to such negotiations is the unification of Ger including the establishment of an all-Ger Govt. The unification of Ger in turn depends upon holding of free elections. Accordingly, the essential first step, as US Govt has pointed out, is the holding of free elections as soon as it is determined that appropriate conditions for such free elections exist.

"3. Moreover, Sov Govt insists on moving backward to Potsdam Agreement and re-establishment of 4-power control. Potsdam Agreement was originally designed to cover "the initial control period". Nevertheless, Sov Govt insists that its provisions must 'guide' not only the establishment of Germany's boundaries, but the interim status of an all-Ger Govt and a peace treaty with Ger.

"4. This attitude of Sov Govt clearly implies that the Ger people shld be excluded from negotiation of the peace treaty, thereby turning the clock back 7 years and ignoring the moral and political recovery of the great majority of Ger people who have been free to make that progress. The suggestion of a return to Potsdam patently includes the retention of a Sov veto power, which taken together with present action of Sov Govt to cut Eastern Ger off from association with Eur and outside world, is a clear illustration of Sov purpose for Ger as a whole. It is apparent that the Sov motive can be only to confuse the Ger people, meanwhile impeding the return of sovereignty to West Ger and its re-entry into a productive association with other countries on a normal basis.

"5. The position of the Sov Union blocks impartial investigation of the conditions now prevailing in the Sov Zone. This attitude constitutes opposition to free elections and since such elections are prerequisite to Ger unity, constitutes Sov opposition to the achievement of such unity.

"6. In the circumstances Sov Govt must bear the responsibility for preventing any progress towards unification of Ger. It is the failure of Sov Govt to meet the proposals of US Govt, including the failure to advance any other practical proposals, which causes the delay in unifying Ger and concluding a Ger peace treaty.

"7. The notes of May 13 of the Govts of US, UK and Fr contain specific and constructive proposals for the realization of the essential first steps towards these objectives. These proposals remain open in the hope that after further reflection the Sov Govt will reconsider its position." [5]

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[4] Document 101.

ACHESON

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[5] On June 5 Kennan reported that he believed the thinking underlying this draft was excellent, but the language "lousy", and suggested that when the draft was agreed one person be designated to give it "fluidity, continuity, force of expression and unity of style." (Telegram 1948 from Moscow, 662A.00/6–552)

No. 108

662A.00/6–952: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 9, 1952—7 p.m.

7678. Re Embtel 7650, rptd London 2116, Bonn 947, Moscow 275. [2] At meeting at FonOff this afternoon, La Tournelle presented French draft of reply to Sov note (text in my immediately fol tel [3]) embodying Schuman's proposal contained in my reftel. Rumbold, Brit counselor, also had rough draft along same lines as he had just received word from London that Eden agreed with Schuman's proposal for early four-power meeting, altho he realized this was departure from agmt reached at recent tripartite Mins meeting Paris. (Brit text will be telegraphed this evening. [4])

Achilles asked whether Schuman really desired four-power meeting or whether he merely considered proposal for one good tactics. [5] La Tournelle indicated former, saying Schuman considers Western position now reinforced by signing of contractuals and EDC and that meeting would satisfy at least French opinion which considers final attempt at understanding should be made. Meeting would be held without delay and would not be made dependent upon any prior agmt or fulfillment of conditions. Aim of meeting would be to discuss two points: (1) Conditions for holding free elections, including competence and composition of investigating comm, and (2) Status of all-Ger Govt pending peace treaty. La Tournelle stated that language in French draft "to discuss problems presented by unification of Ger and peace treaty", did not mean that possible substance of peace treaty would be discussed. On contrary, he hoped agenda could be limited to above two points. Furthermore, although Western note itself should not give impression of being "ultimatum" by demanding lifting of recent Sov restrictive measures, Western Allies would make clear at outset of talks that no agmt possible until situation returned to normal. [6]

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] In telegram 7650 Dunn reported that Robert Schuman had told him on June 7 that the West was now in such a strong position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that it should propose an immediate four-power meeting in its reply to the Soviet note. (740.5/6–752)

[3] Telegram 7679, *infra.*

[4] The British draft reply, prepared by Rumbold based on his understanding of the Foreign Office position, was transmitted in telegram 7683 from Paris, June 9. (740.5/6–952)

[5] On June 10, in response to instructions from the Department of State (telegram 7250 to Paris, June 9, 740.5/6–752), Ambassador Dunn discussed the proposal for a four-power meeting with Schuman, and indicated the reasons why the United States opposed such a meeting. Schuman stated that he had made the suggestion as a tactic to show that the Soviet Union was really against German unification, while at the same time showing that the West was not avoiding the question. Schuman promised to give the proposal further thought in view of the U.S. reaction and would consult with the French Cabinet.

Asked at what level Schuman envisaged talks, La Tournelle replied "FonMins or their deputies", in response to question from Rumbold, indicated that "deputies" might be Ambs but not HICOMs.

Meeting was adjourned until we receive instructions from Dept re Schuman proposal for early meeting.

DUNN

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[6] For documentation on measures restricting access and communication with Berlin, imposed after the signing of the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty, see Documents 532 ff.

No. 109

662A.00/6-952: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 9, 1952—7 p.m.

7679. Re Embtel 7678. [2] Following is French draft reply:

Begin verbatim text.

The French Govt regrets to note that the various questions which it put to Sov Govt in its note of May 11, with a view to facilitating conversations between the four govts on subj of the formation of the free unified Ger Govt which could participate in the negotiation of a peace treaty with US, Great Britain, USSR and France, were not answered in Sov note of May 24.

The French Govt proposed that consideration be given, as an alternative to UN comm which it prefers, to any specific and practical suggestion by the Sov Govt with respect to an impartial commission of inquiry. The Sov Govt ignores this proposal and continues to maintain purely and simply its initial position relative to the establishment of a comm composed of reps of the four powers, a comm which it has already been demonstrated would have difficulty in producing concrete results.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] *Supra.*

The French Govt also proposed a meeting of reps of the Amer, Brit, Sov and French Govts to discuss arrangements for holding free elections throughout Ger at an early date. It maintains that proposal. The Sov Govt nevertheless replies that the French Govt refuses to agree that the four powers should proceed without further delay to examine this question.

The French Govt has emphasized necessity of studying at the same meeting the status of a unified Ger, establishing the nec guarantees of freedom which an all-Ger Govt, resulting from free elections, should enjoy during the period prior to the conclusion of peace. The Sov Govt replies that such a govt must be guided by the Potsdam provisions relative to the initial period of Allied control. It appears to the French Govt that the only concrete proposal envisaged by the Sov Govt is the re-establishment of the system of quadripartite control which has been shown to be impracticable. It is furthermore clear that a Ger Govt subj to such control would not enjoy in practice any freedom in its relations with the four powers and would not be in a position to participate freely with those four govts in the negot of a draft peace treaty.

The French Govt also notes, with regret, that while the Sov Govt in its note repeatedly reaffirms its desire for the unification of Ger, it has just adopted without plausible motive a series of measures in the Sov Zone which tend to prevent all contact between Gers and to aggravate the arbitrary division of Ger despite its insupportable character for the Gers. The French Govt considers that it must emphasize that the agmts recently signed with Federal Republic, far from compromising the unification of Ger, tend toward the peaceful re-establishment of Ger unity and expressly reserve the competence of the four powers with a view to establishing a peace treaty freely negotiated between them and the Ger Govt.

The French Govt, while accordingly renewing its previous proposals, is no less prepared to contemplate an immediate meeting of reps of the four powers for the purpose of discussing the problem presented by the unification of Ger and the peace treaty. It hopes that the Sov Govt will agree and thus permit the prompt establishment of a rep all-Ger Govt. [3]

End verbatim text.

DUNN

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[3] On June 11 the Embassy in Paris reported that Eden had accepted the first five paragraphs of this draft, but proposed the following text for the sixth and seventh:

"The French Govt have already pointed out that the terms of the eventual peace treaty cannot form the subject of negots between the four powers before an all Ger Govt has been formed which can take part in the negots. The Sov Govt themselves recognized in their note of March 10 that peace treaty must be drafted with direct participation of an all German Govt. Programme proposed in French Govt's note of May 13 was designed to enable four powers to reach early agreement on formation

Continued

No. 110

662.001/6-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 10, 1952—7:05 p.m.

6522. Personal from Sec to Ambs Gifford and Dunn. I wish you wld see Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman and convey my views in regard to the proposals which have just been made concerning the reply to the last Sov note.

I have been frankly astonished to receive word that Mr. Schuman and Mr. Eden are now proposing that we shld reverse the line upon which we reached agreement in our conversations in Paris 2 weeks ago and that we shld now propose an immediate mtg with the Sovs. We discussed this question fully at Paris among ourselves and we reached a decision which still seems to me to be the right decision. We had decided to go ahead and press in every way to secure the NEC ratifications so that the Conventions with Ger and EDC Treaty cld be put into effect at the earliest possible moment. If we maintain the momentum which we have already established, I am sure that we will be able to carry through with this plan. In the series of notes which we exchanged with the Sovs, we had as Mr. Eden said to me in Paris "won the battle of the notes". In our last note we put up to them certain definite proposals to which we agreed the Sov reply was utterly unresponsive. We agreed therefore that in our next note we shld point out these facts but also indicate that the proposals already made are still open. If we shld now reverse our direction and propose an immediate mtg particu-

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of such a govt so that a peace treaty could then be negotiated and concluded. In order to avoid further delay, French Govt, in concert with Her Majesty's Govt and US Govt, now invite Sov Govt to take part in early meeting of reps of four govts. This meeting would discuss: (1) How to set up an impartial commission to investigate conditions to enable free elections to be held throughout Germany; (2) The rest of the programme for the formation of an all German Govt contained in final para of French Govt's note of May 13.

"Since the Sov Govt have repeatedly expressed their desire for an early meeting in preference to continued exchanges of notes, the French Govt trust that present proposal will commend itself to them. As soon as Sov Govt signify their acceptance of it arrangements can be made for the place, date and precise form of the meeting." (Telegram 7738, 662A.00/6-1152)

The same day the Embassy reported further that the French had approved this revision. (Telegram 7740, 662A.00/6-1152)

[1] Drafted and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup and cleared with Laukhuff, Riddleberger, Perkins, Barbour, Bohlen, Matthews, Nitze, Bruce, and Secretary Acheson. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Bonn and Moscow.

larly in such broad terms as have been suggested, we wld be in effect denying the soundness of the position taken in our previous notes. It wld seem in many quarters that we had abandoned a firm position which had been generally accepted in the public opinion of Ger, Fr, Great Britain and US. The effect of such a proposal upon the Senate here wld, I think, be very serious. We opened our hearings before the Senate Committee this morning, and we have every reason to believe that if we pursue our present line we can secure ratification promptly.[2] If we give the appearance of changing our whole plan of campaign, it will be hard to convince the Senate that they shld continue to give priority to this matter. As already explained in Deptel 7259 to Paris rptd 6486 to London, 3575 to Bonn and 854 to Moscow,[3] it is also our judgment that such a proposal might well have disastrous effect upon Adenauer's effort to secure prompt ratification in Ger, and you shld restate arguments in third para reftel personally to FonMin.

I think you shld also make it clear to Mr. Eden that I am baffled that this sudden reversal of UK position on matter of major significance has occurred without a word of explanation to me. It may be that Mr. Schuman's explanation as reported in Paris 7650 rptd to London 2116, Bonn 947, Moscow 275[4] was intended by him to be an explanation of his point of view, but I did not find there any reference to any fact which was different from those which we considered when our previous agreement was reached.

Remind Eden that he and I had long discussion this subject Paris May 26.[5] It was Eden who said we shld make clear in reply that there wld be no mtg with Sovs until they had answered questions in our last note. He further said Western public opinion had been entirely won over and I agreed. At Tri mtg May 28[6] Eden stated that reply shld state the West regretted the Russians had refused their offer but that the offer remained open. He agreed with what I had said, namely if there were to be any talks they shld be low level but it was better to terminate the exchange. The 3 Mins agreed the reply shld take this line, Mr. Schuman adding reply shld not give impression withdrawing earlier proposals.

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[2] Senate hearings on the contractual agreements began on June 10. On July 1 the Senate voted ratification, 77 to 5.

[3] The arguments in paragraph 3 of this message stated that the French proposal would represent a weakening of the Western position, that it would confuse and weaken German opinion, that the Soviet Union would consider it as an indication of weakness, and finally that it would detract from the strength of the Western position which had been to concentrate on the single clear issue of popular elections. (740.5/6-752)

[4] See footnote 2, Document 108.

[5] Regarding this meeting, see footnote 3, Document 105.

[6] For a report on this meeting, see Document 105.

I wish to urge with all of the earnestness which I can express that we shld go ahead along the lines of the agreement which we reached in our Paris conversations and that we shld not show any sign of wavering.[7]

ACHESON

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[7] On June 11 Dunn reported that he had just seen Schuman and had "put to him strongly" the points outlined in this telegram. Schuman reiterated his belief that the French proposal would indicate the true Soviet position on German unification better than a continued exchange of notes. Dunn summarized Schuman's position as follows:

"I must advise you that Schuman holds very firmly to his position, that he frankly bases it on French state of mind and that Eden's agreement with him naturally strengthens his insistence upon it." (Telegram 7744, 662A.00/6-1152)

No. 111

662.001/6-1252: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, June 12, 1952—7 p.m.

5677. I saw Eden this afternoon and presented your views as expressed in Deptel 6522[2] on Brit-Fr position on reply to latest Sov note. He expressed regret at difficulties which he had apparently caused, and went on to say that he had, of course, taken a very different position than that originally expressed by the Fr, adding that the Fr had just informed him they were now in full agrmt modification of Fr draft which he had proposed (Paris tel 7738, June 11[3]). He said that his thought had merely been that with respect to an impartial investigation of conditions in Ger we shld say in substance "since you are not prepared to write about it, we are prepared to talk about it."

After some discussion he suggested that fourth and fifth sentences Brit draft of last para Fr text (Paris tel 7738) might be changed to read somewhat along the fol lines:

"In order to avoid further delay, Fr Govt, in concert with HMG and US Govt, are prepared to take part in early mtg of reps of four govts to discuss:

"1. How to set up an impartial commission to investigate conditions to enable free elections to be held throughout Ger; 2. The rest of the program for the formation of an all-Ger Govt contained in final para of Fr Govt's note of May 13, provided the Sov Govt will make clear that it is in favor of free elections and the participation of a free all-Ger Govt in the treaty negots."

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] See footnote 3, Document 109.

Adenauer's comments as reported in Bonn tel 3317 of June 11,[4] were also discussed, and Eden thought that if our reply were to insist on Sov answers to all the questions we posed on the second note before we wld agree to a four power mtg, it wld probably create a gen impression which wld be detrimental to our interests. When the possibility of the three HICOMs discussing proposals with Adenauer was mentioned, he said that he saw no objection. He added that he personally felt quite sure that Adenauer wld find his proposal acceptable if it included the modification suggested above.

He agreed with Dept's view expressed in penultimate sentence Deptel 6543 June 11.[5]

He ended by saying that the Fr had expressed the hope, with which he heartily agreed, that this matter can be settled before Secy's arrival in London and need not be included in agenda discussions of three FonMins.[6]

At no time during the discussion did he give any indication of a disposition to recede from the view that we shld drop our insistence on completion of impartial investigation before quadripartite mtg and agree to include the method of holding such an investigation in the agenda of such a mtg. But I believe his suggestion in para 2 above indicates a willingness to strengthen note in other respects so long as it makes the gesture of offering to include impartial investigation in agenda of quadripartite meeting in order to avoid further delay.

Gifford

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[4] In telegram 3317 Reber reported that Chancellor Adenauer was not opposed in principle to a four-power meeting if adequate preparations were made in advance, but he was strongly opposed to a four-power meeting merely for the sake of demonstrating Allied willingness to talk about German unity, which he believed would be fatal to the prospects of ratifying the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty. (762.00/6-1152)

[5] Telegram 6543 informed Gifford that subject to the resolution of the question of a four-power meeting the points raised in the French draft note were not considered to raise any difficulties. The penultimate sentence of this telegram stated that the Department of State saw merit, in particular, in pointing out the inconsistency of the measures which the Soviet Union had taken to isolate East Germany with Soviet professions in favor of unification. (662A.00/6-952)

[6] Secretary Acheson traveled to London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rio in June and July.

No. 112

662.001/6-1252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 12, 1952—7:44 p.m.

6581. Secy called in Br and Fr Ambs this aftn and discussed with them separately existing difference of opinion concerning content of reply to Sov note and press leaks. [2] Re leaks he urged Bonnet to impress upon his Govt importance of stopping any info to press concerning points we are discussing in drafting note. [3] Secy stated we are issuing nothing from the Dept and that he had cancelled his news conference this week thus avoiding questioning. He pointed out to Fr Amb we could not forever refuse to talk if official statements were issued in Paris. To Br Amb Secy said that he had no complaint on this score re Eden's statement in House of Commons [4] and wld make no point of one press story attributed to official spokesman FonOff. Secy did ask Br Amb to transmit earnest plea that clamps be put on any talk about split between 3 Powers. He emphasized again restrictions we have put on here concerning any such info to press.

Regarding substance of difference of opinion concerning mtg with Sovs, Secy said proposal for immed mtg with Sovs wld be grave mistake. He reviewed agreement at Paris and reasons for position then taken. Proposal for mtg now wld jeopardize ratification here and in Ger. Secy reported hearings before Sen Committee went very well and he was hopeful Committee wld bring in report next week. However, proposal for immed mtg with Sovs wld lead Senate to take position that situation might be changed and thus no need for their giving this matter priority.

Secy told Ambs he thought we shld now proceed with actual drafting stage envisaged in Paris talks May 27 [*28* ?] [5] and believed difficulties cld be adjusted in course of drafting. He suggested drafting coordination sessions cld begin here tomorrow. Secy emphasized our first draft [6] in accordance with Paris agreement was not designed for stylistic perfection but merely to raise various points. Draft can be worked out covering points which Fr and Br have emphasized concerning restatement of propositions in last note, leaving door open and again putting up to Sov questions they have not answered. If Sov comes forward with suggestions mtg our conditions that wld be different situation. To Fr Amb Secy emphasized that in course of hearings he had made a statement on No Africa which he believed wld be helpful. Fr Amb confirmed that it was.

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[1] Drafted and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Jessup. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Bonn and Moscow.

[2] Memoranda of Secretary Acheson's conversation with Ambassador Franks and with Ambassador Bonnet and Counselor de Juniac are in file 762.00/6-1252.

[3] Following receipt of the Soviet notes of Apr. 9 and May 24, leaks to the press, apparently originating in Paris, gave rise to comments on the differences among the three Western powers with regard to the drafting of a reply. Documentation on these press leaks is in file 662.001.

[4] For Foreign Secretary Eden's statement to the House of Commons on June 10 concerning contractual relations, the EDC Treaty, and the reply to the Soviet note, see *H.C. Deb 5s*, vol. 502, cols. 32-41.

[5] For a report on this meeting, see telegram 7397, Document 105.

To Br Amb Secy emphasized that proposal for mtg now had not been thought through. He referred to Art 7 of Ger Convention relative to rights and obligations of present and any future all-Ger Govt. [7] He said Ger elections shld lead to Constituent Assembly rather than directly to formation of all-Ger Govt as Schumacher prefers. Although improbable Sovs will go through with elections, we must think through exact situation which wld develop if all-Ger elections held. Reply note shld heavily emphasize importance of determining conditions for elections. Secy further told Br Amb he believed if we got on with drafting here we could probably work out acceptable texts which wld help meet difficulties confronting Eden and Schuman and if a final issue developed this cld be settled when he went to Lon.

Secy further informed Br Amb he had sent message to Eden indicating he was baffled by fact that, after thorough discussion with Eden and Schuman in Paris, he had had no word from Eden regarding the change in position or the reasons for it. [8] He did not wish to press the point, but it did seem to him it would be better that if after ministerial agreement had been reached some telegram cld have been sent indicating that on reconsideration it was felt different line shld be taken.

Regarding procedure for coordination drafting Wash, Bonnet wondered whether this had been agreed in present conversations in Paris and said he had not yet received Fr draft but probably wld receive it by tomorrow. This was only indication by either Amb of any necessity for further instructions to authorize immed Wash mtg on drafting coordination.

Secy agreed with both Ambs on line to be taken with press concerning their conferences as follows. Fr Amb wld say they discussed a number of matters including FE questions in preparation for visit of Letourneau and certain economic questions in Europe.[9] In course of conversation discussed procedures for going forward with coordination of reply Sov note and did not find any difficulties in way of proceeding with this work. Br Amb wld say same except that other matters merely included certain economic questions. Br Amb further stated that if pressed as to existence of basic difference he wld say there was none and cld not be any at this stage when we were at point of merely exchange views. Dept is taking same line with press here.

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[6] Presumably that transmitted in telegram 7148, Document 107.

[7] For text of the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn May 26, see *Senate Q and R*, pp. 89–130. An extract from this convention is printed as Document 53.

[8] Presumably a reference to the message in telegram 6522, Document 110.

ACHESON

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[9] Letourneau visited the United States, June 16–18.

No. 113

662.001/6-1352: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, June 13, 1952—7 p.m.

3359. At Chancellor's request Blankenhorn called on me this afternoon to inform me of Adenauer's concern over Eden's proposal for a mtg with Sovs which Kirkpatrick had described today along lines of draft contained in London's 5677 (rptd Bonn 660, Paris 2455, Moscow 211).[2] Chancellor told Kirkpatrick that, whereas door shld be left open for future negots with Sovs, such a proposal wld have serious effect upon chances of Ger ratification of contracts and EDC. It wld lead to conference without adequate preparation and leave the important points mentioned in allied reply of May 13[3] still open without obtaining any assurances as to free elections or freedom of action of any all-Ger Govt. It wld thus give Sovs full opportunity to confuse public opinion and create impression that allies had abandoned their previous position which had been fully understood in Ger. Chancellor thought Eden's proposal wld have such serious repercussions on Ger opinion that it might force him to reconsider his decision to press for early ratification of treaties. In these circumstances he urged that efforts to clarify the Sov position continue through exchange of notes until after ratification, which he said was now more than ever before possible within six weeks. Chancellor asked me to communicate foregoing urgently to you and Blankenhorn said that Kirkpatrick has agreed to send similar msg to London.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Document 111.

[3] Document 101.

I explained I had intended to call upon Chancellor today to dispel any misunderstanding as to US position which might have been created by leaks to foreign press re differences of opinion over reply to Sovs, and took this occasion to explain our views as outlined in recent tels. Blankenhorn said that these were similar to those held by Chancellor and said he wld inform latter immed.

Kirkpatrick has subsequently telephoned to confirm that Chancellor had stressed importance of the timing of any suggestion for mtg with Sovs. He said he was reporting to London urgency of Chancellor's request that further clarification of Sov position be obtained before suggesting any mtg, thus giving him opportunity to press through ratification. He said Chancellor had also commented upon Eden's proposal for setting up of an impartial commission by pointing out that as at present phrased this wld imply we had completely abandoned UN commission and were suggesting an entirely new approach.[4]

REBER

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[4] On June 15 Reber reported that Blankenhorn had seen him that morning and had stated that the Chancellor was still worried that the proposal for a four-power meeting would be made prior to ratification of the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty. (Telegram 3370 from Bonn, 662A.00/6-1552)

No. 114

Editorial Note

On June 13 a tripartite drafting group headed by Jessup, Franks, and Daridan began meeting in Washington to consider the reply to the Soviet note. At this meeting the French were without instructions, attending informally to take note of the discussion, and Franks and Jessup reviewed the positions of the United Kingdom and the United States on the proposed four-power meeting. The United States also introduced a new draft reply which was transmitted to London and Paris for delivery to Eden and Schuman. The Department of State reported on this meeting in telegram 6619 and transmitted the new draft in telegram 6609 to London, June 13. (662.001/6-1352 and 662A.00/6-952) The initial reaction in Paris and London was favorable, but on June 16 both Schuman and Eden indicated that they still preferred the French draft (telegram 7679, June 9, Document 109) as amended by Eden (footnote 3 to telegram 7679). Two more drafting sessions were held in Washington on June 16 and 17, but no progress other than agreement on the first five paragraphs of the draft reply was made. The reactions of Schuman and Eden were transmitted in telegrams 7856 from Paris and 5713 from London. (662A.00/6-1652 and 662.001/6-1652) The Department of State reported on the meetings of June 16 and 17 in telegrams 6655 and 6677 to London, June 16 and 17. (662.001/6-1652 and 662A.00/6-1752)

No. 115

662A.00/6-1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 19, 1952—8:50 p.m.

7465. Fr and Brit Ambs called on Secy this afternoon to discuss reply to Sov note. [2] Bonnet summarized progression in Fr position ending with stmt of substantial agreement with Eden Gifford formula (reported London's 5677 [3]) (rptd Paris 2455, Bonn 660, Moscow 211) subject to substituting "it being understood four Govts are in favor" in place of "provided Sov Govt will make clear". Bonnet emphasized Fr insistence proposal for meeting must include question of elections and interim status of Ger Govt and not be confined to composition and functions of commission as proposed in last US draft. [4] However Fr were now willing to accept proposal made by Franks reported in Deptel 6655 to London, Paris 7381 (rptd Bonn 3717, Moscow 885) [5] for insertion of words between subpoints i and ii. Franks noted Fr and Brit positions had moved in direction of agreement and inquired whether US still remained adamant.

Secy stated issue was very greatest importance and not mere preference for language. On wisdom of this decision regarding reply to Sov note depends the question of Ger ratification. Secy then reviewed history of note of May 13, its favorable reception, general agreement at Paris that Sov reply was feeble and further agreement at Paris on matter of our further reply. It was now thought we needed to meet some public opinion pressure which was not clearly identified. If note sent as proposed by Fr and Brit we would be committed to meeting involving discussion of interim status of Ger Govt and this would undermine Adenauer and sabotage his plans for ratification. This was not merely US estimate of Ger situation but emphatic stmt of Chancellor who is best judge of Ger opinion. (Franks confirmed that Adenauer had made similar strong stmt to Kirkpatrick.)[6] If Ger ratification is not secured before recess no telling where we would be. Secy then commented briefly on possible disruption of Senate schedule for ratification if note sent as proposed by Fr and Brit but emphasized that Ger situation was all important. Secy said hard to judge public opinion but we can judge effect on our plans of proposal of kind contemplated. We would be taking terrible risk because discussion now of interim status of Ger Govt would open up the deep divisions of opinion among Ger parties and inevitably postpone Bundestag ratification. Our immediate problem is to aid Chancellor to secure ratification. After that we can take care of public opinion problems in Fr and other countries which will confront parliamentary action at later time. If we secure US and Ger ratification we will have two sound pegs which will help ratification elsewhere. If we wreck plans for Ger ratification we would be proceeding down the road to disaster.

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[1] Drafted by Jessup and cleared with Riddleberger. Also sent to London and repeated to Bonn and Moscow.

[2] No other record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Document 111.

[4] Presumably the draft referred to in the editorial note, *supra*.

[5] In telegram 6655, the words in question were, "when agreement has been reached on this". (662.001/6-1652)

Franks agreed with Secy estimate Ger situation but said problem of note must be viewed in broader terms of European opinion concerning whole struggle between East and West for soul of Ger. HMG has carried public support relative to establishment of positions of strength but could not assert that we refuse discussions with Sovs until after these positions fully consolidated. Brit do not expect results from Sov negotiations but insist on sincere attempt to ascertain Sov position. American draft would be interpreted as striking false note and not taking Sovs seriously. He agreed we should not disrupt Adenauer's plans but must consider general Brit and Eur attitudes as well.

Secy expressing understanding this situation pointed out this was not last note and negotiations could continue. He again emphasized importance of timing and necessity of postponing discussion of status of Ger Govt until after Bundestag ratification.

Bonnet indicated Francois Poncet reported less emphatic stmts by Adenauer but later admitted that Chancellor wanted meeting confined to question of elections. He emphasized Fr parliamentary opinion and Schuman consultation with Senators. Fr did not believe note they proposed would be sure to prevent Ger ratification. He said matter was not fully discussed by Ministers at Paris but there was merely preliminary exchange of views. Secy expressed emphatic disagreement reviewing nature of full discussion with

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[6] Regarding Adenauer's conversation with Kirkpatrick on June 13, see telegram 3359, Document 113.

Eden and Schuman and agreement reached. Secy wondered whether Paris and London disagreed with his conclusions regarding situation relative Ger ratification and Adenauer's view. If any doubt existed on this point Adenauer could be approached by the three commissioners. He wondered if London and Paris agreed that note would interfere with Ger ratification they would say that nevertheless it was desirable to send note. Secy suggestion that matter might have to be discussed by three Ministers in London evoked from both Franks and Bonnet hope that agreement could be reached in Washington. All agreed main issue whether suggestion for next meeting should be confined to composition and functions of commission with second meeting after report of commission according to suggestion in note May 13 or whether other points should be discussed at same meeting before Commission reported. In this connection Secy again stressed importance of timing. Secy stated he could not be responsible for hazarding the results of work of one and half years and asked if London and Paris fully appreciated dangers of delay in Ger ratification. He appreciated difficulties confronting Schuman but felt these difficulties would be greater if Ger ratification were not secured. He emphasized that under American proposal there could be meetings with Sovs on status Ger Govt but only at later time.

Both Ambs said they would report fully although Bonnet indicated he had no hope his Govt could agree. It was understood further tripartite meeting would take place when Embassies had received further instructions in light report this meeting.

ACHESON

No. 116

662A.00/6-2552: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, June 25, 1952—7 p.m.

970. For Secretary and Jessup.[2] In temporary absence from Bonn of HICOMers, Berard, Ward and Reber called on Chancellor this morning to ascertain views concerning latest Allied draft reply

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[1] Repeated to Washington, Paris, and Moscow; the source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] Secretary Acheson and Ambassador Jessup were in London for meetings with Eden and Schuman as the first step in a trip which would take the Secretary to Berlin, Vienna, and Rio de Janeiro.

to Sovs (ourtel 966 to London; rptd Dept 3511, Paris 1114, Moscow 152 [3]).

Berard summarized agreed portions of draft Allied reply and outlined two alternative suggestions for mtg as contained in bracketed portions. He further inquired whether new schedule for ratification, i.e., postponement until Sept, had affected Chancellor's views concerning mtg with Sovs.

Chancellor expressed considerable anxiety over press reports and published views of Brit Labor Party that advantage shld be taken of interval between signature and ratification to hold quadripartite mtg for purpose of sounding out sincerity of Sov offer. He said that such reports were creating considerable uncertainty in Ger and were having serious impact upon public opinion here, giving rise to questions as to Allied intentions of negotiating with Sovs behind Ger's back.

As to schedule of ratification, he was convinced Bundestag wld approve agrmts with substantial majority and had accepted a postponement of second and third readings until Sept only in order to eliminate any grounds for criticism that treaties were being rushed through without full parliamentary consideration and because he had been assured by parl leaders that first reading with its vote early in July wld give convincing proof of united Ger decision to accept treaties. He spoke of recent public opinion polls in Ger as showing marked increase in support of Govt's policies.

He did not agree with thesis that another Four Power mtg was necessary to convince public opinion of futility of Sov offer. Whereas he was not opposed to a mtg if it were properly prepared and gave reasonable prospects of success, he felt very strongly that any mtg which wld give Russians possibility of delay wld be a serious mistake and wld play straight into their hands.

In latest reply Sovs had not only ignored essential point raised by Allies in their note of May 13 but had added new demand that future all-Ger govt be subjected to Potsdam decisions which was of course completely unacceptable to Ger. It was essential that Allies shld not give impression that they had receded from position taken in their earlier notes. If it is not clear that Sov demands with respect to neutralization of Ger or reestab of Potsdam controls have been rejected and if any mtg shld take place without prior clarification of Sov position re freedom of action of all-Ger govt to associate itself with Western defense community and to take part in peace negot, any mtg even if limited in scope wld be a victory for Sovs and weaken Allied position in Ger. May 13 note had given Gers confidence as to firmness of Allied position and latter shld insist upon clairification of all points raised in this note.

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[3] Telegram 966 reported that the British and U.S. High Commissioners had urged the French to agree to discuss the differences in the draft reply with Chancellor Adenauer, and that on June 24 Berard had finally received instructions that authorized him to discuss alternative solutions with the Chancellor. (662A.00/6-2452)

Adenauer said he understood alternative proposals, both wld permit mtg to take place if agrmt cld be reached upon necessity of holding free elections, and of full participation of future all-Ger govt in peace treaty negots. In his opinion this was not enough. Other points must equally be clarified prior to any Four Power talks. He re-emphasized that if this were not done, it wld cause serious setback in Ger and EDC. He felt that second alternative, which wld permit preliminary mtg with Sovs for purposes of discussing appointment of a comm to investigate conditions for free elections, even though they had accepted Allied conditions for comm, wld constitute an even more serious recession from position taken on May 13. Chancellor said he feared such mtg wld create sitn in Ger similar to that created by armistice talks in Korea where Sov Union was using discussions merely to strengthen its own position and that of its satellites and delay a corresponding increase in Western strength. In conclusion Adenauer urged that Allies agree to no reply which did not first insist upon obtaining a clear-cut expression of Sov views with respect to all points of Allied note of May 13.

Chancellor subsequently sent word that he is very disturbed over nature of Allied response as described to him this morning and is considering a further personal appeal to Secretary.[4]

McCloy

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[4] On June 26 and 27 Chancellor Adenauer reiterated his concern over prejudicing the favorable Allied position as a result of a premature meeting with the Soviet Union. The Chancellor's concern was reported directly to the Secretary of State in London in telegrams 976 and 980 to London (3544 and 3581 to Washington) from Bonn, June 26 and 27. (662A.00/6-2652 and 6-2752)

No. 117

662.001/6-2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, June 28, 1952—1 a.m.

Secto 26. Three FonMins had long discussion at morning and afternoon sessions draft reply to latest Sov note on Ger which resulted in agreement on amendments to draft text which were sent by earlier wire. [2] Adenauer's fears were carefully considered. Schuman stated, however, that in view of Fr public opinion it was essential to ratification that Sov intentions be revealed at four-power mtg. He thought mtg shld have strictly defined agenda which shld not be reopened and Western Powers shld agree among themselves that it wld not be permitted to run beyond a reasonable period. He thought note shld avoid appearance of trying to avoid mtg as wld be case if note imposed conditions to which satisfactory Sov reply required before mtg cld be held.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

Secy and Eden agreed that account must be taken of Fr requirements and proposed incorporation by refs of para 11 (iv) of note of May 13 [3] in para 7 of new note, to which Schuman agreed. Eden thought no necessity to repeat conditions stated in last sentence para 3 in form requiring explicit Sov acceptance before mtg cld be held and Secy agreed to language now contained in first sentence amended para 7.

There was long discussion of whether note shld propose one mtg or two. Schuman felt strongly that if any interval were permitted between possible agreement on free elections and discussion of status future Ger Govt, the pressure of Ger public opinion wld relegate latter issue to second place and prevent Western Powers from insisting successfully on necessary safeguards. He thought our position in second mtg wld be very weak and that if it were to fail after agreement had been reached on free elections we wld be accused of causing failure.

Secy pointed out that if we agree to discuss status Ger Govt in same mtg as free elections we will face precedent of former mtgs where four powers have gone on to discussion of later items on agenda after failure to agree on earlier. Thus we wld face great risk of being forced into discussion powers of future Ger Govt. If this were to happen Sovs wld insist on repudiation all prior commitments of FedRep and wld interpret our insistence on Ger participation in integration of West as limiting Ger freedom. This wld also raise Art 7 of Contractuals which wld not be to our interest. Secy questioned Schuman's assumption that there wld be a second mtg. He thought Sovs wld fail to agree on composition and functions of impartial comm or wld refuse to accept its report. Given this probability he saw great and unnecessary risk in agreeing now to talk about powers future Ger Govt. A mtg limited to first item wld disclose Sov intentions and satisfy public opinion.

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[2] U.S. minutes of the two tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings on June 27, MTL TRI-1 and MTL TRI-2, are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 111. The amendments under reference here were transmitted in Secto 25 from London, June 25 (662.001/6-2752). The text of the note as approved by the Foreign Ministers at the meetings on June 27, is printed *infra*.

[3] Document 101.

Schuman finally agreed that formulation new para 8 met his requirement that free elections cld not be held before status all-Ger Govt had been discussed. This formulation, since it incorporates by ref the requirement that the report of the impartial commission be available, was satisfactory to us.

Will be noted that amendment to para 1 expressly refutes inference of any retreat from former position. Final sentence para 3 states position on which a conference wld fail at outset unless major change in Sov policy, and given agreement of three powers not to let conference drag on unreasonably wld cause its failure in circumstances favorable to us before Ger ratification note in Sept or Oct. Para 6 also calculated to help Adenauer, as is last sentence new para 8. But whole tenor of note puts onus on Sovs sufficiently to make it unlikely that Sovs will agree to mtg on terms proposed. Secy, therefore, feels he has secured agreement on a text which goes far to meet Adenauer's requirements and that he shld not consider that note adds seriously to his difficulties.

Though mtg is proposed, all our basic positions are reaffirmed and onus is thrown on Sovs for failure to unify Ger. Adenauer must realize necessity reconciling in reply conflict between his views and very strongly held Fr position. Secy will give additional explanations to Hallstein in Berlin and supply McCloy with arguments to use with Adenauer.

ACHESON

No. 118

662A.00/6-3052

Draft Reply to the Soviet Note on Germany, Approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [1]

SECRET [LONDON, June 27, 1952.]

1. In their note of May 13 [2] HMG made various proposals in the hope of facilitating four-power conversations which could lead to

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[1] The source text was attached to a memorandum from Barbour to Matthews, dated June 30, which stated that the draft was being transmitted to the Deputy Under Secretary for his information. The text was also transmitted to Moscow in telegram 7, July 2 (repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn, 662.001/7-252), for coordination with the British and French Embassies on its delivery to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, provided that Adenauer and Reuter approved the text.

[2] Document 101

unification of Germany and negotiation with an all-German Government of a German peace treaty. They observe with regret that the Soviet Government in their note of May 24[3] do not answer these proposals. HMG reaffirm all the views and proposals in their note of May 13. In the present note however they wish to concentrate attention upon the immediate practical problem of procedure for setting up, through free elections, an all-German Government with which a peace treaty can be negotiated.

2. In their note the Soviet Government once more propose simultaneous discussions on peace treaty, unification of Germany, and formation of all-German Government. For their part, HMG maintain their position on this question, namely that an all-German Government must participate in negotiation of peace treaty, and that, therefore, before undertaking such negotiations Germany must be unified and an all-German Government established. Unification of Germany can be achieved only through free elections. Essential first step is obviously determination that conditions necessary for such free elections exist. Second step would be holding of those elections.

3. In regard to the first step, HMG proposed in their note of May 13 that an impartial commission should determine whether there exist throughout Germany conditions necessary for holding of free elections. While pointing out great advantages of using UN Commission, HMG nevertheless offered to consider any other practical and precise proposals for impartial commission which Soviet Government might advance. Soviet Government advances no such proposals and limits itself to maintaining its position on appointment of commission to carry out this verification by agreement among Four Powers. It is not clear to HMG whether Soviet Government consider that commission should be composed of representatives of Four Powers or merely that Four Powers should agree on its composition, and HMG would be pleased to receive clarification on this point. HMG remain convinced that commission composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Germany would be unable to reach useful decisions since it could only reflect present differences of opinion among Four Powers as to conditions existing in Federal Republic, in Soviet Zone and in Berlin. HMG consider that if commission is to carry out its work effectively, it should be composed of impartial members, should not be subject to veto or control by Four Powers, and should be empowered to go freely into all parts of Germany and investigate conditions bearing on the possibility of holding free elections.

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[3] Document 102.

4. In regard to the second step, HMG similarly proposed that as soon as commission's report was ready there should be a meeting of the representatives of the US, French, Soviet and UK Governments to discuss early holding of free elections throughout Germany, including creation where necessary of appropriate conditions. HMG maintain this proposal to which Soviet Government have not yet replied.

5. HMG further proposed to examine at this same meeting assurances to be given by Four Powers that the all-German Government formed as a result of these free elections will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before a peace treaty comes into effect. It is the understanding of HMG that the only concrete proposal envisaged by the Soviet Government is that the all-German Government must be guided by Potsdam decisions. This would mean re-establishment of quadripartite system of control which was originally designed to cover only "initial control period". An arrangement of this kind would revive a system of control which proved to be impracticable and would, moreover, ignore whole evolution of events in Germany in recent year. A German Government subjected to such control would in practice enjoy no freedom in its relations with the Four Powers and would not be in a position to participate freely with four above-mentioned governments in the negotiation of draft peace treaty.

6. HMG also observe, with concern, that while the Soviet Government in its notes repeatedly reaffirms its desire for unification of Germany, it has recently adopted without any justification a series of measures in the Soviet Zone and in Berlin which tend to prevent all contact between Germans living in territory under Soviet occupation and 50,000,000 Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Western sectors of Berlin. These measures aggravate the arbitrary division of Germany. HMG wish to emphasize that agreements recently signed with the Federal Republic open up to Germany wide and free association with other nations of Europe. These agreements reaffirm determination of Three Powers and the Federal Republic to promote unification of Germany. Moreover, they expressly reserve competence of Three Powers with the view to drawing up of a peace treaty freely negotiated between Four Powers and Germany.

7. In order to avoid further delay HMG, in concert with the French Government and the United States Government, and after consultation with the German Federal Republic and with the German authorities in Berlin, propose that there should be an early meeting of representatives of the four governments, provided it is understood that the four governments are in favor of free elections throughout Germany and of the participation of a free all-

German Government in the negotiation of a German peace treaty. The purpose of this meeting would be to reach agreement on the first question which must be settled if further progress is to be made, namely, the composition and functions of the commission of investigation to determine whether the conditions necessary for free elections exist. HMG propose that the representatives discuss:

i. The selection of members of the commission in such a way as to ensure its impartiality.
ii. The functions of the commission with a view to insuring its complete independence to make recommendations to the Four Powers.
iii. The authority of the commission to carry out its investigation in full freedom and without interference.

8. In order that free elections can be held it will also be necessary to reach agreement on the programme for the formation of an all-German Government as proposed in paragraph 11 (iv) of HMG's note of May 13. HMG therefore repeat that proposal for the discussion of these further important issues by representatives of the Four Powers. When such agreement is reached it will then be possible to proceed to the unification of Germany.

9. Since Soviet Government have repeatedly expressed their desire for an early meeting in preference to continued exchanges of notes, HMG trust that the present proposal will commend itself to them.

No. 119

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 113: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET VIENNA, June 29, 1952—7 p.m.

Secto 50. Hallstein breakfasted with Secy and McCloy this morning. [2] Perkins, Jessup and interpreter also present.

Hallstein had read text draft reply [3] before mtg and commented on basis first reading, reserving Adenauer's position after study of text.

Hallstein emphasized Adenauer's desire delay mtg until after Ger ratification now expected middle Sept. However mtg on proper conditions and with limited agenda does not seem objectionable.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] The breakfast was held at 8:30 a.m. in Berlin. Regarding Secretary Acheson's visit to Berlin, see telegram 1375, Document 551. Regarding his trip to Vienna, see Document 805.

[3] *Supra.*

Two most important points to mention are free elections and freedom of all Ger Govt to associate with West. However reply did not emphasize these to exclusion of others, since otherwise impression created West Powers giving in on those points not specifically reiterated.

Other points of equal importance re (1) Ger participation in Peace Treaty negots (2) freedom of action before and after ratification, rejection of Potsdam and four-power control (3) freedom to continue under agreements signed with West Powers and rejection of neutralism and (4) no abandonment of Eur Federation, no natl army, and no recognition Oder-Niesse line.

In connection with free elections important to emphasize necessity for appropriate guarantees both before and after elections.

Chancellor also attaches great importance to making clear that reply does not open new era of confs which wld preclude further discussion of other issues in exchange of notes.

Hallstein repeated familiar arguments about not losing momentum and stressed recent SPD resolution favoring four-power conf unification.[4]

After some detailed discussion of particular sentences in draft reply, Secy summarized situation. He anticipated another confused reply from Sovs which wld try to broaden the basis for a conf. Since Fr and to some extent Brit opinion were urging that a mtg be held on a broader basis, we might find ourselves engaged in further argument on this question during Aug. Since we had succeeded in London in reaching agreement on present text overcoming some Fr reluctance, Secy hoped it wld not be necessary to reopen the negot on the draft. It is quite possible Fr attitude may have stiffened by Aug. Recent development Fr Socialist attitude fol Guy Mollet was one encouraging aspect. Moreover Secy doubted whether Sovs wld accept invitation to proposed mtg.

Hallstein said he appreciated difficulty of reopening negot with Fr and wld bring this point to Adenauer's attention.

Secy said he and Eden and Schuman had agreed that if conf was held, we sld refuse to be drawn into prolnged propaganda discussion. If Sovs attempted to go outside of fixed agenda we wld walk out of mtg.

Hallstein will report to Adenauer in Frankfort tomorrow and McCloy with other commissioners will see Adenauer in Bonn Tues. In agreeing on these arrangements Secy noted three Mins in London had agreed to accept one week delay which Adenauer had requested.

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[4] For the statement by the Executive Committee of the SPD, May 27, concerning the Soviet note of May 24, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, p. 96.

After Hallstein's departure Gen Mathewson joined in discussion of procedure for consulting Reuter. Mathewson recalled May 13 note was discussed with Reuter in the month as [*he*?] was chairman and tactful handling had resulted in Reuter's approval contrasting with irritation induced on previous occasion by brusque handling of Fr chairman. Since Fr commandant is again chairman, McCloy will discuss substance of reply with Reuter at dinner this evening. [5] Mathewson will seek immed concurrence Fr and UK commandants for formal mtg with Reuter tomorrow. [6]

ACHESON

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[5] According to McCloy's diary (lot 57 F 24, box 14), he had tea with Reuter at 5 p.m. on June 29, but no record of any discussion at that time of the reply to the Soviet note has been found in Deparment of State files.

[6] On July 2 Reuter was shown the text of the draft reply and on the following day he told the British Commandant that he had no comment or objection to make on it. (Telegram 14 from Berlin, July 3, 662A.00/7-352)

No. 120

662A.00/7-352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET BONN, July 3, 1952—8 p.m.

17. For Jessup from McCloy. [2] Fol is summary first part mtg Chancellor and High Commissioners (Ward, Poncet, McCloy) on three Western Powers reply to Sov note of 24 May held 3 July. [3] First part of mtg devoted discussion Chancellor's note of 2 July on paras 5 and 6 of draft reply. [4] (Ref Bonn to London 9, rptd Dept 26, Paris 11 of 3 July [5]) Chancellor emphasized at outset that last sentences paras 5 and 6 of draft reply had raised serious questions re-

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[1] Repeated to London and Washington; the source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] When Secretary Acheson left Berlin for Vienna, Ambassador Jessup went to Paris to be ready to act as the U.S. representative on any tripartite drafting group which might be established to deal with suggestions that were made by Adenauer and Reuter concerning the draft reply to the Soviet note.

[3] For a summary of the second part of the meeting, see telegram 18, *infra*.

[4] Document 118.

[5] Telegram 9 transmitted the text of the note of July 2 from Chancellor Adenauer and a brief summary of a personal letter to McCloy. The substance of the note is the same as the points made by the Chancellor in his meeting with the High Commissioners on July 3 and reported to Jessup in this telegram and telegram 18, *infra*. In the personal letter Adenauer stated that unless his desiderata were met he could not conscientiously present the draft to the Bundestag without expressing his concern about it. (662A.00/7-352)

garding general convention and reservation of Allied rights. He wld be obliged inform Cabinet and coalition leaders on this point in next few days and issue wld certainly be raised at Bundestag debate next Wednesday. He had thought of postponing debate until point was cleared up but had reconsidered in view fact such postponement wld not look well in light early ratification conventions by US Senate. [6] He then rptd at length argument contained in text his note. Last sentences paras 5 and 6, he said, implied that 3 powers interpreted articles 2 and 7 of general agreement [7] as meaning that future peace treaty with Ger wld first be negotiated by four powers and then discussed with all-Ger Govt. In those circumstances such all-Ger Govt wld be confronted with draft treaty already agreed upon amongst four powers and while the Ger Govt might be able to obtain concessions on minor points, it wld be told on all important issues that four power agreement already reached cld not be disturbed. He suggested there was analogy here with conditions under which Versailles Treaty negotiated. He reiterated his contention that such procedure was inconsonant both with terms of arts 2 and 7 of gen agreement and spirit of negotiations at which they had been drafted. He cld not agree to interpretation which wld put a future Ger Govt in this position. In view doubts raised in his mind by inclusion two sentences in paras 5 and 6 of draft reply, he asked that question of three powers interpretation of arts 2 and 7 of gen agreement be raised with govts.

In reply, I said that while I cld understand Chancellor's concern that all-Ger Govt shld not be confronted with anything in nature of *fait accompli* or "diktat" I did not see how two sentences in question cld give rise to such concern. Whole purpose of draft paras 5 and 6 was to protect position of Ger Govt and to ensure that treaty negotiations were freely conducted and without any element of "diktat". Chancellor was taking two sentences out of context and reading into them meaning which was very opposite that intended. It seemed to me that this reflected over-sensitivity on part of Chancellor to fear that Allies might come to agreement with Sovs behind Ger Govt's back. Such fear was wholly unwarranted in view of manner in which three powers have conducted their relations with Fed Govt, particularly during past months of negotiations. I doubted whether Allied Govt wld be prepared now to give absolute assurance that under no circumstances wld they hold discussions with Sovs without participation of Ger Govt. Chancellor cld rest assured, however, that Allies had no intention of taking action on matters of substance without consulting Ger Govt. Poncet said Chancellor shld be reassured by spirit and manner in which three powers had conducted their negotiations with Fed Govt in past 8 months. He stressed difference between contractual negotiations and those at Versailles and said fear of repetition of Versailles had become *idee fixe* in Germany.

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[6] The U.S. Senate had ratified the contractual agreements on July 1.

[7] For the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

Ward also urged Chancellor not to take sentences in draft out of context. Chancellor's position was fully met by the final words of para 6, i.e., "peace treaty freely negotiated between the four powers and Ger."

Chancellor's feeling that some ulterior motive must lie behind inclusion questioned sentences was reflected in his repeated questioning as to why this thought had been included in present draft, whereas it had appeared in none of earlier notes to Sovs. He suggested sentences had been included "to appease Russians." When this argument was discussed, Chancellor then implied that US at this time was perhaps unduly concerned with mtg Fr preoccupations. He went on to deplore what he described as darkening of Fr-Ger relations which had worsened because of difficulties over Saar question. He complained that, whereas, he had been personally consulted before Schuman Plan was proposed, he was now left to read in newspapers of new Fr proposals on Eur union.

He concluded by stressing difficulties which a four power conference prior to ratification of conventions wld create for him and said that delay of ratification by such conference wld represent diplomatic triumph for Sovs. He expressed keen disappointment over what he described as display of "lack of courage" in Western Eur during recent weeks.

At conclusion this part of mtg, it was agreed refer to three govts Chancellor's concern as to interpretation they place on arts 2 and 7 of gen agreement.

In my opinion, Chancellor has not been completely frank with us over this issue, and may not be giving all reasons for his outburst over this relatively insignificant matter. He is unduly sensitive over any intimation that Allies are discussing Ger whether on tripartite or quadripartite basis in absence of Ger rep.

He complained that in recent mtgs of Mins in London [8] no opportunity had been given FedRep to make its views known to them. He also seems to dread the prospect of being shown a previously prepared draft treaty which to him wld limit extent of "free negotiation." We have all endeavored to reassure him that "freely negotiated" means Ger will have a full voice in determining final conditions of treaty.

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[8] Regarding the discussion of the reply to the Soviet note during the Foreign Ministers meetings in London, see Secto 26, Document 117.

McCLOY

No. 121

662A.00/7-352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, July 3, 1952—8 p.m.

18. For Jessup from McCloy. Fol is second part summary of meeting Chancellor-HICOMers June 3 on text reply to Sov note. [2]

Ward made introductory statement indicating three Mins had done their best to take Chancellor's point of view fully into account. Text statement follows by air.

In conclusion, he emphasized that High Commissioners were authorized to assure Fed Govt that if Sov Govt shld be prepared to hold four-power meeting, three Foreign Ministers have agreed they wld not allow such meeting to drag on once it has become clear that Russian objective was obstruction and delay.

Chancellor said he was grateful for positive assurances given re return to Potsdam regime, but expressed dissatisfaction with general tone of note [3] finding it far weaker than Allied reply of May 13. [4] He said it had been drafted to give full consideration to Fr internal polit problems but none to his own difficulties. He mentioned fol specific objections:

(a) As regards neutralization of Ger, third sentence in para 6 of present draft was much weaker than third sentence of para 3 in May 13 note. Gen sentence in first para of present draft referring to previous notes and proposals was inadequate and shld be strengthened.

(b) Note of May 13 had made it clear that prior to conf, understanding must be reached on examination of fundamental problems. No mention this examination of fundamental problems contained in present draft.

(c) Present draft speaks of free elections, but, in contrast to note of May 13, does not spell out conditions for such free elections. In particular, present draft does not reiterate stipulation that conditions for free elections must be maintained in all parts of Ger, not only on day of voting, but also prior to and thereafter.

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[1] Repeated to London and Washington; the source text is the copy sent to Washington.

[2] For the first part of the summary, see telegram 17, *supra*.

[3] Document 118.

[4] Document 101.

(d) Draft does not make clear what composition on commission of investigation wld be. If UN Commission is to be discarded, it shld be made clear that members of commission are not to be nationals of occupying powers.

(e) With ref to first sentence of para 7, Chancellor asked whether three Mins expected Sovs to indicate positive acceptance of condition contained last clause this sentence. He asked what reaction of three govts wld be if Sovs merely passed over this part of sentence in silence during this part of discussion, Chancellor again emphasized that he was not opposed to limited four-power conf at right time but it was quite evident that he is reluctant to see one held before ratification. He regretted fact that reps of Fed Govt had not been invited to participate in discussions on note in London and said that he felt this was not in keeping with agreements just signed. With ref to first sentence of para 7, he also felt that as a matter of appearance it was not appropriate that authorities of Fed Rep and Berlin shld be placed on the same level.

Chancellor's memo covering these points, and suggestions for modified language will be submitted late this afternoon and forwarded immediately by separate cable.[5]

McCloy

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[5] Telegram 52 from Bonn, July 4. (662A.00/7-452)

No. 122

Editorial Note

Following the meeting with Chancellor Adenauer (see telegrams 17 and 18, Document 120 and *supra*) and the receipt of his recommended changes in the draft reply, a tripartite drafting group, consisting of Jessup, Rumbold, Seydoux, and La Tournelle, began meeting in Paris to consider what revisions could be made in the draft (Document 118) to meet the Chancellor's desiderata. In meetings July 3–7, the members of this group revised the draft, prepared a letter to Adenauer explaining the revisions and giving interpretations of parts of the draft which he had questioned, obtained their respective governments' approval of the new text and the letter, and transmitted both documents to the Allied High Commission for Germany for delivery to the Chancellor. Adenauer raised no objections to the new draft which was then transmitted to the three Western Embassies in Moscow for delivery to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Documentation on these developments, including reports on the meetings of the drafting group and the text of the letter to Adenauer, is in file 662A.00/7-352 through 7-1052.

For text of the note as delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on July 10, see Document 124.

The note was also discussed at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on July 9; for a report on this discussion, see Polto 40 from Paris, July 9, volume V, Part 1, page 309.

No. 123

662A.00/7-852: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, July 8, 1952—7 p.m.

100. In the last few days the Chancellor has become greatly disturbed over the contents of the reply to the Sov note and the implication which he read into it of a possibility of a separate deal between the Allies and Russia over Ger.

From many sources I learn that he is extremely upset and nervous over this thought and it has given him deep disquiet in the course of his preparation for the debates which commence tomorrow.

I believe some of his concern is going to get into the press and I am very afraid it may affect the debate. I did my best to have that para of the reply to the Chancellor's letter of June 3 eliminated which refers to the possibility of a separate contact with the Russians, but due to Fr opposition was not able to get it removed. [2] The alternate language proposed is some improvement but this language is still disquieting, particularly in the form in which the Fr have it. While it is too late now to eliminate this passage and we may get by with a good vote in spite of it, if there is one thing which will cause the Chancellor's majority to fade away, it is just this.

We must remember that our long-range policy demands that we do everything to avoid the possibility of a Russian/Ger alliance.

If we retain the right to deal with the Russians without bringing in the Gers they will demand and use a free hand as well and there are some elements in Ger who wld be quick to take this step if they thought there was any danger of our dealing with the Sovs without Ger participation. In my judgment there is only one way that this fear and this danger can be eliminated and that is by scrupulous action on our part to take the Gers with us in all matters of substance relating to Ger when we deal with the Russians. Our only safe course of conduct is to treat the Gers as equal partners in our future dealings with the Sovs on this issue and hereafter I wld suggest that at least consultation with Gers shld take place from the outset when any matter of substance re Ger is being dealt with by US with the Russians. I think the risks are just too great to justify any other course and, at least while the present Chancellor is in power, we will gain much more by doing so than we cld possibly lose.

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Regarding the letter to Adenauer, see the editorial note, *supra*.

I am not suggesting any change in the procedure and the language which is now agreed upon as delivery will be made this evening of the reply to the Chancellor. I am only urging a course of conduct for the future, but I urge it with deep conviction as to its wisdom and the dangers which any other course entails. [3]

McCloy

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[3] On July 17 Dunn reported that he fully appreciated the arguments presented in this telegram, but he also feared that if they were broached to the French at that time they might encounter serious difficulties since the French press had exhibited considerable resentment over Adenauer's influence on the text and timing of the note. Dunn suggested that following the next Soviet note it would be desirable to obtain Adenauer's views during the drafting, thus avoiding adverse publicity. (Telegram 387 from Paris, 662A.00/7-1752) The Department of State also agreed with the cogency of McCloy's views, but saw the difficulties expressed by Dunn as well. It therefore suggested that Dunn approach the French along the lines he had suggested and attempt to convince them that consultation should be established in the early stages of handling the next note. (Telegram 399 to Paris, July 23, 662A.00/7-1752)

No. 124

The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs [1]

[Moscow, July 10, 1952.]

In its note of May 13 [2] the United States Government made various proposals in the hope of facilitating four power conversations which could lead to the unification of Germany and to the negotiation with an all-German Government of a German peace treaty. It observes with regret that the Soviet Government in its note of May

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[1] The source text is reprinted from Department of State *Bulletin*, July 21, 1952, pp. 92-93. The copy transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry was delivered to Vyshinsky by Kennan at noon (Moscow time) on July 10. (Telegram 74 from Moscow, July 10, 662A.00/7-1052)

[2] A footnote in the source text at this point refers to the text of the May 13 note (Document 101) as printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 26, 1952, pp. 817-819.

24 [3] does not answer these proposals. The United States Government fully maintains the views and proposals in its note of May 13. On this basis it wishes in its present note primarily to concentrate attention upon the immediate practical problem of the procedure for setting up, through free elections, an all-German Government with which a peace treaty can be negotiated.

In its note the Soviet Government once more proposes simultaneous discussions on a peace treaty, the unification of Germany, and the formation of an all-German Government. For its part, the United States Government maintains its position on this question, namely, that an all-German Government must participate in the negotiation of a peace treaty, and that, therefore, before undertaking such negotiations Germany must be unified and an all-German Government established. Unification of Germany can be achieved only through free elections. The essential first step is obviously the determination that conditions necessary for such free elections exist. The second step would be the holding of those elections.

In regard to the first step, the United States Government proposed in its note of May 13 that an impartial Commission should determine whether there exist throughout Germany the conditions necessary for the holding of free elections. While pointing out the great advantages of using the United Nations Commission, the United States Government nevertheless offered to consider any other practical and precise proposals for an impartial Commission which the Soviet Government might advance. The Soviet Government advances no such proposals and limits itself to maintaining its position on the appointment of a Commission to carry out this verification by agreement among the four Powers. It is not clear to the United States Government whether the Soviet Government considers that the Commission should be composed of representatives of the four Powers or merely that the four Powers should agree on its composition, and the United States Government would be pleased to receive clarification on this point. The United States Government remains convinced that a Commission composed solely of nationals of the four Powers would be unable to reach useful decisions since it could only reflect present differences of opinion among the four Powers as to conditions existing in the Federal Republic, in the Soviet Zone and in Berlin. The United States Government considers that if the Commission is to carry out its work effectively, it should be composed of impartial members, should not be subject to veto or control by the four Powers and should be empowered to go freely into all parts of Germany and investigate conditions bearing on the possibility of holding free elections.

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[3] Document 102.

In regard to the second step, the United States Government similarly proposed that as soon as the Commission's report was ready there should be a meeting of representatives of the United States, French, Soviet and United Kingdom Governments to discuss the early holding of free elections throughout Germany, including the creation where necessary of appropriate conditions. The United States Government maintains this proposal to which the Soviet Government has not yet replied. The United States Government repeats what it has stated in paragraph 8 of its note of May 13: "Such free elections can, however, only be held if the necessary conditions exist in all parts of Germany and will be maintained not only on the day of voting, and prior to it, but also thereafter."

The United States Government further proposed to examine at this same meeting the assurance to be given by the four Powers that the all-German Government formed as a result of these free elections will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before the peace treaty comes into effect. It is the understanding of the United States Government that the only concrete proposal envisaged by the Soviet Government is that the all-German Government must be guided by the Potsdam decisions. This would mean the reestablishment of the quadripartite system of control which was originally designed to cover only "the initial control period." An arrangement of this kind would revive a system of control which proved to be impracticable and would, moreover, ignore the whole evolution of events in Germany in recent years. A German Government subjected to such control would in practice enjoy no freedom in its relations with the four Powers and would not be in a position to participate freely with the four above-mentioned Governments in the negotiation of a peace treaty.

The United States Government also observes with concern that while the Soviet Government in its notes repeatedly reaffirms its desire for the unification of Germany, it has recently adopted without any justification a series of measures in the Soviet Zone and in Berlin which tend to prevent all contact between the Germans living in the territory under Soviet occupation and the 50 million Germans in the Federal Republic and in the Western sectors of Berlin. These measures aggravate the arbitrary division of Germany. The United States Government wishes to emphasize that the agreements recently signed with the Federal Republic open up to Germany a wide and free association with the other nations of Europe. The United States Government cannot, as it has already emphasized in its note of May 13, admit that Germany should be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, these agreements reaffirm the determination of the three Powers and the Federal Republic to promote the unification of Germany, and expressly reserve the rights of the three Powers relating to a peace settlement—a peace settlement for the whole of Germany to be freely negotiated by the four Powers and the all-German Government.

In order to avoid further delay, the United States Government, in concert with the French Government and the United Kingdom Government, and after consultation with the German Federal Government and with the German authorities in Berlin, proposes that there should be an early meeting of representatives of the four Governments, provided it is understood that the four Governments are in favor of free elections throughout Germany as described in paragraph 4 of the present note, and of the participation of a free German Government in the negotiation of a German peace treaty. The purpose of this meeting would be to reach agreement on the first question which must be settled if further progress is to be made, namely, the composition and functions of the Commission of investigation to determine whether the conditions necessary for free elections exist. The United States Government proposes that the representatives discuss:

a. The selection of members of the Commission in such a way as to insure its impartiality.

b. The functions of the Commission with a view to insuring its complete independence to make recommendations to the four Powers.

c. The authority of the Commission to carry out its investigation in full freedom and without interference.

In order that free elections can be held it will also be necessary to reach agreement on the program for the formation of an all-German Government, as proposed in paragraph 11 (iv) of the United States Government's note of May 13. The United States Government therefore repeats that proposal for the discussion of these further important issues by representatives of the four Powers. When such agreement is reached it will then be possible to proceed to the unification of Germany.

Since the Soviet Government has repeatedly expressed its desire for an early meeting in preference to continued exchanges of notes, the United States Government trusts that the present proposal will commend itself to the Soviet Government.

D. THE SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 23 AND THE WESTERN REPLY OF SEPTEMBER 23

No. 125

662.001/8-2352

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

RESTRICTED Moscow, August 23, 1952.
[No. 38/US]

In connection with note of Govt USA of July 10 [2] this year, Sov Govt considers it necessary state following:

1. In its note of May 24 [3] as well as in its previous notes, Sov Govt proposed to Govt of USA as well as to governments of GB and Fr to proceed without delay to immediate negotiations concerning a peace treaty with Ger and formation of an all-Ger Govt. Sov Govt in order to facilitate decision of these questions has already on 10 March [4] proposed for joint examination by four governments—the USSR, USA, GB and Fr—its own draft of the basis for a peace treaty with Ger, expressing at the time its readiness to discuss other possible proposals as well on this quest. However, as is known, Govt of USA and also Govts of GB and Fr, evaded immed negotiations with Sov Govt on quest mentioned above.

Note of Govt of USA of July 10 shows that three governments are continuing, just as they formerly did, to delay discussion of such important questions as question about restoration of unity of Ger and conclusion of a Ger peace treaty.

2. Govts of USA, GB and Fr, while delaying exchange of notes with Sov Govt on Ger question, entered into deal with Adenauer Govt. In flagrant violation of Potsdam Agreement the governments of the three powers on May 26 concluded with Bonn Govt a separate so-called "agreement", calling it a convention concerning rels between three Western Powers and Ger FedRep, [5] and fol that on

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[1] The source text is a translation prepared in the Embassy in Moscow and transmitted in telegram 352, Aug. 23. The telegram states that the note was handed to Kennan by Vyshinsky that night. This translation should be compared for minor textual differences with the one in Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 518-521. The Russian language text was transmitted in despatch 71 from Moscow, Aug. 27. (662.001/8-2752) It is also printed in *Izvestiia*, Aug. 24, 1952, and *SSSR s GDR*, pp. 227-234.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 102.

[4] For the Soviet note of Mar. 10, see Document 65.

[5] For the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

27 May there was signed in Paris an "agreement" concerning a so-called "European defense community". Having signed these "agreements" the governments again demonstrated that they were not at all interested either in unification of Ger or in conclusion of a peace treaty with Ger, but were aiming at strengthening and deepening of division of Ger and at tying in W Ger and W Ger army organized by the govts of the three Western Powers with North Atlantic bloc and utilizing W Ger more completely for aggressive purposes of that bloc.

The separate Bonn "agreement" of US, GB and Fr with Adenauer Govt represents open mil alliance plainly pursuing aggressive purposes. This "agreement" legalizes rebirth of Ger militarism, the creation of W Ger mercenary army, headed by fascist Hitlerite generals. We place the word "agreement" in quotation marks, since separate Bonn "agreement" was not freely accepted by Gers of W Ger, it was imposed upon W Ger against will of Ger people.

Govts of three powers are trying in every way to conceal from Ger people the character of separate Bonn "agreement", which is one hostile to their natl interests and dangerous to cause of peace. They are trying in this connection to create impression that "agreement" opens up to Ger possibility for a wide and free association with other nations of Europe, and they wish to make people believe that Govts of US, GB and Fr in some way are striving for creation of all-Ger Govt which, according to their statement, "must have nec freedom of action and powers inherent in a govt". However, content of separate Bonn "agreement" is in direct conflict these assurances. As is evident from text of separate Bonn "agreement", govts three West Powers have fully reserved to themselves so-called "special rights", giving as their motives for this the peculiarities of internatl position Ger. These "special rights" give Govts USA, GB and Fr unlimited possibility stationing their forces on territory W Ger, as well as at any time within their own discretion bringing about in W Ger establishment state of emergency and taking into their own hands full power. Govt USA, and also Govts GB and Fr, have by this "agreement" assured themselves right of intervention on wide scale in internal affairs W Ger up to and including use of armed forces of occupying powers for purposes of imposing their diktat on W Ger.

All this is evidence that Bonn separate "agreement" does not only not open up for Ger any possibility of future free development, as Govt of USA proclaims in its note of July 10, but excludes such a possibility, leaving W Ger in state of complete subordination and dependence on occupying powers, as this has been under occupation statute.

3. Evading immed negots concerning formation of all-Ger Govt and conclusion of treaty of peace, Govt of USA, for purpose disguising its position, raises in note of July 10 quest of guarantees which should be given by Four Powers to effect that all-Ger Govt established as result free elections, would have nec freedom action in course of period prior to entry into effect of peace treaty.

However, there can be no question any "freedom of action" of an all-Ger Govt as long as there exists the separate Bonn "agreement", for Article 7 of which it is evident that very possibility of creation of united Ger is made provisional upon the obligatory retention by the Govts of the Three West Powers of all privileges which were envisaged in the Bonn "agreement" and which deprived Ger her governmental independence and integrity.

It entirely clear that Govt of USA, as well as Govts of GB and Fr, in signing the separate Bonn "agreement", are actually not striving for unification Ger, establishment of all-Ger Govt, and extension to that govt in reality freedom of action. Quest, raised in note of Govt of USA of July 10, concerning guarantees "freedom of action" for future all-Ger Govt is false phrase, designed conceal aspirations of govts of Three West Powers to subordinate Ger entirely to themselves, their aggressive purposes. Insofar as Govt of USA raises in its note 10 July quest concerning guarantees freedom of action of all-Ger Govt, which is immed connected with quest of authority of all-Ger Govt, Sov Govt finds it necessary recall that position of Sov Govt on this quest was exhaustively set forth its note May 24. In this note it was stated "as far as all-Ger Govt and its powers are concerned this govt must, of course, also be guided by Potsdam provisions, but after conclusion of peace treaty by provisions of peace treaty, which must serve establishment of firm peace in Eur". This flows directly from Potsdam Agreement, which established principles on which Ger state—peace-loving, democratic, independent, united, Ger state—must be established. Entire activity of Govt US in West Ger is in plain contradiction these principles.

In connection with this Sov Govt finds it necessary to note that Govt US is interpreting in distorted fashion reference of Sov Govt in its note May 24 to Potsdam Agreement, making it look as though in this note there was envisaged "recreation of Four-Power system of control" although in reality note of Sov Govt May 24 spoke not of establishment of Four-Power system of control, but of necessity for observance of principles of Potsdam Agreement concerning re-establishment Ger as unified independent peace-loving and democratic state.

4. Govt US in note July 10 again raises quest re right Ger people "join other nations in peaceful aims" and conclude appropriate

agreements. In this regard, Sov Govt in note April 9 [6] pointed out the provision contained in Sov draft "basis of peace treaty" regarding obligation of Ger "not enter into any kind coalition or milit alliance directed against any other power which has participated with its armed forces in war against Ger". As is quite evident this provision in no way limits right Ger to join other nations for peaceful purposes. But this provision deprives Ger of possibility of joining such groups as for example North Atlantic bloc which pursues aggressive aims and activity of which represents threat of development of new world war. Sov Govt continues consider that in such provision there is no limitation on sovereign rights Ger state and that such provision is in accordance with agreements Four Powers on Ger quest and fully responds also to interests all states neighboring Ger and equally national interests of Ger itself.

5. Govt US in note July 10 refers to measures carried out at present time in GDR for strengthening its security, stating that these measures in some way "deepening division of Ger" and in some way directed to the prohibition of contact between Gers living in GDR and W Ger.

Such statement has no foundation. As is known Govt GDR has widely published that mentioned measures are taking place at request population which suffers injury on part spies, diversionists, terrorists and contrabandists sent from W Zone Ger with provocatory purposes which directly connected with policy remilitarization Ger and inclusion W Ger preparation new war.

6. In reply Sov Govt's proposal note May 24 to enter joint discussion quests re peace treaty with Ger without delay and creation all-Ger Govt, Govt US states it considers nec [7] Ger peace treaty be worked out before all-Ger Govt created and in view this, it nec limit itself only to creation commission investigation Ger. However, such assertion does not correspond Potsdam Agreement which placed on Council FonMins obligations "prepare peaceful arrangement for Ger in order that document appropriate this end will be accepted by Govt Ger when such govt shall be established".

Sov Govt considers as without any kind of foundation refusal of Govts US, GB and Fr to work out peace treaty with Ger before all-Ger Govt created. It would be incorrect and in no way justified to put off for indefinite time discussion such important quests as quest peace treaty with Ger and re-establishment unity Ger as proposed Govts US, Br and Fr.

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[6] Document 82.

[7] Following a query by the Department of State (telegram 217 to Moscow, Aug. 29, 662.001/8-2952) this word was changed to "impossible". (Telegram 403 from Moscow, Aug. 30, 662.001/8-3052)

As evident proposals of Govt US are designed continue prolong for indefinite time discussion of quest of peace treaty with Ger and reestablishment unity Ger and consequently retain occupation forces in Ger for an indefinite period.

7. Regarding quest creation Comm determine existence Ger conditions for conduct gen free elections, position Sov Govt was set forth already its notes April 9 and May 24. Govt US mentions some sort advantages inspection Ger by such Comm. But proposal for creation internatl Comm inspection Ger and thus to convert Ger into subj investigation cannot be considered other than insult Ger nation. Such proposal can be brought forward only by those who forget that Ger in course of more than 100 years has lived under conditions of parliamentary regime with gen elections and organized polit parties and that therefore it impossible put before Ger such requirements which ordinarily put before backward countries.

As regards composition Comm for investigation existence Ger conditions for conduct gen free elections most objective such Comm would be that created, with agreement Four Powers, by Ger themselves and composed Gers representing, let us say, People's Chamber of GDR and Bundestag W Ger. Such Comm which would not insult Gers at the same time would represent first step of road toward unification of Ger.

As regards inspection of Ger with aim determining existence conditions for conduct free all-Ger elections, it self-evident that first quest is to determine in what measure there are being fulfilled the decisions of Potsdam conf realization of which represent condition for actual free all-ger elections and formation of all-Ger Govt representing will of Ger people. Such a decision of Potsdam conf is decision regarding demilit of Ger in order as mentioned in Potsdam Agreement to "forever prevent rebirth or reorganization of Ger militarism and Naziism" that Ger never again can threaten its neighbors or maintenance of peace throughout the world. Such a decision is realization of polit principles enunciated by Potsdam Agreement regarding Ger which require "elimination of Natl Socialist Party and its affiliates and organizations under its control, dissolution of all Nazi institutions, guaranty that they shall not be reborn in any form, and prohibition of any kind of Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda". To such principles also is related provision of Potsdam conf for "preparation for final reconstruction of Ger polit life on demo basis toward eventual peaceful cooperation of Ger in international life".

8. Govts of US, GB and Fr propose to convene a meeting of representatives of four govts for discussion only of quest of creation, function and powers of a commission for the investigation of existence in Ger of conditions necessary for conduct of free elections. It

may be noted that correspondence on this quest has in some measure reconciled points of view of Sov Govt on one hand and Govt of US as well as Govts of GB and Fr on the other hand, but Sov Govt does not see any foundation for limitation of quests set forth for discussion at meeting of representatives of Four Powers only to quest of above-mentioned commission. In limiting scope of quests put forth for discussion of representatives of mentioned Four Powers and to avoid review of most important quests relating to Ger, Govt of US and also Govts of GB and Fr act as though they were striving that meeting of reps of Four Powers should produce the least possible results or should have absolutely no result. Nonetheless, Sov Govt is prepared to discuss at the meeting of Four Powers proposed by Govts of Three Powers quest of Comm for investigation of conditions for conduct of free elections in all of Ger. But Sov Govt, meanwhile, considers that meeting cannot and should not limit itself to discussion of only this quest. The Sov Govt considers it necessary that this meeting as a matter of first importance discuss such important quests as the peace treaty with Ger and formation of an all-Ger Govt.

Proceeding from foregoing Sov Govt proposes to convene at earliest time and in any case in October of this year a meeting of reps of Four Powers with following agenda:

a. Preparation of peace treaty with Ger.
b. Formation of an all-Ger Govt.
c. Conduct of free all-Ger elections and a comm for verification of existence in Ger of conditions for conduct of such elections, its composition, functions, and powers.

Meanwhile, Sov Govt proposes to discuss at this meeting of Four Powers quest of date of withdrawal from Ger of occupation troops.

Sov Govt proposes also that reps of Ger Democratic Republic and Ger FedRep take part in meeting for examination of appropriate quests.

Sov Govt has sent similar notes also to Govts of GB and Fr.

No. 126

662.001/8-2552: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 25, 1952—7:26 p.m.

1078. 1. Foll are preliminary reactions of Dept to Sov note on Ger. [2]

2. Note does nothing to change view held here for some time that (a) Sovs have accepted ratification of contractuals and EDC as virtual *fait accompli* and (b) Sovs are not ardently desirous of having Four-Power mtg, whatever their intentions were when they wrote first note. (c) Nor are they really desirous of seeing unified democratic Ger as we understand the term. By picking up most vulnerable points in contractuals and by harping on arguments most often heard from Ger opponents of these agreements and of EDC, Sovs hope to stiffen opposition and create as much trouble as possible. By insisting on wide agenda and by otherwise failing to make any helpful move forward, they evidence more desire to embarrass us and brand us as enemies of unity than to move into a mtg.

3. Only two points can be called new in any respect. (a) After implicitly rejecting any internatl Comm as insult to Ger nation, they sug E-W Ger Comm. While new in Sov notes, this is simply continuation of Vishinsky line in UN speech on Comm proposal. [3] Since it is only slight variation on Grotewohl proposal of Sept 15, 1951 [4] for E-W Ger talks on elections, which was rejected by Bundestag (including SPD) and countered by Bundestag appeal for UN Comm, we wld not suppose it wld cause us much trouble with Gers. (b) Sovs sug including Fed Rep and Ger Reps in Four-Power talks on "appropriate questions".

4. Sovs were put on defensive by two points in our last note, (a) ref to return to Four-Power control under Potsdam and (b) ref to divisive methods of Sovs, esp along Ger borders. In denying that (a) correctly reflected their intentions, Sovs have however emphasized afresh necessity to return to Potsdam (demilitarization, etc.), and in process have evaded any further mention of their proposal for Ger defense forces, as set forth in their first note. We suppose this reflects awareness of unfavorable reaction in Ger neutralist and paci-

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared with EE, EUR, G, GER, GPA, and S/A. Also sent to London and Bonn, and repeated to Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] For documentation on the question of establishing a U.N. Commission before the U.N. General Assembly, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1747 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Grotewohl proposals of Sept. 15, 1951, see *ibid.*

fist circles, as well as in both Fr and in E. Eur to idea of purely Ger army.

5. Attempting to make their lure more attractive, they have twice referred to future withdrawal of OCC forces.

6. Dept feels new note is directed primarily at Ger opinion and is a negative, if skillful, rehash of old themes. It opens up no prospect of mtg except on terms which we have repeatedly rejected. It opens up no prospect of agreeing on formation and functions of investigating Comm, which West has always insisted must be first step. Dept is convinced any mtg with Sovs on proposed wide terms of ref cld only be harmful at this time, as calculated to delay Ger and other ratification of EDC and contractuals and thus hinder program of Ger integration and Western strength build-up. We therefore conclude that our task in replying will be to avoid accepting Sov proposal, while keeping open our limited proposal. We shld seek to terminate this futile exchange of notes, but at same time must do so in manner best calculated to demonstrate our continuing support for Ger unity and our continuing readiness to "talk turkey" with Sovs whenever they will do so on common sense basis.

7. It wld be our hope that Brit and Fr analysis will be along similar lines and if so we see advantage their reaching such conclusions with minimum stimulus from us. Consequently foregoing is essentially for ur background and any use you decide to make thereof with FonOff shld be of maximum informality. Bonn may use these views also in conversations with Ger leaders. Dept is particularly desirous of having earliest reports on Ger reactions to note and esp preliminary views of Adenauer and of other leaders both pro and anti govt on best way of replying. [5]

BRUCE

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[5] On Aug. 26 Gifford reported that he had conveyed these preliminary views to Roberts who commented that they seemed to be substantially in accord with British reactions. Roberts particularly liked point 3 (a), but stressed that while the British would also like to terminate the futile exchange, the Allies "must keep the ball in play until ratification". (Telegram 1096 from London, 662.001/8–2652)

For the French and German reactions, see the memorandum of conversation, *infra*, and telegram 980, Document 132.

No. 127

662A.00/8-2752

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Laukhuff)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1952.

Subject: Analysis of Soviet Note of August 23 re Germany.

Participants: M. Gontran deJuniac, Counselor, French Embassy
Perry Laukhuff—GER

M. deJuniac called on me at his request in order to convey the information just received by the French Embassy on the preliminary analysis given to the Soviet note of August 23 [1] by the French Foreign Office. He gave me the incoming telegram to read and pointed out that as it was signed by Maurice Schumann it represented not only the views of the "services" but had the approval of the Minister.

The French analysis was in most respects similar to that already made on a preliminary basis in the Department and I commented on it in these terms to deJuniac. [2] The conclusions drawn by the French Foreign Office were also not substantially different from our own. There was not the slightest hint in the French telegram of any suggestion that we should agree to a meeting on the Soviet terms, a suggestion which had apparently been thrown out by La Tournelle in a conversation with our Embassy in Paris (Paris tel 1197, Aug. 25 [3]).

The chief points made by the French Embassy telegram were the following:

(1) The Soviet note obviously seeks in the first instance to play upon the open and latent opposition in the Federal Republic to certain aspects of the contractual agreements and the European Defense Community Treaty.

(2) The Soviet note, while maintaining that Germany cannot be permitted to participate in "aggressive" organizations such as the EDC and the North Atlantic bloc, conveys the impression that the Soviets would be perfectly agreeable to German participation in most other international activities, perhaps even including the Council of Europe and the Coal and Steel Community. The French

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[1] Document 125.

[2] For the U.S. preliminary views, see telegram 1078, *supra*.

[3] Telegram 1197 transmitted La Tournelle's personal views on the reply to the Soviet note. His conclusions were (a) Soviets had abandoned hope of influencing Western Europe against German integration and were now concentrating on German opinion, (b) the note appeared to be a sign-off, and (c) it might nevertheless be well to agree to a meeting despite the obvious futility. (662A.00/8-2552)

recall, however, that *Pravda* recently described the Coal and steel Community as "aggressive."

(3) The Soviet note seeks to flatter the Germans by proposing that the investigating commission be composed of East and West Germans, and by suggesting participation by East and West Germans in the four-power meeting.

(4) The position established in this note appears to be a withdrawal from the earlier Soviet position. In the second and third Soviet notes, the impression was given that the Soviets were ready to meet with us on the election issue. It is now clear that they have gone back from this readiness and seek to protect themselves against fruitful discussion of this issue by first interposing endless discussion on a peace treaty and other generalities. The French conclude that the Russians felt that the Western powers were becoming really serious about holding free elections, whereas the Soviets on the contrary wish to concentrate on a complete integration of Eastern Germany into the satellite system.

(5) the conclusion reached by the French Foreign Office appears to be that we should not place ourselves in the position of answering the Soviet proposal with an outright "no" but that we should keep the exchange going and should hammer away at the logic of our position that the discussion of a commission and of elections is the first step. Discussion of these points with deJuniac elicited his personal agreement with the idea that we should simply renew our former proposal in some form which would be in fact a rejection of the Soviet proposal but would keep the discussions going on a note-writing basis until after ratifications are out of the way.

No. 128

662.001/8-2752: Telegram

The Ambassador-Designate in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET Moscow, August 27, 1952—2 p.m.

378. Following by way comment on Soviet note and reply suggested my 377, August 27. [2] Content of Soviet reply, taken in conjunction with other events, indicates substantially following present background attitude on part of Soviets.

"Western Powers not seriously interested in compromise over Germany, but are holding out for Soviet capitulation of its interests there, and in absence such capitulation are determined to arm Western Germany and make them nucleus of Western military alliance against Russia. We, Soviet leaders, see in these circumstances no possibility advancing or even protecting our interests through direct results of any negotiations with Western Powers, and consider development of immediate future will depend on answers to questions: (a) Who can succeed in arming his Germans first and best and inspiring them with most militant political morale, and (b) can position of Western Powers in Berlin, and accordingly political resistance of West Berliners, be undermined and shattered by cleverly timed and coordinated erosive actions by Soviet and East German authorities? However, exchanges with Western Powers can be used for demonstrative purpose as means of influencing events which will determine answers these questions and we will play our cards accordingly. This means that instead of getting lured into any move toward free elections in Germany, which would only knock existing cards out of our hands, we will continue propaganda pressure on Western Powers by use usual double talk and continue try to lure or maneuver them into Four Power public discussion of peace treaty in which we think it likely we could put them in awkward position and achieve large-scale bewilderment and loss of confidence among West German Public."

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 377 transmitted some suggestions by Kennan for language which might be incorporated in the reply to the Soviet note. (662.001/8-2752)

This doubtless coincides with long-standing western analysis, but feel it useful recapitulate it for sake of clarity.

Two things stand out in my mind as worthy of note in connection with above positions: (a) It rests on sincere belief Western Powers unwilling consider any realistic compromise of conflicting interests in Germany and wld not accept unification of country and withdrawal of forces, even if this were offered them unconditionally, unless it were clear Germany would remain in state of complete military subordination and alliance with US-dominated coalition. (b) It counts on continued Soviet ability to get away generally with propagandistic use of "algebraic" terms, such as peace, democracy, aggression, etc., to which Moscow wishes to have taken at traditional value by world public opinion for propaganda purposes but into which it would expect to insert wholly different content whenever question arises of delivery on commitments.

With regard course of action to be followed at present juncture, see substantially three alternatives:

1. Continue in effect present exchange, commenting in detail on various points of Soviet note and restating our position as done in previous items this exchange, trying at one and same time to show that we do not utterly disfavor unification yet not to arouse German hopes which would effect progress toward Western integration.

Personally see nothing to be gained by this. Communications at which we arrive in this manner seem to be over-complicated, full of heavily compromised, involved and ineffective language, in certain respects noticeably ingenuous, repetitive and unconvincing. They do not lead to agreement. They do not modify in any important way Soviet attitudes. They do not appear to me to have any strong positive propaganda effect. They succeed, or have thus far succeeded, in buying time but probably at price of wearying public attention and encouraging apathy and cynicism about such diplomatic exchanges generally. Surely, whatever positive elements they may have had are now strongly subject to law of diminishing returns.

2. To drop demonstrative exchange of notes and attempt confidential discussion of German problem with Russia on oral diplomatic level, with view to seeing how much of Soviet position rests on genuine and serious misapprehensions about our intentions and position (at best this is only part, but perhaps not an unimportant one) and to ascertaining what form of compromise, if any, Soviets would be willing make on German problem.

I am aware of difficulties and dangers attendant on this course and of fact it would be viewed with particular alarm at present in light effect on ratification contractuals and EDC. Am not recommending we adopt it as this juncture. But feel we must reconcile ourselves to coming to it sooner or later. Longer I remain here more I am inclined feel that in shrinking from genuine contact with Soviet Government on these and other great points of difference between us, we are making mistake from long term standpoint and that we would be better advised to barge right through with such discussions, stating our case instantly to Soviet officials, going to heart of our differences with them, arguing with them on their distortions of language, and accepting whatever hardships this may involve by way of leaks, rumors and distortions. We would suffer many tumbles and bruises in this painful process, but failing to do it and talking only at arms length for demonstrative purposes I think we are in general playing Soviet's game rather than our own. This, however, depends in case of German problem on wider considerations on which I am not competent to comment, and assumes in particular that Western Powers are united in really wanting German unification and in their view as to price they would be prepared pay to get it.

3. To terminate correspondence by calling Soviets on their ruse of doubletalk, pointing out futility of general discussions conducted in terms which mean wholly different things to different people, subsuming in precise and concrete form practical terms on which we would be prepared sanction progress toward German unity, and indicating readiness to renew exchanges when Soviets inclined do business this basis.

This, as Dept will note, is alternative on which suggestions in my 377 were based. It rests on following background considerations:

a. Seems to me that to permit Soviets to continue use customary doubletalk in discussion major international problem is obviously undesirable and no longer necessary, since we today have ample evidence of meanings they attach to their favored propagandistic terms.

b. Dept will note this draft gets away from idea of commission to investigate whether conditions exist, etc., etc. I have never been happy about this particular proposal on our part. It gives impression of archness and insincerity. Everyone knows that as things stand today such conditions do not and could not possibly exist in Eastern Zone and Sector and no UN Commission is needed to prove this point, by same token it misplaces emphasis. If any commission were to be set up with view to paving way for free elections it should be one designed not to examine question to which everyone already knows answer but rather to determine what practical measures would have to be taken, against background existing conditions, to assure free elections in Germany at some specific time. Old formula obviously not clearly understood here and probably led to strange wording of certain passages of Soviet reply. In order to get away from old position without appearing make abrupt change, suggest we slide over this point in coming communication, and get ourselves onto more general position in this respect.

c. Urge re-examine whether we require absolutely identical replies from three governments. Attempt to achieve identity of language involves heavy price in time lost and in outward effectiveness of reply, since it generally means extensive compromising and awkwardness of language. Question whether, provided respective positions are roughly similar and in accord, separate communications by each of three govts, each using approach and language most natural and in character for government concerned, would not have more genuine and convincing ring to public ear than identical communications, which must always necessarily be somewhat forced all around.

d. Whatever language is used would plead for brevity and speed in answer if we hope to give Soviets and world opinion impression of clarity, firmness and incisiveness. Soviet Government is itself obviously uncertain and embarrassed about these exchanges and its own contributions have been somewhat tortured and unconvincing. This gives us excellent opportunity to show ourselves otherwise, and would submit that from standpoint promptness and terseness of reply will be fully as important as details of content.[3]

KENNAN

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[3] On Aug. 30 Ambassador Dunn in Paris commented that he believed the exchange of notes gained the West a substantial advantage and that its possibilities were not yet exhausted, agreed that the United States should be as direct with the Soviet Union as its associates would allow, and agreed that the language of the notes pushed tactfulness close to intellectual dishonesty, but felt different replies would confuse Western opinion. (Telegram 1320, 662.001/8-3052) On Sept. 2 Lyon in Berlin stated that the recent events in the Soviet Zone of Germany thoroughly supported Kennan's analysis. He then submitted an analysis based strictly on developments in the Soviet Zone. (Telegram 375, 662.001/9-252)

No. 129

662.001/8-2952: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 29, 1952—7:17 p.m.

1470. Fol is Dept's draft proposed reply to Sov note on Ger. [2] for discussion in the various capitals and for London's guidance when coordinating talks begin:

"1. On July 10, the US Govt proposed to the Sov Govt that there be a four-power mtg to seek agreement on the composition and functions of a Comm to investigate whether the conditions necessary for free elections exist in all four zones of Ger and in Berlin. [3] The US note pointed out the obvious fact that if any progress is to be made towards sealing the breach now steadily being widened betw the Sov Zone of Ger and the greater part of the country which is under the jurisdiction of the Fed Rep, the first question to be settled is how free elections can be held throughout the country. It was further made clear in the note of July 10 that if this first step cld be undertaken seriously and successfully, future mtgs cld turn to the problems of forming an all-Ger Govt, determining its status, and finally to the terms of a peace treaty to be negotiated with that all-Ger Govt. The US Govt had hoped that in spite of earlier refusals by the Sov Govt to join in practical steps to bring about unity in Ger, the concrete and moderate proposals of July 10 wld induce a more cooperative spirit.

"2. It is with renewed disappointment therefore that the US Govt has noted the Sov Govt's negative reply of Aug 23. Instead of joining the Western powers in an effort to get at the key-log in the jam on Ger unification—i.e. the problem of elections, for which there must first be suitable conditions created, if a free and democratic all-Ger Govt is to result—the Sov Govt offers only a renewal of its earlier insistence on talking first about a Ger peace treaty. Having discussed this point, the Sov Govt wld talk about formation of an all-Ger Govt and finally, apparently as a matter of quite secondary importance, wld talk also about elections and a Comm to investigate the existence of suitable conditions for elections.

"3. With respect to the gen statements of the Sov Govt on the Ger problem in this, as in previous Sov communications, the US

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared with Bonbright, Riddleberger, EE, and S/A. Also sent to Paris and Bonn and repeated to Moscow and Berlin.

[2] Document 125.

[3] For the U.S. note of July 10, see Document 124.

Govt observes that these statements are drawn up in large part in terms inadequate to serve as a basis for profitable discussion of the gen aspects of the subj in question.

"4. The Sov Govt, for example, refers to the Atlantic Pact as an instrument which pursues aggressive aims, and proceeds to discuss the question of the right of a future Ger Govt to assoc itself with other nations for peaceful purposes in the light of this interpretation of the aims of the Atlantic Pact. This represents a unilateral, arbitrary assertion of the Sov Govt, to which neither the US Govt nor any other member of that pact wld be able to agree and which is, therefore, unacceptable as a basis of discussion.

"5. Similarly, the Sov Govt refers to the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement calling for the restoration of Germany as a 'united, independent, peace-loving, democratic state.' The US Govt has learned from the experiences of recent years that these words have meanings for the Sov Govt entirely diff from those with which they have been traditionally associated in either the Russian or Eng (Fr) languages. It notes that Sov statesmen reserve the use of the word *democratic* exclusively for those societies in which monopolistic or dominant political power is exercised by elements recognizing the polit auth of the Commie Party of the Sov Union. The term *independent* appears to have a similar connotation, and is used most frequently in Sov terminology to denote states having the outward trappings of sovereignty but which are actually in a state of marked subordination to Sov Commie influence. The term *peace-loving*, as used in Sov official statements and materials, appears to denote anything which promotes the polit aspirations of Commie Parties recognizing the auth of the Commie Party of the Sov Union; and by the same token it appears that anything which implies resistance to the aspirations of such Commie Parties is portrayed as evidence of war-like and aggressive intent. The Sov Govt by these distortions of the meaning of terms pretends that there has occurred some measure of reconciliation of the points of view of the Govt of the US, the UK and Fr and of the Sov Govt. The US Govt fails to see wherein the previous differences have been bridged in reality.

"6. The US Govt accordingly feels that in existing circumstances discussion had best be confined to the practical steps which each of the parties is prepared to take with a view to overcoming the division of Germany and restoration of that country to normal peacetime status. In its latest note as in the first note, the Sov Govt continues to put the cart before the horse. It continues to relegate to the background the simple and practical question of agreeing on a Comm to see whether free elections can actually be held in all of Ger. Until this is done and suitable conditions exist, elections cannot be held. Until elections are held, no all-Ger Govt can be formed nor can the country be unified. And until an all-Ger Govt is formed and given a suitable status of freedom, it is useless to discuss the terms of a Ger peace treaty. The US Govt for its part wishes to see est for all of Ger an all-Ger Govt which will faithfully reflect the actual electoral strength of all important polit elements in Ger willing to accept the obligations of loyalty and restraint implicit in the operation of a genuine parliamentary system. The Govt of the US is compelled to remind the Sov Govt that conditions have radically altered since 1945 and that the idea of a peace treaty drawn up by the four powers and imposed by them on Germany is entirely unsuitable as procedure in 1952, given the enormous strides made in the Fed Rep towards independent and democratic Govt, a progress we wld expect to go even further in a unified Ger. The Sov Govt must recall that the Potsdam Agrmt stated by its own terms that its polit and econ principles were designed to govern the initial control period only. Nor is the situation aided by the Sov Govt's sug that reps of the Ger regime in the Sov Zone take part in a four-power mtg for 'the examination of approp questions.' Until free elections are held which include that area there will be, unfortunately, no Ger Auth properly qualified to speak for the population of the Sov Zone on such matters as a peace treaty.

"7. Furthermore, since the Sov Govt rejects as 'an insult to the Ger nation' all suggs of an impartial internatl Comm to investigate existing conditions in Ger for their bearing on the holding of free elections, the diff in points of view on this problem do not appear to be growing less. While repeatedly expressing willingness to consider any practical proposal for attaining the desired results, the US Govt has continued to insist that what is needed is a Comm whose members stand apart from the various contentions about conditions, whose members are free from influence by the Occ Powers and who are therefore able to make a useful report. It is no insult to the Ger nation to insist that the best way in which true conditions in the Sov Zone can be exposed and corrected lies through the creation of an uncontrolled outside body. The freely-elected reps of fifty million of the Ger people have themselves declared on Sep 27, 1951 by a unanimous vote of all the non-Commie parties that no fruitful results could come from an attempt to work with the reps of Communism who have imposed their will on the other 17 million Gers.[4] It was thus the Ger people themselves who then proposed the creation of a neutral internatl Comm under UN supervision.

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[4] For the statement of governmental policy on German unity approved by the Bundestag on Sept. 27, 1951, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. I, pp. 209-210, or *Papers and Documents*, pp. 41-44.

"8. The US Govt must insist again on the necess of starting four-power discussions at the only point from which they can logically start, which is the formation of a Comm so that elections can be organized. The need for such a Comm is reinforced more strikingly day by day. The Ger people and the world want to know the truth about alleged conditions of freedom in an area from which kidnappers can issue forth and to which kidnapped persons can be taken and held for weeks, months and years without trial or sign of life. Recent events strengthen this demand. The Ger people and the world want to know the truth about alleged conditions of freedom in an area where farmers and villagers are dispossessed overnight without recourse, in the name of security against non-existent 'spies, diversionists, terrorists, etc.' The people of Ger and the world are not convinced by the information conveyed by a steady stream of thousands of refugees fleeing every month from the Sov Zone that suitable conditions exist there for the holding of free elections. The necess for an impartial Comm is abundantly clear from the 'elections' staged in the Sov Zone in the autumn of 1950, which the Ger people know to have been anything but free and democratic. The world has noted the decision taken at the Jul conference of the Commie Socialist Unity Party that the Sov Zone shld press forward on the road to Communism, thus alienating the Sov Zone still further from the major part of Germany and clearly pushing aside the attainment of a unified democratic Ger. It is precisely because developments in the Sov Zone have not proceeded in the manner envisaged by the Potsdam Agrmt that the proposals of the Sov Govt are now unrealistic.

"9. Under all these circumstances, the US Govt cannot feel that any progress has been made in the six notes which have previously been exchanged. It is anxious, however, to avail itself of any opportunity, however slight, to find a way of ending the division of Ger, now so arbitrarily maintained. This division exists as a festering sore in Eur. It will not be healed by discussions about a hypothetical peace treaty with a country yet lacking all semblance of a unified Govt. It will only be healed by energetically tackling the problem of unifying the country through free elections.

"10. The US Govt therefore renews the proposal made in its note of Jul 10 for a four-power mtg to discuss the formation and functions of an impartial Comm of investigation in order to prepare the way for a subsequent discussion of the program for the formation of an all-Ger Govt. It most earnestly urges the Sov Govt to reconsider its refusal to join the other Powers in a single-minded effort to come to grips with the problem of holding free elections in Ger."

BRUCE

No. 130

662.001/9-252: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, September 2, 1952—10 a.m.

1207. At first meeting yesterday tripartite working group on reply to Soviet note re Germany, both British and French submitted drafts. [2] French draft, which was obviously hastily done, was by tacit agreement dropped as basis of discussion. Altho it was agreed to work from United States draft [3] as being the most comprehensive, British clearly preferred their version of approximately same length as United States. It includes résumé previous exchanges re free elections, and deals more fully and explicitly with new Soviet proposals. General tone less vigorous and plain-spoken than United States draft except for passages dealing with new Soviet proposals. British in particular objected to United States para five as extraneous to argument upholding Western position, as largely propaganda, and, since it is tied to paras three and four referring to charges against Western Powers in first half Soviet note, as giving undue emphasis to such charges, contrary to understanding that they would be dismissed as briefly as possible. British also considered United States note inadequate in treatment of Soviet proposal for Four-power talks.

Drafting group now preparing so-called short draft with minimum reference to Soviet accusation, and longer draft retaining United States para five, for next meeting tripartite group which scheduled for Wednesday morning Sept 3. [4]

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] No copy of the British draft has been found in Department of State files. A copy of the French draft was left at the Department of State on Sept. 3 by an official from the French Embassy and is in file 662A.00/9-452.

[3] Transmitted in telegram 1470, *supra*.

[4] At the meeting on Sept. 3 the drafting group was unable to agree upon a text for the reply, but scheduled another meeting for Sept. 5 after which a new draft would be sent to the three capitals for consideration. (Telegram 1249 from London, Sept. 3, 662.001/9-352)

No. 131

662.001/8-2752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 2, 1952—6:19 p.m.

234. 1. You will have seen from draft note in Deptel to London 1470 (rptd Moscow 220, Paris 1191, Bonn 995, Berlin 123) [2] Dept incorporated verbatim much of language suggested Embtel 377 (rptd London 33, Paris 95, Bonn 24, Berlin 27E. [3] Particularly agree with usefulness seeking puncture Sov double talk on Ger.

2. Have given careful consideration also to views expressed Embtel 378 (rptd London 34, Paris 96, Bonn 25, Berlin 28) [4] as to possible courses of action. Agree fully that tripartite replies cause excessive delay and bad drafting, and believe long continuance of exchange leading to progressive indifference and skepticism. This is due more to Sov notes than to ours, however in Dept's opinion, and we think some of our notes have been well recd publicly and have aided in exposing Sov motives.

3. Wld certainly welcome relief from necessity sending identical replies but conclude this is must. Having followed practice for long time believe departure wld lead Sovs and world to conclude serious differences had arisen among West Powers. Sovs wld see such differences where none really existed. However, notes wld inevitably reflect some differences of approach and emphasis and these wld certainly be exploited.

4. Agree with your doubts that present is proper time begin extensive oral soundings although Dept considers discussion Ger problem orally with Sovs wherever contacts arise or exist which permit it cld certainly well go on in conjuction with notes.

5. You will have noted from Deptel 193 (rptd London 1331, Paris 1078, Bonn 899) [5] we too wld like to terminate correspondence. Do not believe Ger, Fr or Brit opinion will permit us to do this in so many words but have sought in our draft achieve same result by implication.

6. Dept agrees fully with your feeling main emphasis shld be on elections rather than Comm. Have sought in our draft emphasize elections as really important and practical step we strive for and to treat Comm in this context. At same time believe you have over-

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Morris, Barbour, and Williamson. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Document 129.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 128.

[4] Document 128.

[5] Printed as telegram 1078, Document 126.

looked fact western notes of Apr 9 [*May 13*][6] specifically proposed not only that Comm investigate conditions but that it recommend what steps shld be taken create necessary conditions. This proposal was reiterated in our replies July 10.[7] UN res creating a Comm specifically stated this as one of Comm's tasks. Proposal for comm is not archness or insincerity. It is best practical means Dept knows for getting at problem of holding free elections.

7. Dept pleads guilty to sponsoring draft which is longer than we wld wish. If one person cld write all notes and completely control their course, they wld doubtless shape up differently but after considering development of ideas in past notes and anticipated views of our Allies. Dept doubts whether present note can be made more brief.

ACHESON

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[6] Document 101.
[7] Document 124.

No. 132

662.001/9-452: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BONN, September 4, 1952—9 p.m.

980. As previously arranged, HICOMs met with Adenauer this afternoon for discussion Sov note and reply to be made thereto. Chancellor said his views corresponded with what he understood from the press were views of other govts re character of note. In his opinion the press had not laid sufficient emphasis upon fact that acceptance of Sov agenda would mean free elections would follow all other steps and that an interim East Ger regime would be recognized as a legal govt. He considered that Sov note was a retrogressive step and thought that even those who had previously been optimistic now shared this view and recognized Sov intention was to prevent agrmt. Chancellor was nevertheless convinced door should not be closed but that western powers should state readiness to meet with Sovs on basis previously set forth in their earlier communication. They should, however, make it clear that they cannot accept Sov note as a basis for any such mtg.

In response to questions by Kirkpatrick, Chancellor expressed view that note should call attn to UN representative character of

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

GDR and that western powers, instead of being drawn into debate over various points raised by Sov note, should concentrate upon issue of free elections. He added, however, that reply of western powers should also deal with attacks made upon NATO as this would particularly be helpful to him in defending Bonn and Paris agrmts before Bundestag.

Chancellor did not believe that it was neces to make an immed reply but thought it should not be delayed beyond end of Sept.

In response to my ques as to what emphasis should be placed upon Sov ref to Postdam, Chancellor said that it would suffice to refer to position previously taken and to point out that peace treaty based on Potsdam would require some form of Allied control despite Sov protestations in last note and would in any case be imposed rather than a negotiated treaty.

When I referred to possibility of emphasizing free elections rather than placing renewed stress upon impartial commission, Chancellor was insistent that reply must avoid impression that Allies are retreating from position taken in prev notes, and therefore it was necessary to keep commission idea alive.

In short, Chancellor is in agrmt with position so far taken by three western powers and this was confirmed by chairman in mtg.

In light of Chancellor's statements, which accord in general with other views heard here, believe it is desirable that note be shortened to place greater emphasis upon free elections and avoid detailed treatment of all points raised by Sovs. Specifically we suggest dropping para five of Dept draft [2] and using excellent material contained therein in publicizing western reply such as in unilateral statement to be made by Secy. Such an abbreviated version might also contrast "diktat" (word used by Chancellor and strongly recommended here) with freely negotiated settlement and state that while refusing to participate in the imposition of a dictated settlement upon the Ger people, three powers are nevertheless prepared to meet with Sovs to discuss steps to be taken to hold all-Ger elections which would lead to formation of a united Ger govt with which a treaty of peace can then be negotiated.

Donnelly

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[2] Transmitted in telegram 1470, Document 129

No. 133

662.001/9-552: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, September 5, 1952—8 p.m.

1307. Fol is text proposed draft reply to latest Sov note on Ger:

Begin text. HMG have carefully considered the Sov Govt's note of 23 Aug [2] about Ger. They had hoped that it wld have marked some progress towards agreement on the essential question of free all-Ger elections. This must first be settled between the four powers so that Ger can be unified, an all-Ger Govt formed and a peace treaty concluded.

2. Possibly in order to divert attention from this issue, the greater part of the Sov note of 23 Aug is, however, devoted to unfounded attacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the Eur Def Community and the conventions signed at Bonn on 27 May. HMG have no intention of entering into controversy with the Sov Govt on these questions, since their attitude has been clearly stated on many occasions. As they have often emphasized, these agreements are purely defensive and threaten no one. The Bonn conventions and the EDC treaty, far from being imposed on the Ger people and from maintaining them in a state of subservience, are a matter for free discussion and decision by freely elected Parliaments, including, of course, that of the Ger FedRep. Insofar as the Bonn conventions reserve certain strictly limited rights to the three Western Powers, the sole object is to safeguard the principle of Ger unity and to keep the door open for agreement with the Sov Union on the unification of Ger. Facts speak for themselves and HMG do not for their part fear an impartial enquiry into conditions throughout Ger.

3. HMG have noted with the deepest regret that, under the guise of presenting constructive proposals, the Sov note of 23 Aug has in one very important respect gone back upon its own earlier proposals. In its original note of 10 March, [3] the Sov Govt stated, "naturally such a peace treaty must be drafted with the direct participation of an all-Ger Govt" and "the preparation of the peace treaty shld be effected with the participation of Ger in the form of an all-Ger Govt". This was in complete accord with the views of the French, UK and US Govts. In neither of its two fol notes did the Sov Govt imply that it intended to withdraw from this position,

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Document 125.

[3] Document 65.

which was indeed consonant with the statements made over a period of years by the Sov rep in the Council of FonMins. In now proposing to discuss the peace treaty before the formation of an all-Ger Govt, the Sov Govt has completely shifted its ground, thus calling in question what appeared to have been agreed. At the same time they have reverted to the Potsdam decisions. But HMG, whose views on the Potsdam decisions have been set out in their previous notes, are compelled to remind the Sov Govt that conditions have radically changed since 1945 and the idea of a peace treaty drawn up by the Four Powers and imposed by them on Ger is entirely unsuitable in 1952. The Sov Govt will also recall that the Potsdam agreement itself stated that its polit and econ arrangements were designed to govern the initial control period only. HMG cld never agree to a peace treaty being drafted or negotiated without the participation of an all-Ger Govt. Any other procedure wld turn such a treaty into a "diktat". That indeed wld be an insult to the Ger people.

4. The Sov Govt have instead suggested that East Ger reps as well as reps of the Ger FedRep shld "take part in the (four-power) conf during the discussion of relevant questions". HMG must at once state that they are not prepared to accept such a proposal as a substitute for the participation of an all-Ger Govt in the negots. They cannot conceive that a peace treaty for the whole of Ger cld be negotiated with or accepted by any Ger reps other than the all-Ger Govt which wld have to carry it out. Such a govt can only proceed from free elections. In any case, HMG cannot regard reps of the "Ger Democratic Rep" as expressing the will of the East Ger population. Leaving aside the circumstances in which the "Ger Democratic Rep" was set up and is "the govt" appointed, HMG have been shocked by the statement in the Sov note of 23 Aug that the measures recently enforced by the East Ger auths to prevent contact between Gers, and so further divide Ger, were taken "at the request of the population". This assertion alone disposes of any serious claim on the part of the East Ger auths to represent any significant section of the Ger people, since it is wellknown that the first desire of all-Ger is unity in freedom.

5. HMG are, therefore, brought back again to the fundamental question of free elections. They are, however, at a loss to understand the Sov Govt's position. The original Sov note of 10 March made no mention whatever of free elections. In their reply of 25 March,[4] HMG stated that the conclusion of a peace treaty for Ger required the formation of an all-Ger Govt, which cld only be set up on the basis of free elections. The Sov Govt, in their reply of 9

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[4] Regarding this note, see telegram 2209, Document 78.

April,[5] conceded that it was necessary that the Four Powers shld "discuss without delay the question of holding free all-Ger elections". They went on to say that "the recognition by the Govt of USSR, Great Britain, the US and France of the need to hold free all-Ger elections creates the full possibility for holding such elections in the immed future". Thus some progress seemed to have been made also on this issue, altho the actual proposal in the last para of this Sov note again made no mention of free all-Ger elections and suggested only that the four govts shld examine "a peace treaty with Ger as well as the question of unification of Ger and the establishment of an all-Ger Govt". Nevertheless, in their note of 13 May,[6] HMG put forward a precise scheme for an impartial comm to investigate electoral conditions throughout Ger as the necessary prerequisite to the holding of free all-Ger elections. HMG were, therefore, surprised and disappointed by the further Sov note of 24 May,[7] since the Sov Govt's proposal, contained in the concluding section of this note, again avoided all mention of free all-Ger elections. In their note of 10 July,[8] HMG were, therefore, obliged once again to explain the vital importance which they attach to this essential question. They concluded by making definite proposals for the discussion between the Four Powers of the holding of free elections, the formation of an all-Ger Govt and the negotiation of a peace treaty with that govt in that order, since that order alone cld produce early and effective results.

6. In their latest note of 23 Aug,[9] the Sov Govt have yet again evaded this central issue. While the Sov Govt state that they are prepared to discuss "the holding of free all-Ger elections and the setting up of a comm to verify the existence of conditions in Ger for holding such elections, its composition and functions", they are still not ready to settle first things first. Instead, they deem it necessary that the Four Power conf "shld discuss *in the first place* such important issues as a peace treaty with Ger and the formation of an all-Ger Govt". It, therefore, now seems clear that, in the Sov Govt's view, the negot of a peace treaty and the formation of an all-Ger Govt shld precede free all-Ger elections. This is impossible for the simple reason that until elections are held, no all-Ger Govt can be formed nor can the country be unified; and until an all-Ger Govt is formed and given the necessary freedom of action, it is useless to discuss the terms of a Ger peace treaty.

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[5] Document 82.
[6] Document 101.
[7] Document 102.
[8] Document 124.
[9] Document 125.

7. (Para 7 to follow Sept 6).[10]

8. HMG therefore, now turn to the question of the comm of inquiry, having noted that the Sov Govt still agree to the necessity for such a body. The Sov Govt have however, made a new proposal that this comm shld be composed of reps of the People's Assembly of the Ger Democratic Rep and of the Bundestag of the Ger FedRep. HMG have maintained that such a comm, if it is to achieve useful results, shld be composed of members who are genuinely independent, objective and impartial. They cannot but consider that a Ger comm wld be no more able than a four-power comm to meet this requirement. HMG moreover, wld point out that the Sov Govt's present proposal is similar to one made by Herr Grotewohl on the 15 December 1951. This proposal was rejected by the Bundestag, which then put forward the idea of an investigation by an impartial UN comm. It was thus the freely elected reps of 50 millions of the Ger people who themselves proposed the creation of a neutral investigation comm under UN supervision. Nevertheless, HMG remain ready to discuss any practical and precise proposals relating to the composition, functions and auth of the comm of investigation in accordance with their note of the 10 of July.

9. HMG, therefore, renew the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an early four-power mtg—in or before October—to discuss the immed formation and functions of an impartial comm of investigation on free elections. The next step wld be to discuss arrangements for the formation of an all-Ger Govt. When free elections

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[10] The text of paragraph 7 was transmitted in telegram 1320 from London, Sept. 6, and reads as follows:

"For the fol reasons also, HMG insist that genuinely free elections with view to the formation of an all Ger Govt must come first. Over the past 7 years there has been agreement between the three Western Govts and the Soviet Govt that a United Ger shld be 'peaceloving, democratic and independent.' HMG have learned by hard experience in recent years that these terms have one meaning in common parlance and another in the official Sov vocabulary. Sov official pronouncements appear to reserve the word 'democratic' exclusively for those societies in which the Commies have a monopoly of polit power. Similarly, the term 'peace-loving' is applied only to Sov Commie policies and those who follow them, while anything which implies resistance to such policies is labelled as warlike and aggressive. The words 'free' and 'independent' are used to describe states with the outward trappings of sovereignty but actually in a condition of subjection to the Sov Union. The different interpretation of these terms, as laid down for Ger in the Potsdam Agreement, is illustrated by the contrasting results of their application in Eastern and Western Ger. In the Sov Zones, and indeed in the neighboring 'popular democracies' of Eastern Europe, 'freedom' means forced labor, deportations, arrests without trials, and all the other manifestations of the police state. In these territories 'free elections' have hitherto meant 'freedom' for the electorate to cast 98 percent or 99 percent vote in favor of an official single list. It is for the Ger people to choose between these alternative ways of life. But they must be able to make their choice in genuine freedom and full responsibility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect the will of the Ger people and permit the formation of an all-Ger Govt with the necessary freedom of action to discuss and to accept a peace settlement." (662.001/9–652) have taken place and an all-Ger Govt has been formed, the peace settlement (including, of course, "the question of the date of the withdrawal of occupation forces from Ger") can be negotiated. HMG most earnestly urge the Sov Govt to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a singleminded effort to come to grips with the problem of holding free elections in Ger. [11]

End text.

GIFFORD

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[11] On Sept. 8 the Embassies in London and Paris reported that subject to minor drafting changes Eden and Schuman had approved this text. (Telegrams 1326 from London and 1625 from Paris, 662.001/9-852) The reaction to the draft in the Department of State was quite different. On the same day Kellermann transmitted a memorandum to Laukhuff stating "that the consensus of opinion between Washington and London is somewhat less than complete," and indicating that the two drafts could not be harmonized "without drastic concessions by either side or both." (662.001/9-552) This feeling was reported to London in telegram 1696, Sept. 9, which advised that the new draft seemed to bear little resemblance to the Department of State draft (telegram 1470, Document 129). Pending further comments the Embassy in London was told to inform the British and French that the draft was not satisfactory and that the Department of State would probably make new proposals. (662.001/9-552)

No. 134

662.001/9-952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1952—11:57 a. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

1717. 1. In next foll tel, [2] Dept is sending redraft of reply to Sov note on Ger. Present it to your Brit and Fr colleagues for consideration with explanation along foll lines:

2. Dept appreciates effort made to meet its views on para re Sov distortion of terms. Nevertheless, Dept is disappointed in draft worked out in Lond. It is true that its substance is not significantly different from Dept's earlier draft and its conclusion is similar. But it is strongly felt here that Lond draft is verbose, complicated and unclear in drafting, and tortuous in development of ideas. It delves too much into confused history of various notes. It is weak and defensive in rejoinder to Sov criticism of nat, etc. There is too much genteel hand-wringing where we say we are "shocked", "at a loss", "surprised", etc. In short, Dept feels Lond draft suffers from all de-

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared with Calhoun, Jessup, Bonbright, and EE. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1718, *infra*.

fects mentioned in Moscow's 378 (rptd Lond 34, Paris 96, Bonn 25, Berlin 28)[3] and wld have exceptionally weak impact on pub opinion.

3. In effort to improve clarity of phrasing, sequence of ideas and therefore political value and public impact, Dept has prepared redraft, working from Lond draft. You will observe that paras 1, 5 and 7 are virtually same as Lond draft, while first half para 2 and last half para 4 are also practically verbatim from Lond draft. Remainder is mixture from both drafts.[4]

4. Dept's redraft has great merit of being less than half as long as Lond draft, and we recall desirability of brevity has often been stressed by Brit and Fr. We feel its reasoning is simple and clear and is concentrated almost exclusively on issue of free elections. It goes even further than our first draft in direction of subordinating to this issue all else, including idea of Comm, without, however, in any sense abandoning latter. (See example first sentence of para 7 in which Comm is described as "aid to creation of conditions" etc.) It refuses to be drawn into defensive and irrelevant discussion of NATO, EDC and contractuals. We think it hammers very hard at issue Sovs are trying to avoid (elections as only logical starting point) and does so in manner best calculated to appeal to Ger opinion.

5. Note variation in lang in quotes in para 4. We have used lang as received from Moscow.

6. Dept also hopes draft can be speedily agreed, and we note arguments for this in Moscow's 455[5] (not rptd) to effect that if we can burden Kremlin with Eur problems while Chi still there, so much the better. However, we do feel every effort must be made to produce short clear hard-hitting draft.

7. Secy has approved our redraft and shares Eden's view that it may be possible to reach complete agrmt this week.

ACHESON

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[3] Document 128.

[4] The drafts transmitted in telegrams 1470, Document 129, and 1307, *supra*.

[5] Telegram 455, while approving the draft transmitted in telegram 1307, *supra*, stated that prompt delivery would help burden the Soviet Union with European problems at the very time that a Chinese Delegation was in Moscow. (662.001/9-952)

No. 135

662.001/9-1052: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 10, 1952—11:57 a. m.
NIACT PRIORITY

1718. Fol is text of Dept's redraft of note on Ger, as explained in preceding tel: [2]

"1. The US Govt has carefully considered the Sov Govt's note of Aug 23 about Ger. [3] It had hoped that the note wld have marked some progress towards agreement on the essential question of free all-Ger elections. This is the first question which must be settled among the four powers so that Ger can be unified, an all-Ger Govt formed and a peace treaty concluded.

"2. Possibly in order to divert attention from this issue, the greater part of the Sov note of Aug 23 is, however, devoted to wholly unfounded attacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the Eur Defense Community and the Conventions signed at Bonn on May 27 [*26*]. These arbitrary and unilateral assertions of the Sov Govt are naturally unacceptable as a basis of four-power discussions about Ger.

"3. The US Govt must insist on the necessity of starting such four-power discussions at the only point from which they can logically start, which is the organization of free elections. In its note of July 10, [4] the US Govt called attention to the obvious fact that this is the first point which must be settled if any progress is to be made towards sealing the breach now steadily being widened between the Sov Zone of Ger and the greater part of the country which is under the jurisdiction of the FedRep. In its latest note as in its first note, [5] the Sovt Govt, on the other hand, continues to relegate to the background the problem of elections, including the simple and practical question of agreeing on a Com to see whether free elections can actually be held in all of Ger. Until this is done and suitable conditions exist, elections cannot be held. Until elections are held, no all-Ger Govt can be formed, nor can the country be unified. And until an all-Ger Govt is formed and given a suitable status of freedom, it is useless to discuss the terms of a Ger peace treaty.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared with Jessup, Riddleberger, Perkins, and Barbour, and initialed by Secretary Acheson. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1717, *supra*.

[3] Document 125.

[4] Document 124.

[5] Document 65.

"4. The US Govt is compelled to remind the Sov Govt that conditions have altered radically since the four powers agreed at Potsdam in 1945 on certain political and economic principles to govern the initial control period. The idea of a peace treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed by dictate upon Ger is entirely unsuitable in 1952. Until free elections are held which include the Sov Zone, there will be no Ger authority properly qualified to speak for the population of the Sov Zone on such matters as a peace treaty. The Sov Govt has suggested that East Ger representatives as well as representatives of the Ger FedRep shld take part in the four-power mtg 'for the examinations of appropriate questions'. The US Govt must at once state that such a proposal is not a substitute for the participation of an all-Ger Govt in the discussions.

"5. The US Govt insists that genuinely free elections with view to the formation of an all-Ger Govt must come first. Over the past seven years there has been agreement between the three Western Govts and the Sov Govt that a united Ger shld be 'peaceloving, democratic and independent'. The US Govt has learned by hard experience in recent years that these terms have one meaning in common parlance and another in the official Sov vocabulary. Sov official pronouncements appear to reserve the word 'democratic' exclusively for those societies in which the Communists have a monopoly of political power. Similarly, the term 'peaceloving' is applied only to Soviet Communist policies and those who fol them, while anything which implies resistance to such policies is labelled as warlike and aggressive. The words 'free' and 'independent' are used to describe states with the outward trappings of sovereignty but actually in a condition of subjection to the Sov Union. The different interpretation of these terms is illustrated by the contrasting results of their application in Eastern and Western Ger. In the Sov Zone, and indeed in the neighboring 'popular democracies' of Eastern Eur, 'freedom' means forced labor, deportation, arbitrary imprisonment without trial, and all the other manifestations of the police state. In these territories 'free elections' have hitherto meant 'freedom' for the electorate to cast 98 percent or 99 percent vote in favor of an official single list. The contrast between these concepts and those which obtain in Western Ger is perfectly clear. It is for the Ger people to choose between these alternative ways of life. But they must be able to make their choice in genuine freedom and full responsibility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect the will of the Ger people and permit the formation of an all-Ger Govt with the necessary freedom of action to discuss and to accept a peace settlement.

"6. Under all these circumstances, the US Govt cannot feel that any progress has been made in the six notes which have previously been exchanged. It is anxious, however, to avail itself of any opportunity, however slight, to find a way of ending the division of Ger, now so arbitrarily maintained. This division exists as a festering sore in Eur. It will not be healed by discussions about a hypothetical peace treaty with a country yet lacking all semblance of a unified Govt. It will only be healed by energetically tackling the problem of unifying the country through free elections.

"7. The US Govt therefore renews the proposal made in its note of July 10 for a four-power mtg—which could take place in Oct—to discuss the formation and functions of an impartial Comm of investigation as an aid to the creation of the conditions necessary for free elections. The next step wld be to discuss the arrangements for the holding of these elections and for the formation of an all-Ger Govt, as proposed in para 11(4) of the US Govt's note of May 13.[6] When free elections have been held and a govt formed, the peace settlement can be negotiated. The US Govt most earnestly urges the Sov Govt to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a single-minded effort thus to come to grips with the problem of holding free elections in Ger."

ACHESON

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[6] Document 101.

No. 136

662.001/9-1152: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, September 11, 1952—8 p.m.

1436. Dept's draft reply[2] to latest Sov note on Ger was given and explained to British and French at short mtg this morning, and extensively discussed at mtg this afternoon. British argued persistently that London draft[3] shld be used as basis for revision, but finally agreed reluctantly to work from Dept's draft. Fol are principal points raised:

1. Brit feel strongly about retention of historical passages recapitulating Sov position on participation of an all-Ger Govt in peace treaty negots and on free elections, which Eden and top FonOff officials particularly liked. French inclined to agree with US posi-

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 1718, *supra*.

[3] Transmitted in telegram 1307, Document 133.

tion. We are hopeful that Brit will reluctantly go along with us on this course tho they are impressed with effectiveness of "damning Sovs with their own words".

2. Both Brit and French feel strongly that para 2 must contain some direct refutation of accusations in first half Sov note. In this connection Kirkpatrick's account of Adenauer's comments [4] placed special emphasis on value to him of covering these points. Redraft this para being prepared to eliminate defensive tone of London para 2 and also shorten it.

3. Brit and French reps seem prepared to accept idea of going diretly to subj of elections along lines Dept's para 3. Both feel, however, that para 3 in addition to incorporating concluding sentence London draft's para 6 shld also make point that Sovs have now shifted their ground and propose that four-power conf "shld discuss *in the first place*" the peace treaty. Revision Dept's para 3 to cover this point being prepared.

4. Tentatively agree to break Dept's para 4 into 2 short paras, one ending on lines conclusion London draft as para 3 and other concluding along lines conclusion London draft's para 4 which carries particular appeal to Gers.

5. Both Brit and French consider that in a drastically abbreviated note para 5 is now disproportionately long. They have argued from the beginning that discussions Sov misuse of words is irrelevant. Revision this para being attempted which will shorten it without effecting its substance, particularly latter portion dealing with elections.

6. Both Brit and French pointed out that Dept's draft eliminates entirely from the note any comment on the Sov proposal that the commission of investigation be composed of Gers. They feel strongly, and Emb agrees, that this point cannot be ignored. Short para therefore being drafted to insert in Dept's draft after para 5, covering substance of London draft's para 8. It was pointed out that this point is particularly important because SPD in full agreement with Adenauer that FedRep cannot meet with GDR reps.

7. Both Brit and French are unhappy about tone of Dept's para 6, especially the first sentence, which seems to them to imply that we wld be glad to see the exchange of notes terminated. They both feel strongly that the responsibility for terminating the exchange shld rest on the Sov and that we shld carefully avoid any language implying reluctance to continue or desire to cut off exchanges. They cite in this connection opinions expressed at NAC mtg. [5] They also regard para 6 as not necessary to the development of the argument. Redraft being attempted which wld work the last two sentences of para 6 into new opening of para 7, remainder of which remains substantially the same as Dept's draft with fol exceptions:

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[4] Presumably a reference to the meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and the Allied High Commissioners for Germany on Sept. 4, reported on in telegram 980, Document 132.

[5] The reply to the Soviet note of Aug. 23 had been discussed at a North Atlantic Council meeting on Sept. 4. The general tenor of the discussion was that the Soviet note was not very encouraging, but that every effort should be made by the four powers to solve the German problem. Draper reported on this meeting in Polto 260 from Paris, Sept. 4. (740.5/9–452)

(a) Brit and Fr believe, and Emb agrees, that if we omit any ref to Sov proposal for withdrawal of occupation forces, which Dept will note is covered in parenthetical clause of penultimate sentence of London draft's final para, wld give a propaganda opening to the Sovs.

(b) Brit and French suggest, and Emb agreed, that we shld work the customary ref to consultation with FedRep etc., into the final sentence.

Working group mtg tomorrow morning will consider a newly revised text along lines indicated, which will be transmitted to Dept.

FonOff reps emphasized that they cld speak only for working level, subj to Eden's view; Schuman has not yet commented on London draft text, and French therefore also only speaking for working level.

GIFFORD

No. 137

Editorial Note

On September 12 the tripartite working group prepared a revised draft of the reply to the Soviet note of August 23, based on the United States draft (see telegram 1718, Document 135) and modified to take account of the British and French desiderata presented in the meetings on September 11 (see telegram 1436, *supra.).* This text was sent to Washington on the same day and approved by the Department of State on September 13 subject to several nonsubstantive drafting changes. (Telegrams 1445 from London, September 12, and 1837 to London, September 13, 662.001/9–1252) Most of the changes suggested by the United States were accepted by the working group and, on referral, by Eden and Schuman. The resulting draft was transmitted to Washington on September 15 and approved by the Department of State the following day. (Telegrams 1511 from London, September 15, and 1527 to London, September 16, 662.001/9–1552 and 662A.00/9–1652) The text was also shown to Adenauer and Reuter, who approved it and, following a last minute deletion in paragraph 6 at the insistence of the French Cabinet, was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on September 23. Further documentation on the final revisions of the note is in file 662.001; the final text of the note is printed *infra*.

No. 138

The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs [1]

[Moscow, September 23, 1952.]

The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet Government's note of August 23 about Germany.[2] It had hoped that the note would have marked some progress towards agreement on the essential question of free all-German elections. This is the first question which must be settled among the four powers so that Germany can be unified, an all-German Government formed and a peace treaty concluded.

Possibly in order to divert attention from this issue, the greater part of the Soviet note of August 23 is, however, devoted to wholly unfounded attacks upon the Atlantic Pact, the European Defense Community and the conventions signed at Bonn on May 26. As the United States Government has often emphasized, these agreements are purely defensive and threaten no one. The Bonn conventions and the EDC treaty, far from being imposed on the German people, are a matter for free decision by freely elected Parliaments, including of course that of the German Federal Republic. Insofar as the Bonn conventions reserve certain strictly limited rights to the three Western powers, a fundamental consideration has been specifically to safeguard the principle of German unity and to keep the door open for agreement with the Soviet Union on the unification of Germany.

The United States Government must insist on the necessity of starting four-power discussions at the only point where they can in fact start, which is the organization of free elections. In its note of July 10,[3] the United States Government drew attention to the obvious fact that this is the first point which must be settled if any progress is to be made towards uniting the Soviet zone with the Federal Republic, which constitutes the greater part of Germany. In its first note,[4] as in its last, the Soviet Government has evaded this clear issue. Instead of putting first things first, it now relegates to the background the problem of elections and proposes that the four-power conference "should discuss in the first place such important issues as a peace treaty with Germany and the formation of an all-German Government". But until elections are held, no all-German Government can be formed, nor can Germany be unified. Until an all-German Government is formed which will be in a position to negotiate freely, it is impossible to discuss the terms of a German peace treaty.

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[1] Reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 6, 1952, pp. 517–518. The note was delivered to Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin at 4:40 p.m., Moscow time. For text of a statement by Secretary Acheson the following day commenting on the Soviet view of free elections and especially on the Soviet meaning of "independent", "democratic", and "peaceloving", see *ibid.*, pp. 516–517.

[2] Document 125.

[3] A footnote in the source text at this point cited this note (Document 124) as printed in Department of State *Bulletin*.

[4] Document 65.

In complete accord with the views of the United States, French and United Kingdom Governments, the Soviet Government originally said that "the preparation of the peace treaty should be effected with the participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government".[5] The Soviet Government has now shifted its ground. It now substitutes for this, the participation of representatives of the Soviet zone and the Federal Republic in the four-power meetings "during the discussion of relevant questions". The United States Government cannot accept this proposal. A peace treaty for the whole of Germany cannot be negotiated with, and accepted by, any German representatives other than the all-German Government which would have to carry it out. Such a government can only proceed from free elections. It is moreover well known that the East German administration is not representative of the German population of the Soviet zone. This fact is not controverted by the assertion in the Soviet note of August 23 that this administration acted "at the request" of that population in enforcing recent measures further dividing East and West Germans in defiance of their clear desire for unity in freedom.

The United States Government is compelled to remind the Soviet Government that conditions have altered radically since the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which laid down certain political and economic principles to govern the initial control period. The Soviet conception of a peace treaty drafted by the four powers and imposed upon Germany is entirely unsuitable in 1952. The United States Government could never agree to a peace treaty being drafted or negotiated without the participation of an all-German Government. Any other procedure would mean a dictated treaty. That indeed would be "an insult to the German nation".

The United States Government again insists that genuinely free elections with a view to the formation of an all-German Government must come first. It has however learned by hard experience in recent years that terms such as "free elections" have one meaning in common parlance and another in the official Soviet vocabulary. The contrast between the concept of free elections which obtains in West Germany and that which prevails in the Soviet zone is clear. It is for the German people to choose between these alternative ways of life. But they must be able to make their choice in genuine freedom and full responsibility. Only genuinely free elections can reflect the will of the German people and permit the formation of an all-German Government with the necessary freedom of action to discuss and accept a peace settlement.

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[5] A footnote in the source text at this point cited this note (Document 65) as printed in Department of State *Bulletin*.

In order to create the conditions necessary for free elections, there has been four-power agreement that there should be a commission of investigation. The Soviet Government has now proposed that this commission should be composed of representatives of the People's Assembly of the "German Democratic Republic" and of the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic. A commission of investigation must, however, be genuinely impartial. A German commission would be no more able than a four-power commission to meet this requirement. The underlying principle of the present Soviet proposal was contained in one which emanated from the Soviet zone on September 15, 1951. This was rejected by the Bundestag, which then suggested investigation by a United Nations Commission. It was thus the freely elected representatives of fifty millions of the German people who themselves proposed the creation of a neutral investigation commission under United Nations supervision. Nevertheless, the United States Government repeats its readiness to discuss any practical and precise proposals, as stated in its note of the tenth of July.

The United States Government continues to seek a way to end the division of Germany. This will not be accomplished by premature discussions about a peace treaty with a Germany not yet united and lacking an all-German Government. The United States Government therefore renews the proposal made in its note of July 10 for an early four-power meeting—which could take place in October—to discuss the composition, functions and authority of an impartial commission of investigation with a view to creating the conditions necessary for free elections. The next step would be to discuss the arrangements for the holding of these elections and for the formation of an all-German Government, as proposed in paragraph 11 (iv) of the United States Government's note of May 13. When free elections have been held and an all-German Government formed, the peace settlement can be negotiated. The United States Government, in concert with the French Government and the United Kingdom Government and after consultation with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, most earnestly urges the Soviet Government to reconsider its refusal to join the other powers in a single-minded effort thus to come to grips with the problem of free elections in Germany.

No. 139

Editorial Note

No reply was ever received by the three Western Powers in response to their note of September 23. However, the questions of a German peace treaty, German unity, and all-German elections continued to be considered by policymakers in the Department of State. For further documentation on these questions, see Documents 140 ff. and 257 ff.

III. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC INTO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

VISITS OF WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS TO THE UNITED STATES, INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE OUTCOME OF THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS, SEPTEMBER 6, 1953; UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY (NSC 160/1); NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY (PSB D-21); AND INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN PROPOSED INCREASES IN THE FEDERAL BORDER POLICE

No. 140

511.00/1-3152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, January 31, 1952—8 p.m.

Unnumbered. For Kellermann. Public Affairs Guidance No. 159.[2]

German Defense Contribution. The following guidance for dealing with problems of Germany's contribution to European defense is intended as an attempt to facilitate operations during the coming weeks of intense public debate. Additions and adjustments will be made when necessary.

a. . . . US media should carefully avoid any appearance that US may attempt, in the interest of American policy, to push the German people into positive action against their own free will. It is essential to convince Germans that decision will be made by them, respectively by their representatives, in the best interests of German people. Media should abstain from taking any part in public debate on this issue, refrain from expressions of approbation for any activities of German proponents of participation in European defense and, particularly, from interference in controversy between government and Social Democratic opposition.

b. Media should give good news coverage to all statements on defense issue coming from responsible German political leaders, provide full information on statements of major importance, and report fairly on activities of both opponents and proponents of German participation.

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[1] Repeated to the various Public Affairs Officers in Germany.

[2] Public Affairs Guidance telegrams were sent from Bonn on a regular basis to give background for the media on events in Germany. For two other telegrams of this type, see telegrams 2967, Document 40, and 2828, Document 146.

c. While media should avoid running comment on individual pronouncements made in course of defense debate, they may at proper intervals review development of discussion, present fairly arguments made by either side, and thus lead up to brief and factual statement that as yet nobody has shown a practical political alternative to joining the larger European community which will assure protection and progress to those who share in its efforts.

d. Media should carry reports, statements and comment from US and foreign sources which indicate that other countries will determine strategic planning and lines of defense in Europe according to contribution which German people will or will not decide to make to defense of their own country; review question of whether and how Allied troops could be committed to defense of Germany if Germany should not contribute her own manpower; review German-Allied relationships in view of insuperable contradiction between substantial sovereignty and complete dependence on foreign protection.

e. Media should carry reports, statements and comment from US sources, pointing out that this year American voters will be called upon to determine future course of US foreign policy; that US has departed from earlier strategic concepts in expectation that elimination of weak spots from crucial area of Europe would remove temptation to aggression and, thereby, safeguard peace; that people of US are not forced to implementation of any given policy if they have reason to doubt success of this policy, and that, undoubtedly, US voters will be influenced by measure of success achieved in creating a system of European security and by evidence obtained of determination of European nations to defend effectively their own countries. (Media should quote VOA statements and reports on US opinion along these and similar lines. Such statements should be reported without comment.)

f. Media may express most serious doubts in existence of alternate plans to European Defense Force, and, particularly, in possibility to agree on any other form of German defense, if labor and good will invested by many nations in the now far advanced effort on a European basis should be permitted to fail.

g. Media may in proper context point to the fact that defense of Europe would be difficult without Germany but, for geographical and other reasons, impossible without France.

h. Media, while not arguing for defense contribution, should continue to point out the unrealistic fallacy of neutralist isolationism in Germany, the insincerity of communist unity propaganda, and the Western will to frustrate aggression and thereby pave the way for peaceful settlement of outstanding problems, including unification of Germany.

i. Media should continue to carry news items and reports recalling Communist aggression in other parts of world and imply continuous aggressive intentions on part of Soviets by reporting on Communist underground activities and acts or preparations for sabotage in FedRep. News and reports of Communist oppression and exploitation in Soviet occupied territory should receive thorough coverage. Media should, however, play down reports and avoid comment implying an immediate military threat from Soviet arms at this time. Determination to ward off danger of Soviet domination must not be paralyzed by unjustified fear.

j. Media should give good coverage to all reports showing increasing Western strength in Europe as well as superior technological quality and progress of Western and, particularly, new US weapons.

k. In view of real or alleged German fear of preventive war, media should give space to material which illustrates the peaceful and defensive character of Western community of freely associated democratic nations and governments. Lengthy negotiations in NATO and EDC give opportunity to point out that aggression as a Western policy is unthinkable but that Western defense is solidly cemented in a thoroughly considered and freely agreed system of treaties. Faith in Western superiority and in success of Western efforts for preservation of peace should be expressed with assurance and confidence.

l. Media should criticize attempts to confuse and complicate defense problem with introduction of extraneous issues of a secondary nature, i.e., the Saar (see classified PUB Guidance 158 [3]).

m. Media should continue to emphasize the advantages of economic integration of Europe. Any German acts of participation in international economic cooperation should receive good play. German economic progress, such as coal production, productivity rise in other industries, and other economic factors contributing to German and European strength should be played up, with primary emphasis on the efforts of German labor, management and government and reference to Western cooperation as a contributing factor. Media may infer that defense strength is based on such economic strength.

Media should stress that any increase in productivity will eventually bring about a higher standard of living. While such increases in living standard may not be achieved during a period of defense production, the increase in productivity will offset the otherwise inevitable reduction in the standard of living and will form the basis for a better life when defensive strength and peace are assured.

Media should stress continuously the need for European economic integration, both as a factor in overall strength and as a key factor in the development of an expanding economy without trade barriers and with a better life for the individual.

n. US personnel should, in conversations with Germans, carefully avoid giving impression of pleading for German contribution to Western defense. Lines discussed in paragraphs c to m are suggested for topics of conversation if considered useful.

o. Suggest PAO's brief RO's in their districts.

McCloy

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[3] This guidance was transmitted in telegram 1307 from Bonn, Jan. 28. (511.00/1-2852)

No. 141

Editorial Note

On February 18 and 19, Chancellor Adenauer met with Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman at London to discuss questions of mutual concern with particular attention devoted to contractual relations and the European Defense Community. For the minutes of the three meetings held at 10 a.m. and 4:45 p.m., February 18 and at 11:15 a.m., February 19, see volume V, Part 1, pages 59, 66, and 74, respectively. For further documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see *ibid.*, pages 571 ff.; for documentation on contractual relations, see Documents 1 ff.

No. 142

762A.0221/3-1152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 11, 1952—3:58 p.m.

1978. Subj: 1953 GOAG Budget. Below is verbatim text Bur Ger Affrs draft statement basic policy objectives for use 1953 budget highlight statement. Dept shld be consulted if HICOG desires any changes fol draft.

(1) The maintenance of friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the US and the FedRep of Ger.

(2) Continuing and effective participation by the FedRep on a basis of equality in the EDC, itself within a developing Atlantic community, and in the promotion of the polit, econ, and social welfare necessary to a strong and durable Eur.

(3) The maintenance of the allied position in Berlin and the pol, econ, and psychological strengthening of the western sectors of Berlin.

(4) Support of democratic elements in Germany and frustration of the Communist aim to get control of all Ger.

(5) The peaceful unification of all Ger under conditions of freedom.

End verbatim text.

Believe above statement will provide clear summary answer to question raised recurrently by Cong and others of what is US fon pol toward Ger. List pages 3 and 4 submission to Bud Bur [2] viewed as basic functions or activities rather than policy aims and as such shld be retained in Congressional submission to support requirements on level staffing, on staffing not normal other missions and on level program expenses. However, redrafting nec to avoid appearance repetition of above statement policy objectives and to remove connotations offensive to Gers.

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[1] Drafted by Robert Klaber of GER and cleared with GPA, GAI, and GEA

ACHESON

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[2] Not further identified.

No. 143

611.62A/3-1252

Memorandum of Conversations, by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade)

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 12, 1952.

Subject: Conversations with Dr. Walter Hallstein, Secretary of State of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Participants: As mentioned in Memorandum.

1. *Adenauer Visit:* Yesterday I talked to Hallstein and Krekeler alone for 45 minutes before Hallstein's meeting with the officers of GER. [1]

Hallstein first raised the question of Adenauer's visit to the U.S. He went to great pains to explain that past indiscretions and announcements from Germany on this subject had not been the personal fault or doing of Adenauer. He then stated that in his opinion Adenauer should not leave Germany prior to the signature, or perhaps ratification, of the EDC and Contractual Agreements. He also stated that he could well appreciate the fact that Adenauer should not come to Washington this fall just prior to the U.S. elections. He stated that in his own mind he was beginning to wonder whether Adenauer should come to the U.S. at all this year.

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[1] Hallstein was in Washington on an unofficial visit the week of Mar. 10 for a series of lectures and seminars at Georgetown University. In addition to the subjects considered in this memorandum, Hallstein discussed German representation in Austria with Ambassador Donnelly on Mar. 12, contractual relations and East-West trade at a meeting in the Bureau of German Affairs on Mar. 14, and following the latter, Federal Republic support of Berlin. The Department of State reported on these discussions in telegrams 2078, 2095, and 2174 to Bonn, Mar. 15, 17, and 20 (662A.63/3-352, 740.5/3-1752, and 862A.00/1-3052), and a memorandum of conversation by Lewis, Mar. 14 (460.509/3-1452).

I believe his last remark above was thrown out to obtain our reactions to an Adenauer visit. I stated that we would be pleased to see Adenauer come to the U.S. at a time mutually acceptable to both of us if he desired to make the trip. I concurred with Hallstein that Adenauer should not leave Germany prior to the signature of the Agreements; also as to whether a trip between signature and ratification would be helpful from Adenauer's point of view could be judged best by him. I told him of the crowded schedule of visits this spring. I stated that from our point of view sometime in May would be the best date. This would, however, have to be cleared by the President and I could not speak officially as regards that date. We left the matter on the understanding that Hallstein would talk to Adenauer and that we would receive Adenauer's views, on an informal basis, regarding a visit to the U.S. in May. (assuming the Agreements had been signed), either through McCloy or Krekeler.

2. *Moscow Note:* [2] I asked Hallstein for his views as to the effect of the recent note from Moscow on the West German people. He stated that he was certain that the Moscow note would have no effect whatever on the Chancellor or the Government. They would readily see the loopholes in the note and that it presented no basic change of heart on the part of the Russians. He stated that the note would have some effect on the people of Germany but he did not consider that this would be too serious. In his opinion the only question before us was the matter of the proper tactical handling of the note so as to get the best advantage from our reply in Germany.

I read to him a draft press statement prepared by Laukhuff which was substantially the same as the background statement read by McDermott to the Press on Tuesday evening. [3] He heartily concurred in the statement and said he thought the effect in Germany to such a reply would be good.

3. *The Saar:* I took Hallstein somewhat to task over the submission of the Saar issue to the Council of Europe. He gave a long explanation of the reason for their action. I told him that he developed his case with about the same arguments and logic used by the French in the case of their appointment of an Ambassador to the Saar. He stated that their memorandum to the Council had been very carefully drawn so as not to reflect upon the French but only upon the Saar regime. He also stated that, while Adenauer felt he had to take some public action at this time, that Adenauer would

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[2] For the Soviet note of Mar. 10, see Document 65.

[3] The draft press statement under reference here has not been identified further; for an extract from McDermott's statement on Mar. 11, see the *New York Times*, Mar. 12, 1952, p. 10.

be satisfied with shelving the matter by reference to committees during the meeting of the Council of Europe. Hallstein said he thought he had this already arranged with the President of the Council at the next session.

I urged upon him the desirability of obtaining a Franco-German statement of a willingness to negotiate on this subject subsequent to the signing of the EDC and the Contractual Agreements. I asked that if at all possible they work with the French to obtain such a statement prior to the meeting of the Council of Europe, thus making it possible to remove the Saar from its Agenda. He stated that he was certain Adenauer would be quite agreeable to such a course and that Adenauer had hoped that such a two-Power statement could have been made before this time. He stated that in the private talk between Adenauer and Schuman at Eden's house in London the subject had been discussed and that Adenauer felt there was substantial agreement between them that such a statement should be made.[4] He stated, however, that subsequent to Adenauer's return to Germany word had been received from France (presumably Quai d'Orsay) that talks between Adenauer and Schuman were to be considered as being entirely on a personal basis and without commitment of the French Government. I again urged that they make an effort to obtain such a statement and stated that we would be willing to use our influence with the French in that direction.

4. *Location of Meeting for Signature of Agreements:* Hallstein expressed the hope that the Contractual Arrangement Agreements could be signed by the Ministers in Germany. I stated that I did not consider they should be signed in any of the 4 Capitals of the countries involved. Hallstein quite agreed with this suggestion and stated that he had had in mind some convenient location in Germany (he mentioned the name of a resort town but I have forgotten the name).

I stated that if the EDC and Contractual Agreements could be signed at the same time it might be well to consider Strasbourg as a place of signature which could be used to great advantage to give all of the Agreements a European connotation. He seemed to think this a good suggestion.

On the basis of a discussion on this subject among the Foreign Ministers at the close of the Lisbon meeting,[5] I told Hallstein that

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[4] No other record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files. The possibility of a meeting is referred to briefly in paragraph 10 of Secto 12, vol. v, Part 1, p. 58.

[5] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.

I did not believe there would be strong feelings that the signature should take place in either London or Paris and that I personally thought it quite probable that the Agreements could be signed in Germany if the Strasbourg suggestion were not favored.

5. *Israeli Claims:* Hallstein stated that they were being increasingly embarrassed due to the fact that discussions on claims against Germany were taking place in two separate forums, i.e. the Debt Commission in London and the Israeli claims in Benelux. He asked if we could not in some way combine these two discussions. I stated that I was not sufficiently familiar with the situation in this field to give him an answer but I believed his suggestion would cause us considerable difficulty. The matter was left at that point due to the breakup of our meeting. Thorp told me last night after the dinner party at Krekeler's for Hallstein that Hallstein had mentioned the subject to him and that he thought we should look into the matter to see if we could meet Hallstein's point. (I suggest Margolies talk to Thorp about this subject to see if any answer should be made to Hallstein while he is in Washington.)

At 4:45 Hallstein, Krekeler and myself met with the Secretary for 30 minutes. Outside of the general exchange of pleasantries, the subjects of the Moscow note and the question of the Saar were the only important items discussed. Hallstein's remarks on the Soviet note were essentially the same as during my conversation dictated above. The Secretary agreed with Hallstein's analysis. The Secretary took a quite strong line with Hallstein on the question of the Saar and of the need to remove the item as an issue before the Council of Europe. He stressed the desirability of a Franco-German statement along the lines I had discussed with Hallstein. Under pressure from the Secretary, Hallstein stated that he would see if it were possible to obtain French and German agreement to such a statement immediately upon Adenauer's arrival in Paris next Tuesday. If they could agree at that time perhaps they could issue the statement prior to the opening of the meeting on Wednesday or at least prior to the time when the Agenda item on the Saar arose. (Laukhuff should consider sending this suggestion to our Embassy in Paris.)

In the talks with me, and later with the Secretary, Hallstein stated that he believed the EDC Treaty and the Contractuals could be ready for initialling by the first week in April. The Secretary stated that he very much wished to attend the signature of these Agreements and hoped that it would be possible. He stated that he had just made a commitment to be here on April 9th but thought if it were later on in the month he might be able to make the trip.[6]

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[6] On Mar. 14 Hallstein discussed Federal Republic support for Berlin at a meeting in the Bureau of German Affairs. For a report on this session, see telegram 2174, Document 533.

No. 144

662A.00/4-2152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State

SECRET BONN, April 21, 1952—8 p.m.

2456. PA and public appraisal of psychological conditions in Ger suggests certain modification of approach.[1]

Our suggestions are founded on fol considerations:

We expect contractuals and EDC treaty to be completed and signed before end of May and without delay from further Soviet action. We are, however, concerned with possible effect of Soviet maneuvers on ratification and, even more, on implementation of agreements. So far, neither Ger political leaders nor Ger public are impressed with Soviet proposals. Distrust of Soviet intentions is deep-seated and general. Our problem results from questioning of West sincerity and West determination to achieve reunification of Ger rather than from gullible acceptance of Soviet blandishments. Reluctance to proceed with West integration, which appears to be caused by popular resentment, dislike of sacrifice and, in case of SPD, pure opposition tactics, does not result in popular support for Soviet advances but rather in demands that no steps be taken by which prospects of unification may be jeopardized irrevocably. Neutralism in Ger, though still widespread as sentimental attitude, is not considered realistic alternative by preponderant majority, according to public opinion surveys. However, many Gers, somewhat inconsistently, feel that they are being pressured into action which they genuinely dislike, and believe they are being used for accomplishments of American policies which they consider alien to their interest and contrary to their preference.

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[1] Apparently this telegram, transmitted in two sections, was a reply to the points raised in telegram 2544 to Bonn, Document 84, as well as an indication of points to be stressed in general relations with the Federal Republic in the coming months. The references below to numbered paragraphs refer to the points outlined in telegram 2544.

Based on these considerations, we recommend building up our argument for period of several months rather than propaganda pitch concentrated on next few weeks. Equally, we feel it most imperative that we avoid impression of trying to push, persuade or make up Gers minds for them. We should be careful not to over state our case and not to elicit adverse psychological reaction by using too many words and arguments on points which after more than a year of public discussion, must appear obvious to Ger public. For instance, establishment of Soviet insincerity should, at this time, be treated not as target reprise but subordinated to overriding dual purpose of gaining support for our own actions and decisions, and keeping neutralist tendencies from again becoming political force in Ger. It is felt best to present our case as opportunity offered to Gers for their own decision, frankly and explicitly explaining motivations, implications and goals of our policy including our appraisal of Soviet methods and intentions. It should be clear from language of our pronouncements that it is Ger choice whether to avail themselves of this opportunity.

We, also, feel that prophylactic treatment should be given to possible resort to last minute scare tactics on part of Soviets. It would appear in line with Soviet tactics and with threats implied in number of Soviet communications re West defense effort for attempt to be made by Moscow to deter West Eur nations by fear of imminent Soviet attack from consummating their agreements. Such contingency of sabre rattling could create situation politically more dangerous to achievement of West policy aims in Ger than we experience under impact of present not too effective lures of Soviet unity offers. We feel that thought should be given this possibility and that our media should provide immunization treatment by occasionally mentioning prospects of another violent Soviet bluff.

In particular, we agree with line set forth in para 2 (A) casting doubt on kind of "democratic" state envisaged by Sovs. We shall assemble data exposing Commie interpretation of democracy, for instance, as exemplified by announced codification in new penal law of oppressive punitive legislation introduced in Sov Zone. We wish to point out, furthermore, that maintenance of such institutions as Sov-owned corporations, economic integration in satellite orbit, control of workers thru state-dominated union and applicable Commie laws, which it is Sov intention to maintain according to their own pronouncements, wld make mockery of unification or else spell future of satellite servitude for entire country. Our argument on investigation of conditions for free elections may be expected to effect that no Sov proposal so far contains indication that Sovs have changed their other repeated tactics of involving West in lengthy and inconclusive procedures to prevent it from taking decisive action, which is exactly what West and Ger in interest of their security and Eur progress must prevent.

2–B provides sound background for our analysis which, however, should be left brief and factual, explained above. Arguments should be trained on concrete picture of isolated Ger placed at mercy of Red Army poised behind Oder-Neisse line rather than on theoretical concept of neutrality which by now is largely discounted in realistic Ger thought.

Suggestion contained in 2–C to link Sov proposal of Ger natl army to Sov concept of "democratic peace-loving state" and to parallel of existing satellite armies may not sound altogether convincing to Gers inclined to view estab of natl forces as potent factor of natl independence. We wld prefer to point to oppressive burden and ineffective protection which are likely to result from isolated natl army in light of existing constellation of powers and technological developments.

We should fully explain advantages offered by integration West Eur within greater community of Atlantic nations not only for immed security of Ger people, but for future peace and prosperity of all Eur nations. To us a positive decision appears imperative, but it must be Ger choice. Language which may indicate persuasion or pleading, such as our stating what should be aim of every patriotic Ger or object of responsible Ger leadership, should be carefully avoided. Suggestion that Ger has everything to gain from such policy or may acquire posit of leadership seems to us to fall in same category and therefore fraught with danger from Ger as well as Fr point of view. We propose, however, to expand your argument to include statement that basic choice for Eur integration has been made by Ger people and its reps, they have complete freedom to make this final decision on Gers relationship to other nations, and no future govt can be granted less freedom of action than is enjoyed by FedRep under occupation statute.

We fully agree with straightforward line of para 4 [*3*], projecting attainment of Ger unity as result of growing West strength. Sov attempts to estab false choice between integration and unity, try to gloss over one basic fact. Problem of permanent peace settlement, of which question of Ger unity is integral part, will remain and acquire addit urgency for Sovs as prospects of gaining advantage from threats and aggression will diminish in face of determined and united West. Ger opinion trends suggest advisability of emphasizing strongly that every lasting peace settlement must include elimination of cold war frontier, and, therefore a solution of problem of Ger unity; and by this token, aim of reunification of Ger is as much part of fundamental US policy devoted to attainment of peace as part of Ger policy devoted to attainment of Ger freedom. Ger skepticism of our genuine interest in achieving Ger unity may develop into dangerous morale factor and adversely affect value of Ger partnership if not counteracted.

McCloy

No. 145

762.0221/5-1352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 13, 1952—10 p.m.

2803. A series of developments over past fortnight suggests to us Kremlin is embarking on a tough line toward West Ger. Among these incidents were stoppage of MP movement from Berlin,[2] purge in GDR, heightened GDR militancy toward West, riot in Essen [3] shrill Ulbricht statements yesterday.[4]

We have felt that such a turn was almost inevitable once it became evident that tactics of enticement had failed to produce practical political results in West. Time has now come if Kremlin is to achieve its objectives of detaching FedRep from West and bringing about collapse of EDF, to attempt to impress upon West Gers ominous alternative to accepting package offer contained in Sov notes. This does not of course exclude possibility that Kremlin may put forward further offers. But for time being it appears to be concentrating on driving home to West Gers peril of rejecting its offers.

This, however, is not an easy task for Moscow. Ger public has come over years to regard threats from GDR as cries of wolf wolf. Therefore, if this tactic of menace is to have desired effect on West Gers it must carry convincing tone of imminent and great danger.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] On May 8 Soviet authorities had refused to allow U.S. Military Police to continue their courtesy patrols along the autobahn from Berlin to Helmstedt. For texts of letters protesting this refusal and the attack on French aircraft on Apr. 29, referred to in the fourth paragraph of this telegram, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 1, 1952, pp. 311 ff.

[3] On May 11 West German police had quelled a riot by several thousand FDJ who had been in Essen to protest against the contractual agreements and the rearmament of Germany.

[4] At a press conference on May 12 Ulbricht had warned Bonn against signing the contractual agreements and had threatened retaliation against Berlin if they were signed. Berlin reported the substance of the press conference in telegram 1335, May 12. (662.001/5-1252)

At same time, assuming Kremlin does not seek war, scope of its threats are limited by what it must regard as risk of explosive American reaction. Range between this floor and ceiling is not great and must pose vexing problems for Kremlin.

Berlin is of course most obvious point of exploitation. Kremlin has already hinted in Air France and MP incidents what it can do on perhaps our most vulnerable point, that of access, and in so doing has demonstrated to Gers its position of control. We are not now inclined to believe, however, that Kremlin will impose a full scale blockage. To do so might well provoke another airlift which probably would politically boomerang. It seems to us more likely that Kremlin will impose a creeping blockade, possibly even restricting it to outward movements from Berlin combined with an offer to absorb all Berlin production to East. Whatever Russians may do on this score our guess is that they will apply their harrassing tactics selectively trying to avoid cementing West Ger and Allies.

As contractuals and EDF progress toward implementation Kremlin may *pari passu* insist that we take our troubles to GDR and GDR may be increasingly thrust into front position against us. While such maneuver would obviously have many drawbacks for Kremlin tradition of operating thru others with itself bearing minimum responsibility and retaining thereby maximum flexibility.

Foregoing is of course not all that Kremlin can do by way of intimidation. And Moscow may well calculate, as we do, that these measures may not of themselves suffice to stop contractuals and EDF. What remains is creation of East Ger armed forces, border incidents and rumblings of Sov milit power. First two would not necessarily approach ceiling of American tolerance but third might. Because of this we in Bonn do not see what Sov armed forces can do beyond ostentatious display of force in East Ger.

What actual effect of Kremlin's tough line will be on West Gers is impossible to predict. In FedReps present circumstances, crust of West Ger courage is understandably thin. It may be hardened if we keep our own nerves steady and show determination to counter Sov moves. On other hand it may break and West Gers become paralyzed if Kremlin can create atmosphere that we are undependable and that lining up with West will surely lead to civil war, invasion, devastation by American bombing and Tartar occupation. Next few weeks may be the test.[5]

McCloy

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[5] On May 14, in a telegram cleared with Riddleberger and Matthews, McCloy was informed that the Department of State believed the reasons and conclusions pre-

Continued

No. 146

511.00/5-1652: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BONN, May 16, 1952—9 p.m.

2828. For Kellermann. (Remaining distribution per processing memo RZ 17.[1])

Public Affairs Guidance number 173. [2] Sov Zone Commies threaten "liberation" of Germany. The succession of recent bellicose outbursts of Sov Zone leaders, accompanied by invented reports of border incidents and inducements to create civil disorder within West Ger, presage a sustained campaign of threats to prevent the culmination of present efforts to integrate West Ger within the west defense system. Media should cite belligerent attitude and threats to begin internecine warfare as further evidence of the hypocrisy of Commie professions of support for Ger unity and peace. Further, that it characterizes the ephemeral basis of their pretended reasonableness and willingness to make concessions in the interest of a free and united Ger. State that it is obvious that tranquility can be obtained only by complete subservience to Commie demands.

Media should comment that the scare campaign only tends to deepen the rift between East and West Ger and represents an unscrupulous and callous attempt to use Gers against Gers to advance Sov aims. It fits in with the basic dishonesty of the Commie propaganda campaign and ignores the desire of the Ger people for unity.

The fol are significant manifestations of the scare campaign:

1. On the occasion of self-styled "day of defense" on May 8, Minister President Grotewohl warned: "The signing of the general agreement . . . [3] will produce in Ger the same conditions that exist in Korea. The great danger arises of a fratriecidal war of Gers against Gers". In a telegram he assured Stalin of the combat readiness and ability of the Sov Zone to repel attacks. In an interview

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sented in this telegram were sound and he could "count on the full and steady Dept support in all efforts" which he would "undoubtedly have to make [to] demonstrate Western coolness, firmness and dependability." (Telegram 3117 to Bonn, 762.00/5-1352)

[1] Not found in Department of State files.

[2] Public Affairs Guidance telegrams were sent from Bonn on a regular basis to give background for the media on events in Germany. For two other telegrams of this type, see the unnumbered telegram, Jan. 31, Document 140, and telegram 2967, Document 40.

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

published in the East Berlin newspaper *Nacht Express* on May 7, Grotewohl renounced previous statements expressing the willingness of the Sov Zone auths to make concessions in the interest of a united Ger.

2. On May 8, SED announced: "Ger has not yet been liberated. The Red Army smashed the Fascist regime, but the Ger people, exerting all its strength, must complete the liberation from the yoke of American imperialism and resurrected Ger imperialism."

3. The Sov info office charged that the FedRep has been deliberately provoking border incidents and that West agents are in collusion with Sov Zone reactionaries to stage large-scale border crossings to permit participation in anti-Commie demonstrations in West Ger close to border areas.

4. A recent speech by Gerhard Eisler made demands for riots and protest strikes in West Ger. This inducement has been faithfully rptd by Commie media.

5. Fon Min Dertinger, in an address on May 8, stated: "No one can deny us the right and duty to retaliate in the same measure as the danger warrants." Media should refer to recent Rummler statement in which censorship of Dertinger public statement is described. Media should scoff at honesty of Dertinger and emphasize that Rummler's statement shows that Dertinger is only a mouthpiece of the Sovs. [4]

6. In a Berlin speech on May 2, Walter Ulbricht stated that a reunited Ger must become a member of the Commie "world peace camp" rather than of the allied "war pact" system. He followed this with a warning at a May 12 press conf that West political leaders who in any way lend their support to the general agreement (contractuals) wld be subjected to "Volksrache". Members of Fed Govt and Bundestag who support West integration wld have their names registered and wld eventually pay the price of severe punishment at the hands of "the people". Media should play this up as a revelation of the Sov conception of the future role of a united Ger and its "freedom". How are freely elected West polit leaders who are subj to immed arrest and drastic punishment upon entry into the Sov Zone to be expected to conduct an elections campaign in the GDR? Is this what the Sovs mean by "free elections"? Point out further that the existence of the "law for the protection of peace" and other arbitrary decrees make it impossible to oppose or criticize the regime.

The forthright reaction of the Fed Govt to the recent Ulbricht threat should be supported. Stress that the Ger people are getting inured to such cheap propaganda tactics and react with revulsion rather than fear to the crude threats employed. State that they are becoming increasingly aware that the Sovs have thus far only talked about free elections, and in reality have not indicated what free elections mean to them or expressed the specific conditions under which free elections can be held, except to state that the past 98 per cent elections in the DDR were "free". Point out that as recently as the Paris UN session. Sov del Malik stated that a Commie bloc party system was essential to free elections. State that this is the system which the Commies use to obliterate what they derisively term "*bourgeoisie*" parties and by which they mean in last analysis all polit parties not under the control of the Kremlin.

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[4] Gerald Rummler, a press officer in the Foreign Ministry of the German Democratic Republic, had fled to West Germany in April 1952. At a press conference on Apr. 21 he stated that all Dertinger's statements had to be cleared with Soviet political officers. A report on the press conference is in the *New York Times*, Apr. 22, 1952, p. 5.

7. The recent riots in Essen are concrete evidence of the Commie tactic of pitting Gers against Gers and creating civil disorder and confusion.

Media should comment that recent death of SED functionary in Thuringia allegedly at the hands of two members of east zone CDU has furnished a welcome pretext for further intensification of control and terrorization by the SED. Use reports such as in May 8 issue of *Frankfurther Rundschau* of the outbreak of panic among members of the land comite of the OST CDU hearing of incident and that only the last minute and frantic endeavors of Otto Nuschke prevented several from escaping to the west. State that the incident and the aftermath is a revealing commentary of the atmosphere and polit conditions in the Sov Zone. In this connection point to the sudden and unexplained "resignation" of the former Sov Zone Min of the Interior Steinhoff who was succeeded by Willi Stoph (SED member of the Volkskammer). Emphasize the importance of this posit in view of the centralized control of the police and repressive agencies.

Media should give heavy play to reports concerning the adoption of stringent controls and repressive measures in the Sov Zone. Point out that two projected Sov Zone labor decrees aim to strengthen workers "discipline" within the Sov Zone and represent a significant advance in extending Sov system of labor within the Sov Zone. They are designed to (1) introduce a strict disciplinary code among industrial workers, and (2) circumvent existing labor courts for the arbitration of disputes by forming factory commissions depending on polit directives. The projected "decree for further safeguarding the rights of workers and developing a high labor morale" removes the few remaining aspects as even nominal subjs for collective negots within industrial enterprises. The law creates honor courts (Ehrengerichte) (1) To publicize good examples of work and provide rewards and (2) "Punish negligent and undisciplined workers and employees by appropriate measures". Media should comment that emphasis may be expected on latter responsibility and point out that this will subject workers to a penal code at the factory level carried out by polit toadies. The decree also provides for financial responsibility of workers for defective production which may result in fines arbitrarily imposed by these labor courts for as much as one-month salary. The decree also provides for the use of a work norm system which means that workers must perform faster and more intensively in order to avoid reduction in wages. The contemplated legislation incorporates other features which subjects workers to arbitrary polit controls and regulations and are designed to exploit him to the fullest degree. They are evidence of the continuing policy to create Sov labor conditions within East Ger. FYI: The publicity given to these measures over RIAS appears to have delayed their final approval by DDR officials and may result in some modifications or possibly postponement. However, media should continue to give such evidence of labor suppression full play and match it against Sov-Commie pretentions in direction of promoting welfare of workers and the "good life" in GDR.

Media should state that Commie contention that they are being forced to establish a natl army as a result of West Ger intentions to join west is ridiculous in view of the fact that they have been expanding the milit potential of the *Volkspolizei* for more than two years through creation of trained cadres, arms production and other means.

Media should comment that an expanded army will seriously endanger the security of the Commie regime in the Sov Zone since perforce weapons wld have to be given to many who are hostile to the regime. As signs of this uneasiness and insecurity stress practice of using Sov milit officers in the *Volkspolizei* from top echelons down to battalion levels, and the close supervision of training and milit maneuvers. Speculate on the fears that the Sovs may have of creating their own Trojan Horse.

Discuss the possibility that the present propaganda campaign by Sov puppets as anticipate Sov Union propaganda campaign in a final desperate attempt to paralyse the consolidation and def of the west. State that this wld mean that the Sov propaganda bluff of reasonableness and co-existence wld be paralleled or supplanted by the propaganda bluff of sabre rattling and threats.

FYI: It is believed that the present propaganda campaign carried on by Commie puppets will not have serious repercussions in West Ger. However, a Sov campaign backed by the power of the Red Army might have serious effects and create widespread feeling of anxiety, uncertainty and desire to remain neutral. The purpose of bringing up the possibility of Sov scale campaign is to cushion the effect of the blow. In view of known fear of war among Gers, media should adopt attitude of confidence and repose based on growing strength of west which will deter Sovs from aggression.

Media should also interpret Sov–SED bluster as cover for more stringent control measures being instituted in their zone and as an indication of insecurity and uneasiness about unpopular steps they are in process of taking, rather than as threats to be taken seriously in west.

Media should not give free publicity to Commie threats but on other hand should not hesitate to use every opportunity to label these as contradictions of Commie peace campaign. Key phrase is "actions speak louder than words". Media should give heavy play to reports of intensified Sov controls in the GDR which indicate a trend exactly contrary to their offers of unity and "free" elections. We are gathering such info and will forward as soon as ready. [5]

McCLOY

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[5] On May 22 the Department of State replied that this telegram was an "excellent summary of current Sov-Com maneuvers and our counter-efforts." (Telegram 3304 to Bonn, 762.00/5-2252)

No. 147

762.0221/5-2252: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

BONN, May 22, 1952—7 p.m.

3001. Re urtel sent Bonn 3091, [2] ref is made our 2803. [3] Sovs must now consider signatures of EDC and Ger contractuals unavoidable. They will probably shape and time their tactics to create maximum interference with ratification. We therefore expect scare campaign to parallel diplomatic exchanges with systematic attempt to wear down West nerves, using flexible tactics of tightening and relaxing pressures, even culminating possibly with full-fledged war scare when agreements will come up for ratification. Border incidents, plane incidents and troops concentrations or maneuvers may be part of game. Berlin can be expected to become object of special pressures with intent legally and factually to establish Sov controls over access and economy of West Berlin. This may lead up to Sov announcement that ratification will end Potsdam agreement and thereby void legal basis of West rights and special Berlin position. We may also expect partial or temporary closing of Sov Zone border with FedRep tightening of border controls, including those on West Berlin traffic, a purge of GDR state machinery cause of which attributed to sabotage activities of warmongering West, possible proclamation of GDR sovereignty and probable estab of a Sov Zone "national" army.

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[1] Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 3091 asked for HICOG's appreciation of forthcoming Soviet tactics and their impact in the Federal Republic and Berlin. (662A.00/4-2852)

[3] Document 145.

We estimate developments in Sov Zone itself not likely to produce strong impact on West Ger opinion or endanger ratification of contractuals. Commie countermeasures including new pressures on Berlin may be expected to produce in FedRep realization of dependency on West rather than wavering in determination to go thru with West alignment. However, sitn may grow difficult if such events and pressures should be tied into genuine war scare, raising fears of imminent invasion, occupation and devastation. It is hard to forecast how Ger public or parliamentary opinion wld stand up if such threat should become imminent reality in Ger mind. In West Berlin on other hand it appears public opinion is more concerned about our resolution to stand up and maintain position of city against renewed Sov pressure than about danger of war. Evidence of West weakness or yielding in Berlin may also tend to undermine West Ger confidence in our dependability and make ratification more difficult and less secure.

In shaping our polit and psychological treatment of sitn fol points should be kept in mind:

A. In addition to policy statements we should consider use of police or milit measures in attempt to deter Sovs from actions which may produce real war scare in Ger and other West Eur countries. Such measures should not take place in Berlin but rather in area in which we have upper hand. We are thinking of such measures as dispatch of planes to Mediterranean, flights from Alaska to Iceland, or naval maneuvers at significant spots, to underline fact that struggle is global. We should aim such activities at making point that:

(1) We will not be impressed by scare campaign any more than we were by campaign of empty offers and proposals;

(2) We will show this with acts as well as words;

(3) We have means to demonstrate such determination in areas of our choice.

B. We should, thru psychological approach, attempt to preclude Eur fears that Sov threats may be real and actually spell war; and

C. Demonstrate our own confidence in success of our policy and our determination not to give in to Sov threats and pressures. In particular, we favor fol psychological approach:

a. Treat Sov and Commie threats or measures calmly in perspective. Avoid concentrating our propaganda fire on their threats and actions, for to do so wld highlight Sov scare tactics. Rather, create impression that these actions had to be expected and will be taken in stride as an expression of bad humor on part of a frustrated aggressor, and are definitely of secondary importance to West determination to insure security and well-being of democratic world.

b. Expose Sov motive as one of deflecting West from its course thru attempt to create fear, confusion and hesitancy. Treat scare campaign as just another part of familiar Sov propaganda maneuvers along with unsubstantiated offers of negots and other insincere approaches.

c. Use Commie threats of civil war and actions against civilian population of West Berlin briefly but succinctly to debunk Commie phraseology and expose Commie unscrupulousness and disregard for interest and well-being of Ger people. Note measures tightening Commie controls in Sov Zone and on zonal border to highlight obvious insincerity of East demands for Ger unity. Remark that in light of these and other facts, security and hope for unity cannot be based on Sov or Commie promises but must be sought in creation of a firmly integrated community with the West.

d. Make clear our determination to stand on our rights in Berlin and to safeguard our posit and the West Berlin population. We should be prepared to answer immed and strongly any Sov pronouncement reflecting on these rights or on special status of the city. Berliners should be told that their exposed posit, which is well-known to them, may involve another period of strains, but that we shall stand with them as we have in past. We have protected them once and will do it again.

e. State that threats to create an army in Sov Zone constitute no real change in a sign which Sovs have long created. In organizing and equipping mil units of the "peoples police", Commies have maintained core of an army while not a Ger corporals guard exists in FedRep. It is armament of Sovs and their satellites against which West powers have to create security in joint defense. Remark that a gen draft placing armies in hands of average citizen may be dangerous game for imposed Commie dictatorship in Sov Zone.

f. We should not discuss dangers of war unless Sov threats or gen fear in West countries should result in major public opinion problem. Individual Sov moves should not be discussed in this light even with intent to deny existence of such danger. In case of growing public speculation on warlike Sov intentions, we should ridicule alleged Commie fears of aggression from Atlantic Def Community which combine many free, independent and democratic nations; imply that Sov statements and gestures are based on obviously propagandistic pretense and must be considered to be of equally propagandistic character; that Commies resort to aggressive methods where they expect to find weakness and wavering but will hardly court destruction to satisfy self-invented concept of their own propaganda.

g. We should use West answer to USSR of 13 May [4] to emphasize that West is showing road to a settlement in Ger and peace in Eur based on unity with freedom. This road is open to Sovs whenever they will see fit to discard their disruptive tactics in favor of more constructive policy. Immunity on part of free nations to Sov threats and maneuvers, and their determination jointly to protect their security paves way to achievement of peace in Eur.

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[4] Document 101.

These suggestions are designed to fill in during present interim period. Probability increasing that next few months will witness Sov moves which will require thorough reassessment of our Berlin and Ger unity policies as basis for effective counteraction. These problems now under active consideration here.

McCLOY

No. 148

Editorial Note

Secretary Acheson visited Bonn May 23–26 for discussions with Foreign Secretary Eden, Foreign Minister Schuman, and Chancellor Adenauer concerning contractual relations and the European Defense Community. For the records of their discussions, see Documents 42 ff.

No. 149

MSA telegram files, lot W-130, "Bonn Tomus": Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Mutual Security Agency [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BONN, July 18, 1952—3 p.m.

Tomus 18. Personal for Kenney [2] and Harriman. Result consideration of econ factor relevant to determination amount FY 1953 aid for Ger, MSA Mission has estimated aid requirements at $135 million. Documents being forwarded prior to discussions Wash next week with Harris. On assumption ratification EDC treaty and contracts concluded by 1 Jan 1953 Mission forecast deficit $135 million. However, Mission believes illustrative figure $113 million representing across the board cut of 29.5% in original estimates may be sufficient.

While case for econ aid to Ger is compelling one, especially in view of West support and Berlin requirements, I want to emphasize polit considerations in favor of continued aid at least equivalent to

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[1] Repeated to Paris personal for Draper.

[2] W. John Kenney, Deputy Director for Mutual Security.

FY 1952 level were never greater. As discussions and debate over the contracts and EDC treaty alightning GDR [*aligning GFR*?] with West gain momentum and attacks on contracts and treaty are intensified, failure to announce continuance of substantial econ aid to Ger while other Eur countries are continuing to receive it wld probably result in adverse reaction prejudicing ratification. Opposition has always maintained that Adenauer Govt cld have obtained more favorable treatment from West by harder bargaining and wld cite diminution in aid greater than that required by across the board reduction neces result reduction in appropriation, as evidence govt's softness on entire complex its relationship to West. Even Adenauer's supporters wld be shaken by an announcement that Amer econ aid is being substantially reduced or cut off just at the moment when Gers are getting ready to commit themselves to West and are undertaking considerable financial obligations for def rearmament, debt repayment, etc. Substantial reduction of aid to amount below last year's level or complete cessation might have repercussions serious enough to shake stability of coalition.

Because of delicacy of Ger polit situation and Gers peculiar sensitiveness to any suggestion of discrimination against them I strongly urge, if only from polit angle, that aid be continued. Even tho I believe continuation of aid fully justifiable on econ grounds alone, particularly because of def requirements neces if, as it seems most likely, def period commences 1 Jan, I want to particularly urge careful consideration of aid decision in light of its effect on Ger's internal polit situation and her integration with West.

McCLOY

No. 150

740.5/7-2252: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 31, 1952.

A-341. For SRE.

(1) This airgram contains summary US policy re Germany requested Polto 90, rptd Bonn Polto 51 [2] as guidance for approaching NAC discussions. We have not attempted to define economic policies, since you are fully acquainted with this field. Much of materi-

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[1] Drafted by Auchincloss and Ausland; cleared by Calhoun and Barnard; and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Laukhuff.

[2] Polto 90 requested a summary of U.S. policy with respect to Germany for an upcoming North Atlantic Council discussion. (740.5/7-2252)

al which follows is both general and familiar, but we cannot anticipate all specific questions that may arise. On such points believe Embassy can be helpful, particularly Wellington who has had extended experience in Germany. (Hillengrand will also provide SRE with wide background German matters when he arrives in September.) Department will be glad to furnish answers to further specific questions and also suggests it might possibly prove useful to consult HICOG for background information on specific problems.

(2) Policy of US re Federal Republic is to bring Federal Republic into normal and mutually beneficial relationship with other countries of free world. This policy is also intended to serve ultimate objective of restoring free, united, and democratic Germany to community of nations. (See para 10 below on unification of Germany, which we assume will be major interest to other countries in NAC.)

(3) This policy requires that the Federal Republic be given wholly different position in world from one it has now under occupation. That new position, basis of which is established in Convention on Relations between Three Powers and the Federal Republic, will become a reality after that Convention, related Conventions, and the EDC Treaty enter into effect. Occupation will then be terminated, occupation agencies abolished, and relations between the Federal Republic and other Powers (including US, UK, and France) conducted by usual methods of diplomacy. Of rights now held by three occupying powers, none will be retained except those specified in Article 2 of Convention on Relations. These rights are not being kept for reasons which have to do with the Federal Republic alone, but are made necessary by continued division of Germany and continued necessity for presence in Germany of troops to defend free world. When these conditions no longer exist, rights in question will be withdrawn.

(4) Reserved powers will be qualification of sovereignty, but Conventions themselves will not be such a qualification. The Federal Republic's new position will be one of substantial independence, and Germans will have freedom of action in both domestic and foreign affairs. Their policies and relations with other countries will be for themselves to decide, and will not be determined by former occupying powers. Essential condition of US policy is, however, that the Federal Republic will continue effectively bound to West by EDC, Coal and Steel Treaty, and any future arrangements of similar character. In this way purpose stated in preamble to Convention on Relations can be realized—"to integrate the Federal Republic on a basis of equality within the European Community itself included in a developing Atlantic Community".

(5) Paras 3 and 4 cover basic requirements of US policy re the Federal Republic. In lesser and more specific fields we should

expect US policies to develop as circumstances require and generally in same manner as with other countries. This is essential to our intention that German freedom of action should be subject only to Allied reserved powers and to continued German association with West (which is policy freely adopted by the present Federal Government). The Federal Republic intends, according to Article 3 of Convention on Relations, to join international organizations contributing to common aims of the free world, and the Three Powers will support such applications for membership "at appropriate times". We cannot make useful prediction re such times, except to point out that principal difficulty is likely to be opposition of USSR and satellites to Federal Republic membership in UN or other organizations which they participate in. Re possible German membership in NATO you are already familiar with background this question.

(6) Balance of airgram concerns problem of German unification and Soviet intentions. We consider that immediate objectives of USSR in Germany are to consolidate its position in Soviet area of occupation and to prevent integration of the Federal Republic into the European Community. Its ultimate objective is control of all Germany.

(7) Immediate tactical objective of USSR is to prevent ratification of Conventions and EDC Treaty. It is seeking to do this by mobilizing popular resistance in the Federal Republic to ratification, on the grounds that ratification will mean use of the Federal Republic as advanced base for imperialist war of aggression against Soviet bloc and will postpone indefinitely unification of Germany. Communists claim that the best way to bring about a peaceful solution of the German problem is for the Four Powers to meet, in order to draft a peace treaty which would be negotiated with an All-German Government. (Berlin's Despatch 53, July 15, 1952, rptd London and Paris.[3])

(8) At the same time the Soviet Union is seeking to prevent achievement of our objectives in the Federal Republic, Communist regime in East Germany is undertaking to isolate the Soviet Zone and East Berlin from the Federal Republic and West Berlin and to strengthen its control over the population of East Germany. Implementation of this policy was begun through a series of measures taken after signature of Contractual Agreements and EDC Treaty, which were designed to isolate the Soviet area of occupation (Berlin Despatch 946, June 17, 1952, rptd London and Paris). [4] Next step

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[3] Not printed. (762B.00/7-1552)

[4] Document 701.

was taken at Socialist Unity (Communist) Party conference held in early July, when the Soviet Zone leaders announced extensive program for Sovietization of East Germany. (Berlin's 88 to Bonn, rptd info Dept 78, London, Paris, Moscow, unn.)[5] The Soviet Zone regime has also announced that it intends to organize "national army". (Berlin Despatch 54, July 15, 1952, rptd London and Paris.)[6]

(9) While the East German and Soviet authorities have thus taken certain actions affecting West Berlin, so far these have been either connected with their program for Sovietization of the Soviet Zone or have been of a harassing nature. Balance of evidence available would seem to indicate that they do not intend to undertake all out blockade in the immediate future, but rather seek to undermine our position in Berlin through slow process of strangulation. (Berlin unnumbered, July 15, pouched London and Paris.)[7]

(10) US will continue to work toward ratification and implementation of Conventions and EDC Treaty. Whenever Soviet actions evidence an honest desire to permit reunification of Germany in freedom, we are prepared to talk with them. The primary purpose of recent notes to USSR has been to ascertain whether satisfactory basis for such talks can be found. Before there can be consideration of negotiating peace treaty with Germany, there must, of course, be a united Germany with which to negotiate. For that reason, we have rejected initial Soviet proposal to move immediately to drafting of treaty and have insisted that first order of business should be free elections leading to the formation of an All-German Government. Soviets have, in subsequent notes, declared their willingness to discuss formation All-German Government on basis of free elections and conducting of an investigation to determine whether such elections are possible, but have insisted on linking such discussion to talks on peace treaty. While continuing to decline to discuss peace treaty at this time, US, UK, and France have proposed that the Four Powers meet to arrange for an investigation of conditions throughout Germany as first essential step toward reunification of Germany. While we are thus making every effort to explore Soviet intentions, we believe it should be made clear to world that blatant contradiction exists between profession of USSR in its notes and actions Soviets and Communist regime are taking in East Germany.

(11) Re Berlin we are also taking every possible step to make our position there more secure, including the development of an ade-

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[5] Document 703

[6] Not printed (762B.5/7-1552)

[7] Not printed (762B.00/7-1552)

quate stockpile. As Secretary Acheson said, recently in Berlin, "We have given notice, in plain and unmistakable language, we are in Berlin as a matter of right and duty, and we shall remain in Berlin until we are satisfied that the freedom of this city is secure. We have also indicated in unmistakable terms that we shall regard any attack on Berlin from whatever quarter as an attack against our forces and ourselves". [8] Harassing actions taken by the Communists in connection with their efforts to seal off Eastern Germany have been dealt with thus far either in Berlin or in HICOM. See Berlin's unnumbered telegram of July 15 referred to above. These measures have had some success in protecting our and Berliners' interests. We expect, however, that similar developments will continue to vex us.

Copies of this airgram are being sent to AmEmbassy, London and HICOG, Bonn.

ACHESON

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[8] Regarding Secretary Acheson's visit to Berlin, June 28–29, see Document 551.

No. 151

762.00/8–1852

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Lyon) [1]

SECRET [BERLIN, undated.]

This morning I had a conversation with Bishop Dibelius who told me that he had talked with Niemoller ("whom you Americans don't think very much of") last week and that the latter was most optimistic and convinced that Contractuals would never be signed and that everything would be changed in Germany within four months. Bishop Dibelius said that he did not imagine that the Russians told Niemoller very much more than they had told anyone else but still he had rarely seen Niemoller in such good spirits and, in fact, the latter seemed to be happier about the future than any other German.

I asked whether Niemoller indicated in what way he meant everything would be changed in Germany within the next four months and Dibelius said that Niemoller had indicated that the Soviets would "issue an invitation" to Four Power talks and that certain deputies of the CDU and FDP will refuse to support ratification prior to the holding of these talks.

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[1] A heading on the source text indicates that the conversation took place on Aug. 16. This memorandum was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 158 from Berlin, Aug. 18.

I asked Bishop Dibelius if in his opinion the Soviets were prepared to withdraw from Germany now if they were certain of a unified neutral Germany. Bishop Dibelius said he thought they aren't as ready as they were a year ago. Then, he added, he had recommended to Mr. McCloy that the Western Allies accept a unified, neutral Germany as the price of withdrawal. Bishop Dibelius felt that if this were done the Eastern Germans would be so much more pro-western than anyone else, that in a short time one would have a unified, totally prowestern Germany.

Mr. McCloy, according to Bishop Dibelius, had replied that such a policy would not satisfy American public opinion; they would say that Germany was pro-East today, pro-West tomorrow. How could one rely on such a country? American public opinion demanded a clear-cut forthright German policy.

Reminiscing somewhat, Bishop Dibelius said that a year ago Grotewohl and the other East German leaders had said were there to be a unified Germany they (pro-Soviet Eastern officials) would have to commit hari-kari. Today Grotewohl is saying that the farmers of East Germany would be willing to fight to maintain the present situation for they know that if the West should win a new war their land would be taken from them. Bishop Dibelius sighed and said, "Those poor East German officials, they only say what they are told to say—one thing today, another tomorrow. Nuschke sat in that very chair, (pointing to the chair in which I was sitting) and told me that the first thing he does every morning is to look in the paper to see if he is still Deputy Minister President".

Dibelius gave me the impression that he was tired and somewhat muddled. It was not always easy to tell when he was quoting Niemoller or Dibelius. His friendship with Niemoller extends over a period of many years. Niemoller baptized one of Dibelius's sons and Dibelius succeeded in obtaining the release of Niemoller's son from a Soviet prison, and they have many other personal and emotional ties. He says frankly, however, that he no longer agrees with Niemoller politically and has "other troubles with him". Nevertheless, Dibelius, I gather, is still fond of his old friend. I left Dibelius with the feeling that he too feels that there should be Four Power talks before ratification.

No. 152

762A.0221/8-2852: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, August 28, 1952—6 p.m.

887. I agree heartily with desirability proposed conf. [2] Aside from giving more emphasis to Berlin my comment on agenda is that it does not appear to provide for specific consideration of resurgence of Ger productivity and vitality as one of, if not the, most significant factors in West Eur scene. It is in our minds an original cause of many of problems now troubling us in West Eur and is likely to make difficulties for us in East Eur.

In West this dynamism of Ger will and production is creating an ever greater imbalance in power relationship between Ger and Fr. Resurgence of Ger vitality is undoing narrowly calculated balance between Fr and Ger on which much American-Fr thinking regarding Eur integration was predicated.

Let us illustrate what we mean. Saar issue is clear and crucial symptom. Our understanding is that Fr considered alienation of Saar from Ger and its incorporation in Fr econ complex as essential to even approx Fr parity with Ger. Remarkable Ger postwar revival has made denial of Saar to Ger and its retention by Fr even more important than it seemed in 1945. "Europeanization" of Saar on basis of local Franco-Ger equality without integration of Fr and Ger wld mean a sharp absolute decline of Fr strength in relation to Ger.

In Ger Saar is a measure, albeit an exaggerated one, of rapidly reviving Ger natl consciousness and self-assertiveness. Ger demands regarding Saar are not static; they have been steadily expanding. And there is slight reason to believe that they will not continue to grow. What Bonn wld have settled for on Saar last winter was not what it wld accept in spring. Terms negotiable now may well be rejected by autumn.

Reason is simple—Gers are confident of their superiority over Fr. They know it is growing. They calculate they can afford to wait. We shall not be surprised if by Sept their position is that they wish to see Saar "Europeanized" in a total integration of Fr and Ger within EDC, but if Fr will not buy that, then Saar must be returned to Ger lock, stock and barrel. This is a strong position for them and one regarding which it will be difficult for us to reproach them, for they will have ranged themselves, not insincerely, on side of integration angels.

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[1] Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Rome.

[2] On Aug. 28, in a telegram to Moscow, Bonn, Paris, London, and Rome, Bruce had proposed holding another in the series of European Chiefs of Mission Conferences to examine the situation in Europe. (Telegram 855 to Bonn, 120.4341/8-2252)

Burgeoning Ger dynamism is also having its effect with regard to East. Fact that West Gers feel deeply frustrated about recovery of Eastern territories does not mean, so far as we can see, any diminution of desires for reunification. While hopes may fade on this score, growth of confidence and pride tend to make denial of Eastern territories even more intolerable. This is a more slowly working fermentation than Saar. But we must not think that because it is not an immed and critical issue it will not plague us in future.

We wld also observe that unity issue in Ger involves lost Eastern territories, which involve territories ceded to Poland, which involve question of Soviet satellite. Our policy of favoring Ger unification logically leads therefore step by step to question: What is our position re ultimate disposition of satellites? Thus far we have been spared close questioning on this score. But we believe it wld be useful, with eye to future, to have our minds clarified regarding our long term objectives on satellites. With peaceful, we hope, rollback of Soviet power do we think of Eur community, complete with Schuman Plan and EDF, stopping at Oder-Neisse, at old Polish border or at prewar Soviet frontiers? In other words, is this new center of power which we are trying to create in Western Eur eventually to include all or part of any of present Soviet satellites?

It seems to us that these are several practical questions. Gers are now beginning to see beyond their noses. Satellite problem, which may sometimes seem remote to us, is of intimate concern to potentially strongest of our West Eur Allies. I hope that Secretary and Kennan can give us benefit of their thinking on this subject.

DONNELLY

No. 153

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Germany, 1950-1952"

Memorandum by Leon Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 4, 1952.

Subj: Bonn's tel. 887 to Dept. Aug. 28, 1952 re Germany's Position in Europe. [2]

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[1] Copies also sent to Bruce, Laukhuff, Perkins, Bonbright, Riddleberger, and Merchant.

[2] *Supra.*

This telegram reflects a growing concern in HICOG—particularly in the Office of Political Affairs—at certain implication and possible consequences of West Germany's revived economic potential and political influence. German revival—particularly since 1948—has confronted Germany's neighbors and the western powers with the implacable, if not necessarily sinister, fact that the Federal Republic is now the strongest power in Europe outside the USSR, and likely to grow stronger year by year with the full implementation of current Allied policies.

I do not believe that any thoughtful member of Mr. Donnelly's staff questions the wisdom or necessity of present basic policy respecting Germany. What is desired is that the Department be fully aware, in the further evolutionary development of its policy and tactics, of Germany's resurgence and vitality as a most significant reality in the European scene.

Specifically, this raises the question of the balance of power within the emerging European community. Can a renascent Germany, aware of its power, be contained within the legal and constitutional framework of this community as it materializes in the Schuman Plan, the EDC, and possibly a strengthened Council of Europe? There seems to be the thought in some quarters (reflected, I believe, in some of the NSC 68 series [3]) that in achieving our paramount objective of redressing the world balance of power through strengthening the West against Russia it may be inevitable to sanction the emergence of Germany as virtual leader of a West European bloc of powers. In the light of German experience and inter-Allied relationships in World War II, the danger of permitting the power of any ally to be unduly augmented for short-term reasons of over-all strategy must be apparent.

There seems to be little evidence today that Germany consciously aspires to the hegemony of Europe through the instrumentality of European union, or aims to utilize European union as a vantage-point from which to embark upon a new course of Machtpolitik. But it should not be overlooked that Germany once again seems to be in a dynamic-evolutionary phase of development in marked contrast to the other major powers of Western Europe and that a main premise of our German policy must be the uncertainty, the incalculability of future German national behavior. With waxing power which accentuates the existing differential between German strength and that of France, for instance, German policy will become more aggressive and demanding. Possible ultimate developments such as German preponderance in the Coal and Steel Community and in the EDC are certain to be reflected in German insistence upon corresponding influence in the European community. Once the power balance is upset it may be impossible to constrain the forces of German expansion through legal bonds and limitations.

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[3] For NSC 68, Apr. 14, 1950, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 234.

The Saar, though not intrinsically of great importance, symbolizes both French and German fears and hopes. The French, since 1945, have feared the restoration of German power, a fear which has never been entirely overshadowed by the Soviet menace. Having lost out in their earlier efforts to place permanent restraints on German power through detachment and control of the Ruhr, extreme political decentralization, etc., they now have fallen back on retention of economic control over the Saar as the *sine qua non* for the maintenance of a tolerable balance between German and French power in Europe. The Germans see the Saar in terms of their reviving national self-assertiveness and demand political freedoms for the Saar which, they anticipate, will be exercised in a manner favorable to German interests. Both French and Germans do lip-service to a "European" solution of the Saar problem, but have quite different end results in mind. As pointed out in the telegram, the French see concessions on the issue of economic control over the Saar as crucial if a semblance of balance is to be maintained in Europe, but run athwart the German counterdemand that unilateral French controls be sacrificed in the interest of "Europeanization". The Germans feel that time works for them and that ultimate popular pressure from the Saar for return to Germany will in due course become irresistible. Thus Europeanization might be a half-way house on the road to annexation.

The soundest course for the U.S. would seem to be to continue to urge a genuinely European solution of the Saar question. This should placate the French by assuring (1) that Saar coal and iron resources, being subject to the jurisdiction of the Schuman Plan High Authority, could never come under German national control, and (2) that territorial annexation of the Saar by Germany would be precluded. It should assure the Germans that French influence in the Saar would be confined to the protection of legitimate and vested economic interests there, and that the Saar population would enjoy full political freedom and autonomy with maximum possibilities for normal association with their German kinsmen.

German dynamism begins to cast a shadow over eastern Europe. How soon German aspirations for the return of "irredentas" in the east may force the satellite issue to the front can not be calculated, but it may be assumed as an eventuality. It will be most immediate in the case of Poland. This question ties in with the one previously discussed in that Poland and other orbit countries have been registering alarm at the rearmament of West Germany. They also fear a "deal" on reunification which might force them—Poland, at least—to disgorge annexed German territory and confront the enhanced power of a restored and enlarged Germany. The French also have expressed their fears lest a nationalistic German government might develop aggressive designs on the lost territories to the east. Such a Germany, they fear, would be a dangerous partner for NATO and might lure the West into dangerous courses vis-à-vis the East.

U.S. policy embraces the concepts of (1) German reunification (of the four zones and Berlin), (2) at least partial restoration of the Polish-administered trans-Oder-Neisse area to Germany (implied since Secretary Marshall's statement at Moscow CFM, 1947 [4]), and (3) the roll-back of Soviet power in eastern Europe with ultimate liberation of the satellites. There has as yet been no compelling urgency to spell out these policies in detail. But they all bear immediately upon Germany's new power position in Europe and the necessity may soon arise to become more explicit in our east European objectives as the restoration of Germany proceeds.

Basically, the telegram poses two difficult questions which must loom ever more largely in the background of current policy decisions respecting Europe. *First*, must the integrated Europe, which is a cardinal goal of our policy, be one embodying a nicely adjusted balance among the national units composing it, or may it be permitted, *de facto* if not *de jure*, to become subject to German predominance? Do we, in fact, have a choice, or is such an evolution inevitable? *Second*, what do we envisage to be the territorial limits of an integrated Europe—to what extent may it impinge upon the satellite area? This second question, of course, would have a very different significance in the event that western Europe had become or were becoming unified economically, militarily and to some extent politically about Germany as the ascendant power.

It is not likely that the Ambassadors' Conference at London will come to any definitive conclusions about questions such as these. But they may be raised. And these issues must ultimately be resolved. Clear thinking about them at this stage is essential in order to plot the course of future policy.

Two suggestions may be made. First, U.S. policy should envisage an integrated Europe in which German participation is so hedged by safeguards that it cannot develop into hegemony. Operation of the Schuman Plan should preclude German economic hegemony over Europe while maximizing German production in the common interest. The new German armed forces, whether in a realized EDC or otherwise, must be subject to supra-national organs of control and not be permitted to develop as a national army under national control. Further measures should be advanced which would tend to increase intradependence within the European community and its close association with and dependence upon the broader Atlantic community. This approach should satisfy the French and not be unpalatable to the Germans who are preponderantly amenable at this stage to the appeal of *European* solutions of their problems. There would develop a danger if the European community did not materialize and become effective in the immediate future while German intransigence was growing.

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[4] For text of Secretary Marshall's statement at the 24th session of the CFM in Moscow, Apr. 9, 1947, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1947, pp. 693–694, or *Germany 1947–1949*, pp. 146–148. For a summary of his statement, see telegram 1274 from Moscow, Apr. 9, in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. II, p. 320.

Regarding the relation of the satellite area to a united Europe inclusive of Germany, there seem to be two problems, one rather specific, the other more general.

The first involves determination of the German-Polish frontier. German national policy, particularly if and when Germany is reunited, would demand recession of at least part of the territory beyond the Oder-Neisse. This accords with established U.S. policy. The U.S. might, while refraining from specific commitments, continue to insist that the question of Germany's eastern frontier is still open, to be resolved only in a general peace settlement. What might be kept in mind, in this connection, is such a proposal as the U.S. was prepared to advance at the Moscow and London CFM's in 1947 had the point been taken up in actual negotiations. This was a proposed rectification of the Oder-Neisse line in Germany's favor so as to meet more adequately and equitably the historic, economic and ethnographic requirements of the situation in that area.

The second, more general problem, involves the possible extension of a united Europe (Schuman Plan, EDC, *et al.*) to include liberated satellite areas of eastern Europe. No clear U.S. policy has as yet been established as to what areas should ultimately be included in a European union. At present our policy approves inclusion of the six Schuman Plan and EDC countries as a core of union, to which the OEEC, EPU and Council of Europe countries would be more loosely added. We have definitely indicated, as in the tripartite note to the Soviet Government of March 25, 1952 [5] and in subsequent notes, that we would anticipate the inclusion of a united Germany in a "purely defensive European community" and in "associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations". But we have never formulated as a U.S. policy the position that European union should extend to other satellite areas. It is true that certain themes of our policy, more specifically of our psychological warfare vis-à-vis the orbit, such as the "roll-back" and "return to Europe" concepts seem to imply such an objective. But it is not accepted policy—yet. As suggested, German developments may force this issue into the foreground. Certainly one consideration may be alluded to without prejudice to any decision that may be arrived at on the broad issue. This is that any extension of European union to include ultimately any liberated satellite areas would make sense only if there were iron-clad assurances that a united Germany should not be in a position to dominate the union as thus enlarged.

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[5] Regarding this note, see telegram 2209, Document 78.

No. 154

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Germany"

The Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Ferguson) to the Director of the Staff (Nitze) [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, September 26, 1952.

DEAR PAUL: In this letter I will give you my notes on the discussion we have had with respect to Germany [2] and then I have a few comments that John [3] made to me in Bonn.

The item on the agenda relating to Germany raised the problem of its growing strength and vitality. As you remember, Bonn's telegram a couple of weeks ago asked the question what would we do if the French failed to ratify the EDC. This latest question has not been addressed at all here, except that Donnelly referred to Leon Fuller's memorandum to you [4] (this memorandum has been included in the briefing books).

Mr. Donnelly began the discussion by pointing out Western Germany had an area smaller than France, had less than one million unemployed, had absorbed ten million people from the East and was still absorbing five hundred to six hundred a day. They have accomplished this, apart from the financial aid from the U.S., by their own initiative and manpower. They have made an agreement to compensate Israel, they have assumed responsibility for servicing prewar debts, they have developed a general ability to undertake staggering financial obligations and have developed foreign trade to approximate prewar level. They are determined to further improve their position in Europe, and the question is what are we going to do about it. It is impossible to hold back their progress. If they are not brought into the Western European picture it is only a matter of time before the Europeans will be driven out of the export markets. America is already experiencing German competition in Latin America.

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[1] The source text was transmitted in two parts. Between the two parts was a memorandum from Fuller to Nitze, Oct. 1, which stated that Kennan's thoughts did not seem to "add up to anything very definite or satisfactory with respect to our German policy", but were "extremely helpful" in suggesting paths or possibilities that should be explored further.

[2] Ferguson was in London to attend the meeting of Western European Chiefs of Mission, held at London, Sept. 24-26.

[3] John Davies, Director of the Office Political Affairs, HICOG.

[4] *Supra.*

Adenaeur will stand or fall on his policy of western integration. He stands a very good chance of re-election. Mr. Donnelly said he was not trying to push the German case but to give understanding to other missions of the situation. If Germany is too restricted there is always the danger that certain elements will turn East to the Satellites or Russia for trade. Germany must export to live. He added that except for Berlin and psychological purposes Germany has no present need for economic aid. He said that our principal interest was for counterpart funds to use in Berlin.

It is his belief that France will not be able to control Germany nearly as well in the EDC as in NATO. The problem of German membership in NATO is not now urgent but it will arise after ratification of the contractuals and EDC.

With respect to the annual review Mr. Donnelly said Germany was quite far along on the questionnaire which had been given to them. He mentioned some of the questions had been omitted from the document given Germany and the Germans know this and are saying that they are coming to equality and are asking what this differentiation means.

George Kennan said that if Germany were admitted to NATO he could see no peaceful solution to things in Europe. The Soviets would not be able to get out of the Eastern Zone without yielding to the Western Coalition, headed by U.S., and we would have only a Soviet collapse to hope for. Germany will get the bit in its teeth and when they are back with their strength they aren't going to refrain from attempts at unification. He said it had always been his hope that we would not bind ourselves to take part in a German civil war which is bound to come. He felt that if Germany comes into NATO we would not need an Ambassador to Moscow. George said he had wondered what he would say if he were asked to talk privately to the Soviets. He felt that he could only ask for unconditional surrender because we did not seem to be ready to pay any price. George remarked we have already had the bitter experience of learning that when you fight in a big coalition the only tems you can agree on are unconditional surrender. He felt you could apply the same analogy to peace time. All of this worries him very much in his capacity "out there." He said that if the last shreds of hope go out the window for the Soviets he worries about them.

Mr. Draper asked if George felt the same way about Germany coming into EDC and George said he did not since we were not members of it. He still thought it was a very dangerous point, and we were saying we did not want war but that the Soviets must fold up their tents and leave Europe in what for them would be a political debacle. We will have nothing in between if we let these people into NATO. he said he could not assure anyone that if we held open the opportunity to talk we could get agreement with the Russians on Europe. He has always felt that we could have had an agreement on Japan on a basis of a disarmed Japan, but he does not know whether we could get anything on Germany. The question is whether a settlement on Germany would still be better than a war. He says he is afraid the Soviets would chose to fight a war rather than give up in Germany. He said these views really lead you to the whole great question of whether you ought to go in and subvert them. He said he had doubts about it but not on moral grounds. He said his doubts arose from the fact that Soviet leaders had been masters of the Russian people for 35 years. He said there is a good deal of fear of them but also great intimacy between the people and their leaders. The attitude of the people is not wholly negative. Let a foreigner come in and do anything to the system and you will have confusion. George feels that once a totalitarian rule is accepted as a fact, then you cannot do favors for the people or injure the regime. If you try to help the people, as Hoover tried to after the first war, the regime will claim credit and if you try to injure the regime it will step aside and let your efforts hurt the people.

George feels that today we are in a poorer position than Germany was in having an alternative available to the present Kremlin leadership. He is afraid that if we get into this thing we won't be able to drive them from power or really do anything to them. He said it might be possible to distinguish between the Satellites and USSR. We might ruffle up the Satellites, but he does not think this course is consistent with diplomatic relations. If we are going to undertake it, we ought to stop play acting and get out where we can fight them. He said all he really asked was that we take a good long look before we take a last leap.

Mr. Donnelly mentioned that there was one school of thought in Bonn that worries about the ulterior motives of Germany going into EDC. He added there was no suspicion of Adenauer's motives.

but some people ask whether they want to go in in order to dragoon the allies to help them take Eastern Germany. George added he would also like to know the answer to that question. He said you have probably reached the high peak of influence of Catholic center parties in Europe. He feels that in a year or two there will be strong national governments. He said he was all for integration of Germany with Western Europe but he thought we ought to explore the possibility of ending the split in Germany. He said he realized we could not do it now with the ratification of EDC pending.

In continuing the talks on Germany, George Kennan said he would like to suggest it might be better for us to announce unilaterally our determination not to let the Soviet Union take Western Germany or Berlin than to involve ourselves in multilateral commitments. This would avoid an obligation to Germany that could implicate us in a German civil war. George Perkins said that he was unable to distinguish between the EDC and NATO since the European Defense Force would be a part of the NATO army. He pointed out that we have already given a commitment to aid the EDC countries if they are attacked, but we have given no commitment to assist them if they attack.

Mr. Bruce added that while we were committed to regard an attack as an attack upon ourselves, we are not committed to any particular actions. Kennan showed some confusion about the EDC and NATO commitments and seemed to have been unaware of what was involved, particularly in the EDC. He remarked to me in the evening that he had never taken the EDC seriously, but he had regarded it as one of Ted Achilles' ideas.

In continuing the discussion, George said that since the Germans had an interest in the problem of East Germany and the Eastern borders, they are not a fit partner for an alliance. He said that perhaps he had been ill informed and the step to make them one had already been taken in the EDC.

He thinks the only way you can hold the Russians in the area is by developing German strength and leadership. He has always hoped that we would have German leadership in Central Europe. He said he had seen German and Soviet leadership at their nastiest and the Soviet kind was the more dangerous. On the other hand, he does not think you can treat the Germans as a Charlie McCarthy. We need German leadership as a buffer against Russia. He thinks they are the only people who can provide the military strength for the defense of Western Europe, but if they do so in an alliance with us, there is then a great danger of war.

George also discussed the Intelligence estimates of Russian strength and said that he had the feeling we tended to exaggerate this strength; at least we did so in 1946 and 1947. He remarked that except for jet fighters, we never know what proportions of the whole what we see is, since we have no visual confirmation of many of the estimates we read. He says that there is no evidence in Moscow to suggest a large number of armored divisons and he thinks it unlikely. He pointed out that the Germans had had a fairly accurate analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Russia and if Hitler had listened to these reports, he would have known what he was running into. The Germans had not painted any such picture as we do. Our estimates show nothing but strength. The Germans knew there were also weaknesses. George is sure the Russians have improved, but he thinks that some of the estimates are exaggerated when he realizes that the whole structure of estimates is superimposed on a backward country that does not produce as much steel as France and Germany together. They have no adequate highway system and they have made no appreciable repairs to their railroads.

He remarked that he thought that it was possible that the Russians would agree to a demilitarized and united Germany and the mention of this caused a good ideal of surprise at the table.

At our meeting yesterday afternoon, David raised the question of NSC 135 [5] and asked me to speak briefly about it and then asked George what comments he had. George did not address his remarks to the paper directly except to say that he was more worried about what was left out than what was put in. He mentioned that he had not wanted to participate in the drafting of NSC 68 [6] because he thought it was a mistake to tie such a paper into the budget process and probably it would be impossible to write any of these things down.

In his further discussion, he said that what worried him most was that our original purpose in seeking to build strength was with the idea we would create it to use for negotiations. It was to have a dialectical use. Today we are really enmeshed in the dynamics and logic of the armaments program. He stated it worried him all the more because he had seen slight indications in Moscow that the Russians can be moved if (1) the West shows firmness and decisiveness and (2) the Soviets feel they have alternatives. To the extent that they can be made to feel that we hold open the possibility of talking it weakens their defiance. He then spoke briefly about their attitude toward him and his immediate predecessors. He said they regarded Bedell and Kirk as espionage agents, [7] but that they could not regard him that way and he thinks that some of the intelligencia possibly began to ask, when he went to Moscow, whether the leaders could be sure there was no possibility of talking to the West.

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[5] For documentation on NSC 135, "Status of United States Programs for National Security as of June 30 [1952]", see vol. II, Part 1, pp. 56 ff.

[6] For NSC 68, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. I, p. 234.

[7] Walter Bedell Smith and Alan G. Kirk, U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Mar. 22, 1946–Dec. 25, 1948, and May 21, 1949–Oct. 6, 1951, respectively.

George regards the principle issues between us and the Russians to be Germany, Austria, and Japan. He thinks we must reach an agreement on these if we are to have hope of avoiding a war. He does not think it possible to stand still indefinitely with no war, no peace, and he worries that our position may mean that things cannot get better. He believes that Austria stands or falls with the German problem and remarked that we embarrassed the Russians in a most delightful way with our last note, but that they would probably wiggle out of it.[8]

He said he wished the Secretary were here at the meeting: he had noticed that Dean had said we are mobilizing in order to talk on equal terms, but George did not see that that was the way our policy was working out. If the Russians came to him today and asked how we could work out something, he would have to say he could not see anything.

He said that his feelings were possibly differences of emphasis and that perhaps they were premature. His worries center around Germany and he would not be surprised to see the Soviets come back and accept the electoral commission idea and that might postpone things in Germany for a long time. He fears the ratification of the EDC because he does not think he will have anything left to talk about. He said that he saw the dilemma so clearly that he could not speak in terms of blame, but only of worry. He also thought that we ought to attack the problem of defense costs because we have almost priced ourselves out of an adequate defense. If we want to compete with the Russians, we will have to make it cheaper.

George also said that he remembered there was a large Russian army in the 30's and we were not scared of it. The Russians were scared and with cause. He said he would like to get Russian forces to the Pripet Marshes where they were before, but he added that of course we must negotiate with strength and not sell out the people of Western Europe. He added that we must regard deadly rivalry as established in the minds of the Soviet leaders and that was something we could not shake. They think that the great struggle is now going on and they think they are better and have history on their side.

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[8] Regarding the U.S. note to the Soviet Union, dated Sept. 5, concerning the Austrian State Treaty, see Document 814.

Mr. Bruce asked if the Russians would withdraw from Germany if we did not, and George said, "No, they would not." He added that if German unification would come, it would come with a lurch. He realizes that a great deal of our structure would fall to pieces, but there would be a vigorous Germany. He is not so worried about the lack of German orientation to the West in such circumstances because he is confident that the Kremlin is very difficult to deal with and so are the Germans. He thinks the Germans will be very cautious. He also said he thought the Russian position in the satellite area is very strained today and that Titoism is not very far below the surface. He would not want anyone to confuse this with our ability to go in and exploit it, but if the Soviets were out of Germany, he thinks that Germany would very soon form a counter attraction. He does not think the Soviets would want to invade and administer other parts of Europe, but he does think they want to get us out. He thinks we should realize there is no complete security in this world and that we should try to clarify the air by talking about Germany with the Soviets.

Mr. Draper said that this opened a range of problems which we should all think about very seriously and it is my understanding that the ambassadors will recommend that these questions be studied further in Washington, where George Perkins and I explained a good deal of attention had already been given. It was quite clear that except for Draper, none of the others present wished to discuss these subjects here.

When I was in Bonn, John had some rather definite ideas about Germany. He felt it was a mistake to integrate Germany with the rest of Western Europe, not so much because of Soviet reaction, but because the Germans were sure to dominate Western Europe. He felt the Franco-German problem would remain so intense that we might find it necessary, with the UK and Canada, to work separately with the Germans for the creation of German forces, maintaining our position elsewhere in Western Europe by guarantees to the French and the others that we would come to their defense. John is still also concerned about the problem of timing, and has the feeling that we should develop strength in the Mediterranean area, before doing too much in Germany and France.

You will see from this rather long account, that many of the problems that we have worried about trouble George and John a great deal, but have received very little attention from the others whose focus is on the EDC and the current problems it creates.[9]

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[9] At this point in the source text the following paragraph has been marked out: "I am enclosing a paper that George Kennan circulated today, summing up his worries. I do not think it adds very much, but you may wish to have it."

I am going back to Paris tonight to meet Peggy and then on to Spain on Monday.

Yours,

FERG

No. 155

762.00/10-252: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Denmark [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 2, 1952—6 p.m.

427. 1. Dept has studied with some misgiving Embtel 407 (rptd Bonn 11, Oslo 32, Stockholm 30, London 27, Paris 72 and our being repeated to other addressees) [2] reporting conversation with Den Social Democratic leader Hans Hedtoft in which he claims Eur Socialist parties are going to back Ger Social Democrats at Socialist mtg in Rome soon by issuing call for four-power talks. Further development along this line can become definitely embarrassing to us and can weaken our policy both re Ger and re EDC.

2. Addressee Missions shld therefore take every appropriate opportunity to explain to Socialist leaders US position re four-power talks as follows (to whatever extent is suitable in local circumstances) and try to head off Socialist support for Ger Social Democratic position.

(a) US is not opposed to four-power talks. We will be first to welcome them whenever they can contribute to solution of any of our east-west problems. But as wld be case with any kind of talks with anyone, we insist on knowing what we're going to talk about and that subjs are relevant, and whether there is remotest indication other party has serious intentions.

(b) US feels evidence of four Sov notes so far exchanged, as all other Sov or Ger-Commie actions and statements, fails to give any indication of real Sov interest in unifying Ger or in talking seriously about it. The evidence all pts, to the contrary, to Sov intention to talk about other things for other reasons, while cloaking their reasons under "unity" mantle. Socialist backing for "Four-Power Talks" under these circumstances means in effect blind support for Sov slogan and Sov tactics which are to use talks for other purposes than to achieve Ger unity.

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff; cleared by Lewis, Williamson, and GPA; and repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Oslo, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Vienna, Stockholm, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 407 reported, *inter alia*, that while Hedtoft and other Western European Socialists were skeptical regarding any change in the Soviet attitude on German unity, they proposed to issue a call for four power talks on Germany at their meeting in Italy. (762.00/10-252)

(c) Those "other purposes" are to befuddle and confuse west Ger and West Eur opinion in effort to weaken if not completely disrupt west's efforts to build EDC and generally strengthen self politically and morally. This tactic, if successful, cld be disastrous to west's unity of purpose and wreck very considerable success so far achieved which has already brought substantial increase of strength and self-confidence to western countries. Ask Socialist leaders to sit down and compare their own state of mind now with what it was in June 1950 and to consider whether they want to risk progress made by falling in with Commie slogan of "four-power talks".

(d) What will new four-power talks accomplish by way of proof of Sov intentions which is not already accomplished by long careful exchange of notes (recall that western ones have very specific and honest proposals for talks), or by notes on other subjs (such as Aust treaty), or by 258 mtgs of Aust Deputies, or by three months of talk at Palais Rose by Mins Deps in 1951? [3] Everyone professed to be convinced by last-mentioned effort. What in Sov acts or words has given any hope for change? In connection with Aust Treaty, recall Sov failure to show up at last two mtgs Aust Deps. In connection with Palais Rose Talks, recall they closed with open-ended invitation from West to have mtg on Ger without any Agenda whatever.

(e) Make clear that we seek talks on Ger unity and have not been hiding behind dispute over agenda, as Ollenhauer and Ger Social Democrats mistakenly appear to think. This is no agenda dispute. Ask Socialist leaders actually to read last western note. We are talking of something much more fundamental and real than order of items on agenda. We stand on very basic principle here. There is only one way to attack problem of Ger unity. That is through free elections. By our insistence on discussing only this question at this time we are standing guard for entire west against Sov design to create another satellite, another sham democracy, another Czecho. We also stand guard for whole Ger people including Social Democrats to protect their own right to a voice in peace treaty and prevent "diktat". Therefore, we are not prepared to draft peace treaty at this time simply because of recognized importance of having all-Ger Govt in existence.

3. For these reasons we believe our position is right and logical and we believe we have right to expect full support and understanding from all parties and all groups esp in NATO countries but also elsewhere in west. Convinced by all evidence that present Commie drive for four-power "talks" is phony, with ulterior motives, we plead for solid support to end that west can complete job of bldg strength so as eventually to bring about real talks with honest aims and some prospect of resolving tensions instead of fanning propaganda war.

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[3] Reference to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks, held at Paris Mar. 5-June 21, 1951.

4. Important to avoid giving impression that our position stems from decision to give higher priority to ratification EDC treaty than to Ger unity, as charged by some Gers. Reasons (a) to (e) above are honest, stand on own merits and do not add up to this conclusion.

5. Tactically it may be best not to oppose adoption of some res in favor of four-power talks but rather to suggest res shld clearly safeguard west's interests by calling for talks on free elections or when Sovs demonstrate sincerity of purpose on unity or some similar formula.

6. With particular Socialist leaders known to share our viewpoint, foregoing cld be given as supporting arguments for them to use with their colleagues.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] Replies to this telegram from The Hague, Brussels, Rome, and Vienna all indicated that the Socialists in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Austria were unlikely or unwilling to support the proposal for a four-power meeting. (Telegrams 486 from The Hague, Oct. 10; 383 from Brussels, Oct. 10; 1699 from Rome, Oct. 14; and 1002 from Vienna, Oct. 10, 762.00/10–852 through 10–1452) For Bonn's reaction, see telegram 1633, Document 157. No further replies have been found in Department of State files.

No. 156

PSB files, lot 62 D 333, PSB D-21 Series

Paper Prepared by the Psychological Strategy Board[1]

TOP SECRET
PSB D–21

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1952.

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[1] PSB D–21 consists of a cover sheet; a letter of transmission from the Director of the PSB, Alan Kirk, dated Oct. 23, which stated that the paper had been conditionally approved on Aug. 7 and finally approved on Oct. 9 and which indicated that copies were being sent to Acheson, Lovett, Smith, Harriman, and General Young of the JCS; a table of contents; a note making the correction in paragraph 7; and the text of the paper and annex printed here.

A psychological warfare plan for Germany had been under consideration since December 1951 and became in January 1952 the chief concern of the Psychological Strategy Board Panel on Germany, chaired first by Byroade and then Riddleberger. The panel, subsequently called Panel "F", produced its first draft on July 28, 1952 which included 30 pages of text, annexes entitled "Summary and Analysis" and "Covert Operations", and a supplement on Berlin. This draft was considered at a meeting of the PSB on Aug. 7 at which it was decided that further drafting was needed to reconcile various different points of view. After soliciting the views of the members of the Board and extensive comments from HICOG, a new paper was prepared with only one annex (the former second annex on covert activities). This paper was designated PSB D-21 and approved by the PSB on Oct. 9. Documentation on the evolution of PSB D-21 described above is in PSB files, lot 62 D 333, PSB D-21 Series.

A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

SECTION I

PROBLEM

To formulate a national psychological strategy with respect to: (a) the integration of Western Germany into Western Europe, (b) the reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany, (c) the achievement of German unity, and (d) the role of unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

SECTION II

APPLICABLE APPROVED POLICIES

As set forth in NSC 20/4, NSC Actions No. 212, No. 266a, NSC 115, NSC 68/4, NSC 86/1, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951.[2]

SECTION III

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A. Estimate

Our psychological strategy outlined in this paper is based on the following estimate of the situation:

1. *Overall Strategy:*

Our action in Germany can succeed only if they are conceived as an integral part of overall United States strategy, especially in the context of a European Community, to build up positions of strength from which to reduce Soviet-communist expansionism and aggression.

2. *Balance of Power:*

Western capability to support this strategy is likely to increase within the next two to three years, but not necessarily to a degree which would assure a relationship of forces between the Westen nations and the Soviet Union permitting successful negotiations with the Soviet Union.

3. *Cold War:*

The present state of tension between the Soviet bloc and the West may increase in intensity, and the Soviet Union will feel free to employ all of its capabilities for lures and pressures on the West, short of deliberately provoking general war.

4. *Integration:*

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[2] For documentation on the NSC 20 Series for 1948, see *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. I, pp. 507 ff. For NSC 115, Aug. 2, 1951, see the memorandum to the President, *ibid.*, 1951, vol. III, p. 849. For documentation on the NSC 68 Series for 1950, see *ibid.*, 1950, vol. I, p. 234. NSC Action No. 266a, NSC 86/1, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 are not printed.

The process of integrating the Federal Republic with the Western European Community through the EDC, the Schuman Plan, the Contractual Agreements, the Council of Europe, and similar instrumentalities will involve continued difficulties, during which ratification of the Agreements and their implementation may be slowed down and impeded by oppositionist elements within and outside the Federal Republic, and the Soviet Union will encourage elements in the Federal Republic and other European countries to delay and obstruct the process of integration.

5. *Contractuals:*

The present coalition government will honor the Agreements, when they come into force, but it will be subject, by coalition members and the opposition, to demands for liberalization; there will be continuing pressure for abandonment of reserved rights; and, in connection with the 1953 election campaign, there will be increased demands for a revision of the Contractual Agreements and other commitments with the West.

6. *German Unity and the Peace Treaty:*

It will not be possible in the foreseeable future to agree with the Soviet Union on a formula guaranteeing a satisfactory basis for the unification of Germany and for the conclusion of a peace treaty; but the Soviet Union may continue to use diplomatic and propaganda channels to press for quadripartite negotiation of a peace treaty as well as East-West German discussions on unity.

7. *Berlin:*

The Western Powers will maintain their position in Berlin, but the situation in Berlin and in particular the morale and standard-of-living of the British [3] population may be severely affected by the Soviet attrition strategy.

8. *Soviet Zone and East Berlin:*

The population of the Soviet Zone will remain fundamentally opposed to communism but the Soviet Union, through its East German puppet authorities will continue to tighten its controls, isolate East Germany from the West, and proceed with its attempts to set up a satellite state with an army of its own.

9. *German Military and Economic Potential:*

The build-up of an integrated German military force in the Federal Republic will proceed substantially as contemplated but will require pressure from the West, especially since the required draft legislation and the actual organization of the forces will be subject to continued criticism and resistance by the opposition; also, any rearmament in the Federal Republic will be accompanied or preceded by a build-up of an East German army, designed to instill apprehensions of civil war and to cancel out the Federal Republic's military contribution to Western defense.

10. *Western Europe:*

Attempts to promote Federal Republic integration into Western Europe will be inadequate unless they are supported by—and closely coordinated with—parallel attempts to promote the integration of Western Europe, particularly France, into a community capable of accepting the Federal Republic as a partner.

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[3] The note referred to in footnote 1 above indicates that "British" should be changed to read "Berlin."

11. *France:*

The Federal Republic's capability for leadership within a unified Western European community will be feared by France, unless potential German predominance in a united Europe is compensated by closer and more organic ties between Europe and the United States within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community as provided by U.S. existing policies.

12. *Eastern Europe:*

The Soviet-orbit countries are firmly under Soviet control now and will be in the foreseeable future; their liberation will come about only as a result of a major change in the existing relationships between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers; and their peoples generally entertain hopes for eventual liberation from Soviet domination but, especially in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, fear a possible renewal of German domination.

B. Objectives

Note: The order of priority and emphasis is based on U.S. policies reflecting the *present* world situation.

1. *Concerning the Federal Republic:*

a. To maintain and develop friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

b. To encourage and facilitate effective participation by the Federal Republic on a basis of equality in the European Community, included in a developing Atlantic Community, and a contribution by the Federal Republic to the political, economic, and social welfare, as well as to the defense structure, necessary to a strong and durable Europe.

c. In the event of unification on terms acceptable to the West, the above objectives will apply to all of Germany.

2. *Concerning West Berlin:*

To maintain and reinforce our political, economic, cultural, and psychological position in the western sectors of Berlin, and to nullify Soviet efforts to harass the population and to disturb and undermine the normal life of the city.

3. *Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin:*

To maintain contact with the population in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin in order to stiffen their spirit of resistance to Soviet-communist rule and thus (a) to weaken the political, economic, and military system in the Soviet Zone; and (b) to lay the groundwork for eventual incorporation in the free Western Community.

4. *Concerning German Unity:*

To demonstrate U.S. support of German unity attained by peaceful means; and to frustrate Soviet-communist efforts to obtain control of all of Germany and eventually to bring about Soviet withdrawal from Germany.

5. *Concerning Eastern Europe:*

To maintain contact with the people of Germany's Eastern European neighbors in order (a) to stiffen their spirit of resistance and thus weaken the Soviet system of political, economic, and military control of these countries; and (b) to sustain their hopes for eventual liberation and inclusion in an all-European Community free of domination by Germany, the U.S.S.R. or any other Power.

Section IV

TASKS

The following are the Tasks of our psychological strategy in support of the achievement of our objectives:

1. *Concerning the Federal Republic:*

a. To facilitate the transformation of the Allied-German relationship on the diplomatic, political, and economic as well as military levels from the occupation status toward that of equal partners and allies.

b. To foster, encourage, support and facilitate efforts of the population and the Government of the Federal Republic toward the integration of their political, economic, cultural, and military interests with those of the European Community and the Atlantic Community; to help pave the way for acceptance by other governments and peoples (particularly French) for participation by the Federal Republic in the development of the European and Atlantic communities.

c. To support the development in the Federal Republic of democratic institutions, and to assist the German democratic elements in their opposition to authoritarian and extremist elements.

d. To gain the support of the German people and government for U.S. policies, and to strengthen their will to resist and their confidence in the ability of the U.S. (and the West) to frustrate Soviet-communist aggression.

e. To stimulate maximum Federal Republic contribution to the development of increased military and economic strength in Western Europe.

f. To convince the Germans of the need to weaken Soviet aggressive capabilities by impeding the flow of strategic materials to East Germany and the Soviet bloc; and to provide Western markets and raw materials to the Federal Republic.

2. *Concerning Berlin:*

a. To demonstrate to the Soviet Union, the Berliners, the Germans, and the rest of the world our right, ability, and determination to maintain the Allied and West Berliners' position in and access to Berlin.

b. To exploit the continued existence of a free West Berlin as a "show window of democracy," and as a base of psychological operations in the Soviet Zone and beyond it in the Soviet orbit, in order to weaken Soviet influence throughout Germany, and particularly in order to encourage and strengthen resistance to Soviet rule in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.

c. In order to maintain the morale of the Berlin population and strengthen their diplomatic, political, cultural, and economic ties with the West in the face of increasing Soviet pressures, to plan and coordinate jointly with the U.K., French, and the Federal Republic governments, psychological measures to nullify the Soviet harassments, and to enlist and build up the active interest of governmental and private elements throughout the free world in support of Berlin's cause as a symbol of free-world unity of purpose.

d. To stimulate and assist the Federal Republic to provide maximum economic and psychological support for Western Berlin.

3. *Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin:*

. . . .

c. To keep the population informed of world events and of U.S. and Western policies, particularly with respect to Germany.

d. To maintain hope in the Soviet Zone population for a unified and democratic Germany integrated within the European Community.

e. To weaken the confidence and ability of the Soviet authorities and communist leaders to maintain or extend their controls in the Soviet Zone, or their influence in West Berlin or the Federal Republic.

4. *Concerning German Unity:*

a. To demonstrate our willingness to initiate and enter, jointly with the French and U.K. Governments, in negotiations with the Soviet Union for German unification under conditions guaranteeing a unified Germany with a democratic government established by free democratic elections, provided that a reasonable basis for such negotiations exists.

b. To support any legitimate proposal for action seeking peaceful solution to existing territorial problems within the framework of European, rather than national, interests, but to avoid giving official encouragement to German territorial aspirations toward areas external to the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and Berlin, beyond acknowledgement of the established U.S. policy that no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, and that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.[*]

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[*] U.S. note to the Soviet Government dated March 26, 1951. [Footnote in the source text. Apparent reference to the note of Mar. 25, 1952, transmitted in telegram 2209, Document 78.]

d. To expose and exploit Soviet moves aimed at permanent partition of Germany and satellization of Eastern Germany.

5. *Concerning Western Europe:*

a. To enhance popular confidence in:

i. the peaceful future of a European community, within an Atlantic Community, which includes the Federal Republic;
ii. the prospect of mutually beneficial relations with the Federal Republic;
iii. the determination of the Western world to strive for a unified, democratic Germany as a member of a viable European community; and
iv. the intentions of the Western Powers to safeguard the European Community against the resurgence of aggressive German nationalism.

b. To produce among European leaders and people a realistic awareness of the deadly menace of Soviet expansionism and of the strength accruing to the USSR if Germany were included in the Soviet orbit.

c. To stimulate the realization among Europeans that only a tremendous effort of imagination, productivity, and cooperation, far surpassing the present effort of the Atlantic Community, including Germany, will enable them to surmount this threat; and to convince them that the creative energies latent in the free societies, including Germany, when fully developed, will not only nullify the enemy's aggressive moves or plans but also raise the Western peoples to unprecedented levels of material and moral well-being.

d. To promote the concept of the Atlantic Community as provided by existing U.S. policies so that it may be used to support and supplement the concept of European unity as the dynamic and unifying element of our psychological strategy in Europe.

e. To create among the peoples of Western Europe a sense of positive participation in the international community which is now emerging.

6. *Concerning France:*

In addition to the specific effect desired in paragraph 5 above:

a. To stimulate popular acceptance of:

i. a genuine political settlement with the Federal Republic;
ii. the capability of the European Community, within the Atlantic Community, to develop for the common benefit German manpower, heavy industry, and steel production in such a way as to eliminate French fears.

b. To provide reassurance that the distinctive historic culture of France can vigorously flourish within the framework of the European Community, including the Federal Republic.

7. *Concerning Eastern Europe:*

a. To stimulate popular suspicion of Soviet intentions with respect to Germany.

b. To persuade Soviet-orbit peoples that a unified Germany integrated into a European Community is a guarantee against the revived German drive to the East.

c. To convince Soviet-orbit peoples that the weakening of Soviet power in East Germany is necessary prerequisite for their own liberation.

d. To sustain the resistance of Soviet-orbit peoples toward the day when their active participation in their own liberation will be required.

SECTION V

DESIRED ACTIONS

Part A—General Guidance

1. In developing and carrying out the specific actions to implement prescribed tasks, psychological strategy must give attention to the following opportunities and handicaps which influence the courses of action required for the psychological support of our policies in Europe and especially in Germany:

a. *Opportunities.*

i. The friendly orientation of large parts of European nations toward the U.S. and their growing confidence in U.S. strength;

ii. A strong sense of cultural and political identification in Germany with the West and the reservoir of good-will created by U.S. political initiative and by ECA, MSA and other assistance for German rehabilitation;

iii. The existence in the Federal Republic of a government and population sympathetic towards the U.S. and its policies and opposed, largely through personal experience, to communism and to the policies of the Soviet Union; and

iv. The steady decline of the strength of the West German Communist Party.

b. *Handicaps.*

i. The complexity and fluidity of the European political situation which has already on several occasions necessitated major adjustments of the U.S. tactical positions, and which will continue to require a flexible strategic psychological plan;

ii. The present elimination of U.S. influence on European government and peoples coinciding with the need to exert special U.S. pressures to induce Europeans to take actions which appear to be in their own interests; and

iii. Allied with this, increasing sensitivity in Western Europe to U.S. intervention, with the accompanying danger that at times strong U.S. political, economic, or psychological pressures may run the risk of self-defeat, unless offset by measures which emphasize that these programs will serve the best interests of the developing European and Atlantic Communities.

2. In order to gain the most effective support for U.S. policies by the German public, our approach must be conceived and carried out in a manner which is both palatable and persuasive to the German people. We must adjust our approach in accordance with the changes in public opinion and with impressions and impacts which various political, economic, and cultural issues have on the German psychological climate. This will require a major effort of imagination on the part of the U.S. operating agencies to develop new and more effective forms of psychological activities, and it implies a constant review of existing programs—including those recommended hereafter—in the light of their demonstrated effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

3. Our operations in Germany, furthermore, must be closely coordinated with our psychological strategy in other parts of the world, and to achieve maximum effect they should preferably be carried out within the framework of an integrated psychological strategy plan for Western Europe.

4. U.S. psychological operations designed for Germany and Western Europe should be guided by the following principles:

a. While supporting programs endorsed by U.S. which promote European and Atlantic integration, e.g., the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, the European Defense Community, etc., we should avoid raising false expectations by committing the U.S. to a fixed timetable.

b. Care should be taken in the application of any official pressure to primarily domestic issues of European states, in order to avoid the impression of excessive U.S. intervention.

c. In official statements or other forms of official propaganda, avoid over-extending our psychological objectives beyond established policies, thus arousing false, unlikely, or premature expectations.

d. Avoid artificially creating needs or desires for U.S. economic or financial aid.

e. In the furtherance of U.S. psychological strategy programs in the Federal Republic, indigenous pressures should be utilized or created that will parallel and support the attainment of U.S. political objectives, and at the same time instill in the Germans a sense of participation in the achievement of these objectives.

f. In fostering indigenous pressures through official and unofficial support of private groups and organizations the United States should:

> i. in official programs concentrate on those groups and organizations sympathetic to our policy-objectives which manifest strong spontaneous motivation and are financially self-sustaining; and avoid supporting organizations, groups, and individuals that are unable to win solid indigenous support;

ii. in psychological programs, concentrate to the greatest possible extent on established organizations and media, and limit the use of imaginary sponsors in the Federal Republic.

g. In order to create a psychological climate in which the new U.S.-German relationship will be more effective, avoid emphasizing purely legal and formal aspects of this relationship;

h. Wherever possible, propaganda by deed is preferable to verbal propaganda. Our propaganda should, therefore, be tied to specific developments and concrete action designed to implement U.S. policies. Moreover, we should seek to express our themes, whenever appropriate, in the form of live demonstrations and special events which will effectively symbolize U.S. attitudes and intentions. We should encourageUincreased emphasis by German or other European organizations on constructive social and cultural activities, and on serious research.

i. In supporting German (or other West European) activities in promotion of European or Atlantic solidarity, we should give higher priority to those which actually establish institutional links with other countries than to those which merely publicize the idea within Germany or any single country.

Part B—Capabilities

1. Since psychological strategy programs involve all United States action and means which are able to influence people's attitudes directly and indirectly, all elements of the United States Government and appropriate private U.S. organizations in, or conducting activities that affect Germany, should be enlisted in the execution of the United States psychological strategy plan for Germany. In the Federal Republic the following capabilities already exist or should be developed:

a. United States State Department representatives in the Federal Republic including those responsible for the Department's Cultural Affairs and Information Program, will continue to be in a position to influence the Federal Republic Government by direct representations and will also be able to have an indirect influence upon Federal Republic officials in government and the public at large through business and social contacts.

b. Members of official United States economic and military missions to the Federal Republic have a corresponding capability for influencing German official and private attitudes.

c. United States military forces and their dependents stationed in Germany in fulfillment of United States security pledges to NATO and the Federal Republic, constitute an important medium for conveying an impression of America, and its people to the German population.

d. The policies and administration of United States military and defense support programs in the Federal Republic, carried on by the Mutual Security Agency, can make a significant contribution to United States psychological strategy for Germany, and should be conceived and directed with this in mind.

e. Official statements of United States policies by recognized U.S. Government spokesmen in Washington which affect the Federal Republic, must be calculated and fully used to further psychological strategy objectives.

f. Efforts should also be encouraged among private firms, agencies, associations, etc. A suggestive list of such instrumentalities may be found in "Inventory of Resources Presently Available for Psychological Operations Planning" (PSB D-19, Confidential, dated January 5, 1952[4]), previously furnished to the Departments and Agencies concerned.

g. In addition to developing and using the psychological capabilities of official U.S. Government agencies, instrumentalities, and individuals, the U.S. Government within its capabilities should continue to use and further develop other mechanisms (Annex A)† in the Federal Republic and West Berlin which have the greatest potential to attain U.S. psychological strategy objectives, and to accomplish the Tasks enumerated in Section IV.

2. Other capabilities to the United States related to the Soviet Zone or East Berlin are:

a. The U.S. military mission to the Soviet military command in Potsdam;

b. U.S. diplomatic and military contacts with Soviet Occupation authorities in Berlin;

c. U.S. diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.;

d. U.S. representation in the U.N.; and

e. State Department information media.

3. In developing our psychological strategy, we should be aware of and guided by the changing military and economic factors apt to modify the current relationship of forces between the Western nations and the U.S.S.R.

4. Suggested actions in support of this national psychological strategy are listed in the balance of this Section.

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[4] Not printed. (PSB files, lot 62 D 333, PSB D-19 Series)

† Limited Distribution only. [Footnote in the source text.]

No. 157

762A.00/10-1052: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State

SECRET BONN, October 10, 1952—6 p.m.

1633. While we appreciate fact that Dept's 1608 to Bonn of Oct 3 [1] is directed primarily to other missions and while we have used arguments with SPD identical with those set forth in tel under ref, it might be useful for Dept to know the latest SPD views on Ger unity and four power talks.

Conversation with Ollenhauer last week and other recent observations we have made have emphasized widely differing approaches of Western powers and SPD on question of agenda for four power talks. In our opinion SPD resistance to Western emphasis of election issue has four main motivations:

(1) SPD internal polit position; the SPD has adopted line of being sole champion of Ger unity and must consequently push for a four-power conf under almost any conditions.

(2) SPD suspicion of French intentions in Ger unity issue, of which recent Wehner charges are sensational reflections. [2] This suspicion of French motivation is accompanied by growing mistrust of UK and US intentions on unity, since SPD believes ruling circles in Brit fear econ competition of united Ger and considers that US prefers deal with "easily manageable conservative-clerical parties" in Eur of six. Thus SPD no longer views Western powers insistence on order of agenda as evidence of their "timidity" in dealing with Stalin, but has shifted more toward believing that none of them actually wants Ger unity. Therefore, the desire to see where Ger really stands with Western powers in regard to unity has become almost as important as SPD desire to smoke out Kremlin on this issue.

(3) Some SPD politicians like Erler and Baade strongly believe that determined effort must be made to ascertain if Kremlin wld give up Sov Zone "if the price were right". This group feels that it is futile to talk first about free elections and thus the liberation of the Sov Zone which is, after all, what the Kremlin wld give in return for "adequate payment", before discussing what that payment cld be. SPD proponents of this theory are joined by Pfleiderer, Klaus Mehnert, Bodensteiner Mehs (CDU), Von Dirksen, and Sethe, in fact, almost all Ger Sov experts as well as so-called neu-

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[1] Printed as telegram 427, Document 155.

[2] At a meeting of the SPD on Sept. 26 Wehner had stated that he could prove the existence of an East-West conspiracy to maintain the division of Germany. The conspiracy, according to Wehner, centered around Franco-Russian secret conversations in Geneva. These events were reported on in the German press on Sept. 27, especially the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Tagesspiegel*.

tralists. According to this theory, since the kernel of the Ger unity problem is ques of Ger's future power relationships, it is only realistic to discuss this point first.

(4) Many SPD leaders, including Ollenhauer and Mellies, are convinced that there is actually a chance, if only a slight one, that USSR is now willing for world-wide deal with US, of which Ger unity only one aspect. To exploit this chance, they say, it is obvious that the two powers must be brought together; the question of formal agenda is secondary.

Of these four reasons, first is probably most important, but SPD also deeply desires discover if there is any chance that Sovs really mean business with their unity offers. Party leaders do not believe that theoretical exploration during four power talks cld of itself lead "to Warsaw or Prague situation". Our own impression is that SPD and other Gers who are pushing hard for four power talks under almost any circumstances have worked selves into position where they feel compelled to endeavor to ascertain Sov intentions for themselves directly; i.e., through participation in four power talks in advisory capacity, and not merely through second-hand impressions gained from Western powers contacts with Sov auths or through long exchange of notes.

DONNELLY

No. 158

662A.00/10-1452: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

BONN, October 14, 1952.

Unnumbered. We have given considerable thought to situation which is likely to exist upon receipt of next Sov note dealing with German reunification and a four-power conference.[2] unless Sovs themselves terminate the exchange, which seems highly improbable, we believe that if Allies are not to accelerate the loss of Ger support for our policy vis-à-vis Sovs and for Western integration, it may be necessary to review our policy. In any event the decision upon the answer to Sovs must be based upon a considerably broader analysis of the situation than has recently been made and upon a consideration of new factors which have developed during the exchange of notes and to some extent because of them.

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[1] Repeated to Moscow, London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] For documentation on the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union concerning a German peace treaty, German unity, and all-German elections, see Documents 65 ff.

We have consistently endeavored, as has Chancellor, to focus attention in Ger on basic insincerity and falseness of Sov championship of Ger unity, which have given us grounds for hesitating to meet with them unless they are prepared to give some concrete evidence of serious intentions. Until recently our insistence upon free elections as an essential prerequisite to formation of all-Ger govt or peace talks appeared to have general support and even SPD has been equally insistent upon free election.

There are, however, increasingly disturbing symptoms of an underlying compulsion in the German mind toward Ger reunification, e.g., the generally adverse press reaction to latest three-power reply to Moscow; [3] increasing SPD insistence on four-power talks; discovery that some members of coalition were participants in the plan for the Volkskammer visit; [4] acceptance of the Volkskammer proposal for a visit by Ehlers, Schmid, and Schaeffer even though Schmid and Schaeffer under pressure of their parties withdrew; increasing desire of influential Protestant politicians and churchmen to deal with an East Zone delegation, extending far beyond the group who seem to have been participants in the plan for the visit; Bishop Dibelius' projected trip to Moscow; and a series of speeches and editorials by influential political leaders and commentators declaring that Sovs may be willing to agree to unification and withdrawal from Germany for a sufficient price, and that we must deal with Sovs to determine what that price is and whether it can be paid (clear implication being that Germs will make their own mind up concerning the reasonableness of the price, irrespective of Allied decision). It should be noted that SPD insistence on four-power talks does not represent an increasing love for and trust in Sovs and their intentions, but the belief that they have here an issue of such popularity that they should capitalize on it both for its effect upon ratification and the coming Bundestag election. Newspaper comment may reflect not merely editorial opinion but the views of the backers of the papers. Finally, we have just completed a flash public opinion survey which shows 65 percent of those polled favoring Fed Govt negotiations with East Zone Govt and only 17 percent opposed.

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[3] Document 138.

[4] On Sept. 5 the Volkskammer proposed sending a delegation to the Federal Republic of Germany to discuss German unity, all-German elections, and the sending of a joint German Delegation to a four-power conference. The delegation was received on Sept. 19 by Bundestag President Ehlers and a brief discussion was held concerning East German proposals on the future of Germany. For an extract from the Sept. 5 proposals, a report by Ehlers on the Sept. 19 meeting, and the statements made by the members of the Volkskammer delegation the following day, see *Documents on German Unity*, vol. III, pp. 10–11 and 17–21.

Whereas many Gers will admit that prospects of unification may be a fantasy as long as Sovs continue their present policy, nevertheless their mental approach is stronly influenced by this fantasy coupled with a sense of frustration and further complicated by a growing suspicion that the West is as determined as USSR is to perpetuate division of Ger. Resentment which would otherwise be wholly concentrated on Moscow is thus tending to be directed also against us because of our failure to arrive at an adequate formula which will permit at least discussions with Moscow. Formula of strength through integration which would develop reunification seems either an evasion of issue or policy which will eventually entail use of force, a frightening consideration to many Germans.

Our concern relates to contingency that Kremlin might conceivably make a move which could be interpreted by West Gers as seeming to give substance to fantasy if Moscow would negotiate reunification of Ger at a reasonable price. Terms of price which would be paid are already being discussed at least in newspapers. If Moscow should make such a move, and we either rejected it or appeared to evade it, results might be severely damaging to policy of integration. Such a *démarche* if it is to occur, which still seems, however, not very likely, would probably be timed for maximum effect upon Ger ratification and therefore occur in near rather than distant future.

It seems to us that hypothetically there are three positions which we could take. One would be to insist that Fed Rep population should recognize harsh realities of current situation and find compensation through new intimacy with France, Benelux and Italy and make best life they can as part of Western Europe. This would involve acceptance that any idea of negotiations and reunification must be shelved for indefinite future and would contrast with our expressed desire for both reunification and negotiation.

An alternative course would be to demonstrate patiently and concretely to West Germans that unity through negotiations is indeed a fantasy. This would involve our meeting with Russians (without prejudice to negotiations at peace conference) and undertaking to probe and expose what Kremlin would actually settle for regarding future of Ger. This would mean asking Sov reps whether Moscow really meant that Eastern Boundaries of Ger are Oder-Neisse. How would civil liberties for all be guaranteed? What size army would Kremlin permit a unified Ger? What equipment would that army be allowed? Could Gers manufacture all of it? What reparations would be exacted of unified Ger? What restrictions would be placed on Ger's foreign relations? In short, therapy would be designed to dispel or at least reduce fantasy through bringing to foreground of Ger consciousness realities of price Kremlin would exact for a "united" Ger.

To follow this procedure would of course mean that we ourselves would have to be prepared to answer same questions and would not be able to confine discussion to issue of free elections. A repetition of Palais Rose would at this time have greater dangers as it is increasingly difficult to satisfy Ger opinion that we too are not dodging unification. If events bring about such a meeting we must ourselves know answers to questions which unification of Ger would pose at present state of development of European integration. We must be prepared in such a meeting to shelve traditional methods of conference diplomacy and to send representatives of the type who can meet Sov methods on a basis of equality catch as catch can, and no holds barred. It might even be necessary to run risk of offering terms which in fact we ourselves are not willing to accept but coupled with other terms which we are convinced Sovs would not accept so that onus of rejection falls on them.

It might be possible to smoke out Sov reps with these tactics. If we are in position to be candid and forthcoming while Russians were evasive or broke off talks, would we not have substantially accomplished what we seek?

Events may bring us to follow this course, which can only be advocated if Sov reply gives any basis at all for meeting and if we and our Allies are prepared to meet challenge of more basic discussions.

Third course might be to sit tight and hope that Ger sense of frustration will pass without doing our interests great damage. If Moscow's next offer has no greater attraction and FedRep population is not much moved thereby, this course and another note insisting upon free elections may be adequate.

In light of foregoing it would seem to our temporary advantage if Kremlin continues its present retreat from March note [5] and if recent visit of Shvernik to Berlin [6] presages strengthening of chains which bind East Ger under Sov control and commit Moscow to preservation of Tartar Wall through Ger.

DONNELLY

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[5] Document 65.

[6] Soviet President Nikolai Shvernik attended the third anniversary ceremonies of the founding of the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin, Oct. 5–7.

No. 159

100.4 PSB/10–3052: Airgram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 30, 1952.

A–572. Ref: PSB Plan for Germany. The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) has now given final approval to the paper entitled, "A National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany" (PSB D-21).[1] This document was contionally adopted by the PSB at its August 7 meeting with the provision that certain minor changes were to be worked out by the Departmental and Agency staffs jointly and submitted to the Alternate Members of the Board for vote-slip approval. This action was completed and the paper is now approved. Three copies are being forwarded herewith for your use.

It is noted that it was the earlier draft (actually dated August 12, 1952) which was received and commented upon by HICOG at the request of Mr. Norberg of the PSB.[2] An examination of the approved paper will reflect that the more important points raised by HICOG have been taken into consideration in the preparation of the final draft. Moreover, it has been agreed that other HICOG recommendations not specifically included in this draft will be considered further in connection with the implementation of the Plan.

In the opinion of the Department, the next task facing us is that of determining the order of priorities with respect to the Tasks (Section IV) and Desired Actions (Section V). Without prejudice to the long range tasks, it is the Department's view that this order of priority must reflect and give emphasis to the urgent policy problems demanding the early attention of the U.S. Government. The following would appear to be the tasks of our psychological strategy in Germany and related to Germany which require maximum concentrated effort for the immediate period ahead. The references in the Plan which appear applicable are indicated in each instance.

(1) Ratification of the contractual and EDC agreements and the development of the broadest possible public support for and participation in these agreements. (Tasks 1a, b, d, e). In this connection, one of our concerns will be the settlement of the Saar controversy. Tasks 4b, 6a and b would appear to apply here.

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[1] Document 156.

[2] The specific comments by HICOG under reference here have not been identified further; however, a set of comments by HICOG on the Aug. 12 draft of PSB D-21 is in file 511.62A/9-252 through 9-552 and an excerpt from the comments prepared by HICOG was transmitted as an attachment to a memorandum to Alan G. Kirk, Director of the PSB, on Sept. 30. (PSB files, lot 62 D 333, PSB D-21 Series)

(2) Maintenance of the Allied position in Berlin (Tasks 2a, b and c).

. . . .

It would be inexpedient because of constantly changing conditions to prepare a definitive list of priorities which might deprive us of the needed freedom of action. It is also not our intention to suggest that these are the only tasks which should be considered for treatment during the coming year. It is conceivable, for example, that it may prove necessary for us to increase our psychological support of policies relating to the issue of German unity. Any schedule of priorities must therefore be held as flexible as possible subject to constant review in the light of upcoming contingencies. With reference to the three major tasks listed above, actions contained in Section V which appear to be applicable and not already in the process of implementation should be initiated without delay.

It is realized that a great many of the actions included under Section V are already being carried out by HICOG and other U.S. agencies and Departments and that others are in the planning stage. The Department is, of course, interested in obtaining a more detailed picture than is now available of the various activities and programs being carried on in Germany so that a satisfactory division of labor can be agreed upon between the appropriate agencies in the field and in the U.S. For similar reasons, the Department is most anxious to be advised of arrangements made in the field to ensure operational coordination among various agencies to which co-responsibility for action or support has been assigned.

It would be greatly appreciated if you would make your comments on the foregoing available in the near future.

Henry Kellermann, Director of German Public Affairs, who will leave for Germany within the next week, will be available for discussion and consultation with the appropriate officers in HICOG.

BRUCE

No. 160

762A.00/11-1552: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, November 15, 1952—3 p. m.

2230. This tel examines chances for continuation of present Ger foreign policy on eve of EDC ratification proceedings in FedRep and in light of coming Bundestag elections (now tentatively sched for June 1953; they must take place by Sept at latest).

Main substance of contemporary Ger internal polits is drawn from relations of W Germany with USSR and France; with the exception of the possibility of econ depression, there is probably no domestic issue at this time which cld bring about decisive change in Ger politics or foreign policy. On one hand, policy of France-Ger *rapprochement* is keystone of Eur integration both in fact and in public imagination in Ger; on other hand, USSR holds East Zone, Oder-Neisse territories and has threat of war, prospect of trade to use in relations with Ger. (Relations with US do not have same internal polit connotations for FedRep, even in view of impending change in admin, since most Gers, while conscious of its importance, tend to take continued US support for granted, at least, in foreseeable future.) Chancellor as symbol for policy of friendship with France and of complete distrust of intetions of Sov Union; SPD has not committed self finally; on surface at least it is wavering between direct espousal of some form of US-Ger mil connection and some type of neutrality for United Ger. In reality, given its desire to "be different" and oppose Chancellor, SPD is stymied by his monopolistic control of constructive, workable foreign policy, which leave party to play with theoretical policies for future and its hopes that Chancellor will fail or that Sov Union will have miraculous change of heart in Ger unity issue.

In these circumstances, continuation of present Ger foreign policy hinges on two specific possibilities: (1) Fr ratification of EDC or failure to do so and (2) possibility of sensational Sov unity offer. Latter appears increasingly unlikely; Ger distrust of USSR remains strong and constant, and Kremlin wld have to make important concrete concession of some sort before its offers recd general Ger credence.

Fr cooperation with Ger, specifically in EDC, CSC, EPC, is therefore decisive factor in Ger internal polits at this juncture. If Fr ratify EDC, it wld mean great victory for Chancellor and FedRep coalition and shld assure their victory in coming elections and thus continuation of Eur integration. Fr ratification thus obviously key to continuation of present Ger foreign policy. (Saar problem while important, may be regarded as a symptom, not as basic cause of Franco-Ger distrust, and probably cld not of self cause major change in Ger policy.)

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

If Fr fail to ratify EDC, and therefore equally important gen contract,[2] irreparable damage will have been dealt to idea of Eur community and strong nationalist reaction will set in in all Ger polit parties. There is even possibility that nationalist SPD, cool to West, might win Ger elections on platform of unity and neutrality.

In event of Fr refusal to ratify EDC, Chancellor wld have no alternative than quickly to shift emphasis from policy of Franco-Ger rapproachement in framework of "six" to broader concept of Ger participation in Atlantic community, and press for new deal from W allies replacing contractuals to restore Ger sovereignty (Ger insistence on removal of remaining controls wld probably be much stronger than in contractual negots). SPD which is already showing signs of concern lest Chancellor steal march on party by quick change of policy, wld then have two choices: (1) To claim Atlantic idea as own and join in non-partisan foreign policy, though this might not be done until after election; (2) to maintain "unity first" position while exploiting popular hostility and disappointment caused by Fr failure to ratify. Unless Ger resentment is very high and Moscow helps SPD to make up its mind to choose second course, party might ultimately support NATO membership or direct alliance with US as way out of its own foreign policy dilemma. Even if SPD opposes Chancellor's revised foreign policy, he cld still win next elections using it as platform, but only if all Western allies supported renegot of FedRep sovereignty question and some form of mil alliance with West. Otherwise, if Ger sovereignty and def issues are not on way to solution before FedRep election, West may be confronted with hostile, disgruntled Ger with all opportunities this wld present for Kremlin's strategy of dividing West.[3]

DONNELLY

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[2] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Document 51.

[3] On Nov. 24 the Embassy in London added its comments on the future of Anglo-German relations, stating that if the EDC failed Britain would still keep troops in Germany, and probably in the long run, agree to the inclusion of the Federal Republic in NATO. The Embassy warned however, that the British would seek to maintain a balance between France and the Federal Republic in their foreign relations. (Telegram 2945, 762A.00/11-2452) On Nov. 26 Bonn reported its agreement with this analysis. (Telegram 2438, 762A.00/11-2652)

No. 161

762A.00/12-552: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of State

SECRET BONN, December 5, 1952—6 p.m.

2596. In recent weeks considerable speculation has occurred among political observers and press correspondents here concerning the dangers of a serious swing to the right in Germany. In our eyes dangers extreme Nazi type manifestations with fanatical devotion to totalitarian creed is unlikely unless Germany enters a severe economic depression. Extremists of "Frei Korps Deutschland" type are small in number and are influential only in depressed areas and regions in northwest where the full impact of catastrophic collapse of Nazism not fully felt. Most significant politiual trend showing growing rightist influence is reflected in increasing power of extremists in FDP, DP, and "Gesamtdeutsche Block" (formerly BHE).

Present success of extremists in recent local elections not impressive. Returns in NRW and Rhineland-Palatinate showed no striking gains for rightist parties. In Lower Saxony, former SRP vote presumably went to FDP, BHE, and DP, but joint lists make precise analysis very difficult. In any case, no striking increase in total rightist vote discernable. Establishment of a new party of the right composed of elements of FDP, DP, and splinter right wing parties has been frequently discussed, but since this move would probably result in splitting of the Fed parties, it now seems unlikely that it will take place before the 1953 Bundestag elections.

These parties are split between moderate and aggressive wings, altho in case of GDB the more extreme wing is clearly preponderant. The GDB, though making overt attempt to appeal to ex-Nazis, may gain only limited success in long run, since it is considered by most Germans as refugee organization despite its efforts to prove otherwise. GDB, however, is expected to win from fifteen to thirty seats in next Bundestag election depending largely on type of election law finally enacted.

In FDP and DP national parties there is now a rough balance between moderates and extremists who wish to go all out to capture ex-Nazi vote. This balance in FDP shown clearly in Bad Ems Party Conf where extremists who dominated NRW and Hesse delegations unable, without running severe risk of splitting party, to force Fed Party to adopt "Deutche programme", designed as platform to rally rightist groups. Similar development occurred in earlier DP Party day at Goslar where extremists withdrew in order to maintain party solidarity at least until 1953 elections only after they had ascertained that they had slim majority of votes among dels.

Both party conferences indicated growing strength over past year of extremists who support expanision of parties with little regard for principles as against moderates who are unwilling to abandon thesis that parties should be expression of definite political viewpoint and that members must accept these views, rather than become pure power bloc composed of the dissatisfied. Moderate claim that whole character of parties will be changed by all-out recruiting campaign because present party leaders would be unable to control new extremist elements. This is the crucial problem faced by these parties. In NRW and Hesse, the influence of young ex-Nazis in local party machine has increased in recent months. Leading figures in FDP extremist group like Von Rechenberg, Euler, and Middelhauve justify their policy on grounds that right radical groups can be most effectively controlled if they are incorporated in a constitutionally oriented conservative party. Otherwise, they argue, this large group of politically homeless individuals might follow an extremist demagogue of SRP type. However, increasing use of ex-Nazis in local organizations and growing reliance on sensational propaganda methods furnish disquieting evidence to support thesis of moderate FDP members.

Moderating influence may be exerted by industrialists influential in FDP and landed farmers in DP, both of which groups have stakes in society. Their interests and ambitions lead them to support European integration along conservative lines in hope of playing leading role in a United Europe.

Given good econ conditions, basic question of whether constructive conservative parties with relatively moderate program can continue in Germany will depend largely on role Germany will play in Europe and the world. Unless Ger dynamism is able to express itself constructively by participation in close European cooperation and in achieving an important place in world affairs, the more constructive pro-European German leaders will be discredited, and more extreme men will take their places. Finally, should be remembered that danger of extreme nationalism is not confined to parties of the right.

DONNELLY

No. 162

Editorial Note

On December 9, the Bureau of German Affairs transmitted copies of a briefing book for Secretary-designate Dulles to Riddleberger, Lewis, Laukhuff, Reinstein, and Conger. The material in the briefing book, which deals with Germany, European regional organizations, Europe as a whole, the United Kingdom, France, the Baltic area, Iceland, Antarctica, Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Spain, was updated on January 19, 1953. The section on Germany comprises 22 pages covering various facets of United States policy with regard to Germany and Berlin including their economic and political strengths, the question of German unity, and the role of the Federal Republic in Europe. A copy of the briefing book is in the Office of German Affairs files, lot 57 D 344, "ISAC".

No. 163

762A.00/12–1652: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, December 16, 1952—2 p.m.

2792. Reber saw Chancellor last night and was impressed with remarkable confidence and self-assurance displayed by Adenauer throughout interview. Chancellor gave impression of man fully in control of situation and assured of success. There was no hint of uncertainty in his behavior. In response to Reber's question whether he had any special messages for Sec, Adenauer said, it wld be of great assistance to him politically if fol points cld be considered for possible action by NATO council [2] or by US unilaterally:

1. *War criminals:* It wld be of great importance if some announcement cld be made by allies during current Paris mtg indicating their intentions immediately to make far-reaching gesture toward solution of war-criminals prob. Though Chancellor acknowledged with satisfaction HICOG's intention to release number of prisoners in near future, he implied that this action cld hardly satisfy Ger wishes in this respect. He emphasized repeatedly that far-reaching gesture was needed to pacify and favorably impress public opinion. Joint announcement wld be most effective since all

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Reference to the North Atlantic Council meeting at Paris, Dec. 15–18, 1952.

powers, especially Fr, were concerned, Xmas wld be excellent opportunity for this, he added.

2. *Ger membership in NATO and UN.* Since Ollenhauer stated in recent Bundestag debate that SPD stood for direct FedRep membership in internatl sec organ, it wld be useful if US cld reiterate at an early date, its already announced policy to support FedRep membership in NATO and UN.

3. *Defense burden:* Chancellor urged issuance of allied or US statement reassuring Gers that coming def contribution wld be commensurate with Ger econ capabilities and wld take cognizance of spec burden placed upon FedRep by refugees. Assurance that def contribution wld in no way reduce present social standards in FedRep wld favorably impress public in gen and particularly refugees.

4. *Display of Allied military power:* Chancellor urged frequent display of new allied tanks and other mechanized equipment to public in order to increase Ger sense of sec.

5. *NATO–Def plans:* Chancellor referred to recent article in *Baseler Nachrichten* quoting high NATO spokesman as saying that Eur def line wld have to be withdrawn west of Rhine if Ger armed contingents not forthcoming soon. He said he wld like to write ltr to NATO inquiring whether this statement was true provided he cld receive affirmative reply and that Fed Govt cld consult on formulation of text of ltr. Publication in Ger of such communication from NATO wld serve useful purpose.

6. *Public info facilities:* Chancellor reviewed historical developments in radio and press fields and reiterated previous charges that Br Labor Govt had, after 1945, placed 90 percent of control over radio and press in hands of SPD in mistaken belief that SPD was a counterpart of Br Labor Party. He alleged similar developments took place in US zone with result that govt now lacks propaganda facilities of its own. He remarked that members of CDU natl comite, who were then meeting in chancellery, had assured him that broadcasting of Bundestag treaty debate had produced excellent public reaction but concluded with resignation that this was temporary advantage only which cld not be fully exploited for lack of propaganda facilities. He said situation was further aggravated by fact that Br had established unitary trade union movement which was now an effective and willing tool of SPD. To correct distortion arising from this situation Chancellor urged that HICOG grant request for special radio facilities for Fed Govt which has already been made. Without committing himself Reber promised to look into matter.

7. *Opposition's demand for renegotiation of treaties:* In view of recent SPD statements that party wld not accept treaties even

after new Bundestag elections and in light of opposition's "hopelessly Utopian approach" to prob of renegotiations, Chancellor urgently requested allied or US statement making it unequivocably clear that allies wld not renegotiate treaties. Statement shld further point out that, shld Gers refuse to accept present draft, power and ability of any Ger Govt to neogtiate with west powers wld be irreparably damaged for years to come. Such a statement shld (1) make it most clear to SPD that it cld not get better deal and (2) shld, if possible, contain a hint that allies were [illegible] give broad interpretation to contentious provisions of [illegible] treaties.

8. *Lack of US initiative in Europe:* Chancellor deplored that "US had not displayed adequate initiative and leadership in Eur affs during recent months." He stated that he realized that this was owing to US Govt's inability to act because of elections and change of administration. Adenauer nevertheless urged that "period of inactivity" be shortened as much as possible to prevent serious damage to Eur integration. He predicted that unless US Govt assumes leadership soon, Eur nations wld go off in different directions and integration wld in fact become impossible.

9. *Ger ratification of treaties:* Chancellor showed extraordinary optimism, by claiming that treaties wld be ratified early next year. He said his latest info from Karlsruhe indicated that court wld refer coalition case to second Senate by middle of Jan. Since judges of court were already fully conversant with case, second Senate shld render decision shortly thereafter so that Bundestag cld hold third reading before end of Jan. He asserted that Bundesrat action wld follow quickly, thus completing legislative action by middle of Feb. Chancellor seemed to have no doubt that second Senate wld rule favorably, that this decision wld finally resolve constitutional dispute over treaties, and discourage SPD from resubmitting its own case. (Justice State Secy Strauss yesterday gave less optimistic timetable: if court decides to accept coalition case, announcement of this will probably occur late in Jan; hearing and formulation of judgment wld take whole of Feb; Bundestag third reading in first two weeks Mar; and Bundesrat action by middle of April.)

10. *Rumors about new elections:* When I asked for his reaction on current rumors to effect that govt is considering new elections to solve present crisis, Chancellor reacted vigorously and called rumors utterly preposterous. He pointed out that opposition cld carry motion of censure in Bundestag only with the support of a large part of the coalition. Chancellor assured me that he had no intention of dissolving Bundestag prior to expiration of legislative period in Sept.

REBER

No. 164

762A.5/1-253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 2, 1953—6:56 p.m.

3246. For Emb and Reinhardt.

1. Brit and Fr Embs have inquired re US position on problem emergency planning discussed by Special Security Comite in HICOM/P(52)32. [2] Dept has considered this question with Defense in accordance Deptel 1794 to Bonn rptd Paris 2192 [3] and fol represents combined views.

2. It seems to us that problem involves two separate (though related) matters. One is conduct of emergency planning for FedRep and other is reconciliation of polit and mil questions which will emerge from such planning. We contemplate that guidance in relation to emergency planning for FedRep will be incorporated in overall guidance on emergency planning in Eur furnished to SACEUR by the Standing Group in accordance with polit decision and guidance on this matter from NAC. Moreover, the Standing Group staff has prepared a draft study on "Necessary Modifications in Mil Relationships Upon Ratification of the EDC Treaty" which has been forwarded to SHAPE for informal comment of that hdqtrs and informal views of appropriate sections of EDC Interim Comite and Allied HICOM. Accordingly it is not necessary for HICOM to extend special invitation to SHAPE to engage in emergency planning, and we suggest ltr proposed in HICOM/P(52)32 be withdrawn.

3. Re coordination of polit and mil questions which will arise from emergency planning, we think this will have practical application only after emergency planning is undertaken and questions needing coordination have been presented. We shld prefer to see matter put off until it can be taken up in context of more immed reality, and in any case after SG decision on and subsequent MC

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[1] Drafted by Auchincloss; cleared with Perkins, Bonbright, Riddleberger, Parsons, and the Department of Defense. Also sent to Paris.

[2] Dated June 16, 1952, this paper was prepared by the Special Security Committee of the Allied High Commission for Germany to consider the problems which might arise after the contractual agreements had come into force and which might require coordination between SHAPE and various Allied and German agencies. A copy is in lot 311 D (52) 1454.

[3] Telegram 1794 stated that the question of the coordination of political and military problems arising from emergency planning was under consideration with the Department of Defense and that joint views would be forwarded in the near future. (740.5/10-1352)

and Council approval of, modifications in mil relationship upon ratification of the EDC Treaty. We see fol disadvantages in trying to decide problem now.

4. For one thing, problem wld raise matter of direct SHAPE FedRep contacts, on which Fr position likely to give difficulty. We think there wld be more trouble with Fr in trying to decide this question now, when it is largely academic, than later, when it has become practical issue. To press matter now wld involve risk of consolidating Fr opposition in advance, and this might prejudice chances of reaching satis solution at time when practical consequences wld be more imminently involved.

5. Further disadvantage in attempting now to decide what procedure to use in coordinating polit and mil questions arises from fact that there are too many elements involved which cannot be predicted at present time. Even process of emergency planning for FedRep has not been defined, so it is not yet possible to say just how questions to be coordinated will arise or who will present them for solution. Nature of procedure to be used shld correspond to nature of problems that will arise, and here also essential factors are unknown. For example, will questions to be reconciled be numerous or few? Will they raise predominantly polit or mil difficulties? Will they require high level decision or can they be handled lower down? Will they always involve interests of three powers, FedRep, SHAPE, and EDC, or will they often be of concern only to some of these parties? Answers to these and similar questions can be provided with greater certainty later on. Such answers will be needed to indicate whether some sort of group shld be set up on permanent or *ad hoc* basis, and which interests shld be represented and in what capacity.

6. In suggesting that consideration of problem of coordinating polit and mil questions be postponed until there is practical need for solution and until elements of situation can be more precisely known, we do not expect that any important time will be lost, for all parties concerned will be readily available in FedRep when need arises, and permanent procedure might be estab more advantageously in light of actual experience. Wld appreciate your comments and info re later developments so that we can answer Brit and Fr Embs.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] On Jan. 8 Reinhardt replied that the question of emergency planning had been the subject of continuous study at SHAPE, but that the prevalent view was that no urgency existed and that precipitous action might give rise to disadvantages. (Telegram 3834, 762A.5/1-853) On Jan. 23 Reber reported similar views from Bonn, stating that neither the British nor French had pressed HICOG on HICOM/P(52)32 for 2 months. (Telegram 3399, 762A.5/1-2353)

No. 165

762A.00/12-1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 15, 1953—7:02 p.m.

3496. Eyes only Reber. Despite SPD protest reported urtel 3132, [2] or perhaps to help counter it, you may in your discretion wish to follow up your previous discussion with SPD leader Ollenhauer (urtel 2873) [3] by another.

Subj your concurrence, wld suggest you stress fol in particular:

1. Our very real appreciation of SPD's interest in: Ger unity; maintenance of free Berlin until such time as Ger unity achieved; Ger democracy; and importance of Ger as equal sovereign partner in community of free nations.

2. US not "intervening in EDC" as implied SPD protest, and not trying bring undue pressure to bear on Fed Govt or its SPD opposition. At same time, we seriously concerned over situation which has been developing re future status FedRep, Eur integration and defense. Pres-elect's messages to Ridgway and Adenauer [4] may be regarded as self-evident in this connection.[5]

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[1] Drafted by Morris and Williamson and cleared by Perkins, Riddleberger, and Bonbright.

[2] Telegram 3132 reported that on Jan. 7 SPD headquarters had made available to the press a statement protesting against alleged American pressure on the Federal Republic to approve the EDC Treaty. (740.5/1-853)

[3] In telegram 2873 Reber reported that he had met with Ollenhauer on Dec. 19 to convey the concern of the United States with respect to the lagging European initiative on the EDC Treaty. Ollenhauer in response, had insisted that the treaty was unacceptable in its present form because a large segment of the German people opposed it. (762A.00/12-1952)

[4] Regarding President-elect Eisenhower's message to Chancellor Adenauer, Jan. 6, 1953, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 700. For text of the message endorsing the EDC, see the *New York Times*, Jan. 7, 1953, p. 1. The message to General Ridgway, dated Dec. 29, 1952, reads as follows:

"I send you and my former associates in NATO my best wishes for the New Year. We can hope that this year will mark decisive progress toward essential goals. Included in that progress will be, I hope, increasing economic, political and military unity in the Western and continental European nations. As their divided strength becomes combined its effectiveness will be multiplied so that Western Europe will become a strong and vigorous community for peace and freedom. My often expressed views on this matter are not only unchanged but reinforced as I more and more see the feebleness of alternatives." (Telegram 3168 to Bonn, Dec. 29, 711.11 EI/12-2952)

[5] In place of the last eight words of this sentence, the source text had read as follows before transmission:

"were in fact primarily prompted by signs increasing Fr hesitation re Ger and nationalism in Fr, ratification difficulties in both Fr and Ger, and Eisenhower's desire make clear his position and thus refute rumors reportedly circulating Eur re his alleged loss of interest in EDC."

3. Serious crisis which will confront Ger and West Eur if EDC fails resulting in inability to defend Ger under those circumstances. US cld not in long run support continued retention of thousands of US troops in Ger in absence of Ger def contribution. This consideration wld hold either in case of continued division of Ger without def contribution or in case of unified neutralized Ger of type re which SPD evidently thinking. You might well ask Ollenhauer whether his party really thinks latter solution wld achieve the objectives re Ger (see para 1) desired by SPD if US forces in Eur reduced or withdrawn.

4. We feel that even hint that US troops might or about to be withdrawn from Ger might provoke Sov-Commie action against Berlin.

5. Mil forces being rapidly created in GDR certainly add sense of urgency to problem of West Ger def contribution. Remind Ollenhauer that during course of last year, according to our intelligence, GDR mil forces were almost doubled (to present figure of close to 100,000) and we anticipated they may be further doubled during next 12 months.

6. Point out once more practical difficulties trying renegotiate EDC and contractuals, which represent compromise achieved through months of hard bargaining. It already fairly clear that new Fr Govt likely demand changes even less favorable to Ger than present treaties. If Ollenhauer argues that Fr and certain others already making it clear they will not ratify present treaties and hence useless even discuss them, you might pt out that we still believe only real question mark is in Fr, that this constitutes bridge which cannot be crossed until we come to it, that we still feel there is real chance of Fr ratification (subj perhaps further supplementary understandings on various pts not all of which even related Ger) if all others approve, and in any case we wld think FedRep wld be extremely well advised both for the record and its future relations with other Western Allies, to go ahead on assumption that Fr will actually follow suit.

7. Ollenhauer must be aware of impossibility of proposing Ger entry into NATO in present situation. With respect to Ger membership,[6] we feel there can be no consideration of this question until the treaties are ratified and in effect, or as long as Fr do not definitely reject them.

8. In conclusion, our very serious concern re situation which has developed and fact that unfortunately we do not have any ready alternatives to pull out of bag inasmuch as all possibilities of which

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[6] Before transmission the beginning of this sentence read "although US is anxious to bring Ger into NATO at earliest practicable time."

we can think are believed even less desirable from Ger pt of view. In fact we are convinced that SPD has number of basic and vital aims re future of Ger and Eur, but that only practical way to work towards these is by going forward on basis of treaties now drafted and we fear that if instead we shld be forced to renegotiate, such serious delays and problems wld arise that very possibility of attaining these goals might be seriously jeopardized.

ACHESON

No. 166

762A.00/1-1563: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 22, 1953—6:31 p.m.

3605. Eyes only Reber. Though Dept of course entirely willing defer your judgment on matter, suggest you review conclusion last para urtel 3355 [2] on basis fol considerations:

(1) We did not recommend you meet Ollenhauer with any hope of materially changing SPD's position at this critical juncture, but rather for two reasons: (a) emphasize our growing concern latest developments re FedRep's basic relations with Western Allies and try and make clear US Govt does not have practical alternatives to present contractual and EDC solutions (i.e. contrary reports spread by Baade, Brunning, etc.); and (b) make these pts by way of frank, friendly discussion of type we believe top HICOG reps shld have with SPD leaders as frequently as possible. Now that new US Admin in office, your arguments shld carry even greater weight.

(2) Despite your view SPD leadership now allegedly more than ever convinced present treaties dead, we felt both recent SPD protest (urtel 3132 [3]) and Ollenhauer's subsequent statement (urtel 3297 [4]) suggested SPD leaders not entirely happy about present situation and probably trying hard convince themselves that new US

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[1] Drafted by Morris and cleared by Riddleberger.

[2] Telegram 3355 reported that the SPD seemed more convinced than ever that the new Eisenhower administration would take a more flexible approach to European problems, and because of this Reber believed it would not be effective to talk to Ollenhauer at this time. (762A.00/1-2153)

[3] See footnote 2, *supra*.

[4] Telegram 3297 reported that at a press conference on Jan. 16 Ollenhauer had rejected the contention that ratification of the EDC Treaty or an end to U.S. interest in Europe were the only two possibilities for Germany. (762A.00/1-1653)

Admin must have other and more attractive alternatives. Admit this only our guess and we may be wrong.

(3) We wld still favor your having discussion with Ollenhauer along lines indicated Deptel 3496 [5] before Secy arrives. [6] Latter will have neither time nor desire, purpose his trip being mainly one of info gathering, to become involved in detailed, substantive discussion of treaties. And new US HICOMer will also hardly be in a position engage such discussions immed upon arrival. [7]

DULLES

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[5] *Supra.*

[6] Secretary Dulles traveled to Europe with Mutual Security Director Stassen, Jan 31-Feb. 8.

[7] On Jan. 29 Reber reported that he had seen Ollenhauer that day and had made clear the U.S. position along the lines presented in this telegram and telegram 3496, *supra*. Reber indicated further that Ollenhauer took a more positive attitude toward the question of German participation in Western defense than he had displayed in any other recent conversation. (762A.00/1-2953)

No. 167

Editorial Note

During the course of their trip to Europe Secretary Dulles and Director for Mutual Security Stassen visited Bonn, February 5, for talks with officials of the Federal Republic and members of the SPD. For a record of their visit to Bonn and their discussions on EDC, the Saar, refugees, restitution, German financial contribution to Western defense, the Federal Republic's economic problems, and Adenauer's desire to visit the United States, see telegrams 1046 and 1045 and the letter from Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower, volume V, Part 2, pages 1568, 1569, and 1571.

No. 168

862A.501/2-753: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 7, 1953—3 p.m.

3699. At French request special meeting of deputy HICOMers held today to discuss Bundestag resolution of Feb 4 calling for increase of Bundesgrenzschutz from 10,000 to 20,000 men. (See

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

HICOG despatch 2307 dated Feb 6, 1953 for details of Bundestag discussion.[2])

French deputy commissioner made lengthy statement embodying basic points a, b, c, and d of *aide-mémoire* reported in Deptel sent Bonn 3918 repeated info Paris 4246 London 5213 of 5 Feb.[3] He used strongest terms in stating action of Federal Government at this time inadmissible and would be "catastrophic" as regards chances of French ratification of EDC. He alleged Lehr had never been favorable to EDC concept but preferred concept of national German army based on 1914 traditions and proposed doubling of Bundesgrenzschutz constituted an attempt to set up nucleus of a potential national military force which would be outside jurisdiction of EDC.

British deputy commissioner stated they took much less tragic view of situation. He suggested French preoccupations that Germans trying to set up military forces in anticipation of EDC should be taken up in EDC interim committee.[4] In any case, he argued that under present circumstances HICOM controlled question of armament of police and should stand firm on existing basic principles that police should be armed with nothing more than light infantry weapons. He pointed out that French objections were not aimed at principle of existence of Bundesgrenzschutz but at question of degree, namely, whether or not size of Grenzschutz should be increased. He stated British were sympathetic to proposed increase in strength of border police since this reduced load on British military with regard to control of illegal border crossings. He emphasized there was not and could not be any question of German border police usurping responsibility of military with regard to reaction against Soviet military operations.

US deputy commissioner agreed with British position and pointed out that article 11 of EDC treaty provided for EDC control of police force in FedRep and that in view of this and intentions of Allies in period up to entry into force of EDC to maintain existing limitations on armament of police, French fears were exaggerated.

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[2] Despatch 2307 reported that at its 249th meeting, Feb. 4 the Bundestag had approved (188 to 144) a resolution calling for an increase in the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz) from 10,000 to 20,000 men. (862A.501/2-653)

[3] Telegram 3918 reported that on Feb. 4 the French Embassy had presented an *aide-memoire* which raised the following points: (a) increase in border police raised doubts about respect for Article 11 of EDC Treaty, (b) request motivated by desire to create force equivalent to GDR militarized forces and reconstruct national army, (c) Foreign Ministers at New York in Sept. 1950 had authorized 30,000-man *Land* force and liberal interpretation of this authority would allow only 10,000 for border police, and (d) the Allied High Commission would be justified in vetoing such Bundestag legislation. (862A.501/2-553)

[4] The Interim Committee on the EDC Treaty was established at the time of the signing of the treaty in May 1952.

He emphasized US had no intention of approving any measures re police which would, as alleged by French, constitute an evasion of principles and commitments embodied in EDC treaty. On other hand, tension on border was rising, existing personnel available for control of illegal crossings was spread thin and it would be of assistance to military for increased number of Germans to be made available for this duty. He felt that HICOM should point out to Federal Government necessity for joint consultation on this question and that any increase should be subject to principles of initial agreement concerning establishment of Grenzschutz (GEN/P (51) 9, dated 19 Feb 51 [5]) and on understanding that no further increase in *Laender* police [than?] was authorized by New York decisions of 1950 would be undertaken.

French deputy commissioner stated he was under firmest instructions from Paris not to agree to increase and reiterated fear that Germans were attempting to create military force which would be outside scope of control of EDC. He was of opinion Grenzschutz not covered by terms of article 11 of EDC treaty but having functions prescribed in article 16. In refuting this point, British pointed out forces established in terms of article 16 were subject to direction of SACEUR as provided in article 18.

Both British and US deputy commissioners recognized French had valid point that announcement of doubling of strength at this time would have unfortunate political repercussions in France. It was finally agreed to report discussion to Govts with proposal that US representative, as chairman, should make early *démarche* to Adenauer pointing out potential effect on French ratification of EDC of increase in border police at this time and suggesting that further action should be withheld pending discussions between German and HICOM representatives. (Both US and UK deputy commissioners made clear that this was without prejudice to their positions that increase in border police desirable.)

Request Dept views soonest.

Our comments on specific points in *aide-mémoire*, except as already explained in position taken by US deputy commissioner as reported above, are as follows:

Point c. CFM NY decisions concerned internal security and provided for 30,000 police organized at *land* level which could be controlled by FedRep in emergency. [6] Only 10,000 of this force has been organized due to inability and unwillingness of FedRep to implement CFM decisions. As an alternative FedRep established frontier protection service for purposes of border protection after it developed that 30,000 man *land* organ would not be realized. Fed-

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[5] Not further identified.

[6] The Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, held at New York, Sept. 12–19, 1950.

Rep's authority for establishing this organ is provided in letter of Military Governors to Parliamentary Council defining powers of FedRep in police field dated 14 April 1949 [7] and article 87 (1) basic law. In accordance with provisions of above letter and recorded understandings with responsible FedRep officials the number of effectives for this organ is controlled by AHC. We are not aware of any liberal interpretation of text of CFM agreement wherein three govts agreed Federal frontier protection police should be limited to 10,000.

Point d. HICOM of course has right to intervene in this matter, however whether or not such intervention is justified depends upon thorough examination of proposed increase on basis of need in light of current conditions. [8]

REBER

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[7] Transmitted in telegram 541 from Berlin, Apr. 15, 1949, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, p. 242.

[8] On Feb. 10 HICOG was informed that the Department of State fully approved the position taken by the U.S. Deputy High Commissioner, and while stating that it felt the French were "making mountain out of molehill", hoped that Adenauer would refrain from further action pending ratification of the EDC Treaty. (Telegram 4004 to Bonn, 862A.501/2-753) On Mar. 3 the three High Commissioners discussed the question with Adenauer who, while noncommittal on postponing further action, said that he would like to study the matter further. (Telegram 4059 from Bonn, Mar. 4, 862A.501/3-353)

No. 169

611.62A/3-252: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 9, 1953—4:36 p.m.

4462. Urtel 4035 [2] We have always felt that conclusion cultural convention was intended symbolize accomplishment normal relationships between US and Germany and, in point of timing, should follow rather than precede ratification contractuals (*vide* Departmental Policy Statement of July 25, 1951 [3] concerning revision public affairs program and conclusion cultural treaty; also note that language of preamble states explicitly that convention motivated by desire "affirm restoration friendly and peaceful relations" between peoples of US and FedRep). Question of timing has been discussed repeatedly by Kellermann with HICOG officials and also with Dr. Salat and with members of Diplomatic Mission in Washington including new cultural attaché. All parties concerned have expressed appreciation of reasons for moving in manner suggested. Incidental but not exclusive reason for procedure was consideration of public and possibly congressional reaction in event Department should push for what might be regarded treaty of friendship with Germany at time when ratification contractuals remain in suspense. It may be doubtful although not impossible that Congress willing ratify cultural convention pending or preceding ratification contractuals.

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[1] Drafted by Kellermann and cleared, *inter alia*, with Morris, Raymond, and Riddleberger.

[2] Telegram 4035 stated that the Federal Republic wanted to sign the cultural convention, under negotiation at Bonn between representatives of the Federal Republic and the United States for several months, during Adenauer's visit to the United States in April. (611.62A/3-253) Further documentation on the negotiations on the text of the convention is in file 611.62A. For documentation on Adenauer's visit, see Documents 177 ff.

[3] Not printed.

On other hand it could be argued that signing of cultural convention at this time, i.e. irrespective of status contractuals, is defensible move on our part demonstrating progressive *de facto* normalization U.S. relations with Germany and also manifesting our confidence in willingness, at least of official German circles, to proceed with formalization of *status quo* through early ratification contractuals. Not inconceivable that gesture of this nature may have beneficial psychological effects in Germany, even with opposition, which might outweigh such public relations problems as may arise stateside.

Wonder whether your suggestion for early signing cultural convention was prompted by above considerations, or whether yours and FedRep Government's proposal to use Chancellor's visit as occasion for signing was predicated on assumption that contractuals ratified by then. We agree that in latter case Chancellor's visit would indeed provide excellent setting for official ceremony.

Assume you realize that we are not opposed to reconsideration previous position provided that you reasonably convinced that psychological and moral advantages to be gained from early conclusion of convention justify acceptance certain risks here. We want to make certain that in reaching decision you keep in mind possibility of queries and even unfavorable reactions by groups here which may wonder why we bestow token of friendship on Germans in face their continued bickering and delay of contractuals. Latter reaction, of course, even more likely in event of Adenauer's political defeat in matter of ratification. Would appreciate your views and decision soonest.

Department accepts text as revised.

SMITH

No. 170

740.5/3-1653

Memorandum by John J. McCloy [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 16, 1953.

MEMORANDUM OF BLANKENHORN VISIT TO McCLOY, SUNDAY, MARCH 15, 1953

Blankenhorn came in from Germany by plane with a message from the Chancellor, traveling secretly [2] and with the purpose of giving advance notice of matters he proposes to bring up on his forthcoming visit to the United States.

The Chancellor emphasizes that this is probably the only time in his life that he will be visiting the United States. He hopes the visit will be of significance, not merely atmospheric, and this hope is not based only on his own political situation but because he feels that we now have the last clear chance for the establishment of a solid European Defense Community, political as well as military. Further interminable delays will be disastrous and the time has now come for real advances.

First, as to his program this week, the Bundestag will have its third reading of the contractual agreements and the EDC. This action will be followed by Adenauer's trip to the United States, and on his return the treaties will be submitted to the Bundesrat. In this situation, Rheinhold Meyer [*Maier*] seems to be the key figure. Adenauer rather thinks that Meyer [*Maier*], although an uncertain quantity, will shrink before the enormous responsibility of repudiating these agreements. After Bundesrat approval, the President will sign the legislative acts, and then in all probability the SPD will seek from the constitutional court a sort of temporary injunction. According to Blankenhorn, the decision on this might be forthcoming in about three days after submission. According to Adenauer's calculations, it will be the end of April or the beginning of May by the time the Praesidium will have acted and the full ratification of the treaties by the Federal Republic will be completed.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a brief covering memorandum from McCloy to Secretary Dulles, dated Mar. 16, stating that he had dictated the memorandum, but had not had time to go over it.

[2] On Mar. 11 Conant had cabled the Department stating that Hallstein had asked HICOG to issue a visa to Blankenhorn for a secret visit to the United States to see McCloy in New York with regard to Chancellor Adenauer's trip to the United States. (Telegram 4187 from Bonn, 762A.13/3-1153) The following day the Department replied that it had no objection to Blankenhorn's trip. (Telegram 4526 to Bonn, Mar. 12, 762A.13/3-1153)

Adenauer wishes to assure the Secretary of State and the President that he will do everything in his power to put this program through, and that he already has his plans well advanced. He asserts that public opinion is better now than it has been for some time, but we must expect strenuous efforts and strong propaganda from the Soviets to interfere with this schedule.

The real delays will develop in other countries than Germany, and from the Chancellor's reading of the situation he feels the situation in these other countries is still serious. The French, he is convinced, seek only delay. Bidault is a slender reed, loath to cut off the relationships which he now has with the de Gaullists largely because of his personal ambitions, and he believes that though the French will give lip service to the concept of the EDC, what they really seek is continued inaction, in the meantime gleaning all they can in the way of other concessions in return for promises to do better.

According to the Chancellor's estimate, there will be probably one year's delay before ratification. The chances for ratification this autumn, in his judgment, do not look too good considering the French political situation. Belgium and Luxembourg will drag their feet along with the French. Italy is also somewhat of a doubtful factor not through any personal defection of de Gasperi, but because of his local political problem. His statement that he would ratify before the election, it now seems, will have to be modified.

In the meantime, Soviet preparations are going on with real vigor. Refugees are being cleaned out, some being sent to the concentration camps, some being allowed to flee in the hope that the combination of these methods will leave East Germany in a more amenable form for organization by the Soviets than heretofore. One can no longer blink at the actual military preparations in East Germany. The Bereitschaften are being turned into a people's army—180,000 men trained, equipped, good tanks, good anti-tank equipment and training and some planes. The Chancellor believes that with this strength, there will be a real test of our resolution, perhaps coming in Berlin or in some other form. While Europe is badly defended in spirit and in fact, it must get beyond its present stage of paralysis if there is to be any hope of forming a progressive and vigorous Western Community. The Chancellor, conscious of the time element, therefore, proposes two things:

(1) To start training German cadres strictly according to the EDC formulas immediately after German ratification. He submits a schedule for Army, Air Force and Naval Forces, commencing with the training of volunteer veterans, former officers, none above the rank of colonel, and non-commissioned officers, the training to be accomplished with United States units preferably, but possibly also

with British and French. All told, the volunteer veterans (commissioned and noncommissioned officers) would amount to about 30,000 for the Army, and about 60,000 young recruits with no previous training, also volunteers.

For the Air Force it would be contemplated that there would be about 10,000 former officers and former enlisted personnel; for the Navy about 5,000.

As I understand the proposal, nothing would be said about this in any communiqué covering the visit, but at an appropriate time disclosures could be made that selected German volunteers were training with Allied Forces.

(2) On the political front, the Chancellor would hope that the United States would announce that the U.S. would get in contact with her Allies, suggesting to them that as soon as the Federal Republic had ratified the contracts, they would come into effect, thus giving to the Federal Republic full power over its internal and external affairs subject to the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement. In effect, this would mean that the Agreements of May 26, 1952 [3] would come into effect in precisely the same way as if all signatories to the European Defense Treaty had ratified that Treaty immediately upon the ratification by the Federal Republic itself of all the Agreements. In other words, there would be no "junctum" between the Federal ratification and that of the others, but all reserve powers would remain as stated in the General agreement and all the rights of the troops under the so-called "Truppen Vertrag" [4] would be in force and French troops would be given the full benefit of this Treaty as well during the interim period. The Chancellor emphasized that his proposal would involve that all the provisions of these treaties would be in force, including specifically those in Article I of the General Agreement.

Thus far, no one knows of these proposals—not even Conant or Bruce. The Chancellor took these means of communication primarily because of his fear of leaks.

As to the general situation, the Chancellor says that he has no real knowledge of the significance of the Malenkov succession. He knows what is going on in East Germany, but not to any extent in Russia. He comes to the conclusion, however, that the Soviets are preparing something definite, perhaps in respect to Berlin, but probably with the idea of again testing strengths in Europe, say in 1954.

Ollenhauer and the SPD continue negative, but they still have the attraction of German unity as an offset to Adenauer's policies. There were certain other incidentals. He wonders whether some further governmental action might not be taken toward the refugee problem in Germany. This would greatly help him and it would fill a real need. He emphasizes that the refugees are good people, many of them young, a real element of strength if handled properly. He points out that while Reuter and Berlin are attractive figures, it is the Federal Republic which really puts up the money to take care of these people and eventually has to absorb them.

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[3] Regarding the complex of agreements comprising the contractual arrangements, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Document 50.

[4] For an extract from the convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany (*Truppen Vertrag*) signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Document 53.

Would there be a chance of a loan for refugees from either the Export Bank or the World Bank? It is an enormous problem, but the psychological effect of say a $100,000,000 loan would be tremendous.

He will be prepared to sign the so-called Cultural Agreement on his visit. It will be prepared by that time. This provides for cultural exchanges but it is a good means by which we are permitted to carry on activities in Germany in their propaganda war, without which there would be a serious diminution of our propaganda front.

He also wishes an exchange of views between his atomic experts and ours on the matter of air defense. He would like to have his experts come over—if not with him, shortly after. They need information from us in this field, but they also have some of their own to offer.

He urges that everything be done to convince the French that further dilatory tactics will not succeed.

I am leaving in this envelope the training schedules for the Army, the Air Force and the Navy (*Streng Geheim*!), which were handed me by Blankenhorn and which I feel should be looked at by the military people, and the hand-written (in German) proposal for the abolition of the "junctum", which is referred to above. [5] As I think this was carefully drafted, I would prefer to have an expert translator make the translation, but the gist of it is as I have indicated above.

JJ McC

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[5] Neither the training schedules nor the proposal for abolition of the "junctum", both attached to the source text, is printed.

No. 171

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Germany"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Anton Pabsch of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany

RESTRICTED WASHINGTON, March 30, 1953.

Subject: Visit by Bundestag Leaders [1]

Participants: Under Secretary of State, Bedell Smith
Dr. Gerhard Schroeder
Dr. Franz Josef Strauss
Dr. Karl Pfleiderer
Dr. Hans von Merkatz
Mr. James Riddleberger, GER
Mr. A. F. Pabsch, HICOG

The visitors were introduced to the Under Secretary at 15:10. After a brief exchange of compliments, the Under Secretary invited the German deputies to raise any questions they desired to discuss and expressed his willingness to answer them.

(1) European Integration—German Unity

Dr. Schroeder, CDU, opened the conversation on the German side by stating that the Government coalition of the Bundestag favored earliest ratification of the EDC Treaty by all participating nations so that the Federal Republic could start at the earliest date with the organization of its armed contingent to EDC. He said that too much time had already been lost since the treaties were signed at Bonn and that the Russians had used this period to advantage. Schroeder expressed concern lest the French attempt to hinder or delay EDC ratification by insisting upon material changes in the Treaty as indicated by the recently introduced protocols. Schroeder and Strauss pointed out that the six EDC nations had committed themselves to the concept of an integrated European army when their representatives signed the Treaty. The Bundestag had already fulfilled its obligation by ratifying EDC and it was now high time for the other nations also to honor their commitments by getting on with ratification. The deputies stated that any reasonable French demand with respect to overseas commitments could be discussed later and satisfied through liberal interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the EDC Treaty. Strauss emphasized that the

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[1] This conversation took place on Mar. 26. The preceding day Secretary Dulles had met with Minister President Arnold of North Rhine-Westphalia, who was visiting the United States for several weeks at the invitation of the Secretary. A one-page memorandum of their conversation, which dealt mostly with the EDC, is in the Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Germany".

Germans could not accept any protocols to EDC which would materially change the spirit and meaning of the Treaty. He opposed the idea of a German national army as suggested by some French groups, stating that only an integrated European defense force could in the long run provide effective military security for Europe and Germany.

At this point Dr. von Merkatz raised the question of German unity and expressed the hope that the U.S. would continue to support a policy whose aim it was to reunite Germany. He inquired whether the recent change of regime in Russia and the insecurity which resulted therefrom in the Kremlin called for any special action designed to further German unity.

Before replying to the several questions, the Under Secretary paid tribute to the Bundestag for its prompt and courageous approval of the EDC Treaty. [2] He said the U.S. hoped that the other EDC nations would soon follow the German lead and ratify the defense pact. There was reason to believe that both the Netherlands and Italy would act promptly, though with respect to the latter there was some danger that ratification might be delayed until after the elections.

The Under Secretary pointed out that in U.S. opinion it was of utmost importance for the European nations energetically to pursue the policy of military, economic and political integration. The U.S. would continue to support this policy as the only sound way to counter the threat from the East and to establish a viable Europe. The Under Secretary expressed the opinion that no change could be expected in Russian policy in the foreseeable future, and that it was therefore imperative to establish soonest a sound balance of military power between West and East. This, he said, was the most effective way to discourage Russian aggression and assure a period of armed peace, which was the best arrangement we could hope to achieve in the immediate future. However, one could hope that a sound military balance of power might eventually induce the Russians to seek a better and lasting understanding with the West.

The Under Secretary assured the Germans that the U.S. would always seek and support ways to reunite Germany. He cautioned, however, that he did not believe that the Soviets were ready to give up their zone at this time. Although it was entirely possible and even likely that the Russians would make another offer to reunite Germany before the EDC enters into force, such a bid would not be sincere and would be nothing but an attempt to prevent or delay the establishment of a European Army.

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[2] On Mar. 19 the Bundestag had ratified the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty.

(2) The Saar

Dr. Schroeder made brief reference to the Saar problem and remarked that French attempts to arrive at a definitive settlement prior to French ratification could seriously hinder European integration. He stated that the coalition parties were unable and unwilling to agree to any final Saar settlement which would in any way perpetuate the present situation. Postponement of the issue was in Schroeder's opinion the best solution for the time being.

The Under Secretary expressed the hope that France and Germany would soon find a mutually satisfactory solution to this difficult problem. In the meantime, however, the Saar should, in the opinion of the U.S., not be linked with EDC ratification. "The EDC is not an object for trade and should be accepted in its present form by all of the signatory powers."

(3) The Refugee Problem

Dr. von Merkatz raised the refugee problem and pointed out that the ever increasing number of refugees were taxing German capacity to the maximum. He indicated that the Federal Republic would soon be unable to cope with this problem alone and that outside help was urgently needed. He inquired whether the U.S. was prepared to extend financial and other aid to provide employment for the refugees and to speed up their integration.

The Under Secretary informed the Germans that the U.S. was acutely aware of this problem and that the matter was under constant study and observation. As he saw it, the refugees presented three different but related problems: (1) immediate financial aid to receive, transport and house the newly arriving refugees; (2) a long-range program to integrate all refugees into the German economy by providing jobs and housing; and (3) a program of migration for those who could not find employment, such as farmers. The Under Secretary informed the Germans that while the Government had not yet submitted any proposal to Congress, the refugee problem was under study and action would be taken in the event the Federal Republic could no longer handle the situation.

In conclusion the Under Secretary assured the visitors that he had given them the same answers to the questions which the President himself had recently given to other visitors in response to similar queries.

No. 172

762A.13/3-2952

Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 29, 1953.

Subject: Agenda for Adenauer Visit

1. In accordance with arrangements approved by the Secretary and following his conversations with M. Mayer, [2] I saw the Chancellor's emissary, Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn at my house yesterday. In addition to discussing the possibility of Franco-German negotiations in the immediate future on the Saar, Mr. Blankenhorn gave me the Chancellor's thinking on a number of points which he may desire to discuss in Washington. The substance of this interview is set forth below.

2. Mr. Blankenhorn stated that the Chancellor had not intended to raise the Saar question with the Secretary but would be guided by U.S. wishes in the matter. He would come prepared to discuss the Saar and he would likewise have with him a detailed plan for a solution of the economic aspects of this problem. Mr. Blankenhorn said that in the opinion of the German Government agreement had been reached on political principles. The broad outline of this economic settlement had been drafted by Mr. Erhard, German Minister of Economic Affairs, and had been approved by the Cabinet. Mr. Blankenhorn then gave me a statement of the principles of the settlement, a translation of which is appended.

I then conveyed to Mr. Blankenhorn the information we had had from M. Mayer respecting his willingness to enter into negotiations himself with the Chancellor on the Saar problem and his hope that the negotiations between the Chancellor and the Prime Minister could be undertaken in the very near future in Paris. Mr. Blankenhorn and I then surveyed the possibilities and found out that conversations in Paris before the Chancellor's arrival in the United States were excluded because of the travel plans of the two heads of Government. Mr. Blankenhorn then explained that the Chancellor intended to go to Ottawa in addition to his United States trip and consequently would depart from Canada by air on April 18 arriving at Hamburg on April 19. As the CDU Party convention will be held on April 20 to April 22 inclusive, April 23 would be the first day the Chancellor would be free and that unfortunately conflicts with a trip which M. Mayer plans to take for several days. It therefore appears that the earliest possible date for these negotiations would be after April 26. Mr. [illegible] stated that he was certain the Chancellor was now prepared to undertake serious negotiations for a Saar settlement. He [illegible], however, that the Chancellor might want to propose that these negotiations be removed from the atmosphere of either Bonn or Paris and could perhaps be conducted in Washington in the presence of U.S. and U.K. observers. I expressed some doubt that this suggestion would be feasible in view of the earlier attitude we had assumed on direct Franco-German negotiations but said I would convey it to the Secretary.

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[1] The source text bears the handwritten notation "Sec saw, R[oderic] L. O'C[onnor]". Copies of this memorandum were sent to Matthews, Merchant, and MacArthur.

[2] French Prime Minister René Mayer and Foreign Minister Georges Bidault visited the United States at the end of March.

3. The Chancellor plans to explain in Washington the situation on complete German ratification of the EDC and his hopes that the difficulties in the Bundesrat and in the Court will be rapidly overcome. He plans to give precise explanation of the situation in Germany.

4. Although the Chancellor hopes that the German ratification will be completed in the near future, he fears that there may be a delay on the part of other countries in putting treaties into effect. Because of the elections in Germany this summer, the Chancellor is most insistent in requiring certain solutions in this field. His specific suggestion is that some sort of declaration should be issued by the United States that if the Federal Republic has ratified the treaties the United States would intervene with the other signatories in favor of putting the contractual agreements into force. His ideas on this subject are set forth in the hand written draft which has been given to us, translation of which is attached. The Chancellor feels most strongly that he must have something concrete in hand when he returns to Germany from this trip. He believes that the atmosphere in Germany is now very good in the whole field of European cooperation but he requires something in the way of specific progress to keep the momentum in the right direction. As additional suggestion, the Chancellor would like to see the U.S. High Commissioner given the functions of an Ambassador and further that the German Mission in Washington should be converted into an Embassy. The Chancellor is firmly convinced that with the present policies of the U.S.S.R. the West cannot possibly continue as at present with no material progress in the field of German contribution to defense.

5. Given the present military posture of the Western World, the Chancellor believes that the time has come to commence training of German forces. This could be done under the U.S. and U.K. com-

mands in Germany and the Chancellor believes that the Allies could train up to 100,000 men which would provide the cadres for 12 German divisions. These reserves would then be ready when the EDC comes into effect. In answer to my question, Mr. Blankenhorn stated that of course the Federal Republic would pay for such training as part of its contribution to defense.

6. On the refugee problem, the Chancellor expects that there will be at least 250,000 coming into West Germany in 1953. He had three specific suggestions as to how the United States might assist: (a) grants in aid from MSA; (b) moratorium of interest payments under the German debt settlement [3] on our claims for post-war aid (this moratorium would not affect the private debt settlement); (c) a declaration that the United States would support an international refugee loan. I said that I would strongly urge that no proposal with respect to a moratorium on interest should be advanced at this time, particularly as we hoped to put the debt settlement before the Senate very soon for ratification. After some discussion on this point, Mr. Blankenhorn said he fully agreed that the Chancellor should not raise this point and he would so recommend.

7. In order to demonstrate West German solidarity with the struggle of the free world against Communist aggression, the Chancellor would like to offer a medical unit for Korea. This is known in Germany as a "Feldlazarett" and is a completely equipped medical unit. Furthermore, the Chancellor would also like to offer a rest home for U.S. soldiers in Baden-Baden. This is a very well equipped establishment known as the "Mariahaloen" which the French have recently released from requisition. This would be available for any forces or wounded which the United States desired to send.

8. As the Chancellor desires to push ahead as rapidly as possible with the German military side, he wonders if it would be advisable for blank (the German representative of the EDC Interim Commission) to come with him. I rather discouraged this proposal and I think the Chancellor will be governed by our desires.

9. Contrary to previous information, the Chancellor does not desire to discuss the question of atomic energy per se. What he does want to take up is the question of what the Germans call "Luftschuetz", which implies civil defense measures against aerial attacks including the use of atomic weapons.

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[3] The negotiations for a settlement of German external debts, conducted by Tripartite Commission on German Debts, had been successfully concluded on Feb. 27, 1953. The agreement was put into effect on Sept. 15 following ratification by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Documentation on the negotiations is in file 398.10 EDC.

10. The Chancellor would also welcome information with respect to the amount of Off-Shore Procurement which the United States anticipates for West Germany.

11. Mr. Blankenhorn will be in Washington until Monday night and would be happy to provide the Secretary or any of his immediate assistants with any further information which we may desire. Mr. Blankenhorn hopes that one of us will be able to give him some indication of our reaction to the foregoing by Monday night.

[Attachment 1]

Paper Prepared by the Federal Minister of Economics (Erhard)

[BONN, undated.]

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR SAAR ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT

DRAFT GERMAN PROPOSAL APPROVED BY GERMAN CABINET

1. The Saar Territory remains part of the French currency area.

2. With respect to France and Germany the Saar Territory will be fully liberalized. (This means that no quotas will be imposed on Saar trade with France and Germany.)

3. German as well as French goods will enter duty-free into the Saar Territory.

4. In order to protect France against a flood of German goods coming through the Saar, a customs boundary will be created on the French-Saar border, which will have no significance for the trade from France to the Saar and for goods of Saar origin going to France.

5. Eventually, free domicile for Germans in the Saar Territory.

6. Free disposition of the Saar's trade surplus with Germany:

(a) to acquire property in Germany; and

(b) depending upon the magnitude of the surplus, to give the right to Germans having assets in the Saar to transfer to Germany.

RESULTS

1) The Saar Territory will be the first completely liberalized area in accordance with the ideals of European cooperation.

2) Germany will in a legal manner gain in economic influence.

3) France can raise no political and also no economic objections.

4) The Saar area will probably become the cheapest area in Europe and therefore exercise a power of attraction.

[Attachment 2]

Proposal Prepared by Chancellor Adenauer

Translation

[Bonn, undated.]

When the Federal Republic has ratified the agreements and if the going into force of the agreements is still further delayed, the Government of the United States will take up with the other signatories to the agreements of 26 May 1952 respecting the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three powers, and, in agreement with the Federal Government, will support the position that the full authority of the Federal Republic over its internal and external affairs in accordance with Article I of General Convention [4] should be restored.

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[4] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

No. 173

762A.13/3-2953

Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET

Washington, March 29, 1953.

Subject: Agenda for Adenauer Visit

1. Following a meeting with the Secretary this morning, [2] I had a further conference [3] with Mr. Blankenhorn at noon today at the house of Dr. Krekeler, the German Chargé d'Affaires. In accordance with decisions made at the Secretary's meeting, I made the following points to Mr. Blankenhorn:

(a) The Secretary and several of his principal advisers had considered the Chancellor's suggestions as conveyed by Mr. Blankenhorn and the Secretary had come to the conclusion that it would be exceedingly unwise, if not disastrous, at the present time to imply in any way that the EDC treaties would not be ratified. The proposals of the Chancellor would mean in effect that the United States government would announce what its intentions would be if the treaties failed ratification. This attitude might well be fatal to the efforts now under way in France to obtain the ratification of the agreements by the French Parliament. The same reasoning would apply to the suggestions which the Chancellor had made with respect to the military training of Germans by one or more of the Allies. Mr. Blankenhorn stopped me at this point to inject the statement that of course the Chancellor had never envisaged giving any publicity to any plans for training of German soldiers. I said I understood this but that any action of this character would quickly become known. I said further that the Secretary was not willing to embark upon this course which he thought was premature, and I volunteered the further comment that the Chancellor would be well advised to continue on his present clear and consistent line of ratification of the treaties and further development of European unity. Mr. Blankenhorn said he understood this position and that he would pass it on to the Chancellor when he saw him at Le Havre. He did not seem at all surprised at the reply which was given him.

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[1] The source text bears the handwritten notation by Roderic L. O'Connor "Sec saw 4 April. RLC". Copies were also sent to Matthews, Merchant, and MacArthur.

[2] No record of Riddleberger's conversation with Dulles on Mar 29 has been found in Department of State files.

[3] For a record of Riddleberger's previous conversation with Blankenhorn, see his memorandum, *supra*.

(b) We then turned to the question of the Saar and possible meetings between Mayer and Adenauer. Mr. Blankenhorn said he had been in touch with the Chancellor on this subject following my conversation with him on March 28 and that he had received a cable this morning stating the Chancellor's willingness to enter into negotiations with Mayer on the Saar and suggesting that such negotiations be conducted in Paris on May 12 when the Chancellor would be in that city for a meeting of the EPC Ministers. I said that we had hoped for a somewhat earlier meeting, preferably as soon after April 26 as could be arranged, and Mr. Blankenhorn will also convey this to the Chancellor. I anticipate that this question will be discussed further with us during the Chancellor's visit.

In impressing upon Mr. Blankenhorn the desirability of an early Adenauer-Mayer negotiation on the Saar, I discouraged the idea of negotiations in Washington in the presence of U.S. and U.K. observers, pointing out that the French are very sensitive on this matter and that negotiations conducted under these circumstances, even if not successful, might create adverse sentiment in France. Mr. Blankenhorn said he saw the point and did not press the matter further.

(c) With respect to the possible negotiations on the Saar, Mr. Blankenhorn stated that he wished to be altogether explicit on what the present attitude of the Chancellor is and he believes it important that this be understood within the U.S. government. The Chancellor is convinced that Bidault is attempting to sabotage the EDC and that Bidault, fully conscious of the political difficulties of the Saar issue in Germany in an election year, will utilize the negotiations on the Saar in an attempt to place the blame for the failure of EDC on Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn said that the Chancellor is ready and prepared to negotiate with Mayer along the lines of the general principles which had been given to us.[4] It is, however, altogether impossible for the Chancellor to come to a *definitive* settlement on the Saar issue before the election in Germany. It is difficult enough to settle an issue as thorny as the Saar but quite impossible to do it before June in an election year. Therefore, the Chancellor cannot be rushed on this matter, and he believes that this is precisely the intention of Bidault. I then asked Mr. Blankenhorn if there were any possibility of coming to an agreement on the general principles of a settlement which perhaps could be announced in May. Mr. Blankenhorn thought that this was a possibility and provided that it was not rated as an absolutely conclusive arrangement. After the issuance of the communiqué on the talks with the French, [5] Mr. Blankenhorn now believes that the Chancellor will possibly raise the problem of the Saar in the course of his visit because he wants to explain in some detail the nature of the German political difficulties.

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[4] Attached to Riddleberger's memorandum, *supra*.

(d) We then discussed very briefly some of the other points suggested by the Chancellor and the only item of any significance was Mr. Blankenhorn's recommendation that at least some sort of general declaration be included in the communiqué to be issued after the visit on the subject of refugees. He hopes that some general statement can be given to the effect that the U.S. Government will assist the refugees and will lend its support to international efforts in this field. Mr. Blankenhorn would like to have the refugees referred to in the communiqué as victims of the cold war. I said we were considering the entire refugee problem now and that I hope we would be able to say something about assistance in this field but that I was not certain that specific figures would be given.

(e) Mr. Blankenhorn agreed with me that it would not be desirable for Mr. Blank to accompany the Chancellor, but he very much hoped that he could come to the United States shortly thereafter. . . . I told Mr. Blankenhorn I thought this could be arranged after the Chancellor's trip.

(f) Mr. Blankenhorn also expressed the hope that some information could be given to the Chancellor during his visit respecting the amount of off-shore procurement which the United States will undertake in West Germany. I said we might be able to give some figures on this program.

2. It was obvious to me that Mr. Blankenhorn, who incidentally is very close to the Chancellor, was somewhat concerned about the type of communiqué that will be issued after the Adenauer visit, particularly in view of the negative reaction which had been conveyed to him on the most important of the Chancellor's proposals. I observed casually that the comminqué which had been issued after the Mayer visit had not gone far in any U.S. commitments on aid and in view of our reasons for rejecting certain of the Chancellor's suggestions, the Chancellor should not be too disappointed if the communiqué was somewhat thin on the subject of U.S. commit-

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[5] For text of the communiqué, issued Mar. 28 at the conclusion of talks with Prime Minister Mayer, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 491–492.

ments. I do believe, however, that we should give serious thought to what can be said in the communiqué and would recommend that perhaps we should consider further the possibility of raising the German Mission in Washington to an Embassy and asking the British and French to do the same in their respective capitals. It seems to me that this is a small consequence but one which might be given without material damage to French prospects of ratification. I should recommend that we should accept the Chancellor's offer on a medical unit for Korea and on the rest home if this can conveniently be done. I do not anticipate that we should have much difficulty on the subject of atomic energy as Blankenhorn has indicated that what the Germans are most concerned about is the question of civilian defense.

3. Mr. Blankenhorn will return tomorrow to Germany and plans to meet the Chancellor in Le Havre.

No. 174

611.62A/3-3052: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, March 30, 1953—6 p. m.

4410. Conference with Chancellor for one and one half hours this morning. He presented new memorandum which will follow in separate telegram. [2]

Chancellor emphasized importance of real accomplishment his trip in connection with forthcoming elections as he felt the opposition party was not in a condition to take the responsibilities for government either internally or externally. Unless he can show some signs restoration German sovereignty he fears serious political consequences for future government. With this background laid emphasis on possible designation of US High Commissioner as carrying also title Ambassador and raising status German Mission to Embassy. Pointed out Austrian situation as precedent. Felt psychological importance of such changes could not be stressed too much. He attached importance to fact French HICOM also signs himself as Ambassador of France. HICOG's position will be set forth in subsequent message. [3]

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] Transmitted in telegram 4407, *infra*.

[3] This telegram has not been further identified.

Chancellor attaches great importance to putting into effect immediate machinery for clemency war criminals, whether in the form of a mixed commission, provided for under the treaties, or a special bilateral commission of similar nature which he feels we have power to do unilaterally. HICOG's position on war criminals will be sent shortly.

I took advantage of reference in memorandum to defense contribution to raise, at Draper's request, timing of further discussions in Paris on Ministerial level.[4] Chancellor was worried that if these took place too soon before Bundesrat vote, "extremely high" figure mentioned in Paris of a billion and a quarter DM's per month would seriously affect chances of ratification because of danger that this would become known in debate. On other hand he recognizes that prolonged delay will prejudice possibilities of agreement prior to NATO meeting. It was agreed, however, that Schaeffer would go to Paris on April 17 with other Ministers and discuss this matter in hope of reaching a solution in time, but that no agreement would be finalized until after Bundesrat ratification. Figure Chancellor used I am told is too high, but any discussions in Washington about low figure which Schaeffer offered will be countered with protest at high figure which is too high, but any discussions in Washington about low figure which Chancellor claims was asked of Germany in Paris. Chancellor will argue any such figure as 1.25 billion DM per month is utterly impossible for Germany to bear. My personal opinion is that any detailed discussion of this Washington would not be fruitful.

On refugee problem, Chancellor pointed out that Berlin refugees were only part of a much larger problem. We agreed. He will push for a loan for housing and give details. Our view here supports his general position and I should like to be able to argue at high level for this recognizing it is a departure from past practice and may involve new orientation US policy.

As regards cultural agreement, Chancellor has no objection to its taking form of executive agreement. Says German position anyway is that no Parliamentary ratification required.

Chancellor promised rapid action on tax relief for off-shore procurement. Maltzan will give Harris further details re German requests with respect to patents and trade-marks, as well as reciprocal trade agreements and simplification of customs procedure.

Although Saar not mentioned in new German memorandum, Chancellor recognizes that this problem must be discussed while he is in US. He categorically refuses to recognize Saar solution as condition precedent to treaty ratification. He repeated his previous argument that he and Schuman had reached agreement on main lines of political as well as economic settlement, and his complaint that Bidault has not carried thru on this basis. He expects, however, to meet with Mayer to discuss the Saar problem as soon as it can be arranged without appearing to appear to by-pass Bidault. He believes meeting on May 12 in Paris will give this opportunity. He reiterates willingness to resume discussions at any time and states anxiety to come to earliest solution, pointing out that Saar population will probably itself decide not to join either France or Germany.

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[4] The Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council was held at Paris, Apr. 23-25, 1953.

CONANT

No. 175

611.62A/3-3052: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, March 30, 1952—6 p. m.

4407. Reference: our telegram, 4392, March 27, [2] agenda Adenauer talks. Following is text of memo in English handed me by Chancellor this morning:

"The Federal Chancellor comes to US with intention of having thorough exchange of views with President and his staff on international situation and special problems bearing upon German-American relations and those affecting Germany, aim being to make FedRep a strong and useful partner of US. To achieve this object he intends to offer contributions by FedRep.

1. Desiring to secure as early and effective a contribution as possible by Germany to security of West he would like to discuss which joint measures could be taken even before coming into force of treaties in order to avoid that delay in ratification of treaties might have harmful effects on Western defense preparedness. Item 1b of *aide-mémoire* presented [3] is to be understood in this sense. He

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Draper and to London.

[2] Telegram 4392 reported that due to problems in the Foreign Ministry, delay was being experienced in obtaining information concerning the forthcoming Adenauer visit. (611.62A/3-2752)

[3] On Mar. 24 Conant had cabled a five-point draft agenda for Adenauer's visit which Hallstein and Blankenhorn had given him that morning. Item 1b of this draft dealt with the military training of German volunteers before the ratification of the EDC. (Telegram 4340 from Bonn, 611.62A/3-2452)

is interested in learning what repercussions, in American view, changes inside Russia following upon Stalin's death might have on East-West conflict. If it is assumed that because of momentary feeling of insecurity Soviet side is prepared to make certain tactical concessions it seems to him advisable that goodwill of Soviets be tested by raising again question of German prisoners-of-war and civilian internees in direct talks with Soviet Russia.

2. For development of genuine partnership it is unhealthy if one of partners is only giver and other only on receiving side. Federal Government believes it is making its full and useful contribution by working towards a consolidation of European economic and social conditions along lines of American intentions. Results obtained at the EPU and the OEEC are evidence of this.

The Federal Government aims at further stabilizing and normalizing economic basis of Germany. It would seem that a German-American trade agreement along lines of agreement of 1923 could be a means to this end. In this context, Federal Government would like to stress the importance of American tariff policies since object of Federal Government 'trade not aid', cannot be realized without possibility of an increased export of German goods to US. Federal Government therefore would be glad to be advised whether it may count on a prolongation and possibly improvement of reciprocal trade agreements act and on early passing of customs simplification bill.

A satisfactory settlement of treatment of off-shore purchases is impending; therefore it would be desirable to discuss economic side of off-shore transactions.

For favorable development of economic relations between two countries, Federal Government holds view that settlement of problem of industrial property rights, viz., trademarks, patents and copyrights, is necessary.

A development towards partnership should, in view of Federal Government, also find its expression in political field in order to activate all German energies for this partnership. Therefore, the Federal Government is desirous of reaching and [*completing?*] early progress, as far as possible, in the development and handling of the present status of FedRep.

The Federal Government regards conclusion of a cultural agreement as a salutary step towards strengthening mutual relations in the cultural sphere. In view of the fact that German scientific research has not yet overcome grave reverses suffered during past two decades Federal Government considers a discussion of this problem necessary so as to provide for an effective German contribution to strengthening of Western World in this sphere, too.

3. Federal Government considers intelligence refugee problem as threat to political and social consolidation of West. By setting in motion fresh streams of refugees the rulers of East can at any time repeat disturbances, especially in adjacent countries. An example of this is furnished by Germany where in addition to existing millions of refugees more than 100,000 compatriots from Soviet Zone have fled since beginning of the year: To provide employment and housing for 300,000 refugees the Federal Government will this year have to spend three billion DM.

The Federal Government believes that the common danger should be met by common measures. In this respect it knows itself to be in agreement with other governments of West. For its own part it is anxious to do everything within its power to contribute to solution of the refugee problem in the world. Despite its own burdens it has made its contribution towards coping with problems arising elsewhere and will continue to do so. It would like to consult with American Government as to concerted measures to be taken to meet danger.

Among possible measures to be taken it suggests a release of MSA funds with a provision requiring counterpart funds be used exclusively for economic integration of Soviet Zone refugees. Finally Federal Government is concerned to find out whether it can count on the American Government's support for an international refugee loan as soon as conditions for such a loan shall exist."

CONANT

No. 176

862A.501/4-253: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, April 2, 1953—6 p.m.

4468. As reported in Berlin's 1393 to Department, repeated Bonn 1501, Paris 109, London '71, [2] Council decided to defer action on Chancellor's request for increase in strength of federal frontier police.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1393 reported on the meeting of the Council of the Allied High Commission for Germany, held at Berlin on Mar. 28, at which, *inter alia*, it was agreed to defer action on the request for an increase in the border police and to inform Chancellor Adenauer accordingly. (762A.0221/3-2853)

At our meeting with Chancellor on March 30 he continued to press for this increase and sent Interior Minister Lehr to see us yesterday to argue that it is urgently needed as protection against threats to public order. His arguments were, however, based upon need for federal police force at disposal of Federal Government rather than upon necessity of strengthening border protection as he cited example of potential disorders created by Communist agitation and threats of internal unrest caused by possible strikes. He said although increased border police would be stationed near the line, they could be used by Federal Government in emergency.

In part pressure for increase at this time seems due to desire of government to show prior to elections it has taken every means in its power to protect public order, and due to reluctance of opposition to be placed in position of objecting to such measures.

French HICOM informs us that Paris continues strongly opposed to increase at this time and that Mayer has sent new instructions pointing out that chance of ratification in France will be seriously damaged if Chancellor persists in going ahead with measure.

Even if Chancellor does not himself bring up this issue during his Washington talks, it seems to us important particularly in view French position that further effort be made to persuade him to drop matter at least for present.

CONANT

No. 177

Editorial Note

Chancellor Adenauer, his daughter, and various officials of the Federal Republic of Germany arrived in New York on April 6. The following day they flew to Washington for 3 days of talks with representatives of the United States Government. On April 10 they departed for an 8-day tour of the United States including stops in San Francisco, Carmel, Chicago, New York, and Boston. On April 17 they flew to Canada before returning to Bonn on the following day.

In preparation for the Chancellor's visit the Department of State created an interdepartmental group, whose secretary was Christopher Van Hollen, to draft papers for the several topics which might be considered during the meetings with the Chancellor. The papers that were prepared for consideration by the interdepartmental group were designated GPT-D and are numbered 1-17. They deal with the EDC, contractual relations, a German defense contribution, Berlin, refugees, economic questions, war criminals, civilian defense, the estimate of the Soviet position following Stalin's death, German unity, the cultural convention, a draft communiqué, and a draft Presidential statement. A set of these papers is in 762A.00/4-653 and in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142A.

The documentation that follows presents the records of all those meetings with the Chancellor or officials of the Federal Republic during the time that they were in Washington. There is no indication in the files of the Department of State that official talks took place at any other time during the Chancellor's visit. For the Chancellor's account of his visit, see Adenauer, *Memoirs*, pages 438–456. For a record of the speeches which Adenauer made during his visit to America, see Konrad Adenauer, *Journey to America*, Washington, Press Office of the German Diplomatic Mission, 1953.

Two reports of the Chancellor's visit to Canada have been identified in Department of State files. The first was transmitted in despatch 1071 from Ottawa, April 21. (762A.13/4-2153) The second, which is substantially the same as the first, is in a memorandum of conversation by G. Hayden Raynor, director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, dated May 11. (762A.13/5-1153)

No. 178

740.5/4-1753

United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower, The White House, April 7, 1953, Noon [1]

SECRET
GPT MIN-1

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1953.

PARTICIPANTS

US	German
President Eisenhower	Chancellor Adenauer
Secretary of State	Professor Dr. Hallstein

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[1] According to another copy of these minutes in Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "Germany", these minutes were drafted by Morris on Apr. 10. A summary of this meeting and GPT MIN-2, *infra*, were transmitted to Bonn in telegram 4845, Apr. 8 (611.62A/4-853) For the Chancellor's account of the meeting, see Adenauer, *Memoirs*, pp. 441–443.

Secretary of Defense
Mr. Nash
Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. Burgess
Dr. Conant
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Riddleberger
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Morris
Mrs. Logins (Interpreter)

Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan
Mr. Hans von Herwarth
Mr. Felix von Eckhardt
Dr. Alexander Boeker
Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler
Mr. Heins Weber (Interpreter)

The President opened the meeting by welcoming the Chancellor to the United States. He thanked him for the offer of a complete medical unit for Korea which, he said, was greatly appreciated. He expressed the hope for complete frankness in the talks, and stated that, as Adenauer knows, we felt deeply the need for closer union in the western world. We realize there are many difficulties connected with European unity, such as the Saar, which the Secretary of State is prepared to discuss.

In reply Adenauer thanked the President for his attitude, both in his present office and before as Commander-in-Chief of SHAPE. Germany stands today on the side of the West and is determined to press ahead with the EDC and political union of Europe. Adenauer expressed certainty that the Bundesrat will during April approve the treaties, as the Bundestag has already done. He assured the President that Germany will be a reliable partner for the United States, and fully supports United States policies. At the airport this morning the Vice-President had referred to the "old relations" between the United States and Germany—our aim, said Adenauer, will be to re-establish and strengthen these. The agenda for these talks had been submitted, and he suggested that we do not go into details here at the White House. If there were any matters left after the talks with Mr. Dulles, they could be discussed at the White House on Thursday morning.

One question, said Adenauer, will be the Saar. On this he said he is at the full disposal of Mr. Dulles and certainly hopes this issue may be settled.

Adenauer also expressed approval of what he gathered, from the press, to be the views of the United States Government with respect to the U.S.S.R. and its new Government.

The President emphasized that the United States is as anxious for peace as any other power, but so long as the Soviets do not seek peace, we must be firm. The United States hopes, however, that as a result of developments now under way that we may succeed in lessening some of the world's tensions and burdens.

The Secretary of State then referred to the Chancellor's query on the views of the United States Government regarding the Soviet "peace" moves. In elaboration, he suggested that this is presumably a matter of particular significance in Germany, and may affect the attitudes of Germans towards the EDC. It seems to the United States that these Soviet moves are being made in response to our strong constructive policies in Europe and Asia. The obvious lesson to be drawn, in our opinion, is that we should continue to pursue these policies vigorously. Settlements with the Soviets can best be obtained through western strength, and if we push ahead, we may eventually get some of the things we want, such as a Korean settlement, an Austrian treaty and German unity.

In response, Adenauer assured the Secretary that the United States need not fear that Germany would wish to relax. There are a few Germans with such ideas, but, by and large Germany knows Russia and will not slow up. A similar situation developed after Lenin's death. In the Soviet zone of occupation, pressure on the churches continues, and the current Soviet "peace melodies" certainly fit in well with the views expressed in Stalin's "Bolshevik" article. [2]

At Adenauer's request, the President, Secretary of State, Dr. Conant, Dr. Adenauer, Dr. Hallstein and Dr. Krekeler then withdrew into the President's study for the discussion described in Attachment "A".

Attachment A

United States Delegation Minutes of the Restricted Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower, the President's Office, April 7, 1953 [3]

SECRET

Present: The President
The Secretary of State
U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

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[2] Presumably a reference to the article entitled "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", which appeared in *Bol'shevik*, Sept. 15, 1952. Extracts from the article are printed in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 224-229, and the *New York Times*, Oct. 4, 1952.

[3] The source text bears no indication of the drafter, but Attachment A to the minutes referred to in footnote 1 above, which is the same as the minutes printed here, shows that it was drafted by Conant in Bonn on Apr. 10.

Professor D. Walter Hallstein, State Secretary, Federal Republic
Dr. Heinz Krekeler, Chargé d'Affaires, German Mission

The President spoke briefly about the Saar problem and its relation to EDC ratification. He referred to the recent conversations with Mayer and Bidault and said in effect that the French position was that the EDC treaty could not be ratified until the Saar question was solved, and he hoped the problem could be solved between Germany and France by both sides making as many concessions as they could. The President stated that in his own opinion he could not subscribe to the view that there was a necessary link between the two matters. To this the Chancellor replied that he was very glad that this was the President's view, as he could not agree to any linking of ratification of the EDC with a solution of the Saar problem.

The Secretary of State and the President both indicated that, although they did not subscribe to the view that these two matters had to be linked, as a matter of practical politics, the United States view was that it was very unlikely that the French Parliament would ratify the EDC treaty until the Saar problem was solved.

The Chancellor ventured to disagree with this view of the French political scene. He said that as he saw it, Mayer had made some promises to the de Gaullists but that these were no longer valid since the de Gaullists would not vote for ratification now in any event. Therefore, the key to the French problem was the position of the Socialists. He had been informed that there were 20 against the treaty, and 20 for it, and 60 undecided. The question was how to win over these 60, for if that could be done, the Gaullists' position wouldn't matter. The way to win over the undecided Socialist vote was for the British to show sufficient interest in the EDC and show their readiness to associate themselves with the undertaking.

The President said that if he understood Mayer correctly, Mayer had said that the British had made some concessions along these lines but had not expressed them emphatically enough.

The Chancellor said that he believed that the British had been asked to do more than was reasonable, for they had been asked to make a firm promise to keep a certain number of divisions on the Continent, whereas the French had now asked for permission to withdraw divisions under certain circumstances.

The Chancellor then said that he was hoping to meet with Mayer without Bidault. This would have to be arranged by an "accidental" meeting, which he was hoping would take place May 13 or 14. The President expressed his satisfaction that such a meeting would take place in the near future and hoped a solution of the Saar problem would result.

In connection with the Saar problem, the Chancellor pointed out that the difficulty lay in large measure in the French insistence that the solution be a definite and final one. This the Chancellor could not agree to, because if the settlement of the boundaries of the Saar could be final now, the Russians could claim that the Eastern boundaries could also be settled now. The Chancellor said Schuman had originally agreed that the matter of the final boundaries could be left to the peace treaty, but at the end when he, Schuman, was in political difficulty, he changed this position and said that the matter would have to be "finally" settled. The Chancellor said he would be glad to give the outline of the program that he and Schuman had agreed on, which he felt went a long way toward the settlement of the problem. In the Chancellor's opinion the people of the Saar did not want to be either French or German but to be primarily Saarland people.

At the end of the conversation, the President raised the question as to whether an important British statesman, for example, Winston Churchill, might not make a strong statement in favor of political, economic and military unity of the six nations and express at the same time a favorable opinion of British association with the EDC.

The Chancellor replied that he would welcome such a statement and as a matter of fact would prefer to have the British associated with this enterprise, as he preferred to deal with the British and the French rather than the French alone.

No. 179

740.5/4-1753

United States Delegation Minutes of the First General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, Conference Suite, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, April 7, 1953, 3-4:30 p.m. [1]

SECRET
GPT MIN-2

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1953.

PARTICIPANTS

United States	German
Secretary of State	Chancellor Adenauer
Dr. Conant	Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein

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[1] A summary of this meeting was also transmitted to Bonn in telegram 4845, Apr. 8. (611.62A/4-853) For Chancellor Adenauer's account of this meeting and GPT MIN-3, (*infra*), see Adenauer, *Memoirs*, pp. 443-447.

Mr. Matthews
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Riddleberger
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Linder
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Morris
Mr. O'Connor
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Kellermann
Mr. Kitchen
Mr. Van Hollen
Secretary of Treasury
Mr. Burgess
Mr. Overby
Mr. Nash, Defense Department
Col. Gerhardt
The Director of Mutual Security
Mr. FitzGerald
Mr. Schelling
Mr. Harris
Amb. Draper
Mr. Slater
Dr. Hauge, White House

Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan
Mr. Hans von Herwarth
Mr. Felix von Eckhardt
Dr. Alexander Boeker
Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler
Mr. Friedrich-Karl Vialon
Mr. Ulrich de Maiziers
Mr. Von Haeften
Dr. Gunther Harkort
Dr. Georg Federer
Dr. Albert F. Ernecke
Mr. Schulze-Boysen
Mr. Hans Podeyn

Ratification of EDC and Contractuals, Including Relation of Saar Thereto. After extending greetings to Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary Dulles opened the substantive discussion saying that both the Government and the American people had been cheered by the large vote by which the German lower house had recently ratified the EDC Treaty. Such a vote had been forecast by the Chancellor and it was apparent that the Chancellor was a man of his word. Secretary Dulles was gratified to note that the Chancellor had assured the President at the morning meeting at the White House [2] that the EDC would also pass the upper house despite opposition, an assurance which made the U.S. appreciate the Chancellor's leadership. It was the feeling of the U.S. that the treaties would finally come into force providing additional military potential to support the NATO organization. Although there was disappointment that Mr. de Gasperi, because of a filibuster in the Italian Parliament over the electoral reform bill, had not felt it practiable to ask his Parliament to take up the EDC Treaty, nonetheless, de Gasperi had assured the U.S. that when the Parliament reconvened in July, ratification of the treaty would be the first order of business.

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[2] For the minutes of this meeting, see GPT MIN-1, *supra*.

Secretary Dulles reported that the French talks had indicated that the primary difficulty in the way of EDC ratification was the solution of the Saar issue, a subject which had been discussed with the Chancellor at the White House meeting. As was pointed out in the communiqué of the French talks, [3] the U.S. did not agree with the French thesis that the solution of the Saar dispute was a legal matter and that such a solution was indispensable to the ratification of the EDC and the Contractuals. Although the U.S. did not agree that the Saar problem had to be solved before ratification of the EDC, the U.S. likewise did not believe that it was necessary to defer a solution until after ratification. It was extremely important that both the Germans and the French solve this problem in a satisfactory manner because if such a solution were reached, the last major obstacle to EDC ratification would be overcome. As the President had stated, the U.S. looked to the Germans to play a major and farsighted role in the solution of the Saar question.

Chancellor Adenauer replied that he had told the President that Germany would make a serious attempt to solve the Saar problem. Delay had been caused largely because of a change in the French Government, but it now appeared possible to move forward to a successful solution. He pointed out that when the EDC had been signed in Paris in May 1952 all those who took part in the negotiations felt that the treaties would probably go into effect in August or September of that year. However, these prospects had not been fulfilled. Mr. de Gasperi, although he was most desirous of EDC ratification, was not able to carry forward his plans for ratification because of difficulties in the Italian Senate and, for this and other reasons, it appeared likely that it would be four or five months before complete ratification could be obtained.

Because of these delays, and because of the nature of German public opinion, the Chancellor said that he would welcome any assistance that might be given to mollify the public in Germany. He pointed out that he was now under attack by the Social Democratic Party and that in September elections for the Bundestag would be held. It was extremely important that there should be a continuation of present German policy during the next four years and yet it would be extremely difficult to explain to certain groups in Germany why the EDC had not been ratified. With the elections approaching, it would have been most advantageous if EDC ratification had been completed, since, at present, there were many individuals in Germany—who were not strong adherents of any political party—who were in a state of uncertainty because they felt that the Western build-up was being halted through a failure to ratify the EDC on schedule.

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[3] For text of this communique, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 491–492.

The Chancellor pointed out that, either in the Contractuals or the EDC—he did not remember which—it was provided that when France, Britain, the U.S. and Germany had ratified the EDC, certain portions of the Contractual Agreement would go into effect. Therefore, he wondered whether it would be possible, in order to assist with public opinion at home, to raise the status of the High Commissioner to that of an Ambassador. This was not to say that the High Commissioner's task should be abolished. However, since there were certain matters which lay beyond the regular functions of the High Commissioner, it was probable that the High Commissioner would feel certain restrictions or inhibitions and for this reason the establishment of an Ambassadorship would be welcomed. In addition, it would be advantageous if the German representative in Washington could be raised to Ambassadorial rank. The Chancellor pointed out that a precedent for such a change already existed in Austria where, although the Allied Control Commission still existed, the three Western Powers were represented by Ambassadors and Austria, on its part, had an Ambassador in Washington. If the High Commissioner in Germany could be given Ambassadorial status, the Chancellor believed such a move would have a splendid impression on public opinion and would assist him in the forthcoming election.

In reply, Secretary Dulles said that one of the difficulties in meeting the Chancellor's request was that, as the Contractuals were written, it would be impossible for the U.S. to take a position on the question of Ambassadors without prior consultation with the British and the French. While the U.S. would be sympathetically disposed to taking up this matter upon completion by the Germans of the ratification of the treaties, he felt that this subject could be dealt with more effectively if it were not given too much publicity in advance. He said that it would perhaps be best to agree that the U.S. would explore what could be done when German ratification was completed.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed with Secretary Dulles that advance publicity would be unwise and that careful consultation was necessary. He asked whether the U.S. had any objection to the Germans discussing this subject with the British. Secretary Dulles answered that the U.S. had no objection to the Germans discussing it with the British. Secretary Dulles then stated that he desired to make it clear that the U.S. sympathized with the German attitude on this subject and would do everything possible to give the Germans the benefits of the character suggested by the Chancellor so that these benefits would be available before the election. Naturally, if the High Commissioner were raised to an Ambassador, the U.S. would welcome an Ambassador from Germany in Washington since the two types of representation were directly related.

Estimate of Soviet Position Following Death of Stalin. Stating that at the earlier White House meeting both he and President Eisenhower had given a brief estimate of the Soviet position following the death of Stalin, Secretary Dulles asked the Chancellor for his views on this subject. Chancellor Adenauer replied that his estimate of the situation was the same as that of the President and the Secretary of State. It was his feeling that the recent peace feelers were simply evidence that the death of Stalin had caused instability within the USSR. There was no indication that the Soviet Union was diverging from its previous policies. It should be remembered that there had been a continuous armament build-up by the USSR, particularly during the period since 1950. For example, in the satellite states 70 divisions were presently deployed which now had modern equipment compared with the older equipment available to them two years ago. These divisions were backed up by 240 divisions in the Soviet Union itself. Furthermore, there were airfields in the Soviet Union and satellites located so close to Germany that jet planes could be over Bonn in 20 minutes and over Paris in 50 minutes. Soviet pressure on Eastern Germany appeared to be as strong as ever and, in the case of certain religious groups, pressure had actually increased.

The Chancellor felt that the main immediate task of the Soviet Union was to protect itself from unrest by consolidating its internal position. While it was true that the Soviet Union might extend a peace offer which could be acceptable to the West, the West must not relax its vigilance, but instead should continue to build its strength since the only way to negotiate with a totalitarian country was to negotiate from strength. Although the Federal Republic had no desire for war, the danger of war would increase if the West relaxed its build-up efforts. On the other hand, if the present policy of building strength should continue, it would one day be possible to undertake sensible negotiations with the Soviet Union. Referring to the latest Western note on the subject of free elections in Germany,[4] the Chancellor pointed out that the Soviets did not answer the note at all. If they should approve free elections in Germany, a critical point of danger would be removed, since an agreement on free elections would bring about the unity of Germany. The Chancellor also felt that the West should demand that the Soviet Union release some 300,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees who, it was well known to the German Red Cross, were alive and somewhere in the Soviet Union, although their exact whereabouts were unknown.

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[4] For text of this note, Sept. 23, 1952, see Document 138.

War Criminals. Opening the discussion on war criminals, Chancellor Adenauer said that the U.S. now holds about 300 prisoners in Landsborg Prison. Alluding to the fact that the treaties provided for a Mixed Board to be set up to consider all cases, he pointed out that there were considerable psychological and public opinion problems in Germany connected with the war criminal issue. Especially difficult was the agitation of various soldiers and veterans organizations. These psychological difficulties with respect to war criminals must be overcome because they would affect the formation of German units for the European Defense Community, since these units would be composed in large measure of technicians and specialists who would be difficult to recruit unless there were a more lenient parole system for the war criminals. Therefore, the Chancellor requested that, even before the treaties went into effect, a study should be undertaken for the purpose of considering the possibility of establishing the Mixed Board provided for in the treaty. Because of the psychological situation at home, it would be most advantageous if this Board could meet before the end of the year without awaiting complete ratification of the treaties.

With regard to the parole system, the Chancellor maintained that the British were more lenient with paroles than the U.S. He said that a number of prisoners in Germany had been paroled by the French High Commissioner, but that it was more difficult to parole the war criminals who were held in France since the ultimate authority for paroling the war criminals in France was vested in the President under a system which was unduly complicated. With regard to the prisoners held in Spandau Prison, the Chancellor recognized that it was only with difficulty that relief for the prisoners could be achieved although there had been certain recent success. If the Russians were now actually engaged in friendly moves it might be possible to test their true motives by raising the question of the Spandau prisoners. Secretary Dulles replied that the U.S. preferred to defer until the following day the subject of war criminals, including those in Spandau.

German Defense Contribution. Chancellor Adenauer said that it had been agreed that the subject of a German defense contribution would be discussed at a meeting in Paris on April 17 between German Ministers and NATO representatives. Until that time, this subject should be discussed at the expert level since there were a number of questions still to be clarified. Furthermore, at the forthcoming NATO Conference,[5] the NATO Ministers would be in a better position to receive the final proposals. Replying that the U.S. hoped that acceptable agreement could be reached at the Paris meeting, Secretary Dulles said that the information to date had indicated that the total contribution proposed by the Germans might be less than that agreed upon last year. In view of the Federal Republic's improved economic condition, it seemed to the U.S. that any effort smaller than that agreed to last year would not be understood by other countries. Therefore, if this question were not satisfactorily resolved at the April 17 Paris meeting, Secretary Dulles urged the Chancellor to deal with the problem personally upon his return to Germany. He also emphasized the importance of providing support for Allied troops in Germany and expressed the hope that it would be possible to provide a substantial sum for support costs without affecting the amount provided for the German contingents in the EDC. Finally, he said that a substantial amount of military equipment might be made available to the Germans following EDC ratification. Secretary Dulles asked Mr. Riddleberger to comment on the subject of the German defense contribution and asked Mr. Nash to comment on the subject of military equipment for Germany.

Mr. Riddleberger said that in discussing the German contribution, it should be pointed out that the German submission would be given the same type of review given to the submissions of other countries and that therefore, no discrimination existed. It was important to ascertain the total amount of the German contribution by the April 23 NATO meeting, so that agreement could be sought with all NATO countries. If the German amount were not received, the entire review process would be complicated. The basic criteria for the defense contribution was the economic situation in each country, and it would be difficult to contend that the German contributions this year should be less than that provided last year in view of Germany's economic situation, her position in the EPU, etc. As to the build-up of German contingents in the EDC, Mr. Riddleberger said that it was important to get agreement on support costs for Allied Forces in Germany and that he felt that a close examination of the German figures would reveal that the necessary amounts would be available for Allied support costs.

Chancellor Adenauer answered that he would be prepared to provide finished material for the NATO Conference. However, the task was difficult since, as his Finance Minister had pointed out, the Germans had difficulty in comparing their contribution with that of other countries since they did not know what criteria had been used in other countries. The Chancellor reiterated his suggestion that this question be left at the expert level until the Paris conference. Meanwhile, he agreed to do everything possible to adhere to the earlier commitment so that the Federal Republic would be ready for the conferences on the 17th and the 23rd. He said he would send instructions from Washington on this subject.

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[5] Reference is to the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Paris, Apr. 23-25, 1953.

Military Equipment for Germany. After recalling that it had been agreed at Bonn last year, that when the EDC went into effect the U.S. would provide end-item military assistance to German contingents during the initial training period. Mr. Nash read the statement on military equipment attached as an Annex. At the conclusion of Mr. Nash's statement. Chancellor Adenauer requested that the detailed figures be given to his military experts so that they would be in a position to take the necessary additional steps upon the ratification of EDC. Secretary Dulles closed the substantive discussion by saying that, with regard to the German defense contribution, he had not stressed the fact that it appeared to be less than last year but rather that the contribution should be *more* than last year.

The meeting concluded with an agreement that a working group of financial experts would convene to discuss certain technical problems [5] and that another working group would be established to prepare the initial draft of the communiqué for the talks. [6]

Annex

Statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Nash)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, April 7, 1953?]

Provision of Military Equipment by the United States

Taking into account the equipment availabilities for and requirements of the EDC countries as a whole, and assuming the continuation of present world conditions, the United States has made budgetary provisions which put us in a position to provide to the European Defense Community the major equipment required from outside the EDC for the first six German groupements and twenty-four German air squadrons, on a basis comparable to that used in providing equipment to the other EDC countries. This equipment will include:

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[5] A record of these discussions is contained in Dept. of State cable to HICOG Bonn No. 4927, April 15, 1953. [Footnote in the source text; for the telegram under reference, see Document 184.]

[6] No record of the work of this group has been found in Department of State files. A copy of the draft communiqué prepared by the interdepartmental working group, GPT D-16, dated Apr. 6, is in file 762A.00/4-653.

a. For Army contingents:

In general, only those items having a primary military application, such as tanks, combat vehicles, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, and basic signal and engineering equipment, including components and spare parts. This matériel is not restricted to items of United States manufacture, and includes items obtained through offshore procurement.

b. For Air Force contingents:

Fighter-bomber aircraft, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, primary and jet training aircraft, ground handling equipment, maintenance training units and related equipment, electronics maintenance training units and related equipment, electronics and communications equipment, machine guns, bombs, rockets, and miscellaneous ammunition.

I understand that negotiations have been going on, which are now being successfully concluded, concerning the transfer of certain TNC naval vessels to the Federal Republic.

The prompt and orderly delivery of United States equipment depends (1) upon the completion of necessary arrangements by the European Defense Community; (2) upon the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the United States, the European Defense Community, and the Federal Republic; and (3) upon the determination by SHAPE and United States authorities that the units which are to receive this equipment reach a state of training in which they can make effective use of it. While the United States is about to present to the European Defense Community and to the Federal Republic proposed drafts of the required agreements, it will also be necessary that planning for the buildup of German units by the EDC Interim Commission result in schedules which can be the basis of United States programming and plans for delivery of specific quantities of equipment. Our information at the present time is that such planning has not progressed beyond broad preliminary stages. If detailed arrangements for the receipt of United States equipment are to be completed promptly, it will therefore be necessary that the EDC Interim Commission prepare the necessary plans.

Should you desire more detailed information, we are prepared to provide specific delivery forecasts when the ratification of the EDC Treaty has been completed, when EDC Interim Commission plans for the German guildup and production have been finalized, and when bilateral agreements with the EDC and the Federal Republic have been signed. In the meantime we will consider requests for detailed information which is required by the EDC Interim Commission for planning purposes.

No. 180

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142A

United States Delegation Minutes of the Second General Meeting of Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Dulles, Conference Suite, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, April 8, 1953, 3 p.m. [1]

SECRET
GPT MIN-3

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1953.

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary Dulles
Dr. Conant
Mr. Matthews
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Riddleberger
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Linder
Mr. McCardle
Mr. Reinstein
Mr. Margolies
Mr. Kellermann
Mr. Morris
Mr. Martin
Mrs. Eleanor Dulles
Mr. Kitchen
Miss Wilson
Secretary Humphrey
Mr. Willis
Mr. Nash
Mr. Baringer
Colonel Gerhardt
Mr. Stassen
Mr. FitzGerald
Mr. Schelling
Mr. Harris

Germany

Chancellor Adenauer
Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein
Dr. Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan
Mr. Hans von Herwarth
Mr. Felix von Eckhardt
Dr. Alexander Boeker
Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler
Mr. Friedrich-Karl Vialon
Mr. Von Haeften
Dr. Gunther Harkort
Dr. Georg Federer
Dr. Albert F. Ernecke
Mr. Jaenicke
Mr. Sigrist
Mr. Schulze-Boysen
Professor Grewer
Dr. Pelckman
Dr. Werner
Mr. Heins Weber
Mr. Hans Podeyn

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[1] A summary of this meeting was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 4867, Apr. 9 (611.62A/4-953) For Chancellor Adenauer's account of this meeting and GPT MIN-2, (*supra*), see Adenauer, *Memoirs*, pp. 443–447

Mrs. Houghten
Ambassador Draper

The second plenary session opened with Secretary Dulles inviting Chancellor Adenauer to speak with regard to financial aid with particular reference to refugees and Berlin.

Refugees and Berlin

Chancellor Adenauer commented that the problem involved not only the refugees in their present existence in Berlin but also those which must be accommodated in Western Germany. He remarked that the question has its human side to the extent that these people must have some form of security, but emphasized that the problem also had its political ramifications since those refugees who have not yet been worked into West German economic life must be protected from exploitation by both the extreme right and left political wings. He commented that many refugees would be able to work if adequate housing could be provided near their jobs, and noted that the Federal Republic is now building 400,000 dwellings. In view of the destruction in Germany, however, he said that the Federal Republic cannot do enough in this line by itself. He noted that the Federal Republic has allocated 25 billion DM for these refugees and referred to the law passed some months ago for the equalization of burdens which imposed a 50% tax on savings for support of the refugees. He asked for MSA assistance and noted that several European countries had provided money for houses which must be built in the industrial regions. He referred to the plan envisaged in the 1951 report of a group of experts headed by Christian Sonne, [2] and asked for US aid through an international refugee loan, commenting that the Federal Republic can not solve this problem by itself.

Mr. Stassen expressed US appreciation of this problem and said that a thorough study of the question of aid for Berlin and the refugees was now underway as part of a global review of MSA assistance. He noted, however, that the amount of aid which had been spoken of appeared to be large in view of the world-wide commitments of the US. He said the US was not prepared to make such a commitment at this time because the problem was being included as a part of the general MSA study and because new appropriations must be obtained from Congress in May. He told the Chancellor that approximately the first week in May the US will be in a position to tell Germany what we are recommending to Congress in this connection. He said the US is pleased to note the progress the Federal Republic had made in assimilating these refugees into Western Germany and in making them productive working members of the German economy and assured the Chancellor that the problem will have sympathetic and friendly consideration in the US.

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[2] Under reference here is *The Integration of Refugees Into German Life*, a 109-page report with appendices, presented to Chancellor Adenauer on Mar. 21, 1951, by H. Christian Sonne, the Chairman of the ECA Technical Assistance Commission on the Integration of Refugees in the German Republic. A copy of the report is in file 862A.411/6-651; it was released to the press shortly after its presentation to the Chancellor.

Chancellor Adenauer said he understood completely the role of Congress in this matter and the reasons why no US commitment could be made now. He said, however, that he had felt he should take advantage of the opportunity to speak of this matter while in the US. He referred again to the equalization of burdens law pointing out that such a measure, which had never been taken before, provided clear evidence that Germany was making the greatest possible effort to solve the refugee problem. He noted that the German people are determined to help themselves as far as possible and expressed the hope that the measures which had been taken in this regard could be pointed out to the US Congress.

Mr. Stassen noted that, although the refugee situation was the principal point in the MSA consideration of this matter, the study goes beyond to consider the general Berlin situation, including the strengthening of consumer and lighter industries in Berlin for the purpose of creating employment and the question of the stockpiling of food and other essentials. He commented that both he and Secretary Dulles believed Chancellor Adenauer should take this opportunity to tell the American people about the German efforts in this regard, particularly about the burden-sharing law.

Chancellor Adenauer commented that he had mentioned the problem in his luncheon speech at the National Press Club [3] and believed the 500 representatives of the US press in attendance represented an effective channel for reaching the American people. He repeated that he understood Mr. Stassen's points and commented that the refugees now reaching Berlin will be taken care of and will remain in Germany. He mentioned the problem of unemployment in Berlin and the necessity for enlarging employment opportunities and commented that neither the new refugees or those which had been in Berlin for several years should be forgotten.

Secretary Dulles then asked Assistant Secretary Linder to report on the meetings of the economic working group.

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[3] Adenauer had addressed the National Press Club at a luncheon on Apr. 8; extracts from his address are printed in Adenauer, *Memoirs*, pp. 451–453.

Report on Economic Working Group

Mr. Linder said that the economic working group has discussed and were in general agreement on the question of trade expansion and the desirability of currency convertibility.[4] He said the US representatives had expressed pleasure at the recent German trade liberalization measures and at the decisions taken at the recent OEEC meeting. The US representatives also outlined the Administration's plans for a general study of foreign economic policy including its efforts with regard to reciprocal trade legislation, and reported on the progress made on the question of customs simplification. Mr. Linder referred to the President's statement to Congress with regard to reciprocal trade legislation which had been announced during the working group meeting and said that the German representatives had understood and appreciated this move.[5]

He said that the group had discussed and had undertaken to consider further the problem of an increase of US off-shore procurement in Germany and had agreed to find out more about the problems involved in the production of certain types of synthetic rubber in Germany and to aid the Germans in this regard if possible. He said that discussions were continuing with regard to a treaty of friendship and commerce and that the US had undertaken to explore further with other agencies the question of the treatment of German trade marks and copyrights in the US. He expressed the hope that some reference could be made to these last two questions in the communiqué.[6]

With regard to East-West trade, Mr. Linder said the US and German representatives had reached complete agreement with the exception of two problems and he hoped the German representatives could agree on language to be included in the communiqué. He said the US was happy to hear that the balance of the Schlosmann[?] Mill would not be shipped to Hungary but regretted that the Germans could not give the same assurances with regard to the shipment of steel scrap to Hungary. He emphasized the nature of US legislation in this regard and expressed the hope that the Germans would reconsider and cancel these scrap shipments. Otherwise, he said, the President must consider whether or not to grant an exception under US legislation which would involve consultation and clearance through several Congressional committees with the probability of much unfavorable publicity. He noted that if the President were not able to grant such an exception, he would be required by US law to cancel all aid to Germany.

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[4] Regarding the work of this group, see telegram 4927, Document 184.

[5] For President Eisenhower's message to Congress, Apr. 7, concerning the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 163-165, or Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 634-635.

[6] For text of the final communiqué, see Document 185.

Mr. Stassen emphasized the importance of the East-West trade issue and gave his full support to Mr. Linder's statement.

Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized the importance of this question and suggested that individual cases be discussed further by US and German experts.[*]

War Criminals

Ambassador Conant explained the US position with regard to war criminals, suggesting that the US approach France and the UK with regard to the activation of the Mixed Board as soon as German EDC ratification was completed. If the UK and France would not agree to such a step he said the US would then consider urgently the possibility of a new review procedure for war criminals under US jurisdiction. He said that the State and Defense Departments were considering the possibility of the establishment of a US-German parole board (not a clemency board) similar to that established in Japan, and asked if Chancellor Adenauer could comment on his reaction to the establishment of such a board.

Chancellor Adenauer said he would welcome a mixed parole board which he felt would be a great step forward and would help the public opinion situation particularly among the German people.

Ambassador Conant said that the US would hope to have either a Mixed Board or some new procedure for war criminals under US jurisdiction in the near future, and certainly before the September elections in Germany. He suggested that little publicity be given to these plans and that any public reference be made only in general terms.

With regard to conditions at Spandau prison, he said that the US would continue to seek amelioration of the treatment of prisoners in Spandau and agreed with the Chancellor that this might afford a good opportunity to test the sincerity of recent Soviet friendliness.

Chancellor Adenauer remarked that if a parole board could be established, no publicity on its activities would be necessary. The press and public would merely need to know that those prisoners who deserve release would be released as soon as possible, and the manner in which it was done would make no difference. He commented that this parole board should not be connected with EDC but should go into effect before EDC.

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[*] On April 13, 1951, Dr. von Maltzan advised Mr. Riddleberger that the files and experts of the Federal Government were in Bonn, and requested that further discussion by experts be pursued there. [Footnote in the source text.]

Ambassador Conant reiterated, in clarification, that the US planned first to approach France and the UK with regard to the activation of the Mixed Board as soon as *German* ratification of EDC was complete. Failing that, activation of the US-German parole board would be considered also when German ratification had been completed.

Chancellor Adenauer pointed out that releases of individuals held in US captivity were less than those released by the UK and France. He said he realized that the fact that the US was less generous in this regard was due to the attitude, not of the High Commissioner, but of the US Army and expressed the hope that the Army could be brought to be as generous as the UK. He pointed out that the UK had gone far in the release of war criminals in the past few months and remarked that the UK High Commissioner had assured him that those prisoners who had been released on the grounds of ill health would not be returned to captivity once they had recovered their health. He expressed his belief that the US should be able to take steps similar to those of the UK. He pointed out also that the US Army has ceased its normal parole proceedings in anticipation of EDC ratification which would involve the activation of the Mixed Board. Now that EDC ratification appeared to be delayed, he felt the US Army should go back to its normal parole procedure.

Mr. Nash said that this was the first information that he had received that the Army was delaying parole matters or was more strict in this regard than the UK or France. Speaking for the Secretary of Defense, he said he would look into the matter personally and that everything that can be done will be done.

Chancellor Adenauer noted that since April 1950 the US Army had granted no worthwhile paroles. He cited figures on paroles of war criminals under various jurisdictions which indicated that of the total number of prisoners held in captivity by the various nations the UK had released ¾, France ¾ and the French Occupied Zone ⅔, while the US had released only ½.

Secretary Dulles reiterated to the Chancellor that the US would review the policies of its military authorities with a view to more liberal treatment of war criminals. Returning to the parole board question, he reassured the Chancellor that we anticipated the establishment of the joint parole board or commission prior to general EDC ratification, and that we will first discuss the activation of the Mixed Board with the UK and France. Then, if unsuccessful we will take up with the Germans the possibility of a joint parole board. He expressed the hope that the Chancellor believed that the

US will do all it can in this regard and approved of the action which had been promised by Mr. Nash.

Civil Defense Against Atomic Attack

Chancellor Adenauer commented that the Federal Republic was entirely inexperienced in the field of civil defense against an atomic attack, noting that Germany can be reached in 20 minutes by Soviet bombers. He said that they would be glad for a meeting of US-German experts to see what could be done to defend the German people against atomic attack.

Secretary Dulles said that the US was prepared in principle to discuss this matter with the Germans. He remarked, however, that the problem was a delicate one since the US was closely bound by legislation which restricted the information on atomic matters that can be communicated to a foreign Government, and that we had already experienced difficulty in this regard in operations with other countries. He suggested that the question be explored with Ambassador Conant at Bonn who was an authority on the subject and was familiar with US legislative restrictions before such a group came to the US. In this manner he believed an area could be found for useful joint exploration of the question.

Chancellor Adenauer said he would be glad if Ambassador Conant would help them, and that he felt nothing should be said in the communiqué on this issue.

Secretary Dulles agreed that it would be best to omit any reference to this matter in the communiqué.

Vesting of German Property

Chancellor Adenauer remarked that the question of the vesting of German property in the US had not been satisfactorily concluded by the experts, and that Germany hopes that property and other interests in the US belonging to Germany would not be confiscated further. He also expressed the hope that, as the situation develops, such property might be returned to Germany.

Mr. Riddleberger said that the US had the question of vesting under consideration and thought it would be settled to the Chancellor's satisfaction about the time of his departure from the US. [7] He said there was a technical question of the date of the announcement but that we hoped to give the Chancellor a going away present. He recommended that nothing be said publicly prior to the anticipated announcement.

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[7] On Apr. 17 the White House announced the termination of the program for vesting German-owned properties in the United States. The same day Adenauer made a statement welcoming the termination of the vesting program. For the texts of the White House announcement and Adenauer's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 18, 1953, pp. 720-721.

Chancellor Adenauer expressed his appreciation for this move.

Return of former German Vessels

Mr. Riddleberger referred to the 350 naval vessels, mostly small craft, which had been allocated to the US by the Tripartite Naval Committee and said that the US now plans to return these ships to West Germany. He asked if a reference could be made to this return in the communiqué.

Chancellor Adenauer said he was very grateful for this action and would be very glad to have it referred to in the communiqué.

Communiqué

Secretary Dulles suggested that the draft communiqué [8] be submitted to the working group for further study and that it might be discussed at the meeting at the White House on Thursday. [9] He asked if Chancellor Adenauer wished to comment on the communiqué at this time.

Chancellor Adenauer said he would be greatful if nothing were said in the communiqué about the Saar question, since every mention of that issue appears to make it more difficult of solution. He also expressed the hope that Mr. Stassen could give some hope in the communiqué that refugees and expellees would be given some help.

Secretary Dulles said it would be necessary to give more thought to the omission of any reference to the Saar in the communiqué. He noted that the Saar issue had been prominently mentioned in the press after the recent meeting with the French and said he feared that the absence of any reference at this time might be misunderstood to mean that the US was not interested, whereas in reality the US believed an early settlement of this question was extremely important. He said that if the Chancellor felt that the particular expression of the Saar issue in the draft communiqué would be hurtful with regard to German public opinion, we would be glad to consider changes of language. However, in view of the importance of this issue in the eyes of both the US and European public he felt that a three-day discussion followed by a communiqué which did not mention the Saar would give rise to much undesirable speculation. He commented that this would be contrary to public expectation and indeed to reality and that such an omission might do more harm than good.

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[8] The draft under reference has not been further identified; for text of the final communiqué, see Document 185.

[9] For an account of the meeting at the White House on Thursday, Apr. 9, see Riddleberger's memorandum, Document 182.

Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized the true kernel in what the Secretary had said and that it might be enough if the Saar question were not tied to the EDC and the Schuman Plan. He said that the Saar had not been brought into question with regard to EDC and the Schuman Plan and that the German public would object if the Saar issue were raised in discussions of these arrangements after they had been agreed.

Secretary Dulles suggested that the experts be asked to study the text of the communiqué, having in mind the US and German point of view. He said that we would try to find language to meet the Chancellor's suggestion but would like to consider the question more carefully.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed but pointed out that experts are not always politicians.

Cultural Convention

Secretary Dulles noted that certain technical drafting difficulties might make it necessary to change the form of the cultural convention to an exchange of notes, and suggested that conclusion of the agreement be postponed to Thursday.[10]

Chancellor Adenauer agreed.

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[10] For text of the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer on Apr. 9 concerning cultural relations between the Federal Republic and the United States, and their remarks at the time of the exchange, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 567–568.

No. 181

762.022/4-1453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Morris)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1953.

Subject: The Saar

Participants: James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
Brewster H. Morris, GPA

In connection with the final White House session with Adenauer, April 9, 1953, there was again a short restricted meeting in the President's private office, consisting of the President, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Conant, the Chancellor and Hallstein.[1] This was devoted mainly to a discussion of the notes on cultural exchanges, and to the Saar.

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[1] Presumably this restricted meeting took place before the meeting described in Riddleberger's memorandum, *infra*.

The discussion of the latter, according to Mr. Conant, was along the same lines as during the previous Adenauer talks, i.e., on April 7 and 8, except that the Chancellor also stated specifically that, while anxious to go just as far as he could in the coming Saar negotiations, he could not "give away the Saar" to the French in a German election year as "payment for their ratification of the EDC". There was no comment from the U.S. side to this point.

After this meeting, the Secretary told Mr. Conant there was no need for him to draft a regular report on this restricted meeting. Hence this brief note for the GPA Saar file.

No. 182

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142A

Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, April 9, 1953.

Subject: Adenauer's suggestions at White House Conference regarding President's proposed speech. [2]

At the closing White House meeting with Adenauer on April 9, the President invited his comments, if any, on the proposed speech, i.e. in terms of its German implications.

The Chancellor replied that, as far as he could recall, the sections of the speech he had seen the day before seemed excellent. His sole specific suggestion was that some reference should be made to the missing German prisoners of war and civilian internees, i.e., who have never come back from Soviet custody.

Adenauer then agreed with the President's suggestion that any such reference should be to those war prisoners and civilian internees *in general* who have not come back from the Soviet-Communist hands, i.e., German and other nationalities.

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[1] A copy was also sent to MacArthur.

[2] Under reference here is the President's speech, "The Chance for Peace", made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Apr. 16; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179-188, or Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599-603.

No. 183

740.5/4-1653: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 16, 1953.

A-1570. At the request of Mr. Reinstein of the Bureau of German Affairs, Mr. Vialon and Col. De Maiziere of the Blank Ministry, who were members of the party which accompanied Chancellor Adenauer to Washington, attended an informal meeting in the Department on April 9. Additional representatives of the U.S. Government attending were Messrs. Moore and Fessenden of RA, Messrs. May and Jacobs of GER, Mr. Barringer and Colonel Green of the Department of Defense. Mr. Harris of HICOG joined the meeting briefly.

Mr. Reinstein opened the discussion by asking what was being done by the EDC Interim Commission on plans necessary to prompt establishment of the German contingents. Mr. Vialon explained that not a great deal of progress had been made lately. He said that the political situation had made rapid progress impossible. Perhaps now that the French had promised ratification it would be possible to discuss budgetary and production planning. However, rapid progress should not be expected before ratification. Mr. Vialon said he realized the U.S. regretted the lack of progress and the lack of a German utilization plan. He said the Germans had not had the necessary statistical basis but hoped to have it shortly. The main task of the next few weeks should be such planning and progress should be possible at a greater rate when ratification had been accomplished. Mr. Vialon reviewed briefly the work being done on production and armament planning, mentioning the inventories of existing contracts in the EDC countries.

Mr. Reinstein asked when the first year of the common budget would begin. Mr. Vialon explained that it would begin January 1, 1954 and that a "rump" budget would be prepared for that portion of 1953 during which the EDC Treaty was in operation. Mr. Reinstein asked if a decision was possible on when the first year's budget could be developed by the EDC. He said that he thought it would take quite a while and explained that he was concerned since its availability was related to the 1953 NATO Annual Review which would begin with the sending out of questionnaires in June.

Mr. Vialon said that lack of knowledge of the time of ratification and the lack of certainty as to ratification itself in France would make for slowness in the Interim Commission's work. He said he thought plans could be developed quickly by the Federal Republic but it would not be realistic to expect them to emerge from the EDC until after French ratification.

Mr. Reinstein said that we were disappointed that so little had been done up until now. Much, he said remained to be done even after ratification. He asked Mr. Vialon what obstacles should be cleared away to the submission of a useful and realistic requirement and expenditure pattern for the German build-up in connection with the 1953 Annual Review. Mr. Reinstein asked what decisions should be taken now to get military requirements and a realistic expenditure forecast for the year 1954. Mr. Vialon referred to decisions which had to be taken by SHAPE and the EDC. Col. De Maiziere summarized the principal elements of German build-up expenditures (construction, matériel requirements, and pay and personnel expenditures). He referred to the EDC TO/E plans. He suggested that a clear U.S. request to the EDC Interim Committee that they prepare budget and production plans for all EDC units was needed very much. He said also that information on U.S. end-item deliveries was most important.

Mr. Reinstein and Mr. Barringer explained that U.S. end-item assistance was intended to supplement EDC efforts and said a major difficulty faced by the U.S. in stating its plans was the lack of knowledge as to what would be done by the EDC countries. Col. De Maiziere said it was obvious that the Germans could provide only light weapons and soft goods from their own production since it would take longer than the two year build-up to produce heavy equipment. Mr. Reinstein reiterated that the U.S. must know what the EDC is planning to do in Germany and other EDC countries in order to make decisions as to U.S. aid. Mr. Vialon said he understood, but was anxious to know what types of equipment the Germans could not expect to receive from the U.S. This, he said, would enable the EDC to plan to produce those things which they could not hope to obtain from the U.S. This, he said, would save much time in the EDC Interim Commission. It became clear that Mr. Vialon and Col. De Maiziere had not seen a copy of Mr. Nash's statement on U.S. end-item assistance which had been given to the German delegation the previous day. (Department's A-1507 to Bonn, Paris, and London, April 9.)[1] Copies were shown to them and particular attention was drawn to the last paragraph in which it is stated that the U.S. is prepared to consider requests from the EDC Interim Commission for further information required for its planning and will make available information in greater detail, including prospective delivery schedules for U.S. end-item assistance after the EDC Treaty was ratified and Bilateral Agreements between the EDC and the U.S. and the Federal Republic and the U.S. have been concluded.

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[1] For Nash's statement, see the annex to GPT MIN-2, Document 179. Airgram A-1507 transmitted the text of the statement to Bonn, Paris, and London. (740.5/4-953)

Mr. Vialon said he thought that the German group and the U.S. officials understood each other and we were in agreement that more rapid progress was necessary in the EDC Interim Commission. He asked that the U.S. officials understand the difficulties which resulted from the situation in which, until ratification, "all questions are political."

Col. De Maiziere asked if there was anything he could report to Herr Blank with respect to Herr Blank's desire to visit the U.S. in the near future. Mr. Jacobs said we had asked HICOG to tell Herr Blank that we would be happy to have him come to the U.S. and that we thought it would be best if he came in the middle or latter part of May, after new impetus has been given to the work of the EDC Interim Commission. Mr. Jacobs said we were confident that this message had been given to Mr. Blank by HICOG.

Copies of this airgram are being sent to London and Paris for SRE and U.S. Observer Group.

DULLES

No. 184

611.62A/4-1553 Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 15, 1953—6:51 p.m.

4927. Reference Department telegram 4845 to Bonn repeated London 6660, Paris 5136,[2] and Department telegram 4867 to Bonn repeated London 6698, Paris 5162.[3] Following is summary discussions which took place with German experts during Chancellor's visit. Request you follow up scrap question discussed paragraph 6 below.

1. Treaty Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Agreement was reached technical level on draft of short treaty reviving 1923 Treaty. Draft approved by Chancellor and being cleared on United States side.

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[1] Drafted by Margolies and Reinstein, and cleared, *inter alia*, with Morris. Repeated to Paris for Bruce and SRE and to London.

[2] See footnote 1, Document 178.

[3] See footnote 1, Document 180.

2. Germans requested allocation substantial and specific volume off-shore procurement to producer Federal Republic. They were told that this could not be done. Full explanation manner in which off-shore procurement requirements developed and contracts placed was given German Delegation. At conclusion discussion Germans seemed satisfied that principal obstacle to expansion off-shore procurement Germany, once tax exemption problem settled, is limitation on German production military items under Industrial Controls Agreement.[4] German Delegation said Federal Republic prepared in principle grant exemption for off-shore procurement from indirect taxes including turnover tax and hoped agreement on subject could be reached shortly. Relationship of problem to planning for arms production by European Defense Community was also pointed out to German Delegation. Believe discussion useful in clearing up misconceptions on German side regarding off-shore procurement and feeling United States discriminating against Germany.

3. End-Item Aid. Copy Nash statement referred to in Department telegram 4845 given German experts from Blank ministry and general United States approach to end-item aid explained.[5] They were told United States aid supplements efforts by recipients and that in planning aid for German European Defense Community contingents we expected receive information regarding what European Defense Community would be able provide. We pointed out some detail relationship this question to work of European Defense Community Interim Commission. Germans said they understood we were disappointed in failure Interim Commission to go forward more rapidly in planning. They felt that work would advance rapidly once French had ratified and thought that more could be done immediately particularly if United States pressed for action.

4. Trade-marks and Copyrights. Department arranged for German experts to meet with Office Alien Property officials who explained factual situation which cleared away German misconceptions this subject. Germans appreciated fact that we could offer no relief regarding trade-marks sold United States interests. Concerning vested but not sold trade-marks we requested Germans submit list such marks which they felt were significant factor in developing German exports to United States. Germans agreed prepare such list. We were not prepared discuss copyrights since we not informed Germans wished raise subject. We stated copyrights were

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[4] A report on the meeting, held Apr. 10, at which the OSP program was explained to the German Delegation was transmitted to Bonn in airgram A-1549, Apr. 15. (762A.5 MSP/4-1553)

[5] For Nash's statement, see the annex to GPT MIN-2, Document 179.

uniformly vested and that Office Alien Property presently held approximately 650,000 vested copyrights, but we prepared consider German views.

5. Von Maltzan raised with Linder question Vereinigte Stahlwerke trading companies referred to Chancellor's January 28 letter (AG SEC (53) 82)[6] and urged formation one independent company. Linder replied question had been carefully studied by Allied High Commission and that in absence new facts warranting reconsideration German request Department not in position request reopening this issue. Later von Maltzan given letter signed by Linder confirming this position.[6]

Our concern on the draft law regarding decartelization and Federal Government's proposal terminate freedom trade and professions in United States Zone was expressed to German experts but not raised with Chancellor (Bonn telegram 4486[7]).

6. In further discussions with von Maltzan Riddleberger followed up question German inability give satisfactory assurances regarding scrap shipments to Hungary and agreement of Adenauer have problem re-examined by experts as reported paragraph 3 reference telegram. Von Maltzan stated question would have to be pursued Bonn.

7. Germans said that development German synthetic rubber being held back by:

1) Small volume German production. They asked that authorized production in Germany be expanded. In response to question they said they did not know whether applications for licenses to increase productive capacity had been filed with Mutual Security Board. No further discussion this aspect of subject.

2) Lack of access to technical data on most recent American developments. They asked United States Government permit export of data to Germany. At meeting April 13 with Macy, Director, Office International Trade, Commerce, von Maltzan informed export licenses had been granted Goodrich, authorizing disclosure technical data to Huels.

8. Germans requested that United States guarantee new United States capital invested in Germany against political risk. They were told no authority for such guarantee existed in American law and it seemed doubtful United States business would wish Government engage in guarantees other than those against loss due to nationalization and convertibility of earnings. Germans indicated

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[6] Not found in Department of State files.

[7] Telegram 4486 reported various developments on the draft decartelization law which was at that time under consideration by the Economic Committee of the Bundestag. (862A.054/4-353)

they did not consider guarantees on either these points necessary to stimulate United States investment in Germany.

SMITH

No. 185

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142A

Communiqué on the United States-German Talks [1]

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1953.

The President of the United States, the Secretary of State and other members of the Cabinet have met during the past three days with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and had a full and frank exchange of views on the world situation in general and on American-German relations in particular. The conversations took place in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and revealed a far-reaching identity of views and objectives.

The President and the Chancellor discussed the effects which recent developments in the Soviet orbit might have on the East-West conflict. They were fully agreed that, while no opportunity should be missed to bring about a general relaxation of tension, the free nations of the West must not relax their vigilance nor diminish their efforts to increase their unity and common strength. They were further agreed that if the Soviet rulers are genuinely desirous of peace and cooperation among all nations, they could furnish no better proof of their good-will than by permitting genuinely free elections in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany and by releasing the hundreds of thousands of German civilian deportees and war prisoners still in Soviet hands. They further stated their joint conviction that there can be no lasting solution of the German problem short of a reunification of Germany by peaceful means and on a free and democratic basis. The achievement of this purpose calls for sustained common efforts of the signatory powers to the contractual agreements signed at Bonn last year.

There was unanimity of conviction that all concerned should press forward unwaveringly towards European unity through early ratification of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community. Achievement of this goal will be accompanied by the establishment of German independence and sovereignty under the contractual agreements. The Chancellor declared that the Federal Republic of Germany is ready and willing to cooperate on a basis of equality and partnership with all the free nations of the West in strengthening the defenses of the free world. The Chancellor was given assurance that the United States would supply military equipment to the European Defense Community to assist in equipping the German contingents, once the treaty has been ratified.

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[1] Released to the press at 5 p.m., Apr. 9.

The problem of the Saar was discussed and it was agreed that an early agreement should be sought in the common interest.

Consideration was given to the special situation of Berlin and admiration expressed for the political firmness and courage of its inhabitants. It was agreed that the moral and material support needed to keep the city strong is a matter of primary importance. The Chancellor indicated that he had in mind further measures to increase production and reduce unemployment. The Secretary stated that consideration was now being given to assistance by the U.S. Government to investment and other programs to improve economic conditions in Berlin.

The Chancellor indicated the great difficulties facing the Federal Republic because of the necessity to assimilate not only the millions of expellees who came earlier from eastern areas, but the renewed stream of refugees from the Soviet zone and beyond. The President and Secretary of State recognized the great efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic to care for these homeless persons and to preserve economic and social stability. The discussion took account of the possibility that the Federal Republic and Berlin might be unable to bear this burden alone. The Director for Mutual Security stated that careful consideration of this matter would be given in the course of the preparation of the Mutual Security Program for the year beginning July 1, 1953.

The Chancellor raised the problem of war criminals. The future of the war criminals now in U.S. custody was discussed. The U.S. representative stated that his government would reexamine the status of these prisoners, and would also look forward to the possible adoption of new review procedures with German participation, as soon as German ratification of the treaties was completed.

The representatives of both governments exchanged views concerning progress toward the freeing and expansion of world trade, and the achievement of currency convertibility. The German representatives expressed particular interest in the reduction of tariffs and customs administrative barriers. For their part, the U.S. representatives noted President Eisenhower's statement of April 7 that "the world must achieve an expanding trade, balanced at high levels which will permit each nation to make its full contribution to the progress of the free world's economy and to share fully the benefits of this progress". [2]

Representatives of the two governments discussed a number of specific problems connected with the normalization of commercial relations between the U.S. and Germany, including the prospects for increased use by German exporters of the trademarks owned by German nationals prior to World War II. It was noted that considerable progress had already been achieved in making such trademarks available to former German owners and that future progress in that direction was being sympathetically studied by the United States.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State agreed that the conclusion of a new Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the Federal Republic would be of benefit to both countries and that negotiations for such a treaty should begin at a very early date. Meanwhile, as an interim measure, the two governments are negotiating an agreement to restore to force the 1923 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights as it stood prior to the war, taking into account the requirements of the present situation. This interim agreement, when ratified in both countries, would, among other things, re-establish a basis on which businessmen of each country would be able to reside and carry on business in the other.

The German representatives indicated their interest in the placing of off-shore procurement contracts in Germany. They were informed that, as soon as the contractual and European Defense Community treaties have entered into force, the same criteria will be applied in the placing of such contracts in Germany, within the framework of the European Defense Community, as are applied with respect to the placing of contracts in other European countries.

In order to foster closer cultural cooperation between Germany and the United States and promote mutual understanding between their two peoples, an exchange of notes is taking place. [3]

The two Governments re-affirmed their common interest in controlling together with other nations of the free world the movement of strategic materials to nations whose policies jeopardize the peace and security of the free world. Both Governments undertook to continue action to that end, and, in particular, to keep under constant review the list of items which from time to time may be subject to embargo to Communist China. The representatives of the Federal Republic also expressed their Government's intention, in cooperation with other trading and maritime nations, to apply supplementary measures, such as transshipment controls, against violations or evasions of existing strategic controls.

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[2] For text of President Eisenhower's message to Congress, Apr. 7, concerning the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 163–165, or Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 634–635.

[3] For text of the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer on Apr. 9 concerning cultural relations between the Federal Republic and the United States, and their remarks at the time of the exchange, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1953, pp. 567–568.

Announcement is being made simultaneously in the two capitals of the return to the Federal Republic of approximately 350 vessels formerly of German ownership. Arrangements for their transfer to German authorities will be completed by the United States High Commissioner in Germany.

The President and the Chancellor are convinced that the conversations just concluded have made a solid contribution to the achievement of common goals of the two countries, in strengthening the ties of friendship now happily re-established and in consolidating the aims and strength of the free world.

No. 186

740.5/5-1353: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, May 13, 1953—7 p.m.

Polto 2225. Limited distribution. During my call on Chancellor Adenauer this morning (reported in separate telegram [2]) he said he would leave for London tomorrow where he will make two speeches, one to International Press Association and one to Inter-Parliamentary Union in House of Commons. He said he had been obliged to revise speeches previously prepared as result Churchill's foreign policy speech in Commons May 11. [3] Chancellor felt he could not openly take issue with Churchill in his speeches and had decided to touch only upon those points raised in Churchill's speech with which he was in substantial agreement, ignoring those with which he disagreed. Though he did not say so, his attitude toward Churchill's speech probably influenced by thought that proposal for early four power meeting plays into hands of German Parliamentary opposition which has long advocated such a meeting.

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[1] Sent to Washington for Smith and Merchant; repeated to Bonn eyes only for Conant; to London eyes only for Aldrich; and to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem eyes only for Secretary Dulles. Dulles traveled to the Middle East in May.

[2] Polto 2223 from Paris, May 13. (740.5/5-1353) It discussed the EDC, the EPC, and the Saar.

[3] For text of Prime Minister Churchill's speech to the House of Commons on May 11, during which he proposed a four-power conference at the highest level to discuss world problems, see *H.C. Deb 5s*, vol. 515, cols. 883–898.

At close our talk Adenauer requested that I give a message to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to the effect that he is disturbed over recent signs of disagreement between London and Washington. He expects so to inform Churchill discreetly and diplomatically and to point out to latter vital importance of continued unity of Western powers in dealing with Soviet. He was most earnest in this and requested that I transmit message personnally to President and Secretary Dulles.[4]

DRAPER

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[4] On May 16 Acting Secretary Smith took a memorandum to President Eisenhower summarizing the contents of this telegram. A copy of this memorandum is in Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Jan-June 1953."

No. 187

740.5/5-2953: Telegram

The United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Bruce) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, May 29, 1953—9 p.m.

Coled 881. Eyes only Conant. Walter Hallstein called on me this afternoon to discuss EDC treaty. After conversation on this subject he told me that upon his return to Germany tonight he and Chancellor would deliberate upon following topic that had been under consideration by them and, if they decide go ahead, will be taking it up with you almost immediately. I thought it might be useful tell you of its possible reference to you although it may not take the form which Hallstein now contemplates.

Adenauer was somewhat disturbed by his conversations with Churchill.[2] He thinks Churchill unrealistic about benefits for West that might be derived from conference with Russians. He found Churchill in variable state of mental agility depending on time of day. Excellent at night, a bit confused in the morning. Adenauer wants President Eisenhower to know he is firmly in favor of President's position on talks with Russians [3] and so far as he is concerned looks to US for leadership in this regard and not to UK. He believes that Churchill mistakenly considers himself man who can accomplish personal wonders with Russians and overestimates his own and British Empire's influence in Russian political circles.

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[1] Repeated to Washington as Coled 95 which is the source text.

[2] For Chancellor Adenauer's account of his visit to London, May 14-15, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 205-208.

Adenauer feels that existing East-West tensions involve Germany more than they do any other power and feels great sense of responsibility toward President in presenting to him point of view as to how matters that may come up affecting Germany should be handled. To this end he is considering asking you, if you approve, to try to arrange for Adenauer to send special message to President by Blankenhorn before the Bermuda meeting [4] which would convey to President essential thoughts of Chancellor on this and I daresay other subjects. Since Federal Republic only has Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, Chancellor thinks Blankenhorn, in whom he has complete confidence, should deliver written communication to President and expand on it orally.

Other subjects. Following unconnected topics may be of some interest.

1. Chancellor will go to Rome for first day of meeting and will leave Hallstein there as head German delegation. [5]

2. In German public opinion, Russians have recently made two great mistakes; first, turning down discussion Austrian treaty and, second, referring to Potsdam Agreement, which is utterly unacceptable to German people.

3. Chancellor very disturbed about Senator Taft's remarks, which have had unfortunate repercussions in Germany, but President's press conference somewhat counteracted them. Thinks Senator does not realize Russian domination of Germany would make Soviet war potential greater than US potential. [6]

4. Key problem in Europe is Franco-German relationship. Germany wants a strong France able to exercise leadership and carry out its commitments. Constitutional weakness of France makes

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[3] Adenauer is referring to President Eisenhower's position as elaborated in his speech "The Chance for Peace" on Apr. 16; see footnote 2, Document 182.

[4] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, initially scheduled for June and subsequently postponed until December 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

[5] The reference here presumably is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Political Community (EPC) scheduled for Rome in June, which was subsequently postponed due to the fall of the French Government.

[6] On May 26 Senator Taft, in a speech at Cincinnati, had stated that the United States should abandon the United Nations in the Far East and reserve a free hand for itself. The following day at his press conference President Eisenhower said that U.S. policy was based on the theory that no single free nation can live alone in the world. Extracts from Senator Taft's speech are in the *New York Times*, May 27, 1953, p. 6. For the transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 328–341.

future very uncertain. Adenauer and Hallstein feel that Rome meeting, especially on economic side, cannot make real progress because of the dangerous budgetary and monetary situation in France. All friends of France should do everything possible to help it by pressure or otherwise to put its house in order.

5. EDC. Adenauer is not worried about decision of constitutional court on EDC. He does not think it will be rendered until after election and is meanwhile educating members of court on subject.

6. Elections. Hallstein says recent polls in Germany indicate strong trend in favor Adenauer government and even Protestants in North Germany are swinging to him. However, if Chancellor does lose he would not join a coalition with SPD. He believes Germany needs a democratic opposition. Otherwise opposition would be formed of extreme right or left wings which would be anti-democratic as was case under Weimar Republic.

BRUCE

No. 188

611.62A/5-3053: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, May 30, 1953—3 p.m.

5132. Hallstein informed us today that Chancellor had decided for reasons Hallstein explained to Bruce (re Paris Coled 95 to Department repeated Bonn 881 [2]) to send Blankenhorn immediately to Washington bringing special message to President. Blankenhorn plans to arrive Monday or Tuesday and will get in touch with Department immediately. Chancellor hopes very much he can be received by President to deliver written communication and to give further oral explanation of Chancellor's views. Message is now being drafted and, according to Hallstein, will make three points:

1. Chancellor strongly supports President's position on talks with Russians. [3]

2. As any three-power talks or possible four-power talks must concern Germany, Chancellor feels great responsibility for making German's views known before decisions are taken, and looks to President to assist in bringing this about. Hallstein explained this does not mean Chancellor is asking to send observers to Bermuda but must be able to show he has taken some action to insure that Germany's voice is heard.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Adenauer is referring to President Eisenhower's position as elaborated in his speech "The Chance for Peace" on Apr. 16.

3. An effort will be made in message to set forth Federal Government's views on substance of German questions to be discussed. Hallstein said he hoped to make us a further communication on this point prior to Blankenhorn's arrival in Washington.

Chancellor recognizes Blankenhorn's visit will become known publicly but has no objections to this, in fact, it seems probable that he hopes object of Blankenhorn's trip will become known as it will give evidence that he has taken action to bring Germany's case before West powers prior to Bermuda meeting.

CONANT

No. 189

662A.00/6-453

Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower [1]

Informal Translation

TOP SECRET

BONN, May 29, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the present phase of the development of relations between the Allies and Soviet Russia—a phase of such vital importance for the fate of Germany—I am anxious once more to emphasize most strongly that as the responsible head of the Federal Government I endorse the policy which the American Government has pursued since your assumption of office with regard to the settlement of the East-West conflict. I fully agreed at the time with your address of 16 April. [2] My attitude today is unchanged.

We shall achieve positive results in the controversy with Soviet Russia only if we ourselves know clearly and unambiguously what we want and say so unequivocally before the opening of any negotiations with Soviet Russia.

When I read Premier Churchill's speech of 11 May, [3] I felt concern. When I was in London on 14 and 15 May [4] on a visit which had been planned for some time I stressed the view, both in my public statements and in conversations with the leading British personalities, that unity among the Western Allies and concerted action on their part was an essential prerequisite for a successful solution of the tension between East and West.

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[1] Attached to a memorandum, dated June 11, from Dulles to Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams, which states that in view of President Eisenhower's conversation with Blankenhorn on June 4 (Document 194), the message to Adenauer on the same day (telegram 5415, Document 195), and Adenauer's reply thereto (footnote 2 to telegram 5415), there was no need for a written reply.

[2] See footnote 2, Document 182.

[3] See footnote 3, Document 186.

[4] For Chancellor Adenauer's account of his visit to London, May 14–15, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 205–208.

In my discussions with Premier Churchill we agreed—as we did during our talks in Washington—that the Treaties and the mutual obligations contained therein must be observed and respected. I further expressed the view that the Allies should not come to any settlement of the German problem with the Soviets without the Federal Government having been consulted and having approved of any such settlement.

In view of the fateful significance of a settlement of the German question for the German people and for Europe, I venture the suggestion that a meeting of the Allies with the representatives of Soviet Russia should be preceded by a conference of the Western Allied and German Foreign Ministers' Deputies at which agreement should be reached on the course to be taken at a Four-Power Conference to solve the German question. I believe that such a request cannot be denied its justification if one bears in mind the tasks which devolve on Germany within the Western community.

I should also like to express one more request. It would be desirable, both in the Allied and in the German interest, if the Federal Republic were represented at the place where a Four-Power Conference might take place by a prominent personality who will be kept currently and fully informed by the delegations of the Western Powers on the progress of the negotiations. This would ensure a rapid co-ordination of views.

I also attached to this letter a memorandum on views and objectives the due consideration of which appears to me essential from the German point of view to the settlement of the German problem. In respect of points 1 to 5 of the memorandum, agreement existed between the Federal Government and the three Western Allied Governments on the occasion of the exchange of notes with the Soviet Government last year (cf. notes by the Western Allied Governments of 25 March, 13 May, 10 July and 23 September 1952 [5]).

Accept [etc.]

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[5] For text of these notes, see Documents 78, 101, 124, and 138.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany[6]

[Translation]

[BONN, May 29, 1953?]

1) The reunification of the Federal Republic with the Soviet-occupied Zone and Berlin can be effected only by free, equal, secret and direct elections on the basis of a uniform electoral law for the whole area. The freedom of the elections must be guaranteed by international control. The requisite conditions for the holding of free elections must obtain not only on polling day but also before and afterwards.

2) On the basis of these elections an All-German Government is to be freely and democratically formed.

3) The All-German Government must be free from foreign control; this freedom is essential both before and after the negotiation of a peace treaty.

4) The All-German Government must not be denied the right of a free and equal nation to combine for peaceful purposes with other nations.

5) The All-German Government is to participate from the outset as a free and equal partner in the negotiations concerning a peace treaty.

6) In that peace treaty full account should be taken of the right of all people to their homeland, as derived from principles of Christianity and natural law.

7) No German Government will ever be in a position to recognize the Oder-Neisse line; Germany will, however, endeavour to settle the relevant territorial problems in a new spirit of international peaceful co-operation.

8) The Treaty establishing a European Defence Community limits the future armed forces of the Federal Republic and thus safeguards the security of her neighbours. Germany for her part counts on her own security also being safeguarded.

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[6] For the German text of this memorandum, see Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 217-218.

No. 190

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower [1]

Informal Translation

BONN, May 30, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have asked my personal assistant, Herr Blankenhorn, Assistant Secretary of State, to deliver to you the enclosed letter [2] in which I set forth a few thoughts on a conference of the Four Powers and on the solution of the question of Germany.

May I use this opportunity to tell you how much I like to think back to our discussions in Washington. [3] We have achieved in these talks an agreement of opinions on all essential issues which means to me again and again the confirmation that the adopted course is the right one. Western Europe will only be able to hold its ground in the West-East conflict if it unites and builds up an effective common defense as quickly as possible. Only in this way—of that I am firmly convinced—will it be able to preserve for itself the interest and support of the United States. These considerations are today generally accepted by the overwhelming majority of the German people. I am certain that the coming parliamentary elections will express this unequivocally. The consistent attitude of the Federal Republic will become an incentive for the other peoples of Western Europe also to follow to the end the path toward union started upon.

I very strongly feel the desire, my dear Mr. President, to renew my thanks for the fine days in Washington most valuable to me and to join to these thanks my sincere wishes with regard to the heavy burden of work which rests in these days particularly upon you. Please convey my respects and kindest regards to Mrs. Eisenhower.

Sincerely yours,

ADENAUER

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[1] Attached to a copy of Dulles' memorandum of conversation, Document 192.

[2] No copy of this letter was found attached to the source text. For text of this letter, dated May 29, see *supra*.

[3] For documentation on Adenauer's visit to Washington, see Documents 177 ff.

No. 191

762A.5/1-2353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 3, 1953—5:39 p.m.

5398. Pass to USCINCEUR.

1. Bonn's 3399 repeated Paris 919 and Embassy's 3834 repeated Bonn 548 [2] expressed agreement with position stated Department's 3246 to Bonn 3676 to Paris [3] that question procedure for emergency planning Germany after ratification contractuals and EDC Treaty need not be settled until later time. However British have recently renewed earlier request this subject be discussed in High Commission.

2. In support their position British state meetings held Bonn on deployment German forces (see Edcol 22 to Paris repeated Bonn 4623 [4] and preceding telegrams) indicate that SHAPE not aware type planning machinery needed in Germany, and that establishment such machinery should not be deferred. British concerned lest precedent be established which would weaken position High Commission and future ambassadors, and they consider fact that talks on deployment already held shows imminent need emergency planning and creation machinery for that purpose. They suggest accordingly discussions procedure for emergency planning be resumed in Bonn, so that High Commission may raise question with SHAPE, as originally contemplated HICOM/P(52)32. [5]

3. Without attempting appraise these arguments, Department and Defense believe British request for HICOG discussion should not be further refused, but discussion should be strictly limited to exploratory *ad referendum* talks on procedure. Subject objection your part, Department intends inform British talks on procedure for emergency planning in contractural period may be held among three elements HICOM and Commanders of present occupation forces in Germany, with view later discussion SHAPE and other interested parties such as Federal Republic and EDC Interim Commission.

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[1] Drafted by Auchincloss and cleared with RA, EUR, BNA, WE, and the Department of Defense. Also sent to Paris for Bruce and Reinhardt.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 164.

[3] Document 164.

[4] Edcol 22 reviewed various problems confronting the EDC with respect to organizing meetings that would consider the deployment of German forces. (740.5/3-1453)

[5] See footnote 2, Document 164.

4. Such talks could begin mutual convenience Allied representatives. Basic US position to be that procedure for emergency planning Federal Republic should follow lines corresponding procedure for other EDC countries, except for modifications made necessary by factors peculiar to Germany, such as special position three ambassadors, three military commanders, and size and forward locations of allied military forces. Since planning machinery for other EDC countries post ratification period not yet devised, except as contemplated by Article 18 EDC Treaty,[6] we cannot give detailed guidance now, and HICOM talks must therefore be preliminary in nature and any conclusions or recommendations must be subject full review and approval by US Government.

5. One factor peculiar to German situation is that Three Powers retain certain reserved rights specified in Convention on Relations.[7] It is accordingly essential planning machinery provide for participation three ambassadors and military commanders in Germany or their representatives in any aspect emergency planning which concerns reserved rights Three Powers under Article 2 Convention on Relations. Emergency planning for Berlin will be covered in other instructions.

6. None of foregoing inconsistent with suggestions made Edcol 22 regarding arrangements further meetings Bonn, for those suggestions concerned with present and immediate future, while procedure discussed this telegram concerned with period after EDC and contractuals become effective. However, if agreement reached on emergency planning procedure for contractual period, British may suggest procedure be adopted immediately and used in discussions such as those mentioned Edcol 22. In that event, we should have to consider whether procedure designed for use after contractuals ratified would be appropriate for use now, or whether it would require modification.

7. Request your comments urgently.[8] HICOG coordinate with USCINCEUR.

DULLES

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[6] For the EDC Treaty, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116–162, or *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 1107–1150.

[7] Document 51.

[8] On June 12 Reber reported that HICOG and USAREUR had examined the various problems involved in emergency planning for Germany and concluded there was no objection to exploratory talks by the Allied High Commissioners and the Commanders in Chief in Germany. (Telegram 5307 from Bonn, 740.5/6-1253) On July 6 the State and Defense Departments authorized such discussions for emergency planning in the period after the contractuals and the EDC Treaty had become effective. (Telegram 59 to Bonn, 762A.5/7-653)

No. 192

762A.00/6-353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 3, 1953.

Mr. Blankenhorn expressed the following personal views of Dr. Adenauer:

1. He felt the need of someone in Bonn with a greater background than that possessed by President Conant. He suggested Mr. Riddleberger in this connection.
2. He explained that Americans presumably connected with the U.S. High Commission were urging a coalition government in Germany. He mentioned a Mr. Kirchheimer (?) [2] in this connection.
3. He strongly urged that prior to the elections we should give Dr. Conant and later the German Chargé d'Affaires here the title of "Ambassador" in addition, of course, to Conant's position as High Commissioner.
4. Nothing had been accomplished with reference to war criminals and he urged strongly the prompt establishment of at least a two-party U.S. board.
5. He urged that an effort be made at Bermuda to agree that in view of the German ratification of the contractuals some of these provisions could provisionally be put into operation while awaiting ratification by the other parties. He said that the Socialists were constantly asserting that Adenauer's policy had gotten him nowhere with the Allies.

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[1] A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to President Eisenhower on June 3 under cover of a memorandum from Dulles which advised the President to read it before he saw Blankenhorn on June 4. (762A.00/6-353)

[2] Not further identified.

No. 193

762A.00/6-453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Lewis) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1953.

Subject: Visit of Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn with Secretary Smith, June 4, 11:00 a.m.

Participants: Under Secretary Smith

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[1] This conversation took place at 11 a.m. Copies of this memorandum were sent to S/S and EUR.

Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Chief of Division of
Political Affairs, German Foreign Office
Mr. Geoffrey W. Lewis, GER

Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn, personal representative of Chancellor Adenauer, came in today by appointment to see the Under Secretary. He told General Smith of the letter from the Chancellor to the President which he had brought and a copy of which he had left with the Secretary.[2] This letter reaffirms the Chancellor's steadfast support of the integration of Germany with Western Europe and of the EDC. It also sets forth the Chancellor's convictions as to the position which should be taken on the German question in any three-Power or four-Power conference. This position is very close to our own. Mr. Blankenhorn made clear the Chancellor's hope that close liaison would be maintained with him in the event of a discussion on Germany in any great Power meeting.

Mr. Blankenhorn also said that he had been asked by the Chancellor to urge strongly that the US take action in two fields which would assist the Chancellor in the forthcoming election campaign. The Chancellor asked that Mr. Conant be given the title of Ambassador and that the Germans be permitted to have an Ambassador in Washington. The Chancellor also said that it was most important to him that some action be taken in connection with the war criminals problem which would, at least in part, put into effect the provisions of the Contractual Arrangements for a mixed clemency board. The Chancellor realized the difficulties the French would find in taking any Tripartite action in these fields but hoped that the US would be able to do something unilaterally in its Zone.

General Smith said he welcomed this expression of the Chancellor's views and was pleased that the positions of the US and the Federal Republic were so close with respect to the problem of German unification. General Smith assured Mr. Blankenhorn that the US would do whatever it could to help the Chancellor in the matter of the Ambassadors and the war criminals. We were in fact attempting actively to work something out. He thought that certainly Mr. Conant could be given the added title of Ambassador. He assured Mr. Blankenhorn that we were keenly aware of the Chancellor's problems in connection with the forthcoming election campaign and would take what steps we could to help.

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[2] Document 189

No. 194

762A.00/6-453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 4, 1953.

Participants: President Eisenhower
Mr. Blankenhorn, Personal Representative of Chancellor Adenauer
Mr. MacArthur

After the usual amenities, Mr. Blankenhorn said that Chancellor Adenauer had asked him to call on the President and hand to him two personal messages. [2] One was general in character, whereas the other was more detailed. After the President had read the letters, he said that Chancellor Adenauer had proposed consultation at Foreign Ministers' Deputies level, between France, the U.K., U.S. and Germany prior to any 4-Power conference. The President was sympathetic to this suggestion and would discuss it with his foreign policy advisers. He personally believed such consultation would serve a very useful purpose since obviously none of the Big Three would wish to take decisions with respect to Germany's future without knowing very fully the Chancellor's views. The President said that the Chancellor's letter had also suggested that a West German observer be present at the place where a 4-Power conference might be held and that such an observer would be currently and fully informed by the delegations of the three Western powers. The President did not commit himself on this but commented that if there were a West German observer present the Soviets would certainly have an East German observer also present. This question was one which would have to be examined.

Mr. Blankenhorn then said there were two points to which the Chancellor attached great importance and hoped that early steps could be taken. These were:

1. Giving Dr. Conant, the U.S. High Commissioner, the rank of Ambassador.
2. The early establishment of a Mixed War Criminals Clemency Board provided for in the Contractual Arrangements now that the German Bundestag and Bundesrat had ratified the EDC and con-

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[1] This conversation took place at the White House from 2:30 to 3 p.m. Copies of this memorandum were circulated to Dulles, Smith, Matthews, Merchant, Lewis, and Bowie. A summary of the meeting was transmitted to Bonn (repeated to London and Paris) on June 6 in telegram 5434. (611.62A/6-653) The source text also indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it on June 9.

[2] Documents 189 and 190.

tractual arrangements.[3] If it were not possible to obtain U.K. and French agreement to the establishment of the above-mentioned Board, it was hoped the U.S. would be able to go ahead and set up some form of mixed U.S.-German board such as had been discussed with Chancellor Adenauer on the occasion of his recent visit to Washington in April. Mr. Blankenhorn said that if the above steps could be taken they would be extremely helpful to the Chancellor in the forthcoming electoral battle.

With respect to giving Dr. Conant the rank of Ambassador, the President said he was very sympathetically disposed and personally saw no reason why it could not be done in the coming weeks. He would, however, wish to discuss this with Secretary Dulles. With respect to war criminals, the President said he was also very sympathetic but he assumed that the French would be opposed to putting this provision of the Contractual Agreements into effect prior to entry into effect of the EDC. Mr. Blankenhorn agreed that the French would oppose this very strongly. The President said that this also raised the question as to whether as a matter of tactics it would be in Germany's interest for the U.S. to do something which the French would violently oppose. What he had in mind was that the reaction in France might be unfavorable to the extent that it would further complicate French ratification of the EDC. The President said that he personally wished that the whole war criminals business could be settled. It was possible that the U.S. unilaterally could take steps such as suggested by Mr. Blankenhorn and the President asked Mr. MacArthur to have the State Department examine this matter.

The President then referred to eight points which were made in an enclosure to one of Chancellor Adenauer's two letters.[4] He said that some of the points seemed to correspond directly with what had been agreed by the U.S., the U.K., France and Germany. Other points included in the eight raised other questions such as Germany's frontiers. He could not give any off-the-cuff opinion as to the various points but he assured Mr. Blankenhorn that he would ask Secretary Dulles and the State Department to examine them carefully.

The President then said that Chancellor Adenauer's letter indicated he was worried about Prime Minister Churchill's views. The President said that he was an old and good friend of Mr. Churchill. Churchill and the Chancellor were about the same age but in some respects Adenauer was the youngest of all the European Prime Ministers in his mental outlook and the way he sought new solutions rather than looking to the past for answers to the difficult problems the world faces today. He felt that there were no real differences in the fundamental objectives of Mr. Churchill and Chancellor Adenauer. The difficulty was that too many speeches were made and different interpretations were placed on the speeches in different countries which led to loose statements and recriminations. This had a divisive effect. The President said that U.S. policy with respect to Germany was based on (1) West Germany becoming an integrated part of Western Europe and (2) on the ultimate unification of Germany. These were the cardinal principles of U.S. policy with respect to Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn expressed gratification at the President's remarks and said he would pass them on to the Chancellor.

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[3] On Mar. 19 the Bundestag had ratified the contractual agreements and the EDC Treaty.

[4] The letter of May 29, Document 189.

Just before taking departure Mr. Blankenhorn said there was one other point which he would like to mention very briefly. Mr. Reber was leaving Germany and it was very important that Dr. Conant have as his Deputy a very capable officer who has a very complete background understanding of German affairs. The Chancellor hoped that it would be possible to name someone of Mr. Riddleberger's stature. The President asked Mr. MacArthur to look into this matter but said he did not believe it would be possible to send Mr. Riddleberger to Germany since the U.S. Government had in mind for him another important assignment.

In conclusion, the President asked Mr. Blankenhorn to convey [to] the Chancellor his warm respect and also to express the admiration which the President and the American people feel for the great work which the Chancellor is performing in Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn expressed great pleasure at the President's remarks and said he would pass them on to the Chancellor.

No. 195

611.62A/6–453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 4, 1953—6:18 p.m.

5415. Personal for Reber from Secretary. Please see Adenauer and inform him I discussed Blankenhorn's visit with President. Re Bermuda meeting, President wishes you to tell Adenauer that purpose is for a general exchange of views rather than to make detailed decisions on variety of problems and that meetings will be informal without agenda.

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[1] Drafted, cleared, and initialed for the Secretary of State by MacArthur.

While it is obviously impossible to talk about European affairs without references to German problems, President would like to assure Adenauer that no decisions affecting Germany will be taken without full consultation with Adenauer. [2]

President saw Blankenhorn this afternoon and told him he was sending above message to Adenauer. [3]

Cabling summary Blankenhorn's meeting with President in separate telegram. [4]

DULLES

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[2] On June 5 Reber replied that the President's message had been delivered to Adenauer who conveyed his sincere thanks for it and who noted with great satisfaction the assurance that no decisions affecting Germany would be taken at Bermuda. (Telegram 5233 from Bonn, 611.62A/6-553)

[3] For a record of this meeting, see MacArthur's memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

[4] Telegram 5434 to Bonn, June 4. (611.62A/6-453)

No. 196

762.0221/6-1653: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Reber) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, June 16, 1953—7 p.m.

5338. Re our telegrams Department 5320 and 5321 June 13. [2] Series of sensational moves in Soviet Zone, have revitalized unity theme in Germany. Rapid tempo, number and extent of ostensible concessions, indicate importance which Kremlin attaches to Germany at this stage. Soviet Zone policy changes added to previous Soviet "peace" gestures pose questions of (a) Kremlin motivation (b) what next Soviet moves may be and (c) implications for US policy of recent and possible future moves.

While reversal of recent pressure for Sovietization Soviet Zone seems intended to create impression that USSR prepared surrender Soviet Zone in order prevent inclusion Germany in Western defense coalition by permitting creation of unified and free but neutral Germany, we believe that prospects for build-up really effective Western strength are not yet sufficiently menacing to bring Kremlin to point of determining whether such vital sacrifice is feasible. Its implications to the Satellites would be too clear, and Soviets would risk their undoubted long-term objective of adding German industrial strength to their own. However, we are concerned not only with what Soviets will actually do, but equally with what they persuade Germany and other European people to believe or hope they will do. Main weapon of Soviets is implication that they would be willing permit German unification under these or similar conditions, and German public probably will be subjected increasingly heavy barrage of moves designed further this impression. Soviet reactions in past few weeks may soon be considered here as answering President's demands for deeds not words,[3] and Germans will look to Allies for next move. While broad aim of Kremlin appears to be disruption of Atlantic coalition and undermining of EDC or its possible substitutes, we believe present Soviet objective is twofold: (1) to prepare ground for both limited four-power discussions on reunification and (2) to diminish public confidence in Adenauer and discredit his policy of Western alliances and integration as only way to protect German interest. It would serve their interests and appear to be their aim to prevent clear-cut election decision with resultant divided public opinion and ineffective Government.[4]

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 5320 reported that Chancellor Adenauer was concerned over an SPD request for the Western High Commissioners to discuss with their Soviet counterpart measures which would insure normal traffic in goods and persons within Germany. (762A.00/6-1353) Telegram 5321 reported growing speculation and controversy in Germany over the possibility of four-power talks. (762A.00/6-1353)

Possible that next Soviet step will be suggestion for top-level four-power meeting to discuss reunification of Germany under "limited" four-power control, but, though Soviets may be building up to it, this considered unlikely as first step. Tenor of SED declarations and announcement of Semenov appointment suggest that next Soviet step more likely to be offer to negotiate or discuss limited range of problems at four-power HICOMer level. Regardless of actual importance of subjects discussed, talks among four HICOMers would create, as Soviets undoubtedly intend they should, much excitement and confusion in German public. Whether or not HICOMer talks take place, also seems likely Soviets will continue make sporadic minor concessions in fields such as interzonal travel or easing of Berlin situation in order increase disaffection with Chancellor's attitude toward Moscow, though if concessions came as apparent results of talks they would be more impressive. On other side, talks would give Allies opportunity to put forward their own desiderata with respect to improvement conditions in East Germany. If preceded by announcement that four-power conference is scheduled to take place at later date, talks will lose some of their significance.

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 182.

[4] The Federal elections were scheduled for September.

While German skepticism and distrust of Kremlin continue high, and Chancellor considers this dominates German political thinking, we believe recent Soviet Zone moves have brought widespread recognition, even among coalition circles, that four-power talks on German unity must take place eventually to reveal true intentions of Moscow and make it possible for Western defense to get moving again. Chancellor and top coalition leaders continue to fear adverse effect if talks were help prior to elections, but we believe US must avoid creating impression that it is hanging back in exploring possibilities for relaxation of East-West tension or solution of German unity problem. Thus early decision upon four-power conference at convenient date becomes more and more important viewed from Germany.

We recognize that other considerations must govern such decision which will no doubt not be made until after Bermuda. [5] In the interval, however, we must call attention to a situation which can arise at any time and pose the question as to US attitude toward Soviet invitation at HICOM level for talks on specific questions.

Should Soviets make proposals to discussion HICOMer level reactivation of four-power control machinery (e.g., by calling meeting of Control Council or Kommandaturs) or raise overall questions of German reunification on HICOMer level on an *ad hoc* basis, they should be answered, we believe, but statement we consider general questions should be referred to higher levels; in the case of limited specific Soviet proposals we should agree to discuss them *ad hoc* and to take advantage of such discussions to put forth our own counter-proposals on such specific problems as relate, for example, to access to Berlin and to removal "dead zone" on zonal border.

We cannot predict means which Soviets may choose to try to bring about meeting at HICOMer level, but efforts to do this, if they come at all, may come soon. HICOG requests instructions from Department as to our reaction to possible overtures, which subjects we should be ready to discuss, and which subjects should be avoided.

REBER

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[5] See footnote 4, Document 187.

No. 197

Editorial Note

On June 16 strikes and demonstrations broke out in East Berlin over increased working norms which had been decreed by the German Democratic Republic. The demonstrations continued in East Berlin and in several other cities in the German Democratic Republic for two days before being suppressed. This series of events led to an exchange of letters between Chancellor Adenauer and President Eisenhower, initiated by the former on June 21, concerning rights and conditions in the Soviet Zone.

For documentation on the demonstrations in Berlin and the texts of the letters exchanged between the Chancellor and the President, see Documents 713 ff.

No. 198

762.0221/6-1753: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, June 17, 1953—6 p.m.

6623. Blankenhorn had a long meeting with Roberts 15th and brief formal meeting with Selwyn Lloyd following day.

He brought message that Adenauer believes a dangerous situation now exists in Germany as result of international developments, that he is worried about election prospects, and also about the general situation in Europe. Adenauer asks for help on two points. First, that after Bermuda a statement should be issued giving "a new Anglo-US lead to Europe" and specifically reaffirming the points made in the West powers note of September 23, 1952, [2] which were also covered in Adenauer's Bundestag speech of June 10. In order to give statement appropriate conciliatory tone, Adenauer proposed that it should make the point that since the EDC limits the German armed forces, its effect will be to provide real security for all Germany's neighbors including Soviet Union. Second, he renewed the request that HICOMers be given rank of Ambassador.

During discussion Blankenhorn said that Germany had made three points to US which for present should be withheld from

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Document 138.

French. First, they had proposed as an item in ultimate settlement that refugees should have the right to return to their homes under decent conditions (Heimatsrechte) even where under foreign rule. Second, the problem of the Oder-Neisse line, which no German Government could accept, should be by-passed by a "European solution" under some form of international control, which, for example, would not mean ejecting the Poles from areas involved. Third point was putting EDC in new light as indicated above.

Blankenhorn also stated during the conversation that Adenauer was opposed to the idea of secret informal talks with the Russians among a small group as envisaged by Churchill,[3] since experience showed that they almost always worked out to the Soviet advantage. As to proposal for German observer at four power talks Blankenhorn made it clear that Germans did not expect observer could sit in on talks but only wanted him to be present at place where talks were held, provided it was not behind Iron Curtain. German proposal for US-UK-French-German conference "at State Secretary level" before Bermuda was also discussed and Blankenhorn finally appeared to accept Roberts view that it would not be wise or necessary as work could be done by HICOMers.

Roberts replies were generally sympathetic but non-committal as to details, except that he affirmed the wish of the British to give all possible help to Adenauer and pointed out that the British had already expressed favorable opinion about the proposal for giving HICOMers rank of Ambassador. But he thought and Blankenhorn agreed that it would hurt Adenauer if French did not go along and suggested that British work on French to this end. Roberts expressed doubts, however, about the idea of a post-Bermuda statement on grounds that it might prejudice four-power talks, but agreed to consider appropriate way to reaffirm west support of points contained in September 23 note with special emphasis on contractuals and EDC.

ALDRICH

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[3] See footnote 3, Document 186.

No. 199

862A.501/6-2253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 23, 1953—4:42 p.m.

8119. Urtel 6698 repeated Bonn 967 Paris 1439.[2] Department would have preferred increase Federal Border police be deferred until French ratification EDC assured. This position made clear Department telegrams to Bonn 4004 and 4696 repeated London 5311, 6387 and Paris 4321, 4976.[3] Position also made known to Chancellor and coalition leaders several occasions. Latter understandably have wished demonstrate in pre-election period all possible measures being taken protect public order. Delays in ratification EDC by other nations, especially France, have only reemphasized need from German standpoint taking some security measures themselves.

However, now that Bundestag has voted increase we feel HICOM intervention would be extremely ill-advised since German legislation should not at this stage be set aside unless of seriously objectionable nature. Such is not the case in this instance. Furthermore, we feel that annulling this legislation might undermine prestige of Adenauer Government and have an unfavorable effect in coming elections.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Hay and cleared with BNA and WE. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 6698 reported that the British agreed that the Allied High Commission should not intervene over the Bundestag proposal, passed on June 19, to increase the strength of the border police. (862A.501/6-[illegible])

[3] Regarding telegram 4004, see footnote [illegible], Document [illegible]. Telegram 4696 reiterated the position taken in telegram 4004. (862A.501/[illegible])

No. 200

762.0221/6-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1953—10:01 a.m.

5625. Appreciate analysis contained urtel 5338 repeated Berlin 635, London 919, Paris 1282, Moscow 250 [2] and previous re four power talks Germany. Subsequent telegrams re last week's demonstrations Eastern Germany [3] indicate not yet clear extent to which demonstrations and resultant repressive measures may deflect Soviet-GDR moderation pose, as well as affect pressures in Germany for such talks. Nonetheless our present views (supplementing Deptel 5527 [4]) re tactics are as follows:

Believe last week's events have considerably diminished probability Soviets in Germany will in near future try calling ACC or Kommandatura meeting. In event this should however occur suggest your position be that both Berlin Commandants and HICOMers always willing discuss matters of common interest, especially if likely produce ameliorations GDR and Eastern Berlin totalitarian regimes, but unwilling meet within framework of either old ACC or Kommandatura as West categorically rejects any return to this outmoded system four power control.

Pending Bermuda, we would in fact suggest caution re any steps you might wish initiate Germany which likely result in High Commissioner level meeting. Apart from meetings Berlin Commandants and staff members aimed restoring and bettering situation there, believe it wiser that any approaches and demands made to Soviets be confined to declarations and notes.

At same time would favor your attempting put and keep Soviets as much as possible on defensive, with aim of endeavoring deflate any further gestures they may make at conciliation, by demanding complete restoration *status quo ante* Berlin, perhaps even further removal those barriers to travel etc in and around city added during last year, well as immediate end to reign of terror and repression Eastern Germany (including Berlin and emphasizing hollow Soviet charges that West behind demonstrations constitutes insult to courage and will to freedom of German workers). Release of Linse, Kluge and other political prisoners (*Note*: GDR moves fortnight ago covered only economic cases) might well also be demanded.

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[1] Drafted by Morris and cleared with Merchant, Riddleberger, and MacArthur. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Document 198.

[3] For documentation on the demonstrations in Soviet Zone of Germany, beginning on June 16, 1953, see Documents 713 ff.

[4] Telegram 5527 reported that no purpose would be served by the High Commissioners becoming involved in the SPD proposals for quadripartite talks. (762A.00/6-1953)

Will be pleased consider any further points you might wish raise with Soviets, especially after discussing with other HICOMers, with aim further taking wind out Soviet conciliation sails, providing same do not involve risk provoking four power talks re unity and peace settlement prior Bermuda. Such might possibly be demands for greater freedom of movement for persons throughout Germany, liquidation dead areas along zonal border, all-Berlin elections, and better access to Berlin, such as sealed trains for Germans to and from Federal Republic.

Continue report attitudes and statements coalition and SPD leaders towards Western moves and positions, including four power talks.

DULLES

No. 201

562.00/7-653

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET EYES ONLY BONN, June 25, 1953.
PERSONAL

DEAR FOSTER: This is a personal letter to give you my own appraisal of the situation here in Germany. It may be of interest to you as a supplement to our regular cables. You will notice the date and realize by the time this reaches you the situation may have altered for events are moving fast here in Germany. However, I hope that we are in a relatively quiet period and therefore this report by mail may not be wholly out of date when it reaches you.

The first point I should like to emphasize is the difficulty of assessing German opinion in the Federal Republic because of the party conflicts intensified by the coming elections. As I write, the election law providing the way the elections will be carried out has not yet been passed by the Bundestag. The Chancellor is definitely worried about the nature of this law. His opponents accuse him of wishing to insert in the law arbitrary provisions which will ensure the return of the coalition. The coalition itself seems to be split on the merits of various proposals involving the highly complicated problem of proportional representation.

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[1] The source text was attached to a reply from Dulles, dated July 6, which stated that it was being shown to Merchant and Riddleberger and that, in general, the Secretary of State agreed with everything that the High Commissioner said.

These intense party feelings, which are being generated at this time, tend to obstruct the view of German political leaders about events in the East Zone. Certainly they make for lack of candor in the public statements. The Chancellor, for example, feels that he must publicly support the opposition's view, at least in part. Hence his rather impulsive telegram of last Sunday to the President and the Prime Ministers of England and France.[2] As you know, he does not in the least desire a 4-Power conference before the German elections. Indeed, nothing would be less helpful to him in the coming campaign and more helpful to the opposition. He does not favor even a discussion between the three High Commissioners and the new Soviet High Commissioner. He told me only yesterday that any friendly move between the French, British and Americans, on the one side, and the Russians, on the other, would be misconstrued by the German people as representing sympathy to the oppressors rather than the victims of what has been going on in the East Zone.

The opposition leaders, on the one hand, both publicly and privately, are pushing for conversations between the Allied High Commission and the new Soviet Commissar. Privately, a few weeks ago they were pushing for a 4-Power conference and were willing to suggest privately that Germany might make great concessions in the way of boundary conditions and even reparations if unification could be obtained at once. To what extent they believe in the reality of these ideas, which seem to be fantastic, I am not prepared to say.

Mayor Reuter's judgment about the situation in Berlin is likewise affected by his ambitions as a leading personality of the opposition party. He, for example, told the Commandants that he desired an "all-Berlin election". When I asked him, in private conversation, what he meant by this attractive slogan, he had to admit that until there were new arrangements made with the Russians the election of a Mayor and *Senat* for all of Berlin would be disastrous. For, on pushing my argument with him, he admitted readily that a Mayor and *Senat* acting for all Berlin would, under the old arrangements which are still in force in theory, have to be subjected to the veto power of a Russian member of a 4-Power Kommandatura. He then proposed that the Allied High Commission should negotiate with the Russians to establish arrangements in Berlin similar to those that exist in Vienna. But, as he had to admit, on pushing, this was a far more complicated, delicate and far-reaching proposal than the attractive slogan "all-Berlin elections."

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[2] For text of Chancellor Adenauer's message to President Eisenhower, see Document 715. For text of his letters to Mayer and Churchill, see *Papers and Documents* pp. 119-120.

My analysis of German opinion today is that the most intelligent Germans are torn between their desire for re-unification and their realization that, barring miracles, the Russians are not going "to be talked out of" their Occupation status. The events in the East Zone have demonstrated to the whole world the failure of the Russian policy insofar as making converts of the working people is concerned.

What is not always realized in talking about the East Zone is the fact that some 10 percent of the population has already left. It is my estimate, based on talks with a number of people who should be good sources of information, that essentially all the middle and upper class families have left the Zone. Only the workers, the peasants and older retired people are left. This presents a rather special situation in Europe, therefore, and one which the Russians may well have thought was readily susceptible to their form of propaganda. Exactly the reverse seems to have been the case. Workers seem to have rejected the Communistic leadership partly for political reasons but largely, I believe, for economic reasons. The situation in regard to food in the East Zone seems to have been much worse even than some of us, who were pessimistic about the situation, had imagined.

Whatever may have been the cause, it is important to know that the workers in their demonstrations pulled down the Red flag of the SPD and seemed to be almost as hostile to the Socialistic Party as to the Communistic leaders. Workers in Germany in this mood could well be supporters of a powerful right-wing reactionary movement. I believe there is a danger here which must not be underrated, though it cannot be publicly discussed.

One of the questions which may be settled before this letter reaches you is whether or not the Russians can establish a new puppet government in the East Zone. If they cannot and continue to rely on the old regime they will in essence be controlling the affairs of the East Zone themselves. I assume, of course, that martial law will be lifted before long and that they will restore conditions in Berlin to the situation that existed two weeks ago, though even this is not certain. It may be they will decide to try to bargain with us about the Berlin situation, since they have been forced to accomplish what they have long threatened to do, that is, to cut Berlin in half. It would be my judgment, as of today, that we should be very loathe to enter into any talks with the new Russian High Commissioner, Semenov, except on a bilateral basis, that is, between each one of the High Commissioners and Semenov himself. I should think that any offer on his part to meet with the three Allied High Commissioners should be carefully explored before we agree and one of the conditions should be a restoration of conditions in the entire East Zone to what they were on the 1st of June. A further condition, in my mind, should be a specialized agenda and above all it should be made plain that we are not in any sense re-establishing the old 4-Power Control Council. Of course, even the mention of such a possibility as the re-establishment of the 4-Power Control Council terrifies all Germans. You will have seen by our cables that there is a difference of opinion in my staff as to the extent of the pressures in the coalition parties for 4-Power talks at any level. Hallstein, Blankenhorn, Lenz, at my house today, seemed to express almost the opinion of the Chancellor. But one cannot be sure whether they were merely echoing what they knew to be his private thoughts, as shown to me, or whether they sincerely believed in his secret position.

Until the Chancellor himself, as a judge of the political situation here should pass the word to us that he believed negotiations with the Russians should be undertaken, I would be very sure of going very slowly in the direction of a meeting of the Allied High Commission and the Russian High Commissioner on any 4-Power talks about the state of Germany. Even if the Allied occupying powers are blamed for procrastination in going forward with the negotiations, I believe we should be well advised to hold the present line until after the German elections. Sir Winston Churchill's recent reply [3] to the Chancellor's telegram seems to give us a clear line of defense: namely, we again offer the Russians, as we did in our last note, [4] the opportunity for free all-German elections provided they meet the terms we then specified. I do not believe that they can possibly meet these terms when we start to spell out the details of what they must involve.

I hope these somewhat rambling comments of a complicated and rapidly moving situation may be of some value to you.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

JIM CONANT

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[3] For Churchill's reply, June 24, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 120-121.

[4] For the tripartite note of Sept. 23, 1952, see Document 138.

No. 202

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Germany 1953"

Memorandum by Leon Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 6, 1953.

Subject: Talks with Lilje and Blank

I had the opportunity last week to be present at meetings, first with Bishop Lilje of Hannover and later with Theodor Blank and his group of military experts.[1] There were certain points developed in these meetings that might be of interest to you.

Bishop Lilje who has been frequently in Berlin and East Germany of late, made one point repeatedly about the recent uprisings in those areas.[2] He was deeply impressed with their spontaneous character and the fact that the people of these areas looked to the West for material and moral assistance. He was of the opinion that expectations of a change in their status were exceptionally high at this time among these people, but that they saw no possibility of achieving this without Western help. Their mood was such, he asserted, that if there should be no definite moves on the part of the West indicative of its readiness to exploit the situation, there would be a serious letdown in popular morale. In fact, he said, if these people see no chance for getting assistance of some kind, their situation might well be worse than if the uprisings had never occurred. He did not indicate precisely what the West might do, but indicated that the moral factor was a significant one in the situation. The important thing, he thought, was to demonstrate our purpose and intent to do something about it.

Upon being questioned concerning the possible attitude of the Germans toward a Soviet neutralization proposal for Germany, he replied that he was confident that the Germans, of their own free will, would never approve such a solution. Their attitude was strongly antiCommunist and pro-Western. However, if in a show down the Germans were forced to choose between unity with neutralization or no unity at all, he did not feel so sure what decision they would make. He implied that if such a dilemma arose, it might require all resources of Western statesmanship to resolve it.

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[1] Blank and the military advisers had arrived in the United States on June 30 for a 2-week stay that would include the inspection of various military installations and talks with officials in the Departments of State and Defense.

[2] A further report on Bishop Lilje's activities in Washington is in the memorandum by Jackson, Document 722.

Theodor Blank—most of the points made by Herr Blank and his advisers in these talks, in which he was questioned by various Departmental representatives, related to the work of the EDC Interim Committee at Paris in seeking to perfect the organizational structure and joint military plans for EDC, and to German plans for raising and equipping a German EDC contingent.

Herr Blank felt that good progress had been made on the French protocols regarding the EDC treaty, and also regarding the British relationship to EDC. There remained a few unsettled matters, such as the initial status of the French forces in EDC, the question of whether British relationship should be by treaty or by unilateral declarations and the problem of US aid for EDC, which the French want clarified. But he felt that agreement was near on all of these matters.

The most significant point made by Herr Blank in connection with the EDC civilian and military structure was that planning was so far advanced at this time that the organization could readily be set up on short notice once ratification of the treaty is complete. Plans for the commissariat are well advanced, and it was intended that it should function rather as a unified defense ministry for the whole EDC rather that as a cabinet composed of national representatives. Military preparations for a general staff, and land, sea, and air services, and for EDC delegations to operate within the various countries of EDC are also well advanced. Much detailed work had been done in the fields of logistics, standardization of equipment, transport, production and procurement. In regard to all of these matters, Herr Blank constantly stressed the fact that rapid implementation would be possible once the treaty is ratified.

With respect to specifically German preparations for the EDC, Herr Blank stated that much progress had been made on both legal and technical aspects. There was need of a German law on recruitment and a completed draft law was now ready for consideration. However, much technical preparatory work had already been done even in the absence of a law. The first recruits would be volunteers. Eventually, a conscription law would be needed, but not until about one year after the treaty had gone into effect. Other preparations respecting status, pay, retirement, etc., had been worked out in detail.

Plans were also advanced with regard to utilization of forces. Because of the refugee situation in Germany, much new building for the troops would be required. Many decisions must wait upon the necessary legal and financial actions. Slightest progress had been made regarding the tactical air force.

When questioned closely concerning planned production for the new force, Herr Blank was most emphatic in his insistence that there would be no difficulty regarding any type of equipment except tanks, artillery, and planes. Ample productive facilities were available, he said, for non-military supplies, equipment, and facilities of all kinds, and also for small arms. He believed that there would be no serious problem of plant conversion in connection with the types of production required.

No. 203

Bruce Diaries, lot 64 D 327

Extract From the Diary of David K.E. Bruce, Thursday, July 9, 1953

Messrs. Hallstein and Blankenhorn came down to La Lanterne this morning. They said Adenauer felt absolutely certain the Russians would shortly make a new move designed to defeat him in the German elections which are set for September 6. He believes, therefore, he should take the initiative so as to exclude the possibility of the Russians being the first to offer a plan that would appeal to German public opinion regarding the reunification of the two parts of the country.

It has occured to him that the most courageous and useful action in this regard would be for the Western Powers themselves not to demand a four-power conference and set a basis for discussion. Of course, no conference should take place without the prior acceptance by the Soviets of the basic conditions determined upon by the Western Powers. In the offer of the three occupying Western Powers it must be stated that nothing will be acceptable to them that would interfere with European integration. It should point out to the Soviets that the EDC is an excellent starting point toward a wide system of security. For example, only by unanimous consent of the six participating Governments can Germany have more than a stated number of troops under arms. The same applies to the limitation on armament manufacturing in Germany and on the armaments allowed in the possession of the Germans.

The Chancellor during the course of last night prepared a letter which he instructed Blankenhorn to take immediately to Washington and deliver to Secretary Dulles as President of the present meeting of the three Foreign Ministers. [1] Hallstein translated the letter to me. It advocated an offer for a four-power conference by September at the latest by the three occupying powers to the

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[1] Regarding Blankenhorn's presentation of the letter in Washington, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1606–1607.

Soviet Government. The Chancellor wishes this discussed in Washington and if the decision is favorable then immediate announcement to be made. This he thinks would strengthen his position and electoral prospects in Germany.

They asked me to advise the State Department that Blankenhorn was on his way. I asked Hallstein and Blankenhorn whether they had already taken up this matter with Dr. Conant and if not, why not, since that was the proper way to handle it. They said the decision of the Chancellor had been sudden and the text had been put together largely by telephone conversations between the three of them. The Chancellor himself was somewhere in a retreat where he was supposed to be taking a vacation. They had tried to reach Dr. Conant in Bonn yesterday but he had been away and was only returning there this morning.

I informed them that under the circumstances I would advise Washington that Blankenhorn was to depart from Paris by air in a few hours and would be carrying a letter from the Chancellor. I asked Hallstein if he would not arrange to return immediately to Bonn and lay the whole matter before Dr. Conant, which he said he would be delighted to do and recognized this procedure as the way it should be handled.

We had an interesting talk on other matters regarding the German situation and then broke up our cop-and-robber conference.

I called Jim Conant on the telephone and told him as best I could in guarded language, since our telephones are undoubtedly tapped both by the French and Germans, of what had happened. He said Hallstein had already called him and made an appointment to see him at 10:00 o'clock tonight.

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No. 204

762A.5/7-1753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1953—6:49 p.m.

230. Limit distribution. This is a joint State-Defense message. When Ridgway visited Bonn June 15, he asked Adenauer's views on possibility reinforcing US strength in Germany by sending limited number 280 mm. cannons. Adenauer replied Germany's protection lay behind atomic shield furnished by US and any strengthening was important to its defense and would be welcomed.

FYI only. British and French Foreign Ministers have been informed that US now willing send few 280 mm. battalions to Europe in support of NATO forces, and see no objection. [2] End FYI.

You should approach Adenauer on strictly secret basis and advise him US now gratified to state that it is planning make 5 battalions 280 mm. artillery available to SACEUR for present deployment in Germany, in consonance with program mentioned to him by Ridgway. First element of these forces can be made available for movement fairly shortly, but before developing final movement schedules, we wish to obtain privately Chancellor's views as to timing and whether publicity concerning movement, which could and should not be kept secret, would give him any concern in light forthcoming German elections. Necessary press announcement would be made shortly before embarkation of first elements from US, which would be about two or three weeks prior to date of arrival in Germany.

Apart from French and British governments, other NATO nations not yet informed, and it is therefore imperative that this be treated by Chancellor with utmost discretion.

You should advise Chancellor that although it will be our policy to attempt to treat this movement with no special emphasis on atomic character of weapons, which as you know also fire conventional shells, as part of our policy to normalize in public mind atomic capabilities, we anticipate press may nevertheless emphasize atomic nature of weapons. He should be told that should question of whether atomic ammunition is to be stored in FedRep be raised by press or public, comment should be "no comment", explaining that obviously security considerations do not permit comment.

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[1] Drafted by Wolf; cleared with MacArthur, Lewis, Bonbright, S/AE, and the Department of Defense; and initialed for the Secretary of State by Matthews. Repeated to London and to Paris for Hughes and Gruenther.

[2] Foreign Minister Bidault and Acting Foreign Secretary Salisbury were informed about the decision to send a few 280mm. battalions to Europe during the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings held in Washington, July 10–14. For a memorandum of this conversation, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1641.

Your reply requested urgently, by July 21 if at all possible.[3]

For Paris and London. After receipt Adenauer's views we will decide on timing of announcement. Before any publicity we intend inform NAC and will also coordinate substance and timing actual release with Gruenther and Hughes.

DULLES

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[3] On July 20 HICOG replied that Blankenhorn had informed the Chancellor, who was on vacation in the Black Forest, about the move. Adenauer welcomed the idea of the move, but hoped that any announcement concerning it could be withheld until after the elections in September. (Telegram 307 from Bonn, 762A.5/7-2053)

No. 205

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Germany"

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

BAD GODESBERG, July 17, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: I am venturing to send you this personal letter for whatever use you may care to make of it. It is a report on the first reactions here in Germany to the results of the three Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington.[1] It includes some reflections of my own about the future.

The general press response has been favorable though perhaps not enthusiastic. Each paper reflects to some degree the tensions of the coming electoral campaign. But there can be no doubt that the Chancellor has scored a considerable political advantage and for the time being at least has fairly well spiked the Opposition's claim that he was not doing all he could to bring about German unification. I think everyone must admire the skillful way in which he has turned the flank of the SPD. While some of us here were very skeptical about the wisdom of Blankenhorn's visit,[2] there can be no question that as events turned out it was very useful to the Chancellor. It was played up by the newspapers as being an important part of the Chancellor's plan to be sure he was fully consulted, and through Blankenhorn he is said to have influenced the outcome of the Conference.

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[1] Conant is referring to the tripartite note to the Soviet Union calling, *inter alia*, for a four-power meeting to consider German unity and all-German elections, which was delivered on July 15. For text of the note and the discussions leading to its drafting at the Foreign Ministers meetings in Washington, July 10-14, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

The SPD leaders still believe that the Chancellor is only paying lip service to German unification. Mayor Reuter at lunch here today referred obliquely to a widespread opinion in his party (SPD) by saying there never would be German reunification until Germany had a leader who really wanted it. R. Maier of Stuttgart made a heavy attack on the Chancellor along the same lines, bringing in the religious issue at a party conference in spite of the fact that his party (FDP) is in the Coalition. Nevertheless we in this office doubt if this type of electioneering will prove very effective in view of the Chancellor's present public stand for four-power talks (the phrase has become a magic word in Germany).

Much depends on the Soviet's reply, of course, which you will undoubtedly have before this letter reaches you. If Moscow asks for an *immediate* four-power talks, the SPD leaders will pick up this point for Ollenhauer has already criticized the Washington communiqué[3] for postponing the talks until after the German elections. I assume the reply would be that since the three powers must consult with the Government of the Federal Republic they would not be in a position to do so until the election had determined what the composition of the Government would be. The SPD would have some difficulty meeting this argument, I think, but the possibility of such a Soviet offer has seemed to us here a real danger. Indeed, it was with this danger in mind that I put forward my proposal that the East Zone had to be freed first before a four-power conference met to work out the details of an all-German election.

While I still think my proposal was less risky than the Chancellor's, there is no doubt that if the Washington conference had expressed some such view, the SPD Opposition would have attacked it vigorously. Whether the Chancellor could have disassociated himself from the outcome by stating he had urged a four-power meeting is now a purely academic question. The French, I judge, were even more insistent on the magic words than the Chancellor.

One of the factors that seems to have influenced the Chancellor in his rather complete reversal on four-power talks is the persistent rumor that the Soviets are going to make a bold offer in regard to German reunification. The form in which the story usually comes is that the Soviets will offer reunification through the road of free elections provided the coming Federal elections are postponed, and provided the actions of the Federal Republic in regard to treaties and international agreements are to have no binding effect on a subsequent German Government. I would suppose it would not be difficult to answer such a proposal for I would doubt if the SPD would be willing to join in asking for a postponement of the Federal elections which would only be done by a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag amending the Constitution. Of course, if the Soviets offered immediate desovietization of the East Zone, that would be a different story.

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[2] For documentation on Blankenhorn's visit to the United States, see Documents 192 ff.

[3] For text of the communiqué, July 14, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1705.

Leading members of almost all parties seem to be in agreement that the events of June 17 in the Soviet Zone are such as to make the Russians more willing to withdraw from the German commitments. Put in other words, the price they will ask for unification has been lowered but I doubt if it is low enough as yet to make real negotiations a possibility. It would be my own view that the troubles in the East Zone will continue and that the Russian price will continually decrease until a point comes when reunification and European integration are not antithetical doctrines.

If I may say so, I thought the way the EDC Treaty was handled in the communiqué was excellent, though of course most of us here wished that the French would have gone along with a stronger statement. I am planning to be in Paris on Monday to talk with Dillon, Aldrich and Bruce. I find it increasingly necessary to offset the defeatist opinion among visiting Americans that EDC is dead and that further steps toward European integration are hopeless. Until you direct to the contrary, I shall still continue to stick to the opinion that after the German elections, ratification of the EDC will be accomplished by all six nations because there is no real alternative. This latter proposition, I believe, can be proved up to the hilt by an examination of what will happen if the French fail to ratify in the next few months. What we will be faced with then is a chaotic situation here in Germany caused by a rapid deterioration of the prestige and power of the Allied High Commission. Such a situation would be very dangerous to the French, so much so that rather than live with it they will ratify, assuming a solution of the Saar problem next fall. At least, those are my opinions for what they may be worth.[4]

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[4] On July 24 Secretary Dulles replied that he had read this letter with care and was circulating it to one or two other people in the Department of State. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Germany") The source text indicates that copies were sent to Smith, MacArthur, Bowie, Matthews, and Merchant.

With all good wishes.
Sincerely yours,

JAMES B. CONANT

No. 206

862A.501/6-2553: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 22, 1953—[illegible]

256. Urtel 6637 repeated Bonn 921, London unnumbered.[2] Though we hoped make full presentation our views to French re German desire increase Federal Border Police during FM Conference only opportunity was brief conversation between Riddleberger and Sauvagnargues during which latter stated unequivocally French opposition would continue because matter principle involved. French could not budge when creation German national army under guise police forces threatened and this only possible reason that could underlie German ambition increase Border Police. Sauvagnargues said clear from French Intelligence internal German struggle exists between Blank and Lehr with Blank relying on EDC solution and disapproving Lehr's efforts build up German military cadres under police cloak (our latest information from Bonn contradicts this; indicates Blank approves increase Border Police which will result in development trained men who may later be transferred German contingent EDC).

It would be most helpful if you could take this subject up with Bidault next week stressing (a) our fear that Occupying Allies may be caught unprepared on this issue with risk of many ensuing difficulties; (b) our view that ten thousand border police already authorized can not be considered military force and addition second ten thousand will in no sense change nature this security organization; (c) in light events June 17th, Bundestag resolution for increase border police seems to us reasonable security precaution, interference with which, on our part, would constitute distinct disservice to Adenauer in midst of election campaign; (d) to our last knowledge British Government substantially shares our opinion.

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[1] Drafted by Elwood Williams (GPA) and cleared by Bonbright, Lewis, GEA, and WE. Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 6637 reported that the Embassy in Paris had not raised the question of the increase in the border police with the Foreign Ministry due to the lack of a French Government following the resignation of Andre Mayer. (862A.501/6-2553)

If point is raised that policing West German border remains Allied responsibility, you should make clear our view that whatever legal correctness this argument, fact is operating responsibility actually in German hands. Reversal trend increasing responsibility and prestige Federal Government in its own territory undesirable this late date. We give credence Federal Republic statements more men required for border duties unless obvious numbers requested out of line with real needs. View fact border mainly concerned has Iron Curtain character and view recent disturbing developments East zone difficult assert much exaggeration in German estimate 10,000 additional police needed. Our figures indicate something on order 14,000 German police and customs officials (including 700 Bavarian Border Police) covering 1380 kilometers of Soviet zone border. Without allowing for administration, time off, etc., this hardly yields three men per kilometer on 24 hour basis. Increase to five or six men per kilometer cannot be regarded as excessive under present circumstances.[3]

Embassy London should bring foregoing to attention Foreign Office and express hope that British will find it possible make similar approach to French.[4]

DULLES

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[3] On July 24, Conant reported that financial difficulties were preventing implementation of the proposed increase in the border police and that in any case Lehr did not intend at that time to go forward with the increase without consultation with and approval by the Allied High Commission. (Telegram 393 from Bonn, 862A.501/7–2453) The following day Dillon reported that in view of these developments in Bonn he would not raise the matter with the Foreign Ministry until he had received new instructions. (Telegram 319 from Paris, 862A.501/7–2553)

[4] On July 23 Aldrich reported that the question had been raised with the Foreign Office at the Departmental level where it was felt that the British shared the U.S. view and would probably make a similar approach to the French. (Telegram 360 from London, 862A.501/7–2553)

No. 207

396.1 WA/7–2453

President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 23, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: During the development of the conversations between the U.S. Secretary of State and the Foreign

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 318 to Bonn, July 24, with instructions for Conant to deliver it to Chancellor Adenauer. This letter was released to the press in Washington at 10 a.m. EDT on July 25. Telegram 318 was repeated to London and Paris.

Continued

Ministers of Great Britain and France, it occurred to me that it might be helpful if I were to write you a letter in amplification of the thoughts so tightly compressed in the final communiqué.

It seems to me that certain definite patterns are emerging from the situation in East Germany and the Eastern European satellite countries—patterns which will unquestionably have a profound effect upon the future, including the proposed meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers.

I think, therefore, that it will be useful for me to share my thoughts with you in some detail at this time.

Great historical developments, such as the recent Berlin and East German anti-Communist demonstrations, rarely have single roots. Nevertheless, I am quite certain that future historians, in their analysis of the causes which will have brought about the disintegration of the Communist Empire, will single out those brave East Germans who dared to rise against the cannons of tyranny with nothing but their bare hands and their stout hearts, as a root cause. I think also that those same historians will record your own extraordinary steadfastness in the cause of European peace and freedom over many, many years.

In analyzing these recent developments, there appear to be five points of greatest significance.

First, this eruption against Communist oppression was spontaneous. I know that I need not go into any elaborate denial with you of the fantastic explanation put out by Moscow that the uprising was caused by American provocateurs. No provocateur of any nationality can persuade human beings to stand up in front of rumbling tanks with sticks and stones. Such action comes from the heart and not from any foreign purse.

Second, this uprising was not just a momentary flash of desperation. The continuing news of disorders in Eastern Germany indicates a fundamental and lasting determination to be fully and finally free, despite long years of stern Sovietization.

Third, nowhere were the rioters "bourgeois reactionaries" or "capitalist warmongers". They were workers. Therefore, the martyrs who fell before Russian Communist guns were the very same workers in whose name the Kremlin has falsely and cynically built their empire of oppression, their far-flung "workers paradise".

Fourth, the fact of the uprising, the conduct of the German Communist leaders during the event and their actions since the event, all indicate the complete political bankruptcy of the SED.

Fifth, and to me of utmost significance, when the riots developed in the Russian sector of Berlin, the workers' chant was, "We want free elections". In this phrase, the people clearly and simply

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with instructions that the letter be delivered to the respective Foreign Offices 2 hours before the release time on July 25. Further information on the background of this message is provided in footnote 4, Document 722.

summed up their yearning for the alleviation of their grievances and sufferings.

The combination of these five facts actually forms the background for that portion of the July 15 [*14*] Foreign Ministers' communiqué dealing with German unification and free elections. And the communiqué itself, as you know, is actually the diplomatic confirmation of your own earlier statements, of my June 26 [*25*] cable to you [2] and most important, of the Resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10. [3]

For the past many months there have been endless arguments and debates on both sides of the Atlantic over the respective priorities of such words and phrases as "unification", "peace treaty", "free elections", "withdrawal of occupation troops", etc.

It has always seemed to me—and these recent events, to me at least, clearly confirm the thought—that there can be no solution without free elections and the formation of a free all-German government, leading to unification. From that point on can flow a logical, orderly sequence of events, culminating in an honorable peace treaty and the re-emergence of a new united German Republic, dedicated to the welfare of its own people, as a friendly and peaceful member of the European family of nations. To this first step of free elections, the Government of the United States will continue to lend the full force of its political, diplomatic, and moral support.

There are sincere people in Germany, in the nations of western Europe, and even in my own country, who have come to believe that free elections, and therefore the unification of Germany, contradict and possibly exclude the concept of the European Defense Community which has been ratified by both your Houses of Parliament and is now before your Constitutional Court. I do not and have never accepted this theory that the EDC and unification of Germany are mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary.

As the three Foreign Ministers stated at the conclusion of their recent meeting in Washington, since the European community corresponds to the lasting needs of its members and their people for peace, security and welfare, it is looked upon as necessary in itself and not linked up with existing international tensions.

It has long been my conviction that the strengthening of the Federal Republic, through adoption of the EDC, the contractual agreements and further progress in the integration of Western Europe, can only enhance the prospects for the peaceful unification of Germany, by increasing the attractive power of this prosperous Western Germany vis-à-vis the Soviet Zone, an attractive power which has already been demonstrated by the steady stream of refugees in recent months, as well as the demonstrations which began on June 17. This increasing contrast between Western and Eastern Germany, the latter with its bankrupt regime and impoverished economy, will in the long run produce conditions which should make possible the liquidation of the present communist dictatorship and of the Soviet occupation.

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[2] Document 718.

[3] For text of the June 10 resolution of the Bundestag concerning German reunification, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 117-118.

While a future all-German Government must obviously be free to choose the degree to which it wishes to enter into defensive and other arrangements compatible with the principles of the United Nations, I can hardly imagine that it would seek the path of complete and premature disarmament in the presence of other nations still heavily armed. I believe this is a matter worthy of serious attention. Those who in Germany believe they can suggest an easy, safe solution through defenseless neutralization should carefully ponder the true wisdom and safety of such a course.

Speaking for America, and I believe the rest of the free world shares this view, I can say that there has been enough bloodshed and enough misery and enough destruction in the past fifty years, to deter any people or any Government of the West from any ideas of military aggression. But the peace we all so dearly seek cannot be maintained through weakness. EDC will be the simplest, most unequivocal, and most self-evident demonstration of strength for peace.

No one can foretell what the unfolding months will bring, but it can certainly be said that the workers of Berlin's Soviet Sector and the workers of East Germany, with the workers of Czechoslovakia, have started something that will have an important place on the pages of history. May the concluding chapter of that history record the reemergence of freedom, of peace, and of happiness.

With kindest personal regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT EISENHOWER

No. 208

611.00/7-2753: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET BONN, July 27, 1953.

327. Eyes only for the Secretary. In replying to your circ 53, July 23,[1] I should like to emphasize first of all that the German reaction to the U.S. is at the present heavily conditioned by the forthcoming election. The SPD leaders cannot help regretting the obvious fact that the U.S. Government has taken actions which help Adenauer's election and some are inclined to be bitter on this point. Comments by American newspaper correspondents to the effect that United States is actively assisting Adenauer's campaign by such means as insisting on postponing any four-power conference until late September may have intensified feeling. Since the vast majority of organized labor is in SPD camp this aspect of the campaign is unfortunate but inevitable. Apparently the Chancellor is not worried about the possibility that the opposition will throw in his face the fact that he is clearly the candidate favored by both the British and American Governments. Nevertheless we are officially, of course, doing all we can here to preserve neutrality in this campaign. The small neutralist party is attacking the United States along well-known lines as war-mongers. Right splinter parties with strong nationalist views are attacking the United States as an occupation power while certain SPD leaders, particularly in Berlin, are criticizing the United States together with France and Great Britain for not being active enough in support of the demonstrators in the East Zone. When pressed for an answer to the question, "What would you have us do?" there are no concrete proposals and the magic words "four-power talks at the highest level" are certain to be uttered. In general, however, I would say there was no widespread distrust of the U.S. Government motives and much real gratitude for the economic help of the past. There is further recognition of the military protection now afforded by U.S. troops and almost everyone wishes them to remain in spite of the inevitable difficulties about housing and the uneasy relations with the civilian population.

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[1] In circular 53 the Secretary asked the Ambassadors in 11 NATO countries and Austria and Germany for their frank confidential estimate and views on how the United States was regarded by the public and the governments in the countries to which they were accredited. (611.00/7-2353) For the response from the Embassy in Austria, see Document 878. Responses from the 11 NATO countries are scheduled for publication in volume VI.

Comparing the situation today with what I understand it was last December, one can say that there has been no loss of confidence in the U.S. Government since six months ago the SPD leaders were declaring the new administration was going to abandon the EDC treaties. The strong adherence to the EDC and EPC particularly as recently emphasized by the three Foreign Ministers, has impressed the Germans even those who are in the opposition. On the other hand, the long delay and the apparent uncertainty about the position of the French have made some people skeptical about the future.

What misgivings there are in Germany about the present administration are the consequences of the publicity given to disagreements between Congress and the Executive branch. Such misgivings could become serious because the Germans do not understand the American system of government. To them orderly government is of great importance and they associate signs of disagreement and disorder with revolutionary troubles. Hence their frequent attempts to equate Senator McCarthy with an incipient Hitler. To some degree their public apprehension about the clashes between Congress and the Executive represent a delight in pointing out that the Americans are not as freedom loving or democratic or tolerant as they have made themselves out to be as an occupation power bent on reforming Germany. For the future, however, a minimizing of the public criticism by Congressional leaders of the present administrative officers and repeated public demonstrations that the executive is in control of both executive functions and over-all policy will be necessary to convince the thoughtful Germans that the U.S. Government today is a strong government. This is particularly true in regard to foreign policy, including making the slogan "trade not aid" a reality since the Germans want trade not aid (except for the special case of Berlin).

If in the next six months the EDC treaties are ratified and German rearmament begins in this framework, the U.S. will be in a very strong position of leadership in Germany barring unforeseen moves by the Russians. On the other hand, as most Germans believe we are in a position to force the French and Italians to ratify, a collapse of the EDC policy will be blamed on the U.S. primarily. After EDC ratification leadership will be expected on German reunification but for the time being most people outside of the SPD are probably satisfied with our position.

JAMES B. CONANT

No. 209

862B.49/7-2753

Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower [1]

RESTRICTED BONN, July 27, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I express to you my sincere thanks for your letter of July 25 [*23*] [2] which was conveyed to me by Ambassador Conant. Your deep understanding of the German situation and your warm sympathy, especially for my countrymen in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, have filled me with gladness and thankfullness. The German public has also welcomed with grateful approval the contents of your letter. At a meeting in Dortmund yesterday, at which I read your letter, the more than 20,000 listeners accorded your words spirited and hearty applause.

I believe that I can say that I find myself in complete agreement with every thought you have expressed. I also know that you are in accord with me that the urgent problem of reunification requires a speedy clarification in a four-power conference such as was called for by the Washington resolutions of the three Foreign Ministers of July 13. [3]

The Federal Government and the German people, whose most ardent wish is the reunification of Germany in freedom and in the frame of a free and united Europe, consider themselves fortunate to know, in you, Mr. President, such an understanding friend, and in the American people such a staunch support.

With best wishes for your personal well-being, I am yours devoted,

ADENAUER,

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 416 from Bonn. A copy was delivered to the White House on July 28.

[2] Document 207.

[3] Presumably a reference to the communiqué of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting held at Washington, July 10–14; for text, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1703.

No. 210

396.1 WA/7-2953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 29, 1953.

The French Ambassador called to see me under instructions of his Government to state that the recent letter of President Eisenhower to the German Chancellor [2] had been seriously embarrassing to the French Government.

His principal point was that the value and the authority of the 3-Power communiqué had been largely impaired by the fact that the President of the United States apparently felt that it was inadequate and called for his unilateral interpretation.

The Ambassador further pointed out that the program for the 4-Power conference had after long discussion by the three Foreign Ministers been based upon the 3-Power note of September 23, 1952, [3] rather than the Bundestag Resolution of June 10, [4] and that this decision by the three Ministers seemed to have been reversed by the President's letter.

The Ambassador further pointed out that the President's letter seemed to rely for the unification of Germany upon revolution in East Germany rather than upon the orderly processes which were sought to be invoked by the proposed 4-Power conference. It would seem that the President's letter made a 4-Power conference less likely by anticipating its failure and dependency upon other means.

The Ambassador further pointed out that the references to EDC and the option of a future Germany to elect whether or not to stay in EDC was embarrassing since France had no such option.

I said to the French Ambassador that I did not think there was much validity in most of the points he made but that I did feel that if the President had been advised by someone who had been a participant in the 3-Power conference he would have changed the letter in certain respects. I said that any lapses in this respect were my own fault because I had been so much engrossed in Korean matters that I had not been able myself to advise the President in relation to the letter but that it had gone through State Department channels which were not as intimately familiar with the 3-Power communiqué as I had been.

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[1] Attached to a memorandum from Dulles to Under Secretary Smith, dated July 29, which asked that it be circulated within the Department of State as Smith felt suitable.

[2] Document 207.

[3] Document 138.

[4] For text of the June 10 resolution of the Bundestag concerning German reunification, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 117–118.

I told the French Ambassador that he might express to M. Bidault my regret that I had not been able to give the matter my personal attention.

JFD

No. 211

762A.00/7-2753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 30, 1953—6:28 p.m.

397. Department gratified at enthusiastic reception President's letter, [2] but has problem mentioned urtel 415 (repeated London 44 Paris 55) [3] very much in mind and concurs that any support or concession given Adenauer between now and date German elections should be carefully examined lest it boomerang in sense you fear. We should not wish to damage campaign chances of such a valued supporter of Western policies as Adenauer has been by any action on our part which could be interpreted as interference in elections or would lend substance to opposition charge of "American puppet".

Clear that Adenauer feels that much of his strength rests upon good relations established with West powers, especially US, and that success of his policies identified with success of West policies in general. This automatically provides opposition with opportunity to charge him with lack of independence and being too pro-American, charges which he can probably take in stride if issue not exaggerated out of all proportion. We feel that steps we have so far taken which include Adenauer visit, reception of Blankenhorn first June, President's message June 26 [25], [4] Tripartite communiqué and note, and President's message July 23, have had optimum effect and, subject to your advice, should probably not be added to in near future.[5]

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[1] Drafted by Kidd; cleared by Bonbright, Matthews, WE, and EE; and initialed for the Secretary of State by Lewis. Repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Document 207.

[3] Telegram 415 reported that reaction to President Eisenhower's letter among the coalition leaders had been favorable, but that SPD leaders had been violently opposed to what it regarded as a "brazen" attempt to swing the election in favor of Chancellor Adenauer. (762A.00/7-2753)

[4] Document 718.

DULLES

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[5] On July 31 Conant replied that he agreed with this position and stated that he understood he would be consulted before any new undertaking was made along similar lines. (Telegram 478 from Bonn, 762A.00/7-3153)

No. 212

862A.501/8-553: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

BONN, August 5, 1953—7 p.m.

530. Last week when Sir Ivone was in chair he discussed increase of Bundesgrenzschutz with Chancellor. Chancellor assured him that Federal Government did not intend to double the Bundesgrenzschutz before elections. All they propose to do was to fill about 300 leading positions. Chancellor then stated that he considered this conversation fulfilled requirements of consultation with AHC and Sir Ivone and I agreed that we would not present this small increase formally before AHC for action. Understand Francois-Poncet agrees, and may consider increase so trivial that perhaps he has not reported it to Paris.

In view of these circumstances suggest no need further discussion of this matter London, Paris or here until after elections.

Important to note that Chancellor repeated to Sir Ivone his assurance that he did not desire to create a private German army and that at least 300 new positions would be incorporated into EDC forces if and when treaty came into operation.

I have in my files record of this conversation between Sir Ivone and Chancellor, dated July 31.

CONANT

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[1] Repeated to Paris and London.

No. 213

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 159th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 13, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

The following were present at the 159th Meeting of the Council: The Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (for Item 1 only); General Collins for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Brig. Gen. Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of items 1-2, the retirement of General Bradley and significant world developments affecting United States security.]

3. United States Position With Respect to Germany (NSC 160; [2] Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 10 and August 12, 1953 [3])

Mr. Cutler introduced NSC 160 and briefly summarized the background of the present report. He spoke of existing policy statements on Germany and read pertinent paragraphs from these earlier policy statements. He then summarized the difference in point of view between the Department of State and the Department of Defense with regard to NSC 160, and invited the attention of the Council to the Financial Appendix. He concluded his introduction by reading paragraph 11-b of NSC 160 as illustrating the cleavage between Defense and State, and observed that most of the other disagreements in the paper related to the issue of possible unilateral arming of Germany which was raised in paragraph 11-b.

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[1] Drafted on Aug. 14.

[2] Not printed; see NSC 160/1, *infra*.

[3] Neither printed; the first transmitted a financial appendix to NSC 160 (regarding this appendix, see footnote 1, *infra*); while the second transmitted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 160. These views are presented in the memorandum of discussion printed here. (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 160 Series)

Secretary Dulles said that the principal objection of the State Department to the alternative language suggested by Defense related to the latter's desire to fix an arbitrary date for the ratification of EDC. The State Department did not think it wise to set any such arbitrary date, since it would be nothing less than catastrophic to destroy the possibility of realizing an integrated Europe. Secretary Dulles admitted that we ought to have alternatives in mind in the event that EDC failed of ratification. These alternatives, however, should be invoked not on January 1, 1954, as Defense suggests, but *whenever* it should become clear that EDC could not be achieved. If EDC had not been realized by January 1, but seemed possible at a somewhat later date, there was no sense in abandoning the attempt to secure ratification on the first of January 1954.

Secretary Dulles then observed that there were many people who thought that the United States should rearm Germany by unilateral action. The State Department felt that any attempt to do this would probably result in a Communist France, with all that this implied for the position of our forces in Germany. It was necessary to keep France on our side, and if we failed in the attempt to do so, a unilaterally armed Germany would prove useless to us.

Secretary Dulles then admitted that progress on EDC had slowed up, and that recent developments in Europe were such that no one could see what the future holds. He pointed out, however, that no real effort had been made to get the EDC treaties before the parliaments of the Western European countries until Eisenhower had become President and had thrown his weight behind this great project. Since that time there had been real progress in the Netherlands and in Belgium. We had thought that Italian ratification was sure, until the fall of the de Gasperi government. It was impossible to predict now when Italy would ratify. The French would certainly be the last to accept EDC, but if all the other powers acted favorably, France would probably have no option but to follow suit. In any event, Secretary Dulles reemphasized his conviction that there was no hope for Europe without integration, and that, accordingly, the United States must continue every effort to secure ratification. We must keep the pressure on, but have the alternatives in mind if the cause actually became hopeless.

Mr. Cutler explained that the absence of any consideration of alternatives to EDC in NSC 160 was the result of the State Department's conviction that the Planning Board ought not to consider such alternatives, in view of the possibility that mere consideration of these alternatives, if it became known, might kill the chances for ratification of EDC. It was for this reason, said Mr. Cutler, that Defense had been so concerned for the inclusion of the cut-off date.

Secretary Dulles merely replied that we should of course think of alternatives and think of them today.

Secretary Wilson stated that he personally was much confused by NSC 160. He was accustomed to having "better facts" before making up his mind on important problems. He felt that the basic requirement was certainly the requirement for German unification. He also recognized that we must reappraise over-all U.S. basic position and policy. He believed that the forthcoming German elections would cast new light on the German problem and on the attitude of the German people. He recognized, continued Secretary Wilson, the basic weakness of the French Government, and he was greatly disappointed in Italy. We would have in addition to make a reappraisal of the atomic weapon, and there was yet another immediate problem: We have accumulated a very substantial amount of matériel for the use of the hoped-for German divisions. What are we going to do with all these arms? This was one of the factors that influenced Defense to take its position on the January 1, 1954 deadline.

Finally, continued Secretary Wilson, there are a great many people, like the French, who are really fearful of resurgent German militarism. He himself had seen this phenomenon once and some safeguard would have to be worked out to prevent a recurrence. In view of all these considerations, Secretary Wilson concluded that it would be best to refer the present paper back to the Planning Board for reconsideration after some of the obscurities he had referred to had been cleared up. There seemed no point for the Council to try to force an unreal agreement on the present report.

Secretary Dulles expressed agreement with Secretary Wilson's suggestion, and went on to say that if developments in the next six weeks turn out to be bad, we would have not only to re-evaluate our position on EDC, but on much else beside—NATO, for example. Those forces in the European countries which might succeed in blocking EDC would quite possibly do still worse things. For these reasons Secretary Dulles felt it fruitless for the Council to argue about the present report.

The Vice President inquired whether NSC 160 represented something new with regard to Germany, or merely continued previous policy lines.

Secretary Wilson remarked that whatever it represented, it didn't seem to him relevant to what was going to happen.

In answer to the Vice President's question, Mr. Cutler pointed out that it was precisely to show to what degree the present report carries out earlier thinking on the subject of European integration, that he had read to the Council excerpts from previous German policy statements.

Secretary Dulles commented that it was an important consideration that the risk of general war seemed at the moment less than at any time in recent years. The President himself had stated this to be so. Therefore, the urgency to rearm Germany was perhaps not so great as we had thought. While we should, of course, not neglect any real opportunity to rebuild the German army, Secretary Dulles still thought it foolish to try to settle on a German policy here today, in view of the current confusion in France and Italy.

Mr. Stassen then informed the Council that he wished to raise some different questions about NSC 160. It seemed to him that he could detect in the various policy papers on Germany a rigidity of thought which was not justified by the facts of the situation. For example, he thought it erroneous to conclude that we could not make a modest beginning of training and equipping German armed forces, even prior to French agreement on EDC. He pointed out that the schedule for training and equipping the German forces was to commence on October 1, and there would be great confusion if this schedule had to be abandoned. If you started to put together a few units in Germany for future incorporation in EDC, Mr. Stassen believed that this would actually help rather than hinder French ratification. Such a move would also constitute a setback for the neutralists, who would conclude that their only choice lay between a unilaterally armed Germany and a Germany in EDC, and not a choice between an armed and a disarmed Germany.

Another example of too rigid thinking, continued Mr. Stassen, was the thesis that there was no hope of an effective defense of Western Europe without France or with a Communist France. Such a development would of course be desperately serious, but not so serious as surrendering Germany to the USSR. Accordingly, we must indeed think of alternatives to the defense of Europe with France out of the picture. While Mr. Stassen stated his agreement that the danger of global war was just now at a low ebb, he warned that the tide could quickly rise again, and pointed out that a start must be made now on the rearming of West Germany if that country were to have real military strength three years from now.

In summary, Mr. Stassen again expressed his fear that there was too much dogma and rigidity in some of these concepts among the various staff people in the Executive Branch, and expressed the belief that we might well succeed in getting French consent to the initial steps for German rearmament and that this might ultimately lead to French ratification of EDC. Mr. Stassen did, however, express his agreement with Secretary Wilson's proposal to postpone Council consideration of the paper until after the German elections, in which he predicted a sweeping Adenauer victory.

General Collins stated to the Council his belief, and that of General Bradley, that this was not the moment to take final action on NSC 160. Observing that the present report contained no real discussion of alternatives to German integration in a European Defense Community, General Collins expressed the view that it would be best to refer the report back to the Planning Board and, pending the elections in Germany, request the Board to examine particularly the military consequences of a neutralized Germany. If Germany were neutralized, continued General Collins, we would be faced with serious problems. Our occupation forces certainly could not stay long in Germany. We could scarcely expect the French to accept six American divisions for billeting in France. Where would these forces go, and how would we defend Germany against a Russian advance?

In response to General Collins' remarks, Mr. Cutler again reiterated that the State Department had been unwilling to consider alternatives to German rearmament within EDC, and for that reason these alternatives had had to be omitted. He did, however, express agreement that we could hardly tolerate a neutralized Germany, and also stated his agreement to postponement of consideration of NSC 160 until after the German elections.

The Vice President, however, returned to his previous question: What precisely, he asked, will adoption or failure to adopt the current paper do?

By way of reply, Mr. Cutler referred to paragraph 11-b and the possibility of a start on the build-up of the German armed forces.

Mr. Jackson intervened to insist that while there was no magic in a fixed date, there was even less magic in no date at all. Refusal to consider a cut-off date for EDC ratification would involve us in the danger of drifting on forever, and there will never be a time, said Mr. Jackson, when there isn't some "if" in the future. At some time or other the Council must address itself to alternatives for German integration into a European Defense Community. If the Secretary of State would agree that such alternatives could be considered beginning now, so much the better. But we are at present, with respect to Germany, asking the Russians to accept an almost impossible package, containing EDC, unification, and free elections. Obviously the Russians could not accept this package, and we must find ways and means to regain our own maneuverability. One such course is to begin now the gradual rearmament of West Germany. There may well be other courses.

Secretary Wilson said he had another consideration he wished to present to the Council. This was his belief that we needed a whole fresh look at the situation, and not a mere splitting of words over old policy positions, which was precisely what the current report seemed to him. Going on, Secretary Wilson warned that the American people were not going to consent forever to paying $50 billion a year for defense and national security. If for no other reason, a complete new look at our policies must be determined upon. He therefore proposed again that NSC 160 be put to one side and guidance given to the Planning Board on a new policy which should be presented in a period of from thirty to sixty days. Such a policy should be broad-gauged and should include discussion of support by the American people and Congress.

Disagreeing with this position, Mr. Flemming emphasized that there were a great many points in NSC 160 on which the members of the Council were in agreement. Why, therefore, should the Council not recommend to the President approval of the agreed portions of NSC 160 and at the same time instruct the Planning Board to commence at once its studies of alternatives, with instructions for the Planning Board to report back to the Council after the German elections?

The Vice President inquired whether there was some reluctance in the State Department at this time to consider alternatives on the ground that we must do everything to push the EDC and preoccupation with alternatives would endanger the chances that EDC would be ratified.

In reply, Secretaries Dulles and Wilson expressed agreement that alternatives to EDC should indeed have been studied earlier, and announced that they were quite in agreement that the study of alternatives by the Planning Board should be started at once. We must, said Secretary Dulles, explore what will happen if France and Italy become unreliable members of NATO. Certain of the alternatives to EDC could at least be used as a means of exerting pressure to secure ratification of the treaties.

Mr. Cutler observed that if the Council could agree on the substance of the present report, omitting all references to dates for the ratification of EDC, it would be a simple matter to adopt the paper minus these dates.

Secretary Dulles replied that unfortunately he could not agree to the language which had been inserted in paragraph 11-b by the Department of Defense.

The Vice President then asked Secretary Dulles for his reaction to the position taken earlier by Mr. Stassen with respect to a slow start on German rearmament.

Secretary Dulles observed that if, after the German elections, the Germans and the other states ratified the EDC treaties, and only the French held out against EDC, then we should have to begin to talk about and even to make a start on rearming Germany. This move, however, must not be regarded as an alternative to French ratification of EDC, but rather as a means of bringing pressure on France to get into the EDC. The Secretary of State added that he himself had already given much thought to alternatives to EDC, but primarily as a psychological move to secure the realization of EDC.

Mr. Stassen inquired as to the nature of more dynamic steps that could be taken prior to the ratification of EDC and which would assist in that process. What was needed was more ingenuity in the NSC staff and the staffs of the departments. There were moves, he was sure, which could be taken which would not be inconsistent with the ultimate ratification of EDC. Suggestions for such moves were precisely what had been lacking in the present and in earlier papers.

Secretary Wilson stated that enough time had elapsed since previous policy papers on Germany had been adopted, and enough things had happened in the world, so that what we now needed was a fresh look, particularly as to United States objectives. He, for one, did not wish to agree to any part of the present report, since to do so would be to freeze these parts. He preferred his original suggestion, that consideration of NSC 160 be delayed and a start made at a new paper.

Mr. Flemming, however, reiterated his proposal to save such portions of NSC 160 as could be agreed upon by the Council, because he was convinced that basically NSC 160 was a very good statement of policy which could be an excellent interim guide pending a clarification of conditions in Europe and the results of the German elections.

Mr. Cutler reverted to his suggestion that it might be possible for the Council to approve the paper if references to fixed dates were removed and if the Defense suggestion for paragraph 11-b were revised to fit the views of Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Stassen expressed agreement with Mr. Cutler's suggestion and proposed amendments to the Defense draft of paragraph 11-b.

Secretary Dulles agreed with the language suggested by Mr. Cutler and Mr. Stassen.

The National Security Council:

a. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 160, subject to the following changes:

> *Page 11, subparagraph 11-b.* Add the bracketed section, revised to read as follows: "However, these advantages will be lost if the ratification of EDC is long delayed. Therefore, the United States should review alternative courses of action. Furthermore, it may be desirable to take bilaterally with the West German government certain initial steps in the actual creation and arming of German units, if developments should so indi-

cate and if this can be done without serious repercussions on our relations with France. This, it would be made plain to all EDC signatories, would be to expedite the implementation of EDC when ratified. The implication that such bilateral action would continue even though French ratification was further delayed should provide additional leverage on the French to ratify the EDC treaty at an early date."

Page 11: Delete the footnote.

Page 12, subparagraph 11-d: Revise the first line to read: "If and whenever it becomes clear that", and delete the double asterisk in the next to the last line on the page and both footnotes.

Page 15, subparagraph 13-c: In the next to the last line on the page, change the word "some" to "major".

Page 17, paragraph 14: Delete the brackets around the word "preferably", insert a comma before it, and delete the asterisk and the footnote to which it refers.

Page 17, paragraph 16: Delete the double asterisk and the footnote to which it refers.

Page 18, paragraph 21: Delete the bracketed wording and the asterisk and the footnote to which it refers.

b. Noted that, on page 3 of the Financial Appendix circulated by the reference memorandum of August 10, 1953, the Navy program does not provide the full EDC complement, which has not been developed but may include 70 or more additional naval units.

c. Agreed that the policy as adopted in NSC 160 should be reviewed not later than the first Council meeting in October, including a review of the Financial Appendix.

Note: The statement of policy in NSC 160 as adopted subsequently approved by the President and issued as NSC 160/1 [4] for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of items 4-10, evacuation of United States civilians abroad prior to hostilities with hostile regimes, report by the President's committee on International Information Activities, United States psychological strategy with respect to the Thais of Southeast Asia, future courses of action with respect to Austria and United States policy in the event of a blockade of Vienna, Project Solarium, the NSC meeting on August 20, and the status of NSC projects.]

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[4] *Infra*

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Cutler)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 13, 1953.

I gave the President a very thorough briefing on NSC 160 (the Germany paper). We spent about 30 minutes on this one paper. I outlined the existing policies in NSC 82 and NSC 115;[5] the cleavage between State and Defense at the PB level (referring my memo of August 4, par. 3, just as I did at the Council); the principal points raised by Dulles, Wilson, Stassen, and Jackson (which I had taken down in pencil at the Council Meeting).

It was apparent that the President, as I talked for 15 minutes, was sympathetic to the State point of view. I then had him carefully read par. 11.b, as approved at the Council Meeting, because it clearly focuses the issue of a deadline date or no deadline date for French ratification and the issue of bilateral action to rearm W. Germany as a "primer" for EDC.

When he had read the first two sentences of par. 11.b ("The United States should support with all available means the creation of the European Community and the ratification of the EDC Treaty. No satisfactory substitute for this solution has been found"), he exclaimed that these sentences were just right and a good policy.

When I spoke of the despair in some quarters of getting France to act, and the use of bilateral action to rearm W. Germany as a "primer" for EDC, he pointed to the conditional clause in the third sentence from the end of par. 11.b. (", if this can be done without serious repercussions on our relations with France") and said he thought this sentence rather effectively cancelled out the possibility of such bilateral action. I said that Foster Dulles had suggested the conditional language and the Council had accepted it; that at least the concept of bilateral action was now in the paper, and would be one of the matters for reconsideration when the paper was reviewed in October.

He then proceeded to read the basic objectives and courses of action in full, as approved at the Council Meeting. He said he thought them quite satisfactory.

I continued to press him on what we should do if France continued to drag her feet or even worse "went communist" in her Government. I quoted the sentence in General Bradley's great speech at Springfield, Mass.: It is time America began sailing by the stars and not by the driftwood floating by. Should we just wait for events and make policies to meet them or should we have alternatives worked out in advance? The latter, of course, he replied. When I asked him again about a continuing non-ratifying or even communist France, he said that such a situation would call for an entirely new defense posture in Europe. . . .

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[5] Regarding NSC 82, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 273, footnote 1. Regarding NSC 115, see the memorandum to the President, *ibid.*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 849.

In view of the Council action requiring review by October 1, in view of Dulles' assertion that of course we should study alternatives now, in view of the President's last-mentioned remark, should not the PB now outline (with the military) alternatives.

(1) Adenauer elected and a favorable Court decision; France still delaying or communist.

(2) Adenauer elected and an unfavorable Court decision; France still delaying or communist.

(3) Adenauer defeated and German participation in EDC postponed.

Perhaps there are other and better alternatives to be proposed by the PB. The basic alternative is still: our policy if W. Germany wants to participate and France continues dragging into next year.

R. CUTLER

No. 214

S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 160 Series

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council [1]

TOP SECRET
NSC 160/1

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1953.

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[1] Attached to the source text were a cover sheet; a table of contents; a note by Executive Secretary Lay, which stated, *inter alia*, that NSC 160/1 had been approved by the President on Aug. 13 and that its implementation was to be coordinated by the Secretaries of State and Defense; a 9-page financial appendix with five tables which outlined past and estimated future expenditures for the West German military buildup; and a supplement to NSC 160/1, approved by the President on Sept. 12, 1956, which contained a statement of United States policy with respect to East Germany. None of the other attachments is printed.

At its meeting on Apr. 28 the National Security Council had directed its Planning Board to prepare a report on Germany for submission in May. The first draft of a statement of policy on Germany was prepared in GER on May 12 and revised at a meeting in the bureau on May 13. The Staff Study was prepared separately and the resulting paper transmitted on May 27 to the Planning Board which considered it until August. The first identifiable Planning Board draft, dated June 24, is the same in substance as NSC 160/1, but is shorter, arranged in a different manner, and contains no financial appendix. A July 6 draft, no copy of which has been found, apparently eliminated nearly all references to the EDC and a German defense contribu-

Continued

UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Germany presents a problem of critical importance to the United States. This is true because (a) it is potentially the strongest continental European power west of the USSR; (b) it is a major zone of friction and possible conflict between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, especially while divided; and (c) its reliable cooperation with other free European nations is indispensable for a strong and stable Europe.

Basic Factors Affecting Policy

2. United States policy regarding Germany must take account of the following basic factors:

a. Present and potential conditions in West Germany.
b. The division of Germany.
c. The relation of Germany to Europe.
d. Soviet objectives regarding Germany.
e. United States security interests.

3. *Conditions in West Germany* are now favorable, on the whole, despite some sources of possible instability.

a. Economic activity has recovered to a remarkable degree and now exceeds prewar levels. Political life has been reestablished on a democratic basis and moderate political forces are in control. Both West Germany and West Berlin are strongly anti-Communist and firmly aligned with the West. The Adenauer government has strongly supported European integration, with West Germany as a full participant. The danger of aggression against West Germany has been reduced by the strengthening of NATO forces there. West German participation in Western defense through the European Defense Community (EDC) has now been approved by the German Parliament. West Germany displays a vigor and promise of increasing strength which would constitute a valuable asset of the West, if allied with it.

b. There are also present some sources of potential instability and risk. Heavily dependent on exports to pay for essential imports, the West German economy would be extremely vulnerable to any economic recession or major contraction of markets. The institutions of democracy have yet to undergo a real test. Within the population there are maladjusted and, to some extent, disaffected elements which might prove politically unreliable under stress.

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tion. A July 31 draft restored these references, and is the same in substance and arrangement as NSC 160/1, but still contains no financial appendix. The final draft, dated Aug. 4 and designated NSC 160, contains a 3-page appendix. The text of this policy statement is indicated in footnotes below. None of the drafts mentioned above contains a statement of policy with respect to East Germany. Copies of the June 24 and July 31 drafts, NSC 160, and related documentation are in S/S–NSC files, lot 60 D 351, NSC 160 Series. Documentation on the role of GER in the preparation and revision of the paper is in files of the Office of German Affairs, lot 57 D 344, 311.62.

Among these are millions of refugees from the East who have not been fully assimilated and among whom irredentist aims are cherished; many thousands of war veterans and former Nazis who have not fully accepted the democratic order; and many of the youth who are politically apathetic and uncertain of the future. The need for markets might lead to friction with other Western countries and to pressure for closer commercial ties with the Soviet orbit. Under adverse conditions, extremist nationalism, not now a threat, might be able to recruit substantial support from such groups. In that event, a sovereign Germany might prove a difficult and not entirely reliable partner.

4. *The existing division of Germany* between West Germany and the Soviet East Zone is a vital element in the present situation.

a. West Germany is far more important than East Germany, with nearly three times the population, about five times the industrial output, and almost twice the area.

b. East Berlin and East Germany have not been successfully absorbed into the Soviet orbit. The Soviets have imposed police state rule and ruthlessly exploited the economic system for Soviet benefit. Anti-Communist feeling is strong among an overwhelming majority of the population, as evidenced by the popular uprisings beginning in mid-June of this year. These disorders have probably convinced the Kremlin that Soviet control over East Germany can be assured only by maintaining Soviet troops in the area, and that East Germany would be unreliable in the event of war. While these aspects of the disorders might influence the Kremlin in the direction of withdrawal from East Germany, the disorders have also underlined the prospect that such withdrawal would mean immediate collapse of all Communist influence in Germany and a serious further setback for world wide Communist propaganda. Hence, the effect of the disorders on Soviet intentions is uncertain.

c. The German desire for uniting East Germany with West Germany is strong and has been intensified by recent events. If the West Germans concluded that the West had blocked unity on reasonable terms, it would strain their relations with the West and endanger their pro-Western orientation. Active Western support for unity on reasonable terms will tend to strengthen German solidarity with the West and to encourage continued adherence by a united Germany to a policy of European integration.

d. Withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany might facilitate NATO defense against Soviet surprise attack and might lead to further retraction of Soviet military power from other satellite areas. Freeing East Germany from Soviet control might have a magnetic effect upon the East European satellites.

e. The Western position in Berlin will remain difficult and a constant source of friction as long as the Soviets control East Germany.

5. *The short and long term relation of Germany to Europe* imposes inherent limitations on possible policies.

a. Effective defense of the Continent depends upon German and French collaboration therein. For strategic and logistic reasons a sufficient base for European defense against Soviet aggression can be provided only by the inclusion therein of both France and Germany.

b. The defense of Europe cannot be separated from its economic and political strength. In order to attain the stability requisite to withstand Communist subversion and to support a reasonable defense structure, Europe must have the capacity and will to solve its economic, political and social problems. Without reasonable internal stability the effort to build up European military power would be futile and might prove dangerous.

c. The historic enmity between Germany and her neighbors, especially France, must be transcended to permit the kind and degree of collaboration necessary to satisfy Europe's economic, political, and defense needs.

6. *In Soviet policy* control of Germany clearly occupies a central role. The Soviets would like to dominate the whole of Germany as they now do the East Zone. If this occurred, it would gravely endanger our national security. As Western policies have so far frustrated this purpose, the Soviets have devoted their efforts primarily to detaching Germany from the West and delaying its participation in Western defense. With the memory of recent German aggression, the USSR undoubtedly fears revival of German military power as a threat to its security. The Soviet tactics have been to appeal to the German desire for unity and fear of war and to exploit Western differences. In applying these tactics, the Soviets, in the face of increased resistance in East Germany and the satellites, may propose a united, neutralized, disarmed Germany as a means of weakening Allied cohesion, putting upon the Allies or the United States the onus for keeping Germany divided, and repairing Soviet prestige in German eyes. If accepted, unity on these terms would entail loss of Soviet control of East Germany for the present and might complicate the Soviet position in other satellite areas. The Soviets might be prepared to pay this price to prevent the rearming of Western Germany and its integration with the West. They would almost certainly not agree to unity on terms allowing a united Germany to ally with the West, and would be unlikely to permit a united Germany to rearm, except possibly to a limited extent under strict four-power control.

7. *U.S. security interests* require that the continent of Europe be made as impregnable as possible against Soviet attack or subversion. This requires participation in Western defense, in conformity with paragraph 5 above, of West Germany and, if possible, of a united, democratic Germany from which Soviet occupation forces have been withdrawn. A united Germany, disarmed or neutralized by four-power agreement, would jeopardize these interests by tend-

ing to separate Germany from the West and placing excessive military burdens on the U.S. and free Europe.

Reconciling These Factors

8. The United States seeks to reconcile these varied and complex factors by two related conceptions:

a. A strong, united European community, including Germany.
b. A unified, democratic and sovereign Germany, allied to the West by its own choice.

9. *European Community*

a. We should endeavor to effect the integration of West Germany, or a unified Germany if possible, in an organically united European Community, within the broader Atlantic Community. Such a European Community provides the best means of solving Europe's economic, political and defense problems. The first step, the Coal and Steel Community, is already in operation. Integration of Germany in the European Community would channel the immense vitality and resources of the reviving German nation into strengthening Europe without endangering Western Security. An evolving European Community could harmonize the interests of its members and reduce the risk of conflicts, crises, and wars. To be viable, it must clearly include both France and Germany. A united Europe would constitute a counterpoise, but not a menace, to the Soviet Union. Once firmly established, it should exert a strong and increasing attraction on Eastern Europe, thus weakening the Soviet position there and accelerating Soviet withdrawal from that area.

b. The European Defense Community applies this concept to defense. It is designed to harmonize three aims: (1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West. There is opposition in Europe, especially strong in France, to re-creation of a German national army. Indeed, many Germans fear the influence on the policies and institutions of the German Federal Republic which might be wielded by a revived military hierarchy of the old type. To attempt to rearm Germany over French objections would jeopardize Franco-German understanding, and European integration, and might disrupt NATO. The EDC seeks to avoid these dangers by combining German and other forces in a common army under the control of European institutions. It embodies the most acceptable solution for German participation in defense.

c. The six EDC members are now at work on a Constitution to establish democratic parliamentary institutions for governing and extending the European Community.

10. *German Unity*

a. The eventual re-unification of Germany is essential for an enduring settlement, both in Germany and in Europe. But German unity must not be bought regardless of price. Since a free Germany is vital to the security of Europe, German unity must be achieved on terms which ensure such freedom. The United States objective must be a united Germany enjoying full internal freedom; free to determine its external relations and alignments, including the right to participate in European defense and in the free European Community; and oriented to the West. The United States must also seek to obtain the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from Germany, and eventually to the Soviet frontiers, and the elimination of Soviet political or economic control from Germany. A unified, democratic Germany allied to the free world would represent a major step in rolling back the iron curtain and enlarging the basis for an enduring peace in Europe.

b. The Soviet Union seems unlikely to accept unity on these terms at this time. It is more likely to seek to exploit German desire for unity by offering unification on terms designed to isolate and neutralize a united Germany and thus bar it from association with the Free World. A "neutralized", unified Germany, with or without armed forces, would entail sacrifices and risks to the West incommensurate with any possible gains. It would deny Germany strength to the West, wreck present and prospective plans for building augmented European strength through union, and open up the whole of Germany to Soviet intrigue and manipulation which would aim at the absorption of Germany into the Soviet bloc. Unity on these terms should therefore be opposed by the West.

11. *Evaluation of EDC Prospects*

a. Various factors, and especially French and Italian hesitation, have delayed the ratification of the EDC and related Contractual Agreements, designed to restore substantial West German sovereignty, which were signed in May 1952. Although the possibility of holding four-power talks on Germany will tend further to postpone action on these agreements, French ratification of EDC appears unlikely until four-power talks have been held or blocked by the Soviets. The basic policy decisions and compromises of conflicting national interests contained in these agreements are not likely to remain acceptable to the parties concerned unless they are soon implemented.

b. The United States should support with all available means the creation of the European Community and the ratification of the EDC Treaty. No satisfactory substitute for this solution has yet been found. Continuing reliance on the European Community has the drawback of subjecting our present security program in Europe to the risk of further delays, but the advantages to the United States of its adoption appear to justify the risks involved. [2] Howev-

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[2] In NSC 160 the remainder of this paragraph is bracketed in and reads:

"[However, these advantages will be lost if the ratification of EDC is long delayed. Therefore, if it is not achieved by January 1, 1954, the United States should review alternative courses of action. Furthermore, if developments prior to this date should so indicate, it would be desirable to take bilaterally with the West German Government certain initial steps in the actual creation and arming of German units. This, it would be made plain to all EDC signatories, would be to expedite the implementation of EDC when ratified. The implication that such bilateral action would contin-

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er, these advantages will be lost if the ratification of EDC is long delayed. Therefore, the United States should review alternative courses of action. Furthermore, it may be desirable to take bilaterally with the West German government certain initial steps in the actual creation and arming of German units, if developments should so indicate and if this can be done without serious repercussion on our relations with France. This, it would be made plain to all EDC signatories, would be to expedite the implementation of EDC when ratified. The implication that such bilateral action would continue even though French ratification was further delayed should provide additional leverage on the French to ratify the EDC treaty at an early date.

c. If the EDC and the Contractual Agreements are ratified and become operative, the United States should then proceed with all possible expedition to effect the fullest possible integration of the Federal Republic in Western Europe and to build up the military strength of the EDC as an adjunct to NATO. With the EDC in effect, the West would be strengthened in its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviets, and in its attractive force on East Germany, and the Soviet position in East Germany made less and less tenable. From the vantage ground of growing strength, the West should then press the political offensive against the Soviets on the German unity issue, and seek through positive and constructive proposals to effect a negotiated settlement.

d. If and whenever it becomes clear that the EDC [3] cannot be realized or will be indefinitely postponed, the United States should seriously explore the possible alternatives. In doing so it would be essential to keep in mind not only the desirability of a German defense contribution, but also the paramount need of preserving our basic interests in Europe, and the necessity for the voluntary collaboration of France and Germany for any enduring solution. If at that time, French acceptance of West German membership in NATO can be obtained, which now seems unlikely, [4] this might be the preferable course. Otherwise, the United States should attempt, through renegotiation with its NATO partners and with the Federal Republic, to make new and acceptable arrangements for Germany's participation in the collective security organization of the West.

e. Because neither EDC nor any other scheme for West German rearmament can be effected prior to the suggested date of four-power negotiations on Germany, there is no inhibition in the United States proposing with respect to a unified Germany that it should be sovereign, free to rearm and free to choose affiliation with the West through EDC or otherwise. If negotiations are unsuc-

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ue even though French ratification was further delayed should provide additional leverage on the French to ratify the EDC treaty at an early date.]"

A footnote indicates that this was a Department of Defense proposal.

[3] The first line of this paragraph in NSC 160 reads: "If it becomes clear by January 1, 1954 that". A footnote indicates that this was a Department of Defense proposal.

[4] A footnote indicates that the Department of Defense would eliminate "which now seems likely".

cessful, there should then be added stimulus to the creation of EDC with West Germany alone.

12. *Preparation of a Unity Proposal*

a. The recent East German uprisings and the prospect of four-power talks have focused attention on the unity issue. If the Soviets proposed a Germany unified by free elections, but not permitted to ally with other States, and with severely limited military forces, many Germans, despite their distrust of the Soviets and a preference for alliance with the West, might be tempted by such an offer. The best method for handling such a Soviet proposal is a strong Allied position offering Germany full sovereign rights, including the right to affiliate itself with the West. While such a united Germany would probably ally itself with the West, it might choose to remain neutral or to retain freedom of action. Under present conditions, such a risk must be accepted. The Allied proposal must provide a sound position from which to proceed to serious negotiation on a German settlement.

b. Accordingly, the United States should promptly develop, in cooperation with the British, French, and Germans, a full plan for German unity. This should cover not only the initial stages for holding elections and setting up a German government, but also the basic positions on the issues to be settled in the German peace treaty. Such a plan must, therefore, cover, *inter alia,* the conditions necessary for free elections, the structure and authority of the all-German government, boundaries of the united Germany, the right of Germany to make alliances and to rearm, limitations on special weapons, and withdrawal of foreign forces. In preparing this plan, it will be important to analyze the effect of the necessary steps on United States and NATO security plans and to prepare any necessary revision or alternatives in case unity should be achieved.

13. *Some Basic Elements Involved in a German Unity Proposal*

a. An all-German government must be based upon genuinely free, secret, direct and universal elections, so as to insure the representative character of the new government. To prevent intimidation of voters in the East Zone regime, it will be necessary, before, during and after the elections, to ensure full freedom of political activity and protection of political and civil rights.

b. The Allies would be unwise to attempt to specify the frontiers of a united Germany in any proposal. Their position has been that the Oder-Neisse line is temporary and the final boundaries should be fixed in a peace settlement with the agreement of an all-German government. To propose that the Oder-Neisse be made permanent would antagonize many Germans, especially among the refugees. To claim for Germany all the eastern territory would seriously prejudice negotiations with the Soviets and might be considered by many Germans as designed to forestall unity. Accordingly, the negotiating position must be based on readiness to agree to any solution mutually acceptable to Germany and the States immediately concerned.

c. A Soviet proposal for a neutralized Germany would almost certainly require withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from German soil. Under a Western plan for a Germany with full freedom of action in external affairs, such withdrawal might be necessary temporarily, until Germany invited their return pursuant to her right to make alliances, and permanently if she failed to do so. The possible removal or relocation of the forces of the Western Powers now in Germany would involve the risk of major [5] dislocations in present U.S. and NATO plans which would need careful evaluation and replanning to guard against unacceptable weaknesses during any transition. Such planning would take account of the effect of current U.S. atomic superiority, as well as the difficulty of finding places in Europe for stationing troops temporarily withdrawn from Germany and the possible impact of U.S. troop withdrawal upon European opinion. Any plan for phased withdrawal must take account of the effect of the continued presence of Soviet forces for any extended period and the means for ensuring their ultimate withdrawal as agreed.

BASIC OBJECTIVES

14. Firm association of a united Germany, or, at a minimum, the Federal Republic, with the West, preferably [6] through an integrated European Community, to enable Germany to participate in the defense of the West and make the greatest possible contribution to the strength of the Free World, with the least danger of its becoming a threat thereto.

15. Prevention of Soviet domination over all Germany and reduction both of existing Soviet power in East Germany and of Communist influence throughout Germany.

16. Restoration by peaceful means of Germany as a united state, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs, firmly attached to the principles of the United Nations, capable of resisting both Communism and neo-Nazism and from which Soviet forces have been withdrawn. [7]

17. A healthy German economy, independent of United States financial assistance, participating effectively in the European Community, in normal world commerce, and in strengthening the economy of the Free World.

18. Maintenance of the Western position in Berlin pending unification of Germany.

COURSES OF ACTION

19. Continue to promote European integration through arrangements such as the Coal and Steel Community (CSC), the European

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[5] In NSC 160 the word "some" appears in place of the word "major".

[6] The word "preferably" is bracketed in NSC 160. A footnote indicates that this was a Department of Defense proposal.

[7] A footnote indicates that the Department of Defense wanted to make this the first objective.

Defense Community (EDC), and the European Political Community (EPC).

20. Seek the participation of the Federal Republic in the Western defense system under NATO command, within the framework of the EDC. In particular:

a. Press vigorously for the ratification of EDC, especially after failure of any four-power talks.

b. Once EDC is ratified, provide the maximum feasible military assistance for the rapid formation of combat effective German units through EDC, and the maximum utilization of German productive capacity.

c. Following EDC ratification, seek at an appropriate time to obtain German membership in NATO.

21. If ratification of EDC does not seem imminent within a reasonable period, [8] review other possible courses of action open to the United States with a view to taking such action as may be necessary (a) to bring the Contractual Agreements into effect independently of EDC; (b) to attain rapidly an adequate defense posture in Europe; and (c) to achieve by other means the association of the Federal Republic with collective security arrangements in Europe.

22. Seek to promote an understanding between France and Germany concerning their mutual problems, including a solution of the Saar question acceptable to France, Germany and the Saar.

23. Continue to support the Federal Republic for membership in various international organizations (including, at the appropriate time, the United Nations) while opposing such membership for East Germany (German Democratic Republic).

24. Promptly develop positive proposals for German unification through international negotiations. In particular:

a. Develop specific plans for German unity which will assure free elections and full enjoyment of civil and political liberties within a unified Germany, freedom of action for an all-German government in external affairs, and the maximum possibility of association with the free West.

b. Seek to obtain tripartite (U.S., U.K., French) agreement and German concurrence, on a program for German unification for presentation at possible four-power talks later this year.

c. Consider the necessary review of strategic requirements and the necessary realignment of NATO planning and force deployments to cover the post-unification situation, including any transition period.

d. Take steps to prevent the Soviets from paralyzing Western action in Germany and creating division among the Western powers by prolonging hopes for four-power agreement on unity without actually agreeing to talks, or by prolonging such talks unreasonably if they occur.

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[8] In NSC 160 the bracketed phrase "by January 1, 1954" appears at this point in the text. A footnote indicates that this was a Department of Defense proposal.

25. Take such steps as are feasible to promote a healthy economy in the Federal Republic and West Berlin, including reduction of world trade barriers which impede the flow of German goods, development of off-shore procurement, and ratification of the German debt settlement.[9]

26. Continue mutual efforts to impede the flow of strategic goods and services from and through Germany to the Soviet orbit.

27. In accordance with NSC 132/1,[10] the Western powers should maintain their position in Berlin, even to the extent of resisting Soviet pressure at the great risk of general war.

28. Combat communism throughout Germany, and in particular nourish resistance to Soviet power in East Germany (see NSC 158 and PSB D-45[11]), while continuing general psychological programs to support the other basic objectives (see PSB D-21 and D-21/2[12]).

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[9] The instruments of ratification of the German Debt Agreements were exchanged on Sept. 15, 1953.

[10] Document 547.

[11] NSC 158 and PSB D-45, both dated June 29, 1953, are scheduled for publication in volume VIII.

[12] PSB D-21, Document 156. PSB D-21/2 was not declassified when this volume went to press.

No. 215

762A.5/8-1753

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You will recall, in approving NSC 160[2] regarding Germany, the Council decided to insert at the end of paragraph 11b the provision that "if developments should so indicate, it may be desirable to take bilaterally with the West German government certain initial steps in the actual creation of arming German units, if this can be done without serious repercussions on our relations with France".

My understanding is that no action of any kind will be taken by your Department pursuant to this provision unless the Department of State concurs that this can be safely done without injuring our relations with France.

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[1] Drafted by Bowie and concurred in by Bonbright and Lewis.

[2] Not printed, but see NSC 160/1, *supra*.

I must stress my conviction that under present conditions any discussions with the Germans along these lines could have very serious adverse effects in France and in Germany. Furthermore, we must carefully guard against any chance of a "leak" or unauthorized action by representatives of the State and Defense Departments abroad.

The review of the German policy at the first meeting in October, to which we also agreed, will provide an occasion for further discussion of this question.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

No. 216

JCS files, CCS 385 (6-4-46) SCC 70

Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, undated.

GUIDANCE FOR THE PEACETIME CONDUCT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

I Purpose

1. To provide guidance to USCINCEUR for the conduct of military activities with respect to Germany, during peacetime or during the "cold war" period, in order to effect maximum military contribution toward the achievement of our national objectives which pertain to:

a. The integration of Western Germany into Western Europe;
b. The reduction of Soviet capabilities in Eastern Germany;
c. The achievement of German unity; and
d. The role of unified Germany in the unification of Europe.

II. Assumptions

2. *General.* Short of global war, the USSR will pursue and intensify its strategy of political warfare and local aggressive actions, so long as it believes Soviet objectives are being achieved by such means.

3. *Integration.* The process of integrating the Federal Republic with the Western European Community through the EDC, the Schuman Plan, the Contractual Agreements, the Council of

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[1] Attached to a note (JCS 1735/200) dated Aug. 31, which stated that copies had been forwarded to the Commander in Chief, European Command as SM [illegible] on Aug. 26. In an attached enclosure the Commander in Chief was instructed to coordinate his activities under this guidance with the U.S. High Commissioner.

Europe, and similar instrumentalities will be impeded by oppositionist elements within the Federal Republic and by the Soviet Union.

4. *German Unity and the Peace Treaty.* It will not be possible in the foreseeable future to agree with the Soviet Union on a formula guaranteeing a satisfactory basis for the unification of Germany and for the conclusion of a peace treaty.

5. *Berlin:*

a. The Soviets will continue to exert pressures and impose harassments designed to probe and weaken Allied prestige, firmness and unity of purpose as well as to threaten our right to access to Berlin.

b. The Soviets will not deliberately provoke or run a major risk of war for the sake of Berlin alone.

6. *Soviet Zone and East Berlin.* The population of the Soviet Zone will remain fundamentally opposed to communism, but the Soviet Union, through its East German puppet authorities, will continue to tighten its controls, isolate East Germany from the West, and proceed with its attempts to set up a satellite state with an army of its own.

7. *German Military Potential.* The build-up of an integrated German military force in the Federal Republic will proceed substantially as contemplated, but will require pressure from the West, especially since the required draft legislation and the actual organization of the forces will be subject to continued criticism and resistance by the opposition; also, any rearmament in the Federal Republic will be accompanied or preceded by a build-up of an East German army, designed to instill apprehensions of civil war and to cancel out the Federal Republic's military contribution to Western defense.

8. *Western Europe.* Attempts to promote Federal Republic integration into Western Europe will be inadequate unless they are supported by, and closely coordinated with, parallel attempts to promote the integration of Western Europe, particularly France, into a community capable of accepting the Federal Republic as a partner.

9. *France.* The Federal Republic's capability for leadership within a unified Western European community will be feared by France, unless potential German predominance in a united Europe is compensated by closer and more organic ties between Europe and the United States, within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community, as provided by U.S. existing policies.

10. *Eastern Europe.* The Soviet-orbit countries are firmly under Soviet control now and will be in the foreseeable future; their liberation will come about only as a result of a major change in the

existing relationships between the USSR and the Western Powers; and their peoples generally entertain hopes for eventual liberation from Soviet domination but, especially in Bohemia-Moravia and Poland, fear a possible renewal of German domination.

III. Objectives Prescribed by the Psychological Strategy Board Based on U.S. Policies Reflecting the Present World Situation

11. *Concerning the Federal Republic:*

a. To maintain and develop friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

b. To encourage and facilitate effective participation by the Federal Republic on a basis of equality in the European Community, included in a developing Atlantic Community, and a contribution by the Federal Republic to the political, economic, and social welfare, as well as to the defense structure, necessary to a strong and durable Europe.

c. In the event of unification on terms acceptable to the West, the above objectives will apply to all of Germany.

12. *Concerning West Berlin:*

To maintain and reinforce our political, military, cultural, and psychological position in Western sectors of Berlin, and to exploit that position in furtherance of U.S. national interests.

13. *Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin:*

To maintain contact with the population in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin in order to stiffen their spirit of resistance to Soviet-communist rule and thus (a) to weaken the political, economic, and military system in the Soviet Zone; and (b) to lay the groundwork for eventual incorporation in the free Western Community.

14. *Concerning German Unity:*

To demonstrate U.S. support of German unity attained by peaceful means; and to frustrate Soviet-communist efforts to obtain control of all of Germany and eventually to bring about Soviet withdrawal from Germany.

15. *Concerning Eastern Europe:*

To maintain contact with the people of Germany's Eastern European neighbors in order (a) to stiffen their spirit of resistance and thus weaken the Soviet system of political, economic, and military control of these countries; and (b) to sustain their hopes for eventual liberation and inclusion in an all-European Community free of domination by Germany, the USSR or any other Power.

16. For National tasks prescribed by the Psychological Strategy Board in support of the above objectives see Annex hereto.

IV. Military Objective

17. Incident to the execution of the primary responsibilities of the armed forces, the military objective is to support and participate effectively in the attainment of the foregoing objectives prescribed by the Psychological Strategy Board.

V. Plan of Action

18. *General.* In order to gain the most effective support for U.S. policies by the German public, our approach must be conceived and carried out in a manner which is both palatable and persuasive to the German people. We must adjust our approach in accordance with the changes in public opinion and with impressions and impacts which various political, economic and cultural issues have on the German psychological climate. This will require a major effort of imagination on the part of the U.S. operating agencies to develop new and more effective activities, and it implies a constant review of existing programs, in the light of their demonstrated effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

19. The peacetime existence, size, deployments, operations, state of readiness, composition, activities, discipline and day-to-day behavior of the Armed Forces have an orthodox and traditionally recognized impact on foreign governments, armed forces and peoples.

20. U.S. military activities which have an impact on Germany and Western Europe should be guided by the following principles:

a. While supporting programs endorsed by U.S. which promote European and Atlantic integration, e.g., the Schuman Plan, the Council of Europe, the European Defense Community, etc., we should avoid raising false expectations by committing the United States to a fixed timetable.

b. Care should be taken in the application of any official pressure to primarily domestic issues of European states, in order to avoid the impression of excessive U.S. intervention.

c. In official statements and news releases, avoid over-extending our objectives beyond established policies, thus arousing false, unlikely, or premature expectations.

d. Avoid artificially creating needs or desires for U.S. economic or financial aid.

e. In the furtherance of U.S. programs in the Federal Republic, indigenous relations should be utilized or created that will parallel and support the attainment of U.S. objectives, and at the same time instill in the Germans a sense of participation in the achievement of these objectives.

f. In fostering indigenous relations through official and unofficial support of private groups and organizations, the United States armed forces should:

(1) Concentrate on those groups and organizations sympathetic to our policy-objectives which manifest strong spontaneous motivation and are financially self-sustaining and avoid

supporting organizations, groups, and individuals that are unable to win solid indigenous support.

(2) Concentrate to the greatest possible extent on established organizations and media, and avoid the use of imaginary sponsors in the Federal Republic.

g. In order to create a climate in which the new U.S.-German relationship will be more effective avoid emphasizing purely legal and formal aspects of this relationship.

h. Military propaganda activities should be tied to specific developments and concrete action designed to implement U.S. policies. Moreover, we should seek to express our aims, whenever appropriate, in the form of live demonstrations and special events which will effectively symbolize U.S. attitudes and intentions. We should encourage increased emphasis by German or other European organizations on constructive social and cultural activities, and on serious research.

i. In supporting German (or other West European) activities in promotion of European or Atlantic solidarity, we should give higher priority to those which actually establish institutional links with other countries than to those which merely publicize the idea within Germany or any single country.

21. In the absence of centralized direction in Germany of the U.S. effort encompassed in this guidance, the following will govern the responsibilities of USCINCEUR:

a. The conduct of news programs and overt propaganda operations directed at foreign governments and peoples in time of peace is, by Public Law 402, 80th Congress, a responsibility of the Secretary of State.

b. Department of State Foreign Information guidances currently being made available to appropriate military commands are binding on the armed forces and define the treatment desired by the U.S. Government on matters of international concern in official statements and in propaganda or public information releases abroad.

c. Mechanisms should be established by USCINCEUR in Europe whereby the appropriate Department of State representatives can be provided with a timely and continuing flow of information on current and impending military activities and on particular military situations which may have an impact on foreign attitudes and opinions.

d. The employment of armed forces radio and news outlets in the dissemination of news matters related to this guidance is authorized subject to such limitations as are prescribed by the Department of Defense. No existing instructions on I&E policy prescribed by the Department of Defense will be vitiated in the employment of Armed Forces radio and news outlets under this guidance.

e. No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy shall be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State or its authorized representative.

f. Military support for the covert operations aspects of this guidance will be provided to the Central Intelligence Agency under approved policies and conditions. The security aspects of military support to the Central Intelligence Agency will be coordinated to the end that such military support cannot be attributed to the armed forces.

VI. Tasks

22. Provide appropriate Department of State representatives in Europe, for exploitation by the Foreign Information Program, a timely and continuing flow of information on current and impending military activities and on military situations which may have an impact on foreign attitudes and opinions.

23. In order to exploit the potential for propaganda inherent in the employment and contacts of indigenous peoples with the armed forces, assist the Department of State, as appropriate, by the dissemination of official Foreign Information periodicals, exhibition of movies and displays, and other similar actions.

24. In close coordination and collaboration with proper State Department representatives, publicize appropriate content materiel through radio and printed media under the control of the armed forces, and through speeches and public statements by military personnel. Examples of content which may be considered appropriate are the following:

a. Actions by U.S. and other governmental representatives which lend substance to the new relationship between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

b. U.S. determination to honor its NATO commitments in defending Europe, the growing strength and strategic superiority of the West, and any weakening of the Soviet political, psychological, and strategic military position.

c. The political, economic security, and cultural benefits accruing to the Federal Republic through integration.

d. Information calculated to help create a climate conducive to disaffection in the Soviet Zone and East Berlin.

e. Pertinent factual, unbiased, uncolored news of world events.

f. Evidence of U.S. and Western determination to achieve German unity on suitable terms.

g. Soviet measures, such as border control, diplomatic actions, and militarization of Soviet Zone, which belie Soviet unification assertions.

25. Provide, as appropriate, for the timely employment of armed forces facilities, materiel and units in the conduct of search and rescue,-disaster and flood relief and other humane missions for the benefit of friendly foreign governments and peoples.

26. Continue and accelerate, as appropriate, indoctrination of armed forces personnel and their dependents aimed at improving their behavior and attitudes toward the forces and people of the Federal Republic.

27. Except where required for military purposes, remove symbolic reminders of the occupation. (Example—Foreign language signs.)

28. Encourage and facilitate, where appropriate, reciprocal armed forces–Federal Republic coordination in social, cultural and technical activities in order to reduce frictions and minimize German antagonisms toward the use of the Federal Republic as a base for western operations.

29. Consider and recommend, as appropriate, the exchange of military personnel and technical military experts between the Federal Republic and other western countries through attendance at allied military schools, exchange of observers, etc.

30. Demonstrate U.S. and European military strength through suitable military displays, and through excellence of military discipline of U.S. forces.

31. Afford military support to the Central Intelligence Agency in their conduct of covert operations in pursuit of the objectives of this guidance (Section III above) under policies established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Enclosure to SM-792-52, dated 26 March 1952.*

Annex

NATIONAL TASKS

The following are the Tasks of our psychological strategy in support of the achievement of our objectives:

1. Concerning the Federal Republic:

a. To facilitate the transformation of the Allied-German relationship on the diplomatic, political, and economic as well as military levels from the occupation status toward that of equal partners and allies.

b. To foster, encourage, support and facilitate efforts of the population and the Government of the Federal Republic toward the integration of their political, economic, cultural, and military interests with those of the European Community and the Atlantic Community; to help pave the way for acceptance by other governments and peoples (particularly French) for participation by the Federal Republic in the development of the European and Atlantic Communities.

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* Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1969/15; see Decision on J.C.S. 1969/15. [Footnote in the source text. Not found.]

c. To support the development in the Federal Republic of democratic institutions, and to assist the German democratic elements in their opposition to authoritarian and extremist elements.

d. To gain the support of the German people and government for U.S. policies, and to strengthen their will to resist and their confidence in the ability of the U.S. (and the West) to frustrate Soviet-communist aggression.

e. To stimulate maximum Federal Republic contribution to the development of increased military and economic strength in Western Europe.

f. To convince the Germans of the need to weaken Soviet aggressive capabilities by impeding the flow of strategic materials to East Germany and the Soviet bloc; and to provide Western markets and raw materials to the Federal Republic.

2. Concerning Berlin:

a. Contingency A. Western access to Berlin is not seriously impeded.

Tasks

(1) To maintain and reinforce the U.S., U.K., and French position in the Western sectors of Berlin and to buttress the morale of West Berlin.

(2) To deter and neutralize Soviet or Soviet-inspired harassing tactics.

(3) To utilize West Berlin as a means of strengthening the morale of the free world and its determination to resist Soviet pressures and possible aggression.

b. Contingency B. Serious harassment short of a full blockade.

Task. To consolidate the Western position in Berlin in the face of increased Soviet pressures.

c. Contingency C. A blockade or harassing measures tantamount to a surface blockade are imposed.

Task. To gain international recognition of the Berlin situation of the aggressive nature of Soviet actions.

d. Contingency D. The Western position has become or is about to become untenable.

Task. To lay the psychological groundwork for the possible use of Allied military force in Berlin.

e. Contingency E. A Soviet attack on Western forces in Berlin.

Task. To secure the support of all of all our Allies (including our friends in East Germany) for the Allied policy of armed resistance to Soviet aggression.

3. Concerning the Soviet Zone and East Berlin:

a. To encourage in the Soviet Zone disaffection towards the regime and defection from the Soviet and East German military or para-military forces in accordance with existing policies.

b. To reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet and communist administrative and control apparatus by conducting in a nonattributable manner psychological, political, and economic harassment activities in the Soviet Zone, and to prepare, under controlled conditions, for such more active forms of resistance as may later be authorized.

c. To keep the population informed of world events and of U.S. and Western policies, particularly with respect to Germany.

d. To maintain hope in the Soviet Zone population for a unified and democratic Germany integrated within the European Community.

e. To weaken the confidence and ability of the Soviet authorities and communist leaders to maintain or extend their controls in the Soviet Zone, or their influence in West Berlin or the Federal Republic.

4. Concerning German Unity:

a. To demonstrate our willingness to initiate and enter, jointly with the French and U.K. Governments, in negotiations with the Soviet Union for German unification under conditions guaranteeing a unified Germany with a democratic government established by free democratic elections, provided that a reasonable basis for such negotiations exists.

b. To support any legitimate proposal for action seeking peaceful solution to existing territorial problems within the framework of European, rather than national, interests, but to avoid giving official encouragement to German territorial aspirations toward areas external to the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and Berlin, beyond acknowledgment of the established U.S. policy that no definitive German frontiers were laid down by the Potsdam decisions, and that the final determination of territorial questions must await the peace settlement.

c. Through non-attributable propaganda media in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Zone, and all of Berlin, to exploit the Oder-Neisse Line issue as evidence of basic Soviet anti-German attitudes and imperialist aims; and to de-emphasize the related Saar question through non-attributable programs pointing out that the Saar should be subordinated to European unity, which will facilitate settlement by negotiation among the interested parties.

d. To expose and exploit Soviet moves aimed at permanent partition of Germany and satellization of Eastern Germany.

5. Concerning Western Europe:

a. To enhance popular confidence in:

(1) The peaceful future of a European community, within an Atlantic Community, which includes the Federal Republic;

(2) The prospect of mutually beneficial relations with the Federal Republic;

(3) The determination of the Western world to strive for a unified, democratic Germany as a member of a viable European community; and

(4) The intentions of the Western Powers to safeguard the European Community against the resurgence of aggressive German nationalism.

b. To produce among European leaders and people a realistic awareness of the deadly menace of Soviet expansionism and of the strength accruing to the USSR if Germany were included in the Soviet orbit.

c. To stimulate the realization among Europeans that only a tremendous effort of imagination, productivity, and cooperation, far surpassing the present effort of the Atlantic Community, including Germany, will enable them to surmount this threat; and to convince them that the creative energies latent in the free societies, including Germany, when fully developed, will not only nullify the enemy's aggressive moves or plans but also raise the Western peoples to unprecedented levels of material and moral well-being.

d. To promote the concept of the Atlantic Community as provided by existing U.S. policies so that it may be used to support and supplement the concept of European unity as the dynamic and unifying element of our psychological strategy in Europe.

e. To create among the peoples of Western Europe a sense of positive participation in the international community which is now emerging.

6. Concerning France:

In addition to the specific effect desired in paragraph 5 above:

a. To stimulate popular acceptance of:

(1) a genuine political settlement with the Federal Republic;

(2) the capability of the European Community, within the Atlantic Community, to develop for the common benefit German manpower, heavy industry, and steel production in such a way as to eliminate French fears.

b. To provide reassurance that the distinctive historic culture of France can vigorously flourish within the framework of the European Community, including the Federal Republic.

7. Concerning Eastern Europe:

a. To stimulate popular suspicion of Soviet intentions with respect to Germany.

b. To persuade Soviet-orbit peoples that a unified Germany integrated into a European Community is a guarantee against the revived German drive to the East.

c. To convince Soviet-orbit peoples that the weakening of Soviet power in East Germany is a necessary prerequisite for their own liberation.

d. To sustain the resistance of Soviet-orbit peoples toward the day when their active participation in their own liberation will be required.

No. 217

762A.00/8-3153: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, August 31, 1953—6 p.m.

847. It is view of most competent observers here, with which we find no reason to differ, that Chancellor will emerge from coming elections as dominant figure in German political scene and as head of a coalition with sufficiently wide Parliamentary support to formulate and execute a forceful governmental policy, but probably at price of concessions to his coalition partners, especially FDP. We estimate that SPD would have to win 200 seats in Bundestag or more than 35 percent of popular vote to prevent formation of an Adenauer Government. We view this as highly unlikely. Such an SPD victory would represent a considerable increase over SPD performance in recent local and *land* elections whereas in our view SPD popularity has, if anything, waned somewhat in recent months while Chancellor's national prestige has tended to mount since the low point of the constitutional court issue of December 1952. This increased prestige arises from Chancellor's constructive leadership, his skill in seeming to deprive SPD of its claim to be only champion of German unification, and from lack of an effective opponent. Furthermore, relatively satisfactory economic and social conditions have worked to advantage of government in power. SPD, lacking a positive policy of its own, has had its electoral chances hurt by failure of Kremlin to make tempting concessions to

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Vienna, Moscow, Berlin, The Hague, Brussels, Stuttgart, Bremen, Hamburg, Munich, Dusseldorf, and Frankfurt.

German public opinion. This has emphasized SPD's inability to present constructive alternative platform to Adenauer's foreign policy.

Although we believe major outcome can be fairly safely anticipated, precise statements of chances of individual parties are rendered impossible by existence of series of incalculable factors. No one can foresee how the four million new voters who represent more than 10 percent of eligible electorate will act. In addition, there is an unpredictable number of undecided voters whom some competent observers place as high as 20–25 percent. Another element of uncertainty results from fact that new electoral law permits voter to split his vote between a candidate of one party and a list of another party. It is not unlikely that some voters may split their votes between a government party and SPD. Another enigma is the drawing strength of BHE which did not run in 1949 federal elections. If BHE does as well in federal elections as it has done in land and communal elections, it may win as many as 40 seats. Most observers here expect BHE easily to exceed the 5 percent limit, but do not anticipate it will win more than 25 or 30 seats.

There may well be shifts from one of government coalition parties to another, but it is unlikely such changes will affect overall strength of present coalition. Furthermore, Chancellor's ability to maneuver during formation of new Cabinet should be greater than in 1949 because two of former parties in opposition in 1949 (Center Party and Bavarian Party) have now pledged themselves to vote for Adenauer as Chancellor. He can presumably count also, if necessary, upon BHE support because that party has frankly stated that it is ready to hop on anybody's bandwagon.

CONANT

No. 218

Editorial Note

At his press conference on September 3, Secretary Dulles made a statement concerning the partition of Germany and the Soviet note that had been received on August 15 dealing with proposed four-power talks on Germany. Following this statement the Secretary of State answered questions and, in reply to one, stated with regard to the upcoming Federal elections that failure to return the coalition government under Chancellor Adenauer would be disastrous to Germany and the possibilities for its unity. For text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 14, 1953, page 353. Regarding the statement on the elections, see the *New York*

Times, September 4, 1953, page 1. For documentation on the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union which led to the Berlin Conference in 1954, see Documents 257 ff.

The same day Conant reported that the Press Chief of the SPD interpreted Secretary Dulles' remarks as direct interference in the electoral campaign and that the SPD was ordering the use of several hundered thousand anti-American posters designed to show Adenauer as nothing but an American puppet. (Telegram 916 from Bonn, 762A.00/9-353)

On September 5 Chancellor Adenauer sent a letter via Conant stating:

> "I feel a strong desire, Mister Secretary, to thank you for your recent remarks in which you once again so impressively and understandingly stated your position concerning the German question. The vast majority of the German people agreed with your remarks. I am certain that in making the great political decision which they must make today the German people will be guided by the conviction that the longed for goal can be reached only if they in cooperation with the free nations of the Western world make every effort to serve peace." (Telegram 947 from Bonn, 762A.00/9-553)

No. 219

762A.00/9-753: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, September 7, 1953—noon.

950. (Pre-telecon [2] material Washington and Bonn.) Political circles here interpret sweeping Adenauer victory as national endorsement of Chancellor's foreign and domestic policy and attribute it to his strong leadership.[3] Most observers agree electorates unwilling to risk change to uncertainties SPD course which they feared would oblige Germany to go it alone. Apparently only traditional SPD voters continue to support the party. Thus vast majority electorate backed continuation of integration with west.

Chancellor is now in such a strong position that he should be able to make concessions to France on Saar issue as part of over-all European integration settlement. Chancellor's strengthened position should oblige France to make up its mind on European defense.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Not further identified.

[3] In the Federal elections on Sept. 6 the CDU won 244 seats, a clear majority of the 487 in the Bundestag, to the SDP 150.

Most striking domestic consequences are disappearance of small parties and strong trend in direction of two party system with practical elimination of confessional factors which were generally regarded as great obstacle to two party system. Annihilation fanatic elements is encouraging evidence German people have chosen middle road and disavowed extremism. This makes it more difficult for Kremlin to frighten French and British with spectre of resurrection of Nazism in Germany and its main remaining weapon will be old charge that Germany is becoming American colony.

Although Adenauer has wide range of possibilities in forming government, it is generally anticipated that he will again ally himself with FDP and DP plus center. Such a coalition would give him comfortable majority of 310 out of 487. By inclusion of BHE with 27 seats, Chancellor could reach two thirds majority which would make approval of treaties absolutely certain.

CDU victory will undoubtedly enable Adenauer to reestablish progovernment majority in Bundesrat by changing composition of one or more *Laender* Governments.

Relative decline of SPD is certain to provoke disappointment and confusion within party which may lead to changes in party leadership within next six months.

Official final returns not yet available.

CONANT

No. 220

762A.00/9-153: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 8, 1953—12:44 p.m.

790. Despite further comments contained urtel 873, [2] Department somewhat concerned re new pronouncement (urtel 841 [3]) indicating

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[1] Drafted by Morris and cleared by Bonbright and Barbour. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 873 reported that the Eichler-Erler press conference (see footnote 3 below) seemed to be a last minute attempt to appeal to neutralist sentiment in Germany and was inconsistent with the general SPD line. (762A.00/9-153)

[3] Telegram 841 reported that at a press conference on Aug. 28 Erler and Eichler had outlined their proposal for a neutral Germany, but that it was not as yet clear whether their position was espoused by the leadership of the SPD. (762A.00/8-2853)

certain SPD party leaders publicly advocating neutralized Germany. If this done formally and by top party leaders, this would presumably have serious implications re our position on German unification and peace treaty.

Would appreciate it if you could personally, or have Dowling or Steere, see Ollenhauer (or other top SPD leader) now that elections are over, and inquire whether views expressed by Eichler and Erler in fact represent party's official and considered position. You should point out we have until now understood that while certain elements within party favored such position, top leaders had been conscious of its obvious dangers and hence opposed it. Please also emphasize US Government has always considered such neutrality solution extremely dangerous for Germany's safety and future, and inquire whether SPD thinks that in such case US Government would really be prepared to guarantee such weak Germany from attack with powerful Red Army remaining at or close to eastern frontier while much or even bulk of US forces now in Germany might have to be removed from Continent. Moreover, does SPD believe NATO powers could develop effective strategy with available armed forces backed up to Channel and confined to France and Low Countries?

Ollenhauer may reply that SPD might support neutralist solution on purely opportunistic basis as only way to get Soviets out of eastern Germany, and would expect Germany could before long throw off this shackle on its sovereignty and join western defense alliance. In such case, you should point out US could hardly be expected to participate in international agreement which it knew in advance one party to it (i.e., Germany) intended to violate at early opportunity, and also when it realized such violation might well provoke Soviets into drastic action.

We trust this latest development in fact only result of heated election atmosphere and does not represent considered SPD views.

Our purpose in making such approach to SPD would of course be to try and head off tendencies within this party toward adoption of neutralist position. We shall also continue to bear in mind possibility of a public statement on same subject by President or Secretary at some appropriate opportunity, as suggested by HICOG on several occasions in last few months, which would be aimed at affecting public opinion on this important issue.[4]

DULLES

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[4] On Sept. 9 HICOG replied that it had talked with Heine, an SPD party leader, on that day. Heine said that he had just come from an Executive Committee meeting at which the statements by Erler and Eichler had been unanimously condemned. HICOG "strongly" recommended that no statement be made on the subject of neutralism. (Telegram 972 from Bonn, 762A.00/9-953) The Department of State concurred in telegram 828 to Bonn, Sept. 10. (762A.00/9-953)

No. 221

762A.00/9-853: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, September 8, 1953—6 p.m.

958. Limit distribution. Brentano gave us this morning in strictest confidence his analysis of elections and their effects upon new government and upon internal as well as external developments:

Surprising and overwhelming CDU victory entails not only increase of power but also "a responsibility that is almost frightening." One of points on which he and Chancellor agreed last night was victory must not be abused and that coalition partners and particularly SPD must be treated with respect. Chancellor intends to do nothing to offend SPD and aims, if possible, to strengthen moderate elements during crisis which they believe imminent in SPD. Chancellor as friendly gesture intends to address letter to Ollenhauer within next few days proposing meeting for discussion of current issues.

Brentano and Chancellor are agreed that present coalition should continue in same spirit of cooperation as if former partners had not suffered decline. Brentano personally favors inclusion BHE to assure two-thirds majority in Bundestag which would overcome constitutional problems relating to EDC. Price BHE would have to pay for obtaining Refugee Ministry for Kraft and minor positions for other BHE leaders would be immediate overthrow of anti-Adenauer *land* governments in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Lower Saxony. Brentano is opposed, however, to change in political composition of Bavarian government since latter has supported Chancellor's policies in upper house.

As regards composition new Cabinet, Brentano said while no decision has been made thus far, his own views at present juncture are as follows:

Chancellor has agreed to relinquish Foreign Office and offered it to him. Brentano implied that he would accept, although reluctantly relinquishing his post as faction leader. Chancellor however, would temporarily reserve for himself certain prerogatives in foreign affairs, for example, completion Saar negotiations and matters pertaining to Council of Europe.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Berlin.

Interior Ministry would be given either to Schroeder or Tillmann of CDU. Ehlers, who has been mentioned for this post, would most likely remain in more important position of president of Bundestag. Brentano thought that in this way he would be groomed as possible successor to Adenauer. He believed it would be good politics to train leading Protestant layman as successor to Adenauer both as Chancellor and party leader.

Food and Agriculture Ministry would again go to CSU if latter can produce qualified candidate. If not, Brentano thinks Luebke, former Minister of Agriculture North Rhine Westphalia, should succeed Nicklas. He favors removal of Seebohm whom he regards as "too extreme" and whom he would possibly replace by Merkatz of DP.

Brentano thought FDP should retain present posts and Bluecher's Ministry would probably be broadened to include foreign trade and CSC functions. As for Dehler and Kaiser, while admitting Chancellor would like to eliminate them, he thought their fate would be decided in internal coalition negotiation.

Brentano gave little credence to current rumors re organization new Information and Intelligence Ministry under Lenz. He said he would categorically oppose establishment of Propaganda Ministry in any form. Brentano felt sure Blank would continue in present post. He anticipated no other Cabinet changes.

Touching on overall European integration, he declared Chancellor was now in position make any concessions which would facilitate speedy settlement of outstanding problems connected with EDC, EPC as well as Saar. As for latter, he felt Chancellor would continue to insist upon Europeanization, with satisfactory economic arrangements for France. He thought election results would compel French soon to make up their minds and would greatly favor forces in Paris backing EDC. He even expected French ratification of treaties before Xmas. Brentano, who has special interest in Italian affairs and whose brother is Ambassador in Rome, considered that Adenauer victory would have favorable repercussions in Italy, possibly resulting in new elections and return of De Gasperi.

Brentano said it has been agreed with Chancellor and Ehlers to convene new Bundestag on October 2 by which time coalition negotiations should be completed.

CONANT

No. 222

Editorial Note

On September 8 President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles each sent Chancellor Adenauer messages of congratulations on his electoral victory. Four days later the Chancellor replied, thanking both the President and the Secretary of State for their messages. All four messages were sent through HICOG in telegrams 791 and 793 to Bonn and 1005 and 1006 from Bonn and subsequently released to the press. (762A.00/9–853 and 9–1253)

No. 223

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 160 Series

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 29, 1953.

Subject: NSC 160/1, "U.S. Position with Respect to Germany".

Discussion:

1. When the NSC approved the German position paper [2] on August 13, it agreed that the policy should be reviewed not later than the first Council meeting in October, including a review of the Financial Appendix.

2. Reservations regarding the Financial Appendix NSC 160/1 were made in the discussion in the NSC.

3. The basis for a review of our policy toward Germany will not exist until the proposed Four-Power Conference at Lugano [3] has been held or we have terminated our present exchange of notes with the Soviets on this subject, and until the French EDC ratification picture becomes somewhat clearer than it is at present. Clarification of the situation with respect to both of these matters does not appear likely until November.

4. FOA distributed on September 25 a proposed revision of the Financial Appendix to NSC 160/1. [4] The FOA draft proposes, in effect, that the U.S. should not provide military aid for German units beyond the equipment which has already been programmed, which would provide initial equipment for seven divisions and some supporting battalions. The total force goals envisaged for the German contribution are twelve divisions and necessary support units. The FOA proposal is based upon the suggestion that German

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[1] Drafted by Reinstein and concurred in by Bowie, MacArthur, Merchant (who agreed with the recommendations but not with all of the points made in the discussion), and WE.

[2] NSC 160/1, Document 214.

[3] The proposal for a four-power conference at Lugano eventually led to the Berlin Conference.

[4] No copy of this revised financial appendix has been found in Department of State files.

financial resources would permit the Federal Republic to procure out of its own resources equipment for the remaining units.

5. At a working level meeting of the interested agencies on September 28, it was agreed that the FOA proposal raised important political issues. It was also agreed that sufficient data are not available at the present time to judge the cost of the German buildup and the degree to which the Federal Republic could finance the completion of the buildup plan. It was therefore not possible to submit an agreed recommendation regarding the revision of the Financial Appendix.

6. Some of the policy issues raised by the FOA proposal are:

a) It would involve extending the period of the German buildup to three years and possibly more. The plan for the German buildup contained in the secret military protocol to the EDC Treaty which has been approved for planning purposes by NATO envisaged a buildup period of two years. The Germans attach great importance to a speedy buildup since they regard the period of the buildup as that of greatest risk of Russian action. Extension of the buildup period on financial grounds would cause major political difficulties with Germany. Great stress has been consistently placed on a speedy buildup by the U.S. since the question of rearming Germany was first raised in 1950. A rapid buildup of German forces would become even more important in the event of the unification of Germany.

b) Even assuming that Germany or the EDC would eventually be able to pay for the matériel required to complete the equipping of the German units, it is doubtful whether the equipment would be available in time to meet the buildup plan unless the production of the essential equipment is provided for out of U.S. funds.

c) End-items furnished by the U.S. to equip German EDC contingents are, under the terms of the EDC Treaty and the proposed Mutual Assistance Agreement with EDC, transferred to the EDC and not to Germany. The funds provided by Germany for defense will form a part of the EDC common budget and any payment for end-items would therefore have to be sought from the EDC, not directly from Germany. The EDC common budget is a novel concept and much work remains to be done on it. It will be some time before it will be clear what resources the EDC might have to pay the U.S. for end-items and the extent to which they might exist is a highly speculative matter.

d) End-item assistance to NATO countries has been furnished heretofore on a grant basis. To confront the new European community with a policy of requiring payment for American aid raises major political considerations.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you propose:

1) that the review by the NSC of NSC 160/1 and of the Financial Appendix be deferred until the middle of November;

2) that the interested agencies meanwhile consider urgently the Financial Appendix and the policy issues connected therewith.

No. 224

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 164th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 1, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 164th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Sherman Adams, The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Brigadier General Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion of item 1, significant world developments affecting United States security.]

2. *United States Position With Respect to Germany* (NSC 160/1; NSC Action No. 881 [2])

Mr. Cutler refreshed the Council's memory as to the last discussion of this subject by reading paragraphs 10 and 11-b of NSC 160/1. He then informed the Council of the view of the NSC Planning Board that the policy in NSC 160/1 should not be revised at present. He then asked the Secretary of State to explain to the Council why the State Department believed it unwise to revise this policy at this time.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that since NSC 160/1 had last been considered by the Council a month ago, a number of developments had occurred which pointed to favorable action on the EDC concept. In fact, these developments were still going on and we were not in a position, therefore, to make any decision to revise the existing policy. Secretary Dulles pointed out, in illustration, that Europe had not yet wholly absorbed the effect of the recent German elections. New thoughts were stirring both in Bonn and elsewhere in Europe. The approaching French presidential elections were stirring up the new forces in France. Italy presented a pessimistic picture but the State Department was engaged in trying to reach a satisfactory settlement of the Trieste issue. If this effort were successful there was real hope that the Italian Parliament would eventually ratify EDC.

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[1] Drafted on Oct. 1.

[2] NSC 160/1, Document 214; NSC Action No. 881 is not printed.

While Secretary Dulles thus thought the situation too fluid to suggest revision of the substance of NSC 160/1, he expressed the view that we should push on to complete the financial appendix to this report.

Mr. Cutler then reminded the Council that at its previous consideration of this paper, Governor Stassen had expressed doubts as to the validity of the financial appendix because it appeared to him that the United States was paying too much to re-arm Germany. Mr. Cutler reported that as yet no new financial appendix had been prepared and that the Planning Board recommended that Governor Stassen be requested to take the lead in providing a revised financial appendix. Governor Stassen pointed out that the original appendix had set the cost of German rearmament at approximately five billion dollars and that he had thought that the United States contribution was too high. He believed that the Germans should be able to finance this five billion dollar outlay with no more U.S. assistance than had already been appropriated. So remarkable was the German economic recovery that Governor Stassen believed that the Germans would be able to put out as much as 10% of their gross national product to the account of their own rearmament.

Governor Stassen admitted, however, that the Departments of State and Defense did not wholly agree with the above view. Defense was not ready to state categorically that five billion represented the total cost of German rearmament. The State Department was not prepared to agree that the Germans could safely devote 10% of their gross national product to rearmament. Governor Stassen assured the Council, however, that an agreement could be worked out with these two departments and a satisfactory financial appendix provided for Council consideration.

Governor Stassen then said he wished to call the Council's attention to another aspect of this problem. We had accumulated a vast amount of military materiel for re-arming the German units at such time as they came into existence. A serious log jam could be anticipated if the day when these German units came into existence was postponed beyond the end of the calendar year. If the

German units would not be ready to take over the equipment which we were providing then Governor Stassen wondered whether it might not actually be sent to Germany and distributed prior to to the actual ratification of EDC.

The President inquired whether these military items could not be sent to Germany in the guise of reserve stocks for U.S. occupation forces stationed in Germany. Admiral Radford and Governor Stassen thought that this suggestion might be followed but Secretary Wilson expressed the opinion that there was just too much equipment to be disguised in this fashion.

Secretary Dulles predicted that definitive action on the ratification of EDC could not be anticipated until after the first of next year and that the scheduling of production for the rearmament of the German units should be geared to some such date as the end of January. Governor Stassen then inquired of the Secretary of State as to whether in the event of an adverse decision on EDC, at the beginning of 1954 the State Department would be prepared to suggest alternatives to a re-armed Germany with membership in the EDC. Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative but the President expressed strong skepticism as to whether there was any really effective alternative to French membership in the EDC. We had, said the President, worked very hard on the French to induce them to support the EDC but the issue certainly seemed in doubt. Governor Stassen replied that the recent German election and the Spanish agreement with the United States on bases might well have changed favorably the prospects for EDC. The President agreed that these were hopeful developments but went on to express anxiety that while the West was floundering in indecision as to the best means of defending itself, the Russians might well decide to take a long chance and make a really attractive offer to the Germans. This might take the form of an offer to permit the re-unification of Germany coupled with a very favorable trade treaty. The result of such an offer was not happy to contemplate.

In reply to the President's speculation, Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that for the moment, at least, the Soviets would not consent to the unification of Germany under any circumstances. At present the situation was so unsettled in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland that the Russians could anticipate a general reaction if they allowed Germany to be unified. Furthermore, said Secretary Dulles, the Russians would do everything to avoid any meeting of the powers to discuss the German problem, a fact which was supported by Ambassador Bohlen.

The President replied that at least this gave the United States a little breathing spell and Governor Stassen added his view that for the next two years the Soviets would not be in a position to launch a massive attack on the United States. The great question, therefore, was how the United States should use this two year interval. Should we devote it to an attempt to roll back the Russian power. This was the question.

The Council then resumed its discussion of the problem of scheduling the flow of American arms to Germany and the choice of a planning date for EDC ratification as a guide to the production and delivery of this equipment.

The National Security Council:

a. Reaffirmed the statement of policy on the subject in NSC 160/1, pending review by the Council in 30 days.

b. Requested the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, in collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense and the Bureau of the Budget, to prepare for Council information in 30 days a revised financial appendix on the subject.

c. Requested the Secretary of Defense to report for consideration at the Council meeting on October 13, 1953, as to the desirability of establishing a revised planning date for EDC ratification later than November 1, 1953, as a guide to the scheduling of production and delivery of equipment for the German military forces.

Note: The actions in b and c above subsequently transmitted to the Director of Foreign Operations Administration and the Secretary of Defense respectively for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of items 3–5, Berlin (see Document 587), the decline of United States prestige abroad, and the current budgetary situation and outlook.]

No. 225

Editorial Note

At its 166th meeting on October 13, the National Security Council took the following action with respect to Germany.

"Agreed, on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, that April 1, 1954, should be established as the planning date on which the German military build-up will effectively begin, as a guide to the scheduling of production and delivery of equipment for the German military forces, assuming prior EDC ratification."

The text of this action was transmitted to Bonn, Berlin, Paris, and London in circular airgram CA-2170, October 19. (762A.5/10-1953)

On April 9, 1954, these four posts were informed that because of the failure of France and Italy to ratify the EDC, but with the expectation that they would by July 1, the date October 1, 1954, should be substituted for April 1 as the planning date on which the

German military buildup would begin. (Circular airgram CA-5698, 762A.5/4-954)

No. 226

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "H"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis)

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 21, 1953.

Subject: Visit of State Secretary Hallstein

Participants: The Secretary of State
Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the German Federal Republic
Dr. Heinz Krekeler, Chargé d'Affaires of the Federal Republic
Geoffrey W. Lewis—Acting Director, GER

Dr. Hallstein saw the Secretary at his own request for about three quarters of an hour on October 21. Dr. Hallstein was in this country to deliver an address at the *New York Herald Tribune* Forum and to accept a degree from Georgetown University.

Dr. Hallstein began by expressing pleasure at having an opportunity again to talk to the Secretary. He had been asked by the Chancellor to thank the Secretary for having met the Chancellor's points on the reply to the Soviets in so satisfactory a manner. [1] He then said that the Chancellor had asked him to convey to the Secretary the following:

(1) *EDC*. Dr. Hallstein said that the Chancellor was considering no alternatives to EDC. In fact, ratification of the EDC within the near future was essential to the Chancellor's continued political life. The Chancellor had won the election on the basis of his foreign policy and the keystone of that foreign policy is ratification of the EDC. He was, therefore, determined to do everything in his power to obtain this objective.

The Secretary said that the policy of this government was identical with that of the Chancellor in that we had considered alternatives to the EDC only sufficiently to determine that there were no acceptable alternatives. He fully appreciated the Chancellor's dedication to this objective and said that he felt the prospects for reasonable prompt ratification were brighter than ever before. He had been encouraged by his recent talks with Bidault,[2] who felt that there was a possibility of some sort of token vote even before the French presidential election, perhaps taking the form of a vote to replace the *rapporteur* of the Committee in the Assembly having charge of the EDC. In this connection, the Secretary felt that a solution of the Saar problem was very important in obtaining the end we all desire and he hoped that stories he had heard to the effect that the Chancellor's position on the Saar had hardened were untrue.

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[1] Presumably Hallstein is referring to the tripartite note of Oct. 18 which invited the Soviet Union to a four-power meeting at Lugano on Nov. 9. For documentation on this note and further exchanges of messages with the Soviet Union which led to the Berlin Conference in January 1954, see Documents 257 ff.

Dr. Hallstein assured the Secretary that the Chancellor's position on the Saar had not changed and that he was eager to take advantage of M. Bidault's invitation to discuss the matter.[3] He felt, however, that it was necessary this time carefully to lay the ground work so that this conference would not end indecisively as others had done. To this end the Chancellor was thinking of working out the preliminaries through Francois-Poncet. No detailed settlement could, of course, be expected out of talks between the Chancellor and Bidault but the Chancellor did feel that there should be certain principles established which would make it impossible for the French to delay consideration of the EDC indefinitely. Furthermore the Saar issue now constituted a problem by reason of not only the SPD attitude but also that of certain elements in the Chancellor's coalition, notably the FDP. The Chancellor was taking steps to handle this opposition within his own coalition. In the end, strong intervention by the United States might be necessary to bring about Franco-German agreement.

Dr. Hallstein went on to say that if the EDC ratification were long delayed, the German people would become very restive over the fact that the occupation would continue and the Chancellor felt that consideration would have to be given in that event to putting the contractual agreements into effect even though there was no EDC ratification.

To this the Secretary replied that he was fully aware of the dangers of allowing the French simply by inaction on the EDC to perpetuate an outmoded occupation and he agreed that the problem was to get the French to act, for it now appeared reasonably certain that the French Assembly would ratify the EDC by a small margin if it were brought to a vote.

(2) *Security Guarantees.* Dr. Hallstein said that Van Zeeland had called on the Chancellor last week to discuss his plan of security guarantees.[4] The Chancellor was very much concerned by certain of its features. In effect it substituted a guarantee by the Soviets for the presence of American troops in Germany which was from the German point of view an entirely unsatisfactory exchange. It confirmed, temporarily at least, the Oder-Neisse line. Lastly, the Chancellor thought it was very bad tactics to discuss such a plan

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[2] For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting at London, Oct. 16-18, during which the question of Germany was discussed, see Documents 291 ff.

[3] For documentation on Adenauer's discussions with Bidault concerning the Saar, see Documents 607 ff.

[4] Regarding Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland's proposal for security guarantees in Europe, made to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, Sept. 29, see the memorandum of conversation by the Secretary, vol. v, Part 1, p. 813.

before EDC was solidly established since this would enable opponents of the EDC in France to continue to stall.

The Secretary replied that this plan had been discussed during the recent meeting of the three Foreign Ministers at London but that they entertained similar misgivings to those of the Chancellor and, therefore, had agreed politely to discourage the idea.

(3) *Russian Progress in Atomic Weapons.* Dr. Hallstein reported that Van Zeeland had told the Chancellor that the Russians had recently made unexpected progress in catching up with the US in the atomic arms race. This had led certain Americans to be more willing to make concessions in order to reach agreement with the Russians than had been the case before. He wondered if the Secretary could give him any comments to take back to the Chancellor.

The Secretary replied that our scientists had indeed come to the conclusion that the Russians had made unexpectedly rapid progress in developing a Hydrogen type of weapon but that they felt that the U.S. still had a reasonable lead. He then pointed out that we were far ahead of the Russians in developing and manufacturing types of atomic weapons for tactical use and that these promised to be more useful as practical military weapons than the bomb which obliterated huge areas. It was felt that we were far enough ahead of the Soviets in this field to prevent them from deliberately starting a war for some years to come.

(4) *Consultation with the Germans.* Dr. Hallstein said that the Chancellor wanted to be certain that there was adequate consultation with the German Government during the Paris meeting and during a meeting at Lugano if one should develop.[5] As to the latter, he realized that the Germans could not sit down at the conference table and he was satisfied with the tentative arrangements so far made. He was, however, concerned lest matters be discussed in Paris without an adequate opportunity being given the Germans to express their views on matters vital to them.

The Secretary replied that he considered the Paris conference little more than an academic exercise since he thought there was small likelihood of a Lugano meeting taking place. He, therefore, thought the Chancellor did not need to worry that any final decisions would be taken there. He pointed out that it was a conference principally of technical experts and that he had consented to have Mr. MacArthur participate for only a short time. He could assure Dr. Hallstein that the Germans would be kept fully abreast of all developments in the meeting which affect their interests.

As Dr. Hallstein and Dr. Krekeler were leaving, the Secretary asked if Dr. Hallstein attached great importance to a meeting with the President. Dr. Hallstein replied that the Chancellor thought it would indeed be very helpful to him. The Secretary thereupon arranged a short call by Dr. Hallstein on the President for the following morning.[6]

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[5] For documentation on the tripartite technical conversations at Paris, Oct. 21–Nov. 2, 1953, see Documents 312 ff.

[6] For a record of Hallstein's meeting with President Eisenhower, see the memorandum of conversation, *infra*.

Before going in to the Secretary's Office, Mr. Lewis learned from Dr. Hallstein that the Chancellor was thinking of putting through amendments to the Basic Law to remove all doubts as to the legality in Germany of EDC without waiting for action by the Constitutional Court. This was not yet a fixed decision. The Chancellor had failed in his attempt to get the SPD to drop their suit, a course of action which the Chancellor thought would have been the best way of resolving the problem.

No. 227

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "H"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis)

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 22, 1953.

Subject: Visit of Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein

Participants: The President
Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the German Federal Republic
Dr. Heinz Krekeler, Chargé d'Affaires of the Federal Republic of Germany
Geoffrey W. Lewis, Acting Director, Bureau of German Affairs

Dr. Hallstein began by conveying to the President the Chancellor's greetings and best wishes. The President thanked Dr. Hallstein and remarked that he greatly valued the picture which the Chancellor had given him on the occasion of the Chancellor's visit [1] and that it served as a reminder of that pleasant occasion. Dr. Hallstein said that the Chancellor had found the business of forming his cabinet very difficult because his victory had been so complete that all elements of his coalition felt that there was no excuse not to grant their wishes in the matter of representation in the Cabinet. The President asked if the solution might not be to form extra cabinet posts and Dr. Hallstein confirmed that this had in fact been done.

The President then expressed concern about the Yugoslav attitude in connection with Trieste. He observed that Trieste was of no real intrinsic value to the Yugoslavs and hoped that Tito would not allow the issue to interfere with the development of Western defensive strength. He wished that Tito would show the same determination that this relatively small problem should not be permitted to weaken the West as had Chancellor Adenauer in connection with the Saar.

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[1] A reference to Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington in April.

Dr. Hallstein then said that the Chancellor had asked him to discuss three points with the President, one of which was the EDC. He assured the President that the Chancellor was unwavering in his support and that failure to obtain prompt ratification would indeed be catastrophic both for the Western world and for the Chancellor himself since he had won the election on his foreign policy which in turn centered around support of the EDC. The Chancellor was considering no alternatives to the EDC but if it were long delayed he felt that some other method would have to be found to enable Germany to contribute to the defensive strength of the West. He was greatly concerned lest the French by inaction would allow this great opportunity to further European integration to slip by.

The President replied that, as Dr. Hallstein knew, he had been supporting the EDC concept in every way that he could. He knew that the Chancellor was unalterably opposed to the formation of a national German army. He asked if there was anything that the Chancellor thought should be done at this point to make further progress. Dr. Hallstein replied that he thought that the closest possible association by Britain would be extremely helpful particularly in gaining the essential support of the French Socialists. The President said he thought that Sir Winston was now thoroughly in favor of EDC and would lend all possible support to it.

Dr. Hallstein then said that the Chancellor's position on the Saar was unchanged but that the question was difficult for him particularly since he now found opposition from some of the members of his own coalition to his views and he therefore had these men to cope with as well as the SPD. It might well be that the aid of some outside body like the Council of Europe or the diplomatic influence of the US would have to be sought to obtain a satisfactory solution.

The President said that this government would do all that it could in this regard but that as Dr. Hallstein knew, we felt it important to stay out of this question to the greatest extent possible. The President said that he knew that in particular the Secretary of State, Mr. Bruce, and Dr. Conant, would be available to assist in any way they could.

Dr. Hallstein then said that the Chancellor was greatly concerned about Van Zeeland's suggestion of a security guarantee.[2] As the Chancellor saw it, a Russian guarantee would be substituted for the presence of American troops if this plan were followed and that alarmed the Germans. He also thought that the plan in effect embodied a confirmation of the Oder-Neisse line which also could not be accepted by the Germans. Lastly, the Chancellor felt that it was a great mistake to discuss matters of this sort before the foundation of EDC had been securely established.

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[2] See footnote 4, *supra*.

The President said he appreciated those points and sympathized with them. He agreed that we should first obtain ratification of the EDC. We could then perhaps develop some arrangement which would bring about withdrawal of the Russian forces further East so as to give us more warning should they decide to attack.

The President then inquired as to whether Dr. Hallstein was satisfied with the progress made on EPC in the recent Rome meeting which he understood Dr. Hallstein had attended.[3] Dr. Hallstein said that he was indeed pleased with progress but that representatives of the Quai d'Orsay had not been particularly helpful in promoting progress and had indeed, he thought, deliberately followed delaying tactics. He added, however, that other French officials, notably Teitgen, had worked hard to make the meeting a success.

The interview began about 8:55 a.m. and lasted for nearly 15 minutes.

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[3] A reference to the EPC meeting at Rome, Sept. 22–Oct. 9.

No. 228

033.62A11/10-2153

The Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis) to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, October 28, 1953.

DEAR MR. CONANT: You have probably already received copies of memoranda of the conversations Professor Hallstein had with the Secretary and with the President during his recent visit.[1] In addition, Bob Bowie found an opportunity to have a discussion with him and I was able to see him for a little while at a dinner Dr. Krekeler gave.

The matters he seemed to have most on his mind are covered in the two memoranda. However, both Bob and I got the impression that he and the Chancellor really had something else on their minds which did not emerge until just as Hallstein was leaving. Then it came out. The Germans are apparently putting together a number of things and are getting the jitters that the Americans are really thinking seriously of withdrawing from Europe and perhaps adopting some kind of a peripheral concept. I think this feeling explains in part the Chancellor's quite violent reaction against security guarantees (an idea which he himself put forward back in July[2]) and probably was the reason Hallstein dragged into the conversation with the Secretary a reference to Russian progress in atomic warfare capabilities. In addition they probably are concerned at newspaper reports of Secretary Wilson's statement to the effect that we might be able to withdraw some of our troops from Europe because of recent new developments and the publicity given to the re-evaluation of American defense needs by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in light of progress made in the atomic weapons field.

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[1] See *supra* and Document 226.

As I say, since this fear never came out in the open during Hallstein's talk with the Secretary, there was no occasion for the Secretary to reassure the Germans on the point. Bob, of course, did so as soon as he found out what was on Hallstein's mind. I am passing this on to you with the thought that if you have not already detected the same preoccupation you might consider it wise to reassure the Germans, without, of course, stressing the matter or dragging it in. Similar fears as you know have been expressed in other countries in Europe and I understand that as a consequence Ambassador Hughes has a reassuring statement approved by the President which he is going to discuss confidentially with the permanent representatives to NATO.

Sincerely yours,

GEOFFREY W. LEWIS

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[2] For text of this proposal, see the memorandum of conversation by Riddleberger, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1606.

No. 229

762.00/10-2853

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET EYES ONLY BAD GODESBURG, October 28, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: This personal note will supplement the cables and at the same time bring you a somewhat more intimate picture of the way the situation here in Germany looks to me at the present moment.

Unless something unexpected happens in the next few weeks it seems we must be reconciled to a slower schedule for EDC ratification than I had hoped, and a slower schedule than the Chancellor had repeatedly prophesied before his election. There can be no doubt that the Chancellor has run into resurgent German nationalism in connection with the formation of his Cabinet. He has also run into political ambitions and party differences greater than he had anticipated. He told me the other day he had spent two very bad weeks forming his Cabinet and had finally told the quarreling party leaders that if the German people had overheard the quarrels they would be shocked, and he was going ahead and settle matters finally himself. How much his difficulty in forming a Cabinet will affect his eventual attitude toward the Saar question is problematic, but it certainly has delayed his meeting with Bidault.

The Chancellor is now blaming Bidault and the French for the delay. He has probably convinced himself that the French and not the Germans are responsible for the delaying tactics. Yesterday he refused to consider even on an off chance that he and Bidault could make a settlement of the Saar problem before the French presidential election, placing the blame on Bidault and his presidential aspirations. We shall see whether or not the Chancellor and Bidault can make some progress towards a Saar settlement in the next few weeks. I am not yet willing to pass final judgment on whether the Chancellor's own previously liberal point of view about the Saar has been altered.

The Chancellor seems quite aware of the dangers inherent in the delays. Likewise, the French High Commissioner, M. Francois-Poncet, is very disturbed about the growing impatience of the United States. Possibly the Chancellor believes the United States will force the French to ratify without a settlement of the Saar problem. There is even a remote possibility that under the influence of the more nationalistic elements in his coalition he may himself be flirting with the idea of a national German army within the NATO framework. If so, he has reversed himself recently. For as late as September 10, in the course of a conversation with Bruce and myself, he went out of his way to affirm strongly his belief that only an EDC solution would be acceptable to him and the more sensible Germans. He then said we do not want a national army.

If I may express my own personal views, I would be deeply concerned if there were any possibility of a national German army. I know some people in the Pentagon and in Congress feel otherwise. And the former British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, also was willing to consider the possibility, but from what I have seen I would consider the creation of a national German army a most dangerous undertaking. The basic German political situation is too unstable and the German governmental structure is too new to trust the final command of a national army to the hands of the unknown German leaders of the future. It could well be that such a national army would find itself allied with the East against the West. In short, the crucial decision of these months is whether we can bind West Germany to the West politically, economically, and militarily. If in the coming months there should be serious discussion in Washington of an alternative involving a national German army, I hope I may be permitted to return to argue my case at the highest level. If worse came to worst I myself would prefer the withdrawal of all but token forces from Europe and a so-called peripheral defense rather than a German national army.

I trust these personal observations may be of some value to you. You will readily understand why I am sending them in this personal form and for your eyes only. There are so many reasons why EDC must be put through that I have found it unwise to argue with most people about whether or not a German national army would be a good or a bad thing in itself. My standard argument is that I cannot imagine that French leaders in a rational mood would prefer a national German army, and France is as necessary for our defense as Germany.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

JIM

No. 230

762.00/11-953

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant)

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 9, 1953.

DEAR JIM: I have your letter of October 28th.[1] I read it with intense interest and considerable disappointment. I had hoped that the overwhelming success of Adenauer would have made his path easier rather than perhaps harder. I am particularly disappointed at the prospect of considerable delay on the Saar matter and the possible stiffening of the Chancellor's position.

From all the information we have, there is no basis for blaming Bidault on the French delays. Bidault now seems to be the strong, outspoken supporter of EDC, and the latest information we have from Paris is that it is he who is pushing for quick action, whereas Laniel and others are holding back.

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[1] *Supra.*

I noted your views with reference to national German army within the NATO framework. I myself consider that this would be a most unsatisfactory alternative to European unity. I read to the President this portion of your letter.

No doubt we are at the crossroads and if EDC fails, the consequences may have to be a change more radical than merely to bring Germany into NATO. Of course, Churchill and many of our military people would doubtless favor that course.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

No. 231

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "1951-1959"

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State [1]

OFFICIAL EYES ONLY
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

BAD GODESBERG, November 13, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: When I wrote you on October 28 [2] that I believed there was "even a remote possibility" that the Chancellor, under the influence of the more nationalistic elements in his coalition, might be flirting with the idea of a national army, I was giving expression to only a vague suspicion. I am sorry to say that events which occurred yesterday, and of which you have heard through other channels, have now thoroughly alarmed me. [3] It seems clear that the Chancellor is interested in exploring an alternative to EDC. This can only mean a national army, presumably within the framework of NATO and in close collaboration with the United States. I have also today learned that recently Herr Blank told one of our . . . men that he had three plans of organization, one for the present, one for EDC, if the treaties are ratified, and one for another alternative.

There can be no doubt that some American Army and Naval officers have been making statements to Blank and some German officers and politicians suggestive of something pretty close to a German-American military alliance while expressing disdain for the French. A little of this sort of talk will go a long way in the present mood in a country which today is feeling its oats. Indeed, I am distressed with the increasing tensions between France and Germany since I am convinced that there is no future for Western Europe unless these tensions can be diminished and European integration accomplished, however slowly.

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[1] Handwritten notations on the source text indicate that it was seen by Secretary Dulles, Under Secretary Smith, MacArthur, Merchant, and Bowie.

[2] See Document 229.

[3] Neither the events nor the communication has been further identified.

I believe we must now face the possibility that the Chancellor has really changed his mind about a German national army and about the possibility of a solution of the Saar problem. Indeed, his realization of the difficulties he faces here with a solution of the Saar problem may have led him, step by step, to the conclusion that he must throw over EDC and temporarily, at least, EPC and the movement toward European integration. How he can hope to go down this new road and yet be known in history as the great statesman that brought about European integration, I fail to see. Of course, there is the possible hypothesis that he is still unchanged in his fundamental point of view and is merely anxious to test out the United States position in order to demonstrate to some of his colleagues that there is no real alternative to EDC.

Needless to say, I hope this second hypothesis is correct, for otherwise we are really in for great difficulties. Indeed, the difficulties would be so great that I would prefer to risk the defense of the free world to an emasculated NATO, rather than see the creation of a German national army. I take it our experience in Korea has shown the dangers involved if a nationalistic government has an independent army, even if it is only a small one and not prepared for a global war. Needless to say, the relation between the Bundesrepublik and the East Zone is almost as explosive as between North and South Korea. I wish that some of our soldiers and Congressmen who have been talking here rather lightheartedly about a German national army would think over the analogy between Korea and Germany.

If I may venture a recommendation, it would seem to me highly important for the Chancellor to be told directly by the President that the United States would not be a party to arming a German national army. Furthermore, that the United States Government was convinced that a defense of Europe is only possible in the long run on the basis of good German-French relations and that a solution of the Saar problem is essential as the next step in forwarding these good relations. This is on the assumption that the United States policy is and will remain the policy of support of EDC, EPC and European integration. If there is any discussion of a reversal of this policy, may I repeat my request of my earlier letter, namely, that I be given a chance to come to Washington to argue the case against the formation of a German national army. I was somewhat disturbed by a recent cable (Deptel 1451, of November 6 [4]) expressing the hope that an amendment of the German constitution would permit "a direct defense contribution" if EDC failed.

In a later letter or cable, which could receive wider distribution than this letter, I may suggest certain statements which could be included in a radio speech I am to make on Wednesday the 25th. I believe that two ideas might well be coupled together at this time; namely, that American troops will remain here in force to defend a united Western Europe, and second, that a united Western Europe means primarily progressively bettering French-German relations.

May I conclude by expressing my opinion that outside of political circles public opinion in Germany is much less concerned with rearming the country than in regaining sovereignty. This is particularly true among the industrial people with whom I have been meeting in a number of cities recently. The removal of the industrial controls is a matter with which they are deeply concerned and, I think, quite rightly. Therefore, if the Saar problem could be solved in at least general outline before the first of the year, it might well be in order to consider the removal of most of the remaining occupation functions by action of the Allied High Commission. But this is a separate subject about which I may trouble you later.

With all good wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

JIM

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[4] Not printed. (762A.3/10-1653)

No. 232

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "November 1953"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis)

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 18, 1953.

Subject: Visit of Dr. Krekeler with Under Secretary Smith, 11:30 a.m., November 18, 1953.

Participants: Under Secretary Smith
Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires of the Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Geoffrey W. Lewis, Acting Director, GER

Dr. Krekeler came to see the Under Secretary at his own request. He had just returned from a quick trip to Germany. He wanted to deliver certain messages from the Chancellor and discuss the situation he found in Germany.

Withdrawal of US Forces. Dr. Krekeler said the Chancellor was seriously concerned that the United States may be contemplating withdrawal of a large part of its forces and reliance instead on new weapons. The Chancellor greatly feared the effect on both the Russians and the other NATO members if this should be done.

General Smith stated emphatically that there was no thought of any such action. The United States fully appreciated the great importance of keeping its troop strength in Europe at about the present level. As evidence of this, General Smith told Dr. Krekeler that when the question had come up of the possible withdrawal from Trieste of our small garrison, the intention was not to bring these troops home but to station them elsewhere in Europe as an indication of our policy. With respect to new weapons, General Smith assured the Ambassador that before any fundamental change in US tactics or troop dispositions would be made on the basis of a changed situation brought about by the existence of these weapons, there would be full consultation with our Allies.

The Saar. Dr. Krekeler said the Chancellor was worried about the French attitude as reflected so far in his discussions with Francois-Poncet.[1] He thought that a solution would demand true compromises and that while the Chancellor would accept a solution based on the Europeanization of the Saar, this must not be simply a new name for something resembling the present status. The Chancellor hoped that if need arose, the United States would be willing to take a hand in order to bring about a solution of the problem.

General Smith said that the United States stood ready to help in any way that it could. However, the larger issues at stake were so important that the Saar problem must not be allowed to stand in the way of working them out. Therefore, the Germans must be prepared to give on the issue of the Saar until it hurt. Both sides would have to make concessions which would be painful to them.

Progress in EDC Ratification. Dr. Krekeler said the Chancellor was greatly concerned at the slow pace of action by the French although he realized that nothing could be done until after their Presidential election. He was particularly troubled by the impression he had gained that the French people did not really desire an integrated Europe. As for ratification in Germany, a bill would be introduced from the floor in the Bundestag to amend the Basic Law so as to remove the constitutional issue which is now before the Constitutional Court. The Chancellor was sure that the Court would not act before this legislative action had been taken and that the bill would be passed since the Chancellor's coalition commanded a two-thirds majority in both Houses. Dr. Krekeler asked if General Smith could give him any views as to the possibility of EDC ratification and as to the all-important question of timing.

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[1] For information on Chancellor Adenauer's conversations with François-Poncet see telegrams 1589 and 1992, Documents 654 and 655.

General Smith stated that he was certain the French would ratify the EDC some time during the early part of 1954. He pointed out that the US Congress would meet on January 6 and would shortly thereafter take up the budget and the question of further aid to the European countries. The French were well aware that the sentiment in Congress was such that it would be extremely difficult to get our program for aid approved by the Congress if the French had not at least given definite indication by that time of their intention to ratify. General Smith then read to Dr. Krekeler a passage from a staff paper which he said he had set aside when it came to his desk for just this purpose.[2] The passage emphasized that US policy toward Europe was founded on close Franco-German *rapprochement.*

The Bermuda Conference.[3] Dr. Krekeler asked if the Under Secretary could give him any indication of what might come out of Bermuda, particularly with respect to matters which concern Germany.

General Smith said that it was still pretty unclear as to what would emerge. However, he felt sure there would be a reaffirmation of the fundamental support by the three Allies for the EDC. There might perhaps be a statement by the President that we intended to keep our troops in Europe for the foreseeable future. There would probably also be considerable progress in ironing out some of the differences of view among the Allies on questions in other parts of the world, for example, the Near East. General Smith assured Dr. Krekeler that the Chancellor would be kept fully informed on matters affecting Germany and he understood that the Chancellor did not want an observer at Bermuda.

Dr. Krekeler thanked the Under Secretary and said that the Chancellor would be greatly reassured by General Smith's statements. The interview lasted about 40 minutes.

On the way out of the building Dr. Krekeler said to Mr. Lewis that he hoped we would not hesitate to seek information on the Saar problem, if we needed it, for, he said, "If the problem is discussed at Bermuda, who would present the German point of view?"

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[2] Not further identified.

[3] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, Dec. 4–8, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

Mr. Lewis said he thought it extremely unlikely that the problem of the Saar would be discussed in that kind of detail at Bermuda but that he would bear Dr. Krekeler's offer in mind. He hoped that Dr. Krekeler, for his part, would keep us fully informed on the progress of the Franco-German negotiations insofar as lay within his power.

No. 233

033.62A11/11-2353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis)

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 23, 1953.

Subject: Courtesy Call of Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics, Federal Republic of Germany.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Dr. Ludwig Erhard
Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires of the Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Geoffrey W. Lewis—GER
Fraulein Grosse-Schware—Interpreter

Dr. Erhard, who is in this country at the invitation of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, paid a fifteen minute courtesy call on the Secretary this afternoon. [1]

After an exchange of greetings, Dr. Erhard said he was in this country to discuss economic problems not political ones. He was happy to note the understanding of Germany's economic problems on the part of US officials. The Secretary then asked him how the European Coal and Steel Community was operating.

Dr. Erhard replied that there was some difficulty in setting up a common market due, in his view, to the fact that many European countries maintained false exchange rates. This pointed to the necessity for obtaining free convertibility immediately, and he was gratified at the interest shown in the US on this problem. The Secretary then alluded to the British difficulties on this matter and to the discussions he had had with Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler last spring. Dr. Erhard appreciated the British problem but disagreed with Mr. Butler on two points, namely, that convertibility must mean convertibility of currency and goods and that to establish convertibility greater dollar reserves would be needed.

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[1] Erhard was in Washington for economic conversations, Nov. 23–25, at the invitation of the U.S. Government. Records of seven memoranda of conversation with him have been found in Department of State files, but only this one and that *infra* have been printed. In addition to these two, there are memoranda for conversations at the Departments of Commerce and State on Nov. 23, at the Foreign Operations Administration and the Council of Economic Advisers on Nov. 24, and a second conversation at the Department of State on Nov. 25. These memoranda are in file 862A.00/11-2353 through 11-2553.

The Secretary then asked if Dr. Erhard attached importance to the recent increased Soviet sales of gold. Dr. Erhard thought that this indicated internal difficulties in the Soviet Union which led them to want to increase the standard of living and the supply of consumers goods. In response to a further question from the Secretary, he admitted the possibility that the Soviets were deliberately dumping gold in order to promote currency difficulties in the rest of the world.

No. 234

862A.00/11-2553

Memorandum of Conversation, by William K. Miller of the Office of German Affairs [1]

RESTRICTED [WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1953.

Subject: Off-shore Procurement

Participants: Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics, German Federal Republic
Dr. Mueller-Armack, Economics Ministry, German Federal Republic
Dr. Albert F. Ernecke, German Diplomatic Mission
Mr. Hans Podeyn, German Diplomatic Mission
Miss Grosse-Schware, Interpreter
Mr. Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., S/MSA
Mr. Allen Moreland, S/MSA
Mr. Louis Pollak, S/MSA
Mr. Oscar Gray, L/MSA
Mr. Geoffrey W. Lewis, GER
Mr. Jacques J. Reinstein, GER
Mr. Daniel F. Margolies, GER
Mr. William K. Miller, GER
Mr. Howard Hilton, GER (2)
Mr. Michael Harris, HICOG, Bonn
Mr. Weir Brown, HICOG, Bonn
Colonel Haas, Defense, OMA

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[1] Drafted on Dec. 2 and cleared with Margolies and Nolting.

Lt. Col. Beaudrias, Defense, OMA
Mr. Shafer, Defense, OMA
Miss Lejins, Interpreter (TC)

The meeting was arranged at the request of Dr. Erhard.

Dr. Erhard said that he was not too satisfied with the situation as respects German participation in the OSP programs. So far only a minor start had been made. He attributed this to three reasons:

(1) The prolonged tax negotiations: This problem, he said, is now settled. The Finance Minister had agreed with him to give tax relief for OSP on basis requested by the United States.

(2) The question of the use of surplus property DM: The Finance Minister had also agreed that expenditures for OSP of DM drawn by the U.S. under the surplus property arrangements would, like expenditures in free dollars, be given the same tax relief as exports.

(3) Prohibitions on German production administered by the Military Security Board: Dr. Erhard said he had the impression that the MSB might be interpreting the rules more narrowly than it ought to be, that is that it probably has more latitude in permitting production than it uses. He observed that perhaps negotiations should be started to give Germany more latitude in industrial production if Germany approves the agreements for Western integration.

Dr. Erhard said that he would like more OSP in Germany, which would mean more inclusion of Germany in the Western defense production effort.

Mr. Nolting said that he was glad to hear that the tax problem was settled and that he wished to be sure he understood Dr. Erhard correctly on this point. Was his understanding correct that the surplus property funds could be used for OSP and would be tax exempt?

Dr. Erhard confirmed that this was correct. At the same time he said he assumed that OSP would be larger in scope than the available surplus property funds.

Mr. Nolting assured Dr. Erhard that there would be no attempt to match OSP to the surplus property funds.

Colonel Haas, at Mr. Nolting's request, described the basic purposes of OSP, the categories of equipment purchased, and the purchase procedures. He emphasized the competitive factor in bidding and our intention to use the available funds where they would procure the most and best equipment. In response to Dr. Erhard's remark that he could not understand the low volume of procurement in Germany if competitive ability is the test, Colonel Haas said that this resulted from the exclusion of Germany from manufacture of most of the major items in the program, such as ammunition and aircraft.

Dr. Erhard questioned whether it would be possible to relieve the Federal Republic in respect to the restrictions on production, conditional upon German ratification of the treaties.

Mr. Reinstein said that this is a delicate problem, particularly with EDC under discussion in several parliaments. OSP generally relates to completed weapons. Weapons and armament production in Germany now might cause difficulty in speedy ratification. Whether it would be necessary to await ratification of the EDC Treaty by all parties, however, is a question that might be examined at a later stage. He recalled that the Foreign Ministers had agreed that there should be an examination of the resulting problems if the other parties to the EDC Treaty should delay ratification after the Contractual Agreements had been ratified by all four parties and the EDC Treaty ratified by France and the Federal Republic.

Dr. Erhard raised the problem of unemployment in Berlin, which he said the Burgermeister of Berlin had asked him to raise, and what could be done through OSP to relieve the situation. He indicated that other business could be shifted from Western Germany to Berlin in certain industries if these West German industries could secure OSP orders. He mentioned particularly the electrical goods industry and some branches of mechanical engineering. Dr. Erhard said Berlin would supply as much as possible in parts and supplies for OSP contracts placed in West Germany. He asked whether orders could be placed in other countries and subcontracts for "harmless objects" placed in Berlin. Dr. Erhard emphasized the importance of helping Berlin and specifically of relieving the unemployment situation.

Mr. Nolting, Mr. Lewis and other U.S. representatives indicated that we fully share the desire to help Berlin and expressed appreciation for any efforts to steer business from West Germany to Berlin. However, subcontracting is ordinarily left to the prime contractors. Subcontracts probably are being placed in Germany without the German Government or German business knowing that they are for our OSP program. An effort has been made to shift business to Berlin whenever possible; we are helping through payment of transportation costs, but the competitive factor cannot be dismissed. The proposal regarding subcontracts from other countries would involve real difficulties, but the U.S. would explore it.

Dr. Erhard interjected during the above that he was primarily interested in dollar orders, not subcontracts paid in other currencies, which throw out the EPU balance more. With respect to the question of competition, he agreed that things are not always in order on the German side; there have been price agreements, which is against his economic policy.

Dr. Ernecke raised the problem of the application of the "Buy American Act" to aluminum. He had been informed earlier by *Aide-Mémoire* [2] that the exemption of aluminum to the provisions of the "Buy American Act" would be interpreted to include rolled products and other semi-processed shapes and forms as well as pig and ingots; now he had heard that there was some doubt about this since the Department of Defense had apparently acted to change this interpretation by removing mill forms and shapes from the exemption and to examine each case separately on its merits. Dr. Ernecke said that his Government would regret extremely any change in the previously announced position and requested assurance that the position remained as stated in the *Aide-Mémoire*.

Mr. Margolies said he understood that Mr. Kalijarvi had further information on this subject and that the problem could perhaps be better explored in the meeting with Mr. Waugh scheduled for that afternoon. [3]

Mr. Nolting, in response to Dr. Erhard's question, said there had as yet been no definite determination of how much OSP there would be in Europe with FY 54 funds. A general order of magnitude as a target had been set, but time would be needed and so far no contracts had been placed. As regards placement of contracts in Germany, we could not be specific with respect to this year, and it would be even more difficult to forecast FY 55. Mr. Nolting said that we are interested in procuring some light naval craft, minesweepers and motor torpedo boats. As to future years, we do not know what funds there will be for MSP or what part will go for OSP. He believed OSP requirements in FY 55 would be less than this year, however, since most equipment requirements would already be filled.

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[2] Not further identified.

[3] A memorandum of Erhard's conversation with Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Waugh is in file 862A.00/11–2553.

No. 235

762A.00/12-1253: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Steere) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BONN, December 12, 1953—4 p.m.

1938. Following is our evaluation of Chancellor's political strength in coming crucial months.

Emergence of Chancellor's own party from September 6 elections with unprecedented absolute majority in Bundestag, great increase in total coalition strength, and formation of new coalition with two-thirds majority in both Houses, led many to assumption Chancellor's strength increased proportionately. Actually, although he is without rival in eyes of German people as political leader and statesman, his position vis-à-vis Bundestag and party is somewhat weakened. In old Bundestag, coalition margin so narrow parties hung together against SPD threat and supported Chancellor even when his policies unacceptable, e.g., co-determination. Today, parties and many individual deputies feel there is room for maneuver on specific issues and smaller coalition parties, who suffered in elections from Chancellor's personal prestige, attempt to recoup their position by asserting independence on even crucial issues such as Saar and constitutional amendment for defense. Moreover CSU insists it is separate party (from CDU) and is seeking alliances, especially in Bundesrat, to protect federalist principles against anticipated centralism of Chancellor.

Issues in domestic field have not yet developed sufficiently to indicate how serious are difficulties which lie ahead for him. Larger federal share in income tax may be first hurdle, followed by possible difficulties on federal police, federal participation in education, stronger federal administrative control over *land* offices executing federal powers, family law, constitutional court reorganization and perhaps labor legislation.

Altered situation is reflected even more strongly in foreign affairs. French procrastination in EDC has created increasing frustration and discouragement about integration with West simultaneously with rise new questions about other foreign relations. For example, business and industrial groups are increasingly restive with competitive free economy policies of Minister Erhard and a sharp struggle over economic policies may develop. These same groups are concerned regarding Federal Republic's lack of progress in obtaining concessions in such economic fields as E-W trade (particularly Red China and impression that German trade interests to East, including GDR not fully appreciated), German external assets, industrial controls, and German property interests in Saar. Finally, realities of cost military buildup not yet faced and when apparent sharp clash between military and finance authorities likely.

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[1] Repeated to London, Moscow, Berlin, Vienna, and to Paris for Conant, who was attending the North Atlantic Council meeting, Dec. 14-16.

All these factors have some adverse effect on Chancellor's position and his power to put through his foreign policy particularly in the European field. For example, his ability to reach agreement on Saar, i.e., make sufficient concessions to assure French acceptance, depends largely on German estimate of French willingness to proceed with EDC, EPC and Franco-German *rapprochement* in general. Important elements in coalition, it would appear, can be forced to swallow certain details of a Saar settlement (objectionable to them but acceptable to Chancellor) only if they are convinced French will proceed with their part of bargain, not only now but for future as well. It must be emphasized that French action and attitude on European integration really determine Chancellor's ability to deal on Saar.

Position regarding reunification is even more confused because Soviet concessions, real or apparent, both weaken Chancellor's ability to force through concessions which are involved in his foreign policy, and at same time probably weaken ability of French Government to assure French Assembly action which is only *quid pro quo* acceptable to Germans. Adenauer is still convinced Soviets intend no real concessions and no unification and wants to push forward with European plan including Saar settlement. He cannot, however, reject any opportunity to test Soviet intentions. Soviets have ability therefore to lead Chancellor step by step into situation threatening success of his foreign policy and therefore his whole position.

We believe Chancellor too skillful a politician to run serious risk of defeat on domestic issues. His coalition may fall out among themselves on specific issues but we believe self-interest of office holders will keep it going and because parties really have nowhere else to go. This situation could conceivably change but such change not presently on horizon.

In foreign policy field, danger more serious because of French weakness and possible Soviet moves. Best thing for Adenauer would be four-power conference which shows conclusively Soviet unwillingness to make real concessions and agree to reunification, which sufficiently strengthens French resolve to produce EDC ratification and EPC progress, and which removes issue of Soviet intentions inside Germany. If these events do not come to pass, Chancellor will be confronted, before many months, with failure of major thesis his foreign policy and the need to find substitute.

STEERE

No. 236

Editorial Note

On December 13 Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer had a long discussion on European policy, with particular emphasis on the EDC and EPC. For a summary of their conversation, held at Paris before the North Atlantic Council meeting, see telegram 2282, December 14, 1953, volume V, Part 1, page 865.

No. 237

Editorial Note

By the end of 1953 agreement had been reached among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union to hold a four-power conference in Berlin to discuss, among other things, the future of Germany. The conference opened January 25 in the Allied Control Authority building in West Berlin and met until February 18 when it adjourned without results. For documentation on the conference, see Documents 257 ff.

No. 238

762.00/3–1154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 11, 1954.

Subject: Visit of Members of SPD to Acting Secretary

Participants:

The Acting Secretary
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon, GER
Mr. Richard Straus, GER/P

Prof. Dr. Carlo Schmid, Vice President of Bundestag
Mr. Fritz Erler, Member of Bundestag

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[1] Members of the Bundestag had arrived in the United States on Mar. 2 for a 45-day study of Congress.

Mr. Willy Brandt, Member of Bundestag
Dr. Guenter Klein, former Member of Bundesrat

After an exchange of pleasantries, the Acting Secretary said that, of course, the question which was uppermost in every German's mind was unification. This was the all important problem in Germany and we must never lose sight of it. We must reiterate the necessity for a unified Germany on every occasion. We must insist, if necessary, on future conferences to try to attain this end. The Acting Secretary said that the Berlin Conference had indicated that the Soviets were not prepared to do much for Germany in this connection at the present time. The Acting Secretary thought that one of the most revealing aspects of the Conference was the brutal disregard for German public opinion both in East Germany and West Germany which the Soviets had displayed. The Soviets had so obviously aimed at French public opinion that they had paid no heed whatsoever to Germany. General Smith also said that while he had not ever been optimistic that the Conference would contribute very much to amelioration of the German situation, he had hoped that it might result in something for Austria. However, here, too, the Soviet treatment of the Austrians had been brutal in the extreme. All this should not deter us in our determination, however, to press forward on every occasion towards the goal of German unification.

The Acting Secretary said that he was concerned about the possibility of food shortages in the Satellite countries and Eastern Germany, that our reports from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland indicated prospects for poor harvests, and if there were to be food shortages we would have to do everything we could to help the starving people.

Dr. Schmid concurred in this and added that he was apprehensive that the people in Eastern Germany might become so discouraged that they might resort again to a repetition of the uprising of June 17.[2] He feared the outcomes of any such action. The Under Secretary said that that was a possibility about which we, too, were worried for while we wish to keep up the courage of those in the East, premature uprising could result in unnecessary bloodshed and slaughter and this we could not have happen. It was indeed a serious problem of which we were very much aware.

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[2] For documentation on the uprisings in East Germany on June 17, 1953, see Documents 715 ff.

Dr. Schmid next said that while he was entirely against having any relations or any discussions whatsoever between the German Federal Government and the Pankow regime, he did think it might be possible for the Four Occupying Powers to authorize purely technical discussions on a very low level between East and West Germans.

General Smith asked whether the Soviets would permit this and said that we would have no fear of this since we had no fear of having anyone see what we were doing in West Germany. General Smith indicated that the question should be explored.

Dr. Klein emphasized the importance of free communications between Eastern Germany and West Berlin and how important for the morale of the East Germans this was. He also said that we should constantly reiterate our determination to remain in Berlin.

General Smith concurred and said that the more East Germans who went to West Berlin, the better, and added that this seemed to be a time when we must constantly repeat certain important facts.

Mr. Brandt emphasized the need for more than mere propaganda and suggested that one way of indicating the continued interests of the Western powers in Berlin would be to assure continued economic aid.

The Acting Secretary also said that the Saar reports were promising.

No. 239

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "April 1954"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of German Affairs (Straus)

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 21, 1954.

Subject: Current Problems Concerning Germany

Participants: The Acting Secretary
Ambassador Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, Chargé d'Affaires of the German Federal Republic
[Mr. Richard Straus, GER/P]
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon, GER
Dr. Thomas Dehler, Chairman of the Free Democratic Party
Mr. Rudolf Eickhoff, Member of the Bundestag
Dr. Richard Jaeger, Member of the Bundestag

Mr. Adolf Cillien, Member of the Bundestag
Mr. Horst Haasler, Member of the Bundestag
Mr. Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Member of the Bundestag

The members of the Bundestag were received by the Acting Secretary, General Walter Bedell Smith, on Monday, April 12, at 3:30 p.m. Following words of general welcome and inquiries about the forthcoming trip, the Acting Secretary and the German visitors discussed three major problems: 1) the problem of German reunification, 2) the Saar problem and 3) the so-called "new look" in U.S. military policy.[1]

The Acting Secretary assured the German visitors that the U.S. had not lost sight of the need for continued efforts at German reunification and that as the West continued to increase its strength, negotiations from a position of strength may become possible which could then lead to peaceful German reunification. He indicated that this was a long process and not something that can be done immediately, but that it was necessary that none of us lose courage and that we continue to build strength in the West of which EDC is such a major part.

As to the Saar, the Acting Secretary recognized that it constituted a difficult hurdle in the way of European integration but felt that if both parties, France and Germany, "give until it hurts," this hurdle also could probably be overcome.

Asked about the "new look" defense policy, the Acting Secretary indicated that this "new look" was indeed not new but an adjustment in military policy to take the changed situation into account. As to the hydrogen bomb, the General indicated that the United States would continue to seek a workable system of control and inspection for both conventional and atomic weapons. He mentioned in this connection the US-Soviet talks on President Eisenhower's plan for the peaceful use of Atomic energy.

The German delegation took the opportunity of the interview to express Germany's thanks for the post-war U.S. aid program which to such a large extent had been responsible for Germany's recovery.

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[1] For documentation on the "New Look" in NATO, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 482 ff.

No. 240

762A.00/5-554: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, May 5, 1954—8 p.m.

3395. Limited distribution. We have long foreseen time when German patience with occupied status would disappear. We think turning point has come and we are in last weeks of period at end of which alternative must be found to hold German cooperation if EDC not meanwhile ratified.

Shift in climate evidenced in several ways. Debate on Saar and foreign policy (ourtel 3350 to Dept [2]) and Chancellor's unprecedented difficulty in forcing coalition support (not completely successful) is one illustration. Another is almost complete desertion by normally pro-Government, pro-Western press of support for western (US) policy generally and Adenauer foreign policy specifically. Papers which have consistently supported EDC and European integration are now almost wholly agreed that EDC has no chance and substitute must be found. They turn to some variation of German national army idea. Coupled with this is general dissatisfaction directed at alleged FedRep and western inflexibility toward Soviets and DDR. None suggest DDR recognition but criticism of western legalism in contrast East-West realties.

Saar presents extra difficulty. To French Saar settlement may be precondition to EDC; from here it seems progress on EDC has now become precondition to Saar settlement. In other words, Chancellor's ability to make compromise has been limited by French inaction on EDC.

Danger that wave of support for Chancellor in Sept election is about to recede unless he can have quick and striking victory re foreign policy. This recession likely to show itself in *Land* elections beginning Nord Rhine in June.

Discussing Saar, Blankenhorn made point yesterday with which we agree, that Chancellor cannot himself propose substitute for EDC since this would antagonize other western countries and lead them to charge Germany with bad faith, revival of nationalism, etc.

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Telegram 3350 reported that after a series of false starts which demonstrated that the coalition was functioning very stiffly, the Bundestag had on Apr. 30 approved a resolution commending the Chancellor's European policy. (762A.00/5-154)

We assume Chancellor can keep these issues out of Bundestag and hold coalition together until summer recess unless completely unforeseen development but if EDC defeated or again postponed, he will have to abandon his previous policy publicly in order to save coalition unless three occupying powers can come up with some immediate action to support him. [3]

CONANT

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[3] On May 15 HICOG reported that Blankenhorn had been instructed to request the U.S. High Commissioner to inform the Department of State as follows:

"He [Chancellor] is finding himself under increasing pressure of party leaders and public opinion as result of political developments in France, lack of progress and discouraging outlook on Paris and Bonn agreements, and growing confusion and uncertainty in international situation. He is doubtful of his ability to continue to hold the line with Western Allies on present basis their relations with Germany for more than few months. Present indications are that he will be forced to raise these questions later this summer." (Telegram 3536 from Bonn, 762A.00/5–1554)

No. 241

762A.00/5–2754

Paper Prepared in the Office of German Affairs [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

Subject: Developments in Germany since April 25

No individual events in German affairs since the start of the Geneva conference have appeared on the surface especially noteworthy or important, except for the progress on the Saar question (see below).

However, a series of relatively minor developments has indicated clearly an increasing German restiveness which has been especially prevalent in political and press circles during the last month. The Chancellor's fine speech of April 29 during the foreign affairs debate in the Bundestag met with unaccustomed resistance, and he was forced to a maximum exertion of his political strength in order to obtain a favorable vote on the government's policy. The current speculation on the possibility of establishing some kind of contact between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, while it is contrary to the Federal Government's policy and represents no consistent objective or point of view in German public opinion, still indicates a keen responsiveness to some new approach in German policy and reflects a widespread feeling of frustration over the failure to achieve German unification on the one hand, and the delay in the contractuals and EDC Treaty on the other. Most significant of all, Dr. Conant has reported that the Chancellor doubts his own ability to continue holding the line with the Western Allies on the present basis of their relations with Germany for more than a few months in the face of pressure from party leaders and public opinion reflecting lack of progress on EDC and the contractuals.[2] The Chancellor's situation is aggravated by coming *Land* elections, the first of which will take place in North Rhine-Westphalia in June. Dr. Conant believes strongly that if, following the Geneva Conference, France continues to delay bringing EDC to a vote, we and the British must, in order to prevent a complete deterioration in Dr. Adenauer's position, take positive steps (even without the French) to implement the contractual agreements with Germany.

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[1] Attached to a memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, dated May 27, which stated that it was EUR's response to a recent request from the Secretary's Office

Much thought has been given by the Federal Government and the Allies to the problems that may arise out of the recent Soviet move to confer sovereign status on the East German Government, and a tripartite paper on this subject is on its way to Washington. So far, however, the Soviet side has raised no real difficulties in this connection. No non-Communist country has recognized the East German Government, and at least half of the fifty-two nations addressed by the Federal Republic after adoption of the Bundestag resolution against recognition have given assurances that they do not intend to recognize that regime.

The Saar

The continuing discussion of the Saar question culminated in a meeting at Strasbourg, where on May 20 Chancellor Adenauer and Vice Premier Teitgen reached an agreement on the principles of a settlement based on the van Naters report. This agreement was then referred to the German and French Cabinets for approval, but the situation has become increasingly confused. The French have said there was no final agreement and have attempted to reopen negotiations at Bonn. The Germans have maintained that the agreement is final. While our impression is that this may be the last chance for the French to reach a settlement on the Saar as favorable as this one, we and the British are refraining from any form of direct intervention, in view of Mr. Spaak's advice to this effect and Teitgen's specific request for a few days in which to persuade the French Cabinet to adopt the agreement.[3]

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[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

[3] For documentation on van Naters' report on the Saar and the Teitgen-Adenauer agreement, see Document 640 and Documents 686 ff.

Economic Relations

Our relations with the German Government in the economic area continue to develop along satisfactory lines in the direction of reestablishing a normal relationship. In the past month further progress has been made toward completing a number of important economic agreements which have been under negotiation for some time. By way of illustration, we hope to sign a double tax convention within a matter of days, and a treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation next month, or later in the summer.

A difficult negotiation is now in progress between the Occupying Powers, on the one hand, and the German Finance Minister, on the other, concerning a formula for extending an agreement on the German contribution to a common EDC budget and on support costs for our forces after the EDC enters into effect. The difficulty seems to arise from domestic budgetary problems in Germany, rather than any basic change in policy.

As regards Berlin, approval of Congress has been requested for the appropriation of $25 million to maintain the economic and political position of the city.

The refugee problem remains chronic but poses no immediate major difficulties. Since March 1, 1954, the influx into Berlin has been fairly constant, 350-400 daily.

No. 242

740.5/6–1854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 18, 1954—7:24 p.m.

3587. Limited distribution. Paris pass to Bruce. Discussions began yesterday with Leishman of British Embassy on exploratory and *ad referendum* basis re plans for Germany in case further delay French ratification EDC. Explained that Department's object was to make sufficient progress on political side to hold situation for Adenauer, while gaining few more months to work on solution rearmament problem. Department's view any action taken should be such as to facilitate rather than foreclose ratification EDC, hence no intention going into alternatives this time.

Leishman said that British approach had been directed first to question alternatives in event EDC not ratified and then of interim political action in Germany to save Chancellor's position while military problem being solved. Re alternatives Churchill and Foreign Office favored German membership in NATO with possible readjustment in SHAPE to improve technical military controls on non-discriminatory basis. Some consideration being given to expedient involving expansion German border police by unilateral action US and UK within framework preparation for future EDC contribution. Consideration also being given to looser EDC in form of confederation which UK might join, but this third alternative highly tentative.

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[1] Drafted by Auchincloss and cleared by Lyon, Merchant, BNA, and WE. Repeated to London and Paris.

Foreign Office agrees solution military question may take time, while political situation in Germany requires early action. Their analysis current situation Germany similar to ours. They have considered two means accomplishing political objective. Preferred course would be simple one-sentence treaty or protocol placing Contractuals in effect without regard EDC Treaty. Second course would be for HICOM to abrogate occupation status and controls by own action under instructions from governments, but without renouncing powers in fields to be covered by Contractuals. Their tentative suggestion would be, if we agreed and Adenauer had no objection, to put first course to French and then, if this refused, urge French to join in instructing HICOM to proceed abrogate occupation status. If this also refused, US and UK should issue declaration that they would by majority action eliminate as much of occupation status as possible while guarding any of rights covered by Contractuals (as UK puts it) or in order place substance Contractual relations into operation between ourselves and Germans (as we put it). British hope such gradual procedure might induce French ultimately accept these measures.

Foreign Office has also been considering steps to expand German border police in order hasten French decision EDC. Such steps would be in preparation EDC, not as substitution for it.

British views not yet firm but likewise on informational and *ad referendum* basis. Further instructions hoped for next week.

DULLES

No. 243

762A.00/6-2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lyon)

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 23, 1954.

Subject: Visit of Ambassador Krekeler with the Secretary, June 23, 3:30 p.m.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, Ambassador, Chargé d'Affaires, German Diplomatic Mission
Mr. Cecil B. Lyon—GER

After an exchange of greetings, Dr. Krekeler indicated that he would be departing Friday, June 25th, for Germany on three months' leave, and before doing so he wished to pay his respects to the Secretary.

The first subject which Dr. Krekeler discussed was the desire of Chancellor Adenauer to obtain favorable US official reaction to the Chancellor's Dusseldorf speech wherein the Chancellor indicated that if ratification of EDC was delayed further Germany could not be kept waiting indefinitely for the return of its freedom and sovereignty.

The Secretary stated that this certainly represented the view of the US Government and asked whether his indicating this to Dr. Krekeler would be sufficient. Dr. Krekeler said that what the Chancellor really wanted was a public statement to this effect which he could use in this connection with the North Rhine Westphalia elections which are to take place on Sunday, June 27. After a discussion as to how the Secretary might do this, the Secretary decided upon a press release to be issued following Dr. Krekeler's visit. The Secretary thereupon dictated a press communiqué, copy of which is attached.

Dr. Krekeler was highly pleased with the statement and said that he knew the Chancellor would be also. He thanked the Secretary for this statement which he felt would be very helpful in Germany.

Dr. Krekeler next took up the question of a letter which Chancellor Adenauer proposed sending to President Eisenhower with regard to German assets in the US (copy attached). Dr. Krekeler explained that he knew the Secretary's views, which had been expressed over a period of many years, against seizing of foreign assets in time of war. The Secretary said that he had expressed these views as far back as the Conference of Versailles in 1919 and that in his opinion, except where large corporations were obviously serving as shields for government operations, it was against our interest to seize enemy assets. The Secretary also explained that his sympathy was particularly with the small individual claimant, the holder of an insurance policy or the inheritor of a small estate, the loss of which constituted a serious proposition. He said that although he understood that Dr. Krekeler was well aware of the many problems which the Dirkson Bill presented, he wanted to emphasize to the Ambassador some of these complications; for example, certain people in this country feel that we are duty bound to carry out our commitments *not* to return these assets, the administrative costs of taking any action with respect to these smaller claimants were said to be prohibitive, the return of the assets would undoubtedly require large appropriations and it is not at all certain that Congress would be prepared to appropriate these funds, and also as Dr. Krekeler knew, these assets had been placed in a common pot and certain claims against the Japanese had been paid therefrom. All these made the problem a difficult one, but we should be glad to study the Chancellor's letter, copy of which he had given to Mr. Conant and which we had also received, and we shall reply through Mr. Conant as to our views on this matter.

It was pointed out to Dr. Krekeler that the Chancellor might wish to consider the fact that if he wrote to the President and made his letter public and then no action was forthcoming with regard to this legislation this might redound unfavorably to the Chancellor.

Dr. Krekeler made clear that he understood the difficulties in this whole matter.

Before leaving Dr. Krekeler again reverted to the question of what would be done in the case of failure of French Parliament to ratify EDC before adjournment for the summer and said that the Chancellor was anxious that we have some plan to put into action right away. He inquired whether with the U.S. Senate adjourned such a move would be possible. The Secretary indicated that he had already sounded out the Senate on this matter and that he felt that there would perhaps be a few weeks in which the Senate could take some action, which the Secretary did not anticipate would require too much time. The Secretary added that about the 1st of July we should give the matter another and careful look. During this discussion the Secretary explained that we found ourselves in an unusual position where oddly enough there is actually a better attitude toward EDC in France at this moment than there has been at any time since the Treaty was signed, and if it could only be got to a vote there is a very strong possibility that it would be approved.

In answer to a direct question, the Secretary said that these matters would be discussed at the forthcoming meeting between the President and Mr. Churchill.[1]

[Attachment 1]

Press Release No. 345

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1954.

Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler called today upon Secretary of State Dulles with a view to an exchange of views prior to Dr. Krekeler's return to Germany. Among other things, he brought to Secretary Dulles' attention the portion of Chancellor Adenauer's speech before the Christian Democratic Union in Dusseldorf, Germany, on June 20, 1954. In that speech, he said the Chancellor expressed the view that the German people cannot wait indefinitely to have their sovereignty restored, and that if the ratification of the EDC Treaty is much further delayed, this delay should not keep deferring the return to the German people of their freedom and sovereignty.

Secretary Dulles told Dr. Krekeler that the view thus expressed by Chancellor Adenauer was fully shared by the Government of the United States. The United States Government, he said, believes that there is a good prospect of an early completion of the ratifications of the European Defense Treaty. If, however, this hope and expectation should not be realized, it would, in the opinion of the United States Secretary of State, be necessary that there should be prompt consideration to the restoration of sovereignty to the West German Republic.

[Attachment 2—Translation]

Draft Letter From Chancellor Adenauer to President Eisenhower

SECRET [BONN?, undated.]

MR. PRESIDENT: The Federal Government is following with the greatest interest the efforts in the United States Congress to find a solution for the problem of the confiscated German assets in the United States.

In spite of the favorable development of the relations between our two nations, this problem still remains unsolved. My Government greatly desires a solution. I noted with great satisfaction that you expressed the same wish at a press conference. The final report of the Senate Sub-committee investigating the alien-property administration also was received by my Government with great satisfaction.

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[1] See Document 245.

For many thousands of Germans in poor circumstances, for old people and people living on small pensions, for people insured by American insurance companies, for the heirs of property in the United States, for all these people the return of their former property would mean economic security and freedom from want. It is noteworthy that especially those people were affected by the confiscation who for many years through personal and commercial relations with the United States helped to establish the friendship between our two nations.

In the opinion of the Federal Government and of the German people the Federal Republic by recognizing in the London Agreement on Foreign Debts the foreign obligations of Germany,[2] by ratifying the Bonn and Paris Treaties, by concluding the treaty with Israel, and by the German restitution legislation demonstrated the will to work out its reconstruction on the common foundations of the Western world.

I have the well-founded hope that an early solution of this problem by the Government of the United States would strengthen the feeling of security and the morale of the German people. In addition, a solution would greatly strengthen the friendship between our two nations which is now developing so encouragingly.

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[2] For text of the Agreement on German External Debts, signed at London Feb. 27, 1953, and entered into force on Sept. 16, 1953, see TIAS No. 2792.

No. 244

762A.5/6-2454

Memorandum of Conversation, by Coburn Kidd of the Office of German Affairs [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, June 24, 1954.

Subject: Consultation with European Sub-committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Regard to Plans for Germany.

Mr. Merchant, accompanied by Mr. Brown of the Office of Congressional Relations and Mr. Lyon and Mr. Kidd of the Office of

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[1] The source text was attached to a memorandum of transmittal from Merchant to Dulles, dated June 24. This conversation took place on June 22.

German Affairs, conferred with the members of the European Subcommittee today with regard to action which it might be necessary to take in Germany to prevent deterioration in Adenauer's position if the French do not ratify the EDC in the near future. Senators Wiley, Fulbright, and Humphrey, Dr. Francis Wilcox and Mr. Carl Marcy participated in the conversation, which was on an informal and confidential basis.

Mr. Merchant outlined the Department's thinking on the subject, the elements of which were as follows: Adenauer had gone all out in support of western policies, including EDC and European integration; his critics were now charging him with misjudgment and lack of success for Germany in these policies; if the French Parliament should adjourn without having taken action on EDC, a very serious situation would develop in Germany, with the consequences that Adenauer would be discredited and the Germans might adopt a more "Germanic" attitude favoring independent action and playing off East against West; these consequences appear to the Department so grave that the conclusion has been reached that it may be necessary to take certain action on the political side in Germany to save the support for Adenauer while gaining a little more time to work on the German defense contribution. Mr. Merchant explained that what the Department had in mind was separation of the Contractual Conventions from the EDC Treaty, with a view toward implementing as much of the Contractual relationships as possible. What stood in the way of this was Article 11 of the Convention on Relations, [2] which had been ratified by the Senate. This article provided that the Contractual Conventions could not come into effect until ratification of the EDC. We proposed, by a short treaty or protocol which would have the effect of amending this section of Article 11, to free our hands in order to put the Contractual agreements into effect in Germany. This would be received with great satisfaction in Germany and would hold the situation for Adenauer for the time being.

Mr. Merchant explained that we had given thought to various possibilities of obtaining the necessary Senate approval. The normal thing, of course, would be for the four governments (US, UK, France and the Federal Republic) to negotiate a short treaty, which would then be laid before the Senate for approval. The difficulty in the present case was that the situation might become critical in August and September, when we should need to take prompt action, while the Congress was adjourned until next January. We had therefore thought of the possibility of asking for Senate approval in advance, in the form of a resolution authorizing the President to negotiate the amendment of Article 11. Although unusual, there was a precedent for this, and since it involved no substantive change to speak of, but merely an unfettering of the Bonn Agreements from the Paris treaty, we thought the Senate might be willing to take this unusual step. At any rate, we wished their advice on the point. Our general idea was to make the proposal to the French Government in an open and above-board fashion, after agreement was reached with the British and with Adenauer. If the French agreed, for which there was a modest chance, there would be no difficulty from a foreign affairs viewpoint. If the French did not agree, we had in mind that it might be necessary for the U.S. and U.K. to proceed on their own toward abolition of the occupation status and putting into effect the Contractual relationship to the extent this would be possible. Mr. Merchant said that we had tried our hand at a draft of the resolution, which we would be glad to leave with Dr. Wilcox, although we wished to give further consideration to the matter and might later present an alternatively phrased draft. We wished no specific action at the present time, and indeed felt that the whole subject should be treated in strictest confidence. Mr. Merchant would get in touch with the Sub-committee again after the Churchill discussions.

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[2] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed May 26, 1952, at Bonn, see Document 51

Senator Humphrey said that he gave his wholehearted endorsement to the course proposed. No one could deny that he had been an ardent supporter of EDC, but he had reached the end of his patience. There was a feeling among the people in his State that American foreign policy was bogged down; troubles in southeast Asia, troubles in Guatemala, and now the European alliance was sagging. People were worried; they badly needed some reassurance that the United States was making progress somewhere. Steps to restore German sovereignty and obtain a German defense contribution would provide a badly needed shot in the arm. The people in his part of the country did not put much store on the Italians and French; they felt that we should have allies in spirit as well as legally, and the people they regarded as capable of supporting such an alliance were the British, the Germans, and the Scandinavians. Senator Humphrey said that the reports he had received from Germany filled him with deep concern about the weakening of Adenauer's position. There was nothing but obscurity in the position of the Socialist opposition, in the FDP, and in such meetings as those recently sponsored by the Ruhr magnates.

Senator Fulbright said that although he too had been a strong proponent of EDC, he agreed entirely with the Department's analysis and proposals to do something to strengthen Adenauer's position. He thought that the Senate would be disposed to take favorable action.

Senator Wiley asked a number of questions regarding the legal aspects of the step proposed. On the political side he said that he felt satisfied that the step would be welcomed in this country; that it might conceivably influence the French to speed up action with regard to the EDC; and he would recommend that the sooner we took the step, the better. Senator Wiley agreed that the proposal to seek authorization in advance was unusual, but he thought it might be accomplished in this case. He for one did not see who could object—surely not the Courts and both the Administration and the Senate wanted it—for he felt the majority of the Senate would be in favor of the proposal. He thought that with the number of German voters in Ohio, Senator Bricker would not be so apprehensive about any possible derogation from the legislature's prerogatives. In fact, if the resolution were framed as a request from the Congress to the Executive, authorizing and requesting that steps be taken to renegotiate for the purpose of restoring German sovereignty and obtaining a German defense contribution, Senator Wiley thought that Senator Bricker would have little objection. Senator Wiley told Mr. Merchant that the conversation would be kept on a confidential basis and the Senators would expect to hear from him again after the Churchill-Eisenhower discussions.

No. 245

Editorial Note

From June 25 to 29 Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden were in Washington for conversations with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on topics of mutual concern. In the course of their discussions they agreed to set up an Anglo-American Study Group on Germany.

The Anglo-American Study Group on Germany met in London July 5–12, focusing its attention on possible alternatives to the European Defense Community (EDC) failing French ratification. Under the leadership of Frank Roberts and Cecil Lyon the study group drafted a report with several annexes which was submitted to both governments on July 12. For further documentation on the work of the study group including text of the report, see volume V, Part 1, pages 997 ff.

No. 246

762A.00/7-854

Memorandum of Conversation, by Coburn Kidd of the Office of German Affairs

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 8, 1954.

Subject: Chancellor Adenauer's views on situation in Germany.

Participants: Herr Fabian von Schlabrendorff
G—Mr. Robert Murphy
GER—Mr. Geoffrey Lewis
GPA—Mr. Coburn Kidd

Herr von Schlabrendorff said that he had with him a letter from the Chancellor to the Secretary, which he would like to hand to Mr. Murphy for transmission to the Secretary if permissible.[1] He said that he was aware of the unorthodox nature of his request, which would ordinarily be a matter for diplomatic channels, but he had taken the liberty of laying the matter before Mr. Murphy, since he, von Schlabrendorff, had been privileged to be closely associated with the Chancellor.

By way of introduction, von Schlabrendorff said that he had been associated with anti-Nazi movements in Berlin before the war where he had practiced law. His activities became known to the Gestapo during the war, and he was arrested while serving on the Eastern Front. He was thereafter confined in one concentration camp after another—in Moravia, Flossenburg, Dachau, and finally a prison camp in North Italy, from which he was released by American forces toward the end of the war. He had shortly thereafter been brought into contact with Mr. Allen Dulles, with whom he had since remained in touch whenever he came to the United States. Through his activities in the CDU party since the war, he had become a member of the political circle close to the Chancellor and was authorized to convey the Chancellor's personal views, if they would be of interest to Mr. Murphy.

He said that the Chancellor felt extraordinarily isolated at the present time. The Chancellor often dwelt upon the fact that he carried the whole responsibility of his pro-Western, pro-French (reconciliation with France) policy on his old shoulders. The Chancellor felt fairly confident about the strength of those shoulders, but foresaw nothing but trouble if he should die. He thought it would be a long time before the Western powers found another German political figure who would assume the responsibilities which he had—

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[1] This letter has not been further identified.

with respect to European integration, Schuman Plan, EDC, the Saar. He had gone much further on these matters than the German people were prepared to go of their own inclination. There was much distaste for the Saar settlement, through all classes from the working people, influential industrialists, to such personages as the Bishop of Trier, who was unwilling to publicly endorse what the Chancellor had done with respect to the Saar. There was general skepticism that the French would ratify EDC.

Von Schlabrendorff said that the Chancellor privately acknowledged that he had been mistaken in his judgment of France, and felt depressed at the consequences for the policies he had tried to follow in Germany. When these policies become discredited, there will be an inevitable drift towards a more independent policy and Germany's traditional interest in the East.

The difficulties for the Chancellor arose from all sides. . . .

The coalition party, FDP, was full of discontented and restless elements. The Chancellor had not been particularly concerned about Pfleiderer's outburst in recommending the resumption of trade and diplomatic relations with Russia. The Chancellor felt that he could keep Pfleiderer under control. But he literally trembled with anger at the thought of ex-Chancellor Bruening's espousal of an independent policy and resumption of connections with the East. The impact of Pfleiderer's and Bruening's speeches should not be underestimated. A lot of people were impressed by their proposals in the face of continued stalemate for the Chancellor's foreign policy.

Von Schlabrendorff said that in the Chancellor's own party, the CDU, industrial figures, on whose contributions the party was dependent for election purposes, increasingly interposed the condition that the Chancellor do nothing which would cut off opportunities for trade with the East. Business circles were convinced that the British were doing a great deal of trade with the East; if the British could do it, the Germans saw no reason why they should not obtain their share.

All this added up, von Schlabrendorff said, to produce the feeling of isolation which the Chancellor had. None of the leading personalities with whom he had to deal were particularly close to him. In fact the Chancellor felt closest to Washington so far as understanding and sympathy for his position and policy were concerned. He earnestly hoped, if the President and Secretary shared his view of the urgency of the situation, that Washington might make some "large gesture" on Germany's behalf, which would effectively still the doubts being raised against the Chancellor's policies.

When von Schlabrendorff had asked what was meant by a "gesture", the Chancellor said that this could only be determined from the perspective of Washington: he was not in the Secretary's shoes. It was not for him to say the form which it should take: whether implementation of the Contractual Agreements, or rearmament of Germany in the near future, or a peace treaty. Whatever it was, he hoped that it might occur before the elections scheduled to take place in the autumn.

Mr. Murphy asked von Schlabrendorff a number of questions with regard to the persons he had mentioned— . . . Pfleiderer, Bruening—and the general political situation. In thanking him for this expression of his views, Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Chancellor would be aware of the action being taken with regard to Germany since the Eisenhower-Churchill decisions. A Working Party was at present engaged in discussions at London on plans which might amount to the "gesture" which the Chancellor hoped for. Mr. Murphy said that he would transmit to the Secretary the Chancellor's letter (which authorized von Schlabrendorff to participate in German assets negotiations and expressed the hope that the Secretary would give the matter of German assets his personal attention). Von Schlabrendorff would be informed if the Secretary wished to confer with him further.

No. 247

740.5/7-1254

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET BAD GODESBERG, July 12, 1954.

DEAR LIVIE: The situation here in Germany continues to deteriorate, as we expected. The SPD attacks the Chancellor and the U.S. and has turned into a pro-French party! (I think the attitude is purely based on expediency and may be short-lived.) At least one group of German generals is preparing plans for an alternative that envisions an old-fashioned army massed on the frontier. In short, a great deal of nonsense is being talked publicly and privately. Unless the miracle occurs and the French Assembly ratifies the EDC before adjournment, the situation will get a lot worse before it gets better.

The purpose of this letter is to offer an amendment to the HICOG proposal based on one recent development, namely the talks between American officers and Germans in Blank's office.[1]

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[1] These talks have not been further identified.

These were recently authorized, you will recall. They have started off very successfully, I am told, by Tuthill. If Washington will continue to give us a green light in this direction, I believe Blank's office and his generals can be kept usefully busy for another 4 to 6 months on real planning, which up to now has been impossible. It is my guess that though these talks are very secret, the fact they are proceeding will take the heat off the Chancellor from one direction. Therefore, it will probably not be necessary to do anything overt about military preparations for the next six months. Nevertheless, before long I'm afraid we must face up to the rearmament problem and my present thinking is still along the lines of the HICOG proposal.

Though the Chancellor says now that EDC and the whole European integration movement will be dead and gone forever if the French don't ratify this summer, I believe a second round may be possible, that is, if we can give the Chancellor some tangible evidence of our desire to return sovereignty at once either by treaty or by HICOM action and if Blank's office can be satisfied. The second round would emerge in the fall and winter. If this fails, then even I would be willing to throw in the sponge. But I do hope we can have a second try. A German national army within NATO is for me a very dubious undertaking, even assuming the French would agree, and I see no evidence to indicate they would. (Would it require action by the French Assembly,—an important point?)

What to me is far more important than the *way* the Germans rearm is the *spirit* in which they do so. The significance of the EDC is not that it is a method for controlling the German soldiers, but a guide line as to the type of Europe to be defended. And here I come to the second point of this letter, namely, my desire to emphasize the importance of the Saar. I would be relatively optimistic about the picture of Europe if I could envision a German National Army in NATO *and* the Saar settled as envisioned by the Adenauer-Teitgen memorandum.[2] For then I think the Coal and Steel Community would continue to develop and the EPC come into existence. In short, the Chancellor's European policy would have been, on the whole, justified. But a German National Army with the Saar still in the hands of the French occupation (as it is today) and the Coal and Steel Community in a state of dissolution is quite another story. Why? Because the moods of Germany under these two alternatives would be as different as night from day.

I believe that the U.S. has reason to intervene more actively in the Saar than we have been willing to do in the past. (How, of course, depends on the state of negotiations on sovereignty and rearmament.) Not only is an unsettled Saar a political handicap to us, it is also somewhat of a military one as our lines of communication from Kaiser-lautern to Metz run through the Saar.

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[2] For documentation on the Adenauer-Teitgen agreement on the Saar, see Documents 686 ff.

If Western Europe is to be successfully defended for the long pull, France and Germany must work together. This means eventual European integration; the Saar solution which is contemplated is dependent on the creation of a European Community. But for the present France is like a man mentally incapable of attending to business. Can not the U.S. act as an interim trustee, so to speak, and get ahead with the German part of EDC by starting the rearmament of a sovereign Federal Republic under a plan which assumes EDC as the goal? I don't know whether the thought behind this question makes sense or not, but I am sending this letter along at all events. You are free to file it, or even burn it!

With all good wishes,

As ever,

JAMES B. CONANT

No. 248

762A.00/7–2454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, July 24, 1954—2:31 p.m.

243. Re Otto John [2] Department in consultation other interested agencies developed following position:

1) Imperative that in answer press inquiries Secretary, HICOMer, Adenauer and other Federal Republic authorities follow same line.

2) Utilizing anticipated official Federal Republic statement as peg, we shall take position in answer press inquiries that:

> a) John German official and Government Federal Republic has made statement (or it our expectation statement forthcoming);
>
> b) All evidence points fact John being held Soviet Zone against will. Certainly not acting like free man. (This will

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[1] Drafted by Kellermann and cleared in draft with Lewis, EE, and P. Repeated to Berlin.

[2] On July 21 Berlin had reported that Otto John had disappeared and had been missing since 10 p.m. July 20. (Telegram 44, 762A.00/7–2154) On July 22 in a memorandum to Elbrick, Lyon stated that John "would undoubtedly be very useful if he fell into the hands of the other side." (762A.00/7–2154)

make gratuitous any discussion of whether or not this a voluntary defection.)

c) If questioned whether he knew much about US intelligence activities Germany we shall simply state John in charge internal security Federal Republic. Beyond this have no knowledge.

3) Essential no member Department and HICOG Bonn and Berlin speculate on subject John publicly or with correspondents.

DULLES

No. 249

033.62A11/7-2754 Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 27, 1954—7:5[illegible] p.m.

266. Limit distribution. From Secretary for Conant. I have discussed with the President the Chancellor's proposed visit to Washington to address the American Legion Convention on August 30. Please convey to him a message along following lines.

"Ordinarily we should welcome a visit from the Chancellor as evidence of the strong bonds which exist between our two countries and as an indication of the mutual respect we have for one another. However, this visit would not be an official visit and it would come at a time when the President will be in Washington but only for a few hours in order to address the Convention and immediately fly away because of previous plans. We therefore feel that such a trip by the Chancellor under these conditions and without opportunity for President to receive him and talk with him at any length could be construed as rudeness. Also might be subject to misinterpretation and would in the end place both the Chancellor and the President in embarrassing positions.

We look forward to seeing, talking to and entertaining the Chancellor during his visit to receive an honorary degree from Columbia University which we understand is scheduled for the end of October and [during] which we anticipate making an official visit."

I leave to your judgment whether or not you present such a message as a personal one from me. The President is willing to write a personal letter to the Chancellor if you think this advisable.

FYI but not to be passed to the Chancellor an additional consideration is our feeling that the announcement of the Chancellor's visit to speak from same platform as President at almost same hour with the vote on EDC probably taking place in the French Assembly during the latter part of August might well be interpreted by the French as further pressure from outside and might therefore contribute to failure by the French to ratify. [2]

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[1] Drafted by Secretary Dulles and Lewis and cleared with Lyon, Barbour, and McIlvaine, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

DULLES

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[2] On July 28 Conant reported that he had conveyed the message in this telegram to the Chancellor as coming from Secretary Dulles. (Telegram 307 from Bonn, 033.62A11/7-2854) On Aug. 2 he transmitted a short reply from the Chancellor stating that he had now declined the invitation frem the American Legion and looked ward to visiting the United States at the end of October. (Telegram 349 from n, 033.62A11/7-2854)

No. 250

762A.00/8-154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 1, 1954—1 p.m.

311. Department and other agencies primarily concerned have had Otto John case under intensive study during past week. Sufficient information now at hand to give indication of unfavorable way situation developing in Germany, consequences to be guarded against, and action which might feasibly be undertaken by High Commissioners and Adenauer to prevent further deterioration.

(1) Most striking fact is "Schadenfreude" with which large part of press and public have jumped to conclusion that John defected, in spite continued absence unequivocal evidence of defection and cumulative indications that John lured or trapped into Eastern Germany, being held against will, and acting under duress.

(a) If John defected to damage Adenauer Government, Soviets should have been able exploit political aspects much more effectively and fully than they have done, by showing him in public and allowing him talk to press. (Especially in light John's knowledge details various secret negotiations with Adenauer Government.) This not done, and recorded radio statements, if made by him, leave impression inept and canned propaganda not at all characteristic of John speaking his true mind.

(b) If John willing defect, Soviets would not have uselessly compromised their agent Wohlgemuth. [2] Latter's services were apparently needed, in active sense, to get John into Soviet custody.

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[1] Drafted by Kidd; cleared with Murphy, Kellermann, and Hulick; and repeated to Berlin.

[2] Wolfgang Wohlgemuth, a West Berlin doctor who disappeared with Otto John.

(c) On defection theory, John would have taken advantage opportunity bring along valuable documents of intelligence material, perhaps leaving behind political testament to explain transfer of loyalty. On contrary he left no such testament, had not expressed in intimate conversations any marked concern over present political impasse re unification, and carefully emptied pockets of all compromising material before leaving to meet Wohlgemuth.

(d) Department particularly struck by message from John to wife with underscored word suggesting forced detention.

(e) Unnecessary to go into further circumstances which will occur to Mission, and which can most probably be explained as lack of initial cooperation of John with Soviets, although in due course Soviets may condition John into acting like voluntary defector. Brain-washing technique has been perfected to advanced art, e.g. Mindszenty case and US pilots who confessed to bacteriological warfare.

(2) Most unfortunate public aspect of case, in our view, is that continued grubbing for sensational material for press will in time succeed, if not already, in discrediting John as individual even though it does not prove anything as regards his basic loyalty. We are concerned with reaction of average German who after being denazified has always wondered what he had to match moral courage of July 20 group.[3] He probably comforts himself with thought of his "Treue": he was true to Fuehrer, he remained true to war effort until end, he is now true to Germany, whereas John was disloyal to Hitler, was agent of British in last year of war, then alleged to be agent of US/UK in Amt Verfassungschuetz, and now agent of Communists. Focus will be on alleged chameleon-like character of man. Politically this reaction may lead to pronounced self-justification of ex-Nazi elements and all elements opposition to Adenauer from left to right. May lead to exaggerated reaction against all forms of security or intelligence agencies, especially those maintaining contacts with foreign powers, and demands for parliamentary investigations and disclosures. This could seriously jeopardize security of Federal Republic, where particular vigilance necessary, and badly hamper vital activities of US and Allied agencies in security field.

(3) In our view situation calls for firm gesture on part of Federal Government to show that situation in hand, restore some self-possession and self-confidence to German security organs, and give lead to public in creating attitude of critical objectivity toward future Communist attempts exploit John.[4] We consider it po-

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[3] A group of German officers which attempted to assassinate Adolph Hitler on July 20, 1944.

[4] On July 26 Schroeder had given a press conference at which he stated that (a the evidence indicated that John had not entered the East Zone of Berlin with trea

Continued

litically important for Government to forestall critics and ex-Nazis from capitalizing on John case.

(4) After coordination with British (omitting French whose reaction this issue uncertain) we would recommend High Commissioners approach Adenauer with suggestion that Federal Government formally request return of official Otto John or access to him for appropriate officials of Federal Republic. Statement need not go into pros or cons beyond fact that John is high official of Federal Republic, reason to believe that he may be detained against will by local authorities in East Germany, and demand for return or access to him. (Possibility of access being granted is calculated risk but minimized by recent behavior Soviet authorities re John and their standard treatment persons detained.) High Commissioners would transmit this statement to Pushkin under formal cover note requesting that it be conveyed to appropriate local officials. Such statement clearly within rights any government would not prejudice Chancellor's future freedom of action and would avoid placing US/UK in position of principals. Important that John be identified as Federal Republic official and that no handle be given to Soviets or public to identify him as US/UK agent.

(5) Since details and exact estimate local situation can be worked out Bonn better than Washington, Department suggests that matter be urgently studied by working group of Mission and representatives of other agencies primarily interested with view to obtaining UK concurrence and action by Federal Government in coming week if possible. Delay thus far justifiable on grounds avoidance precipitate action, but may be too late if postponed much longer.

(6) If proposed action taken, would enable Adenauer or Government make explanatory statement expressing skepticism re Communist attempt exploit John and confidence in efficiency, democratic nature, and importance Government security organs. Again avoiding appearance of principals, High Commissioners could through all suitable means convey their agreement with views expressed by Government. Importance attached to prompt and decisive action this case arises in part from US and Allied responsibility in creation Amt Verfassungschuetz (including sponsorship John) and crucial security role this agency. [5]

DULLES

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sonable intent, (b) he was lured into the East Zone, and (c) he was being detained there under pressure. Bonn reported the substance of the press conference in telegram 270, July 26. (762A.00/7-2654)

[5] The Otto John case continued to simmer throughout the summer and fall of 1954 with the United States maintaining the position outlined in this telegram. Reports on press statements by John and the impact on political life in Germany were reported regularly by Bonn and Berlin. Further documentation on the case is in file 762A.00.

No. 251

762A.00/8-2754: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, August 27, 1954—7 p.m.

600. Ger polit leaders with whom we have recently spoken report that they are operating in atmosphere of some public anxiety. Coincidence of stalemate at Brussels [2] and recent defections [3] has added Ger sense of insecurity and weakened confidence in Govt. In such atmosphere, distrust of foreign countries thrives. Suspicion of France. Previously strong, intensified. Although conviction most leaders incl FDP Chmn Dehler that effective Eur defense impossible without France is moderating influence, this view also increases pessimism and frustration arising from present French actions. Disquieting are indications of growing suspicion England being whipped up by right-wing leaders still smarting from Brit action against Naumann group. [4] Symptomatic such Anglophobia are (1) conviction FDP's leading mil expert Manteuffel that England will never permit German rearmament and (2) imputation in *Fortschritt*, organ FDP party organization in NRW, John defection Brit plot. Up to present we have noted no signs of anti-American feeling. Gers expect US to stand by them and to pull some rabbit out of hat. Following Chanc's lead, Ger coalition politicians and pro-govt and independent press refrain from public expression pessimism re EDC or attacks on French for her role at Brussels. Despite this superficial calm and restraint politicians very pessimistic as to chances positive French action on EDC and leaders actively engaged planning steps to be taken if French do not ratify EDC in acceptable form next week. Chanc has started laying ground-work at home for continuing united front for pressing French on Ger de-

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] On Aug. 19 French Prime Minister Mendes-France, at a meeting of the EDC signatories in Brussels, had proposed five amendments to the EDC Treaty, two of which discriminated against the Federal Republic. None of the proposals were accepted by the other signatories.

[3] The John case and the defection of CDU Bundestag member Karl Franz Schmidt-Wittnack, which was announced on Aug. 22.

[4] In January 1953 the British had arrested Werner Naumann and several other West Germans for neo-Nazi activities. Documentation on the arrests is in file 762A.00.

fense participation by mentioning to Bundestag FonAff Comite that consultations with other countries, incl US and UK, shld be next step if France fails to act favorably. Gers view English position as decisive for success of conference on Ger def participation but some skeptical as to firmness English support for Ger rearmament. Numerous Ger politicans have expressed fears that if Bonn convention put into force without provision for rearming FedRep clearly agreed upon at least by US and UK, the FedRep may lose important basis for leverage to make French and English act on Ger def participation. In our opinion any offer apparently entailing indefinite postponement rearmament would not help to bolster Adenauer's prestige. Fact such an offer has now been made publicly by Mendès-France makes it doubly suspect in Ger eyes.

Indicative of mood some politicans is report from conf source that Bundestag FonAff Comite, following leadership CDU members, is drafting detailed plan for alternative to EDC involving rapid expansion Ger border police to 150,000.

SPD actions since Brussels stalemate have been restrained, party is pointing to need for Ger-French entente in moderate way but placing major emphasis on timeliness new negots with USSR on reunification. In our view Ger reunification issue less threatening to Chanc's position than rearmament issue for present. As long as Sovs make no clearly new offer, especially re elections, we estimate Chanc can justify to majority Ger polit leaders his policy that Ger rearmament within western complex must be in hand before reunification can be effectively dealt with.

Despite disturbing elements noted above, in our opinion Chancellor will be able to hold his supporters in line for time being. Nevertheless he will require evidence continuous activity and progress in field Ger def participation to maintain his prestige and to counteract pressures for discussing reunification Ger with USSR again. Present atmosphere in FedRep today makes it highly advisable to avoid any "dead period" during which western action on Ger def might appear to have come to complete standstill. Convocation of conference on Ger rearmament as soon as possible if EDC not adopted in satisfactory for in Paris wld certainly help in this regard, but not for long unless it produces a concrete agreed plan involving features which cld be fairly attacked as discriminatory against Germany.

CONANT

No. 252

Editorial Note

On August 30 the French National Assembly voted to discontinue debate on the European Defense Community Treaty thus ending any hope that it would become the vehicle for West German integration into Europe. The defeat of the EDC brought on a frantic search for alternatives which led Foreign Secretary Eden and Secretary Dulles to visit Europe during September with the aim of securing the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and obtaining its membership in NATO. The success of these aims was achieved at nine-power, four-power, and North Atlantic Council meetings in London and Paris in September and October during which it was agreed to terminate the occupation regime in the Federal Republic, to admit West Germany to the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, and during which Adenauer and Bidault managed to reach an agreement on the status of the Saar.

For documentation on the events described above, see volume V, Part 2, pages 1114 ff.

No. 253

Editorial Note

Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States October 27–November 2, 1954, staying in Washington the first 4 days and in New York, where he received an honorary degree from Columbia University, for the remainder of the trip. In addition to the meetings described in the three memoranda, *infra*, and Documents 255 and 256, and the signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation on October 29, the Chancellor attended a variety of functions which are outlined in a memorandum by GER/GPA, dated November 10. (033.62A11/11-1054) During the several meetings in Washington, President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and the Chancellor issued various statements concerning the visit. See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 8, 1954, pages 680–683.

No. 254

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Germany"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 28, 1954.

At dinner last night the Chancellor and I had considerable discussion about the re-creation of the German military establishment.[1] He expressed his concern lest it should be along the old Prussian lines. He said he wanted to dedicate himself very largely to superintending this matter, and to that end he expected to resign shortly as Minister of Foreign Affairs so as to deal with military and economic matters.

He particularly emphasized the importance of establishing firmly the principle of the subordination of the military to the civilian.

The Chancellor referred to some speech which had been reported in the German press made by some high United States military official, whom he could not identify, indicating that the United States favored following the German method. He deplored this because he said it made it very difficult for him to advocate adoption of the United States system while the United States was advocating adoption of the German system.

I said I thought there must be some misunderstanding about this particular incident.

The Chancellor asked whether he could have a chance to talk with General Ridgway about the situation and we subsequently arranged that he would meet at my office on Friday at 9:30 a.m.[2]

J.F.D.

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[1] The dinner was given by Secretary Dulles on Oct. 27 and was attended by members of the Chancellor's delegation and various executive and legislative members of the U.S. Government.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files. However, the memorandum by GER/GPA, dated Nov. 10, states that the Chancellor went to the Department of State for two interviews between 9:30 and 10:30 a.m. on Oct. 29, but does not indicate either the substance or the participants in the interviews. (033.62A11/11–1054)

No. 255

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, "October 1954"

Memorandum of Discussion Between the Secretary of State and Chancellor Adenauer, October 28, 1954, 11 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, undated.

OTHERS PRESENT

United States	*Federal Republic*
Mr. Murphy	Professor Hallstein
Mr. Conant	Ambassador Krekeler
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. von Herwarth
Mr. Elbrick	Mr. Federer
Mr. Lyon	Mr. Pauls
Mr. Reinstein	Mr. Kilb

Interpreters
Mr. Weber
Mrs. Lejins

The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming the Chancellor. He observed that the conversations which were about to begin would be continued a little later with the President and resumed again the following day. [1]

Joint Statement by the President and the Chancellor [2]

The Secretary suggested that the most important immediate problem was that of the joint communiqué to be issued by the President of the United States and the Chancellor and proposed that the text be reviewed.

A number of changes were made in the draft text which had been prepared by representatives of the Department and the Federal Government. [3] The Chancellor remarked that he felt the emphasis of the draft language regarding the latest Soviet note was wrong. [4] The wording which had been suggested might give the impression that the main objection to the Soviet note was the manner in which it dealt with the question of free elections and that other aspects of the note might be acceptable. He personally felt that the main point of the Soviet note was the proposal with regard to a collective security system for Europe which would include the Soviet Union but exclude the United States. The Chancellor's first reaction was to suggest that some language should be included with regard to the question of collective security. The Secretary pointed out that, while it would be appropriate for the President and the Chancellor to make comments on the bearing of the note on Germany, the question of collective security arrangements concerned the United Kingdom and France and the President might be reluctant to refer to matters on which other governments might feel that consultation with them was necessary. The Chancellor said he quite agreed with this point and proposed that the problem be dealt with by the deletion of any comment on the substance of the election issue.

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[1] A memorandum of Chancellor Adenauer's conversation with President Eisenhower is printed *infra*. No record of any further conversation with Secretary Dulles has been found in Department of State files.

[2] For text of this statement see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 8, 1954, pp. 680-681.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] For text of the Soviet note, Oct. 23, calling for a four-power conference on Germany to be held in November, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 13, 1954, pp. 902-905; an extract is printed in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 96-101.

German Assets (Section IV of Statement)

In connection with the subject of German assets in the United States, the Chancellor expressed the desire for inclusion of a reference to Dr. Conant's *aide-mémoire* of August 8, 1954 in which it had been stated that the United States Government would be willing to engage in exploratory discussions with the Federal Government.[5] He also asked that the communiqué indicate the conversations on the subject of German assets in the United States would begin between representatives of the two Governments immediately. When the Chancellor suggested omitting certain sentences which included reference to our willingness to explore problem while Germans studied question of American claims, Secretary disagreed pointing out that mention had also been made in the *aide-mémoire* of comparable problems with regard to unsatisfied American war claims against Germany and that the expression of American willingness to enter into discussions had related to both subjects. The Chancellor said that he understood this point. In agreeing to the language in the communiqué stating that the conversations between representatives of the two Governments would begin soon, the Secretary said that it would be necessary to have additional discussions within the United States Government before intergovernmental conversations could usefully be commenced. The

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[5] Adenauer is referring to an *aide-memoire* which was delivered to him along with a letter from President Eisenhower, dated Aug. 7, concerning the settlement of the question of German assets in the United States. For text of the President's letter and a letter from the Chancellor, dated July 17, to which it was a reply, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Aug. 23, 1954, pp. 269–270. A copy of the *aide-memoire*, dated Aug. 9, rather than Aug. 8, is in file 033.62A11/10–2554, as an attachment to a briefing memorandum from Merchant to Secretary Dulles.

Chancellor indicated he was aware there were differences of opinion on the subject within the United States Government.

The Saar Agreement

The Chancellor referred to the provision of the Saar Agreement [6] in which the Federal Government and the French Government had agreed to request the United States and the United Kingdom Governments to guarantee the Saar settlement. He said that, according to press reports, the United Kingdom Government had expressed willingness to give such a guarantee. He attached great importance to the issuance of a statement by the United States Government of its willingness to do likewise and expressed the hope that the matter might also be referred to in a communiqué. The Chancellor said that guarantee of the Saar settlement implies many things. It implies that France and the Federal Republic should conduct their affairs in accordance with the Agreement until there is a peace treaty. He said that there was one main point which he had in mind in this connection. In the first conversation which had taken place with the French, the French had proposed that the Saar Agreement should not be subject to criticism within the Saar. [7] He had agreed that the Federal Republic and France should abstain from criticism of the Agreement, but he could not agree that there should not be such criticism in the Saar.

The Chancellor said that the French had finally given in on this point in the negotiation of the Saar Agreement. He did not think that the present Prime Minister of France would think of preventing the Saar population from criticizing the Saar Agreement. However, governments change and the Agreement is one of indefinite duration. He attached great importance to a guarantee which might include an undertaking to make representations if the free expression of the wishes of the population of the Saar were prohibited.

The Secretary said that he did not feel that it would be practical to make a statement on the subject while the Chancellor was in Washington.

The Chancellor said that he had not had this in mind.

The Secretary said that the problem of giving guarantees is more difficult from a constitutional standpoint in the United States than it apparently is in Great Britain. He observed that many weeks had been spent in discussing the form of the Security Declaration made by the United States Government in relation to the Declaration of the Federal Government on this subject at the recent London Conference, and that finding appropriate wording for this Declaration had given rise to much difficulty.[8] He said that he did not think it would be practical in the case of the Saar (as in the case of the Security Declaration), to cast any statement made by the United States in a form which goes beyond the President's power and which would require action by the Senate. He did think that, if it were the joint desire of the Federal Republic and of France (as the Chancellor had indicated) to obtain an indication of continuing American concern regarding the Saar, and if the United Kingdom Government were disposed to go along, it would be possible to find some formula which would meet to a measurable extent the German and French wishes. However, the wording would have to be dealt with very carefully to avoid a challenge by the Senate to the Declaration as an infringement of its constitutional authority.

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[6] For text of the Franco-German Agreement on the Saar, signed Oct. 23, 1954, at Paris, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pp. 116–118.

[7] Regarding the talks at Paris between Adenauer and the French on the Saar, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1294.

The Secretary asked what bearing possible undertakings under Article 8 of the Saar Agreement would have on Article 2 of the Agreement which makes the European Commissioner responsible for the representation of the Saar's interests in the field of foreign affairs. He asked whether dealings on this subject would be with the Commissioner or whether the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union would have responsibility in this matter. The Chancellor responded that the Council has no direct responsibility, but that the Commissioner is responsible to the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union. It was therefore only at a second level that the Council is responsible.

The Chancellor said that he did not wish to press the matter of a United States declaration further at this time, since there would be ample time to go into the subject. He reiterated that he attached great importance to an American guarantee of the Saar settlement.

The Secretary asked if an indication of the American position would be of importance in relation to the Chancellor's parliamentary situation in Germany and whether it would be necessary or useful to have this indication prior to ratification of the Saar Agreement.

The Chancellor said that it would.

The Secretary asked what was the Chancellor's time schedule for parliamentary action.

The Chancellor said that he planned to take the agreements up in the German parliament in November and December. He wanted to get action as soon as possible, although he recognized that action by the American Senate would not be taken until January. He asked whether it would be possible for him to say in the German parliament that he had discussed the subject of an American guarantee with the Secretary and that an American statement on this subject could be anticipated. The Secretary said it would be necessary to agree on the exact wording which the Chancellor should say. He doubted that it would be possible to use the word "guarantee" which has many meanings.

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[8] For documentation on the London Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff.

The Chancellor suggested that the matter might be left in this position. If he saw in the course of the parliamentary debates in Germany that a statement by the United States would be helpful, that he would get in touch with the Secretary and appropriate language could be agreed upon at that time.

The Secretary remarked that, to the extent that he had been able to give thought to the subject, he felt that what the President could do in terms of a statement on the Saar would be limited to the sort of statement made in London on security. In effect, the President could perhaps say that the United States would regard any breach of the Agreement as a disturbance of peace and security; that it would, in the event of a breach, enter into discussions as to what action should be taken; and that it would regard the violator as having forfeited its right to the benefit of the collective security arrangements.

The Chancellor said this would be very much.

The Secretary asked if the Saar Agreement (which he observed he had as yet only seen in the newspapers) was a definitive Agreement or whether it was to be further elaborated.

The Chancellor said that the Agreement signed at Paris would be submitted to the German parliament. Further detailed agreements would be necessary to implement the Agreement, but these would be of an administrative character. The Secretary said he assumed that the United States Government would be able to receive official copies of the Saar Agreement either from the Federal Government or from the French Government.

United States Relationship to the Western European Union

The Chancellor asked that the Secretary give some thought to the relationship between the United States and the Western European Union. He said that he remembered that the subject had been lightly touched on in previous discussions and that the Secretary had remarked that this would not be the last time he attended a discussion of the subject. The Chancellor hoped that the Secretary would in fact continue to participate in meetings on the subject. He thought there was much to be done and that it would be a long time before it would be safe to leave the Europeans to deal with the problem alone. He said there were a number of questions to be considered in the Western European Union which would affect the security of the United States and would affect NATO. He cited as an example the arms control arrangements. He said that the United States had made a beginning in establishing a relationship and that he hoped it would be continued. He pointed out that there is an American official mission to the European Coal and Steel Community, and said that he would welcome it if the United States could establish an official mission to the Western European Union as soon as possible. Possibly this mission could be the same as that to the CSC.

The Secretary said he was flattered to observe that the Chancellor had remembered what he had said on the subject. All Ministers did not have equally good memories. As far as relations with the Council of Western European Union are concerned, he thought that the United States would be disposed to respond to an invitation, if one were extended, to establish a mission accredited to the Council which would keep in touch with the Council to the extent the Council desired it. He said the matter was somewhat complicated from a practical viewpoint, since the Council would have its seat in London and the Arms Control Agency would be located in Paris. No doubt this problem could be solved if the Council wanted it solved. He thought that the American Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be the logical person to deal with the Arms Control Agency, since the work of the Agency would be closely related to the work of NATO.

Cyprus

The Chancellor said he had no further matters to raise, but that there was one point he wished to comment on. Before leaving Paris he had had a talk with the Greek Prime Minister regarding Cyprus. M. Papagos told him that if the matter came before the United Nations there would be an open breach on the subject which could only benefit the Russians. M. Papagos had expressed the urgent wish that something be done to avoid such a clash. The Secretary said he also had a talk with M. Papagos in Paris. All he could say on the subject was that he wished the Greek Government had had these same thoughts two months ago. He remarked that the Greek Government had started something which it did not know how to finish. The Chancellor remarked this often happened in life.

The Secretary told the Chancellor that the United States would use its good offices to try to avoid a clash which would benefit the Russians and injure NATO.

No. 256

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Germany"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 28, 1954.

Participants: President Eisenhower
Chancellor Adenauer
High Commissioner Conant
[Secretary of State Dulles]

The first matter discussed was the communiqué which had already been gone over by the Secretary and the Chancellor. [2] The President read the communiqué and said that it met with his approval. There was no lengthy discussion of any item among those listed in this communiqué.

The Chancellor referred to his desire to have a German army built on a new basis and his intention of devoting a great deal of his own efforts to that end. He referred to his satisfactory conversation with General Ridgway on this whole subject. [3] The President said he would be very glad indeed to have the United States assist in any way he could. He wished the Chancellor to understand that it was his desire to see that the Chancellor was assisted in the rearming of Germany in the way the Chancellor desired. It was more important from the point of view of the United States and the President to have this done in the right way than to have it done in the minimum amount of time. The President wanted the Chancellor to feel free to report to him if there seemed to be any pressures put on the Chancellor to go forward with the rearming of Germany in ways that seemed to the Chancellor unsatisfactory.

The rest of the conversation was of a purely social nature and the whole interview did not last more than twenty minutes.

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[1] Attached to a cover sheet, dated Nov. 24, which stated that the meeting took place at the White House at 12:30 p.m. and that the memorandum had been drafted by Conant.

[2] For a record of Dulles' meeting with Adenauer, see the memorandum, *supra*; for text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 8, 1954, pp. 680-681.

[3] The conversation under reference has not been further identified, unless the meeting scheduled with Ridgway for Friday, Oct. 29, was actually held on Oct. 28.

IV. THE BERLIN CONFERENCE, JANUARY 25–FEBRUARY 18, 1954

A. PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE, JULY 1953–JANUARY 1954

1. Exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union, July 15, 1953–January 1, 1954

No. 257

396.1/7-1553

The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union [1]

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and requests him to transmit the following to his Government:

The development of the international situation and the recent events in Eastern Germany and in Berlin [2] have intensified the universal desire to see peace more firmly established and to ease existing tensions in a way consistent with the fundamental right to freedom.

While recognizing the fact that enduring peace can only be ultimately assured when certain basic problems, such as controlled disarmament, can be dealt with, the United States Government desires to dispose now of those problems which are capable of early solution.

The conclusion of the German and Austrian Treaties which are long overdue clearly constitutes an essential element of the European settlement which the United States Government regards as a major contribution to peace.

A German peace treaty can only be negotiated with the participation of a free and representative all-German Government in a position freely to discuss such a treaty. Such a government can only result from free elections.

The conditions under which such a Government should be formed and enjoy full liberty of action, constitute a problem which is capable of early solution if there is good will on all sides. It is equally clear that no real progress can be made toward a general relaxation of tension in Europe so long as this problem remains unsolved.

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[1] The text of this note was drafted and approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at their meeting in Washington, July 10–14, 1953. For documentation on their meeting, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

[2] For documentation on the demonstrations in Berlin and East Germany starting on June 16, 1953, see Documents 713 ff.

In its notes to the Soviet Government, the last of which is that of September 23, 1952, [3] to which no answer has yet been received, the United States Government made constructive proposals, which were fully reflected in the resolution of the German Bundestag of June 10th of this year. [4] These proposals are designed to satisfy the unanimous desire of the German people for unity in freedom.

Mindful of the even greater urgency which the recent events have given to German unification, the United States Government is determined to make a new effort so as to bring to an end the abnormal situation to which the German people is subjected. It has therefore decided, after consulting the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, to propose to the Soviet Government a meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union. This meeting of limited duration might begin about the end of September at a place to be mutually agreed. The subjects for discussion should be the following:

(1) The organization of free elections in the Federal Republic, the Eastern Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. This would involve discussion *inter alia* of the necessary guarantees for freedom of movement, freedom of action for political parties, freedom of the press, and the enjoyment of the basic freedoms by all Germans before, during and after elections.

(2) Conditions for the establishment of a free all-German Government, with freedom of action in internal and external affairs.

These are essential steps which must precede the opening of discussions with the Soviet Government for a German peace treaty, itself a major element of a general settlement.

The United States Government also considers that at this first meeting agreement should finally be reached on the Austrian Treaty.

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953.

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[3] Document 138.

[4] For the June 10 Bundestag resolution, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 117-118.

No. 258

Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, "1951–1959"

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET PERSONAL AND PRIVATE WASHINGTON, July 17, 1953.

In furtherance of our conversation at the British Embassy the other night [2] concerning the possible nature of the Soviet reply to the Note on the Four-Power talk, [3] while obviously we cannot anticipate its exact nature, I believe the following are the possibilities:

1. It is conceivable the Soviet Government would accept without qualification a Foreign Ministers meeting and choose for its own reasons to ignore the implications of the "questions" listed in our Note. In this case, there would of course be no problem to a further communication to the Soviet Government.
2. Judging from the main lines the Soviet Government has been stressing of, (a) the desire for negotiations, and (b) an apparent unwillingness to accept what they regard as "pre-conditions" or "dictation", et cetera, the Soviet reply might indicate an acceptance in principle of a Four-Power meeting on condition that the questions listed in our Note which they might choose to consider "pre-conditions" or conclusions prior to negotiation be dropped and all participants come to the Conference without any pre-conditions.

I believe we should be considering the best method of dealing with their reply along these lines, since to abandon at Soviet insistence the five points outlined in our Note might be construed as an abandonment of the principles in the Bundestag Resolution. [4] Conversely, an insistence on Soviet acceptance of these points as written prior to a Conference might place us in the position of seeking to block any conference with the Soviets while they would be in a position of merely insisting on "equality" for all.

The possible line of answer might be to reply that the Soviet Government had misinterpreted the contents of our Note, which did not contain conditions but merely gave them advance warning of the positions we intended to advance and support at the Conference and that it goes without saying that each participant will be fully free to advance their own positions at the meeting. In any event, in view of the difficulties of tripartite coordination and the great disadvantage of a period of delay in answering the Soviet reply, I would suggest that we should at least have clear in our own minds our line in the event that the Soviet reply was of the nature indicated above.

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[1] Copies of this memorandum were also sent to Under Secretary Smith, Matthews, and Barbour.

[2] Presumably Bohlen is referring to a dinner at the British Embassy during the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington, July 10–14.

[3] *Supra.*

[4] For text of the June 10 Bundestag resolution, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 117–118.

As a secondary point, I have heard that Vienna was being considered by us as a possible site. It seems to me that Austria, being a deeply interested party, would not be the best site for a Conference and that Geneva or some other place in Switzerland would be more suitable.

Charles E. Bohlen

No. 259

396.1/8–453

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

Number 26/OSA

1. July 15 Soviet Government received note of Government of United States of America [2] and simultaneously notes of Governments of England and France from which it is apparent that at July conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of United States of America, England and France in Washington, it was decided to call a Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three powers referred to above and of Soviet Union. Moreover, agenda proposed by three Ministers and time of convocation of Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of United States of America, England, France and Soviet Union were communicated in notes.

It follows from what has been said above that Ministers of Foreign Affairs of United States of America, England and France contrary to international customs, have taken upon themselves a preliminary examination of questions for Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of four powers without participation a representative of Soviet Union. Such a situation cannot be recognized as normal. Moreover, it is in obvious contradiction to existing agreements on Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In addition the preliminary collusion of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs could exercise a negative influence on entire course of Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of four powers. Such a conclusion naturally flows from fact that three participants in this Conference have previously bound themselves by separate agreements, without even having attempted to bring about, as has frequently been done previously, a free discussion unhampered by any private obligations of ripe (nazrevshikh) international problems. Under present international conditions, conferences of the powers have great significance for regulation of international questions in dispute. It is precisely at this time when efforts of peace-loving governments have made it possible to put an end to war in Korea and conclude an armistice that favorable conditions have been created for achieving a lessening of tension in the international situation. It goes without saying that successful solution of this task depends primarily upon efforts of all peace-loving states, great and small. However, the responsibility for maintenance of peace and international security rests primarily as is evident from Charter of United Nations organization on five powers—United States, England, France, Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. It would not be in interests of maintenance and strengthening of peace and international security to ignore this circumstance. On other hand, to ascribe any special significance to such events as Fascist adventure of June 17 in Berlin—which was the handiwork of international hirelings and criminal elements—means to give one's self up to illusions and to distract attention from facts which are really important and have a positive significance for easing of international relations.

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[1] Transmitted to Washington in telegram 160. This translation should be compared for minor textual differences with the text in Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 352–353.

[2] Document 257.

In view of considerations adduced above, Soviet Government takes position that at a Conference of Foreign Ministers there should be considered the question of measures which promote a general lessening of tension in international relations, including questions of reduction of armaments and impermissibility of foreign military bases on territory of other states. Moreover, possibility should not be excluded of considering question of in just what composition (v kakom immeno sostave) these or other problems of international relations should be considered.

Necessity for an examination of questions referred to is dictated not only by state of affairs in Europe. It is known that situation of countries of Asia with its serious current problems is also attracting attention of international circles. From this it also follows that participation of Chinese People's Republic is necessary in a discussion of questions concerning measures for lessening tension in international relations. The great Chinese People, united and unified by Chinese People's Republic as never before, with full justification now demand restoration of their legitimate rights in all international affairs and to underestimate importance of urgent solution of this question would also not be in interests of strengthening peace and international security.

In connection with notes of Government of United States of America of July 15, Soviet Government expresses its agreement to examine German question at Conference of Ministers. However, in American note of July 15 as in published communiqué of Washington Conference of three Foreign Ministers,[3] instead of an actual examination of German question entire matter in fact is reduced to repetition of proposal which was contained in American note of September 23[4] of last year, ignoring necessity of resolving the basic problems of Germany.

As is well known German people are interested first of all in solution of such questions as realization of national unification of Germany and conclusion of a peace treaty. But it is precisely solution of these basic problems of Germany which American note of July 15 of this year disregards, citing note of September 23, 1952, which also ignored necessity of solving these basic questions. Note of Government of United States of America of July 15 substitutes for solution of these basic problems of Germany a proposal for all-German elections, but very question of elections according to American note of September 23 of last year is in turn replaced by proposal to designate a so-called neutral commission made up of representatives of foreign states "for an investigation with the aim of creating conditions" for conducting these elections. From what has been said above it follows that United States note of July 15 not only does not have as its aim the promoting of a solution of the basic questions of Germany, but reduces matter to prolonged discussions—whether or not situation in Germany should be investigated by some foreign representatives or other, how and for what purpose to conduct all these "investigations" humiliating for German people et cetera. Apart from unnecessary and pointless negotiations on such questions, there is nothing to be expected from this sort of proposal.

All this determines attitude of Soviet Government to above mentioned proposal of Government of United States of America.

Soviet Government considers that such a proposal not only cannot contribute to unification of Germany and creation of an all-German democratic government or to conclusion of peace treaty with Germany, but will as consequence leave Germany split into Western and Eastern parts and as before delay conclusion of a peace treaty. Simultaneously measures for remilitarization of Western Germany are being carried on, a danger which peace loving peoples of Europe and in particular neighboring states cannot disregard. If all this is conducted in agreed consultation with Bonn Government of Adenauer as is stated in note of July 15, then this can only destroy completely confidence of German people in such a government to say nothing of other peoples of Europe.

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[3] For text of the Foreign Ministers communiqué, see vol. v, Part 2 pp. 1703 ff

[4] Document 138

In spite of considerations expressed above concerning note of Government of United States of America of July 15, Soviet Government attaches great importance to joint consideration of German question by the powers and moreover hopes that such a consideration will make it possible to examine thoroughly pertinent problems relating to restoration of German unity and, together with a decision of question of a peace treaty with Germany, will contribute to strengthening of peace in Europe.

Proceeding from above, Soviet Government proposes:

1. Taking into account the foregoing, to examine at a Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs measures for lessening of tension in international relations;
2. To consider at Conference, German question, including problem of restoration of German unity and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

As regards Austrian treaty, position of Soviet Government on this question is set forth in its notes of July 30 [*29*] sent to Governments of United States of America, England and France.[5] It goes without saying that possible successes in settlement of German problem could also contribute to decision of Austrian treaty as well.

Soviet Government is sending similar notes to Governments of England, France.

Moscow, August 4, 1953.

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[5] Regarding the Soviet note of July 29 concerning the Austrian Treaty, see Document 872.

No. 260

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Chronological 1953"

Memorandum by Jacob Beam of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie)

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 5, 1953.

Subject: Soviet Note on Four-Power Conference

Following is consensus of meeting of S/P, EUR, GER, R, etc. held this morning on the Soviet Note: [1]

(1) The Korean armistice is taken as point of departure for campaign to play up need for relaxation of international tension. Requested participation of China is in accord with communist peace congress line and is played up to aggravate division of opinion between us, British and Asiatic bloc. However, while designed to serve larger propaganda purposes, references to China do not seem to be made a condition for four-power talks.

It is interesting to note that the Russians now adopt as their own the line we took at the conclusion of the Palais Rose Conference, [2] namely, that a general relaxation of tension is required for the solution of important problems. The U.S. reversed this trend in President Eisenhower's April 16 speech calling for specific performance. [3]

It is significant that the Russians still make specific mention of the question of foreign military bases and armaments.

(2) The U.S.S.R. expresses precise agreement to examine the German question at a Foreign Ministers conference. The Russian position on Germany, however, is much the same as before, stressing unification and a peace treaty but making no proposals on the holding of elections. In contrast to the last note on Germany, no mention is made of taking Potsdam as a basis. [4] In objecting to the western previous proposal of a UN investigation of electoral conditions, the Russians are on weak ground in the light of German reaction to current developments in the eastern zone. The Soviet protest against German remilitarization is directed toward French opinion and the opinion of the satellites.

The order of the agenda suggested by the Russians indicates that they may attempt to lead off at a conference with the question of lessening of international tension as a precedent to discussing Germany. Although the Note is ambiguous, it does not preclude the possibility that German questions can be discussed separately and without Chinese participation.

(3) For the first time the Russians indicate that an Austrian treaty is dependent upon a German settlement. This cut the ground from under Gruber who has been attempting an independent Austrian settlement and the new Soviet public approach can be exploited in Austria.

It was recommended that a separate reply be sent to the Soviets on Austria, and before a reply to their August 4 Note on Germany and other matters. It was suggested that we indicate we would agree not to table the short draft (but would not specifically withdraw it) on the understanding that Russia would not introduce extraneous issues.[5]

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] For documentation on Palais Rose Conference, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 183.

[4] For text of the Soviet note, dated Aug. 23, 1952, see Document 125.

As regards the August 4 Note, it was suggested we await German and British and French reaction. Our preliminary feeling was that we should tell the Russians that we are willing to take first things first and to discuss the German problem at an early date (however after the German elections[6]). While not making Russian acceptance of our proposal on the holding of free elections a condition for a conference, we would nevertheless play up election and human rights issues as being most important points in a settlement.

In our initial press reaction, we will take much the same line as the reported attitude of the British Foreign Office that the Russian Note does not seem to constitute a rejection of our proposal for a conference on Germany but that the larger and complicated issues introduced by the Russians require much further study, in consultation with the British and the French.

According to R, Russian press reports mention the probability of a *four-power* conference being held in the near future.

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[5] For documentation on the short draft of the Austrian Treaty, see Documents 784 ff.

[6] The Federal elections were scheduled for Sept. 6, 1953.

No. 261

396.1/8-653: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Seoul[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 6, 1953—7:10 p.m.

Tedul 17. Re Soviet note August 4,[2] Department's preliminary reaction is that language of note dealing with general sources of international tension, Asian problems, Commie Chinese participation, etc., is much vaguer and more obviously of propaganda nature than section of note expressing Soviet willingness to examine German problem. We believe Soviets do not intend stand firm on their ambiguous suggestion of Five-Power meeting including Communist China and that, depending on nature our reply, they would be willing participate in Four-Power meeting of Foreign Ministers dealing with German problem.

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[1] Drafted by Thurston; cleared with Kidd, Matthews, and Merchant; and sent at the request of Under Secretary Smith. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Moscow. Secretary Dulles was in Korea for talks concerning a defense agreement with South Korea; for documentation on his visit, see vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1465 ff.

[2] Document 259.

There would appear to be three alternative types of reply that might be made to Soviet note: (1) flat rejection; (2) counterproposals re agenda; (3) brief acknowledgment stating we are pleased Soviets have acknowledged our proposal to discuss German problem and suggesting time and place.

Soviets would make most capital out of negative reply on our part and British and French public opinion would obviously never permit this. We have no desire to get into the endless argument about agenda, such as occurred in Palais Rose discussion in 1951. We accordingly favor adopting third course, which involves positive reply, trying to pin Soviets down on German issue. This would mean playing down point 1 of their proposal, which we think can be done.[3]

Foregoing represents only preliminary position and our further thinking will develop in light British-French-German and other foreign contacts. This connection, Soviet note is well calculated gain support considerable elements of public opinion in Western Europe and will probably increase German public pressure for Four-Power conference on German unity.

British have already asked our cooperation in restricting official statements to press to non-committal language and we have taken initial public line very similar to theirs. They have also expressed hope we would not say anything at this time which would definitely close door to discussions with Soviets of general problems giving rise to international tensions. British also suggest it would be advisable have tripartite drafting teams set up in either Paris, London or Washington begin work on reply to Soviet note.

French official reaction is one of considerable unhappiness and pessimism. Though recognizing door not completely closed, they conclude Moscow does not want Four-Power talks on Germany at this time and that purpose of note is to provoke negative reply and divide Western Powers. They believe in our response we should stress it is Soviets who are opposing unification of Germany, not us.

Re Austrian issue, we have decided take advantage Soviet stated unwillingness reach decision on Austria pending German negotiations to treat Austrian issue separately and, after consultation with Allies, to send early reply to latest Soviet note on Austria indicating willingness participate in meeting Foreign Ministers' Deputies in very near future.

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[3] On Aug. 7, 10, and 11 the U.S. Missions in Moscow, Bonn, and Paris, respectively, pressed for agreement with this approach and the choice of the third alternative (Telegrams 180 from Moscow, 591 from Bonn, and 536 from Paris; 396.1/8–753, 8–1053, 8–1153)

SMITH

No. 262

396.1/8-853

The Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 8, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: While you were away, the Soviet Union sent notes [1] to the U.S., Great Britain, and France in reply to the July 15 notes [2] of those Governments proposing a meeting this fall of the four Foreign Ministers. I found the Russian reply an interesting document for several reasons:

Despite earlier *Pravda* fulminations,[3] which were tantamount to an insulting rejection of the proposal, they now agree to the principle of such a meeting. There is undoubtedly a whole complex of reasons for their decision. My quick reaction is that there were three main reasons:

(a) Whereas the Russians had expected us to react strongly, we virtually ignored the *Pravda* editorial, thereby depriving them of either a cue or an excuse.

(b) The Russian position in East Germany, with its continuing deterioration has upset their entire German gambit. The strong-arm methods to which they have been forced to resort have ruined their plan to monopolize the unification *cum* neutralization theme, as well as their plan to play up to the Socialists in both East and West Germany as a political force to delay or wreck EDC. As of the moment, their main chance of partially rectifying their present poor position, and getting the Germans to stall on EDC, is to accept the principle of the Four Power proposal later this year, and reestablish the bait of hope for unification without EDC or rearmament.

(c) At a time of widely rumored or actual internal Kremlin difficulties, it was necessary for them to make a noise like a smoothly functioning, unified Government capable of embarking on a serious discussion of matters of international importance.

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[1] Document 259.

[2] Document 257.

[3] Under reference is the *Pravda* editorial of July 23 which, while generally negative in tone, did indicate that the Soviet Union might put forward a counterproposal.

The note, though it took the standard cracks at the West, and accused the three Western nations of conspiring against them, and raged at the "Fascist adventure in Berlin of June 17 . . .[4] an act of foreign hirelings and criminal elements", was actually rather mild, and plausibly serious in tone.

Speaking from the standpoint of public opinion both here and abroad, it is sufficiently serious and plausible to make a reply of ours which simply referred them back to previous notes, and did not move a little forward, at least by intimation, appear arbitrary and unimaginative if we are really sincere in our expressed desire for a German and Austrian solution.

The new elements which the Russians have introduced in their reply as conditions of participation in a new conference to discuss Germany and Austria are (a) Chinese Communist participation, (b) placing the lessening of tensions in international affairs at the top of the agenda, (c) reduction of armaments and "impermissibility" of Foreign military bases.

Besides this they have gone into a big smoke screen operation on the question of German unification by picking up the reference in our note to the earlier September 23, 1952 note.[5] This note suggested a Four Power meeting, "to discuss the composition, functions, and authority of an impartial Commission of Investigation with a view to creating the conditions necessary for free elections". (I can only assume that this was a tongue-in-cheek stall at the time, as the proposal could not conceivably have been accepted by the Russians then, and probably not now.)

Naturally, Washington, London, and Paris will be conferring on this, and an appropriate reply will be forthcoming one of these days.

Incidentally, I have just seen a cable from Germany saying that Adenauer hoped we would not be too hasty in our reply, in order to avoid the possibility of upsetting his election apple cart.[6] In this connection, if we followed Russian practice and delayed our reply the exact number of days that they took to reply to our July 15 note, we would have until August 27. If we again followed their practice of adding on a few days just to show that we had our pride too, the reply could easily be postponed until after the German elections, and in the meantime, what with their food problem and police defection, their leverage on the elections would not improve, and could very easily deteriorate still further.

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[4] All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

[5] Document 138.

[6] Telegram 528 from Bonn, Aug. 5. (396.1/8–553)

However, no matter what skill we display in technical maneuvering, I think, again from the viewpoint of my particular business, that their note calls for our most thoughtful reconsideration of our German position.

Does it have to be EDC, unification, free elections, or else? This was a very smart position for us to take at the time, because it backed them into giving us some leads. If we persist now in that "or else" position, it becomes very much like "unconditional surrender"—giving them no room for the slightest maneuver, and what we are asking them to agree to, in their eyes and in the eyes of the world would be complete, total, crushing defeat.

I am all for complete, total, and crushing defeat if we really have the leverage to bring it about. But we haven't, and they know it, and therefore all they have to do is to lay their ears back, and no real progress will have been made except raising hatred of Russia a notch or two in German minds.

You will know far better than I if there are any possible alternatives which would allow the Russians at least a small piece of face and yet move us some steps nearer to our ultimate objective, bearing in mind that concessions work both ways, and whatever improvement is brought about in the lot of the East Germans will simply make them hungrier for more, and make the Russians less and less able to deny them the further steps.

. . . Maybe tossing the mixed Investigating Commission called for in the September 23, 1952 note out the window would be something we could do quickly and at no actual cost.

. . . Maybe phasing the overt EDC rearmament of Germany while at the same time making up for the delay by unofficially organizing and arming *our* People's Police would be a negotiable device.

. . . Maybe there is some effective and at the same time acceptable interim political move that could precede unification, free elections, and an all-German Government.

. . . Maybe, . . . maybe.

It occurred to me that in advance of a tripartite reply, you might consider it a good idea to send up an American trial balloon. The occasion of your Korean trip gives you a perfect opportunity, in that you will probably want to report by radio or television to the American people on Korea. At that time you could introduce into that talk, on the peg of "While I was away, the Soviet Government delivered a note" . . . some personal reactions to the Soviet note.

I am attaching a rough "as dictated" draft [7] of some of the points that might fit into such a talk. [8]

Sincerely,

C. D. JACKSON

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[7] This 12-page draft is not printed.

[8] On Aug. 13 Secretary Dulles sent a memorandum to Jackson stating that his memorandum contained "some good thoughts on the German situation and the Russian note." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, "1951-1959")

No. 263

396.1/8-1453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1953—4:55 p.m.

772. Following is text proposed US draft reply to Soviet note August 4 [2] which is transmitted for use in tripartite drafting group which we understand from Paris 534 [3] will begin work early next week. In meantime you should make text available to Foreign Offices and report initial reaction. Re London's 581. [4] Embassy there requested convey Salisbury my appreciation his personal greetings and convey to him thought that following draft text embodies my assessment of tactics we should use in replying to Soviet note.

"1. Presents its compliments, etc.

2. In its note of July 15 [5] the US Government proposed a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, UK, US and the Soviet Union to discuss the German question, including the reunification of Germany, the holding of free elections, the establishment of a free all-German Government, and the peace treaty, as well as agreement on the Austrian treaty.

3. The Soviet reply of August 4 is devoted largely to the theme that the Chinese People's Republic should be brought into the discussions as a government having legitimate rights in all international affairs.' The German problem has been a subject of discussion at Four-Power meetings since 1947, but never before has there been any suggestion of Chinese participation. The status of the so-

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[1] Drafted by Thurston; cleared with Morris, Bowie, Merchant, L, and U; and approved for transmission by Dulles. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Moscow, Berlin, and Bonn.

[2] Document 259.

[3] Telegram 534 reported that coordination of the reply would take place at Paris with de Margerie representing France and Reilly, the United Kingdom. (396.1/8-1153)

[4] In telegram 581 Aldrich reported that he had discussed the Soviet note with Salisbury who had asked for the U.S. position. (396.1/8-1053)

[5] Document 257.

called Chinese People's Republic is itself a matter of serious international controversy and it has no recognized competence in German affairs. The US Government finds totally unacceptable and rejects the suggestion that the Chinese Communist regime is entitled to participate in the discussion of the problem of German unification, or that discussion of the problem of Germany be subordinated to the solution of the problem of China.

4. Real progress toward peace and the lessening of international tensions can be made by the solution of immediate concrete problems, such as the German problem, and the injection into the discussion and solution of such problems of numerous other complicated issues can only result in delay and possible failure. The US Government seeks by all means at its disposal to find solutions for problems which lie at the base of international tensions, but it does not believe that progress can be made within a framework permitting only superficial consideration to important questions. In this connection the US Government would remind the Soviet Government of a statement contained in an editorial published on May 24, 1953 in *Pravda*, widely believed to be an authoritative source of Soviet official opinion, which appears to endorse the views of the US Government in this regard. Pointing out that 'the present international situation is known for great complexity of its outstanding problems, *Pravda* expresses the opinion that 'an attempt to discuss and solve all controversial outstanding problems at once would end in failure' and added that 'a move forward in the settlement of such sore problems as the problem of the war in Korea or the problem of Germany could help to ease the tension in the present international situation and prepare the soil for the settlement of other problems.'

5. The Korean Conference to achieve by peaceful means the unification of a free and independent Korea and the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, charged with the important task of the reduction of armaments, are concrete examples of the present existence of opportunities for the lessening of world tensions and the advancement of peace and means that should be availed of to that end. The solution of the German problem and the conclusion of the Austrian treaty will be major steps toward the achievement of peace and will furnish a firm foundation for the solution of other international problems. They should therefore not be delayed or hindered by extraneous issues.

6. The Government of the US welcomes the statement that the Soviet Government attaches importance to the joint consideration of the German question by the Four Powers, and in response to the United States note of July 15 agrees to examine the German question at a conference of Ministers. For its part, the Government of the US fully shares the hope that such consideration will make it possible to examine thoroughly the pertinent problems relating to the restoration of German unity and the question of a peace treaty with Germany, as a contribution to the strengthening of peace in Europe.

7. The Government of the US therefore proposes that the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Great Britain, France, and the United States, meet at Geneva (or in some other mutually agreeable loca-

tion in Switzerland) on October 1, 1953, and if this is agreeable, will communicate with the Government of the Swiss Republic to ascertain whether the Four Powers may take advantage of its traditional hospitality and to make the necessary arrangements.

8. This Government is of the opinion that in examining all relevant aspects of the German question, including the restoration of German unity and a peace treaty, the four Powers should not fail to take any practical step which would serve as a means towards these ends, or which would in any event constitute integral parts of a solution of the German problem. As expressed in its note of July 15, 1953, the Government of the United States considers free elections and the constitution of a free all-German Government, in response to the clearly expressed wishes of all Germans, to be a practical and fundamental point of departure, which would most facilitate reunification and the negotiation of a German peace treaty.

9. With respect to Austria, the Government of the US has never been of the opinion that the reestablishment of the freedom and independence of this liberated country, as required by the Moscow Declaration of November 1943, should be subordinated to the German question. This Government believes that the solution of any one of the major outstanding international questions has a reciprocally beneficial effect on the possibility of solving others, and with this thought in mind has invited the Soviet Union by a note dated ——— to a conference of Deputies for the Austrian State Treaty to be held in London on ———. This Government believes that world opinion would find the best augur for the success of the following conference on Germany in the speedy conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty.

10. The Government of the US is surprised that the Soviet Government should misinterpret as inadmissible collusion the initiative taken by the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and France at their recent meeting in Washington. As is their custom and right, the three Ministers considered questions of mutual interest in the development of a prosperous and secure European Community between nations manifesting a willingness to cooperate toward that end."

DULLES

No. 264

662.001/8-1653

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

[Moscow, August 15, 1953.]

Soviet Government considers it necessary once again to call attention of Government of USA as well as Governments of England and France to the abnormal situation in which Germany eight years after end of war in Europe, is without peace treaty, remains split into Eastern and Western parts, and is in unequal position with relation to other states. Such situation contradicts aspirations of peace-loving peoples for strengthening of peace in Europe and is, moreover, violation of legitimate national interests of German people.

As far back as March 10, 1952, Soviet Government presented for consideration of Governments of USA, England and France draft of bases for peace treaty with Germany in connection with which Governments of USA, England and France have not, up to present time, expressed their attitude. [2] (Draft of bases of peace treaty with Germany is enclosed. [3]) Governments of USA, England, and France have also not presented their draft of peace treaty. It follows from this that governments of three indicated powers underestimate importance of question of peace treaty with Germany. Question of peace treaty with Germany is being dragged out more and more, for which responsibility is borne primarily by Governments of USA, England and France.

Refusing to examine question of peace treaty with Germany, Governments of USA, England and France embarked upon another course on May 26, 1952, Governments of USA, England and France along with Bonn Government of Adenauer signed "Treaty on Relations Between Three Powers and Federal Republic of Germany", [4] which is known as "Bonn agreement"; and on May 27 of same year, Treaty for "European Defense Community" [5] known by name of "Paris agreement" was signed along with Bonn Government by Governments of France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. Thereby, both the "Bonn agreement" as well as "Paris agreement" are indissolubly bound for 50 years to come with aggressive North Atlantic bloc of powers.

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 215, Aug. 16, from Moscow. It should be compared for minor textual differences with the unofficial translation in Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 354-356. Similar notes were sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of France and the United Kingdom.

[2] For text of the Soviet note of Mar. 10, see Document 65.

[3] According to the Embassy in Moscow, this enclosure was the same as that attached to the Soviet note of Mar. 10.

[4] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

[5] For text of the European Defense Community Treaty, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116 ff.

As is known, sense of "Paris agreement" is that armed forces entering into composition of so-called "European army" destined for aggressive aims of North Atlantic bloc are to be created in Western Germany under leadership of Hitlerite generals and other revanchists. According to "Bonn agreement" Western Germany will remain in position of dependent state subordinated to three powers which, regardless of formal abolition of Occupation Statute, [6] maintain their troops on territory of Western Germany with unlimited rights of interference in its internal affairs. This preserves for many years enslavement of Western German population under conditions of modified occupation regime.

This means Bonn and Paris agreements are leading to rebirth of German militarism and to transformation of Western Germany into a tool of aggressive plans of other powers which pretend to world domination.

As can be seen from communiqué of conference of Foreign Ministers of United States, England and France which took place in July 1953 in Washington, [7] Governments of Three Powers decided to pursue further policy directed toward realization of plan to create "European Army" and to include in it West German armed forces led by Hitlerite generals. In communiqué it is shown outright that "Three Foreign Ministers reaffirm their strong intention to pursue energetically the policy upon which their governments agreed within framework of Atlantic Treaty. This policy includes work on creation of European unity of six European countries which have already created unification of coal and steel and whose governments have signed treaty for a European defense community". Course which Governments of USA, England and France have taken in German question is leading to rebirth of German militarism, to creation of dangerous focus of new aggression, to continuing increase of danger of new war in Europe. To follow this course means to renounce those solemn international obligations which set up goal of promoting restoration of Germany as peace-loving and democratic state and which were undertaken by United States of America and England at Potsdam Conference in 1945 and subsequently adhered to by France.

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[6] For text of the Occupation Statute, signed Apr. 8, 1949 at Washington, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, pp. 179–181.

[7] For text, see vol. V, Part 2, p. 1703.

Other course is course which corresponds to peace-loving goals and obligations undertaken by Four Powers with regard to Germany immediately after ending of war and which respond to interests of strengthening peace in Europe. In this connection however it is impossible not to recognize fact that since time of Potsdam Conference eight years have passed and that since that time not a few changes have come about which must be taken into account at final regulation of German problem. However basic aims of Potsdam Agreement—to promote creation of peace-loving Germany—express as before interests of all European peoples including German people and must be guaranteed by means of concluding peace treaty with Germany.

Solution of this task will create conditions for unprecedented growth of Germany with its great possibilities for development of its economy and culture. No one can deny that rebirth of Germany as a great power worthy of occupying corresponding place among other powers is possible only by way of peaceful and democratic development of German State, by way of friendly cooperation with other states striving for strengthening of peace and international security. Experience of history shows more than once already course of war has led Germany to national catastrophe and that German people have paid dearly as a consequence.

There is no doubt that conclusion peace treaty with Germany has first rank significance for settlement German problem. It will in decisive fashion contribute to stabilizing peace in Europe and will permit definitive decision appropriate questions having arisen as result second world war in which are vitally interested European states which have suffered from Hitlerite aggression, and first of all Germany's neighbors. Conclusion peace treaty with Germany is also necessary in view fact that threat reestablishment of German militarism, which has twice unleashed world war, has not been removed inasmuch as appropriate decisions of Potsdam Conference still remain unfulfilled. Peace treaty with Germany will establish stable conditions of peace for German people, will contribute to development of Germany as united, independent, democratic and peace-loving state, will assure the German people of possibility peaceful cooperation with other peoples on basis equal rights.

Governments USA, England and France justify their refusal to consider peace treaty with Germany by fact that there does not as yet exist all-German Government which could take part in preparation of treaty. However, such type of motives for refusal to consider peace treaty do not correspond with real state of affairs. In reality policy of USA, England and France will lead to result that not only will consideration question of peace treaty be even further postponed, since this policy is directed at reinforcing division of Germany, toward prohibiting reestablishment of German unity.

At present time more and more new measures of pressure are being carried out in order that Bonn and Paris agreements be ratified by appropriate states despite serious opposition which exists on part parliaments several states. This pressure, and especially on part US Government, has aim of hastening creation armed forces of Western Germany and their inclusion in "European Army" provided for by Paris Agreement in order to turn Western Germany, which is dependent on states North Atlantic bloc into weapon for implementation plans of this bloc. But inclusion Western Germany in "European Army" and North Atlantic bloc will render impossible unification Western and Eastern Germany into one state. Peace-loving peoples of all Europe are interested in establishment united and peace-loving Germany, as German people itself is also interested in this. But from that time when Bonn Government brings Western Germany into aggressive North Atlantic bloc unification Western and Eastern Germany will be rendered impossible. For exactly this reason overwhelming majority Germans not only in German Democratic Republic but also in Western Germany oppose plans Adenauer Government for bringing Western Germany into "European Army" and North Atlantic bloc, and in this regard peace-loving peoples of all Europe are on their side.

From what has been said above it is evident that policy Governments USA, England and France, and equally of Adenauer Government, is directed not toward unification Germany and not toward formation all-German Government but toward leaving Germany divided into parts for many years. Such policy is directly aimed opposition to formation all-German Democratic Government.

Consequently, refusal to consider peace treaty with Germany under pretext non-existence all-German Government does not reflect real motives for this refusal.

From what has been said above it is also evident that present policy Governments USA, England and France is directed both against deciding question of peace treaty and against unification Germany on peace-loving and democratic basis, against formation all-German Democratic Government.

Governments USA, England and France instead of deciding question of formation all-German Democratic Government introduce a different proposal. They propose to discuss question of all-German elections but reduce this matter to consideration by Four Powers of their proposal for appointment so-called neutral commission from representatives foreign states "for investigation with aim creating conditions" for conducting these elections.

It is impossible to evaluate this other than as attempt transfer conduct elections in Germany to hands foreign powers, to foist on German people for this purpose all sorts of foreign "investigators", as if matter concerns not Germany which has democratic traditions of many years standing, but some sort of colony without rights. Such proposal leads to pushing German people aside from decision its internal question, is expression of crude lack of faith in German people and, naturally, is met with rebuff on part wide circles German population.

Above indicated proposal Governments USA, England and France in its essence departs from principles of democratism which found its expression in Potsdam decisions. This proposal, according to statement of Three Powers, has been agreed upon with Adenauer Government, which serves interests greatest capitalist monopolies of Western Germany, which more and more unleashes hands yesterday's Hitlerites and open Fascists for suppression German democratic forces, which represents mouthpiece of extreme German nationalists and revanchists, who are striving for the rebirth of German militarism for new aggressive wars. In this connection it is impossible to forget that Adenauer Government has invariably come out against very possibility of coordinating policy of Four Powers on German question, since it has completely tied its fate with plans for the reestablishment of German militarism, with plans for preparation of new war in Europe. Exactly for these anti-popular purposes, it is striving for ratification of Paris and Bonn agreements despite fact that these agreements contradict national interests German people and mean turning Western Germany into dependent state, enslaving Western German population for many years.

The Bonn agreement as well as Paris agreement have nothing in common with interests reestablishment unity democratic Germany and that real purposes these agreements are directed against basic principles Potsdam Conference, at which USA, England and USSR, and also France which acceded to it, decided to assure reestablishment of United Germany as peace-loving and democratic state.

From all that has been said above it is evident that question of reestablishment national unity of Democractic Germany was and remains fundamental question for German people, in decision of which are interested peace-loving people of all Europe. No sort of pretexts can justify further delay in this matter inasmuch as under present conditions chief responsibility for its decision rests on Governments USA, England, France and USSR. In any case there must not be postponed such measures as can serve even gradual settlement question of unification Germany, of formation all-German Democratic Government.

Government USSR is approaching Government USA and also to Governments England and France with proposal to take now practical measures aimed at settlement German problem.

In accordance with what is set forth above Soviet Government considers as urgent settlement following basic questions with regard to Germany.

1. Convocation peace conference for examination question of peace treaty with Germany.

Soviet Government proposes that such a conference with participation of all interested states can be convoked within next six months and sees no basis for further postponement of convocation of a peace conference. All preparatory work for preparation of peace treaty with Germany could be completed within above mentioned period. In connection therewith it is important to assure appropriate participation of representatives of Germany at all stages of preparation of peace treaty and at a peace conference. Prior to formation of a provisional all-German government the representatives of the existing governments of East and West Germany could take part in the preparation of the peace treaty.

2. The formation of a provisional all-German government and the carrying out of free all-German elections.

For purpose of restoration of German national unity on peace-loving and democratic bases Soviet Government proposes that parliaments of German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic with the broad participation of democratic organizations should form a provisional all-German government. Such a government can be created by means of a direct agreement between East and West Germany as a substitute for presently existing governments German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. In event that this proves to be difficult at given time the provisional all-German government can be established with retention for a certain period of governments of German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. At same time in this event the provisional German government obviously will have in first stage only limited functions. However, in such a situation also the establishment of a provisional all-German government will represent in itself a real step forward on path of reunification of Germany which must receive its full completion in creation of an all-German government on basis of really free all-German elections.

The tasks of the provisional all-German government:

> a. The provisional all-German government could decide such urgent questions of all-German significance as the representation of Germany in preparation of peace treaty and also representation in international organizations; the inadmissibility of involvement of Germany in coalitions or military alliances directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Hitlerite Germany; questions of German citizenship; guarantee of free activity of democratic parties and organizations and the inadmissibility of existence of Fascist militaristic and other organizations hostile to democracy and to cause of preservation of peace; the expansion of trade rela-

tions between East and West Germany; questions of transport, postal and telegraphic communications; questions of free movement of peoples and goods independent of established zonal frontiers; the development of economic and cultural ties between East and West Germany and other questions affecting interests of the entire German people.

b. A chief task of provisional all-German government furthermore must be preparation and carrying out of all-German free elections as a result of which German people itself without interference of foreign powers will decide question of social and state structure in a democratic Germany. The provisional all-German government must work out a draft of an all-German electoral law guaranteeing the really democratic character of all-German elections, the participation in the elections of all democratic organizations and the inadmissibility of pressure on the electors from the great monopolies. On its free decision must depend the recognition of expediency of verification of existence in all Germany of conditions necessary for the carrying out of democratic elections as well as adoption of measures for guaranteeing such conditions in addition Soviet Government considers it necessary that measures be taken by governments of USA, England, France and USSR for carrying out of all-German elections under conditions of genuine freedom with the exclusion of any pressure whatsoever on part of foreign powers in the carrying out of these elections.

3. The easing of the financial and economic obligations of Germany connected with the consequences of the war.

Taking into consideration that Germany has already carried out an important part of its financial and economic obligations in regard to USSR, USA, England, and France connected with the consequences of the war and considering the necessity of easing the economic situation of Germany, Soviet Government recognizes urgency of adopting in this connection appropriate decisions.

a. Soviet Government considers it necessary beginning January 1, 1954, that Germany be freed completely from payment of reparations and equally from payment to Four Powers of postwar state debts with exception of indebtedness for commercial obligations.

b. Soviet Union considers it also necessary to limit extent of expenditures connected with presence of forces of Four Powers on territory of Germany. For this purpose it is proposed that sum of expenses for maintenance of these forces annually should not exceed 5 percent of revenues of state budget of German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic and in any event should not exceed the sum of the occupation expenditures of 1949 when the extent of the occupational expenditures had not yet been affected by the formation of the North Atlantic Bloc. Soviet Government proposes in addition that Germany should be completely freed of payments of indebtedness for foreign occupation expenditures of Four Powers which were created after 1945. Soviet Government is confident that an agreement between the USSR, USA, England and

France on German question and the adoption in near future of decisions in accordance with proposals outlined above would serve to reduce tension in international relations, assisting thereby in strengthening of peace and international security.

No. 265

396.1/8–1753: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 17, 1953—6:53 p.m.

574. Soviet note of Aug 16[*15*] [2] strikes us as directed at Germany in contrast with preceding combination of *Pravda* editorial, Aug 4 note, and parts of Malenkov speech [3] which were directed primarily at Brit and Fr public opinion. We regard four statements taken together as all-out effort to foster divisions in West and increase hesitation to proceed with EDC both in Germany and elsewhere. Implication for Germans is that adherence to Adenauer's present course will result in indefinite division of country, and for other Western Europeans, that EDC will result in indefinite prolongation of Cold War and rebirth of German militarism. These points may have considerable appeal to public, since they coincide in large part with position of opposition parties and elements in Germany and France. While we believe Soviets are still not anxious for meeting on Germany at this time, they are clearly laying groundwork for exploitation German issue to achieve larger stakes (disruption EDC and NATO).

August 16 note advances ostensibly practical program for prompt establishment all-German Government which will *inter alia* arrange elections and for convocation peace conference. (In last year's notes, Soviets only covered these points vaguely, though they represent established GDR positions. [4]) Moreover, note aims directly at influencing Bundestag elections to Adenauer's detriment, and represents serious effort bolster shaky GDR regime.

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[1] Drafted by Kidd; cleared with Bonbright, Merchant, Matthews, Thurston, P, L, and U; and initialed for the Secretary of State by Merchant. Also sent to London and Paris and repeated to Moscow and Berlin.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Regarding the *Pravda* editorial, see footnote 3, Document 262. For text of the Aug. 4 note, see Document 259; for extracts from Malenkov's speech, Aug. 8, to the Supreme Soviet, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 22 ff.

[4] For documentation on the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union in 1952, see Documents 65 ff.

Main theme of argumentative part of Soviet note is "back to Potsdam", mentioned six times, though notable that section of note dealing with provisional all-German Government does not once indicate degree of control to be exercised by four powers. Paragraphs 1 to 16 stress necessity of peace treaty eight years after war, possibility of achieving this on basis of Potsdam objectives, and impossibility of achieving either peace treaty or unification via West route of EDC, NATO, and 1952 proposals for supervised elections. Conclusion of Soviet note states three proposals, of which first on convocation of peace conference may be attractive, second on role provisional all-German Government is so transparent that should be susceptible firm German rejection, and third on easing financial and economic obligations is nothing Germans will complain about, although literal example of locking barn door after horse stolen by Soviets.

Our preliminary view is that Soviets would definitely gain more than we if we refused take them up on conference looking toward peace settlement. This in fact not unanticipated result West's initiative of July 15,[5] and we believe we should not only answer positively but press for early four-power conference in accordance our July 15 note. Reaction of responsible German leaders important, however, re Soviet point of "back to Potsdam" and especially re creation provisional all German Government by representatives from GDR and Fed Rep rather than on basis free elections. Before replying to Soviet note, we should like if feasible have West Germans set tone on these two points (both of which we would of course like to reject strongly).

In our view this calls for statesmanship on part of both Adenauer and Ollenhauer and subordination if possible of their current election campaign tactics to reach bipartisan agreement on matter of serious German national interest. This has been possible in past as in Bundestag resolution of June 10.[6] Could you as HICOM Chairman check with Adenauer and informally with Ollenhauer to ascertain their positions? Most satisfactory might be if German response could take form of Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee declaration or joint Adenauer–Ollenhauer statement. Failing that, could you induce separate but similar statements by these two leaders? Hope you can, if Brit and French HICOMers agree, contact Adenauer and Ollenhauer on urgent basis. Please also report last prior public rejection by Federal Government and SPD leaders which we could mention in our reply if Ollenhauer at present unwilling cooperate as suggested.

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[5] Document 257.

[6] For the June 10 Bundestag resolution, see *Papers and Documents*, pp. 117–118.

Our tentative view is that western reply (which will cover both Aug 4 and 16 notes) should be brief and positive and should be made before Bundestag elections, in fact within next week or 10 days if possible. By brief and positive we mean note similar that transmitted Deptel 772 to London 512 Paris rptd Moscow 105 Berlin 106 Bonn 547, [7] i.e. proposing German conference in October, concentrating on few basic points and generally avoiding laying down conditions for meeting.

Paris and London authorized pass above tentative views to Foreign Offices. FYI we hope produce new US draft reply by time Paris working group meets which will reflect if available information from Conant referred to above.

Above preliminary views have not been discussed with Secretary whose comments if any will be transmitted subsequently.

SMITH

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[7] Document 263.

No. 266

Editorial Note

The tripartite drafting group began its meetings in Paris on August 20 with Theodore Achilles, D'Arcy Reilly, and Roland de Margerie representing respectively the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. At the initial meeting the group had before it drafts from each of the participants. The United States draft, which had been cabled to Paris in telegram 554, August 8 (396.1/8-1853), was similar to that in telegram 772, Document 263, but took into account the second Soviet note of August 15, Document 264, while the British draft was a more general reply and the French a more detailed response. Achilles reported on the first meeting in telegram 675 from Paris, August 21. (396.1/8-2153)

At the second meeting the drafting group adopted a French revision as the working draft for further discussion. (Telegram 697 from Paris, August 21, 396.1/8-2153) This draft was similar in substance to a draft prepared in the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany which was only four paragraphs in length and proposed a four-power meeting to begin on October 1. (Telegram 697 from Bonn, August 18, 396.1/8-1853) While progress had been made, Achilles reported that there were still substantial differences to be ironed out since the British wanted a four-power conference to discuss problems other than just Germany and Austria, while the French wanted such a meeting limited only to Germany. (Telegram 710 from Paris, August 22, 396.1/8-2253)

Following further changes with consequent references to individual governments the drafting group on August 26 approved the text of a reply to the Soviet notes. The following day this text was shown to Chancellor Adenauer who reacted strongly to paragraph 7, the last sentence of which he believed would have to "be removed if not to damage him in the elections and jeopardize the German position." (Telegram 816 from Bonn, August 27, 396.1/8-2753)

This paragraph reads:

> "7. United States Government considers it desirable that meeting of Foreign Ministers should concentrate on German problem and, in first instance, on question of free elections and status of future German Government. This need not preclude Foreign Ministers from discussing any other aspects of problem of German unity nor even from considering the principle of a German peace treaty, which is, of course, an essential part of a world settlement." (Telegram 762 from Paris, August 26, 396.1/8-2653)

Paragraph 7 then became the object of several cables among the three capitals before an acceptable draft note could be presented to the Chancellor on August 31. For Conant's report on the meeting with Adenauer, see his letter to Secretary of State Dulles, *infra.* At the same time the draft was shown to Mayor Reuter and Foreign Minister Gruber for their approval and to members of the North Atlantic Council for their information. For the agreed note, as delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on September 2, see Document 268. Documentation relating to its drafting and the work of the tripartite drafting group is in file 396.1.

No. 267

Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, "1951-1959"

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE
EYES ONLY

BAD GODESBERG, August 31, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: I am venturing to send you this personal note about my conference with the Chancellor this morning, as I think it throws some light on the future relations between the German Government and our own. [2] In making this statement, I realize that I am prophesying as to the outcome of the elections, [3] which is perhaps gratuitous in view of the fact that by the time you receive this letter, you will know how the voting has gone here in Germany. However, almost everyone here believes the Chancellor will be returned. The big question is, how much he will have to pay in the way of political debts for the support from other parties, in particular whether he has to bring the BHE into the government. But leaving these matters aside, I am addressing myself here to our differences of opinion about the contents of the note to the Soviet Union.

In my attempts this morning to persuade the Chancellor to accept a modified Seventh Paragraph, which were unsuccessful, I ran into his repeated reference to Article Seven of the Contractual Agreements. [4] I am convinced that his objections to the original draft and to the substitute Paragraph Seven offered were quite sincere, and did not stem from any attempt to be difficult or to show the Allies that he was displeased because he had not been consulted in greater detail earlier.

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[1] The source text was attached to a chit which indicated that Secretary Dulles and Merchant had seen it and to a reply from Dulles, dated Sept. 8, which read as follows:

"Dear Jim: I have your letter of August 31. I think you handled the matter with the Chancellor very well indeed. Now that the election is over and he has won a smashing victory, I imagine that his personal influence will be enhanced to a point where it will be very difficult—and perhaps undesirable—to deal with the German problem except on the basis of treating him as a full partner.

"I was in Denver yesterday and had a fine talk with the President. He was, of course, delighted with the Adenauer victory. He has a very high personal regard for Adenauer.

"Sincerely yours, John Foster Dulles."

[2] Regarding discussion of the reply to the Soviet note of Aug. 15, see the editorial note, *supra*.

[3] For documentation on the Federal elections of Sept. 6, see Documents 217 ff.

[4] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

As a matter of fact, he was quite satisfied with the way the consultation had taken place this time. The heart of his objection centers on any public statement that anything to do with the Peace Treaty would be discussed in a Four-Power Conference. He believes that the Allied governments are committed by their previous notes and by Article Seven of the conventions to refusing to discuss the Peace Treaty with the Russians until representatives of a unified Germany can be present at the peace table. If this is not in fact the position of the present three governments, then we are faced with a serious problem for the future. This seems to me to go far beyond the question of finding a set of words that were suitable to all concerned in the note to the Soviets.

The reason the Chancellor was quite willing to accept the second alternative which I presented was that it made no reference to the peace treaty. I take it, though he did not say so, that he believes that if a conference is held, and the Russians start the discussion of the peace treaty, the three Allies will rule this discussion out of order at once. It would seem to me of importance to be sure that we are in accord on this position if there is any possibility of a Four-Power Conference on the German question.

The Chancellor (and Professor Hallstein, in a separate conversation) more than once raised the question of why we had gone beyond the note of July 15[5] which they found so satisfactory. In attempting to explain the position of the three governments, I pointed out that the idea of a Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference in this note had been urged by him, and that the possibilities of such a conference had aroused hopes in other countries, whatever might be the case in Germany. If we had intended merely to consult with the Russians on the details of free elections and the status of an all-German Government, it would have been quite unnecessary to have convened four foreign ministers for that purpose.

Indeed, in some preliminary discussions which he and I had had early in July, I had suggested that a procedure might be contemplated which would involve only the four High Commissioners, but he and Professor Hallstein then insisted on the importance of calling a Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference because those were, to use his own words, "magic words." I suggested to him today that these magic words had now raised the hopes of people in the United States, Great Britain and France, and that our government's unwillingness to limit the discussion to merely free elections and the status of the German Government was a consequence of the magic contained in these words, which he had himself first urged.

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[5] Document 257

I am not sure whether this line of argumentation will meet with your approval, but I believe it had some effect on the Chancellor, though I hope it did not unduly annoy him. I attempted, in presenting the point of view of the three governments as vigorously as I could, to bring out the basic differences of opinion, and to support as strongly as I knew how the three Allies' stand. I felt if I was at all weak in this encounter with the Chancellor this morning, I should have lessened my future usefulness to you. At the same time, I hope that the Chancellor was not too disturbed at my frank statements, for he has not in recent times been used to much argument with his own staff government, I have been told.

All of this, of course, is a supplement to the regular telegrams I have sent to the Department, and is an attempt to give you a rather personal flavor of my rather strenuous hour-and-a-half dispute with the Chancellor this morning. It all ended very amicably, as when I offered the second alternative, he accepted it at once and with a certain measure of relief and gratitude. The same feeling seemed to be expressed at once by his two advisers who were present, namely Blankenhorn and Hallstein.

With all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,

JIM

No. 268

396.1/9-153

The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs[1]

[Moscow, September 2, 1953.]

1. US Government, in its customary close consultation with Governments of UK and France, has carefully studied the Soviet Government's notes of August 4 and 15, 1953,[2] which were in reply to proposals presented on July 15 by three Western powers.[3] Government of German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

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[1] Transmitted from Paris on Sept. 1 in telegram 844 in response to a request for a clean text of the note. The note was delivered to the Foreign Ministry at 1 p.m. Moscow time on Sept. 2.

[2] Documents 259 and 264.

[3] Document 257.

2. US Government has no intention once again to refute Soviet Government's criticisms of policy followed by three powers, nor of thus prolonging a sterile discussion which can only be harmful to the cause of peace.

3. US Government therefore fully reserves its position in regard to the various allegations in Soviet notes of August 4 and 15, and will confine its comments to the problems of an urgent nature which arise in connection with meeting of Foreign Ministers proposed in its note of July 15.

4. Real progress toward peace and toward a lessening of international tension would be achieved were it possible to find an early solution of some of existing problems concerning Germany and to conclude the Austrian state treaty. It therefore appears desirable that meeting of Foreign Ministers should devote itself to these problems; whereas to inject into the discussion a series of other complex questions, as proposed by Soviet Government, could only delay and prejudice success of talks. A solution of the German and Austrian problems could be expected to pave way for fruitful discussion of other major questions. US Government also wishes to point out that the study of some of these other questions has already been entrusted to such international organizations as the United Nations or to international bodies such as political conference on Korea where Chinese People's Republic will be represented. Latter's participation in proposed meeting of Foreign Ministers of four powers could not therefore be justified.

5. Soviet Government has suggested a procedure for dealing with German problem which appears complicated, and work on such a basis could, at best, only be long drawn out. Soviet Government's note of August 15 envisages, in effect, a series of devices which could result in postponing to some indeterminate date the holding of free elections in Federal Republic, in East Zone of Germany, and in Berlin. An all-German Government which is not based on will of people as expressed in free elections would not be qualified to take decisions affecting the future of United Germany. Problem of free elections is thus key to any all-German settlement. US Government therefore considers that meeting of Foreign Ministers should devote itself to German problem, the solution of which is an essential part of a world settlement, and concentrate in first instance on question of free elections and the status of the future German Government.

6. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that when US Government proposed, in its note of July 15, that problem of free elections be considered first, it did not make any prior condition that an investigating commission be established. It seems, therefore, that on

this point Soviet Government has misinterpreted terms of this note.

7. US Government has never considered that re-establishment of freedom and independence of Austria, which by terms of Moscow declaration of November 1943 must be considered as a liberated country, should be dependent upon progress toward a solution of German problem. It considers that these two problems are quite distinct. In its view nothing should now prevent the conclusion of an Austrian treaty. It therefore regrets failure of Soviet Government to accept its proposal that Austrian treaty deputies should meet on August 31.[4] It nevertheless remains hope of US Government that Foreign Ministers will be able to agree on the Austrian state treaty when they themselves meet.

8. US Government is convinced that progress is more likely to be made by discussion of these problems than by a further exchange of notes. Consequently, it renews its invitation to Soviet Government to participate in a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers which could take place on October 15 at Lugano. It understands that this would be agreeable to Swiss Government.

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[4] In a note dated Aug. 17, the United States had suggested a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to be held in London on Aug. 31; see Document 882.

No. 269

396.1/9–1053: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BONN, September 10, 1953—3 p.m.

978. Re Department to London 1259; repeated Bonn 794 September 8.[2] Venture to suggest that a fundamental problem to be settled before French, British and ourselves are ready for four-power conference on German question is differences revealed between Chancellor's views and ours in my argument with him on Monday, August 31.[3] Although a satisfactory sentence was found for inclusion in note to Soviets, there was no real agreement between Chan-

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Telegram 1259 reported that the Department of State believed there should be careful tripartite preparation for the four-power meeting and presented a timetable for the circulation and discussion of position papers. (396.1/9–253)

[3] Conant reported on this meeting in telegram 846 from Bonn, Aug. 31 (396.1/8–3153), essentially along the lines indicated in telegram 978. This was the meeting at which the Chancellor finally agreed to the text of the reply to the Soviet note.

cellor and position I was instructed to present on behalf of three powers. Chancellor's position seemed quite clear that any four-power meeting concerned with Germany should be restricted entirely to question of free elections and formation of an all-German Government. Only after such an all-German government has been formed and representatives duly appointed should there be any discussion with Russians of nature of peace treaty or any other aspects of German problem. If I understood him correctly, he believes that if any four-power conference is held and Russian representative endeavors to discuss in any way anything but free elections and formation of all-German government, allied representatives must adjourn meeting or rule discussion out of order. Position I was asked to present to him as vigorously as I could on behalf of three governments was to consider any discussion of four-power conference in a much wider context. I suggest that this difference of opinion must be settled at the highest level and if possible agreement obtained with Chancellor before much progress [can be made] in meeting suggested for Paris early in October. As this month French are in the chair and I should not be able to speak, except on behalf of US Government, it might be advisable to consider a meeting of three HICOMers and Chancellor to explore this problem. I have reason to believe he would prefer this to dealing with French HICOMer or British as representative of three-powers.

If Chancellor's views are accepted by three governments, preparation for any four-power talk on Germany would be almost exclusively at a technical level and might well be best accomplished here by three HICOMers and their staffs in collaboration with Chancellor and his staff. For example, what methods are to be employed to ensure that Bundestag conditions are met before a free election is a problem which can best be explored here in Germany. Likewise, question of whether or not international inspection of actual free elections would be required is matter on which there seems to be possibility of difference of opinion between Chancellor and ourselves. A discussion of these problems in absence of representatives of three HICOMers and of Chancellor might prove to be rather sterile.

CONANT

No. 270

396.1/7-2653

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, September 26, 1953?]

[Subject:] Conversations with the Secretary Concerning United States Positions in Forthcoming Tripartite Conversations

Participants: The Secretary
Messrs. MacArthur, Knight, Kidd, Bowie, Beam, Thurston, Moore, Barbour, Morris, Galloway, Trulock, Nagle

Inquiry of Swiss

Mr. MacArthur requested that EUR get in touch with the Swiss Legation here to see whether any indications of Soviet intentions to participate in a Lugano meeting on October 15 could be ascertained.

Franco-Soviet Treaty

In response to his inquiry, the Secretary was advised that British responsibilities under the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1942 and French responsibilities under the Franco-Russian Treaty of 1944 do not carry over into EDC.

Tripartite Working Group

In response to the inquiry of Mr. MacArthur, the Secretary stated that should a Soviet rejection of our note be received prior to departure of the US Working Group, the tripartite conversations in Paris should be temporarily postponed. [2]

Tactics

a. *Agenda*

The Secretary inquired as to whether we were willing to let the Conference break down on the question of agenda. Mr. Thurston replied that an attempt would be made to introduce the broad declaration so the public would feel the break had come on broad issues rather than procedural ones. Mr. Beam suggested tactics might follow lines of a general broad discussion, referral of the peace treaty to a committee and subsequent discussions in plenary sessions of the composition of an all-German government.

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[1] The meeting took place from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Sept. 26.

[2] Following the delivery of the tripartite note on Sept. 2, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France discussed the possibility of meeting in Paris to prepare agreed positions for the four-power meeting. The status of this meeting was still unclear at the end of September.

The Secretary inquired whether we would accept an agenda with the German Peace Treaty as Item I. The consensus indicated it might be necessary although the great risk of alienating Adenauer if we did so was stressed. Mr. Bowie suggested our position might be that we could not discuss the German peace treaty since the proper party would not be present. The Secretary said that it would always be possible to make a broad preliminary statement, but in the end we must decide whether or not we were prepared to discuss the peace treaty, either among ourselves (Four Powers) or with the two German governments.

b. *Representation of German Communist Viewpoint*

The Secretary asked if our tactics were to prevent the German Communist viewpoint from being heard and suggested that if the Soviets propose GDR participation in the conference, our position should be that the GDR does not represent the East German people. The Secretary said that we should be very well documented on the lack of popular support for the GDR.

The Secretary raised the question of proportional representation. It was generally agreed that we could accept proportional representation in the Constituent Assembly provided a 5% clause was included. Our position as to how minority views could be expressed in the negotiations would be that this is a matter for the Constituent Assembly itself to decide. Mr. Knight suggested that while without opposing proportional representation officially, we might unofficially attempt to advise the Germans against it. He referred to the history of proportional representation in Italy and France, and said that he did not know of a single exception to the rule that where constituent assemblies are formed on a proportional representation basis the governments which are established adopt the principle of proportional representation in their elections.

The Secretary felt that we should admit that our position on Germany amounts to the Soviets giving up East Germany, and that we should state at the outset what we are prepared to give in return. Without this *quid pro quo* our case might seem plausible only to those people who are already on our side.

c. *Our Opening Statement*

The Secretary stressed that a full case must be made in our opening statement; that the declaration of intent could be, if necessary, held until the conference breaks down. He said the opening statement must include assurances to the Soviets and unless we gave assurances the Soviets would not give an inch. He said we must have something at the very outset which will cater to the Soviet fears and suggested phraseology to emphasize we know the

Soviets want to be safe from another German attack; that in our opinion if proper procedures are devised the tripartite governments could insure that they would never agree to anything which would impair Russian security. There was concurrence in this viewpoint.

The Secretary said he thought an agenda might be patterned, in part, after that used in the General Assembly in that the first item could be scheduled simply as *General Exchange of Views or General Debate.* Item two could be *Agenda,* (or *To Fix Agenda*). Mr. MacArthur stressed the necessity of getting across our infinite reasonableness.

d. *Consultations with the Federal Republic*

The Secretary inquired as to the proposed procedures for consultation with Adenauer in connection with the Lugano conference. Mr. MacArthur said that there were two problems involved: 1) consultation with the Germans during the tripartite working group meetings in Paris, and 2) at the conference site in Lugano. It was generally agreed that there should be two channels: one through the High Commissioners in Bonn, and one directly to Adenauer, through a high level "observer" at the conference site.

The Secretary stated he thought well of his seeing Adenauer en route Lugano although not in company with the French or British Foreign Ministers. He stressed his belief in the soundness of the personal approach and in the development of joint personal confidence and respect.

e. *The Question of Tripartite Positions*

The Secretary inquired to what extent were the tripartite governments to speak as a bloc and whether they must be in complete accord before a position could be taken. Mr. MacArthur replied we were hopeful of reaching a situation wherein substantial tripartite agreement could be evolved through the forthcoming talks but that points could well remain that would have to be resolved by the three foreign ministers themselves. The Secretary said he was reluctant to assume that any one of the three would have a veto over the other and that no one of the three could speak without agreement with the other two. He said we might have to break loose from the British and French on occasion as the only way to get action and that he did not want to be bound hard and fast by any tripartite unity rule. It was suggested that perhaps independent action would be in order toward the conclusion of the conference. The Secretary again stressed we should not tie our hands by conceding to the law of complete unanimity.

Security Guarantees

The Secretary asked what we planned to offer Russia in return for East Germany. He was advised that information on the Van

Zeeland Plan [3] and Bonn's 1055 had been referred to Defense, that no preliminary report had been received of the Joint Chiefs' reactions but that some indication might be expected on Monday. [4]

In a discussion of possible security arrangements with the Soviets, the Secretary stated he would never place much dependability on an arrangement based on neutralization or limitation in that it could be backed by no real sanction. In such an arrangement, lacking by its very nature a sanction which operates against the individual, a mere agreement by governments was highly undependable.

Qualitative limitations are totally unenforceable. It was suggested that, should an inspection team certify a violation had occurred, the opposing side could counterbalance. The Secretary reiterated the inherent weakness of any enforcement power and remarked that the Versailles treaty was grand protection on paper.

The Secretary stressed the requirement for a system for proof against evasions and violations: that we must have something we think workable despite violations on the other side. The only recourse is that violation frees the opposing party of its obligation to adhere. Also violation could be construed as notification of aggressive intent.

The Secretary said that what we would primarily hope for would be some sort of a German-French agreement and that in the opening statements the tripartite governments must stress open-mindedness and lack of a predetermined formula from which there could be no deviation. He suggested that, if general agreement is reached in Paris, perhaps it would be wise to have Adenauer prepare a declaration which could be presented.

Boundaries

In discussing the frontiers problem Mr. Kidd said we could progress very little until German participation in the discussions was arranged. The Secretary stated we needed, for the purposes of discussion, a substantive position on boundaries; that it would be necessary to combat the fear that the Germans would use EDC as a means to regain their former boundaries. Mr. Kidd mentioned that, generally speaking, it had been US opinion that Free Poland should get a little more of the industrial area of Upper Silesia and that the Germans should get some of the agricultural lands of Pomerania and Brandenburg; large mass movements would not be involved. He recalled that Adenauer foresaw no possibility of a quick solution to the frontier problem.

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[3] See footnote 4, Document 226.

[4] Telegram 1055 presented Adenauer's plan for a European security system that was similar to the Van Zeeland plan. (740.5/9-1653)

The Secretary referred to the Moscow CFM and to his memorandum to Secretary Marshall stating that freedom of movement across the German-Polish boundaries was of more importance than exactly where the boundaries were eventually to be drawn.[5]

The Secretary emphasized that on the question of guarantees the Germans, rather than the tripartite governments, must evolve a position. He added that he did not consider the guarantee envisaged in the Beam paper[6] as derogating from UN authority; further, that we cannot make our vital interests reliant upon such guarantees.

Mr. Kidd mentioned that while he could envisage a non-agression pact of some manner a mutual assistance pact might be the cause of some trouble. The Secretary said he doubted our ability to get a treaty ratified that would require going to war against Germany were she to attack Russia; that we would not go to war against a non-communist country if it attacked a communist country.

Austria

With respect to Austrian "neutralization", Mr. Knight said that, in order to avoid a bad precedent which might subsequently come back to haunt us on the German problem, we now advocate a unilateral nonaggression declaration by Austria renouncing Austrian participation in any military alliances. This would in effect be a renunciation of the right to join NATO or EDC. The Secretary asked if this did not mean that we might be inclined to agree with the Soviets with respect to the position of Austria on the Four Power agenda. It seemed that we might also prefer to discuss Germany first. If we agreed to place Austria second on the agenda, we should state at the outset that we hope during the course of the meeting to *make progress* on the German conference and to finalize an Austrian solution.

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[5] The memorandum under reference has not been further identified.

[6] Under reference is a memorandum from Beam to Bowie, dated Sept. 22, in which Beam discussed the possibility of a security guarantee for the Soviet Union as a means for obtaining German unification. A copy of this memorandum is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Germany 1953".

No. 271

396.1/9-2853

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

[Moscow, September 28, 1953.]

Soviet Government confirms receipt note Government USA of September 2 [2] answering notes Soviet Government August 4 and August 15. [3] Familiarity with note of September 2 shows that in note of US Government questions raised by Soviet Government, consideration of which would assist in regulation of international problems which have come to head and in strengthening of peace and international security, have been passed over.

In its note of August 4, Soviet Government proposed consideration question measures assisting general lessening tension in international situation and also German question including problem re-establishment unity Germany and conclusion peace treaty. In addition to this, in note of August 15 Soviet Government outlined basic problems connected with essential tasks of solving German problem.

Advancing these proposals Soviet Government had and has as its aim achievement of agreements which would answer aspirations of peoples toward stabilization of peace and would assist in solution German problem in accordance with interests peace-loving peoples of Europe as well as of German people itself. Questions raised in notes of Soviet Government under reference have by present time acquired still greater significance.

First of all concerning lessening of international tension importance of which is not disputed in note of US Government of September 2.

Soviet Government has noted fact that achievement armistice in Korea has created favorable situation in which to achieve lessening of tension in international situation. However, recently there have been created new difficulties in solution Korean problem. Very calling of political conference on Korean problem is meeting with serious difficulties inasmuch as in defining the composition of the political conference at Seventh Session GA as result of all kinds of measures on part USA there was demonstrated impermissible onesidedness and gross underestimation of importance of actions in agreement with such directly interested countries as Chinese Peoples Republic and Korean Peoples Democratic Republic. Moreover success political conference in many ways depends on joint efforts both interested sides and participation other governments which cooperated in achievement armistice and which are striving for definitive regulation of Korean problem. Also aggressiveness of South Korean Syngman Rhee clique which ceaselessly repeats threats to break armistice draws attention to itself.

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 421 from Moscow, Sept. 28. This translation should be compared for minor textual differences with that in Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, pp. 548–550.

[2] Document 268.

[3] Documents 259 and 264.

In relation Asian countries one must not overlook other political problems having particular significance for national interests of these states and for stabilization of peace which have come to head. In this connection first of all one must point to necessity reestablishing legal rights Chinese People's Republic according to which reestablishment its inalienable rights in United Nations organization must be secured, achievement of which at present time opposition of only certain states is hindering. The unpostponed regulation of such a problem is necessary in the interests of lessening international tension. The same is true of a number of other important problems relating to the situation in the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean. In the regulation of such problems as well as to achieve general lessening of tension in international relations continual participation of Chinese People's Republic is necessary. As is well known in laying very foundations of United Nations organization place of China in solution Pacific problems of peace and security and peoples was defined in this very fashion.

As regards Europe recent political events in West Germany have increased alarm in peace-loving states. In West Germany especially in view of pressure on part foreign circles which base themselves on big German monopolies the influence of revanchist elements is becoming stronger and these elements have again started to talk in the language of the aggressive *Drang nach Osten* policy which has already brought not only other peoples but also the German people itself innumerable misfortunes. Although the failure of this policy is inevitable the peace-loving states of Europe and in particular the neighbors of West Germany cannot overlook these negative facts of political development in Western Germany, since in the center of Europe more and more former Hitlerites are raising their heads and the threat of creating a new dangerous nidus of aggression is growing. In its note on August 4 the Soviet Government taking into account the danger of the aggressive policy carried on by North Atlantic bloc emphasized importance of the question of limiting armaments and not permitting military bases on territory of other states. To pass over consideration of this question would mean to ignore a matter which has most important significance for lessening international tension. Specifically the continuing arms race especially in connection with the accumulation of atomic hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction of people demands that there should be no postponement in considering the question of limiting armaments and outlawing atomic hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction with the establishment of effective international control over execution of the appropriate agreements concerned. Nor may one deny that the creation by certain powers in the countries of Europe, Africa and Asia of air and sea bases especially numerous near the borders of USSR and countries of peoples democracies has aggressive aims. Refusal to consider the question of military bases on the territory of other states naturally may be considered as evidencing unwillingness to cooperate in the lessening of international tension and is capable of undermining the faith in all statements regarding aspirations of regulating ripe international problems.

Inasmuch as both Soviet Government and Government of US have repeatedly spoken of their aspirations to lessen international tension one cannot overlook the fact that propaganda for a new war and calls for new acts of aggression have not ceased and that governments of certain states have openly undertaken acts of diversion, threat and sabotage in countries of democratic camp. Not only is well known resolution of GA condemning war propaganda frequently unobserved, but also official circles of certain states praising "policy of force" are encouraging strengthening of "cold war" etc. Entirely evident that to achieve lessening tension in international relations it is necessary to undertake measures which would effectively rebuff continuing propaganda of new air and all attempts on part aggressive circles undermine faith of peoples in safeguarding and strengthening peace and international security.

From what has been said, it follows that important problems of international significance have come to head which demand unpostponed joint consideration USA, France, Great Britain, Chinese Peoples Republic and Soviet Union, inasmuch as in accordance with charter UN responsibility for safeguarding peace and international security lies above all with these countries.

Accordingly, Soviet Government in note of August 4 proposed to consider at conference of Foreign Ministers questions concerning measures for lessening tension in international relations. Significance of consideration such important international questions is completely self-evident. Nonetheless, in US note of September 2, necessity of relaxation of tension in international situation is grossly underestimated, since in answer of US Government, above mentioned important international problems which have come to head were passed over.

In notes of August 4 and 15, Soviet Government also proposed full consideration of German problem at conference Foreign Ministers. At same time Soviet Government proposed consideration following questions:

(1) Calling peace conference to consider question of peace treaty with Germany;
(2) Creation provisional all German Government and holding free and all German elections;
(3) Relieving financial and economic obligations of Germany connected with consequences of war.

Out of all these questions in United States Government's note of September 2 only question of all German elections is touched on and all other questions having outstanding significance for solution of German problem are ignored. Such position is all the more untenable since all German elections are exclusively internal affair of Germans and must be decided by German people itself without allowing interference on part of foreign powers.

On other hand note of September 2 overlooks vital problems relating to Germany, solution of which under present conditions is impossible without active participation and cooperation of four occupying powers: USA, France, England and USSR.

Soviet Government has twice sent to United States Government, as well as to Governments England and France, its draft peace treaty with Germany and proposed this draft be considered and that it (United States Government) present its draft peace treaty for consideration. One year and one-half has gone by without United States Government having expressed its opinion regarding Soviet draft peace treaty and without having presented its own draft.[4]

In note August 15 this year Soviet Government proposed calling peace conference within 6 months in which all interested states would participate and in which necessary German representation at all stages of preparing peace treaty and peace conference would be assured. United States note in reply overlooked question of calling peace conference although one cannot argue with significance of such conference.

According to Soviet Government's proposal, formation of provisional all German democratic government was to have assisted in the unification of Germany on peaceful and democratic principles. This government could either have replaced existing governments in East and West Germany in advance of holding all German free elections or it could have temporarily taken on itself certain all

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[4] For Soviet note of Mar. 10, 1952, to which was attached the Soviet draft treaty see Document 65.

German functions and, above all, the preparation and holding of all German free elections, while the presently existing governments in East and West Germany were maintained. The Government of the USA did not agree with this proposal of the Soviet Government. This attitude toward the above-mentioned proposal of the Soviet Government excludes practical and possible measures directed toward re-establishing unity of Germany, inasmuch as no all German organ is being formed which could carry out the will of the German people in the preparation of all German elections. From this moreover it follows that there is intent actually transmit the holding of all German elections to the occupation powers and this makes possible impermissible pressure on the part of foreign authorities on the whole course of preparing and holding the elections.

In its note of September 2 the Government of the United States gave up finally, the creation of the so-called "neutral commission" composed of representatives of foreign powers "to investigate with the aim of creating conditions" for carrying out all German elections and which, as is well known it had not given up in its note of July 15,[5] of this year, and on which it had previously insisted over the course of many months. But in this case objections to the Soviet proposition that the holding of elections be given over to the Germans of East and West Germany themselves without any kind of interference and pressure on the part of foreign powers should have disappeared.

In its note of August 15 this year, the Soviet Government in addition proposed to the Governments of the USA, France and England to decide to lessen the financial and economic obligations of Germany connected with the consequences of the war, namely:

From January 1, 1954 to free Germany from payment of reparations and post-war debts to the four powers;

To limit the extent of occupation costs to sums not exceeding 5 per cent of the incomes of the state budgets of East and West Germany;

To free Germany fully from the repayment of indebtedness connected with external occupation costs of the four powers which had come about since 1945.

All these questions relating to relieving the financial and economic obligations of Germany connected with the consequence of the war were passed over in the United States Government note of September 2. Moreover, acceptance of the proposals of the Soviet Government would have now resulted in significant economical relief to the German people and would have assisted in raising the level of the German economy which naturally is what the population of Germany expects inasmuch as more than 8 years have passed since the end of the war. The Soviet Government continues to consider it necessary for the Government of the United States and equally for the Governments of England and France to state definitely their attitude toward the Soviet Government's proposals under reference. The necessity for an unpostponed solution to the vital questions under reference relating to Germany is dictated by the fact that recently there have been undertaken more and more new measures of anti-democratic external influencing intended to achieve the ratification by the parliaments of the governments concerned of both Bonn and Paris agreements as a result of which it is intended to accomplish the militarization of Western Germany and to make it into an obedient weapon of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. All this has been going on despite the fact that ratification and execution of these agreements would turn Western Germany into a nidus of new aggression with all the dangerous consequences ensuing therefrom for the German people and for the cause of maintaining peace in Europe and would make impossible the uniting of Western and Eastern Germany into a single state.

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[5] Document 257.

In view of this situation, Soviet Government while agreeing to proposal of Government USA to consider question of all German elections considers that in addition it is necessary that at conference of Foreign Ministers consideration German problem not be limited only to this question. It is necessary to agree that consideration of German problem at coming conference should include all basic questions mentioned above and, in addition, that representatives of both Western and Eastern Germany should take part in this discussion.

In accordance with above Soviet Government proposes to call conference of Foreign Ministers proceeding from following:

(1) To consider at conference composed of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of United States, United Kingdom, France, CPR, and Soviet Union measures to lessen tension in international relations.

(2) To discuss at conference composed of Foreign Ministers United States, France, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union German problem including all proposals introduced in course of preparing conference.

Soviet Government has not yet received from United States Government answer to its note of August 28 concerning Austrian treaty [6] and expresses readiness to continue discussion of this question in normal diplomatic channels. (*Poryadok*)

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[6] Regarding the Soviet note of Aug. 28, see Document 882.

Soviet Government is sending similar notes to Governments France and United Kingdom.

No. 272

396.1/9-2953

Memorandum of Conversation, by Walter Trulock of the Executive Secretariat [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 30, 1953.

Subject: Meeting in Secretary's Office re: The Soviet Reply to our September 2 Note.

Participants:

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
C—Mr. MacArthur
S/P—Mr. Bowie
EE—Mr. Thurston
S/P—Mr. Bowie
GPA—Mr. Morris
[S/S-O—Mr. Trulock]

After reading the draft telegram [2] re the Soviet note, [3] the Secretary asked if we needed to say so much. Ambassador Bohlen said that some of the present draft got into the realm of speculation, and agreed with the Secretary that this part of the telegram was not needed. The Secretary said that the last part of the cable [asking for official and public reaction from London, Paris, and Bonn] [4] was what we really wanted to know in order that we can decide whether to use the Soviet reply as a basis for general disengagement.

The Secretary said that he had asked Ambassador Bonnet if the Soviet reply would in any way impede French ratification of EDC. Bonnet replied that he did not think so. General Smith and Ambassador Bohlen agreed with this.

General Smith said that it was too early to try to break off the exchange of notes. We should press the Soviets on the German conference, saying let's put first things first and if we make reasonable progress on the German and Austrian issues, then we can proceed to further, broader discussions.

The Secretary agreed and reiterated that it is too early to indulge in "thinking out loud". We need to know the European reactions especially in France and Germany in order to help us decide how we should reply.

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[1] This conversation took place at 4:15 p.m. on Sept. 29.
[2] Not further identified.
[3] *Supra.*
[4] These and following brackets are in the source text.

The Secretary said that the President's flash reaction, in a previous discussion of the subject earlier in the day, had been that perhaps we ought to go ahead and talk to them about these other things. General Smith said that we should reverse the field on the Soviets and go back to the German conference [the Soviets proposed a five-power conference on easing world tensions, and a four-power conference on Germany, in that order]. Ambassador Bohlen agreed with this, and suggested that we indicate in our reply that a meeting on Germany and Austria would not preclude any Foreign Minister raising any topic within the cognizance of the CFM. The Secretary said that we could reply by saying that we were pleased to note that the Soviets agreed to discuss Germany, and that since it is now a little late to meet the October 15 date in our original invitation, that we simply set the date back a few weeks.

Mr. Thurston pointed out that the Soviets had suggested that the East and West German representatives participate in the German conference, and asked if we were accepting this if we agreed to meet on Germany. It was generally agreed that we should finesse this question and face it "at Lugano".

The Secretary said that we needed to give some real thought to: "what are we really trying to do now. Our earlier notes had been aimed primarily at the German elections, but what do we want now? Do we really want a meeting?" Mr. Morris said that we needed to continue to take the lead on the question of German unity. General Smith said that it was clear that we could not accept meetings on the Soviet terms, and it was equally certain that they didn't want to meet to discuss Germany and Austria because of their weakened position there. We should, therefore, pin the Soviets down on this one.

The Secretary said that, after determining the French and German reactions to the reply, our course should be one that would: (1) not impede EDC in any way, and (2) not hurt Adenauer in any way.

The Secretary referred to the unfortunate story from Paris which attributed to an American Embassy source the statement that the Soviet note was an "unconditional acceptance" of our invitation. Ambassador Bohlen said that this was most unfortunate, and that it made it even more imperative for us to put the blame on the Soviets for attempting to avoid a conference. Mr. Bowie said that the Soviet "acceptance" was an acceptance on unacceptable terms. General Smith said that the Soviet note in effect threw the ball back to us. He said that the "man in the Street" would pick up the press highlights on the Soviet reply and would get the impression that the Soviets are prepared to have two conferences. This would make it difficult for us to maintain that they are unwilling to meet.

Referring to the Far Eastern part of the note, Ambassador Bohlen said that this indicated Soviet concern about their relations with China, but said that no one would be more upset than the Soviets if the Chinese actually participated in a five-power conference. The Secretary asked if the Soviets intended to substitute the five-power conference for the Korean political conference. Ambassador Bohlen said that he had been struck by the reference to the Korean political conference. This may be a warning that it will never come off. He said that the Soviets are in the same box in North Korea as they are in East Germany. It is possible that they don't want to discuss either one in a conference. Mr. Thurston referred to a certain passage in the note which he said was a hint that there would be no political conference until the status of Communist China was defined. The Secretary asked about the reference to Southeast Asia and the Pacific in the Soviet note. It was generally agreed that this referred to Indochina and to US bases in that area.

General Smith referred again to the telegram, and asked if our Embassies were not at least entitled to our first thoughts on the note. The Secretary wondered if it would be better not to prejudge the reactions of our allies. He said that their reaction to Vishinsky's recent speech in the UN indicated an increasing sophistication on the part of our allies. Ambassador Bohlen agreed, and went even further to state that public opinion in Western Europe has been more sophisticated for several years than the views of the political leaders. The Secretary said that we should play the Soviet note as another evasive and dilatory tactic. The problem is to determine whether this view is reflected in French and German public opinion, or if we will have to go through another exchange of notes to pin down Soviet unwillingness to meet. Ambassador Bohlen said that in view of recent developments in Germany the importance of a four-power conference has decreased. Mr. MacArthur said that Bidault had expressed this same view to Dillon the other day.

The Secretary said that Makins had reported that the initial views of London were that we would have to have another round of notes. The Secretary said that we would probably reach the same conclusions. General Smith and Mr. Bowie agreed. Ambassador Bohlen agreed, but pointed out that if we did meet with the Soviets on Germany, they would argue that we had accepted their entire note.

It was agreed that if the text of the note was not released in Moscow within the next few hours, we should arrange to informally release it here in time for the morning papers. If an unofficial English translation were to be released by the Department, we should clarify the language to indicate that the Soviets do not "propose to call" the conference.

The Secretary asked that the draft telegram be revised to reflect the discussion. [This was done by Messrs. Thurston and Morris. See telegram 1201 to Paris. [5]]

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[5] Telegram 1201 summarized the reaction to the Soviet note as indicated in this memorandum of conversation. (396.1/9-2953)

No. 273

396.1/10-353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 3, 1953—3:58 p.m.

1742. Immediately following telegram [2] contains US draft of proposed reply to Soviet note of September 28 [3] which you should give to British and French. In drafting this reply we have had very much in mind comments from British and French, which we fully share, that reply should be as forthcoming as possible. The draft has been approved by the President. The following comments are for your guidance in discussing it with French and British.

With reference to second sentence, paragraph 3, of draft note, in using the phrase "the relation of the German problem to European security" we have in mind, in the first instance, emphasizing the contribution which EDC will actually make to overall European security, including that of the USSR. We are also aware that in recent weeks suggestions have been made as to possible further moves in the general field of European security. Our attitude regarding these is one of open mindedness and willingness to consider them on their merits in consultation with our allies. We have no specific plan of our own to present at this time.

The intent of the last two sentences of the fourth paragraph is to press Soviets to attend Lugano conference by conveying thought that in any event the other Foreign Ministers wish to get on with the important business at hand. Moreover, we believe it would be useful for the three Foreign Ministers to exchange views on a number of current issues at the conclusion of the proposed tripartite talks in Paris. This procedure also has the advantage of taking the wind out of the Soviet sails in the matter of accusing the Western Foreign Ministers of "ganging up".

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[1] Drafted by Kidd and Thurston; cleared with MacArthur; and initialed for the Secretary of State by Bonbright. Also sent to Bonn and Paris, and repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] Telegram 1743, *infra*.

[3] Document 271.

For HICOG: You will note from first two sentences of paragraph three that our objective is general exchange of views, as in UN procedures, before we get down to agenda and possibilities for argument on procedural question of order of agenda. We have no objection to Soviets talking about any point they wish to raise, which can be anticipated to be largely propaganda. We would hope effectively to puncture Soviet arguments while developing line laid down in our previous notes as our own substantive position. We shall endeavor persuade Adenauer at proper time that he and West Allies can well afford to develop additional points of their position against Soviets without excluding free elections and status all-German government, and that it would greatly underestimate strength of our position to attempt confine discussion to single point as we have done in past notes. This FYI and not to be taken up with Germans until agreement on text reached by Tripartite Drafting Party.

DULLES

No. 274

396.1/10-353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 3, 1953—3:58 p.m.

1743. Following is draft referred to in immediately preceding telegram: [2]

(1) The United States Government, in its customary close consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, has carefully studied the Soviet Government's reply of September 28 [3] to the proposals of the three Western Powers for a four-power meeting at Lugano on October 15. The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

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[1] Drafted by Kidd and Thurston and cleared with MacArthur. Also sent to Bonn and Paris, and repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] Telegram 1742, *supra*.

[3] Document 271.

(2) Although it is not clear whether the Soviet Government intends that a discussion of German problems should follow or depend upon a settlement of other matters, the United States Government hopes that the Soviet note reflects a willingness promptly to discuss the German and Austrian questions. These are of obvious importance to any relaxation of international tension as well as vital to the future of the German and Austrian peoples. Moreover, this conforms to the judgment of the seventeen European countries as expressed in the recent resolution of the Council of Europe which called for a convocation of the proposed four-power conference as the first step toward relaxation of international tension. The United States Government is convinced that a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the US, USSR, UK, and France can better enable the four powers to make progress on the German and Austrian questions than through a time-consuming and inconclusive process of exchanging further diplomatic notes.

(3) The United States Government envisages that this conference will enable the Soviet Government to state its views on any aspect of the German and Austrian questions which it may wish to present. For its part, this Government would welcome the opportunity to put forward its views concerning questions dealt with in its previous notes, as well as the relation of the German problem to European security. It trusts that despite the fact that the Soviet note seems to relegate the important question of concluding the Austrian State Treaty to the less satisfactory procedures of negotiation through diplomatic notes, the Soviet Government would consider it appropriate that the Foreign Ministers discuss this problem as well, with a view to reaching agreement on the Austrian State Treaty at this time.

(4) The United States Government therefore once more inquires whether the Foreign Minister of the USSR will attend a conference of Foreign Ministers at Lugano in the very near future. Since the date of October 15 originally suggested by the United States Government is now impracticable, this Government proposes that the conference take place on November 9. In view of the urgency of the German and Austrian questions, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France have had in mind engaging in an exchange of views at that time. The United States Government would be most regretful if the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union were not able to participate.

(5) The Soviet note also proposes an additional five-power conference to consider measures to lessen tensions in international relations. The United States is always prepared to discuss the underlying causes of such tensions with a view to their removal, but wishes to do so under conditions which offer reasonable prospects

for positive results and assure that the views of the directly interested governments are properly represented. Accordingly, the United States Government has already agreed to the Political Conference on Korea in the form proposed by the Communist side in the Korean armistice negotiations and recommended in the armistice agreement and by the UN General Assembly. All of the five governments mentioned in the Soviet note could be represented at this conference which it is hoped will convene at an early date to enable the removal of one of the major sources of tension in the Far East. As to disarmament, the United States is ready at all times to go forward with the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on which the major powers are represented and which is now charged with the task of considering the complex problems in this field. Other matters mentioned in the Soviet note are under either current or projected discussion in the UN General Assembly where the many nations concerned are directly represented; indeed, several of the subjects mentioned in the Soviet note were recently inscribed on the agenda of the current General Assembly at the request of the Soviet Union.

Thus on these various questions, the way is open for progress, which if accompanied by a fruitful four-power discussion of the German and Austrian problems as proposed in the United States note of September 2 [4] could go far toward restoring the necessary conditions for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. [5]

DULLES

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[4] Document 268.

[5] On Oct. 5, the Embassies in Paris and London reported that they had presented the U.S. draft to the respective Foreign Ministries and had been told that the draft was in general parallel with that Ministry's thinking. (Telegrams 1353 and 1426, from Paris and London, 396.1/10–553)

No. 275

Editorial Note

On October 7 the tripartite working group, this time meeting in London, began consideration of the Western reply to the Soviet note of September 28, using the United States draft (telegram 1743, *supra*) as a basis for discussion. The Embassy in London commented that at the first two meetings there were very few differences between the positions of the United States and France, but that the British were still caught up in the spirit of Prime Minister Churchill's proposal for a four-power meeting, made in his speech to the House of Commons on May 11, 1953 (Telegram 1505, October 8, 396.1/10–853) On October 9 the working group approved *ad referendum* the text of a reply (telegram 1519 from London, October 9, 396.1/10–953) which seemed to gain general approval, but on October 12 the French presented a completely new draft prepared largely by Bidault. (Telegram 1564 from London, October 12, 396.1/10–1253) In the interim between these two drafts, the Western reply had been discussed with Chancellor Adenauer. (See telegrams 1361 and 1360, *infra*, and Document 277.) The working group produced yet another draft on October 12, working from the new French draft, and this was accepted, *mutatis mutandis*, by the three Western governments, presented to Adenauer, who objected to two parts of it, and finally discussed by the Foreign Ministers of the three Western countries at their meetings in London, where an agreed text was drafted which was acceptable to the Chancellor. For the final text as delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on October 18, see Document 279. Regarding the Foreign Ministers discussion of the draft, see Secto 5, October 16, Document 296.

No. 276

762A.00/10–1253: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, October 12, 1953—2 p.m.

1361. For Merchant from Conant. Courtesy call on Chancellor this morning with Aldrich provided opportunity for Chancellor to start discussion with me on Berlin and Allied reply Russian note. Berlin, Chancellor anxious to retain coalition government, presented good reasons Suhr as SPD man for mayor's position. He urged me to talk to people in Berlin tomorrow, which I shall do. Will report details from Berlin. [2]

He then turned to subject of Allied reply and spoke very strongly to Aldrich and myself as to necessity of restricting the invitation to Soviets, repeating much of argument we had with him over reply last time. [3] It is clear that he had received from some source intimation of nature of draft reply and was very much upset. His arguments this time were much less concerned with reaction in Germany than with his firm belief that any invitation to discuss broad

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] No further report on Berlin has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Regarding Adenauer's attitude on the first reply, see Document 266 and telegram 978, Document 269.

German problem and particularly relation of EDC to security of Europe would provide opportunity for Russians to drive a wedge between three Allies and delay ratification in France. He repeated number of times his concern over delay in ratification in France and said every month situation will become worse. He reminded me that he had officially communicated to three Allied Governments through AHC his opinion that answer to Russian note should be short and not argumentative.[4] He was afraid that proposal to Russians to state their position and a declaration we would state ours would lead to confusion among three powers and be seized by anti-ratification forces in France most effectively.

I assured him that it was intention of three governments to consult him officially through AHC with British in chair this month and I could not believe but his views would be given very careful consideration by Secretary of State and Foreign Ministers. It would be my personal opinion that it would be extremely inadvisable to present him now with text proposed in London cable 1519 to Department, repeated Bonn 101.[5] I am worried if present text is shown him there will be a long and bitter debate. If text could be revised or he could be shown alternative versions, chances of eventual agreement much better. His arguments seem to me to be well taken and not to turn on sensitivity of German opinion.

He further told me his Cabinet will not be formed for another week and he will not give his formal speech until middle of next week. This has no reference to consultation on note, but does indicate further delays on meeting with Bidault on Saar question, though this problem was not discussed.

CONANT

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[4] On Oct. 5 the High Commissioners had asked Adenauer for his views on the reply to the Soviet note. The Chancellor stated that he strongly favored a short, clear repetition of the invitation to a Foreign Ministers Conference to discuss Germany with other matters being handled through normal diplomatic procedures. (Telegram 1299 from Bonn, Oct. 5, 396.1/10-553)

[5] See the editorial note, *supra*.

No. 277

762A.00/10-1253: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, October 12, 1953—2 p.m.

1360. Eyes only for the Secretary. I am convinced from adequate evidence that Chancellor obtained full text of proposed reply to Soviets from British sources, including proposed timetable, which disturbed him almost as much as content of note.[1] May I suggest that our relations with Chancellor would be much better if we could bring him into consultations earlier for he emphasized in conversation his belief that he would be presented with a text which he disapproved of, already agreed to by Eden, Churchill and yourself. My knowledge of source of Chancellor's information came from an inadvertence on his part. To protect him and his British source, I am sure you will agree this information should be held closely but I thought you should know what is going on in British Foreign Office. I am further convinced that source of leak hoped to stimulate Chancellor's objections.

CONANT

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[1] Conant is referring to the discussion reported in telegram 1361, *supra*.

No. 278

396.1/10-1253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 13, 1953—6:55 p.m.

1973. We naturally concerned over prospect (Bonn's 1361 and 1364 rptd London 182, 184 Paris 237, 239 Berlin 270, 272 Moscow 83, 85[2]) that we may again have argument with Adenauer over text our new note to Soviets and presume that in presenting it, British HICOMer (acting on behalf all three Governments) will therefore endeavor explain our aims and considerations which have produced present text. We also hope Conant will use any informal opportunities do likewise.

Re German agenda proposals (first two sentences of para 3 London's 1563 rptd Bonn 105 Paris 230 Moscow 71 Berlin 25[3]) our aim has of course been to do precisely what Adenauer urged, i.e. produce short and nonargumentative formulation. Were we to restrict agenda, as Chancellor evidently still has in mind, we would facilitate another evasive argumentative Soviet reply. By indicat ing that Soviets may state their views on any aspect German problem they wish to present, we merely state the obvious and do not in any way agree to engage in "substantive discussion of peace treaty". This should be made clear to Chancellor. Our latest Tactics paper (D–1/4c, copy of which pouched Conant October 5 [4]) makes this plain and we believe British and French thinking is similar re manner in which we would handle any peace treaty mention at Lugano. Chancellor should agree that second sentence para 3 of draft note suggests no departure on our part from established positions.

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[1] Drafted by Morris and cleared by Knight, Barbour, Merchant, and MacArthur. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1361, Document 276. Telegram 1364 reported that from a conversation with Blankenhorn it appeared that Adenauer's principal objections to the reply were (1) apparent willingness of Western powers to discuss a German peace treaty and (2) their willingness to discuss security arrangements before the EDC was ratified. (396.1/10-1253)

[3] Telegram 1563 transmitted the Oct. 12 draft reply. (396.1/10-1253)

If Adenauer opposes proposed mention of possible exchange of views on relation of German and Austrian problems to European security (i.e. third sentence para 3) on grounds that subject cannot be broached until EDC ratified, we wonder why he has himself raised subject publicly? We would not have favored inclusion of sentence in note had we feared it might permit Soviets to drive wedge between us or further to delay French ratification. We think mere mention of this point adds considerably to note, by indicating attitude of reasonableness on Allied side and constituting further bait to Soviets to come to Lugano and moderate their present opposition to German unification. We presume these have been very same considerations which led Adenauer to public mention of subject. Moreover, strong attack which *Pravda* has just made on security proposal possibilities suggests that West can afford to mention them without fear that Soviets likely to take them up.

We fear in fact Adenauer's latest remarks to Conant indicate he still basically afraid of Four Power conference in which (if there should be one) we would hope to defeat Soviets and which we believe, especially after last Soviet note, they most anxious to avoid.

Adenauer also seems to be forgetting that one of main reasons we have embarked on this note series is belief we must make it unmistakably clear to French political and public opinion that we have made real effort [5] to bring Soviets to Conference table. We convinced that proposed note will be even more effective in "clinching" this matter than September 2 note, [6] and that its revision in line of Adenauer's apparent thinking would only detract from this effect.

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[4] A copy of this paper, dated Oct. 2, is in CFM files, lot M 88, box 165, "Proposed Talks with the Soviets".

[5] The end of this sentence read as follows before transmission: "for German settlement on reasonable terms, and that until this accomplished ratification opponents in Paris will continue to urge delays."

[6] Document 268.

Hope therefore that real effort will be made to persuade Adenauer to accept text, especially as election campaign now over and he should be in much more reasonable mood than end of August.

DULLES

No. 279

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 165

The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs [1]

[Moscow, October 18, 1953.]

1. The US Government in its customary close consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom and France, has carefully studied the Soviet Government's reply of September 28 [2] to the proposals of the three Western powers for a four-power meeting at Lugano on October 15. The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

2. A satisfactory settlement of the problems relating to Germany and Austria is clearly essential for any real and lasting relaxation of international tension and is vital to the future of the people of those countries. The US Government recalling its earlier notes of July 15 and September 2, [3] is firmly of the opinion that real progress towards a solution of major international questions, including the problem of European security, can be made by frank discussions on Germany and Austria at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the US, USSR, UK and France and not by embarking upon a further exchange of notes. The US Government trusts that the Soviet note reflects a willingness promptly to discuss these subjects.

3. Such a meeting will enable the Soviet Government to state its views on any aspect of the German and Austrian questions which it may wish to present. For its part, the US Government welcomes the opportunity to put forward its views concerning questions dealt with in its previous notes.

4. As regards the Soviet proposal that the Austrian question be discussed in the ordinary diplomatic way, it is the view of the US

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[1] Transmitted in Secto 15 from London, Oct. 17, which states that it had been approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France after consultation with Chancellor Adenauer, Mayor Schreiber, and Foreign Minister Gruber.

[2] Document 271.

[3] Documents 257 and 268.

Government that diplomatic channels are always available and this government will continue to give its most careful consideration to any Soviet proposal re the treaty which may be thus submitted. However, as no progress has been made through such channels during the past few years, the United States Government is of the opinion that discussion by the four Foreign Ministers themselves represent the most practicable way to end the present stalemate and reach agreement on a treaty.

5. A solution of the German and Austrian questions is long overdue. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France, conscious of the special responsibilities which their governments together with the Soviet Government share in regard to Germany and Austria, therefore, desire to consider these questions together with the Soviet Foreign Minister as soon as feasible. Since the date of October 15 originally suggested has now passed, the United States Government proposes that the Foreign Ministers should meet at Lugano on November 9. They sincerely hope that the Soviet Government will agree to participate.

6. The Soviet note also proposes an additional five power conference to consider measures to lessen tensions in international relations. The United States Government is always ready and willing to discuss the underlying causes of such tensions with a view to their removal. But it wishes to do so under conditions which offer reasonable prospects for positive results and assure that the views of the directly interested governments are properly represented. Accordingly, the United States Government has already agreed to the political conference on Korea in the form proposed by the Communist side in the Korean armistice negotiations and recommended in the armistice agreement and by the United Nations General Assembly. It has been proposed that discussions shall take place at Panmunjom on arrangements for the conference. All the five governments mentioned in the Soviet note could be represented at this conference which it is hoped will meet at an early date. Its object is precisely to remove one of the major sources of tension in the Far East, thus opening the way for an early peaceful settlement of other international problems now existing in this part of the world. Other matters mentioned in the Soviet note, such as the disarmament question, are under either current or projected discussion in the United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, several of the subjects mentioned in the Soviet note were recently inscribed on the agenda of the current General Assembly at the request of the Soviet Union. In addition, the United States Government remains ready to discuss through ordinary diplomatic channels any points which any government may wish to raise.

7. Thus, on these various questions, the way is open for progress. If in addition a fruitful discussion can now take place at Lugano, the way it would be paved for discussion of other major questions and for restoring the necessary conditions for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.

No. 280

396.1 LO/11-353

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

[Moscow, November 3, 1953.]

Soviet Government acknowledges receipt note Government United States America of October 18, [2] which is answer to note Soviet Government of September 28. [3]

In its note of October 18, just as in former note of September 2, [4] Government United States America avoids principal questions posed by government whose examination has aim of contributing to settlement unresolved international problems and strengthening peace. Meanwhile, necessity for such settlement has become still more pressing.

It is also impossible to ignore fact that latest note Government United States America is once again result separate collusion three powers, i.e., United States America, England and France. Accordingly, new meeting Ministers Foreign Affairs three powers at London, [5] like preceding meeting at Washington, [6] in no way facilitates task settlement unresolved international problems. On contrary, such meetings cannot but limit initiative and possibilities attainment agreement between interested powers, fact which naturally is contrary to interests international cooperation.

In its note of September 28, Soviet Government drew attention Government United States America, as well as Governments Great Britain and France, to necessity examination measures for lessening tension in international relations by Ministers Foreign Affairs

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[1] Transmitted in telegrams 545 and 546 from Moscow, Nov. 3. This translation should be compared for minor textual differences with that in Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 745–748.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 271.

[4] Document 268.

[5] For documentation on the London Foreign Ministers meeting, Oct. 16–18, see Documents 291 ff.

[6] For documentation on the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting, July 10–14, see vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1582 ff.

United States America, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union. In this regard, Soviet Government has been guided by fact that governments indicated powers are also expressing desire to reach such an understanding as would lead even in near future to lessening international tension, and this, in its turn, would make possible attainment positive results in settlement urgent (Nazrevshi) international problems. In advancing this proposal Soviet Government proceeded from fact that favorable conditions have been created for this at present time, especially in connection with conclusion armistice in Korea.

It is well known what a favorable effect statement government Chinese People's Republic had on achievement armistice in Korea. This government, together with Government Korean Popular Democratic Republic, took initiative which led to agreement on termination bloodshed in Korea. It would be completely natural to expect further steps toward easing international tension from both interested parties. Refusal to consider question of easing tension in international relations could not be considered other than as unwillingness to contribute to settlement unresolved questions, and thereby to contribute to strengthening peace and international security.

One of chief elements bearing witness to great tension in international relations is fact that during course recent years armaments race is increasing ever further, including atomic and hydrogen weapons, military groupings of some states against other states are being formed, network of military bases established by certain states on territories of other states is growing rapidly, and so forth. If Government United States, like Government USSR, recognizes that such a situation increases threat new world war and that examination of above mentioned most important international questions must not be postponed for an indefinite period, then in that case there should disappear objections to undertaking examination question of measures for lessening international tension without further delays. In contrary case it would be impossible to assure appropriate conditions for resolution of urgent international problems, to settlement of which Government United States America also attaches great importance.

In its note of October 18, Government United States America refers to fact that several questions raised in Soviet Government's note of September 28, including disarmament question, are already being considered or will be considered by General Assembly of United Nations. However, it is impossible to acknowledge this reference as in any degree well founded. In United Nations, several important questions related to maintenance international peace have been considered from very beginning of organization. This refers especially to such questions as limitation and regulation of armaments, prohibition atomic and other types weapons mass destruction, impermissibility establishment military bases on foreign territory, impermissibility propaganda aimed at preparation new world war. However, as is well known, solution these important questions in United Nations has encountered serious difficulties. As a result, armaments race being carried on by certain countries not only is not decreasing, but is continuing in still greater measure, in connection with which tax burden which broad sections of population these countries bears on its shoulders is increasing without interruption, and weapons of mass destruction are becoming ever more destructive and dangerous, especially with appearance hydrogen bomb. Full settlement Korean question has great significance for easing tension in international relations. At present time this requires that question of national unification and establishment stable peace in Korea be settled on basis armistice reached. Convocation political conference on Korea should answer these ends.

Soviet Government has already noted in its note of September 28 that convocation this conference is facing serious difficulties in connection with examination question of conferences. There still exists clear under evaluation significance agreed actions on this question with such directly interested states as Chinese People's Republic and Korean Popular Democratic Republic. As should be completely obvious, success Korean political conference depends to great extent on coordination actions most interested parties and on participation in this conference of other neutral states which contributed to attainment armistice in Korea and which can offer substantial help in settlement whole Korean question. In accordance with existing understanding, there is already taking place a meeting between the parties at Panmunjom, called for examination of unsettled questions connected with preparations for Korean political conference. [7] If Government United States America and government certain other countries bearing responsibility for difficulties which have arisen in settlement Korean question, in particular for difficulties connected with decision of question, are really striving for success this conference, then they cannot fail to take into account above mentioned legitimate demands of Korean-Chinese side which, as has been shown by consideration of question conference composition at Seventh Session UN General Assembly, are shared by majority states Europe, Asia and Africa.

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[7] For documentation on the meetings at Panmunjom, beginning Oct. 26, to discuss the agenda for the Korean Political Conference, see vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1578–1657, *passim*.

Easing of tension in international relations also depends to great extent on settlement question mutual relations with Chinese People's Republic, re-establishment China's legitimate right in UN and its participation in decision fundamental questions relating to maintenance peace and security of peoples. To ignore necessity urgent decision questions relating to re-establishment national rights Chinese People's Republic and to delay implementation of China's participation with full rights in settlement urgent international problems is to contribute to further maintenance international tension. It is impossible to limit matter to participation Chinese People's Republic in Korean conference, inasmuch as positive results of this conference are also in no small measure connected with recognition of rights and legitimate interests Chinese people in settlement other important international problems. It is also necessary to recognize as impermissible a situation whereby in recent years there have taken place a number of acts of aggression in relation to Chinese People's Republic provoked by certain powers.

From all this it follows that for regulation urgent international problems having great significance for lessening international tension, to say nothing about special problems relating to situation in South East Asia and Pacific Ocean, it is urgently necessary to call conference of Foreign Ministers of five powers: US, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union.

In reply to Soviet Government's proposal concerning calling conference composed of Foreign Ministers of five powers to examine means to lessen tension in international relations US Government expressed its readiness consider causes of such tension with view to eliminating them. At same time, however, US Government stated that it "wishes do this under circumstances which would create reasonable hope of achieving positive results and would ensure that viewpoints of directly interested governments would be properly represented".

Thus, stating its readiness to examine causes of present international tension in order eliminate them, US Government there and then refuses call conference of five powers at present time. This evident from fact that it advances various preconditions directed toward postponement calling above-mentioned conference for indefinite period. If US Government in future continues insist on these preconditions, it will be evidence that it does not in fact desire easing international tension and corresponding settlement unresolved international problems.

In refusing convocation five power conference US Government points out that it has agreed to convocation Korean political conference where all these powers might be represented. However, that this statement of US Government is without foundation if only for fact that position it has taken rejecting participation of neutral countries in Korean conference makes participation of USSR in this conference impossible. One must not forget that it is impossible at Korean conference to consider general question of lessening international tension, urgent consideration of which can not be denied at present time.

In its note of September 28 Soviet Government drew attention to fact that recent political developments in West Germany have increased alarm in peace-loving countries of Europe. Ruling circles in Western Germany openly set as their goal the accelerated implementation of plan for remilitarization. Measures for creation of regular army, air force and navy are being carried out. Hundreds of industrial enterprises are being converted to serve military needs. West German monopolists who in their time inspired Hitlerite aggression are engaged in re-establishment war industry. Those generals who created Hitlerite army and carried out Hitler's military plans are again assuming leadership over creation armed forces West Germany. Present Bonn Government which expresses aspirations aggressive circles West German monopolists and Hitlerite military leadership already feels no necessity hide its aggressive aims in regard neighboring states. Ruling circles in West Germany openly advertise their revanchist plans, fact which creates increasing threat European security. West German revanchists, who have raised their heads recently, are trying secure support of aggressive circles other states.

In this situation one cannot fail see danger in endeavors of ruling circles West Germany to hasten in every way ratification and entry into force of both Paris and Bonn agreements,[8] with which are bound up their calculations for acceleration remilitarization West Germany and for realization their revanchist plans in Europe. In these circumstances one should recognize as particularly impermissible those attempts at crude pressure which have recently been undertaken in relation, for example France, to overcome public resistance to Bonn and Paris agreements.

Inasmuch as Paris agreement concerning so-called European army including West German armed forces means creating regular army in West Germany, West German revanchists stop at nothing to achieve this agreement's entry into force. In addition West German revanchist circles are exerting continuous pressure to hasten entry into force of Bonn agreement also. They intend utilize this agreement as well, which leaves West Germany for decades in position of occupied country, in order subsequently free their hands having joined North Atlantic military group of powers and having secured support of most aggressive forces this group.

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[8] For text of the European Defense Community Treaty, signed at Paris May 27, 1952, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116–162; for text of the agreements, signed at Bonn May 26, 1952, see Documents 50 ff.

Entry into force of Paris and Bonn agreements would mean that remilitarization West Germany will get fully under way. And then, as is witnessed by grievous experience peoples of Europe, West German revanchists will cease paying any attention to many paragraphs these agreements. Then they will do everything possible involve parties to these agreements in adventures, which will facilitate their starting a war for accomplishment their criminal revanchist aims.

Peace-loving peoples of Europe, and above all West Germany's neighbors, cannot fail take this into account. Lessons of history will-known to all whereby neighboring countries, which German militarists never hesitated to dig up pretexts for attacking, became first victims of aggressive German militarism.

In connection with this it is understandable that US Government's note of October 18 touches on so serious a question as that of European security, to which Soviet Government has always attached greatest significance. One cannot but admit that only such a solution of German problem as will guarantee restoration national unity of Germany as democratic and peace-loving state and also guarantee interests security all other European states will accord with interests peace-loving peoples Europe as well as interests German people itself. This means that formation special military group of European states directed against some states of Europe such as creation of so-called European army now being undertaken has nothing in common with real European security.

One should not forget that there exist Franco-Soviet treaty 1944 and also Anglo-Soviet treaty 1942 according to which USSR and France as well as USSR and England assumed obligations undertake joint measures against possible new aggression on part German militarism which in addition is in accord with aims of ensuring security all European states. To forget these important obligations would not be in interests of France and England. As regards Soviet Union for its part now as previously, it is fully ready not only not to weaken these obligations but also take into account existing new possibilities for ensuring security in Europe.

However, position of US Government regarding German problem expressed in referenced note as well as in its previous notes does not at all accord with interests ensuring European security since they ignore not only above-mentioned obligations but also provisions Potsdam conference 1945 according which US, England, USSR and France which adhered to them agreed to assist by joint efforts in re-establishment unity German state, creation all-German democratic government and conclusion peace treaty with Germany. Government Soviet Union considers it necessary again call attention of US Government to great importance for assuring European security of observance principles and aims of Potsdam agreement regarding Germany.

Soviet Government still considers that only by joint efforts of four powers can European security be assured and can one prevent re-establishment aggressive German militarism toward which West German revanchists are striving. It is thus necessary for US, England, France and USSR together with representatives West and East Germany to agree that in accordance with interests strengthening peace and European security solution of principal that there be no further delay in decision concerning Germany connected therewith, i.e., problems of peace treaty with Germany and re-establishment unity of German state on democratic and peace-loving principles.

Namely by reason of above considerations Soviet Government proposed consider at conference Foreign Ministers such questions as: Calling peace conference to examine question of peace treaty with Germany, creation provisional all-German Government and conduct all-German elections.

In addition Soviet Government considered and considers it important to examine question of lightening financial-economic obligations of Germany connected with consequences war.

As before, in its note of October 18 US Government did not express its attitude toward these questions which have paramount significance for solution German problem. Instead, it confines itself to statement that in conference under reference it would "utilize this occasion to expound its ideas on questions already raised in its previous notes".

This statement of US Government means that it as before seeks to limit consideration of German problem to question of all-German elections organized by occupation authorities and not by German people itself inasmuch as US Government again evades considering question of immediate formation of all-German democratic government. Moreover, until such all-German Government is formed, it is impossible hold truly free all-German elections and ensure solution basic tasks set by four-power Potsdam agreement, i.e., assist re-establishment Germany as democratic and peace-loving state.

Moreover, impossible consider German problem independent of other important problem directly relating to security of Europe, i.e., question of situation which has arisen in connection with ever-widening network American military bases on territory certain European states. As Soviet Government has already repeatedly stated, these military bases are being created principally in regions bordering Soviet Union and countries of Peoples Democracy which in itself is evidence that these bases have nothing in common with tasks of defense of countries participating in North Atlantic bloc and are intended for use for aggressive ends. Such American bases have been established, as is well-known, on territory England, France, Italy, Turkey, Norway and number other countries. Only recently agreement was concluded regarding establishment new American military bases on territory Greece, which has nothing in common with national interests Greek people. How far business of creating American military bases in Europe has gone is witnessed by fact that recently agreement was signed between US and former accomplice of Hitlerite Germany, Franco Spain, which is becoming military ally of North Atlantic group of powers and is making its territory available for establishment American naval and air bases. In view these new facts no one can assert that North Atlantic bloc serves defensive aims.

In addition, open pressure is being systematically put on certain other states of Europe, and Near and Middle East and, in particular, on Iran to oblige them to make their territory available for foreign military bases despite legitimate protests from wide circles of public in these countries who realize that establishment of such bases serves aggressive aims and is incompatible with national sovereignty and independence these countries.

Measures being carried out now in remilitarization West Germany and directed toward turning West German territory into Place d'Armes for preparation and carrying out revanchist aims of West German militarists and also aggressive plans of North Atlantic bloc have direct connection with creation above-mentioned military bases.

It is not difficult to understand that in such a situation when on the territory of a number of states of Europe, North Africa, Near and Middle East are being organized more and more new foreign military bases, and when plans are being carried out for remilitarization of Western Germany—that a threat is being created to security of Soviet Union as well as a number of other states which is leading to further aggravation of tension of the international situation and is increasing threat of new world war. All this indicates that settlement of German problem in conformity with interests of guaranteeing European security is inextricably bound up with decision of question of liquidation of these military bases. Any other attitude to this question would mean interests of genuine guarantee of European security are being ignored.

In connection therewith Soviet Government would like to receive clarification from Government of US as well as from Governments of England, and France as to whether their statement on willingness to consider German question at meeting Ministers Four Powers and their recognition of importance of guaranteeing European security means that they will not place themselves in a position whereby on the one hand it is proposed to examine German question at conference and on the other simultaneously to adopt measures for ratification of Paris and Bonn agreements by those states which have so far not ratified them. Receipt of such clarification is necessary in view of fact that ratification of these agreements and their entry into will make impossible restoration Germany as unified state and thereby render pointless also consideration of German question at meeting of Ministers Foreign Affairs of Four Powers, such meeting would be bound in advance by agreed separate obligations of three powers and Bonn Government of Adenauer for inclusion Western Germany in North Atlantic bloc and creation of West German revanchist army. All that is said above shows that given genuine desire to settle urgent international problems it is necessary to reach understanding concerning urgent consideration of measures for reduction of tension in international relations and this requires convocation of conference of Five Powers. It is possible to hope that examination of above-mentioned measures will facilitate also decision of German question which, as is evident, is inextricably bound up with problem of guaranteeing of European security.

On basis of foregoing Soviet Government reaffirms proposal contained in its note of September 28 for calling of conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and at that meeting:

1. To examine measures for the reduction of tension in international relations with participation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of USA, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union;
2. To consider German question including all proposals advanced during course of preparations for conference with participation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of USA, England, France and Soviet Union.

In connection with question of Austrian Treaty mentioned by Government of USA, Soviet Government considers it necessary to recall that it is awaiting answer of Government of USA and also of Governments of England and France to its note of August 28 [9] on this question and notes that discussion proposed by Soviet Government of this question through normal diplomatic channels has not yet taken place.

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[9] Regarding this note, see Document 882.

No. 281

396.1 LO/11-453: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1953—7:43 p.m.

2431. Our preliminary comments Soviet note November 3: [2]

Note largely repetition points made Soviet note September 28 [3] and repeats proposal for five-power conference with participation Communist China to discuss wide range international issues. Soviet note indicates that such discussion is necessary prelude to four-power conference on Germany to examine question of German peace treaty, creation all-German government and conduct all-German elections.

Soviet note however goes beyond previous notes in establishing preconditions for discussion German problem. It specifically demands that all progress towards EDC ratification and German contractuals be stopped. Note picks up theme of European security mentioned in Allied note October 18 [4] and not only states Soviet position that "EDC has nothing in common with European security" but goes on to require "liquidation" of NATO collective security structure. Latter demand phrased in terms of "US military bases" but directly links these with NATO by assertion that "no one can assert that North Atlantic bloc serves defensive aims" in view existence various US bases Europe, North Africa, Near East.

In virtually requiring abandonment EDC project and dismantling NATO collective security structure, Soviet note makes clear that its price for coming to conference table is a defenseless Europe. Only carrot thrown out to European governments to counterbalance this harsh condition is suggestion that existing Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet mutual security treaties might be strengthened.

Reference section note dealing with Far East, of interest that while adhering to previous views on composition Korean political conference, Soviet note does not close door to eventual holding of

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[1] Drafted by Thurston and Morris; cleared with GER, C, U, and FE; and initialed for Secretary Dulles by Merchant. Also sent to Paris, Bonn, and Vienna and repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and Munsan-ni, Korea.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 271.

[4] Document 279.

Korean political conference on separate basis from other conferences proposed.

Though language of note not belligerent in tone, spelling out of preconditions for a conference known to be absolutely unacceptable to Western allies makes this a strong uncompromising document. Reference to an increase in the "threat of a new world war" is made both in connection with armaments question and question of EDC and NATO. Note is therefore not without certain threatening aspect.

Department is however inclined agree with analysis Moscow's 549 [5] that reasons for Soviet unwillingness engage in any serious negotiations this time relate primarily to Soviet determination strengthen domestic position in Soviet orbit, particularly East Germany, and out of preoccupation with relations with China. While too early predict how long Soviets will adhere to this rigid position, it appears clear that for indefinite period West will be confronted with revived tough Soviet line in foreign policy.

While uncompromising nature position taken by Soviets in note no doubt determined by internal necessities Soviet regime, its propaganda message clearly directed not at US or German opinion (to which latter it would be most disappointing) but primarily at our Western European allies, in particular France. Repetitious references to danger of revived German militarism in connection with threat new world war, allusion to Franco Spain, and hints that five-power conference might afford opportunity for discussion Indochina question may strike responsive chords among some European elements.

Essence of note is however a demand for liquidation our common defense effort, including NATO, US troops in Europe and EDC as prerequisite to conference on Germany and Austria. Because this aspect of Soviet note places issue squarely before our allies as to path they now wish take, we would prefer have British and French suggest how we should best respond to note, that is, whether or not we should attempt disengage ourselves from present note series (while leaving door open for future negotiations), and, if so, how. FYI while we feel that European public already resigned to inability get Soviets to Lugano as result of negative position taken by previous Soviet notes and that present note should sharpen and firm up European opinion this regard, we do not wish to attempt set pace re Allied response but rather let British and French make suggestions.

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[5] Telegram 549 reported Moscow's preliminary interpretation of the Soviet note (396.1/11-453)

London and Paris requested approach Foreign Offices, outline our analysis of new Soviet note as given above and get their reactions as to note and best course of Allied response.[6] In view of degree to which NATO is involved in note, we also hope British and French will recognize desirability of presenting tripartite analysis to NAC at earliest date and inviting views of other Governments. USRO please note.[7]

HICOG requested similarly to sound out Adenauer. In view our difficulties with him re last two Allied notes, which we believe stemmed at least partly from his feeling he was not consulted until very late in process of Allied reply, suggest inviting his concrete and urgent suggestions re form and substance our response. HICOG contact with Adenauer might well be on part of three powers, since Conant in chair this month, though if British and French not prepared sound him out to this extent now, we would still appreciate informal and urgent contact by Conant for our information.[8]

While it would normally be our turn to coordinate Allied response here in Washington, Paris might be more convenient for British and French. In fact, in view foregoing analysis we believe it would be highly desirable for coordination be done in Paris. Kidd could proceed there from Germany in few days to help Achilles (assuming Dillon once more willing spare Achilles for this purpose).

DULLES

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[6] On Nov. 4 Aldrich reported that the reaction of the British Foreign Office to the Soviet note was the same as the United States. (Telegram 1928 from London, 396.1/11-453) The following day Henri Ruffin, the First Secretary in the French Embassy, informed Thurston that the French preliminary reaction was even more negative than that of the United States. (Memorandum of conversation, by Thurston, Nov. 5, 396.1/11-553)

[7] The tripartite analysis was presented to NATO at a closed session on Nov. 12. Hughes reported on the session in Polto 807 from Paris, Nov. 12. (740.5/11-1253)

[8] On Nov. 6 Conant reported that the Chancellor seemed to believe that the reply should record the West's regret at the Soviet unwillingness to meet and reiterate its willingness to meet. (Telegram 1612 from Bonn, Nov. 6, 396.1/11-653)

No. 282

396.1/11–753: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 7, 1953—10 p.m.

1813. Reference immediately preceding telegram. [2] Following is tripartite draft text:

"(1) In close consultation with governments of France and UK, US Government has carefully studied Soviet Government's note of November 3 [3] in reply to its note of October 18 [4] in which it was proposed that four Foreign Ministers should meet at Lugano November 9. (*Comment:* French suggested omitting reference this time to consultation with Federal Government and German authorities Berlin since this note somewhat different from previous and perhaps preferable omit unless Adenauer has contrary views.)

(2) US Government noted that Soviet Government has for third time ignored invitation addressed to it which it was intended should lead to study of most urgent international problems. US Government is still of opinion that best way of reducing international tension is to persevere in constructive efforts to resolve existing problems step by step, starting with those which best lend themselves to an early solution. With this in mind, US Government proposed meeting of four Foreign Ministers about Germany and Austria and continues to pursue its efforts to enable political conference on Korea to take place. It remains of opinion that negotiations on these issues could clear ground, open way to broader agreement, and thus improve chances of reestablishing real peace in the world.

(3) To judge from its note of November 3, Soviet Government sees matter in different light. It prefers that Foreign Ministers should deal in first instance with international problems of so general a character that Ministers could not consider them with any chance of success in absence of real progress on the most urgent concrete questions.

(4) Although US Government laid down no conditions in its invitation and sought increasingly to take into account, insofar as possible, view of Soviet Government, latter has made a meeting of Foreign Ministers conditional upon acceptance of a number of demands. This would entail abandonment by US, UK and France of all their plans to safeguard their own security. A defenseless Western Europe appears to be price demanded by Soviet Government for participation in a conference. Soviet Government must be well aware that such demands are totally unacceptable.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, and London.

[2] Telegram 1812 reported that the tripartite working group began meeting at Paris on Nov. 7 and agreed on a tentative reply working from a French draft (396.1/11–753)

[3] Document 280.

[4] Document 279.

(5) It therefore seems that Soviet Government does not wish, at least at present time, to open any negotiations which might lead to positive results. US Government is nevertheless determined to let no opportunity pass of contributing to lessening of international tension which remains essential objective of its policy. It intends to continue its efforts to achieve peaceful reunification of Germany. It would like the four Foreign Ministers or their deputies to conclude Austrian state treaty as rapidly as possible, and it hopes that note addressed separately to Soviet Government in reply to its communication of August 28 will help to achieve this. [5] (*Comment:* French propose separate note to Soviets re Austria as indicated Embtel 1774 November 5. [6]) Invitation which it has already extended to Soviet Government, and which latter has so far felt unable to accept, therefore remains open." [7]

DILLON

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[5] Regarding the Soviet note of Aug. 28, see Document 882.

[6] Telegram 1774 reported that Sauvagnargues had suggested replying to the Soviet note of Aug. 28 in a separate note from that on Germany. (396.1 PA/11-553)

[7] On Nov. 9 the Department of State commented on this draft, expressing its pleasure at the text, but suggesting the retention of consultation with the Germans in paragraph 1, adding minor changes in the remaining paragraphs, and specifically requesting the deletion of any mention of a separate note on Austria. (Telegram 1775 to Paris, Nov. 9, 396.1/11-953)

No. 283

396.1/11-1453

The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs [1]

[Moscow, November 16, 1953.]

1. In close consultation with the Governments of France and the UK, the US Government has carefully studied the Soviet Government's note of November 3 in reply to the note of October 18 in which the US Government proposed that the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs should meet at Lugano on November 9. The Government of the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin have also been consulted.

2. The US Government notes with regret that the Soviet Government has for the third time within the past four months ignored its

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 1915 from Paris, Nov. 14. Following transmission of the draft in telegram 1813, *supra*, the working group met daily Nov. 9-14 to prepare a final draft. This note, which was approved on Nov. 14 with the first and last sentences in brackets, was shown on Nov. 15 to Chancellor Adenauer who requested the removal of the brackets. The resulting text, printed here, was approved by the three governments and Mayor Schreiber and delivered to the Foreign Ministry on Nov. 16. Documentation on the work of the tripartite working group is in file 396.1

invitation to discuss the most urgent international problems. The US Government is still of the opinion that the best way of reducing international tension is to persevere in constructive efforts for the progressive solution of outstanding problems, starting with those which most urgently require an early settlement. With this in mind, the United States Government proposed a meeting of the four foreign ministers in order to reach agreement on Germany, especially on its reunification in freedom, and on the Austrian State Treaty. In the same spirit, it is continuing its efforts to enable the political conference on Korea to take place.

3. To judge from its note of November 3, the Soviet Government contemplates a meeting of the foreign ministers, "with the participation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Peoples Republic" of such a different character that it would not only become involved in futile and endless debate, but would also prevent all progress in the settlement of questions which are both urgent and concrete.

4. The United States Government laid down no conditions in its invitation and made every possible effort to take into account the views of the Soviet Government. But the latter has made a meeting of the foreign ministers conditional upon the acceptance of a number of demands. Some of these have no relation to Europe, but must in the Soviet view be met before even the study of European problems could be initiated. Others would entail the abandonment by the US, UK and France of all their plans to safeguard their own security. A defenseless Western Europe appears to be the price demanded by the Soviet Government for participation in a conference. The Soviet Government must be well aware that such demands are totally unacceptable.

5. The US Government can only conclude from the latest Soviet note that the Soviet Government does not wish at the present time to enter into any negotiations which might have positive results. The US Government nevertheless remains determined to seek by all appropriate means agreement on the most urgent questions the solution of which is essential to the lessening of international tension. Therefore it leaves open the invitation addressed to the Soviet Government on October 18. The US Government is convinced that negotiations on these vital problems would open the way to broader agreement and would thus improve the chances of re-establishing real peace in the world.

No. 284

396.1/11-2753

The Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the United States [1]

No. 43/OSA [Moscow, November 26, 1953.]

Soviet Government acknowledges receipt note Government USA of November 16, 1953 [2] which is an answer to Soviet Government's note of November 3. [3]

Government USA alleges that Government USSR has refused proposal for conference Ministers Foreign Affairs on most urgent international problems. Such allegation does not correspond with reality and is in clear contradiction with what was said by Soviet Government in its note of November 3.

As is known, in this note Soviet Government not only did not refuse proposal for convocation conference Ministers Foreign Affairs on most urgent international problems, but on contrary, again affirmed its favorable attitude toward convocation such conference although proposal Government USSR did not coincide with proposal Government USA.

Soviet Government proposed:

"To call conference Ministers Foreign Affairs and at this conference

> 1. To examine with Ministers Foreign Affairs USA, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union measures for lessening tension in international relations.
>
> 2. To consider with Ministers Foreign Affairs USA, England, France and Soviet Union the German question including all proposals advanced during course preparation for conference".

Soviet Government considers it necessary recall that it has repeatedly advanced its proposal for convocation conference Ministers Foreign Affairs during course recent months, i.e.: August 4, September 28, November 3.[4]

Thus Soviet Government has consistently insisted on convocation conference Ministers Foreign Affairs for examination general question concerning measures for lessening tension in international relations and especially the German question, decision of which is connected in closest fashion with assuring security in Europe and, consequently, with lessening tension in international situation. Soviet Government at present time still considers convocation of such conference necessary. Such conference, according to Soviet Government's opinion, should not be confined in advance to examination of any one question but should actually be able to examine most urgent international problems.

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[1] Transmitted in telegrams 618, 620, and 621 from Moscow, Nov. 26 and 27. This translation should be compared for minor textual differences with that in Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 853-854.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Document 280.

[4] Documents 259, 271, and 280.

Soviet Government's proposal for convocation conference with participation Ministers Foreign Affairs USA, England, France, USSR and Chinese People's Republic for examination measures for lessening tension in international relations, and also with participation Ministers Foreign Affairs USA, England, France and USSR for consideration German question was advanced with one general aim—to contribute to easing international tension and, in particular, to assuring stable security in Europe, which requires definitive settlement German problem.

Government USA also speaks of its desire for lessening international tension and also mentions as most urgent questions: German problem, conclusion Austrian state treaty, and cooperation convocation political conference in Korea. Even the listing of above-mentioned problems shows that Government USA regards both specific questions concerning Europe as well as questions concerning Asia as among the most urgent international problems suitable for consideration at Conference Ministers Foreign Affairs.

Inasmuch as US Government has recognized that at conference Ministers Foreign Affairs it is also appropriate to examine those problems which concern situation in Asia, then it follows that participation Chinese Peoples Republic, together with other four great powers, in examination and settlement such type of problems is completely natural and necessary. In addition, there is no basis to deny obvious fact that time has become ripe for examination measures for lessening tension in international situation as a whole, towards which persistent efforts of Soviet Government are directed as well, and this means that conference with participation Ministers Foreign Affairs USA, England, France, USSR and Chinese Peoples Republic is matter which must not be put off.

It is exactly because examination question of measures for easing international situation as a whole is not only urgent necessity but also not to be postponed that Soviet Government has considered and considers it necessary to convoke conference with participation all great powers without any exception whatsoever. As US Government states that it also is pursuing aim of contributing to easing international tension, obstacles to convocation conference five powers, USA, England, France, USSR and Chinese Peoples Republic, should disappear. From this is also evident the whole baseless ness of objections contained in note of November 16 on question at hand.

Government of USSR reaffirms position stated in its note of November 3 concerning meeting of Foreign Ministers.

In addition Government of USSR again states that plans for creation so-called "European army" opening door to rebirth German militarism and remilitarization Western Germany together with creation foreign military bases on territory number European states which creates threat to security of other European states, are incompatible with interests security in Europe.

Soviet Government rejects as without any foundation statement contained in note US Government of November 16 alleging that negative attitude of Soviet Union toward creation European army represents demand for "abandonment by US, Great Britain and France of plans for ensuring their own security" although position which USSR has stated in no way touches on question of military forces these states. Equally unfounded is statement clearly made for propaganda purposes alleging that "a defenseless Western Europe appears to be price which Soviet Union demands for participation in conference."

As is well known, an attempt is being made under the label of "European army" to create an army of six states: France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Consequently, this plan envisages the creation of army of narrow groupment of European states which does not include majority European countries. Moreover, principal purpose of creating European army is to make possible reestablishment regular army in Western Germany with West German Army included as basic military force in abovementioned European army. Creation of European army is being supported in every way by former Hitlerites and other German revanchists who in order to serve their aggressive purpose are striving to prepare unleashing of new war and involve in it not only German people but also other peoples of Europe since creation of European army will be forced on them.

Danger of carrying out this plan of creating European army must be understandable to all peoples of Europe, including peoples of those countries which are now being involved in creation this army, since it is clear that under cover of so-called "European army" army of German militarism is being revived. Creation of European army can mean nothing but creation of aggressive groupment of several European states which relying on armed forces and including in its composition West German revanchist army will set itself in opposition to a whole series of other European states: Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries. By same token plan for creation European army can in no way assist strengthening peace in Europe. Such plan includes setting one part of Europe against other part of Europe. It cannot lead to lessening tension in international relations, but, on contrary, will contribute to inflaming contradictions between countries of Europe and thereby increasing danger of new military adventure. Thus, creation of European army unleashing forces of German militarism, most dangerous for peace in Europe, will contain threat of new world war which peace-loving peoples of whole world cannot fail to take into account.

In opposing so-called "European army" Soviet Union proceeds from fact that creation such army can in no way contribute to strengthening security in Europe, but rather, inevitably, will lead to contrary results. Nor does creation such army have anything in common with desire not to permit "defenseless Western Europe" which, moreover, no one is threatening.

The guaranteeing of security Western European countries will be firm if it is based not on setting countries of Western Europe off against countries of Eastern Europe but on obtaining concord of efforts all European countries in regard to assuring security in Europe. These efforts can and must be based on obligations previously assumed by states concerned, aim of which is to prevent new acts of aggression in Europe.

In opposing creation European army Soviet Union is acting in interests of forestalling threat of new war and, consequently, in interests securing real peace in Europe.

Soviet Union is ready to exert all efforts together with other countries Europe to cooperate assuring European security by means of appropriate agreement between all countries of Europe independent of their social structure. Security can be fully guaranteed for all European countries if efforts of all European states and other states interested in this will make their efforts conform to these specific purposes. This also requires that solution of German problem, which has very important significance for strengthening security in Europe, will be carried out in interests of re-establishing unity and independence of Germany as democratic and peace-loving state.

The foregoing permits the conclusion that inasmuch as Governments of United States America and USSR are striving for reinforcement of peace and international security they must be interested in urgent examination of the questions of measures for the reduction of tension in international affairs in general, as well as, in the specific examination of questions concerning security in Europe and the consequent resolution of the German problem. This was also the substance of the proposal of Soviet Government in its note of November 3.

Since, however, the exchange of notes between the USSR and United States America, and also with England and France, has not led, up to present time, to the establishment of a common viewpoint in regard to the above-mentioned proposal, it is necessary to examine this question at an appropriate meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In this connection, Soviet Government has taken into consideration statement contained in note of Government of United States of November 16 to effect that its participation in a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of United States America, USSR, England and France is not connected with any conditions of a preliminary character. Similar statements were made by Governments of England and France. Being guided by the desire to cooperate in the speedy settlement of urgent (ripe) international problems, Soviet Government expresses its readiness to take part in a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States America, USSR, England and France.

Soviet Government considers it necessary to declare that in light of considerations set forth above, at this meeting there will be brought up by it the question of the convocation in near future of a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of United States America, England, France, USSR and the Chinese Peoples Republic for purpose of reducing tension in international relations. In opinion of Soviet Government, a suitable place for the meeting of the Ministers of the Four Powers could be the city of Berlin. Soviet Government has sent similar notes also to Governments of England and France.

No. 285

396.1/11-2753: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY Moscow, November 27, 1953—6 p.m.

624. Soviet note[2] represents important shift in tactical handling of German question and general subject negotiations with West. There is nothing in note itself however which would justify conclusion that it represents any basic shift in Soviet attitude towards German or Austrian problems. Chief point of interest is what circumstances or considerations induced or forced Soviet Government

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

to accept in principle on November 26 what it uncompromisingly rejected on November 3.

While full motivation of necessity obscure it is probable that principal cause of shift Soviet tactics was due to recognition of damaging impression created by Soviet note November 3, particularly among their adherents and supporters in Western countries. Reaction to Molotov press conference (Embtel 578 [3]) probably convinced Soviet Government that if it was to provide its adherents abroad with ammunition to fight EDC something more than mere negative attitude was necessary.

In this connection it has been noted that present peace conference in Vienna [4] has been marked by extremely feeble and negative attempts by Soviet followers to bridge glaring contradiction between Soviet refusal to meet and constant reiteration of desire to reduce international tension. It is likewise possible that chief preoccupation of effect four-power discussion on Germany on position East German regime so clearly visible in November 3 note (Embtel 549 [5]) has been eased by at least partial rehabilitation position that regime as reported Berlin's 474 and 476 to Department. [6] On balance therefore Soviet Government has apparently decided that general over-all effect refusal to meet was more disadvantageous to its general position than risks of discussion on Germany. It is likewise possible that even domestically and in satellite area basic contradiction referred to above was becoming embarrassing to Soviet Government.

Chief substantive difference in Soviet reply is of course abandonment of condition inclusion of Communist China as price any meeting which can hardly be pleasing Chinese Government no matter how much reciprocal dishonesty there has been in previous insistence participation Communist China. Next to last paragraph clearly sop to Chinese in endeavor offset effects this shift.

Note is furthermore marked by absence of vituperation and abuse (with exception attacks on West Germany in this case milder and limited to generalities such as militarists and revanchists without mentioning Bonn Government or Adenauer) in contrast not only to contents November 3 note, but to recent line in Soviet press. In fact, except for one passing reference to foreign bases this favorite subject is passed over in silence and no mention is made NATO. Substance of note furthermore, is confined entirely to Europe and emphasizes extreme danger to peace of setting one group of European states off against another, with unusual reference willingness Soviet Union to cooperate with all European countries, regardless their social structure, for achievement European security.

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[3] Telegram 578 reported that Molotov's press conference on Nov. 13 had probably been held to counteract the unfavorable Western press commentary on the Soviet note of Nov. 3. (961.61/11-1453)

[4] A Soviet-sponsored peace conference was held at Vienna at the end of November.

[5] See footnote 5, Document 281.

[6] Telegram 474 is printed as telegram 542 to Bonn, Document 758. Telegram 476 attempted to determine future Soviet policy in Germany based on the situation reported in telegram 474. (762B.00/10-2253)

Suggestion of Berlin as place of meeting is very diffidently phrased, and it is not quite clear how insistent Soviet Government will be on that place alone, which conceivably might raise certain awkward problems in view of division of city and location behind Iron Curtain.

Fact that chief point of note was given on Soviet radio almost simultaneously with delivery contrary to past practice, makes it clear that this shift is primarily designed for public consumption, both domestic and foreign. Since there is no reason to believe that basic Soviet policy of support East German regime has changed and that present shift merely represents for reasons given above, shift in tactical handling of problem, I consider we have everything to gain and nothing to lose by agreeing to Soviet proposal, which constitutes distinct victory for Western diplomacy, and bring them to a conference as soon as possible after Bermuda and NATO meetings. If there are serious difficulties as to Berlin as site of conference (and West German reaction on this point will be very important) I would suggest that rather than reject Berlin out of hand in reply, it might be worthwhile considering informal sounding out of Molotov by one of three Western Ambassadors as to exactly what lies behind Soviet suggestion on Berlin. Greatest advantage to Soviets in circumstances would be to enter into arguments as to date and place, while allowing Soviet shift in position to obtain maximum propaganda value in order to delay or obstruct EDC.

BOHLEN

No. 286

396.1/11-2853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 28, 1953—7:28 p.m.

2859. Embassy London requested inform Eden that Secretary has read with interest his preliminary views [2] on Soviet note of November 26 [3] which were made available to Department today by British Embassy, and that we are disposed agree with him that our correct course is to accept Soviet offer to meet in Berlin as rapidly as possible and without prior conditions on agenda.

You should add that Secretary will be discussing question further with President upon latter's return to Washington November 30. However, because of Eden's desire to clear our ideas prior his imminent departure for Bermuda, we wish give him our views without further delay.

We are not inclined interpret Soviet note as accepting our view that a 4-power meeting should be mainly concerned with Germany, European security, and Austria and anticipate on the contrary that Soviets will attempt emphasize their proposal for 5-power meeting with Chinese Communists to consider what they call measures to reduce international tensions.

We have not yet reached any definite conclusions as to tone and scope of our reply to Soviets and believe that this problem will require careful consideration at Bermuda. We are favorably impressed with French suggestion (Paris' 2091 to Department [4]) that our reply should contain paragraph refuting Soviet attack on EDC.

Re timing of proposed conference with Soviets we believe that it should be held as soon as possible and would like to aim at first week of January. There are obvious difficulties in the way of such an early date (the French Presidential elections, etc.) but believe we should make concerted effort at Bermuda to remove them.

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[1] Drafted by Thurston and approved for transmission by Dulles. Also sent to Paris and Bonn and repeated to Berlin, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] On Nov. 28 Leishman had given Secretary Dulles a two-page summary of Eden's views which stated, *inter alia*, that the Western powers should accept the offer to meet, that Berlin was an acceptable site, that mid-January would be an acceptable date, and that the reply to the Soviet note should be drafted during the Bermuda Conference. A copy of the summary is in file 396.1/11-2853.

[3] Document 284.

[4] Telegram 2091 reported the French belief that it would be difficult to refuse the Soviet offer to meet, that the note indicated no basic shift in Soviet policy, that the reply should contain a refutation of the attack on the EDC, that Berlin was not the place for the meeting, and that their schedule of events made a meeting before mid-January very difficult. (396.1/11-2853)

Since it will be our intent to emphasize German question at 4-power conference, our final decision on the response to the Soviet note will necessarily be influenced in large part of Adenauer's views, which we are seeking. Latter's views on Berlin as site of conference will also be important. We ourselves not particularly concerned about the Berlin aspect and in fact see certain advantages to it from our viewpoint.

Except as indicated above, we find ourselves in full agreement with Eden's analysis of Soviet note and suggested course of action.

Department is informed that Eden's views have also been conveyed to French Government. Embassy Paris should therefore bring foregoing US views to attention Bidault or other French officials soon as possible. In so doing, inform French that we are considering their views as transmitted Paris' 2091 and that we agree with them re need to refute Soviet attack on EDC in our reply.

DULLES

No. 287

762A.13/11-3053: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BONN, November 30, 1953—5 p.m.

1797. For the Secretary from Conant. I called on Chancellor this morning as chairman for month AHC, and inquired for three governments as to his opinion about the Russian note. [2] Chancellor said important part of note was last paragraph which insisted that Red China be brought in. He also pointed out that note again spoke harshly of EDC and wants European security to be discussed before German problem. He therefore thought answer should take into account order in which topics would be discussed at any possible four-power conference, although he wanted to avoid word agenda. He thought if some such phrase as "the order of procedure" could be used, our answer to note would not be contradictory to our previous notes. Chancellor felt very strongly that it would be dangerous in extreme for Bermuda meeting to agree to meeting of four foreign ministers in too near future and he pointed out that French Government was not in position to make firm commitments on European policy. He felt that for three Allies to meet with Russians before there was another three-power meeting with a French Government, which had been put in power after French presidential elections, would be foolish and might well be disastrous. His whole idea therefore was to write note now which would gain time. To this end he suggested that US might well point out that last paragraph was equivalent of their admitting that meeting with Red China was discussable, point which he understood we had been unwilling to concede in past. It might well be a condition of acceptance of four-power meeting that this matter of five-power conference not be open for discussion at that time. He also felt there was an implied agenda in an earlier paragraph which placed European security before solution of German problem and it should be clearly pointed out that order of procedure, when meeting occurred, would be for German problem to precede discussion of European security.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Document 284.

If French Government would want to take attitude that they were unwilling to have meeting until after new French Government were formed, that would be, of course, another matter on which he did not pass judgment. I asked him particularly whether note, which did not simply and immediately accept invitation, would not arouse hostile opinions here in Germany. He said he did not believe so and he undertook to support publicly in Germany position of note gaining time along the above lines.

On place of meeting, he said that officially as Chancellor he must, of course, agree to Berlin but that personally he had considerable doubts, particularly as it would provide an opportunity for propaganda between East and West sectors. If Berlin were accepted it should be in building of Allied Control Authority (in West Berlin) and in no other spot. [3]

CONANT

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[3] On Dec. 1 Hallstein, who was visiting the United States, met with Secretary Dulles and read him a message from Adenauer expressing the Chancellor's views regarding the Soviet note. These views, as recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Merchant, were along the lines of those transmitted by Conant in this telegram. (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Germany") For a record of other matters discussed with the Chancellor, see telegram 1798, *infra*.

No. 288

762A.13/11-3053: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BONN, November 30, 1953—4 p.m.

1798. Limited distribution. For Secretary from Conant. In addition to points Chancellor made to me as chairman of AHC for month, and which are being reported (Bonn to Department 1797 [1]), he made following points to me as US representative:

He believes he has accurate report from several sources that Churchill is in very precarious state of health. He therefore feels that British Government is in similar position to French and is not capable of developing continuing firm European policy. He believes therefore that it suicide (those are his own words) for three Allied powers to meet with Russians in too near future. What is required before four-power meeting is another three-power meeting not earlier than second half of January after new French Government formed. His arguments on this point seem to me personally compelling, though I may merely have fallen under spell of the old gentleman.

Speaking to me again as US representative he said he had heard that Laniel had asked for assurances from America that American troops would remain in Europe for long period of time. He realized difficulties constitutionally but said anything that could be done along this line would be of greatest significance. He agreed that number of soldiers was not issue, but military strength; perhaps solution could be found by which NATO treaty could be implemented by Congressional action guaranteeing present military strength for long period of time. He said Europe was imprisoned in its past and for its successful development there need for preceptor and that preceptor was US. Without presence of US military strength our guiding hand would be of little avail. He would much rather look forward to Germany working in partnership with Britain, France and US than be left alone on continent with hysterical France. He could understand French worry and he thought they, too, would feel much safer in our company.

He still optimistic about EDC ratification and has not retreated from this line, though he recognizes difficulty with French politics. He said meeting at Hague remarkably satisfactory as far as European spirit concerned and he is believer that EPC will go through provided EDC goes through.

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[1] *Supra.*

His two-hour conference with Bidault in presence of Parodi and Francois-Poncet was satisfactory. He thinks there possibility, though he cannot guarantee it, that after meeting on December 11 some statement could be issued showing progress. He feels now that Saar problem will not be block to EDC ratification. [2]

In spite of his great anxiety as to what might occur if Allies were foolish enough to meet with Russians in too near future, Chancellor seemed to be in more optimistic mood than on some previous recent occasions. He said he less anxious today about note than when he first read it. [3]

He emphasized to me point about Red China, made in my other telegram. He could not see how US could let last paragraph of present note go unanswered. He felt that for US even to admit on agenda discussion of five-power meeting would be to give up our present position.

CONANT

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[2] For documentation on Adenauer's occasional conversations with Bidault concerning the status of the Saar, see Documents 659 ff.

[3] For the Soviet note of Nov. 26, see Document 284.

No. 289

396.1/12-553

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET
OFFICIAL EYES ONLY

BAD GODESBERG, December 5, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: This brief note I trust will reach you before you leave for Paris. I am writing to supplement my cable of last night in which I stated that the Chancellor had changed his mind about the date of the four-power conference. [2] I further added the suggestion that you and he might meet in Paris on the 12th or 13th of this month. He is going to have an opportunity to see Eden just before or just after that time and I am sure it would be of great help to the Chancellor if you could see him in Paris.[3]

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[1] A notation on the source text indicates that this letter was seen by Secretary Dulles, but that there would be no answer.

[2] On Dec. 4 Conant had cabled that Adenauer had changed his mind and was now in favor of a four-power meeting as soon as possible provided it was short. (Telegram 1856 from Bonn, 740.5/12–453)

I found him yesterday looking very worried and in one of his depressed moods. Your conversation with Hallstein and Gerstenmeier had been already transmitted to him by Hallstein and had obviously made a profound effect.[4] Hallstein told me later that the Chancellor had not slept the night before because he had been so worried. I think the danger of a few weeks ago that he and some of his advisers and colleagues believed that a German-American solution to their problems could be found has now disappeared. Your strong letter[5] and General Gruenther's plain talk, I think, have cancelled out the bad effects of some ill-considered statements by traveling Americans during the first days of this Fall. I now find a mood of great anxiety among the leading German politicians that I meet.

I think the Chancellor may originally have desired a postponement of the four-power conference for reasons of domestic German politics. He has to have a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag in order to change the constitution to get around the issue now before the Constitutional Court. At the same time some of the elements in his coalition government have undoubtedly been causing trouble on the Saar question. Therefore, his time table may well have been a constitutional change by the first of February (it apparently will take that long, as the details are subject to considerable debate) and then talks on the Saar in February. The postponement of a four-power conference might have provided a good excuse for this delay. Whether or not I am right about this surmise, he is now completely changed as a result of your arguments transmitted through Professor Hallstein. He is in favor of a four power conference as soon as possible, only hopes it will be brief and conclusive in the sense that it will persuade the French that they must proceed with ratification of EDC. He is worried about the French attitude in this conference and others I have spoken to are worried lest either the conference be long drawn out or that the German problem be "solved" by some deal between the French and the Russians. If the Chancellor shares these worries I am sure a conversation between you and the Chancellor in Paris will remove all his anxiety on this score.

May I venture an opinion on a matter of fundamental policy which will perhaps have been given a new turn in Bermuda before you read these words. Despite the discouragements of the last few weeks, I am more than ever convinced that EDC, as part of European integration, is basic to successful American foreign policy in this part of the world. I believe that there are so many forces working in Europe for European integration that the long range prospects are by no means discouraging. This being the case, one can only hope that public opinion in the United States and in Germany may be kept sufficiently in check to allow us to ride through this difficult period in which, by one method or another, the French are brought to ratification of EDC. Unless instructed otherwise, I shall continue to be an unregenerate optimist about EDC ratification.

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[3] Regarding Dulles' meeting with Adenauer on Dec. 13 at Paris, see Document 236.

[4] Regarding Dulles' meeting with Hallstein on Dec. 1, see footnote 3, Document [illegible]

[5] Not further identified.

I am, of course, at your service to come to Paris, if you desire my presence at any time during your stay.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

JIM

No. 290

Editorial Note

The discussion of the reply to the Soviet note next moved to Bermuda where the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France were meeting December 4-8 to consider questions of mutual concern. By December 7 the Foreign Ministers had approved the text of the reply, had directed that it be shown to Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Schreiber, who approved it, and had instructed their Ambassadors in the Soviet Union to deliver the note to the Foreign Ministry on December 8. The note agreed to a meeting of the four powers at Berlin to discuss Germany and Austria, stated that any participating government could give its views on a five-power meeting, and suggested January 4 as the date for the opening of the meeting. For documentation on the drafting of the reply and the text of the note as approved by the Foreign Ministers, see volume V, Part 2, pages 1737 ff.

On December 26 the Soviet Union replied positively, but suggested January 25 as the date for the opening of the conference. This date was accepted by the three Western powers in a note dated January 1. For texts of the Soviet reply and the Western note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 11, 1954, pages 43-44. Copies of these notes and documentation relating to their drafting of the tripartite note is also in file 396.1 BE.

2. Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at London, October 16–18, 1953

No. 291

Editorial Note

On October 7 Prime Minister Churchill wrote to President Eisenhower asking if they could meet at the Azores between October 15 and 18 to discuss matters of mutual concern. The President replied the same day stating that his schedule was filled, but that Secretary Dulles could be available in Washington for a meeting with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Eden. Copies of these letters are in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file. Three days later Churchill wrote further saying that he was sorry that they could not meet, but saying that Eden had suggested that Dulles and Bidault come to London for tripartite talks. Eden himself had made this proposal to Dulles in a letter dated October 9. Copies of these two letters are in the Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, and in 396.1/10–953. Another part of the background to the invitation for a Foreign Ministers meeting in London is presented in telegram 1376, *infra*.

No. 292

396.1 LO/10–1253: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 12, 1953—8:18 p.m.

1376. Eyes only Ambassador. Eden has invited Bidault and me to come to London for talks. I have accepted and suggested October 16 and 17. Understand Bidault agreed. Coordinated announcement will be made tomorrow in three capitals.

Background on meeting is that some weeks ago and about time we invited Laniel and Bidault to Washington, I also suggested to Eden that it would be useful for me to talk with him as soon as practicable after he resumed duties. [2] I suggested he might come to UN which would afford opportunity for exchange of views. This was not feasible. Upon Eden's return Foreign Office, accumulation of work, Conservative Party conference, and opening Parliament made trip to US impossible and Eden suggested a tripartite meeting take place in London. This meeting continues consultation between three govts, last such instance being July meeting in Washington, on matters common interests. [3] It is desirable that we have opportunity discuss entire exchange of notes with USSR and in particular recent reply by USSR to invitation three Western powers for four-power meeting Foreign Ministers to consider urgent problems Germany and Austria. [4] In addition, we will review other developments where interests three governments directly affected and discuss ways and means contributing to general relaxation of tensions. Foregoing background will be used in briefing press when announcement made.

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[1] Drafted by W.J. Galloway of the Counselor's Office, cleared with Secretary Dulles and initialed for him by MacArthur. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris.

[2] Regarding the background to the meeting, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Since this meeting was arranged at Eden's request on very short notice, there will obviously not be time for extensive type of preparation which preceded tripartite meeting last July and therefore do not expect this meeting to result in spectacular decisions on various problems discussed. Rather it will afford opportunity for general exchange of views which will be helpful in further consideration of issues confronting us. Since the larger the meeting the more the press will be tempted to build it up out of all proportion, I intend to take with me from Dept only one or at most two advisors so as to keep meeting as small and informal as possible. In circumstances, I think it best for you not to plan to attend but to keep yourself available to come to London on short notice if needed. I will of course keep you fully informed of discussions by cable.

DULLES

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[3] Reference to the Foreign Ministers meetings, held at Washington, July 10–14, 1953.

[4] Document 271.

No. 293

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "CFM London, Oct 1953"

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, October 14, 1953

Participants: President Eisenhower
Secretary Dulles
Douglas MacArthur II
Robert R. Bowie

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[1] Drafted by Bowie and MacArthur.

The Secretary said that before leaving for the London meeting he wanted to discuss the following points which were certain to arise:

1. Four-power talks among chiefs of government

The Secretary pointed out that Mr. Churchill was almost certain to raise again the question of the four-power talks among the chiefs of government. [2] He said he had just come from a meeting with a small group of Republican and Democratic members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees which had discussed this question. [3] They were unanimous in thinking that the President should not attend any meeting of the sort visualized by Churchill.

The Secretary said he continued to feel that such a discussion at this time would not be productive and might tend to delay further progress toward EDC, especially in France. If the President approved, he therefore intended strongly to oppose a move toward such discussion at this time.

The President said he would fully support this position. He pointed out that the Secretary would be walking a tightrope in maintaining this position without creating the impression that the US was blocking a useful step. He said he was definitely not prepared to attend any meeting away from Washington for any substantial length of time. He pointed out that his position as both Chief of State and Chief of Government was quite different from that of the other three, and because of our constitutional requirements the wheels of government were slowed down when the President was absent. He said the issues and chances for any solutions should first be explored at a meeting with the Foreign Ministers or through diplomatic channels. If these reveal a real possibility for specific agreements, then the President would be willing to consider a brief meeting to put a seal on the solution of concrete issues.

The President said that if the Press asked him about Churchill's proposal, he would indicate a negative attitude but would avoid a definite answer by saying that this question might well be discussed at the London meeting which Secretary Dulles is attending.

2. Trieste

The Secretary reported on his meeting with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, and the statement made by the Foreign Minister that the Yugoslavs would enter Zone A, despite the presence of US and British forces, if any Italian soldiers entered the Zone.[4]

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[2] Regarding Churchill's proposal, see footnote 3, Document 186.

[3] A memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Senators Wiley, Ferguson, Green, and Sparkman and Representatives Vorys, Judd, Burleson, and Zablocki is in file 110.11 DU/10-1453.

The President expressed his surprise at the Yugoslav attitude, and suggested that it might be desirable at some point to move some of the 6th Fleet into the Adriatic area to indicate our readiness to deal with such a situation. (This was subsequently raised in a State–JCS meeting and the JCS informed us it would take from 36 to 48 hours to move important elements of the 6th Fleet into the upper Adriatic.)

The Secretary said that the Italian reaction had been almost too favorable and had doubtless complicated the situation. He said we would continue our efforts to obtain the acquiescence of Tito in a *de facto* solution.

3. Security Guarantees

The Secretary said he was doubtful about the wisdom of tendering any non-aggression pacts or similar guarantees to the Soviets at least until EDC had been ratified. It now appears that there is a good chance that the EDC would be approved by the French Parliament if it could be forced to a vote. It now looks as if this would take place in early January.

The Secretary called attention to telegram 1452 from Paris[5] which set out a clear and persuasive analysis along the line approved by Bidault. As long as EDC was not a reality, the Soviet policy was certain to be directed mainly at preventing its approval. The Soviets were not likely to consider seriously settling any European issues until EDC had become an accomplished fact and was no longer an issue for debate. The President agreed with this analysis.

4. Indochina

The Secretary referred to the French reports as to possible Chinese air support with jet planes to the Vietminh. Our intelligence is doubtful about this, but the possibility could not be ruled out.

The President felt that it might be desirable to make available to the French some of our F-86 planes in case the Chinese should provide such support. This might be a good way to boost the French morale in Indochina and might not be a serious burden on us since we might have on hand some of these planes in view of the Korean armistice and they would soon be obsolete. He did not know whether the French in Indochina had the capability of receiving and operating jets or what our own situation is with respect to supplying them, but thought this might be looked into informally.

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[4] On Oct. 8 the United States and the United Kingdom had announced that they proposed to remove their troops from Zone A.

[5] Telegram 1452 transmitted the substance of the French position on security guarantees in Europe. (640.611/10–1353)

The President was told that JCS was advised of this report and was considering what action the US should take if the contingency occurred.

No. 294

396.1/10-1653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 16, 1953—10 a.m.

Dulte 1. Eyes only for the President from the Secretary (information Acting Secretary). Aldrich and I dined last night with Churchill, Eden and Salisbury.[1] Dinner and after-dinner conversation almost wholly on possible Soviet meeting. I explained your position, based on responsibilities as head of state, and also fear lest such meeting should prejudice EDC. Winston made usual uncomplimentary references EDC with grudging acquiescence in importance early decision one way or another. I said once EDC ratified and western position thus solidified there would be a foundation for talks now lacking, and possibility of Soviet maneuvering against west would be greatly diminished. Under these circumstances you might possibly consider brief appearance at some four/power meeting, particularly if groundwork laid by four Foreign Ministers. I said if Churchill would defer seeking four-power meeting until after EDC ratified I would ask you give new consideration to matter along above lines.

At this point Winston switched to project of going alone to see Malenkov, perhaps with Eden, saying he recognized your position as chief of state was different from his. I said that obviously this was a decision he was wholly free to make, but I expressed concern lest it create impression that Britain now assuming role of middleman between US and Soviet Union, which I felt would seriously prejudice our desire to work in close partnership with British in areas of mutual concern. I felt that this unity should be preserved. Only at this point did Churchill show any sign of irritation saying that he thought we could trust him not to be entrapped at Moscow, and he recalled at December meeting in New York that you had said that he was of course free to go alone.[2] I said that I had no doubt that that was still your view and of course we would not attempt to interfere with his decision but I merely felt obligated to point out that since he could hardly go as our representative, US public opinion would almost inevitably cast him in the role of middleman and could have undesirable effect on relations elsewhere. Decision was, of course, his.

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[1] Secretary Dulles, accompanied, *inter alia,* by O'Connor, MacArthur, Bowie, Kidd, and Knight, had arrived in London at 5:15 p.m. Oct. 15.

[2] Prime Minister Churchill met with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles at New York at the beginning of January 1953.

Except for this passage meeting throughout most cordial.

Churchill's mental and physical condition seemed almost normal. Eden and Salisbury were significantly silent throughout and there is every indication that they do not share Churchill's ideas regarding Russian meeting. Indeed Eden told Aldrich and me on drive from airport that he doubted wisdom although he would, of course, loyally support his chief. Salisbury privately told Aldrich he felt there was much merit in my position.

[DULLES]

No. 295

396.1 LO/10-1653: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 16, 1953—7 p.m.

Secto 4. Tripartite, morning October 16, section one of two [2]—Trieste. Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting this morning started with consideration of Trieste. Secretary explained that we are in the dark re Yugoslav intentions; that we anticipated more trouble with Italy than with Yugoslavia and that violent Yugoslav reaction may perhaps be due to lack of consultation which made Tito appear to his public to have been treated cavalierly by US and UK. In recent conversation, Yugoslav Foreign Minister gave Secretary impression that Yugoslavia may in fact move troops into Zone A if Italian troops enter that Zone but if made clear zonal division is final and if Tito able to save face, he may accept settlement. Secretary then tentatively suggested that we might consider desirability of a four or five-power conference provided we do not abandon our original decision [3] and provided it does not cause fall of Pella government. If such conference were considered practicable, it might be advisable for us to take preliminary soundings in Belgrade and either concurrently or very soon thereafter in Rome. Such conference could discuss minority guarantees, port arrangements, etc., and even minor territorial adjustments, although latter could probably better be omitted and left for bilateral settlement. Secretary added that Yugoslav Foreign Minister had told him that Yugoslavs wanted conference arranged before any substantive Security Council discussion in order prevent Russians from muddying waters.

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[1] Repeated to Belgrade and Rome.

[2] For section two, see Secto 5, *infra*.

[3] Under reference is the decision, announced on Oct. 8 by the United States and the United Kingdom, to remove their troops from Zone A.

Secretary emphasized to Yugoslav Foreign Minister that basic motive of US–UK action was to strengthen Yugoslav association with West by removing problem of Trieste which was rock upon which past efforts in this direction have always broken. This point should be strongly reiterated in any further approaches in Belgrade.

Eden agreed that conference might be desirable and agreed it should be based on fact that zonal division represents final settlement. Eden thought ambiguity re finality is main reason for current Yugoslav violent reaction. He agreed that conference should probably not consider minor territorial readjustments. He added his opinion that present Russian manoeuvres are primarily intended to embarrass Tito on home front by emphasizing that his false Western allies have let him down. Re conversations with Tito, Eden stated he discussed problem with Tito[4] at great length and ended by suggesting that if Zone A–Zone B solution were imposed, it could probably be accepted by Yugoslavia. This Tito did not deny and Eden has impression that Tito himself not so rigid as some of his advisers. Eden added that this conversation was some months ago and that situation had changed in meantime. Eden concluded by proposing that problem be referred to experts who would make recommendations within framework that decision to withdraw from Zone A must be adhered to but that implementation could be stretched out and that conference could discuss minority guarantees and similar questions to make the action more palatable to Yugoslavia.

Bidault thought conference might be advantageous but doubted that framework proposed by Eden would prove practicable although suggested experts might come up with feasible recommendations. He doubted that Italians would consent to conference without firm assurances as to its results and believed that we would probably have to entice Italian participation with partial implementation of turnover Zone A to Italy.

In brief discussion of mechanics withdrawal it was pointed out that US–UK military considered it unacceptable to retain troops after administration handed over to Italians and that phased withdrawal was already in effect with evacuation of dependents, but that we had approximately one month's grace before any troops would move.

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[4] Presumably Eden is referring to his visit to Belgrade in September 1952.

With reference to emphasis on finality of Zone A–Zone B partition, as stated in Eden's suggested terms of reference for experts, the Secretary commented that this point very tricky, and that we would probably have to keep open possibility of bilaterally agreed modifications.

Eden stressed necessity of absolute secrecy in view of highly sensitive nature of matter discussed. [5]

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[5] At the end of the tripartite meeting during the morning of Oct. 17 (see Sectos 19 and 23, Documents 304 and 305) Eden proposed, and Secretary Dulles agreed, that the actual withdrawal of troops from Zone A should not be initiated without specific orders from the two governments because of the situation which had developed since the Oct. 8 announcement. (Secto 11 from London, Oct. 17, 396.1 LO/10–1753)

No. 296

396.1 LO/10–1653: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 16, 1953—8 p.m.

Secto 5. Tripartite, morning October 16, section two of two [2]—draft note to Soviets. [3] Bidault opened discussion by stating that although Adenauer's comments re last sentence paragraph 3 very pertinent, it would be mistake to delete sentence now, after Chancellor's request had been leaked to press. [4] It was German idea originally.

Eden wondered whether idea might be worked in elsewhere in note, since it would be awkward to delete it altogether. Felt that explanation of deletion would be embarrassing to Adenauer as well.

Secretary stated he would have liked to hear better reasons for keeping sentence in than mere fact that Adenauer wanted it out. Emphasized that regardless of legal situation in Germany, practical situation such that we must take reasonable account of wishes of Federal Republic. Pointed out difficulties we had encountered in Korea by taking Korean views for granted. Hoped phraseology could be found which would avoid elimination of idea, but meet legitimate concern of Adenauer that we might embark upon discussion such things as neutralism of Germany without his knowing what was in our minds. We would wish to avoid any suggestion that decision re bases, NATO, EDC could be suspended pending finish of conference with Soviets.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Vienna, Moscow, Berlin, and Bonn.

[2] For section one, *see* Secto 4, *supra*.

[3] Regarding the draft reply under reference, see telegram 1743 and the editorial note, Documents 274 and 275.

[4] On Oct. 14 the Allied High Commissioners for Germany had given a copy of the latest draft reply to Adenauer who had objected to paragraph 3, especially to the reference in it to European security guarantees. (Telegram 1392 from Bonn, Oct. 14, 396.1/10–1453 and despatch 1255 from Bonn, Oct. 15, 396.1/10–1553)

Eden and Bidault agreeable to examining possibility of revising sentence. Eden very pleased with note in its present form and mentioned favorable reception reference to European security had received in NATO meeting.[5] Bidault proposed return to French formula disconnecting reference to security from German and Austrian problems.

Secretary stated this would indicate invitation to conference on two subjects, one, Germany, and the other, security arrangements for all Europe. We would be guided to some extent by Bidault's views re implications such a conference for ratification of EDC.

Bidault said he had changed ground. Since chances for Lugano so slender, he felt offer to Soviets should be as broad and generous as possible and include those guarantees to Soviets which they were not interested in anyway. Re ratification, it was important to show French public that Soviets had not refused a narrow conference but one with broad agenda. Whole question aroused passionate interest in France.

Foreign Ministers confirmed insertion of sentence in paragraph 6 reading: "It has been proposed that discussions shall take place at Panmunjom on arrangements for the conference" (Embtel 1611 [6]). Revised phrase in third sentence paragraph 5 to read: "has now passed" instead of "is now impracticable".

After further discussion of possible revision of last sentence paragraph 3, matter was referred to drafting group. [7]

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[5] The text of the draft reply had been disclosed to the North Atlantic Council on Oct. 15. (Polto 586 from Paris, Oct. 15, 396.1/10-1553)

[6] Telegram 1611 reported British agreement with various minor changes in the draft reply to the Soviet Union. (396.1/10-1453)

[7] During the afternoon of Oct. 16 the drafting party agreed to drop the offending sentence in paragraph 3 and revised paragraph 2 to incorporate a reference to European security. This new draft reply was approved by the Foreign Ministers at 4:15 p.m.; shown to Adenauer, Mayor Schreiber, and Foreign Minister Gruber the following day; and delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Oct. 18. The U.S. Delegation reported on the work of the drafting group and the Foreign Ministers meeting in Secto 6 from London, Oct. 16. (396.1 LO/10-1653) For text of the note as delivered on Oct. 18, see Document 279.

No. 297

396.1 LO/10-1653: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreig[illegible]isters Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 16, 195[illegible]—8 p.m.

Secto 3. At tripartite meeting this afternoon, Eden raised question of Israel-Jordan incident. [2] Selwyn Lloyd reported he had called in Israeli Ambassador who has no information on incident. Selwyn Lloyd asked him inform his government that UK felt Israel should take initiative in withdrawing troops, punishing those responsible and offering compensation for deaths and damage. Israelis should also cooperate with MAC by abandoning Banat Yacov work and facilitating inspection Mt. Scopus area. Selwyn Lloyd added that Jordan Government was being advised to exercise restraint and withdraw Arab Legion which has been moved west of Jordan River.

Eden suggested there was nothing further to be done at the moment but that Foreign Ministers might inform press they had discussed matter. This was done. Secretary described his two recent conversations with Israeli Ambassador Washington in which he had earnestly requested Israel moderate attitude and stated present incident assumes added gravity in light these conversations. Bidault suggested possibility of issuing statement based on third paragraph tripartite statement of May 1950. [3]

Later in meeting Eden read urgent telegram from British Embassy Washington stating Department proposed referring matter to Security Council today. Secretary approved and Bidault approved suggesting again basing action on May 1950 declaration which he thought should be strengthened and reaffirmed in every way possible. Eden had doubts but promised have answer later tonight or in morning.

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[1] Repeated to Amman, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Paris.

[2] On the night of Oct. 14-15 Israeli forces had raided the Jordanian village of Qibya destroying buildings and killing many of the civilian population.

[3] Regarding the 1950 Declaration, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1029, footnote 4.

No. 298

396.1 LO/10-1653: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 16, 1953—10 p.m.

Secto 8. At meeting this afternoon Foreign Ministers considered security guarantees in relation to tripartite experts meeting in Paris next week. [2] Eden explained object of meeting to prepare tripartite positions on all possible phases Lugano meeting on assumption Soviets will accept invitation to meeting. He summarized British thoughts on security guarantees which based on fact that elements of security arrangements such as UN already in existence. British have three proposals none of which ideal:

(1) A NATO declaration or agreement that if Germany or EDC committed aggression NATO Treaty would come into effect and victim would be defended even though it might be USSR or satellite.

(2) Agreement between UK, US, France, USSR, and Germany for mutual assistance in case of attack across German borders.

(3) Nonaggression pact between the EDC and USSR as supported by US and UK guarantees.

Bidault then summarized views outlined in Paris telegram to Department 1452, October 13. [3] He stressed that these ideas should be kept secret and that if we can agree on what to do there will still be question of when and how to do it.

Secretary expressed doubt that USSR, in view its own record, rates nonaggression pacts very high. He suggested emphasizing purely defensive character of EDC at every opportunity, mentioning particularly coming Hague meeting. Also explained that tying guarantees closely to UN Charter will greatly facilitate US ratification. He mentioned particularly Article II, Sections 4 and 6 of UN Charter and suggested experts keep these two sections in mind during Paris discussions.

It was agreed that discussions in Paris should begin October 21, last approximately 10 days, and be conducted in light of above.

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] For documentation on the meetings of the tripartite working group at Paris, see Documents 312 ff.

[3] Not printed. The proposed French guarantee envisaged (1) a declaration by NATO reaffirming its devotion to the U.N. Charter and restating the defensive character of the alliance; (2) a declaration by the Federal Republic not to seek forceful modification of the territorial settlement of 1945; and (3) a declaration by the Occupying Powers noting the Federal Republic's declaration and guaranteeing it with respect to the Soviet Union. (640.611/10-1353)

No. 299

396.1 LO/10-1653: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, October 16, 1953—11 p.m.

Secto 10. There follows essentially British proposal for next step in Trieste matter. Secretary reserved until tomorrow expressing desire for careful consideration in Washington. Re manner in which soundings should be made alternate suggestion has been made to that appearing in following text: Three Foreign Ministers would receive Italian and Yugoslav Ambassadors London and Eden would act as spokesman. Fact that del Balzo now in London mentioned by British in support of this method. This first step would merely be intended to sound out Italians and Yugoslavs re five-power conference. The following first text was conceived as a proposal which could subsequently be handed to Italians and Yugoslavs. At this stage, however, the ideas would be set forth, no formal communication would be made and the text would not even be read as such.

Text of possible eventual proposal

"1. On Oct 8 the governments of the US and of the UK decided on a step which was designed to lead to a solution of the vexed problem of the Free Territory of Trieste, which repeated attempts had failed to solve. They announced their decision to terminate the Allied Military Government in Zone A of the Free Territory, to withdraw their troops and to relinquish the administration of the Zone to the Italian Government. The first steps to give effect to this are proceeding.

2. The two governments recognize that there are problems arising out of their decision which require further consideration. They are accordingly prepared to hold discussions with the Governments of Italy and Yugoslavia with a view to ensuring that the decision of October 8 is so applied as to bring about lasting peace in the area. In particular the conference should reach decisions re the protection of minorities in both Zones and re arrangements for facilities in the Port of Trieste and free access thereto so as best to serve the interests of neighboring countries.

3. The Governments of the US and of the UK have consulted on these matters with the Government of France who have signified their willingness to participate in a conference of the kind envisaged. The three governments accordingly invite the Governments of Italy and Yugoslavia to a conference to be held on the —— at ——."

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Rome, Moscow, and Belgrade.

The following text was circulated covering procedure and arguments in support of a five-power conference to be used with Italian and Yugoslav Governments:

"Supporting arguments to be used by the Allied representatives in Rome would include the following: (I) The three governments consider that they have a duty attempt, with the Italian and Yugoslav Governments, to settle the question of Trieste, rather than allow it to be discussed in the Security Council at this stage (II) we are maintaining our decision of October 8 (III) we cannot assume that Tito is bluffing. We must, therefore, try to prevent a possible Italo-Yugoslav military clash (IV) our intention is that the settlement should be final. It is, of course, without prejudice to a bilateral settlement which might be arrived at by negotiation.

The Allied representatives in Belgrade should support the case for a conference with the following arguments: (I) The need to withdraw the question from the Security Council (II) we are agreeing to a conference (III) this conference will discuss priorities and port facilities (IV) repeat our intention that the settlement should be final and that we should give no support for further claims by either party. It is, of course, without prejudice to a bilateral settlement which might be arrived at by negotiation.

Procedure

Instructions should be sent tonight to the UK, US and French representatives in Rome and Belgrade to take immediate soundings of the Italian and Yugoslav Governments to see whether those governments can be brought to acceptable proposal on the lines suggested. They should explain and advocate orally these views and ideas of the three governments but should not put them forward as a proposal at this stage. After concerting between themselves they should act separately and report back urgently the Yugoslav and Italian reactions. If the Yugoslav and Italian Governments react favorably, then our objective would be make the formal communication not later than Sunday so that it can appear in the communiqué which will be issued that evening in London."

It was also agreed re paragraph two of proposal stating " . . .[2] is so applied as to bring about lasting peace in the area" that this refers to our refusal to countenance use of force by either party in achieving its aims and that this point should be made clear both in Rome and Belgrade. Secretary expressed strong feeling that a forceful presentation would be needed to gain Italian acceptance of proposal but this should be done and we should impress upon Italians that we intend to carry out this operation with their cooperation which is essential to its success; if they hold aloof (while on other hand Yugoslavs should respond favorably) it would be difficult to foresee consequences. Bidault expressed great skepticism of our obtaining favorable answer from either Italians or Yugoslavs but felt we must make the effort, and in any event there must be no doubt about our carrying through decision of October 8.

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[2] Ellipsis in the source text

Eden and Bidault are requesting comments from British and French Ambassadors Rome and Belgrade. Rome and Belgrade pleased do likewise. Secretary desires Department's views at morning London time.

No. 300

396.1 LO/10-1653: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference, at London [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 17, 1953—1:44 a.m.

Tosec 14. 1. We believe UK proposal on Trieste (Secto 10 [2]) has merit and subject following comments we recommend acceptance.

2. On procedure, we believe alternative of taking soundings in London by Foreign Ministers this weekend definitely preferable but suggest this be reinforced by UK and US representatives confirming to Tito and Pella substance statement as made by Eden as spokesman in London.

3. On assumption that main point acceptance conference proposal is to give Tito face and contribute to restoration his confidence in West, it seems to us preferable to buy his four-power suggestion without addition France which Jugos might well regard as loading in Italian favor. Realize this requires delicate handling with Bidault but believe he should respond to frank explanation this view.

4. Plan fails to emphasize or even provide opportunity to lead Tito toward annexation Zone B which in our view remains highly desirable objective if not in fact key to Tito's exit from his present exposed position. If soundings of Italians and Jugos result in agreement of both to attend conference on narrow basis suggested we believe we should in meantime seek to devise means to encourage Tito to annexation.

5. We must bear in mind that before agreeing to conference Pella will undoubtedly ask confirmation of our original assurance that he will not be required publicly to acknowledge *de facto* partition as final and we should be clear that such confirmation must be given him if he is to carry this off in Italy.

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[1] Drafted by Merchant and cleared with Barbour, Elbrick, Byington, and Murphy. Repeated to Rome, Belgrade, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

6. On timing of conference, our reaction is that prospects of heading off Security Council debate would be improved if date is in near future, say within ten days or two weeks.

7. Finally, we believe important that passage in tripartite communiqué on Trieste follow and not go beyond three point quotation second paragraph Secto 10. [3]

SMITH

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[3] On Oct. 17 Eden on behalf of the three Foreign Ministers met individually with the Italian and Yugoslav Ambassadors and read to them the text of a statement substantially along the lines of the British proposal (Secto 10, *supra*), but incorporating in his oral comments to each of them the thrust of the desiderata in Tosec 14. The text of the statement was transmitted from London in Secto 26, Oct. 17. (396.1 LO/10-1753). Minutes of the meetings with the Ambassadors were transmitted in Sectos 28 and 29 from London, Oct. 18. (Both 296.1 LO/10-1853).

No. 301

Editorial Note

The final item discussed by the Foreign Ministers during the afternoon session on October 16 was the date for the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which was to be held in Paris. Bidault stated that the French Presidential elections might interfere with a December session, but promised to advise his colleagues further. (Secto 9 from London, October 16, 396.1 LO/10-1653) The following day Bidault reported that December 17-20 appeared to be the best dates for the meeting and promised to do his best to keep the French elections from conflicting with it. (Secto 18 from London, October 17, 396.1 LO/10-1753)

No. 302

396.1 LO/10-1853: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 18, 1953—1 a.m.

Secto 27. Secretary met privately with Bidault at French Embassy for about an hour afternoon October 16 with MacArthur, Bowie, Margerie present. Following is summary:

Bidault said his two principal concerns are Indochina and EDC.

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

Re Indochina, Reynaud, Pleven, Faure, and Martineau-Deplat were very difficult in French cabinet about five-power meeting proposed by Soviets. Differences within cabinet were reflected in French press which has not helped prestige of government. Bidault said he will continue to hold line in cabinet re Indochina but he has problem because two elements within cabinet who wish to negotiate. (This conversation took place before Bidault received word of action by Vietnam Congress reported in Secto 12).[2]

Re EDC position of French Government is set forth in Laniel's reply to President Eisenhower's letter.[3] Bidault said it essential for French Assembly to take positive stand on both EPC and EDC before The Hague meeting now tentatively scheduled for late November. He said that if French Assembly does not give some form of preliminary approval to EPC and EDC he would not go to The Hague and would not remain as Foreign Minister. He outlined parliamentary steps as follows: October 27, debate in Council of Republic on EDC, (related to US aid legislation which envisages giving assistance to EDC); November 12–13, hearings before Foreign Affairs Commission of Assembly and Council of Republic; followed by a debate in Assembly about November 20 when "Assembly must give preliminary approval to EDC and EPC".

On basis his present estimates, he believed it would be possible to obtain slim Assembly approval of EDC and EPC but mentioned great difficulties with Socialist and Gaullists.

Secretary said difficult to exaggerate our anxiety over coming weeks. US believes future of Europe and indeed Western civilization depends upon whether we grasp opportunity to integrate Germany with West. US has long hoped for European unity, and through Marshall Plan and military aid has provided about $30 billion. Furthermore, our strategic planning has been based on development real strength in Europe through unification. In past there have been disappointments but now point has been reached where unless Europe moves forward with EDC we will be forced against our will to explore new alternatives which will be presented to us by changed situation in Europe resulting from failure of EDC. It would be tragic if great opportunities now present escaped us and Secretary sure Bidault felt same way.

Secretary then mentioned apprehension over reports as to French attitude re EPC which seemed one of keys to acceptance of EDC, and made reference to elements in French Foreign Office and others who are opposed to it. Bidault appeared somewhat evasive.

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[2] *Infra.*

[3] For text of Eisenhower's letter and Laniel's response, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 812 and 820.

He admitted there was opposition in Foreign Office and elsewhere and said French Government's instructions to Rome had been too "narrowly" interpreted at beginning Rome conference.[4] However, French Government policy did support political community with supra-national attributes. Bidault reiterated French Assembly must discuss EPC and EDC before The Hague and said present *rapporteurs* in Assembly committees would have to be replaced, as they were hostile to EDC. He did not indicate how replacement would come about but implied it would be related to parliamentary hearings.

Bidault said agreement on Saar essential prerequisite to EDC ratification. Adenauer sincere and full of good intentions but latter has his own problem with rightist and other elements in coalition working against Saar settlement acceptable to France.

Secretary then said we had disquieting reports re extent French reforms in North Africa, and he hoped French would push forward vigorously with reforms, which essential to stability and progress.

Bidault said situation in North Africa complicated but staunchly defended French reform program, mentioning labor law reforms and increased participation in North African Assemblies. Universal suffrage not yet possible but France determined to push ahead with greater native participation in government. Bidault had report that US would vote for Bolivian resolution re North Africa and expressed unhappiness, saying "voting for a comparatively mild resolution creates more difficulties than for an exaggerated resolution". He explained that latter probably would not pass or get much real support outside Arab-Asian bloc. Furthermore, France does not recognize United Nations competence to intervene in internal affairs in North Africa.

In conclusion, Bidault again expressed deep gratitude for United States assistance in Indochina and said that next six weeks are going to be "terrible for me", but he was determined to push ahead with EDC and Indochina. He would not hazard when final French ratification might occur but reiterated that French Assembly must give some form of preliminary approval to EPC and EDC before The Hague meeting late November.

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[4] The Deputy Foreign Ministers of the signatories to the EDC Treaty met in Rome Sept 22–Oct 9, 1953.

No. 303

396.1 LO/10-1753: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 17, 1953—1 a.m.

Secto 12. At Eden's dinner this evening Bidault in highly emotional state told Secretary that he had just learned that Vietnamese Congress had passed resolution against membership in French Union. While we did not get full and clear picture from Bidault, we gathered Congress had specified that relationship with France would be established by negotiated treaties outside French Union framework. Bidault was emphatic in opinion this Vietnam action would add so much grist to mill of Reynaud, Mendes-France et al. that pressure to withdraw from Indochina would become irresistible unless solution rectified in next few days.

In response to query, Bidault said he understood Bao Dai [2] was behaving well about this but he was in France many thousand kilometers away whereas here were maneuvers in Indochina involving Tam. [3]

Bidault mentioned telephone conversation with Paris this afternoon and said Auriol was reported in high state of emotion about this.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and Saigon.

[2] Bao Dai, Emperor of Vietnam.

[3] Nguyen Van Tam, Prime Minister of Vietnam.

No. 304

396.1 LO/10-1753: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 17, 1953—3 p.m.

Secto 19. Subject: Korean Discussion at Tripartite Meeting October 17, a.m. At request Eden, Secretary stated according latest information Chinese Communists have agreed to preliminary discussions at Panmunjom for arrangements for political conference (PC) and United States has agreed send representative to Panmunjom this purpose October 26. Krishna Menon,[2] who often seems have firm ideas Chinese Communist reactions, told Secretary he not confident how Communists would react to United States unwillingness discuss at Panmunjom composition of PC. Secretary emphasized importance United States attached to united front on composition. If Communists feel they can reopen this question, they will attach more importance to it than to purpose PC itself, to detriment of success of conference. Supreme United States concern is fighting not be renewed. Whether PC can succeed is at best problematical. Were Communists renew hostilities it might be on basis belief they would this time be successful. They seemed to be building up airfields and bringing in new planes. Thus, they might deliberately provoke an incident.

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

UNC aware this possibility and is erecting new defense lines which in month or so will be as strong as those abandoned at time of armistice. On other hand, ROK might provoke hostilities. Rhee, as in US opinion he legally entitled to do, has reserved freedom of action. When Secretary was in Korea[3] Rhee publicly committed himself not take independent action until three months after convocation PC. Thus, we have assurance Rhee will do nothing until security agreement comes into effect which expected about February. Rhee controls world's sixth largest military force which well-trained and loyal and will probably obey orders even if execution such orders would amount to suicide. He might gamble on US support if he does renew hostilities. US can not publicly state it will not support Rhee as Communists might take advantage this knowledge by attacking ROK. We, therefore, faced with extremely dangerous situation. US best acquainted with Korean problem and is doing its best handle that problem in light its knowledge situation. US asks the confidence and support its Allies.

Eden replied UK aware of US difficulties with Rhee, and of his military power and character. UK will do what it can to help. Re PC, if Chinese Communists show desire discuss composition at Panmunjom, he would hope US would at least listen. It would be pity if plans for PC broke down at preliminary meeting. It essential we retain a certain elasticity in dealing with Communists on Korea and elsewhere. It would be well for US representative not reject out of hand Communist views on composition PC but merely agree report Communist views to UN. Attitude US representative would have important bearing on whether or not PC even held.

Bidault commented from French point view it most important PC be held. In itself it would be important as putting an end to

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[2] V. K. Krishna Menon, Indian Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

[3] Secretary Dulles traveled to Korea in August 1953.

Korean conflict. It would present opportunity for later discussion Indochina. He expressed concern over certain persons, even inside government, who have heretofore been supporting agreed Western line but who now seem to be plugging for five-power conference discussion Indochina.

Secretary said it had been made clear to Chinese Communists we should be prepared listen to what they wished to say re composition PC. He mentioned that there was feeling in some quarters US obstinate in refusing admit India to PC. US position based on impressions gained by Secretary during his visit to Korea where he became convinced Indian participation would have vastly increased chances renewal hostilities. We have nothing against India—quite the contrary. Opposition based solely on anticipated violent reaction Rhee. If desire is have someone at PC who could act as intermediary, we have made it plain to Indians we should be glad to have them act in this capacity but this does not require formal invitation. Indian representatives already in Korea in connection with NNRC. If as occasion arises India wishes informally play part of honest broker we would be delighted if it could play useful role. This fact certainly clear to Chinese. Secretary said as much to Krishna Menon just before leaving Washington and he confident Menon had already passed on this information.

In reply to Eden's remark Krishna Menon only an indirect channel to Peiping, Secretary agreed authorize US representative who would be sent Panmunjom make US views known to Communists.

No. 305

396.1 LO/10-1753: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 17, 1953—4 p.m.

Secto 23. Subject: Indochina discussion at tripartite meeting October 17 morning. Re military picture Bidault reported Viet Minh preparing major effort in Tonkin delta with two divisions, two regiments and one "special division" grouped north of Hanoi and two divisions and one regiment assembled in south of delta. Does not expect new Viet Minh push into Laos, but this cannot be ruled out in view presence one division near Vinh.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and Saigon.

Re "Navarre Plan" nine battalions from France will be in Indochina by end of October.[2] Aircraft carrier *Arromanches* has arrived, the additional Air Force personnel will be on hand by end of month and the additional US equipment is also arriving in quantity. Of the 54 commando battalions program 36 now activated with 18 to follow within next month thus completing ahead of schedule. Bidault report Navarre also succeeded in creating a mobile battle corps by withdrawing elements from static defense but did not give figures.

Re political aspects Bidault said talks have started in Indochina following French July 3 announcement.[3] These, however, relate to transfer of certain limited powers and essential negotiations will be conducted soon in Paris.

Re Laos matters progressing smoothly with Laotians first to recognize need for continued presence western technicians. Talks Paris started October 15.

Re Cambodia difficulties common knowledge. Quick agreement was reached concerning transfer of police and judicial powers, but military has been stumbling block. French have now agreed transfer territorial command west of Mekong to Cambodia, also command five battalions on condition that three be returned to French command for operations. However, difficulties continue unresolved concerning date of return and use of these three battalions as well as re protection of French and other foreigners.

Re Vietnam talks have not yet started; no fault of French who appointed their delegation in August. Delay caused Bao Dai who wanted non-governmental representatives in his delegation also because difficulties with Tam, internal Vietnam politics and calling off National Congress. Latter not only disappointment but has caused unexpected great difficulties. Congress adjourned without designating panel of 20 from which 6 representatives to Paris talks were to be selected. Resolution denouncing French Union (Secto 12, repeated Paris 252, Saigon 3[4]) could have disastrous effect both on Paris talks and French public opinion. Bao Dai has sent telegram calling for remedial action, but Bidault not optimistic in view demagogic climate Saigon. Bidault warned that because public opinion and parliamentary pressure French Government could not continue present effort if nothing subsists of French Union, for example, in military field so important to all interested in Southeast Asia.

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[2] The plan of Gen. Henri Navarre, Commander in Chief of the French Forces in Indochina, was to strengthen the French Expeditionary Force in Indochina and expand the training of Vietnamese forces.

[3] On July 3 France had offered to conduct negotiations with the Associated States of Indochina for a review of their status in the French Union.

[4] Document 303.

Bidault remarked parenthetically that Bao Dai also much better than his reputation (Eden later mentioned that he had recently received rather glowing report on Bao Dai from MacDonald [5]).

Bidault then raised question action in support of French should Viet Minh Air Force appear. According "entirely reliable sources" pilot training school established Nanning [*Nanking*?] last April. Other sources report concentration jet equipment South China and completion air strip Langson. French have no jet planes Indochina as not best adapted for present operations, but French Air Force would become worthless day Viet Minh jets appear. While five-power staff agency at meeting June 1953 [6] considered question military help in case Communist Chinese aggression Bidault wanted inquire at what point increasing Chinese aid would bring above support agreement into play.

Eden stated French report re Viet Minh planes communicated to British JCS and any information thereon will be given to French. While pointing out difficulties drawing up theoretical schedule of "percentages of intervention," he recognized usefulness studying this important problem. UK fully understands link between Indochina and Malaya and improvement over past year would be wiped out if Navarre fails.

Secretary expressed great US appreciation French efforts Indochina which US sought to demonstrate in form very substantial financial and material aid.

Re possibility appearance Viet Minh planes US is studying this problem. Information given to US military who are checking their sources. The US is ready to consider what should be done if Communist China exceeds what could be considered a normal level of supplying military equipment.

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[5] Malcolm J. MacDonald, British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia.

[6] Five-power talks on East and Southeast Asia were held periodically.

No. 306

396.1 LO/10-1753: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 17, 1953—3 p.m.

Secto 20. Bilateral Foreign Ministers' meeting morning October 17 discussed following:

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[1] Repeated to Cairo.

1. Egypt:

Eden showed Secretary in greatest confidence latest draft on availability as approved by Cabinet, providing base would be made available in event (a) attack on Egypt (b) attack on any member ALCSP or (c) recommendation by UN that base should be made available in view aggression or threat aggression. Eden said this wording would be given Egyptians at Monday's meeting.

Secretary said our information was Egyptians would agree to refer their responsibilities under both charter and 1950 uniting for peace resolution and suggested wording of latter ("in event of threat to peace, breach of peace or aggression") be substituted under (c) above. British agreed consider this.

Eden continued UK were prepared to agree to (a) 15-month period for withdrawal of troops, which was "major concession", (b) 7-year duration and (c) time schedule providing for 4,000 technicians for a year and a half, then 2,500 for 3 years and finally 1,000 in last year. Did not anticipate any great difficulty on either air facilities or base organization. On uniforms, however, there had been a long Cabinet discussion as result which finally agreed uniforms would never be worn outside base while inside they would not normally be worn but this would not be incorporated in formal agreement as UK unwilling give up right wear uniforms and carry weapons inside base. In actual practice uniforms would only be worn inside base on ceremonial occasions such as church parade, etc. Selwyn Lloyd added British hoped get Egyptians agree that inside base shirts, shorts, badges of rank and caps could be worn.

During considerable discussion which followed, Secretary expressed hope talks would not break down on uniform question. This he said, would be serious and have a bad effect on American public opinion. He wondered whether argument was not over words rather than substance. Eden replied question was important since if Naguib Government should be replaced by less friendly one, British might wish put its soldiers in uniform. Secretary concurred but added that if it was intended technicians would ordinarily not wear uniforms, he thought this should be made very clear, not simply stated orally.

Ambassador suggested there misunderstanding as to whether men in question were soldiers or technicians. Eden replied that they would be mainly engineers and actually soldiers. He hoped Egyptians might agree to British position, in view especially British concessions on initial evacuation and staging of technicians. Cabinet, however, was absolutely firm on uniforms and public opinion would not allow further concessions.

Eden said he thought latest UK proposals were "pretty good" and expressed hope that even if Egyptians did not accept them wholly Monday they would not break off talks. He hoped we would do our best prevent any break. Secretary assured Eden we would do all we could to help.

2. Iran:

Eden told Secretary that when Parliament meets next week he intended to "say something nice" about new government, stressing that as Iran aware UK ready resume relations. In reply Eden's query re present government, Secretary said Zahedi's [2] position seemed satisfactory for time being but something must be done to assist economically. Congress would not extend aid indefinitely. Eden and Secretary agreed Iran oil must start moving into world market as this was of major importance politically. British then said they were planning supply locomotives worth about 1 million pounds to Iran on extremely liberal credit terms. Outright gift would require approval Parliament.

3. Saudi Arabia:

Eden mentioned latest approach made by Hafiz Wahba re Buraimi (Embtel 1580, October 13 [3]) and said there had been no developments since Hafiz return Jidda this week but that things looked better.

4. Israel:

British stated Syria bringing Banat Yacov situation before SC.

5. Kuwait:

Eden said situation was causing some anxieties [since?] ruler not anxious continue ruling. UK trying encourage him continue as succession not clear and as he appeared to be best choice.

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[2] Gen. Fazollah Zahedi, Prime Minister of Iran.

[3] Telegram 1580 reported that the Saudi Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Hafiz Wahba, was proceeding to Jidda to open discussions with the British concerning Buraimi. (780.022/10-1353)

No. 307

396.1 LO/10–1753: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, October 17, 1953—8 p.m.

Secto 25. Eden raised question of four-power top level talks at Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting this afternoon, explaining Churchill's view that such talks might have beneficial effect without prejudicing regular work of Foreign Ministers.

Secretary stated he had already given his views to Churchill [2] and reiterated them for benefit Bidault. He stressed that (1) because of President's position as head of government and head of state there are great difficulties in his leaving the United States and American opinion has not generally approved departures from this rule in the past. (2) It is feeling of President and United States Government that top level talks should be confined to ratifying agreements carefully prepared at lower level otherwise they would result only in comforting, but illusory generalities which might well cause dangerous relaxation in western defense efforts. Secretary emphasized that it was particularly dangerous to consider such a meeting before western security was made firm through activation of EDC in which Germany participates on our terms.

Bidault indicated sympathy with our viewpoint, said he had no objection in principle to meeting. He explained that as idea has been widely talked about it gave opponents of EDC opportunity to maintain that EDC should not be ratified until such a meeting had been tried. Situation is thus embarrassing for Bidault in his efforts to obtain prompt ratification EDC.

Secretary explained that type of conference suggested by Churchill did not solve Bidault's problem because it was impossible for President to spend the time necessary to participate in a conference which would itself work out concrete settlements. Secretary also reminded meeting that both President and he were anxious to show desire to discuss problems with Soviets under conditions which give some prospect of specific and concrete success and mentioned as evidence of this desire President's April 16 speech [3] and Secretary's United Nations speech [4] as well as possibility that

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] See Dulte 1, Document 294.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 182.

[4] For text of Secretary Dulles' speech to the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 17, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 28, 1953, pp. 403–408.

President may reiterate this desire in speech before United Nations prior to adjournment GA.

Eden said he would convey views to Churchill and that it would probably be discussed at Churchill lunch tomorrow.

No. 308

396.1 LO/10-1853: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, October 18, 1953—5 p.m.

Secto 31. Eyes only Ambassador Lodge. Limit distribution. Subject: Trieste. Information available at tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting this morning indicated doubt that Yugoslavia and Italy would accept five power conference proposal. [2] Discussion therefore concerned primarily with possible alternative courses of action. In view of danger of hostilities if Italian military forces are now introduced into Zone A, and pending further clarification of Yugoslav and Italian plans and intentions, possible course of action would be to turn over civil administration in Zone A to Italians in near future while deferring action on introduction of Italian military forces.

Eden suggested and Secretary agreed to recommend to Department:

1. That State and Defense send representatives London to consider urgently with British JCS (to whom Winterton is directly responsible) possible arrangements for turning over civil administration of Zone A to Italy while maintaining US–UK troops there.
2. This group would work in liaison with tripartite group also in London to consider political aspects of problem. Bidault agreed to French participation on this group.
3. When subject comes up in UN on October 20 three powers will press for postponement of at least a week on grounds that conversations taking place.

Full report on discussion by separate telegram. [3]

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[1] Repeated to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

[2] See Secto 10 and Tosec 14, Documents 299 and 300.

[3] Secto 34, *infra*.

No. 309

396.1 LO/10-1953: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 19, 1953—11 a.m.

Secto 34. Limit distribution. Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, 11 a.m. October 18.

1. Recognition of Communist China:

Eden stated Selwyn Lloyd had requested guidance on recognition of Communist China and was instructed to take position that question is regulated by UN decision which postponed further consideration until end of this year. Eden added that he hoped there would be opportunity for three governments to discuss matter before that time.

2. Trieste:

Secretary stated we understood that three power representatives in Belgrade were pressing for decision on five power conference proposal. Agreed that Eden would send immediate telegram to Belgrade and Rome in name of three Foreign Ministers instructing representatives to request prompt reaction but not press for definite reply. This done.

Dixon reported on call by Italian Ambassador this morning who stated Pella examining proposal and that Italian Foreign Office had asked for certain clarifications. Emphasizing he was speaking purely personally, Dixon gave following replies:

(1) Is agenda intended to be limited to those subjects mentioned paragraph two or could Italian representative introduce other subjects? (It was not clear whether Italians wished to expand or restrict agenda.)

Reply: Wording second paragraph not intended definitely exclude other subjects, but this should not be regarded as encouraging Italians to raise other questions.

(2) Was it anticipated that Yugoslavs would participate at conference in discussion of arrangements for transfer of control?

Reply: Details of arrangements would be for discussion between three powers and Italians only.

(3) Did last sentence paragraph one imply that timing of turnover was to be left open?

Reply: Sentence intended to carry a double meaning that timing fluid and at same time decision upheld.

Dixon said conversation rather complicated and Brosio connected questions 2 and 3 by asking if Yugoslavs could influence timing of turn-over by insisting on prior agreement on proposals re minorities, port facilities, et cetera. Finally, Brosio reminded Dixon that Pella had publicly said Italy would only attend conference after Italians had taken over Zone A and also noted that our proposal included no statement condemning Tito's resort to threats of force.

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[1] Repeated to Paris and to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

Eden reported receipt of message from Belgrade stating first reaction unfavorable but definite reply expected later. Yugoslavs requested that communiqué should in no way allude to possibility of a conference and Mallet had reassured them on this.

Eden raised question of what should be done if Yugoslav and Italian reactions unfavorable. On military side, first steps toward evacuation already publicly taken and although Winterton's detailed plan not available here, it is understood that decision to withdraw could be reversed without operational embarassment at any time prior to D-Day minus three weeks, i.e. November 9. If decision reversed after November 9, it would mean shipping supplies back into Zone A.

Eden said we had three courses: (1) Go ahead with decision, which is what Italians want but carries grave risk of bloodshed; (2) Reverse decision, which is what Tito wants but would have disastrous effect in Italy; (3) Try some other plan, which raises possibility Security Council action.

Secretary suggested exploring possibility of turning over administration to Italians but retaining out troops and not introducing Italian troops. He realized reluctance of military to face situation of divided responsibility but felt this course might prove to be least undesirable from over-all point of view. Bidault stated that if there was no detente there was great chance withdrawal would result in bloodshed and major incident and that he therefore approved Secretary's idea. Eden said idea worth study but would put our garrisons in almost impossible position as Italians might act irresponsibly, provoking incidents with Slovenes, et cetera.

Some discussion local Zone A police force followed, it being pointed out that this force would probably not be reliable from Italian point of view as it is understood to be in favor of independence of Trieste or at least in reluctant to come under Italian authority.

Speaking from long-term point of view, Secretary said that all three governments are allied with Italians through NATO and, prospectively, EDC. We had hoped to reconcile this relationship with our beneficial relationship with Yugoslavia and its ties with Greece and Turkey. However, if Tito elects to attempt obtain immediate success by preventing implementation our Trieste decision, this matter will change US ideas of Tito's reliability as an ally, thus resulting in change in our relationship with Yugoslavia.

which would in turn have an effect on our military aid program, strategic discussions, et cetera.

Secretary said we had thought of delaying shipment of some military equipment to Yugoslavia but decided this could not be done without giving appearance of coercion; however, US would find it very difficult to go giving arms to Tito which he threatens to use to invade Zone A. Bidault and Eden agreed these factors demonstrate urgency of problem.

Eden proposed following procedure: British-American working party would be set up composed on American side of State and Defense representatives to work with British JC's (to whom Winterton directly responsible). This group would attempt to work out feasible arrangements for turn-over administration Zone A to Italy, which at same time maintaining US-UK troops in Zone A. This group would work in liaison with another group of representatives of three Foreign Ministers which would consider political side of problem. Meanwhile we would await definite reactions from Rome and Belgrade on five power conference.

Bidault agreed. Secretary said he would be glad to recommend this proposal to Washington and attempt to get State and Defense representatives to London promptly. Some discussion of handling problem in UN followed and it was agreed that three governments would, when subject comes up October 20, propose at least one week adjournment on grounds that conversations proceeding. Bidault mentioned that Hoppenot was disturbed that Lodge was apparently planning engage in rather extensive discussion this subject. Bidault thought the less debate the better. There was some discussion of whether, if turn-over, of administration to Italians with continued maintenance US-UK troops proved feasible, we should make prompt announcement of our intention. Eden inclined in favor and Bidault against. It was agreed this is type of question which should be examined by working groups.

3. Communiqué:

Remainder of discussion devoted to communiqué. Agreement reached on text subject to further discussion at Churchill luncheon.[2]

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[2] For final text of the communique, issued by the Foreign Ministers on Oct. 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 26, 1953, p. 546.

No. 310

396.1 LO/10-1953: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 19, 1953—2 p.m.

1674. Eyes only for President and Secretary. Secretary and I lunched yesterday with Churchill, Eden, Salisbury, Bidault and Massigli. As was case at dinner on October 15 (see Dulte 1, October 16 [1]), conversation confined entirely to question four-power top-level talks with Russia, but this time discussion revolved around second paragraph of text of proposed communiqué to be issued to press by Foreign Minister yesterday afternoon. This paragraph as drafted referred to the fact that the three governments in their new notes had renewed their invitation to the Soviet Union to attend an early meeting of the Foreign Ministers and continued: "They believe that such a meeting *is the most practical step* toward a reduction of international tension and a solution of major European problems. They exchanged views on the question of high level talks." Everyone present had, of course, heard the Secretary's views regarding question of four-power high-level talks as stated by him to Churchill at dinner October 15 and reiterated fully for benefit Bidault at tripartite Foreign Minister meeting afternoon October 17 (see Secto 25, October 17 [2]). Bidault stated that if last sentence above quoted remained in communiqué it would give opportunity to opponents in French Parliament of ratification of EDC to state that they wished to postpone action until four-power top-level talks had been held and that inasmuch as he only expects a majority of 21 in Parliament for ratification, this might prove fatal. Churchill replied that he was not impressed by this argument and commented facetiously that he had majority of only 18 in his own Parliament and he stated he wished to have sentence remain in. Bidault then shifted his ground and said he believed that communiqué as drafted placed the three Ministers in an extremely weak position because while they were issuing an invitation to Russians to attend a meeting at Foreign Ministers level in the same paragraph of the communiqué they were stating that they had exchanged views on an entirely different type of meeting. He said that this left the door wide open for the Russians to suggest a meeting at the top level which could not be a satisfactory result.

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[1] Document 294.

[2] Document 307.

Comment: It had already been pointed out by the Secretary at tripartite meeting of October 17 that conference at top level would not solve Bidault's problem because it would be impossible for President to spend time necessary to participate in conference which would itself work out concrete settlement. End comment.

It was apparent when Bidault had finished argument in favor of elimination of last sentence quoted above, everyone present except Churchill was convinced of correctness of his position. Eden then sent for text of statement and when it arrived, Eden said it is obvious that sentence should either be eliminated or moved to some other part of the text. Churchill then accepted elimination of reference to high level talks but took the position that preceeding sentence should be altered to read as follows: "They believe that such a meeting *might be an invaluable step* towards a reduction of international tension, et cetera." He said that he was not in agreement that a Ministers' meeting was the most practical step for reduction of international tension because he thought that a meeting at the top level would be more desirable. There was considerable discussion as to whether the word "might" in Churchill's suggestion should be changed to "could" or "would" and finally the word "would" was adopted after Eden had indicated considerable annoyance at the reflection by Churchill upon usefulness of Foreign Ministers meeting.

Churchill's physical condition was much less good than at dinner on 15. Toward end of luncheon he had some difficulty in concentrating and his remarks to Bidault on attitude of French toward EDC and his own preference for national armies in NATO and the fact that he would put British troops in line with American and French again if Germany should become aggressor tended to take on character of set speech and were not closely integrated with subject under discussion. He did not give in on wording of characterization of the proposed four Foreign Ministers' meeting as it appeared in the final communiqué until after Salisbury had intervened in the discussion to say that the word "would" seemed to him to be satisfactory.

I have given so much detail regarding what took place because I believe that Eden and Salisbury were able to convince Churchill to alter his position only because of firm attitude taken by Secretary at dinner October 15 and at Foreign Minister meeting on October 17 plus able argument advanced by Bidault at luncheon October 18. Whether Churchill will stay put is, of course, another matter. I am afraid he may be still turning over in back of his mind the possibility that he might embark on "a lonely pilgrimage" to Moscow.

ALDRICH

No. 311

Eisenhower library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 167th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, October 22, 1953 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 167th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; Judge Barnes for the Attorney General (Item 4); the Acting Secretary of Commerce (Item 4); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (Item 1); the Director, U.S. Information Agency (Items 1, 2 and 3); William A. Porter, Office of Defense Mobilization (Item 1); Ralph L. Clark, Central Intelligence Agency (Items 1 and 6); Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration (Items 6, 7, 8 and 9); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of items 1-4, electromagnetic communications, implementation of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee, the United States Information Agency, and the source of United States aluminum supply in wartime.]

5. Report by the Secretary of State

Secretary Dulles briefed the Council on his meetings in London over last week-end. The atmosphere had been very cordial and the results satisfactory in most respects. Indeed, the only real disagreement had actually emerged outside of the official meetings with Foreign Secretary Eden and Bidault. This involved the question of the top-level conference with the Russians. Prime Minister Churchill, in his conversation with Secretary Dulles, had indicated his anxiety to press forward with the proposal for a meeting of the heads of state of the United States, Britain, France and Russia. Secretary Dulles explained our reasons for opposing such a meeting at this time, and Sir Winston had subsequently agreed not to press the matter. Basically, continued Secretary Dulles, Sir Winston's proposal for a conference at the highest level was simply a sleeping pill. Peoples of many of the Western democracies were desperately anxious for such a sleeping pill, and believed that Churchill could give it to them. But if such a meeting were held, with no agenda and no clear positions, its only result would be a dangerous sedative. Such a meeting would have a potentially disastrous effect on both NATO and the EDC, and would enable the Russians to push ahead while the Western democracies dozed. When we all woke up, we would find ourselves in a grave situation, with which President Eisenhower would be left to deal.

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[1] Drafted on Oct. 23.

Secretary Dulles indicated that Bidault also had opposed a high-level meeting, at least at this time. His position had been that all the talk about holding such a meeting had the effect of compounding the difficulties which he faced in effecting the ratification of EDC. It would be best if no such meeting were to be held, but in any case, we should stop all the talk about it and reach a decision promptly one way or the other. Secretary Dulles stated that he had been somewhat apprehensive as to what Prime Minister Churchill would say on this subject when he spoke about it in Parliament after his conversation with Secretary Dulles. Happily, however, Sir Winston had abided loyally by his agreement with the Secretary of State.

The best result of the meeting had been progress with regard to the proposed meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers at Lugano. Secretary Dulles said that he and Chancellor Adenauer were both opposed to including any statement in the note to Russia[2] mentioning a non-aggression treaty. Accordingly, this statement was removed, and it was decided that the note would concentrate on calling for the unification of Germany. Incidentally, continued Secretary Dulles, Mr. Eden apparently did not agree wholly with Sir Winston with regard to the top-level meeting, and preferred to concentrate at the outset on securing the ratification of EDC. Once this had been achieved, Mr. Eden thought that a high-level meeting would be much less dangerous.

Secretary Dulles said that the meeting had also given consideration to the Trieste problem. The repercussions of the Anglo-American action on Trieste had been much more violent than had been anticipated. Secretary Dulles said that we had relied fundamentally on Mr. Eden's judgment as to Tito's reaction to this decision, which had been the subject of discussion when Tito had visited London and when Eden had returned this visit by going to Belgrade.[3] Mr. Eden's judgment, said Secretary Dulles, had proved something less than perfect. In any case, continued Secretary Dulles, we had decided on convening a meeting of the five interested parties in an effort to put through the turnover of Zone A to Italian administration without provoking hostilities. Eden had already met with the Yugoslavs and Italians to broach this proposal, and their reactions had been "not altogether" unfavorable.

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[2] Document 279.

Also during the course of the London meetings, continued Secretary Dulles, had come the bad news of the savage Israeli attack on the Arab village in Jordan. As a result, it had been determined to ask the UN Security Council to take cognizance of the matter, since it seemed sufficiently grave to risk the collapse of the existing armistice between the Israelis and the Arabs. Secretary Dulles emphasized, however, that the decision of the United States not to allocate mutual security funds earmarked for Israel had not been related to this specific incident, but had been the result of Israeli defiance of the UN with regard to the irrigation project.

Secretary Dulles said that he and his British and French colleagues had also given careful consideration to the problem of the political conference on Korea. Secretary Dulles had stressed most emphatically the necessity for unanimity by the three powers on this problem, and specifically to avoid raising again the question of Indian or other neutral participation in such a conference. The Communists would be sure to exploit this issue in order to widen the rifts among the Western allies, and to give in to them on it would certainly not enhance the prospects of holding the conference. The need was to close ranks, Secretary Dulles had said, and if the three powers did so he predicted that there was a pretty good chance that the political conference would actually be held.

Bidault had reported on the military and political situation in Indochina. In the course of the Saturday meeting had come the news of the resolution adopted by the National Congress of the Vietnamese, denouncing the French Union. Initially, Bidault had been completely dismayed by the report. The situation, however, by Sunday morning seemed to him less serious, since by then the tone of the resolution had been much modified. Nevertheless, the upshot of all this had not been very hopeful. Premier Laniel had failed to forestall debate in the French Parliament on the Indochina war. It was quite possible, said Secretary Dulles, that this debate could end in the overthrow of the Laniel government and the consequent ruin of our ambitious plan to bring the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion.

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[3] Eden visited Belgrade in September 1952 and Tito visited London in March 1953

With specific regard to the military situation in Indochina, Bidault had expressed to Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden his great anxiety about reports that jet planes would soon be made available to the Vietminh from Communist China. Secretary Dulles said that United States intelligence does not support French apprehensions in this regard. Our intelligence reported no airfields in Indochina capable of handling jet planes. If these planes were flown into Indochina from Chinese airfields, it would constitute direct and overt Chinese Communist intervention in the hostilities.

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Finally, said Secretary Dulles, he had lunched at the American Embassy with fifteen principal British editors and had talked with them about U.S. policy in various parts of the world.[4] It was clear, said Secretary Dulles, that our real position has been seriously misrepresented in England, and he believed that his talk with the editors had helped to put things aright.

The President's only comment on Secretary Dulles' briefing was to ask how the Secretary accounted for the violent outburst of anti-American feeling in Jordan despite the fact that we had announced the suspension of further aid to Israel. Various members of the Council undertook to explain this outburst, and it was pointed out that news of the suspension of aid had not reached Jordan in time to affect reaction to the Israeli outrage. In any case, the President commented, the cutting off of aid to Israel struck him as a very logical step in the circumstances.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on the recent meetings which he attended in London, with particular reference to a possible high-level meeting of the Four Powers; the proposed meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Lugano; the Trieste situation; the tension between Israel and Jordan; prospects for the political conference in Korea; the military and political situation in Indochina and its impact on the domestic political situation in France; . . . .

[Here follows discussion of items 6–9, significant developments affecting United States security, the security of strategically important industrial operations in foreign countries, the Government Employee Security Program, and the implications of Soviet nuclear weapons tests in 1953.]

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[4] No record of this luncheon has been found in Department of State files.

3. Meetings of the Tripartite Working Group at Paris, October 21-November 2 and December 16-21, 1953

No. 312

Editorial Note

The Tripartite Working Group on preparations for possible talks with the Soviet-Union at Lugano met at the French Foreign Ministry October 21-November 2, 1953. The British and French Delegations were led respectively by Sir Frank Roberts and François Seydoux de Clausonne, who also chaired the sessions. The United States Delegation was led by Douglas MacArthur II, and included Theodore Achilles, Coburn Kidd, Ridgway Knight, Jacques Reinstein, Rebecca Wellington, and Charles Yost.

For the purpose of communication with the United States Delegation the Department of State designated two special series telegram indicators, Macto and Tomac. The former designated traffic from the delegation, while the latter designated traffic to the delegation. Both series of these cables are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 166; Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 166; and file 396.1 PA.

At its first plenary meeting the Tripartite Working Group established five subcommittees: (1) Political, including all-German elections and the status of an all-German Government, (2) Economic, (3) Security Guarantees, (4) Austria, and (5) Industrial Controls. The subcommittees began work immediately and continued to meet as frequently as their work demanded, while the plenary met less frequently and then usually to discuss questions arising out of the consideration of security guarantees. In the course of their meetings the subcommittees generally arrived at agreed tripartite positions on the questions to which each devoted its attention. Only the Security Guarantees Subcommittee was unable to adopt an agreed position paper, and its difficulties, which were referred to the plenary for resolution, remained unresolved when the working group completed its meetings on November 2. Copies of the agreed papers and the bracketed report on security guarantees, none of which are printed here, are in CFM files, lot M 88, boxes 165 and 166.

Following receipt of the Soviet note of November 26 (Document 284), the Tripartite Working Group again met in Paris, December 16-21, to continue and complete its work on the preparation of agreed tripartite positions for presentation to the Soviet Union at the four-power conference to be held in Berlin.

The documentation that follows presents materials only on the discussion of a draft security declaration, which occupied most of the time of the Tripartite Working Group, and the position of the

United States with regard to a five-power conference. The working group also discussed Austria, all-German elections and the status of an all-German Government, economic problems, and the tactics to be followed by the three powers in preparing for a four-power conference.

Copies of the telegrams to and from the United States Delegation and the final report of the second session of the Tripartite Working Group (PREP D–5), dated December 23, are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 166 and in file 396.1 BE.

No. 313

396.1/12-953

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 9, 1953.

In connection with our desire to complete preparations for proposed 4-Power conference in Berlin, it occurs to me that we might, even before our experts meet in Paris on December 16, [2] seek further to explore security declaration question.

In discussing this problem at our final meeting in Bermuda on December 7, [3] I indicated that, despite my doubts about UK-French draft declaration [4] and particularly its acceptability to Adenauer, I was perfectly willing to present this draft to him provided we made it clear that he was under no pressure to accept this specific formulation. If Adenauer should prove willing to accept it, I would be prepared to do likewise, so that we could firm up our position on this matter to which you attach such importance. If on other hand Adenauer should not accept this language or this type of formulation, we would then develop US draft together with any comments or suggestions Adenauer might give us as tripartite position.

If you are agreeable to this procedure, I would suggest we instruct our HICOMers to put this matter to Chancellor on urgent basis, explaining our general conclusions re preferability of unilateral security declaration (as against bilateral or multilateral pact) and giving him present UK-French draft, not as such, but as possible draft we three have worked out together and on which we would appreciate his frank views. We would like to have Adenauer's views by December 14.

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[1] Transmitted to London in telegram 3046; the same message was transmitted to Paris for delivery to Bidault and repeated to HICOG Bonn.

[2] The Tripartite Working Group was scheduled to resume its work on Dec. 16 at Paris.

[3] For a record of the final meeting at the Bermuda Conference, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1834.

[4] *Infra.*

Such procedure, including Adenauer's reaction and comments, should help us expedite solution of this problem when our experts meet in Paris December 16.[5]

DULLES

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[5] On Dec. 10 the British agreed to this procedure. The following day, the Embassy in Paris cabled that Bidault also concurred and since Adenauer was in Paris the draft security declaration would be shown to him on that day. (Telegram 1743 to London, Dec. 10, 396.1/12-1053, and telegram 2245 from Paris, Dec. 11, 396.1 BE/12-1153) The Chancellor's preliminary reaction to the draft was described as "not unfavorable" by the Embassy in Paris and while the commitments on Germany would produce stress, Adenauer commented that that "did not worry him". (Telegram 2270 from Paris, Dec. 12, 396.1 BE/12-1253)

No. 314

740.5/12-1953

United Kingdom-French Draft Security Declaration [1]

SECRET [PARIS, November 2, 1953?]

A. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace, in accordance with the general principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular with the purposes defined in Article 2 of the Charter:

determined to safeguard the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is clearly expressed in the Treaty establishing this Organization;

considering that the European Defense Community by its very structure constitutes a strictly defensive organization;

formally take note that the German Federal Republic has undertaken to accept the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular of Article 2 thereof;

record the declaration by the terms of which the Government of the Federal German Republic;

recalling that the provisions of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community, relating to the integration of forces and pooling of resources and armaments of the member states on the European continent make any individual armed action on the part of these States impossible;

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[1] The source text was attached, together with three other drafts of the security declaration, to a memorandum from Elbrick to Secretary Dulles dated Dec. 15, which was prepared for a meeting with Ambassador Bonnet that day. The draft is the version which emerged from the first session of the Tripartite Working Group (see Document 315) and is the draft shown to Adenauer on Dec. 11 at Paris. For a record of Dulles' discussion with Bonnet on Dec. 15 see Document [illegible].

undertakes to refrain from any action likely to revise or impair either these provisions or the strictly defensive character of the European Defense Community of which the forces cannot be employed except for the protection of the territory of member States against an armed attack in Europe;

undertakes in consequence in no case to have recourse to force, but to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.

B. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France declare that they will withhold all forms of support from any Government committing any action in violation of the above-mentioned undertakings and to regard themselves, wherever they consider it necessary to this end, as automatically released from their commitments to that Government. They accept a similar obligation in case the Government of unified Germany should have recourse to force to modify the frontiers settled by the Treaty of Peace.

C. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France will use their best efforts to obtain the association of the other member States of the NATO with the declaration and the obligation set out in the preceding paragraph.

No. 315

396.1 PA/12-1553: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Tripartite Working Group, at Paris [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 15, 1953—7:37 p.m.

Tomac 3. Department suggests you make following presentation our position in regard anticipated Soviet demand for inclusion of Chinese Communists in so-called "Five Power" conference. This represents expansion and amendment preliminary memorandum from McConaughy to Thurston of December 11: [2]

Our rejection anticipated Soviet proposal for "Five Power" Conference including Communist China should be based in first instance on its lack of logic in European context. Any initial meeting of Chiefs of State or Foreign Ministers of US, UK, France and Soviet Union should be primarily concerned with settlement German and Austrian problems. There is no reason have any Far Eastern country represented such a meeting. Although US maintains cordial relations with National Government of Republic of

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[1] Drafted by McConaughy of FE and cleared with NA, PSA, EUR, UNP, and G.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

China, it would not occur to this Government to suggest that that Government, the Government of Japan, or any other Far Eastern Government be included in a European conference of the nature contemplated.

If it should prove necessary discuss question representation of Chinese Communist regime at separate conference on Asian matters proposed for later date, or as latter stage of Berlin Conference after German and Austrian questions have been dealt with, our objection to such representation should be stated in following terms: US Government considers Chinese Communist regime to be convicted aggressor. It has never been either representative of bona fide national interest and will Chinese people, or responsive its international obligations. By its deliberate and flagrant maltreatment foreign nationals and interests within its borders it has placed itself outside bounds of responsible international community and confirmed its outlaw status.

Chinese Communist aggression in Korea has not been terminated, nor has regime ceased its extensive support of Viet Minh insurrection against established and duly recognized Government Vietnam. At preliminary negotiations Panmunjom Chinese Communists have not even been willing make possible projected Political Conference on Korea to bring about end Communist aggression against Korea and peaceful unification that war-torn land. It is useless talk about another Asian conference with Communist participation when Chinese Communists with Soviet support make use every conceivable device prevent holding of Political Conference on Korea on rational basis.

Note: Foregoing is statement our position in terms considered suitable for presentation to Soviet Government or for publication. It is predicated on assumption that French and British will adopt an equally firm position, although reasoning of the British will be somewhat different since they recognize Chinese Communist regime. It is essential that three Western powers present united front this issue. If British or French should indicate disposition temporize on question, you should seek further instructions.

SMITH

No. 316

[illegible] PA/12-1653 Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Working Group to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, December 16, 1953—noon.

Macto 3. In preparation for discussion with British and French concerning security guarantee declaration, we discussed UK-

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

French version [2] of draft with Secretary this morning, [3] taking into account Adenauer's preliminary views and Phleger's opinions as reported Deptel 2180. [4] Pending receipt Adenauer's full reaction, we believe that following revisions are in order:

1. Sixth paragraph under A should be amended to exclude all language following phrase "European Defense Community". This would meet Adenauer's point regarding link between NATO and EDC.

2. Seventh paragraph under A in present form would apparently preclude German recourse to force under any conceivable circumstances, which is obviously too far-reaching a restriction to place on Germany and we would therefore wish to revise this section as follows: "Undertakes in consequence in no case to have recourse to force in violation of the foregoing obligations", etc.

3. Secretary is also disturbed concerning far-reaching implications of Section B in present form which apparently envisages withholding of support from fellow members UN, NATO and EDC under circumstances stipulated. Furthermore, phrase "all forms of support" might be interpreted to include any kind of economic or trade connection. Concept of automatic release from commitments raises obvious constitutional questions. We propose revision Section B to make it a more simple obligation of three governments to consult with respect to withholding support as follows: "Governments of the US, UK, and France declare that whenever they consider it necessary to this end they will consult together with respect to withholding support from any government committing any action in violation of the above mentioned undertakings".

Would appreciate Department's views soonest. [5]

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[2] Document 314.

[3] Secretary Dulles was in Paris for the Twelfth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 14–16.

[4] Telegram 2180 reported that Phleger, the Legal Adviser in the Department of State, had questioned the wisdom of the participation of the United States in a declaration such as that presented in the United Kingdom-French draft. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Tomacs and Mactos")

[5] In Tomac 6, Dec. 16, the Department of State concurred with these changes. (396.1 PA/12-1653)

No. 317

CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Tomacs and Mactos" Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Working Group to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, December 16, 1953—8 p.m.

Macto 8. 1. First plenary session of tripartite WG re Berlin conference held this afternoon, Seydoux presiding. Agreed most expeditious way of handling work was to assign each delegation preparation of paper to be used as basis tripartite discussion of various subjects in plenaries. Thus US will do paper on elections and status of German Government after German views obtained. French will prepare overall security paper and British tactics paper which will cover additional points including organization Berlin conference and handling Soviet demands for five-power conference. French will also prepare brief paper on contact with Adenauer during Berlin conference. In order that other delegations might have benefit of US views in preparation of papers, MacArthur tabled US WG suggestion re (1) position to be taken on five-power conference; (2) organization of conference; (3) broadening Allied position on European security question to include initiative re Soviet power structure in EE; (4) revision old tripartite tactics paper. (These four papers based on Department papers and discussion here with Secretary.) [2]

2. Re Austria, special WG designated (Yost US representative) and held first meeting this afternoon in hopes completing work in next couple days. [3]

3. Heads of Delegations accompanied by one or two advisers each, will meet with Grewe tomorrow morning (French have now yielded to British-US request have him here for consultation).

4. Plenary tomorrow afternoon will consider tactics paper to be prepared by British and have preliminary discussion on security question in light British redraft of security declaration (see separate telegram [4]).

5. It was agreed that if time permits, WG will take another look at: (1) UK papers on draft heads of German peace treaty and proce-

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[1] Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and London.

[2] Copies of the papers under reference have not been found in Department of State files.

[3] The U.S. Delegation reported the discussion of the Austrian working party in Macto 7, Dec. 17, indicating that general agreement had been reached on several questions with respect to Austria. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Tomacs and Mactos")

[4] Macto 16, *infra*.

dure for negotiating treaty; and (2) declaration of intent. In so agreeing, MacArthur pointed out US doubts present inter-allied difference could be reconciled by Paris group. French suggested advisability of reviewing economic papers to see if any changes or additions needed. MacArthur said US had no economic expert present but that if French or British wished raise any particular points he would cable them to Department. (British have not thus far pushed proposal to discuss German assets as side issue).

No. 318

396.1 PA/12-1753: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Working Group to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, December 17, 1953—7 p.m.

Macto 16. UK delegation has presented following draft security declaration for tripartite consideration:

"The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,

Being resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and in particular with the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the charter,

> (i) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
>
> (ii) To refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
>
> (iii) To give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action;
>
> (iv) To ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security;

Being determined to preserve the purely defensive character of the Atlantic alliance which is manifest in the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein they reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and undertake to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles, of the charter and to refrain, in accordance with those principles; from the threat or use of force in their international relations;

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

Considering also that the very structure of the European Defense Community provides assurances that its forces cannot be used for purposes of aggression, and that the provisions of the treaty establishing the community, which relate to the integration of forces and the pooling of resources and armaments of the member states on the European continent, preclude any individual armed action on the part of these states;

Take note that the Federal Republic of Germany, under Article 3 (i) of the convention on relations between the three powers and the Federal Republic signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, [2] agreed to conduct her policy in accordance with the principles set forth in the charter of the United Nations and by a declaration dated ——— has undertaken in no case to have recourse to force contrary to those principles, but to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between her and other states;

Declare that:

> (1) In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations charter;
>
> (2) They will regard any recourse to force in violation of the undertaking noted above as a threat to the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, and consequently to their own security and to the defensive character of the North Atlantic alliance. They will therefore act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and will in any event withhold all support from the government concerned and, to the extent that they consider necessary to this end, will regard themselves as automatically released from their commitments to it.
>
> (3) They will act similarly in case a unified Germany should have recourse to force to modify the frontiers settled by the treaty of peace.
>
> (4) They will use their best efforts to obtain the association of the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty organization with this declaration."

In our view UK draft with exceptions noted below represents improvement over previous drafts. While maintaining principal features of UK-French version [3] UK draft spells out UN charter, NATO and EDC obligations more fully and is thus nearer concept of original US draft. At same time, in numbered paragraph 2, it borrows useful language without attribution from already existing tripartite obligation embodied within the tripartite declaration of May 1952 made in connection with signing of EDC.[4]

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[2] Document 51.

[3] Document 314.

Numbered paragraph 2, however, as now drafted contains unacceptable language regarding the question of withholding support and unnecessary and ambiguous phrase re the defensive character of NATO. Also by apparently referring only to German undertaking it fails to carry reciprocal flavor which we believe desirable.

To meet foregoing objections we have put up for tripartite consideration following amended numbered paragraph 2 which we stated had not yet been approved by Department.[5]

> "(2) They will regard any recourse to force in violation of the undertakings noted above as a threat to the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, and consequently to their own security. They will therefore act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with respect to withholding support from the government concerned; and, to the extent that they consider necessary to this end, will regard themselves as automatically released from their commitments to it."

Department's views urgently requested for use in tomorrow's meetings.

Pass advance copy Elbrick.

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[4] For text of the Tripartite Declaration, made at Paris May 27, 1952, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, p. 897, or *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 169–170.

[5] The U.S. Delegation reported that it had offered the draft of paragraph 2 during an afternoon meeting on Dec. 17. The British appeared inclined to accept the amendment, but the French said they would have to study it further. (Macto 17 from Paris, Dec. 17, 396.1 PA/12–1753)

No. 319

740.5/12–1953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)

SECRET WASHINGTON, December 19, 1953.

Subject: Tripartite Security Declaration

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Bonnet of France
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

Ambassador Bonnet said he had been instructed to see the Secretary to present the French Government's view on the tripartite security declaration now being negotiated in Paris. He said his government was concerned over the lack of agreement on the operative part of this declaration as reflected in the differences between the latest French and US drafts. (The UK representative in Paris has stated that while he likes the US formulation of the problem, the UK could "live with" the new language suggested by the French.) The French draft, in translation, reads as follows: "They will regard any recourse to force in violation of the undertakings noted above as a threat to their own security. Any government having recourse to force in violation of its undertakings under the EDC treaty will be immediately deprived by the three governments of any form of military support and aid; and they will regard themselves, to the extent that they consider necessary to this end, as released from their commitments to that government. Finally, they will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking any other measures which they may deem appropriate." [1]

The US draft reads: "They will regard any recourse to force in violation of the undertakings noted above as a threat to the integrity and unity of the EDC, and consequently to their own security. They will therefore act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with respect to withholding support from the government concerned; and, to the extent that they consider necessary to this end, will regard themselves as (automatically) released from their commitments to it." [2]

Ambassador Bonnet said that the French Government feels that our draft is too weak and does not offer assurances it feels are required in order to demonstrate the peaceful intentions of the western powers. He said that Chancellor Adenauer had already agreed with the substance of the French proposal and he felt that Adenauer would not look with favor upon any change such as that suggested by the US. Moreover, the US version would offer ammunition to the opponents of the EDC in France.

The Secretary pointed out the constitutional difficulties which confront the US in this matter and indicated that a declaration along the lines of the French version might be regarded as a modification or extension of our treaty obligations. The Secretary was then obliged to leave for the White House. After some further discussion, Mr. Merchant informed the Ambassador that yesterday we had instructed our delegation in Paris that we could not agree to accept the French text of the declaration and had suggested that this matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers.[3] Mr. Merchant believed that the Secretary would wish to study this matter and we would probably want to get in touch with the Ambassador again in the next few days.

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[1] This draft had been introduced by the French Delegation at the tripartite session on Dec. 18. During this meeting the British had stated that they could live with this draft although they liked the U.S. draft for paragraph 2 better. (Macto 24 from Paris, Dec. 18, 396.1 PA/12-1353)

[2] According to Macto 24 Elbrick and Thurston held a telephone conversation on Dec. 18 and agreed to minor changes in the U.S. draft. No record of this telephone conversation has been found in Department of State files.

In the discussion with the Ambassador, the following points were made in support of the US position:

1—Acceptance of the French version might extend our treaty commitments and thus require Senate approval.

2—It could be maintained, if the French version were accepted, that the three governments were prejudging the consultations envisaged in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty referred to in the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952.

3—The French version would appear to give to the USSR greater assurances than the NATO members have given each other in the North Atlantic Treaty.[4]

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[3] This was done in Tomac 15 to Paris, Dec. 18. (396.1 PA/12-1853)

[4] At the tripartite meeting on Dec. 19 the U.S. Delegation maintained its position as did the French. The parties remained in disagreement when the working group completed its meetings on Dec. 21. (Macto 29 from Paris, Dec. 19, 396.1 PA/12-1953) A copy of the paper on security in Europe with the unagreed draft paragraph 2 is in CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "Tripartite Meeting—Paris" and Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 178.

No. 320

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Paris Tripartite Conversations"

Memorandum by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie)[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 5, 1954.

Subject: Summary of Paris Tripartite Working Group Final Report, December 23, 1953.

Following is a more comprehensive summary of the tripartite positions reached in preparation for the Berlin four-power talks, to replace my memorandum of December 23.[2]

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[1] Attached to the source text was a copy of the Final Report of the Tripartite Working Group (PREP D-5), dated Dec. 23.

[2] Not found in Department of State files; presumably it transmitted a preliminary summary of the report.

1. Objectives and Tactics for Berlin

Main Western Objectives: reunification of Germany through free elections establishing all-German Assembly and Government; freely negotiated Peace Treaty; integration of united Germany (or at least, of GFR) in Western European community, itself part of Atlantic Community; in lieu of agreement, establish Western proposals as only means to German unity in freedom; show that our proposals assure security requirements of Europe and USSR and serve peaceful relations of USSR to West; ascertain Soviet intentions, and, if negative, show Soviets responsible for continued division of Germany and Europe; avoid impasse as result Soviet delaying tactics; keep open prospect of further negotiation with USSR; conclude an Austrian treaty, or show USSR alone responsible for failure.

Presumed Soviet Objectives: frustrate NATO policies and EDC; achieve US withdrawal from Europe; prevent integration of Germany, West or united, in Western European community, and serving Western defense purposes; isolate and ultimately dominate Germany; pending above, restore and strengthen Soviet power and prestige in East Zone; obstruct conclusion of Austrian treaty until German objectives are won.

Presumed Soviet Tactics: give priority to discussion of five-power conference; raise security issue; stress conclusion of German peace treaty as main conference task; possibly suggest disarmament talks; relegate Austria to diplomatic channels; seek conference breakdown on questions tending to throw responsibility on West for thwarting constructive achievements.

Suggested Four-Power Tactics: propose at least three of four meetings in US sector; resist revival of CFM, but not to breaking point; rotating chairmanship with US first; simple agenda (Ger unity, Austrian treaty, Security in Europe, other matters); prevent indefinite prolongation of meeting; avoid referring issues to Deputies except for Austrian treaty; broad presentation of issues, pointing up Soviet responsibility for past failures to agree, giving priority to free German elections and all-German Government; avoid breakdown on agenda; refuse discuss substance of peace treaty in absence Ger reps, but let Russians speak on this if they wish; refuse admit reps of East Zone; aim at agreement on free elections and all-German Government safeguarding Ger and Western interests, including right of all-German Government to assume obligations of GFR; on security, stick to idea of unilateral declaration and avoid discussion of broader security arrangements, making clear defensive nature of Western intentions and rejecting Soviet concept of exclusive European security arrangements; seek to defer discussion on specific guarantees re Germany until after territorial settlements; reject proposed restoration of quadripartite control over Germany; use of unilateral declaration will depend on whether all-German agreement is reached; consider participation Austrian Government reps in Austrian treaty talks, but be ready refer to Deputies; refuse admit link between Austria and German questions.

2. Soviet Proposal for Five-Power Talks

US–UK: illogical in Eur context; should hold Korean conference, and discuss other matters in UN framework; or use diplomatic channels.

French: illogical at Berlin, should be separate; CPR should first give evidence of good intent, as in engaging in Korean conference; other matters in framework of UN.

3. All-German Elections

Should receive major emphasis; Fon Mins should agree on principles, leaving details to subordinates (working group); details to be settled by four powers, not by GDR and GFR; should stress adequate supervision and guarantees of freedom, including free movement; electoral law *not* to be negotiated between GFR and GDR but promulgated by four powers, possibly based on existing GFR and GDR laws (WG to be set up for this purpose), but avoid breakdown on this issue; prefer GFR electoral law of Feb 6, 1952[3] as basis, but might consider law along lines Weimar law of 1924; detailed system of guarantees not needed, but must insist on freedom of political activity and movement, immunity of candidates, freedom from victimization, absolute secrecy of ballot, radio freedom; supervision by commissions covering whole area at regional and local levels, radiating from central body (there would be 40,000 voting places); presence of supervisory bodies should be apparent to population, especially in GDR; supervisory bodies should observe, supervise and report, but might have certain powers of decision and sanction as well; supervisory commissions should be organized on collegial basis, decide by majority, be composed of "neutrals," but might include mixed personnel (allied and German) if necessary for agreement.

3. [sic] All-German Government

Objectives: must avoid "Austrian" situation or arrangements precluding German integration in Europe; put onus for German partition on Soviets; prolong GFR until assured of attainment of our objectives with united Germany; Fed Govt has no rigid views on steps leading to unification but agrees with basic allied objectives.

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[3] See footnote 6, Document 80.

Proposals: Assembly may form provisional all-German "Authority" with limited powers, to assist in drafting constitution, prepare way for future all-German Ministries, and aid preliminary work toward Peace Treaty negotiations; such "Authority" might, if authorized, actually begin Peace Treaty negotiations; meanwhile, GFR and GDR continue with present powers; after constitution adopted and approved, all-German Government would then take over or begin Peace Treaty negotiations; decisions concerning transfer of powers from GFR and GDR to new all-German Government and phasing out of former to be made by National Assembly in absence disapproval by majority of four powers; all-German Government would be free in this connection to assume international rights and obligations of GFR and GDR (unless disapproved by majority four powers), pending final peace settlement; four powers, while keeping existing authority, should exercise no special control over National Assembly or provisional all-German "Authority"; after all-German Government is established, four powers would exercise no greater controls than those envisaged in the Bonn Conventions, up to time Peace Treaty goes into effect (their decisions would be by majority vote, but some question as to how this would operate).

4. German Peace Treaty

Refuse discuss in absence reps of all-Ger; may have to exchange views on peace treaty in general terms; but avoid being drawn into substantive discussion or letting conference deadlock on such issues as frontiers or neutralization; on frontiers, refuse enter into discussion at this stage; on neutralization, either refuse to discuss, or declare such a formula unacceptable.

5. Allied Position Toward Soviet Proposals (in notes [4])

Soviet proposals in essence call for creation of all-Ger Govt through agreed arrangement by GFR and GDR, with so-called "free elections," with unified Ger barred from any such arrangement as EDC or NATO, with forced withdrawal of occupation forces, with Oder-Neisse as frontier, permitted forces for defense, and certain concessions re reparations and occupation costs.

Allies would oppose GDR participation in arrangements for free elections and formation of govt from existing Ger reps; oppose barriers to Ger inclusion in integrated Europe; avoid unlimited Ger army as enabling Ger to play off East against West; refuse accept Oder-Neisse as final frontier.

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[4] For documentation on the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union leading to the Berlin Conference, see Documents 257 ff.

Re economic Proposals:

On reparations, US and UK note Soviet proposal that no further reparations be required after Jan 1, 1954, and indicate they will ask no further reparations and oppose inclusion reparations payments for other countries in peace settlement; *France* reserves rights to reparations for settlement in peace treaty, refusing to prejudice such rights at this time and would discuss reparations with Soviets, accounting for all "takes" and criticizing Soviet methods of exacting reparations in past.

On inter-govt. debts, Soviets attack bilateral agreements, as in London Debt Settlement; [5] West will defend as due compensation for previous claims and the more justified in view of West's contribution to German economic restoration.

On external occupation costs, Soviets may propose renunciation; West would then state willingness to waive claims for reimbursement in peace settlement.

On level of current occupation costs, West would refuse to be drawn into detailed discussion but justify costs as mutually agreed contribution to West Ger defense; unnecessary for four powers to agree on occ costs prior to formation of all-Ger govt.

6. Security in Europe

General Considerations: Soviet security demands would require dismantling of Western defense arrangements; West has suggested juridical guarantees, but must refuse to renounce present means of defense in area; West ready to consider additional unilateral declarations to supplement UN Charter provisions, stressing exclusively defensive character of Western arrangements; West *not* ready now to consider guarantee pacts (mutual assistance or non-aggression), as these appropriate rather to post-treaty stage (note that UK and France now have mutual assistance pacts with USSR).

Proposed Declaration: would be tripartite assertion of peaceful intentions, stating "purely defensive" character of NATO and EDC (latter precludes "any individual armed action in Europe" by a member state); notes that GFR under Bonn Convention has agreed to adhere to UN Charter principles in conduct of its policy; declares Western powers will observe Art. 2 of UN Charter in relations with GFR; [*US draft:* in event of violation of above pledges, would consider this an act against their own security and act in accordance with Article 4 of NAT with respect to withholding support from govt concerned and, to extent considered necessary, regard selves as released from commitments to it] [6] [*French draft:*

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[5] The Intergovernmental Agreement on German External Debts came into force on Sept. 16, 1953; for a description of its terms and the negotiations leading to its conclusion, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 479–481.

[6] These and following brackets are in the source text.

would regard any recourse to force in violation of above pledges as threat to own security, would withhold military aid from such govt, would regard selves, to extent considered necessary, as released from commitments to it, and would take any further appropriate measures under Article 4 of NAT] (*N.B.* UK would accept either draft, but prefer French); Western powers agree to act similarly re a united Ger, and to seek similar action by other NATO members; GFR would also issue declaration accepting obligations of Article 2 of NAT, stating EDC precluded any individual armed action by members, undertaking to refrain from action likely to impair defensive character of EDC, or from recourse to force in any case (Adenauer has approved such a declaration for GFR).

Tactics: Western proposals best adapted to conference failure and continued cold war; must be prepared for Soviet proposal of more concrete nature; general approach would be to develop argument that Soviet actions in Europe since 1945 have posed real threat to Europe's security by forcing division of Europe into hostile camps; therefore West has envisaged only adequate security system as one assimilating Ger in joint Eur arrangements precluding independent military action by Ger and limiting its armaments; West ready to consider post-treaty assurances for USSR and France that US and UK would withdraw support from Ger govt resorting to force to modify its frontiers; at Berlin, defer issue at first if possible, but be ready meet issue squarely if raised by Soviets by pinning on them responsibility for present division and insecurity of Europe, citing their tactics re armed Soviet Bloc; issuance of any declaration on security must be contingent on progress made in Ger unity negotiations (as to nature and timing).

Demilitarized zone and limitation of forces: West would not favor any arrangement for demilitarized zone (whether complete, partial, or limited to narrow zone) as creating dangerous military vacuum, difficulties of enforcement, scene of new "incidents"; partial withdrawal of Western forces, in event of demilitarized West Ger zone, would weaken NATO defenses; easier for Soviet troops to withdraw into subject "hinterland" (Poland) and quickly return, than for Allied forces to withdraw while retaining potential strength in Europe; narrow demilitarized belt would be least objectionable; tactically, avoid raising issue, but would find difficulty in opposing if Russians proposed it, which they might conceivably do; would not propose setting ceiling on Western and Soviet forces in Ger as means of relieving tension, because this would create difficulties of inspection and would weaken West more than it would USSR.

7. Consultation with Germans

No GFR "observer" to be at conference; Western delegations to maintain contacts outside conference with Prof Grewe as special envoy of Fed Govt; tripartite group would inform and consult Grewe; Fed Govt also to be consulted directly on questions of particular importance.

8. Austrian Question

Make clear West wants conclusion of treaty; refuse link treaty with Ger settlement; ask for early discussion of Austrian item, and if Soviets agree, propose Deputies seek agreement on basis "long draft" before end of conference; support Austrian request for participation in treaty negotiations, and at least insist Austria be allowed to state views before conference; point out we have withdrawn "short draft" treaty,[7] in event Soviets raise point; seek to reopen discussion of Article 35 with view to alleviation of its economic provisions (on basis request by Austrian govt), then proceed to other unagreed articles; refuse to discuss Trieste as irrelevant; refuse to discuss denazification and demilitarization as covered by previous Austrian and Allied actions; resist any Soviet proposal to neutralize Austria to detriment Austrian and Western security, noting that Austrian Govt has stated it would not join post-treaty military alliances, and preserving Austrian right of free association under principles of UN Charter; not let negotiation break down solely on refusal to accept Soviet version of unagreed articles, though seeking to get Western versions.

9. Consultation with Other Governments

With GFR, agreed that tripartite position papers to be shown, with certain omissions and deletions, to Fed Govt, especially those on elections and all-Ger Govt.

With Austria, agreed to inform Govt re own views on tactics, Austrian participation, Article 35 and other issues.

With Benelux, give govts full summary of tripartite report, and arrange consultations during conference through AHC and Benelux reps at Bonn.

With NATO Govts, make short statement to NAC not going into detail.

10. Other Papers

No further work was done on "Declaration of Intent," which is still in part unagreed, it being felt differences are still too great to be adjusted except at highest level; if Soviets set forth at Berlin a strongly appealing program for a German peace settlement, this may cause us embarrassment and require further efforts to get Western agreement on effective declaration.

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[7] For documentation on the U.S short draft Austrian Treaty, see Documents 882 ff.

The British also presented papers on "Heads of a German Peace Treaty" and "Procedure for Negotiating a German Peace Treaty."

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4. Final Arrangements for the Conference, January 1954: Further Tripartite Consultations; Meetings of the Berlin Commandants Concerning the Site of the Conference; Tripartite Consultations With Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany

No. 321

396.1 BE/1-554

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, January 5, 1954.

Now that Soviets have formally agreed to conference Berlin beginning January 25, I suggest we plan to meet in Paris on January 22 and 23, in order complete our plans and settle any remaining points relative Berlin Conference. I would leave here night of January 20 arriving Paris evening January 21. Thus we would have all Friday and Saturday Paris for our discussions.

Since we aim at having Conference concentrate on German and Austrian problems, especially former, I feel it very important we consult Adenauer briefly before Berlin. Rather than our visiting Bonn, it might be better ask him come Paris for meeting with us afternoon January 23. This could follow tripartite meeting that morning and previous day and still leave us all day Sunday to get to Berlin and settled there in preparation for Conference opening next day. With flying weather as uncertain as it is at this season, I believe we should leave ourselves this degree of latitude.

I would appreciate your reaction above suggestion and am greatly looking forward to seeing you and working with you at Conference.

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[1] Transmitted to London in telegram 3488, Dec. 5. An identical message was sent to Bidault in telegram 2400 to Paris the same day, and repeated to HICOG Bonn, HICOG Berlin, and Moscow.

No. 322

396.1 BE/1-554 Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 5, 1954—7:29 p.m.

2397. Please pass William Tyler. Since impact of Berlin conference on public opinion likely have critical importance for moving ahead on general European policy, Dept interested in taking steps ensure good play of positive features of Western position during conference and as much advance immunization as possible against Soviet points which may prove infectious. Re latter, it seems clear that French public opinion would be especially vulnerable to Soviet suggestion of settlement Indochina conflict by means Five-Power conference. Might also be vulnerable to Soviet play for alternative European security arrangements, probably based on some form of mutual assistance pacts.

In your judgment, is there anything that can be done at this time . . . to provide "anti-bodies" against this type of Soviet appeal? We do not wish anything of this nature labelled with an American source, and it would be equally unproductive to attempt discount entire conference. We have in mind possibility of completely realistic statements or newspaper articles on such things as Soviet use colonial nationalism issue (i.e., exploitation of "Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies," VI World Congress Comintern 1938, etc.) or mutual assistance and non-aggression pacts. Examples of Soviet violation of "security" treaties include Peace Treaties of 1920, Treaty of Paris Protocol of 1929 on Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Treaties of Non-Aggression and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes signed in 1926 and 1932, Conciliation Convention of 1932, Convention of 1933 for the Definition of Aggression, and the Pacts of Mutual Assistance signed in 1939. List of non-aggression pacts reads like obituary column: Poland (renewed 1938), Finland (1934), Lithuania (1934), Latvia (1934), Estonia (1934), Rumania (1933). Another point to make would be dangers of German neutralization for Western neighbors.

Please inform Department whether anything of this nature feasible through your contacts . . . .

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Kidd; cleared with Merchant, Elbrick, and MacArthur; and initialed for Secretary Dulles by MacArthur.

No. 323

396.1 BE/1-654: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BONN, January 6, 1954—7 p.m.

2151. We met with Ollenhauer, Mellies and Wehner January 5 in cordial atmosphere to discuss latest tripartite positions on free all-German elections and formation of all-German Government. Meeting opened with prefatory statement our part in which we informed SPD leaders substantially as follows: US Government (and we thought generally also our allies) was approaching Berlin conference with deep awareness of gravity and importance of doing utmost to reach agreement with Soviets on solution German problem. SPD might be assured allies would make every effort secure agreement on reunification and failing that to prove they not to blame for continued division.

At same time allies deeply aware their responsibility toward 40 million people West Germany, and they could not gamble on welfare and freedom these people in negotiations with opponent which during 8 years had repeatedly proved that its good faith and even solemn obligations could not be trusted, and whose intentions at this conference completely unknown. We considered it necessary therefore to proceed with utmost caution yet at same time to afford every opportunity for progress to be made if progress possible. We believed that tripartite proposals which had been worked out for free elections and formation of all-German Government contained minimum safeguards necessary yet sufficient flexibility to permit sure and rapid transition to fully sovereign all-German Government if future negotiations with Soviets could be successfully carried out.

We then went carefully through the election and status papers. [2] At the end, SPD leaders gave us impression they accepted allied approach to all-German elections as well considered. On other hand, all three were in agreement that Chancellor's suggestion of separate landtag and volkskammer elections for Soviet Zone was unacceptable as it would amount to voluntary and legal recognition of Pankow and thus of division of Germans themselves. Wehner stated that Germans had been duped once before, in connection with Saar, where French used "free" *Landtag* elections as indirect means of obtaining what they represent as popular endorsement of separation of Saar from Germany. SPD leaders agreed that occupation powers must agree on and promulgate all-German election law; SPD would categorically refuse deal with DDR on elections except to discuss purely technical issues of implementation but then only as agents of occupation powers following agreement in principle by occupation powers.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] For summaries of these papers, see items 2 and 3 of the memorandum by Fuller, Jan. 5, Document 320.

On issue powers constituent assembly, SPD leaders initially reiterated party's opposition to co-existence Bonn and Pankow following all-German elections. However, when it was made clear to them that proposal in assembly would have authority to take over powers of Federal Republic and DDR at own initiative, they withdrew their objections and reserved their position until party could study subject more fully.

In connection with our statement on Paris report on status of all-German Government, Ollenhauer inquired whether such government would be free accept or reject treaties and obligations entered into by Federal Republic or DDR. He was informed that it would be free to do so. Ollenhauer welcomed our assurance that Western powers would fully explore all possibilities German unity in freedom and would not adopt inflexible course. He then said West should realize as most Germans realized that coming conference could not be regarded as one of series of conferences on German unity to be repeated at will, but rather as only chance for long time to come of bringing about German unity. If conference failed, he said, new attempt for unity could not be made for years with any chance of success. He concluded by saying that SPD highly appreciative of opportunity discuss this question with US officials since "Federal Government far less cooperative in this respect." Ollenhauer, who dominated this discussion in distinction previous ones on four power conference where Wehner has taken lead, said that SPD wishes consult at least once again prior to conference.

In earlier conversation with same SPD leaders, they made following general remarks on subject four power conference.

Ollenhauer stated party leaders believed genuine if gradual change might be taking place in USSR and Kremlin might possibly be prepared make some concessions in order achieve new *modus vivendi* with West which would give Soviets period needed to stabilize internal conditions and consolidate new regime. In this connection, he mentioned that a Kiel shipbuilding firm had recently received multimillion dollar order for fishing vessels from Soviets, and this action appeared to be part of general pattern of relaxation of conditions with USSR. As consequence of this situation, Ollenhauer declared, West should go to conference with flexible program and attitude. On German question, he said, while military status of united Germany would be a central issue of conference and should in no account be avoided, it would be serious mistake for West to present EDC to Soviets in conference as sole security device for united Germany. There were many other possibilities such as UN membership for a united Germany which would guarantee security of both Germany and its neighbors. "German people would simply not understand it if conference should break up over Western insistence on EDC as sole possibility for defense of united Germany," he said. Wehner then commented that it would be victory for USSR if West, especially United States, could be made to appear as guilty as Soviets in maintaining division of Germany. Result would be general European disaffection with both sides, in itself a distinct advantage for Soviets.

Wehner was less optimistic than Ollenhauer on Berlin conference. He felt little progress would be made there because no major Soviet concessions on Germany could be expected until after top-level agreement on more important issues like atomic control and disarmament had been reached. In order, however, to prevent post-conference situation from being worse one than present and in order get something out of conference for Germans even if no agreement on unity possible, Wehner suggested that Foreign Ministers should, as soon as it becomes apparent that conference would fail on major issues, refrain from pushing developments to their logical end in attempt to place blame clearly on one side or other. Instead, West should propose that HICOMers, including Soviets, be Directed to work out program for lessening difficulties arising from division of Germany by series of practical steps which would not directly affect position of occupation powers. Program should include (1) unification of Berlin including freedom for city government to decide which laws (Federal Republic or DDR) should be applied in Berlin, and which offices of both governments be located there, and including revamped Kommandatura without veto rights and severely limited in its powers to interfere; (2) free access to Berlin from Federal Republic and DDR including "land corridor"; (3) steps toward creation of common currency for Federal Republic and DDR; (4) "normalization" of interzonal traffic and trade.

Wehner said that SPD had refrained from attempting make major public issue out of controversy over powers of all-German Government because subject was so highly theoretical and complicated it did not lend itself to public debate. With regard to all-German elections, he said, SPD continues to believe that free elections should be means of carrying out previously reached agreement of occupation powers on powers and status of all-German Government rather than main issue of conference. If four powers could agree on future international status of united Germany, [portion omitted in the source text]. While recent Chancellor-SPD-FDP controversy over powers of constituent assembly seems resolved, views expressed by Ollenhauer and Wehner to effect that real vital issue of conference for Soviets, West and Germans alike, would be status and powers of all-German Government rather than free elections, are, in our opinion, not confined to SPD, but have very wide support.

CONANT

No. 324

396.1 BE/1-754

Foreign Minister Bidault to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, January 7, 1954.

I am in complete agreement with your proposal for a meeting in Paris of the three Foreign Ministers, Friday, the twenty-second, and Saturday, the twenty-third of January. [2] It is, in fact, essential that we proceed, before the opening of the conference in Berlin, to a last adjustment of our common attitude and to the examination of the questions on which our experts could not reach unanimous agreement.

I do not consider it less important than you to establish a complete agreement with the Government of Bonn before our meeting with the representatives of the Soviet Union; but I feel strongly that we would compromise this agreement itself by asking the Chancellor to come to Paris, and in thus allowing all the adversaries of European unification to accuse us, even before the beginning of our work of having [garble] ourselves to the views of the German Federal Government. I can tell you advisedly that such would be the reaction of those Western circles which it is essential to convince by means of the Berlin meeting. As to Soviet propaganda, it would not miss taking advantage of a public talk from which it would inevitably draw the conclusion that the three powers were not acting in full liberty.

In these conditions, I definitely consider that the necessary contact with the Government of the Federal Republic must be effected with the required discretion in conformity with the usual procedure followed, that is to say, through the High Commissioners. If, however, it seems to you absolutely necessary that we have a talk with a representative of Dr. Adenauer before going to Berlin, I could, if need be, agree that the contact be made with his personal representative, State Secretary Hallstein, for example, whom we each could see on our own part during our conference. But for all the reasons I have indicated to you above, and in view of the difficulty of keeping such a journey secret, I urge very strongly that preference should be given to the first solution, since the problem of public opinion which I have pointed out to you is of overriding importance.

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[1] The translated text was transmitted in telegram 2528 from Paris, Jan. 7 and repeated to London, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin. In a subsequent telegram the Embassy in Paris reported that de Margerie, when he had delivered Bidault's message, stated that he could not emphasize too strongly the adverse effect of Adenauer being invited. (Telegram 2529 from Paris, Jan. 7, 396.1 BE/1-754)

[2] Document 321.

I am looking forward to the opportunity I soon shall have of conferring with yourself and Mr. Eden, and I do not need to tell you that I consider it more necessary than ever, in the present circumstances, that complete and frank accord of views be reached among us three.

No. 325

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [LONDON, January 7, 1954?]

Many thanks for your message suggesting that we should have a preliminary meeting with Monsieur Bidault to complete our plans before the Berlin Conference. [2]

I entirely agree that we should have a meeting of this kind. The preparatory work already done has shown that we are all three in broad agreement on essentials but we must also discuss our tactics before we meet Mr. Molotov.

While I have nothing against Paris as a meeting place, I wonder whether it would not be more convenient for us all, given the uncertainties about flying weather, if we arranged to meet in Berlin. We could arrive on Friday, January 22, and we should then have the 23rd and, if necessary, the 24th for our talks. This would enable the High Commissioners and our own staffs to be with us in Berlin, to complete all the technical preparations for the four-power meeting and to be available for our preparatory talks.

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[1] The source text was attached to a memorandum of conversation by Merchant, dated Jan. 7, which indicated that Ambassador Makins had left Eden's message with Secretary Dulles on that day.

[2] Document 321.

I have serious doubts about inviting Dr. Adenauer to meet us. Our preparatory consultation with him is going very well and, so far as I know, there are no major problems which need to be discussed personally by us. If such problems should arise, we can think again. As I understand it, our preparatory meeting will be mainly about the tactical handling of the meetings with Mr. Molotov, with which Dr. Adenauer is not directly concerned. If we invite him to meet us, we may give a false and undesirable impression that there are major difficulties on which we have had to carry him along with us, or, alternatively, on which he had tried to tie our hands before the Conference.

I cannot help feeling also that, if we met Dr. Adenauer before the Conference, we would also have to invite the Austrian Foreign Minister, or Austrian public opinion would be offended. I cannot think this is either necessary or desirable.

May I say in conclusion that I also am very much looking forward to meeting you again and to working together in Berlin.

I am sending a similar message to Monsieur Bidault. [3]

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[3] Bidault had received his copy before de Margerie delivered his reply to Dulles' message, and in his comments de Margerie stated that Bidault was not impressed with Eden's reasons for holding the meeting in Berlin, but would go along with the idea if Dulles approved it. (Telegram 2529 from Paris, Jan. 7, 396.1 BE/1-754)

No. 326

396.1 BE/1-754: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, January 7, 1954—5 p.m.

2527. From Tyler. Reference: Deptel 2397. [1] Admittedly present climate Western European opinion not favorable with regard to interpretation and prospect role which US will play Berlin conference

It seems to us that major factor with which we have to contend is generally prevalent impression that US going to Berlin first and foremost in order prove contention that no basis for agreement with Soviet Union can be reached, rather than in order to explore meticulously and objectively all possibilities for reaching agreement.

We here feel that psychological consequences of this impression cannot be individually eliminated or reversed by specific psychological warfare or propaganda action. . . . In our opinion problem needs rather to be considered in terms of the creation of an atmosphere or climate in which posture of United States seems consistent with position and expectations our partners.

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[1] Document 322.

If above diagnosis correct we will benefit most by recapturing and publicizing note struck by President in his UN atomic speech of December eighth [2] in passages relating to sincerity and determination of US to explore every possibility for reaching agreement with USSR at conference table.

While of course we cannot prevent newspaper speculation, official pronouncements by officials of US Government could profitably find occasion stress our determination explore every avenue and thus create impression that we are in earnest and not merely going through motions. Western European opinion in general will be acutely sensitive to US posture with regard possibility reaching solution Indochina problem. French opinion in addition will have equal sensitiveness with regard prospects reaching solution Indochina problem.

Rightly or wrongly considerable section French opinion believes that possibility may exist reaching negotiated peace Indochina if United States willing not slam door to possibility eventual five power conference even if this ultimately involves *de facto* recognition Communist China.

While we must of course expose and knock down any attempt by Soviet Union bargain off abandonment EDC in return for calling off Ho Chi Minh, we must avoid appearing now to take position which in eyes of French would render America responsible for continuation French financial and human sacrifice Indochina war, "kept going" thanks to American financial and military assistance. Here again we find ourselves in psychological context which appears at first sight negative but implications of which are decidedly positive for good or for bad.

With regard to . . . action which might be taken along line in reference message, we do not feel that statements such as those proposed, whether on Soviet colonial and nationalist issue or record Soviet treaty violations, are relevant to problem under consideration. In fact we advise, for reasons already given above, against anything resembling pre-conference campaign discredit Soviet Union and implicit advances impugning motives Soviet Union agreeing to meet Berlin. Our position and tripartite unity in general will be best served by US Government meeting in Berlin without any suggestion that we are apprehensive at possibility reaching agreement with Soviet Union on any issue of concern to our allies.

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[2] For text of President Eisenhower's address, "Atomic Power for Peace", made before the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 8, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 813-822, or Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 847-851.

One of most intelligent and best-informed observers current world affairs with whom Embassy officer discussed generally topic under consideration, said that US position psychologically at disadvantage in eyes French opinion for following reason: US policy fully and rigidly committed to (a) creation of EDC and (b) continuation present French role Indochina, both of which issues emotionally and politically explosive. If US had given indication willingness follow more flexible tactical course on either of these two issues, chances of the other one succeeding in accordance with our policy would have been increased. However present situation seems, to this observer, to cast role US as holding big stick over France in either hand, so that psychological reaction inclined to be rather fear that US will use Berlin Conference to prove that no alternative exists to present east-west relationship, rather than to act as moral and political leader free world in exploring possibilities even restricted areas agreement.

While above obviously over-simplification for purpose illustration, we believe it contains essential elements psychological truth in terms our general posture. This borne out by stress French Assembly debate January sixth on "independence" with which French Government expected approach Berlin Conference.

To sum up:

a. We do not believe anything useful can now be attempted in terms suggested by reference message to immunize western opinion before Berlin Conference against Soviet appeals.

b. We feel that significant psychological area is less what Soviet Union may say to western opinion than what western opinion believes are basic motives and intentions US Government with regard forthcoming conference. In proportion as climate confidence in west between ourselves and our partners is created, so Soviet appeals will be discounted and fail.

c. Reiteration sincerity and earnestness with which we approaching conference by responsible officials, combined with words suggesting confidence in our partners and recognition validity their preoccupations would doubtless contribute effectively to general improvement atmosphere.

d. We recommend against campaign . . . exposing or recording Soviet duplicity and past record for two reasons: First because irrelevant to psychological problem before us and second because such campaign likely be traced to US and thus would tend confirm existing suspicions our intentions.

e. We feel that US attitudes and policy as revealed in terms discussions and issues Berlin Conference will be considered by western opinion as touchstone world role US. Therefore recommend that nothing be neglected in arrangements conference which will contribute to insuring that our role will be presented in most accurate and most favorable light.

We suggest that Department may care to repeat its 2397 to Paris to Moscow as well as this message in the belief that Moscow's comments would be most useful both in Washington and in Paris.[3]

JOYCE

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[3] Copies of this telegram were given to Secretary Dulles and C.D. Jackson on Jan. 8.

No. 327

396.1 BE/1–754: Telegram

The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT BERLIN, January 7, 1954—8 p.m.

720. Western commandants met with Soviet representative Dengin today at British headquarters from 1030 to 1700 hours to discuss technical arrangements for Foreign Ministers conference but were unable reach agreement on building where conference to be held;[2] it was decided hold further meeting at Soviet headquarters Karlshort morning January 9.

British commandant as chairman proposed ACA building as most suitable for Foreign Minister conference, and French and US commandants supported this proposal. Dengin countered by proposing Soviet Embassy (to GDR) building on Unter Den Linden in Soviet sector. Long and fruitless discussion ensued as to respective merits and disadvantages two buildings, with Dengin persistently evading direct answer to query whether he proposed Soviet Embassy building for all meetings. He repeatedly stated however, he would be glad hear any alternative suggestions, and French commandant finally referred to possibility considering use of both buildings. At this point Dengin promptly indicated this principle acceptable and proposed that in interests of compromise it be agreed meetings be held alternately in Soviet Embassy building and ACA building.

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[1] Also sent to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] In an exchange of notes on Jan. 5 and 6, the four commandants of Berlin had agreed to meet at British headquarters on Jan. 7 to discuss technical arrangements for the forthcoming four-power conference. The texts of the two notes were transmitted in telegrams 707 and 717 from Berlin, Jan. 5 and 7. (396.1 BE/1–554 and 1–754) Verbatim minutes of this meeting are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, "Quadripartite Meeting of the Berlin Commandants".

French commandant then made counterproposal that chairman of each meeting be allowed to choose building site; he agreed when pressed by Dengin that in practical effect this would mean in all likelihood three meetings would be held in ACA building to every one in Soviet Embassy. British and US commandants reserved positions on French suggestion, while Dengin continued to press his proposal for alternating sites. Latter also repeatedly invited three commandants to inspect facilities at Soviet Embassy to determine their adequacy; commandants remained noncommittal this point in view their feeling that inspection visit at this time would undoubtedly be given wide publicity by Communist press and might be misinterpreted by Germans.

After further extensive and inconclusive discussion, in which all three commandants maintained objections to Dengin proposal, French commandant moved for adjournment until January 9 in order permit Dengin give further study to French suggestion; Dengin indicated his agreement to this.

British chairman also indicated to Dengin desirability discussing at January 9 meeting not only conference building issue but certain administrative problems such as joint secretariat and assurances re adequacy of arrangements for press in case any meetings held in Soviet sector. Dengin noncommittal these issues but indicated he at least prepared to discuss them.

Atmosphere of meeting was business-like and devoid of any recriminations or propaganda speeches. While Soviets were adamant in declining to accede to views of representatives other three powers re conference building, there is as yet no indication they are deliberately using stalling tactics this issue with view delaying opening of conference on schedule.

For our guidance in January 9 meeting we should appreciate instructions on following points:

1. Is French proposal. i.e., that under system of rotating chairmanship one of every four meetings be held in Soviet Embassy building and other three in ACA building, acceptable to United States?
2. Are we correct in our assumption that Dengin proposal re alternating meetings in Soviet Embassy and ACA building is unacceptable, or are we prepared to accept it as last resort?
3. If we agree to French proposal would we not insist at least that first meeting of Foreign Ministers be held in ACA building? [3]

PARKMAN

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[3] On Jan. 8 Berlin was informed that the French proposal was acceptable, but that Dengin's proposal for alternate meetings was unacceptable, and that the Western Commandants should insist on the first meeting being held in the ACA building. (Telegram 430 to Berlin, 396.1 BE/1-754)

No. 328

762.00/1-853

Memorandum by Sir Frank Roberts to the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State (Kirkpatrick) [1]

CONFIDENTIAL

The French Minister told me last night that a member of the French Embassy staff had a very interesting conversation about the Berlin meeting at lunch yesterday with Mr. Rodionov, [2] whom the French regard as the most intelligent and influential member of the Soviet Embassy staff. I should be inclined to support this impression from such conversations as I have had with Mr. Rodionov.

Mr. Rodionov's general line was that there was clearly little, if any, hope of reaching agreement at Berlin on Germany or Austria. The Soviet Union could not make concessions over free elections, since these would inevitably mean Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Germany. Nor were they likely to give way over the Austrian Treaty, since they could not expect any *quid pro quo* in Germany. At the same time the Russians realised there was no reason for the Western Powers to abandon their thesis about free elections, etc. Mr. Rodionov said that the account of the Western Powers' position given by the *Times* Diplomatic Correspondent yesterday made this quite clear. He spoke of this Western position quite objectively, without any attempt to criticise it as improper.

In these circumstances it might be asked what use the meeting would be at all. Mr. Rodionov's reply was that the Russians attached real importance to more friendly direct contact between the four Foreign Ministers. The Soviet view was that they should cut the formal proceedings at Berlin as short as possible and go into small restricted session as soon as possible so that they could have a really frank and, he hoped, friendly exchange of views, not so much with the object of reaching agreements as of making each other's position clear. Mr. Rodionov indicated pretty plainly that the Russians would wish to discuss at such meetings questions going far beyond Germany and Austria, e.g., a Five-power conference, disarmament, and what they describe in their notes as "cause of international tension" generally.

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[1] This memorandum, a copy of which was presumably transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy was seen by Secretary Dulles, MacArthur, Bowie, Merchant, C. D. Jackson, and Bohlen. The source text is a typewritten copy and is mistakenly dated Jan. 8, 1953.

[2] First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in the United Kingdom.

In the course of this conversation Mr. Rodionov had of course developed on conventional lines the Soviet thesis about the dangers of German rearmament. He had argued at one point that the only really safe solution was a return to Potsdam and to real Four-power control of Germany, or, failing this, control by the French and the Russians together on the basis of a revived Franco-Russian alliance. Mr. Rodionov's French guest, who was quicker off the mark than Sir Robert Boothby, at once countered by expressing skepticism of Russian fear of Germany alone, and he asked Mr. Rodionov point-blank whether the Soviet Union's real fear was not the strength of the United States, with Germany figuring only as an important potential addition to the U.S. bloc. After some argument, Mr. Rodionov admitted that this was perfectly true and came very near to giving away the whole case of the new Soviet propaganda line "Europe for the Europeans".

After this the conversation became much more realistic. Mr. Rodionov admitted that Four- or Two-Power control of Germany was very unlikely and that it would probably be impossible to prevent German rearmament. He said that, accepting this unpleasant fact, the most unacceptable form of German rearmament for the Soviet Union would be full and independent German membership of N.A.T.O. The least unacceptable form, he admitted, was German membership of the E.D.C. But he made it clear that he was thinking only of the Federal Republic, and he ended on the note that the most likely and perhaps, after all, the safest solution of the European problem for the time being would be the continued division of Germany, with the Federal Republic as a member of the E.D.C. and Eastern Germany remaining under Soviet control.

While one must make every allowance for the propaganda line which the Soviet Embassy are so busily developing with all and sundry, the above conversation seems to me to give a pretty fair indication of Soviet thinking and, incidentally, to confirm our own very modest assessment of what we can reasonably expect from the Berlin meeting.

F. K. ROBERTS

[LONDON,] January 8, 1954.

No. 329

396.1 BE/1-854

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Bidault [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON, January 8, 1954.]

I appreciate very much your prompt reply [2] to my suggestion that you, Mr. Eden, and myself meet together prior to the Berlin Conference. [3] In view of the reservations which both you and Mr. Eden have with respect to a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, I will defer to your wishes.

With respect to the place of our meeting, I am impressed with the reasons advanced for meeting in Berlin, particularly because of the uncertainties of flying weather. Therefore, I am agreeable to the suggestion that we arrive in Berlin on January 22nd and have the 23rd, and if necessary the 24th, for our talks, if this is convenient to you.

Since we are not to meet with Chancellor Adenauer before the Berlin Conference, I think it is important that he know we wish to maintain close contact with him on those aspects of the Berlin Conference relating to Germany, and with this in mind, would you see objection to our having a brief meeting in Berlin with Dr. Grewe prior to January 25 in order to make his acquaintance? I plan to have Ambassador Conant with me in Berlin for those meetings concerning Germany and assume you and Mr. Eden will also have your High Commissioners there. In these circumstances, Dr. Grewe would presumably be a channel of communication with Chancellor Adenauer which our representatives will frequently use.

I am sending a similar message to Mr. Eden.

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[1] Transmitted to London in telegram 3529, Jan. 8.

[2] Document 324.

[3] Document 321.

No. 330

396.1 BE/1-954: Telegram

The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 9, 1954—midnight.

733. Re Berlin's 829 to Bonn, repeated Department 732, Paris 58, London 46, Moscow 131. [2] Up to Dengin's last-minute introduction of new proposal re conference site, today's meeting had largely consisted of tireless repetition by all representatives of various arguments for and against two building sites which had been proposed at January 9 meeting. [3]

After opening statements by three Western Cdt's, including particularly comprehensive one by US Cdt, enumerating physical and other advantages of ACA building and disadvantages of Soviet Embassy building, Dengin for first time attacked argument that ACA building was particularly suitable because of its established quadripartite character. He asserted ACA activities had closed in 1948, that since then character of building had changed, and that it had lost its quadripartite nature. Cdt's countered this assertion by pointing out that building still retains many four-power characteristics, including uninterrupted and continuing practice of flying flags all four powers, continued operation of several quadripartite agencies including Berlin Air Safety Center and Interzonal Facilities Bureau, and fact building still used as point of four-power contact in number other respects.

After long discussion this aspect, British Cdt introduced new element by stating that building proposed by Dengin was an Embassy to a country British Government did not even recognize and was therefore unacceptable as meeting place for Foreign Ministers. Dengin contended this argument groundless since building in question was also residence of Soviet HICOMer to Germany, who had in past received repeated visits from three Western HICOMers in this building. Dengin then turned to his proposal made at January 7 meeting [4] that alternate meetings of Foreign Ministers be held in

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[1] Also sent to Bonn, Paris, London, and Moscow.

[2] Telegram 829 reported that after the U.S. Commandant had proposed adjournment of the Commandants meeting on Jan. 9, Dengin had proposed that the meetings of the Foreign Ministers be held on an alternate basis at the Karlshorst office of the Soviet High Commissioner and at the ACA building. (396.1 BE/1-954)

[3] Verbatim minutes of this meeting are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, "Quadripartite Meeting of the Berlin Commandants".

[4] For a record of this meeting, see telegram 720, Document 327.

Soviet Embassy and ACA buildings making it clear his proposal included holding first meeting in Soviet Embassy. Without joining issue on question location of first meeting, three Cdt's in turn attacked this proposal, standing with US Cdt in maintaining Soviet Embassy building did not, as did ACA building, meet requirements of building having quadripartite or international and not purely national character. Cdt's also consistently declined Dengin's repeated invitation to inspect premises of Soviet Embassy to determine its suitability.

Dengin's next tactic was to concentrate on French Cdt, inquiring whether he had withdrawn his proposal made at January 7 meeting that one meeting take place in Soviet Embassy to every three in ACA building. French Cdt stated that what he had had in mind was one meeting in some Soviet sector building to every three in ACA building and he had strong reservations re use Soviet Embassy for any meeting. When asked by Dengin for his views this point, General Timberman said he had given careful study to all proposals which had been made and had determined that best solution was to hold all meetings in ACA building; he had no other proposal to make.

Dengin then read from written statement rejecting as completely groundless objections raised against "building of Soviet Embassy and residence Soviet HICOMers" as conference site, stating that Soviet HICOMer was in same position as those of Western powers, that Foreign Ministers' conference should be quadripartite, and that consequently Soviet side proposed meetings take place alternately, with first in Soviet Embassy building.

After more than an hour's repetitious discussion of this stale proposal, US Cdt stated that since time was of essence in reaching agreement on conference site and since this meeting was obviously getting nowhere, he proposed adjourning until afternoon January 11. After reluctantly agreeing Dengin then suddenly advanced new proposal indicated reference telegram—alternate meetings in Karlshorst (office of Soviet HICOMer) and ACA building. Three Cdt's expressed objections but agreed consider proposal and meet again with Dengin January 11.

At one point during long meeting Dengin suggested consideration of other administrative questions which British Cdt had mentioned in January 7 meeting. Latter then proposed formation joint four-power secretariat for Foreign Ministers' conference; French and US Cdt's supported proposal. Dengin stated merely that this question was beyond his competence and then turned discussion back to problem of building site for conference.

PARKMAN

No. 331

396.1 BE/1-1054 Telegram

The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET NIACT BERLIN, January 10, 1954—3 p.m.

831. In course of January 7 and 9 meetings with Dengin re building site for meetings of Foreign Ministers,[2] US representatives have been ever mindful of and have striven to attain objectives set forth in Paris tactics paper[3] (and most recently reaffirmed in Deptel 430 to Berlin January 8 repeated Bonn 2002, London 3528, Paris 243, Moscow 446[4]) that agreement should be reached with Soviets on basis that (a) not more than one out of every four meetings be held in Soviet sector and (b) that in any case first meeting be held in ACA building in order that US might chairman meeting and make opening statement. After making realistic appraisal of situation existing after two hard-bargaining sessions with Dengin, however, we believe we are now confronted with either of two undesirable alternatives: (1) Making some concession to Soviets on either point (a) or (b) set forth above; or (2) holding out further for both objectives at very real risk of forcing postponement January 25 opening date (in view time required for other technical arrangements, including installation simultaneous interpretation equipment) without being in very advantageous position publicity-wise as to who is to blame for delay.

From tactical standpoint US representatives have found themselves handicapped in two Dengin's meetings thus far by (a) premature withdrawal of French Cdt from tripartitely agreed position to hold out as long as possible for all meetings ACA building, which action considerably strengthened Dengin's bargaining hand, and (b) rigidity of British instructions from London (and to lesser extent those of French from Quai d'Orsay) that Soviet Embassy was objectionable per se as site for any meeting of Foreign Ministers; as result latter development basis for possible proposal, as set forth Paris tactics paper, that chairman of each meeting be allowed choose building site for that meeting has now been completely destroyed. In face this situation, coupled with extreme character Dengin's original proposal, US representatives have been left with very little room to maneuver and we have not thus far felt we were in position ourselves to budge from our original proposal all meetings be held ACA building. Dengin on other hand has to date been able make two substantial concessions: (1) By withdrawing from original (though not very strongly held) position that all meetings be held in Soviet Embassy building, and (2) by suddenly withdrawing completely from concept any meeting at all should be held in Soviet Embassy. While we gather from referenced Deptel that latter concession was not very material to us, it was of major importance to British and French and had loomed large as issue in January 9 meeting.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] For records of these meetings, see telegrams 720, Document 327 and telegram 733, *supra*.

[3] See item 1 of Fuller's memorandum, Jan. 5, Document 320.

[4] See footnote 3, Document 327.

Having come this far, i.e., to point of now proposing that meetings be held alternately in Karlshorst and ACA buildings (with clear implication first meeting should be held in Karlshorst), Dengin, who was pushed quite hard at January 9 meeting, will be most grudging in making any further concessions. While we feel that at tomorrow's meeting he may be prepared to concede further by either (a) agreeing three meetings ACA building to one in Karlshorst provided first meeting in Karlshorst, (b) agreeing first meeting in ACA building but only if alternating meetings West and East sectors, we seriously doubt he will go any further tomorrow. Thus basic question on which we require guidance is whether it is considered more important (a) to achieve all tactical objectives re meeting site and chairmanship out-lined Paris paper even if this should possibly involve postponement scheduled January 25 opening date, or (b) to reach final agreement with Dengin tomorrow on either of two bases indicated above in interests permitting other necessary technical arrangements go forward without further delay. Since we feel that in any event US Cdt must be prepared at some fairly early stage in tomorrow's meeting to move forward at least to position of French Cdt (three meetings in ACA to one in Soviet sector), we should appreciate instructions urgently.

Re issue of location first meeting, chairmanship, first speech, etc. (on basis three to one meetings in ACA), we have tentatively considered with British and French here such devices as (a) determining site of first meeting by lot, (b) agreeing to first meeting in Karlshorst provided US be permitted make opening speech, and (c) insist first meeting in ACA building but permit Soviets have chair and make opening speech. Do HICOG Bonn and Department have any views these points? [5]

PARKMAN

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[5] On Jan. 10 Conant replied that he appreciated the difficulties reported in this cable, but wondered if it would not be better to restore Western solidarity before

Continued

No. 332

396.1 BE/1-1254: Telegram

The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET NIACT BERLIN, January 12, 1954—4 a.m.

839. Re Berlin's 838 to Bonn repeated Department 740, Paris 63, London 51, Moscow 136. [2] Despite helpfulness most recent instructions HICOG Bonn and Department (as well as from British and French Foreign Offices) in giving us greater degree of flexibility in negotiating with Dengin than heretofore, this factor [did not?] enable us reach agreement in January 11 meeting in view Dengin's adamant adherence to earlier proposal meetings of Foreign Ministers be held alternately in east and west sectors. Since it was quite apparent he was bound by his instructions to hold fast to this concept, we reluctantly agreed at 0115 hours January 12 his proposal for adjournment until January 13.

Meeting largely followed course of previous two, with endless repetition by Dengin of his earlier arguments. Only new noteworthy features were following:

(1) Three Western representatives, starting with US chairman in opening statement, repeatedly gave recital of many concessions made thus far by three Western governments re place and time of four-power conference (acceptance Berlin instead of Lugano, January 25 instead of January 4 etc.), all given promptly and without discussion, and asked for similar evidence good faith Soviet representative in making conference possible.

(2) Deliberate and carefully planned movement forward was made by three Western commandants toward proposal outlined

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making any concessions to Dengin. (Telegram 2190 from Bonn; 396.1 BE/1-1054) On the same day Berlin was informed, apparently before the receipt of this cable, that the Western Commandants should:

"(a) remain adamant on ratio three to one for meetings on basic right of each chairman to choose place;

"(b) raise no special objections to Karlshorst;

"(c) if agreement on three to one ratio reached, as last resort agree to draw lots re first meeting." (Telegram 439 to Berlin, 396.1 BE/1-1054)

[1] Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, Heidelberg, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] Telegram 838 reported that the Commandants meeting had lasted from 2:30 p.m. Jan. 11 to 1:15 a.m. Jan. 12 without producing an agreement. The Western Commandants had proposed that the first Foreign Ministers meeting be held at the ACA building, the second at Karlshorst, the next three at the ACA, the next one at Karlshorst etc., but Dengin had declined to accept this proposal. (396.1 BE/1-1254) Verbatim minutes of this meeting are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, "Quadripartite Meeting of the Berlin Commandants".

Berlin's reference telegram, which comes close to final position outlined our most recent instructions from Bonn and Department, reserving as final concession point for next meeting agreeing to Soviet Embassy rather than Karlshorst as meeting place on three to one basis. (We did not use this point tonight in view Department's instruction this a "last resort" compromise and because French also most reluctant give away on this yet. For this reason we were not yet able, as advocated by HICOG Bonn, to insist on principle each government must insist on chairmanship for his Foreign Minister every fourth meeting which would imply free choice in selection of meeting site.)

(3) When question of chairmanship various Foreign Ministers meetings came up indirectly several times, Dengin consistently stated this question was one which Foreign Ministers themselves must decide and was beyond competence of High Commissioners representatives.

(4) Dengin stubbornly took view that three to one proposal of Western representatives was inequitable, despite tireless exposition by latter on grounds of elementary equity, arithmetic, justice, etc. Dengin contended it was not equitable for three Western Foreign Ministers each to have three meetings in building their own choice to one for Soviet Foreign Minister in building his choice. He remained completely deaf to argument proposed conference was four-power not two-power conference and even refused to discuss four-power equality this regard on theoretical grounds.

After tonight's meeting we are convinced that most important factor to Soviets re conference site issue is principle of alternating meetings west and east sectors, which Dengin repeatedly contended was only real basis of "equality." We believe it clear that such issues as where first meeting will be held and Soviet Embassy as against Karlshorst are subsidiary in their view to above principle and that they would readily yield on these points if they could get agreement to meetings on one to one basis. Dengin was obviously under instructions tonight not to concede on this point and we have no way of knowing whether he will receive different instructions for January 13 meeting. Therefore, within framework our existing instructions, we may face prospect another fruitless meeting at that time.

While we have thus far given press only noncommittal quadripartitely agreed communiqués, we wonder whether time not fast approaching when course and status of meetings should not be publicized, at least in broad outline. British and French here have opposed our suggestions this regard but HICOG Bonn and Department may wish take some action.

PARKMAN

No. 333

396.1 BE/1-1354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

WASHINGTON, January 13, 1954—7:49 p.m.

3616. Re Bonn's 2213. [2] British Emb here received instructions ascertain US and French views as to three alternative courses of action proposed by Eden which might now be taken re stalemated Berlin talks. [3] Assume addressees can get text British instructions from their British colleagues. Secretary has examined Eden analysis and following represents his reaction which should be passed Eden and Bidault:

1. We fully agree with British criteria that we avoid postponement Berlin conference beyond Jan 25 and that our final stand these preliminary issues should be such as to carry Western public opinion.
2. We therefore disposed reject first course of maintaining pressure at Berlin level in favor three-one formula. Soviets may well refuse accept this formula on basis that break on this particular point would in terms of public opinion cause more problems for West than for Soviets. This could result in postponement of conference.
3. Second course proposed involves tripartite approach to Molotov by three Ambassadors in support of three-one ratio. If Molotov refused we would then suggest that place of meeting might be transferred to Switzerland or Vienna. We believe this has grave disadvantages. First, by approaching Molotov we tend by our action to convert these procedural questions into major substantive issues on which it would be unfortunate to break or retreat. Second, by suggesting new locale for conference we afford Soviets splendid opportunity drag out preliminary proceedings well beyond Jan 25, thus leaving proposed meeting without either definite place or date.
4. Because of difficulties presented by above alternatives and particularly possibilities for indefinite postponement Berlin Conference, we believe third course suggested by British, i.e., to cut short argument and accept alternate meetings ACA building and East Berlin seems preferable. Procedure of alternate meetings should impress Western public opinion as more than fair and cut ground

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[1] Drafted by MacArthur, Morris, and Thurston; cleared by Merchant; and initialed for Secretary Dulles by MacArthur. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Moscow, Berlin, and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 2213 reported HICOG's view after discussions with British and French officials in Germany that the time had come to insist on the right of each Foreign Minister to determine the place of his meeting. (396.1 BE/1-1254)

[3] According to telegram 2606 from Paris, Jan. 13, these alternatives were: (1) continue to insist on the present Western position; (2) appeal to Moscow; or (3) accept the one-to-one ratio. (396.1 BE/1-1354)

out from under Soviet dilatory tactics. We believe however that in order there be no further pretext for delay our acceptance alternate East-West sector meetings should be coupled with agreement that location first meeting be determined by lot. We have in mind that in presenting this proposal to Dengin we would stress concessions we have made re place and date of conference. Now in order further to facilitate convening this conference we are prepared as indicated above to accept Soviet position on alternate meetings in two sectors. Under these circumstances if they are not able to agree to our present proposal, we shall feel impelled to make public reason why no agreement has been reached at these preliminary talks. Refusal of Soviets to accept this package difficult to conceive from public opinion viewpoint. At same time, while increasing somewhat physical difficulties of conference, such procedure should not obstruct attainment our basic tripartite objectives.

If agreement reached along above lines we do not anticipate any particular difficulty re following past practice rotating chairmanships. If first meeting should be held Soviet sector it would be natural for one of us suggest Molotov as chairman that day, whereas if first meeting held West sector one of three Western Foreign Ministers would be logical candidate for chair. Thus there seems no reason why chairmanship question should be raised now in present preliminary talks with Soviets.

Please send UK and French reaction soonest. Would also appreciate receiving urgently views HICOGs and Moscow.[4]

DULLES

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[4] On Jan. 14 the Embassy in London reported that Eden and Churchill agreed on the third course of action (telegram 2990, 396.1 BE/1-1454), while on the same day the Embassy in Paris reported that Bidault was adamantly opposed to the one-to-one ratio proposal. (Telegram 2625, 396.1 BE/1-1454) HICOG on the other hand favored the approach to Molotov, while the Embassy in Moscow believed a proposal offering a choice of either the three-to-one ratio or alternate meetings with the first ACA building might be successful. (Telegrams 2248 from Bonn and 853 from Moscow, Jan. 14, 396.1 BE/1-1454)

No. 334

762.00/1-1354: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BONN, January 13, 1954—7 p.m.

2237. This telegram discusses present state of German expectations with regard coming four power conference.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.

Death of Stalin and subsequent developments in USSR, especially fall of Beria,[2] have, as elsewhere in Europe, resulted in change of atmosphere in Federal Republic, though owing German fear of Soviets, this had taken place more gradually here. Soviet propaganda about new course in USSR and indications of conciliatory Soviet attitude, specifically release of large numbers German POWs have had some direct effect on German opinion, but main reason for change of atmosphere here is growing conviction that while present Soviet gestures may be merely tactical, genuine if undesire [*sic*] social and structural change away from doctrinaire Communism taking place within USSR which will have inevitable by-product of lessening chances of Soviet aggressive action.

Coming on top of this changing appraisal of USSR, Germans also see pronounced change of course in US policy as indicated by announced plans to cut defense budget, realignment of armed forces, signs of possible redefinition US policy toward China, and, perhaps most important of all, developments following President's proposals for atomic controls.[3] Germans have now therefore received what they regard to be valid indications from both sides that there has in fact been some relaxation in cold war and there is more to come.

Nevertheless, few Germans believe that these changes have gone far enough to create any real possibility that problem of German unity can be solved in any complete or final sense at coming conference; it is not believed that Soviets are now ready make necessary sacrifices. Taken together, these apparently confliciting appraisals have resulted in a growing feeling that Berlin Conference should not be allowed to break down completely and that four-power talks on German unity should be continued in some form rather than attempting assign complete guilt to Soviet for failure to agree on major issues. Tendency to follow this course regardless of actual developments at conference is, as might be expected, strongest with SPD. (We believe party will continue after conference with its present deliberate ambiguity of approach, suggesting on one hand that SPD recognizes necessity of joining forces with West in common defense effort and on other hand that neutrality might be acceptable price for German unity.) SPD emphasizes one or other of these approaches depending on foreign developments, especially its estimate of Soviet willingness make concessions on unity and with approach of Berlin Conference, neutralist tendency is in ascendant. This demonstrated during luncheon discussion with US High Commissioner, January 11, when Ollenhauer openly declared that "Swedish-type solution"—here he actually means compulsory military neutrality—"for German unity completely satisfactory to party and Austrian type of arrangement would offer many advantages." (Wehner and other SPD leaders have already advanced proposals for continuing or recommencing negotiations if it becomes apparent that no agreement on major issues can be reached Berlin.) Desire to keep talks going also widespread in coalition circles (as well as among press and radio commentators), though coalition leaders see considerable difficulty in bringing about EDC ratification in France while talks are still going on, even though negotiations were no longer on Foreign Minister level. Of course, coalition leaders are not as suggestible as SPD where Soviets are concerned and their final attitude on continuation of talks is more dependent on actual course of conference.

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[2] Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs and State Security, had disappeared from public view at the end of June 1953.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 326.

General change in atmosphere has therefore resulted in situation where Germans are discounting in advance Berlin Conference's chances for major success at this time but at same time feel that complete breakdown would be regression and attempts at gradual progress on smaller issues should be made. Soviets presumably will do everything prevent abrupt termination of conference and should find this German attitude useful if it continues. If Soviets can actually be forced to make definite and unequivocal refusal permit German unity within relatively short time, present German attitude will pose no problem. If Western opinion should support negotiations on less important issues in event no agreement can be reached on major ones, and no acceptable way is found quickly to incorporate German forces in Western defense structure, Chancellor could lose some of his hold over coalition and public opinion where unity issue concerned, to advantage of SPD, unless he shifts ground. That is tactic at which he has shown himself adept.

CONANT

No. 335

396.1 BE/1-1454: Telegram

The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT BERLIN, January 14, 1954—4 a.m.

853. Fourth meeting with Dengin re site for Foreign Ministers conference ended without agreement, after lasting from 1030 January 13 to 0100 January 14. [2] In view of unsatisfactory and uncompromising character of position maintained by Soviet Representative throughout long meeting, three Western Commandants at end of session declined fix definite date for next meeting; Commandants also refused accept noncommittal quadripartite communiqué proposed by Dengin and have issued tripartitely brief statement to press reporting that no progress has been made over four meetings in selecting site for conference or in agreeing on other necessary technical preparations and that date for next meeting of High Commissioners representatives has not been fixed.

Only new "proposal" advanced by Dengin on site issue today was following: First meeting in ACA building and second in either Karlshorst or "Unter den Linden building" (Dengin said Soviets would much prefer latter building but would not insist on it); after first two meetings question of where following meetings were to be held should be left for Foreign Ministers to decide themselves. Commandants spent some time attacking this proposal in turn, pointing out that it was really no proposal at all, that it fulfilled only small portion of mission with which four governments and High Commissioners had charged their Berlin representatives, that it seemed to be merely a variation of Dengin's original proposal for alternating meetings in east and west sectors, and that it appeared frivolous and even preposterous in any event for him to suggest that four Foreign Ministers should spend many wearying hours (as we all had) in haggling over housekeeping details when purpose of their conference was obviously to settle pressing world problems.

General Timberman then made following specific proposal, on basis of his assumption that each of four Foreign Ministers would chair meetings of conference in rotation: first meeting ACA building, second meeting Karlshorst, and thereafter site for each meeting to be selected by chairman of that particular meeting. Dengin claimed that proposal was not new since it had in effect been made by French Commandant in very first meeting on January 7;[3] he also said he had repeatedly stated question of chairmanship was beyond his competence and one for Foreign Ministers themselves to decide. Prolonged discussion elicited from Dengin nothing but variations on this theme, even when French Commandant submitted alternative formula substituting "in Soviet sector" for Karlshorst as site second meeting. Again Dengin turned deaf ear to arguments re equality of four Foreign Ministers and stolidly reiterated that all questions pertaining to chairmanship were for Foreign Ministers and not him to decide. He also declined Commandants' repeated invitations to make new proposal.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] Verbatim minutes of this meeting are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, "Quadripartite Meeting of the Berlin Commandants".

Since it had become abundantly clear that character of Dengin's instructions did not permit him advance any further, General Timberman finally proposed adjourn meeting on ground it was evident after more than forty hours of discussion that Dengin did not have necessary authority to negotiate and to reach reasonable solution of our problem; he said he would have to refer to his government for instructions, British and French Commandants stated they also saw no purpose in continuing meeting and in view of attitude of Soviet Representative had no alternative but to refer entire matter to their governments. Dengin appeared slightly upset over Commandants' refusal fix date for next meeting or to agree on quadripartite press release. He expressed willingness to discuss other technical arrangements and proposed appointment quadripartite experts for security and communications; Commandants replied that for reasons already stated they would await instructions from their governments before proceeding further.

PARKMAN

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[3] See telegram 720, Document 327.

No. 336

396.1 BE/1-1454

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Bidault [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT [WASHINGTON, January 14, 1954.]

Since sending you my comments last evening [2] on Mr. Eden's alternative courses of action, [3] I have received a report from the US Commandant in Berlin on yesterday's meeting with Dengin. [4] My own inclination is to accept the latest Soviet proposal which is that the first meeting be in the ACA building and the second in the Karlshorst, following which the question of location of subsequent meetings will be left for the Foreign Ministers to decide themselves. I am not unduly concerned about Dengin's position that the chairmanship is one for the Foreign Ministers themselves to decide. In past meetings of the four Foreign Ministers the chair has always rotated, and I believe we should go into the meeting on this assumption and not give the Soviets the impression now that there is any question about rotation of the chair among the four.

While the foregoing represents my reaction to the Soviet proposal of yesterday, I recognize that there may be other factors which you or Mr. Eden may have in mind, and if you think we should take a stronger stand I will of course support it wholeheartedly.

I am sending a similar message to Mr. Eden. [5]

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[1] Transmitted to Paris in telegram 2500, Jan. 14 with the instruction that it be conveyed urgently to Bidault. Also sent to London, HICOG, Bonn, and HICOG Berlin.

[2] The U.S. position as indicated in telegram 3616, Document 333.

[3] For the British alternatives, see footnote 3, *ibid.*

[4] For a record of this meeting, see telegram 853, *supra.*

[5] In a subsequent exchange of views the three Western powers agreed to authorize their Commandants to proceed along the following lines in their next meeting with Dengin: allow Dengin to state his own views in the hope that he might have been authorized to accept the three to one ratio; failing this, propose the internationalization of the ACA enclave for holding all the meetings (Bidault's proposal); if Dengin rejected that, propose a one to one ratio with the first meeting at the ACA building; if this in turn was rejected, then the Commandants would accept Dengin's offer for the first meeting at the ACA building, the next meeting in the Soviet sector, and subsequent meetings settled by the Foreign Ministers. This proposal was transmitted to Berlin in telegram 474, Jan. 15. (396.1 BE/1-1554) Further documentation on the exchanges preliminary to arriving at this position is in file 396.1 BE/1-1454 and 1-1554.

No. 337

396.1 BE/1-1654: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, January 16, 1954—9 p.m.

2647. As far as France is concerned, we believe West goes to Berlin meeting with more favorable basis than we can recall at four-power meetings in past, of tripartite agreement which is both broad in scope and result of real meeting of minds. Furthermore, Bidault has had long experience in conferences with Russians, is shrewd operator, shares our views as to importance of determining and if necessary exposing real Soviet position and intentions as prelude to action on EDC, and is apparently in personal agreement with practically all of preparatory tripartite work.

We must remember, however, that problem of public opinion with respect to meeting is, in France as elsewhere in western Europe, markedly different from that in United States. Following is our appraisal of prevailing attitude here toward Berlin conference.

1. For French parliamentary and public opinion, conference will be taking place in atmosphere of "*détente*". Fear of Soviet aggression has steadily declined since early 1951, although confidence in Soviet peaceful intentions has not correspondingly increased; but desire for a meeting with Soviets has been strong for some time and interest in news about the conference will be considerable, at least initially. Few Frenchmen expect important results from the Berlin conference, but the testing of Soviet intentions appears to public and parliamentary opinion as an important and not necessarily futile business. There is real hope that with judicious handling, the present "*détente*" can somehow become accentuated.

2. Rightly or wrongly, the United States is believed to have very different attitude. Many Frenchmen believe that the United States considers neither that "*détente*" exists now nor that one is possible in immediately foreseeable future. There is some suspicion, judiciously fostered by Communists and other enemies of European integration, that United States is going to Berlin with purpose of having conference fail because such failure would be favorable to EDC ratification. Important elements of public opinion fear that United States may desire to break off talks at relatively early stage, before testing of Soviet intentions has been really conclusive; and because of considerations in foregoing paragraph, French views of what is conclusive will probably differ from that of other participants and observers.

3. It need hardly be pointed out that government representing France at Berlin will be neither strong nor united, nor supported

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, Moscow, Frankfurt, and Rome.

by cohesive parliamentary majority. Due to the impending decision regarding EDC, due to rightist policies pursued by the present coalition (which are displeasing, not only to opposition, but also to important elements of the coalition), and due to increasingly clever and unorthodox Communist tactics, the parliamentary situation here is more fluid and confused than it has been for some time; but on the basic need for Western solidarity vis-à-vis Soviets, the coalition is fairly united and still well supported in both houses of Parliament.

4. As the decision regarding EDC approaches, there is frantic casting-about on the part of certain opponents of treaty, for some alternative means of controlling Germany. Those who believe in bilateral deal with Soviets are distinct minority, however, and most of them are Communists or discredited fellow-travelers. Nevertheless, some are Gaullists represented in government, and one of principal preoccupations of government is to keep the present coalition intact. This concern may give rise to some ambiguities in government's position, as it has during recent reinvestiture debate, but we do not believe present government would, or could, go any appreciable distance in possible bilateral dealings with Soviets regarding Germany.

5. Same is not true regarding Indochina, however. No French Government can at present time refuse to listen and give serious attention to any Soviet proposals regarding Indochina, any more than United States Government could refuse to listen and give serious attention to Soviet proposals regarding Korean war when it was still in progress. Even if French Government were not willing to give such attention, public and parliamentary opinion would exert such pressure that refusal to explore a Soviet initiative regarding Indochina could lead to government crisis. Since Laniel government is from our point of view the best possible government (among likely alternatives) to conduct any negotiations regarding Indochina, it may be unwise for us to discourage, or hinder, its representatives in Berlin if bilateral soundings take place between them and Soviets on this subject. We are satisfied, however, that French will not take initiative.

6. One important point on which Soviet propaganda has made some headway in France recently has been ventilation of Oder-Neisse question by fellow-travelers, on basis of a correct appraisal that Frenchmen in general have little interest in German unity and still less in seeing Germany attempt to regain its lost territories in the East. For this reason, question of security guarantees to Soviets, which has as yet been little discussed in public here, is likely to attract particular attention when it is raised. Soviet blandishments to France, when they are as direct and crude as they were in *Pravda* editorial in December, are probably counter-productive; but in security guarantee question Soviets have important opportunity for exploiting any possible divergences between Western allies.

7. There is some relationship between this question and the more basic one whether the United States, unlike France, is perhaps devoted to dynamic policy of anti-Communism looking to eventual destruction of the Soviet system rather than peaceful coexistence

and, at best, disintegration from within of totalitarian Communism. Berlin conference can thus furnish important arguments to proponents or opponents of EDC in connection with question whether we view German contribution as entirely defensive in character. The present and likely succeeding French governments will probably continue to accept our moral thesis that we cannot bargain away enslaved peoples in an attempt to bolster our own security; but French opinion will critically analyze our reaction to any proposal of additional assurances to Soviets against future German warlike action.

ACHILLES

No. 338

396.1 BE/1-1754: Telegram

The Assistant United States High Commissioner for Germany (Parkman) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT BERLIN, January 17, 1954—7 a.m.

870. Re Deptel 2532 to Paris, 3676 to London, repeated Berlin 474, Bonn 2086, Moscow 475; re Bonn's 433 to Berlin, repeated Department 2271, Paris 455, London 363, Moscow 142. [2]

At Western Cdts fifth meeting with Dengin, which began at 1715 hours January 16 and ended 0455 January 17, [3] three Cdts in name their respective governments accepted following formula proposed by Dengin (at 0115 hours) for solution Foreign Ministers' meeting site issue: during first week of Berlin conference all meetings of Foreign Ministers will take place in ACA building in West Berlin, during second week all meetings will take place in Unter Den Linden residence of Soviet High Commissioner in East Berlin, and during third week all meetings will take place ACA building; as for fourth week, "this question will depend on course of conference itself".

Last-minute snag developed, however, when Dengin refused to associate himself with proposed quadripartite communiqué reporting in precise terms that agreement had been reached among four High Commissioners' representatives on basis spelled out as per above in Dengin proposal and accepted by Cdts. Dengin at this point stated he would have to consult with his High Commissioner before issuing any such communiqué and proposed instead brief communiqué stating merely that agreement had been reached on two buildings for conference and that details would be issued later. Since this immediately raised question of whether any agreement had in fact been reached and if so on what terms, Cdts declined accede to this procedure. When pressed Dengin repeatedly confirmed that Cdts proposed communiqué was accurate statement of his proposal (and he even repeated it in detail as given first paragraph) but persistently refused sign any document or agree to detailed communiqué until he had reported to his High Commissioner. He declined General Timberman's invitation to do so by phone immediately on ground of lateness of hour. Best which Cdts could get from Dengin was commitment consult his High Commissioner at earliest opportunity and arrange with his colleagues for meeting of four deputies late afternoon or early evening January 17 to work out detailed quadripartite communiqué. British Cdt then declared meeting in recess until receipt of further word from Dengin. Three Western Cdts declined issue any communiqué at all at this stage and agreed that for moment only information to be given press was that meeting had recessed until later in the day.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] Regarding telegram 2532, see footnote 5, Document 336. Telegram 433 transmitted the High Commissioners instructions to the Western Commandants on how to present the proposal in telegram 2532 to Dengin. (396.1 BE/1-1654)

[3] The verbatim minutes of this meeting are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, "Quadripartite Meeting of the Berlin Commandants".

It is view of General Timberman and British and French Cdts that Dengin made his proposal in good faith and personally is willing abide by it but that he simply did not have authority reach final agreement without specific approval from Semenov.

During course of long and tedious discussion which preceded introduction new Dengin proposal, latter had maintained completely negative and hedging position and had declined to entertain favorably or even display any interest in various stages outlined in reference Western representatives. In face of this attitude three Cdts had maneuvered carefully through various stages outlined in reference telegrams virtually to point of accepting formula set forth in point C of reference Department telegram, i.e., meetings on alternating days in ACA building and Soviet sector building. (To all Cdts arguments on behalf of three to one formula on basis of chairman's choice in rotation, Dengin had stolidly reiterated that all questions re chairmanship were for Foreign Ministers themselves to decide.) Since new Dengin proposal represented in view all three Cdts infinitely more advantageous arrangement than that which at that stage they were faced with having to accept without much further delay, three Western Cdts after telephonic consultation with Bonn and some effort obtain elaboration of Dengin formula for meetings fourth week (which had obviously been carefully worded and appeared in no event prejudicial to US), accepted Dengin proposal without further discussion.[4]

PARKMAN

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[4] In a subsequent telegram Parkman reported that the Soviet representatives had telephoned British headquarters to state that they were in agreement with the text of the communiqué which recorded the agreed four-power position on the location for the conference. (Telegram 777 from Berlin, Jan. 17 (8 p.m.), 396.1 BE/1-1754) The text of the communiqué, also transmitted in telegram 777, was released to the press at 7:30 p.m., Berlin time.

No. 339

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "S/P Papers—Jan.-Feb. 1954"

Paper Prepared by Jacob Beam of the Policy Planning Staff[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1954.

BRIEFING PAPER ON PROSPECTS FOR BERLIN CONFERENCE

The Conference developed from Churchill's hints that the West probe the intentions of the new Soviet leaders.[2] These hints were seized upon by the French who insisted that before they could ratify the EDC, a serious effort must be made to reach an accommodation with the Russians on Germany. For both sides the French position will be the critical point at the forthcoming conference.

It was obvious that after the June 17 events[3] the Soviets would be most reluctant to seriously discuss German affairs. Our principal achievement to date is that we have forced them into a position where such a discussion at some stage is unavoidable. We can face them with the issue of free elections; their acceptance would mean abandonment of a communist regime for the first time, that in Eastern Germany; should they seek an alternative advantage in a plausible plan for unification, their credit is so low as to invite skepticism and exposure. The Russians, however, will try to becloud the issue by placing emphasis on their concept of European security and by a proposal for five-power talks to settle Far Eastern problems. They will try at all costs to forestall a clear-cut decision by delay.

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[1] The source text bears the notation "Prepared by JB for Secretary's presentation to NSC mtg 1/21/54". For a record of Secretary Dulles' presentation to the NSC, see the memorandum of discussion, Document 343. Copies of this paper were also sent to Bowie, Murphy, MacArthur, and Merchant.

[2] Reference is to Churchill's proposal for a four-power meeting with the Soviet Union; see footnote 3, Document 186.

[3] For documentation on the uprisings in the Soviet Zone of Germany beginning June 16, see Documents 713 ff.

Judging from the Soviet notes[4] and Malenkov's August 8 speech,[5] the Russians will probably play two gambits—the French and the German, with stress probably on the first. The French gambit will be: Russia is willing to develop a European security system based on a "normalization" of bilateral relations and trade expansion, and on an exchange of bilateral security assurances where desired. The Franco-Soviet alliance should be built on. Thus there will be no need for the NATO military coalition. The solution must be purely European in character. U.S. bases which are obviously aimed at Russia must be withdrawn. France would forfeit great power status in EDC which would be dominated by Germany and which Germany would use to involve Europe in new adventures.

The Russian gambit on Germany may take some such form as this: The Western Germans must know that their entry into EDC will permanently prevent German reunification. The Soviet Government is now prepared to take the following steps: East and West German representatives should attend the conference to express their views. Since unification may take some time to complete, the East and West German Governments should meet together to form a provisional authority capable of consulting with the four powers on peace terms. This authority should establish conditions of free elections without foreign interference, since this is purely a German affair. In the meantime occupation costs must be immediately reduced and foreign debts cancelled. Under the peace treaty occupation forces would be withdrawn; united Germany must join no bloc but should have an army adequate for defense; its economy should be uncontrolled except for the production of war material.

In short the Russians will work toward a neutralized Germany. Although they have recently concealed their intent, They doubtless envisage some kind of four-power control over Germany in the peace treaty. If a dead-lock is reached the Russians may offer, as an alternative to continued division, an "Austrian solution" for Germany. Under this the present barriers would be removed and the East and West German Governments would be encouraged to work out some kind of united authority. Occupation forces would remain and four-power control would be reinstituted.

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[4] For text of the Soviet notes, exchanged with the three Western powers during the summer and fall of 1953, see Documents 257 ff.

[5] For extracts from Malenkov's speech on Aug. 8, 1953, to the Supreme Soviet, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 22 ff.

As to Austria itself, the Russians will probably be willing to discuss the state treaty, despite their recent reluctance. They are unlikely, however, to agree to a settlement until a solution is found for Germany.

The Russians would count upon their five-power conference proposal, which they say they will introduce, to serve several purposes: first, to encourage the French to believe that a solution can be found for Indochina; secondly, to divide the Western allies in their respective attitudes toward communist China; and thirdly, to gain favor with the Chinese, possibly in return for a commitment from them to insist on Soviet participation in the Korean political conference.

Our endeavor will be to help the French to face up to their own decisions, avoiding insofar as possible any appearance of U.S. domination or interference. The French must find out for themselves that EDC offers them greater security than a Germany united on even the most liberal Soviet terms. At best these would make Germany a source of continued rivalry between East and West; Germany would be left sufficient initiative to provoke such rivalry, the more so as it would rebel against any imposed restraints. By probing, the French and Germans must be convinced that the Russians probably have no intention of agreeing to free elections or of totally abandoning their stake in Eastern Germany.

On the positive side, we will emphasize that the division of Germany must be repaired in the interest of peace and justice toward Germany. A role must be found for a united Germany which best serves European security. Past experience has shown that it is dangerous to hold Germany down by dictated terms and crippling servitudes. It must voluntarily accept the same restrictions on its actions as other nations are willing to assume for the maintenance of peace.

While we will not initially confront the Russians with acceptance of EDC, we will stress that security can best be obtained by Germany's association with a community devoted by self-interest to the maintenance of peace. A constructive relationship between France and Germany must be found in order that one source of war can be eliminated. The type of association should be one in which Germany must depend upon its partners for prosperity and protection. There should be collective responsibility for the prevention of aggression. The opportunity should be offered Germany to participate in a community which by the nature of its mutually accepted engagements and organization itself would make it unprofitable and impossible for any one country to break the peace. Russia's security would be assured through any system, based on the principles of the UN Charter, which included Germany as a member and which through collective action and conscience made it certain that no act of aggression could be committed by any partner within or without the confines of the community.

We will say that the first step is to enable the German people freely to decide the form of the institutions under which they choose to live and to determine the role which Germany by its own free will is best suited to play in the community. It is essential that our first consultation with all the German people be through the holding of free elections and the observance of human rights. A democratic government for all of Germany should be established which would be able to join the four powers at an appropriate stage in the drafting of a peace treaty.

We will not deal with the question of five power discussions until this is raised by the Soviets. We will oppose the suggestion on the grounds that the projected Korean political conference is the proper place to start any discussion of Far Eastern problems. We will endeavor to hold the French in line with respect to any overtures on Indochina.

We will insist that the Austrian treaty be concluded apart from the question of Germany and we will reject the introduction by the Soviets of extraneous issues or a proposal that Austrian neutrality be stipulated in the treaty.

Our probing action is likely to be as tedious as the Soviet methods are devious. The Russians will try to protect themselves against any final break. They may propose that since this conference has not achieved results, a further meeting be held within a few months time. We will guard ourselves against any such excuse for further delay.

No. 340

396.1 BE/1-2154: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Berlin [1]

SECRET BONN, January 21, 1954—8 p.m.

457. Berlin for US Delegation. In course of conversation January 21, Brentano, CDU faction leader, volunteered following comments on Chancellor's position on tactics for Berlin conference:

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[1] Repeated to Paris and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

"Although no one in coalition disagrees with Chancellor that Federal Republic should not be sacrificed until replaced by all-German Government which is free to act and capable of doing so, including capacity continue policy of close cooperation with West, there is serious disagreement over Chancellor's approach to conference. Main characteristic Chancellor's position is excessive caution, which has led to proposals so complicated they could be understood neither by public nor Bundestag leaders and which were open to interpretation as indications Chancellor's preference for EDC over idea of German unity at this time. Almost whole CDU faction is opposed Chancellor's position on Volkskammer elections, veto right on transfer of powers to all-German Assembly, and continued existence separate east zone government, but as long as issue remains merely theoretical one, their loyalty to him will prevent public criticism. Faction favors clear and simple policy which can be understood by public, i.e., genuinely free elections to lead to all-German government which from outset has complete freedom of action internally (within limits of contractuals as minimum) and in foreign affairs.

"There is, of course, little chance that Soviets would accept such a program but if it began to appear more possible, Chancellor would undoubtedly quickly shift his ground and lead movement in direction outlined above. If Soviets ever actually prepared accept free elections this alone would amount to such complete revolution in their policy that it would mean they were also in fact prepared relinquish all control over east zone *Volkspolizei* and SED apparatus would have disintegrated even before elections during election campaign.

"Extra elections for Volkskammer at same time as all-German elections or later completely unnecessary, as are recent government demands for pre-election reduction of *Volkspolizei* though latter not bad propaganda issue. There would be many ways cope with problem of governing Soviet zone in event Soviet agreement on free elections. For example, one could imagine that all-German Assembly would establish committee to temporarily administer area by means of ordinances on basis basic law until new all-German constitution adopted, while Federal Republic remained intact as administrative unit.

"If Soviets should bring up question of withdrawal of occupation troops as topic which must be negotiated before all-German elections take place, it would be best if West would refuse discuss problem in these terms but rather seek to turn edge of Soviet attack by insisting that only all-German Assembly could decide on such questions, since it is policy of West to demand freedom of all-German Government to decide which foreign troops it wanted on its territory and where they should be stationed as part of general freedom this government should have. If pressed, Western powers could concede withdrawal to Wesser in order create troop-free area in central Germany if Soviets would go to Oder-Neisse. In no case should US agree to withdraw its troops.

"West should have no fears about outcome of elections, provided they were really free—and Germans are united in their understanding of what free elections really are. Coalition leaders expect a high majority for Chancellor, much higher than in federal elections if all-German elections were to be held, and Chancellor's fears about composition all-German Assembly groundless, all the more if selection of candidates took place as now planned with each Federal Republic (and DDR) party drawing up single list of candidates for all of Germany. Certain risks are connected with every change, but risks for West and for Adenauer, if Soviets actually permitted free elections, would be infinitesimal."

In subsequent conversations, Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gerstenmaier took identical line. He too ascribed Chancellor's "overly cautious" approach, latter's nervousness over potential dangers of conference for Germany and his desire to counter them all in advance even though this could lead to breakup of four power meeting.

In our opinion, general tone taken by Brentano in conversation represents feelings of majority of coalition on this subject. Main reason there is not more visible coalition dissatisfaction with Chancellor's present course, is, we believe, as Brentano states it: At present issue is regarded as so theoretical that it is not considered worth-while provoke Chancellor's displeasure or give public proof of important rift in CDU and coalition at time when unity of approach necessity for Germans. Nevertheless, Ministers Tillmanns and Kaiser, State Secretary Thedieck and faction whip Krone (all CDU) have privately expressed views almost identical with those of Brentano and Gerstenmaier. Of course, SPD also following this line, together with majority FDP and large number government officials who feel Chancellor unnecessarily jeopardizing his prestige by present course, (e.g., Grewe's position on east zone elections as reported Bonn's telegram 2323 to Department, 376 London, 468 Paris, 447 Berlin, 20 January [2]). These points might be taken into account in deciding accept or reject Chancellor's position in its entirety for incorporation Western powers tactical plan at Berlin.

CONANT

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[2] Telegram 2323 reported that a meeting with Grewe on Jan. 20 had been generally inconclusive since Grewe had not had an opportunity to discuss the tripartite position on all-German elections, the status of an all-German Government, and tactics for the Berlin Conference with Hallstein and Chancellor Adenauer. In particular Grewe had refused to commit himself on whether the reduction of the number of Soviet Zone police was a precondition for all-German or Eastern Zone elections. (396.1 BE/1-2054)

No. 341

396.1 BE/1-2154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET VIENNA, January 21, 1954—7 p.m.

1824. Foreign Office having been somewhat disturbed at two points made by Figl to Western High Commissioners re Austrian attitude at Berlin (Embtel 1763 repeated London 142, Paris 242 [2]), Caccia discussed these points with Figl today. They were (1) Austrian indication they might seek revision of a number of obsolete or objectionable articles including Article 4 and (2) Austrian tactics re neutrality which also disturbed Department (Deptel 2049 repeated London 3683, Paris 2533 [3]). On former point, Foreign Office feared that to reopen whole series of articles would open doors for Russians to introduce new proposals of their own, and reopening of Article 4 would be particularly dangerous in view recent Soviet accusations re *Anschluss*. On second point, Foreign Office somewhat exaggerated significance of Austrian tactics by describing them as "complete abdication of sovereignty in a vital matter".

(We had, in fact, taken these points up at last working group [4] meeting and obtained from Austrian experts assurances that revision of articles other than 35 would be sought only in final drafting stage if treaty seemed imminent, that they would advise against reopening Article 4 under any circumstances, and that Austrian gambit on neutrality would only be utilized, if appropriate at all, during late stage of discussion this subject.)

Figl replied to Caccia along much same lines. He stated categorically that no reference to revision of any article other than 35 would be made in his opening statement to conference and other articles would be reopened only if prospects for concluding treaty seemed excellent. He said he would discuss full text his opening statement with High Commissioners in Vienna before his departure and again with Western delegations in Berlin. As to neutrality, he reiterated Austrian position as previously stated, emphasizing he would oppose derogation from full sovereignty and would be guided by attitude of Western Powers.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Telegram 1763 reported on a meeting with Figl on Jan. 14 at which the Austrian Chancellor reviewed his plans for the Berlin Conference, stating, *inter alia*, that Austria would not raise the neutrality issue itself. If however, the Soviet Union raised the question, Austria would reiterate its intention not to join any military alliance, express its belief that there should be no neutrality clause in the treaty, and state that this was a matter for four-power resolution. (396.1 BE/1-1454)

[3] Telegram 2049 stated that the four-power agreement on the terms of Austrian neutrality was unlikely and that it would be better if Austria said nothing about it rather than leave it to the four powers. (396.1 BE/1-1454)

[4] Following completion of the second session of the Tripartite Working Group in December, tripartite consultation with Austria had begun in January concerning those papers affecting Austria. Documentation on the several meetings in Vienna to discuss tripartite positions is in file 396.1 BE.

THOMPSON

No. 342

762.00/1-2154 Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET Bonn, January 21, 1954—8 p.m.

2342. Text of UK telegram reporting today's conversation of US High Commissioner with Chancellor follows:

Begin verbatim text:

1. When US High Commissioner saw Chancellor yesterday evening and discussed Chancellor's proposal for elections to an east zone parliament at the same time as all-German elections, a new idea emerged from their discussion. This was that, as an alternative to the above proposal, the *Laender* in the east zone, which are still in existence *de jure*, should be restored in practice, and *Landtag* elections should be held in them under supervision simultaneously with the all-German elections.

2. Dr. Adenauer told me this morning that, having reflected on this idea, he thought it had certain advantages. In the first place it would ensure that the federal structure was extended to the east zone. This would be in accordance with the wishes of the Western allies and with the basic law as well as with the Chancellor's own ideas. It would not, however, appeal to the centralist school of thought represented by the Social Democrats (SPD) and part of the Free Democrats (FD). Secondly, for purposes of presentation to the Russians the proposal would have a less one-sided appearance than the previous idea of new elections for an east zone parliament. As the *Laender* of the east zone no longer existed in practice, it would be natural that, on their reconstitution, *Landtag* elections should be required there.

Chancellor did not say in so many words that he would see no objection, if necessary, to simultaneous *Landtag* elections in the *Laender* of Federal Republic, but he did say that in five of those *Laender* new elections are due in any case during 1954.

3. There would naturally be a transitional period between all-German plus *Landtag* elections and formation of a definitive all-German Government based on a constitution. During this period it would be essential to keep the federal government in being in

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[1] Repeated to Berlin, London, and Paris.

order preserve its links with West. This would mean keeping Volkskammer and east zone government in being too, but present proposal would have effect of cutting off their legs. Great part of powers of east zone government, including control of police, would go to new land governments. When pressed to say how powers of land governments would be defined, Chancellor said existing east zone constitution was, as he understood it, not unreasonable about powers of *Laender*. Anyway, in practice new *Land* governments would know they were supported by National Assembly and provisional all-German government.

4. In reply to questions, Chancellor said he saw no difficulty about providing suitable candidates for *Land* elections. He also thought an idea on these lines would be supported by great majority of opinion in Federal Republic.

5. Chancellor said that while he still preferred his idea for new east zone parliament, for purposes of presentation to Russians he considered present proposal had undeniable advantages, and he would be prepared to accept it on this basis. He would let us have new memorandum as soon as possible.

6. Chancellor emphasized no scheme of this nature would work unless his proposals for reduction and disarmament of *Volkspolizei* were accepted. I stressed difficulties attendant on this proposal, and made further point that, once we started bringing in *Volkspolizei* in this way, Russians might be tempted to go one better and say that free elections would also be difficult in presence of foreign troops. In spite of these arguments, I was not able persuade Chancellor to modify his ideas.

7. Grewe was present at meeting, and promised afterwards he would still let us have clarification for which we asked him yesterday in addition to Chancellor's observations to me today.

End verbatim text.

I am preparing memorandum of my own conversation with Chancellor yesterday which I shall hand to Secretary in Berlin. Copy will be telegraphed to Department.[2]

CONANT

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[2] Not found in Department of State files.

No. 343

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, January 21, 1954[1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend the meeting because of his absence from the city. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 6); Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Under Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of the Army and Adm. Duncan for the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Bolte for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Item 4); Judge Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Department of State (for Item 6); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler and C.D. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers

Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that the forthcoming Berlin meeting would be more important in its negative than in its positive aspects. He thought that this meeting might represent the last major Soviet effort to disrupt the Western alliance and to destroy the security of Western Europe. If this effort failed, our own program would succeed. If the Soviets are successful, it would be necessary to reexamine fundamentally United States policies with regard to the EDC and NATO.

Turning to specifics, Secretary Dulles thought that if the Soviets were in the "right mood" it might prove possible to obtain a treaty for Austria and the withdrawal of the occupation forces. We would be prepared, if absolutely necessary to secure the treaty, to envisage some degree of neutralization for Austria.

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[1] Drafted on Jan. 22.

As for Germany, Secretary Dulles thought the prospects for unification very poor. Soviet agreement to German unification would, in effect, represent an invasion of freedom deep into the Iron Curtain. Until the Soviets are prepared to extend greater freedom to Poland and Czechoslovakia, they cannot afford to permit this invasion to occur. Nevertheless, the Soviets will probably put forward some kind of package proposal for German unification, primarily designed to induce the French to abandon both EDC and their struggle in Indochina. Whether or not the French will succumb to these Soviet wiles remains to be seen. In any event, for tactical reasons Secretary Dulles said that he proposed to submerge his own personal role in the hope that France would then take a more positive part in the forthcoming conference. Thus we shall avoid the charge that France is merely the tail to the U.S. kite, and will favorably influence the French Parliament and French public opinion.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on probable developments at the forthcoming meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin.

[Here follows discussion of items 2-7, United States policy on Berlin, significant world developments affecting United States security, United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Southeast Asia, United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Indonesia, United States policy toward Iran, and United States policy toward Finland.]

No. 344

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 211: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1954—1:17 p.m.

Tosec 10. Summary No. 1.

[Here follows a summary of developments in the Far East, Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.]

Following intelligence summary:

Available indications fail suggest any forthcoming change in known Soviet positions at Berlin. (1) Soviet propaganda continues high sustained attention. Like buildup before 1951 talks,[1] Moscow press daily takes up one aspect international problems and represents standard attacks against US position and reiterated Soviet position as outlined November 3 note.[2] USSR shows preoccupation with question German militarization and what it calls "policy dividing Europe" as allegedly symbolized by EDC. Basic Soviet argument: task of conference to reduce international tensions; to accomplish this necessary to work out European security, and for this necessary solve German problem along lines advocated by USSR. Moscow characteristically shuns prediction outcome Berlin talks, although prepares public for difficulties by citing Western press reports alleged US intentions torpedo meeting. In essence Moscow pictures meeting as "opportunity" for relaxation, with responsibility on West to seize it. (2) In private conversations Soviet diplomats have generally given no cause except modification in Soviet position, but have stressed particularly to French community interest of European countries regarding German problem and argued all-European security arrangement would make EDC unnecessary.

Indicative of Soviet intentions toward Germany is series reports that last October tour duty Soviet officers in Germany extended from three to five years. Since late October dependents of officers have been arriving in Germany and Austria. Requisitioning housing facilities reported in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bucharest.

[Here follows a brief summary of reaction to Secretary Dulles' speech on January 12.]

SMITH

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[1] Reference is to the Deputy Foreign Ministers meetings at Paris, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951.

[2] Document 280.

No. 345

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, January 22, 1954, 3:30 p.m.

TOP SECRET

USDEL MIN-1

Present:

The Secretary
Conant
Parkman
MacArthur
Schwartz
Gerhardt
Freund
Davis

Merchant
McCardle
Bowie
Bruce
C. D. Jackson
Page
Tyler
Morris
McConaughy
Thurston
Reinstein
Steere
Ausland
Nagle
O'Connor
Eddy
LaSelle
Herfurt
Manfull
McAuliffe
Seamans
Matthews
Gilman

Physical Arrangements

Mr. Eddy reported that the table arrangements in the ACA Building were for a square conference table with five seats at the table for each delegation and 10 seats in the second row. At the Unter den Linden building there were three seats at a smaller round table and we have asked for 12 seats in the second row.

Entertainment

With regard to entertainment Ambassador Conant said that if the three powers start entertaining with the West Germans the Russians would undoubtedly hold quadripartite entertainment with representatives of the East German Government being invited. Even a social meeting with the East Germans would have a bad psychological effect in West Germany. Ambassador Conant noted that there would be many social activities in Berlin and he suggested tripartite coordination to make sure that all three foreign ministers did not attend the same entertainment on one night.

With regard to Soviet entertaining Mr. MacArthur suggested that attendance at such functions should be worked out with Ambassador Bohlen when he arrives.

Mr. Eddy reported that there would be a simple buffet at the break in each session of the conference or at the end of the session, depending on the wish of the Chairman. No liquor will be served at these buffets and at the ACA Building the expenses will be shared tripartitely.

Press

With regard to press communications Mr. Eddy reported that space for the press in the East Sector was adequate but inspection revealed that the Soviets were not providing adequate telephone communication to western points. Mr. McCardle has asked Mr. Suydam to inform correspondents that they could come back to the press center in the western sector after the meetings in the Unter den Linden building to use the more adequate communications facilities.

With regard to press briefings Mr. MacArthur said there were officers specialized in French and German press briefings. Substantive officers would meet together after each session for 10 or 15 minutes to coordinate with their opposite numbers in the other two western delegations regarding the general line to be taken. So far as the briefing sessions themselves were concerned the British and French will be checked as to their proposed procedure so that all three delegations would be following a similar line with the press, although the respective national treatment would be tailored to the national interests.

Ambassador Conant said that there had been and undoubtedly would continue to be free circulation of people between the western and eastern sectors. Should any violation of this principle occur to any of our people it would constitute an international incident.

Consultation with Germans

With regard to consultation with the Germans, Ambassador Conant suggested that if it were approved at the tripartite meeting tomorrow at 11:00 [1] it would be easy to arrange for a meeting with Blankenhorn tomorrow afternoon, which he considered of primary importance. Ambassador Conant said that there was restrained optimism on the part of the Germans with regard to the conference. The SPD were more enthusiastic publicly than in private. There was more optimism in the eastern zone where there were more hopes to fulfill. Ambassador Conant emphasized the manner in which the conference broke up would have a profound effect on German opinion.

Reports to NAC

With regard to reporting to the North Atlantic Council, Mr. MacArthur suggested that Mr. Page should get together with his opposite number in the other western delegations to work out a report every week or two weeks. The point was made by Mr. Creel that other members of the diplomatic community in Berlin were extremely anxious to receive word on the progress of the meeting. It was the general view that while it would not be possible to have a tripartite briefing of the entire diplomatic community, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Page, and Mr. Creel would get together to work out a procedure for briefing representatives of those governments who have asked for such briefing or where we think it will do most good. In this regard the Benelux countries and Italy should be given special consideration.

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[1] For a report on this meeting, see Secto 10, *infra*.

German Questions

With regard to German questions, Ambassador Conant asked that he have some time with the Secretary to discuss the complicated issues involved and time was provisionally set aside immediately after the Delegation meeting.

Security Guarantee

With regard to the security guarantee, Mr. MacArthur noted that the United States and the United Kingdom were in agreement but the French had not been able to agree at the Tripartite Working Group meeting in Paris with the proposed US–UK draft. [2] The French will not raise this subject during the tripartite sessions and it is not the intention of the United States or United Kingdom to discuss it at this time.

Five-Power Conference

With regard to the probable Soviet proposal for a five-power conference, Mr. McConaughy reported on the latest position of the French on this subject. Although their initial position was strong, their retreat position was to agree to a five-power conference under conditions which would not necessarily preclude Soviet acceptance.

The Secretary said there were two aspects of a meeting with the Communist China regime. If the conference were to include Communist China as one of the five great powers, as provided in Article 106 of the UN Charter, and the conference was to proceed under such general terms of reference as those indicated in that article it would be impossible for the U.S. to attend. While we have never agreed that Potsdam covered Far Eastern matters, the United States would not have the same objections to a conference to settle certain Far Eastern problems in the proper context. Such a conference would include the nations interested in the problems and, with respect to Indochina, the Associated States might well be invited to the conference. The Secretary noted that since we were carrying on negotiations with the Chinese Communists with regard to Korea we could hardly object to the French discussing the Indochina problems with them.

Austria

With regard to Austria, Mr. MacArthur suggested that there should be a specific briefing on this subject with the Secretary tomorrow morning before the tripartite meeting.

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[2] Regarding the different positions on a European security guarantee as reported by the Tripartite Working Group, see the memorandum by Fuller, Document 320

General Discussion of Conference

The Secretary said that one reason the United States has been reluctant to hold a four-power conference was the possibility of the Soviets using the conference to promote their objectives in the Satellite countries. For example, pictures of western and Soviet leaders in congenial poses might be used in Soviet propaganda to imply that the West accepted the moral position of the Soviets and dealt with them on an equal plane. Therefore the Secretary had maintained the position that the four foreign ministers would meet only on specific issues and not in the context of a periodic reunion. He asked that members of the Delegation attempt to avoid making a particularly friendly appearance in any dealings with the Soviets. The United States Delegation should be correct, formal and polite.

With regard to security matters, it has been agreed quadripartitely that the Soviets would be responsible for the Unter den Linden building and that the three western powers would be responsible for the security of the ACA Building. From an inspection of the building in the Soviet Sector this morning Mr. Herfurt concluded that all offices to be used by the Delegation in the Unter den Linden building were wired for detecting conversations. All primary substantive discussions should be held in the U.S. Compound. Although equipment would be used to attempt to counteract detection devices in the ACA Delegation offices, even the ACA building could not be considered completely secure. The conference room in the U.S. Compound was secure and similar conference rooms in which tripartite discussions would be held in the British and French elements were also secure.

The Secretary said that the technical preparations for this meeting had been more complete than they had ever been before for a conference of this type. For this he expressed his appreciation. The objectives of the conference with regard to Germany and Austria were well known but perhaps the most important results of the conference would be its byproducts. While there was hope for a treaty with Austria and the unification of Germany, we should not be under the illusion that those objectives were the only positive results to be gained. From his experience as an adviser to U.S. Delegations the Secretary reviewed some of the indirect results achieved at CFM's. The Secretary emphasized that the consequences of the present conference would affect a long span of history. He asked for dedicated service on the part of all members of the Delegation, regardless of the nature of the tasks to be done, so that everything could be done to enhance the possibility of future cooperation between France and Germany, and with her two western allies.

No. 346

396.1 BE/1-2354: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, January 23, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 10. Department pass OSD. Three Western Foreign Ministers held first meeting at 11 a.m. January 23 at Berlin residence French HICOMer. They discussed following questions: Chairmanship and opening statement, nature of conference, Chinese participation, control of passes, Austria, translation, press, time of meetings, and consultation with Federal Republic.

1. Chairmanship and opening statement. Secretary Dulles proposed and it was agreed that Bidault should make first substantive statement. It was agreed to use French alphabet for seating with US in chair first meeting which supported by fact ACA building in US sector. Secretary would then call upon Bidault to speak first. Agreed that Secretary Dulles should approach Molotov shortly before first meeting of 4 Foreign Ministers and seek his agreement re above arrangements and daily rotation chairmanship of meetings.

2. Nature of conference. Agreed not desirable treat conference as meeting of CFM and that discussion this question would not be initiated by Western powers.

3. Chinese participation. Secretary Dulles noted press reports re delegation of Communist Chinese in Berlin. Agreed Western powers would not accept their admission to conference if Soviets propose, even as observers.

4. Control of passes. Agreed more important provide additional control entry into Foreign Ministers meeting beyond pass system for ACA building, but no definite decision made yet upon how this could be accomplished.

5. Austria. Agreed would seek early preliminary discussion Austrian problem and principles of solution. Agreed Austrian question would not be referred to Deputy Foreign Ministers but that after general discussion by Foreign Ministers it might be referred to group of conference experts who could report back in few days to conference. Would propose that Austrians be allowed state their case during general preliminary discussion by Foreign Ministers leaving question full Austrian participation full negotiation open for further Foreign Ministers consideration. (At afternoon session

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, and Frankfurt.

on Secretary's motion agreed to support at conference participation of Austrians in substantive discussion treaty.[2])

Bidault said that Yugoslavs in a note had asked French that Yugoslavia be informed of and consulted on four-power discussions re Austrian settlement. Ministers agreed that Yugoslavs would be kept informed but not consulted.

6. Translation. Agreed simultaneous translation could be used for prepared statements but not for oral exchanges. Also agreed that if Soviets refused install simultaneous in Unter den Linden building West could not insist.

7. Press. Texts of statements expected to be released in full to press immediately after each meeting of Foreign Ministers. Allied experts who will brief press will meet briefly to agree on line in advance. Then each delegate will hold press conferences open to all members of press. (This would not preclude delegates holding additional background conferences for own press.)

8. Time of meeting. Agreed propose 3 p.m. to Soviets although Secretary pointed out possibly desirable hold additional meetings as conference progresses and this should be stated to Soviets in discussion this item.

9. Consultation with Federal Republic. Foreign Ministers discussed primarily recent Adenauer proposals for holding new Volkskammer elections at same time as all-German elections for national assembly and reduction *Volkspolizei.*[3] Agreed that it would not be desirable to amend Allied proposal to provide for these. Three HICOMers will discuss these questions with Blankenhorn.

Meeting ended with agreement to meet again at 4:30 p.m. at residence British HICOMer. After meeting, Foreign Ministers agreed informally in briefing press on this meeting emphasis would be on discussion of substantive matters studied by Paris working group rather than procedural questions, in order avoid giving Soviets impression Foreign Ministers had settled all procedural matters in advance.

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[2] For a report on the afternoon meeting, see Secto 12, *infra.*

[3] For a further elaboration on Chancellor Adenauer's views, see telegram 2342, Document 342.

No. 347

396.1 BE/1-2454: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BERLIN, January 24, 1954—2 a.m.

Secto 12. Following is résumé second meeting today of three Foreign Ministers: [2]

(1) Austrian participation: Secretary said Austrians would be satisfied by reply to their note requesting participation [3] in which we would indicate that we were prepared to raise their request for participation in the Berlin conference and to take a sympathetic attitude towards it. Messrs. Eden and Bidault agreed to this procedure.

(2) Prospective discussions with Blankenhorn re Adenauer latest proposals regarding free elections (see Secto 8 [4]).

(3) Position re Soviet proposal for five power meeting: Eden referred to latest French proposal for modification initial tripartite position (see BER D1/2 [5]) as transmitted Paris telegram 2707 to Department. [6] French revisions as embodied that telegram were accepted by the three Foreign Ministers.

Bidault then stated that he recognizes objections to five-power conference but length of Indochinese war and state of French public opinion such it not possible exclude chance of "honorable" negotiations on Indochina; hence essential to hold out hope that should Chinese Communists proceed with Korean settlement and give signs good faith, some kind Indochina political settlement possible. Therefore French seek agreement on second position outlined reference telegram.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] For a record of the first meeting, see Secto 10, *supra*.

[3] On Jan. 22 the U.S. Delegation reported that it had that day received an Austrian note requesting that the Austrian question be placed on the agenda of the conference and that Austria be allowed direct participation in the proceedings. (Secto 3 from Berlin, Jan. 22, 396.1 BE/1-2254)

[4] Secto 8 reported that the Foreign Ministers had agreed to have their High Commissioners meet with Blankenhorn on Jan. 24 to explain why they could not accept Chancellor Adenauer's position on elections and the reduction of the *Volkspolizei*. (396.1 BE/1-2354)

[5] A copy of this paper is in CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, "Four-Power Meeting in Berlin".

[6] Telegram 2707 stressed that many of the problems likely to be discussed at a five-power conference were already under study by appropriate institutions, but that if a five-power conference were held it would have to meet certain preconditions. (396.1/1-2154)

Secretary stated we do not favor French proposal. US does not deny existence Chinese Communists and is negotiating with them on Korea. However, we do so not on basis of accepting Soviet proposal for five power conference which seems to depend on Soviet interpretation UN Charter (particularly Article 106). US cannot accept legal validity this Soviet position as applied Chinese Communists. Article 106 designed for immediate postwar situation now past. Secretary went on to say that if Potsdam Agreement basis for Soviet juridical position for five power conference, France would not be eligible. Furthermore, our interpretation Potsdam is that agreement pertained to European not Far Eastern affairs. Secretary did not exclude possibility that if at some future time conference was held to deal with Indochinese problem and US invited, we would accept regardless Chinese Communists factor. However, this should not be taken for granted nor would US participation be predicted upon five power thesis. Hence, US does not accept "principle" of five power conference as French proposal states. If Korean conference should go well and opportunities arose, Korean conference might be extended to cover Indochinese problem with appropriate modification of representation to include, for example, Associated States. This would obviously not be five power conference.

Bidault acknowledged that Soviet proposition for inclusion Communist China could not be based on any juridical right or on general power status. He thought it would be based more on prospect that participation Communist China could make practical contribution to settlement in Indochina. He stated that France was now procrastinating as to negotiations. Negotiations must be tackled some time. He asked us to consider the length of time required for the armistice negotiations in Korea. He remarked that France had already suffered a physical and moral attrition in Indochina which had gone on through seven years. He granted that the group which might be convened to negotiate on Indochina would not be limited to five. Communist China would, of course, have to participate as the aggressor but neutral countries in the area such as Thailand and Australia also might be invited. The motive in seeking negotiations would be to alleviate the serious plight of the French in Indochina. A line would have to be drawn somewhere as to the participants. Undoubtedly, Ho Chi Minh would wish to take part in the conference. If some other medium for negotiations should be used, Ho Chi Minh could hardly be excluded. Yet it was desirable that he be prevented from participating. Status of Viet Minh was quite different from that of North or South Korea and the participation of Viet Minh would not be acceptable to the French. If it were allowed the prestige of Ho Chi Minh would be increased to a serious extent, but Communist China would have to participate if the war were to be ended.

Eden said that he was glad the first position was acceptable to all three. If one went beyond the first position it was necessary to branch out into many hypotheses. It was not possible to anticipate them all and to reach agreed positions for each contingency. Undoubtedly Molotov would wish to embarrass the three foreign powers in every way possible. Hence, he did not see how we could now look beyond first stage. The UK is "in a legal doghouse" having already recognized Communist China and could not raise a political issue. The first point he saw was that we must not be diverted from the main issue (German). Second, it would be embarrassing for us to set conditions for a later conference. It would seem as if we were creating the difficulties rather than the Soviet Union. He did not see how we could now do more than agree on the initial position. He said that he would wish to consult his colleagues again if it seemed we could not hold the first position.

The Secretary indicated that he was in substantial agreement with Eden. He thought it was entirely possible that we might escape from the dilemma as a result of the Soviets taking a position so extreme that the tripartite differences would not have to be exposed. He thought that the Soviets would feel bound to be very emphatic in their pressing of the Communist Chinese cause. Their general line as to Communist China in the UN and elsewhere did not admit of any compromise. It was unlikely that they would agree to any form of limited Chinese Communist participation in a later conference. Therefore the first position might suffice as the final position. He remarked that an emergency tripartite session on this subject would always be possible if the need arose.

(4) Tripartite consultation with Austrian delegation: It was agreed that each delegation would name a representative to participate in a tripartite group through which our contacts with the Austrian delegates would be maintained. The Secretary designated Freund for US; Eden named Geoffrey Harrison while French designated Seydoux.

(5) Liaison with NATO countries re conference developments: It was agreed that NATO representatives of the three countries at Paris would be best channel. They could consult together and prepare agreed report which should be of brief and general nature. In order to minimize difficulties of three NATO representatives Paris it was agreed that it would be preferable to have tripartite liaison here on question, and the Secretary designated Page as US representative for this purpose; Roberts named for United Kingdom. Agreed Benelux should be informed through regular HICOMer channel.

(6) Tripartite steering committee: Mr. Eden suggested it might be useful designate from each delegation representatives to maintain close general contact during conference since ministers might not have time handle some matters. It was agreed that those who represented governments during Paris preparations (MacArthur, Seydoux and Roberts) would perform this work with added understanding that on some subjects HICOMers would be more appropriate group.

(7) Hospitality and entertaining: Eden asked for any views on this subject. Secretary stated two basic reasons against undue or ostentatious entertaining: First, bad impression which would be created at home especially if conference unproductive; and second, Soviets might use entertainment gambit to make political impression especially in Soviet sector affairs which might bring us into contact with German Communists. Therefore inclined keep entertainment to minimum while being "correct" and "polite". Bidault agreed stating that excessive entertainment would be tiring, [garble] possibly embarrassing. Eden stressed need avoid any tripartite formal entertainment of West Germans so Soviets would have no pretext for asking East Germans to official conference receptions.

(8) Further tripartite meeting referring to declaration of intent and question of opening statements: Eden asked whether it was desired to discuss these matters now whereupon Secretary asked whether it would be possible have draft of Bidault's remarks in advance since that would be viewed as having tripartite character. Bidault agreed. Secretary then invited others to come to his house tomorrow 4:30 when it was agreed following matters would be discussed: (1) opening statements (2) declaration of intent (3) certain points on Austria including position on Article 35. [7]

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[7] For a record of the Foreign Ministers meeting on Jan. 24, see Secto 15, Document 349.

No. 348

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY BERLIN, January 24, 1954.

1. *Malaya.* Mr. Eden said the situation there was deteriorating and causing them considerable concern. Open hostilities were diminishing but were being replaced by more subtle methods of infiltration which were more difficult to cope with.

2. *Atomic Talks.* Mr. Eden indicated he was personally well disposed toward the program I outlined of preparing a plan and then having simultaneous exchange with the Soviet plan. However, before definite committal, he wanted to communicate with London. He indicated that he thought the United Kingdom and Canada should be the only countries to participate with the United States in the work which would precede the drafting of our plan, with the understanding that France and possibly Belgium, South Africa and Australia would be brought in and given an opportunity to see and comment on the plan prior to its actual transmittal to the Soviet Union. He said he thought his government would be prepared promptly to send the necessary experts to Washington. [2]

3. *United Nations Assembly.* He expressed the view that we were committed to holding a resumed session of the General Assembly. He thought some assurances in this respect had been given India when they agreed to recess the regular session at the end of December. I asked what he thought the Assembly would do. He thought it would do little except pass a resolution expressing appreciation to India and others for their work in handling the POW's. I said that I felt that it was probable that they would pass a resolution seeking to impose their ideas regarding a political conference. I said I saw little prospect of great success from a political conference and felt strongly we were not justified in paying a large price to get such a conference. As such a "large price", I cited agreement to treat the Soviet Union as a neutral and without blame in the Korean affair, and the elevation of India to a leading role in Asia. I said that I felt that a majority of the Assembly which had little responsibility might be willing to try to impose such terms in an effort to get a political conference. This I said

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[1] This conversation took place following dinner at the residence of the British High Commissioner on Jan. 23. A brief summary of the conversation was transmitted to President Eisenhower and Acting Secretary Smith on Jan. 24 in Dulte 3. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

[2] The verbatim text of this paragraph was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 2, Jan. 24. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

might mean an open break with the U.S. on the subject. I said the U.S. had on the whole discharged its responsibilities satisfactorily. We had obtained the Armistice. The prisoners of war desiring to be repatriated had been returned. The prisoners not wanting to be repatriated had been given their choice. President Rhee had not broken the Armistice, and it seemed unlikely that the Communists would do so. We were spending large sums to develop the economy of South Korea, and make it viable. Against this background, others having no comparable responsibility were seeking to impose their views because they thought that it would be "nice" to have a political conference. I hoped that the U.K. would not play that game.

Mr. Eden seemed impressed by this presentation, and indicated that he had not realized that there was any such hazard in the meeting. I said that if he could get assurance that the adjourned General Assembly would limit itself to innocuous action and not attempt to impose its views as to the terms of a political conference, then I thought no harm would be done. He said he would explore the situation and let me know his further views.

4. *Middle East.* Mr. Eden indicated very considerable interest in the idea of a regional grouping to include Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. He indicated that the Indians were annoyed that U.K. was not trying to oppose this. He expressed a special hope that Iraq could be brought in. I got the impression that he wanted an Arab state in with a view to teaching a lesson to Egypt and making them realize that they were not necessarily the heart of the Middle East defense project. He said he thought matters were moving well in relation to Iran, and that he hoped there could shortly be an oil settlement. He indicated discouragement over the possibility of a Suez agreement with Egypt, although he still talked of such an agreement as a possibility.

5. *Soviet Union.* Mr. Eden indicated great eagerness to have a bilateral talk with Molotov. He had already suggested this at the afternoon meeting, [3] and he renewed this suggestion with strong emphasis. He hoped we would not object. He thought that out of such bilateral talks some positive results might come. The thought was that each of us should entertain Molotov separately. I said I would like to give this further thought. I was fearful that this would give Molotov a good opportunity to sow seeds of dissension—particularly in talks with the French. [4]

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[3] For a record of the afternoon tripartite meeting, see Secto 12, *supra*.

[4] The verbatim text of this paragraph was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 1, Jan. 24. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 349

396.1 BE/1-2554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, January 25, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 15. Pass OSD. Following is résumé meeting January 24, three Foreign Ministers Conant's residence: [2]

1. Secretary General's Report

Secretary General Bromley of Western Secretariat was asked give report on status technical arrangements concerning passes, press, recording of minutes and agreed decisions, etc. Noted insistence Soviet opposite number that flags in conference room be arranged in reverse of customary clockwise order of rotation of chairman and seating. Three Foreign Ministers suggested interior flags be eliminated as solution possible Soviet effort to lay foundation for counter clockwise rotation at table which would entitle Molotov to opening speech if Secretary in chair at first meeting. [3]

2. Outline of Bidault's proposed opening statement

Bidault outlined in general terms opening statement, which it is agreed he should make tomorrow's first meeting, along following lines:

(a) We come to meeting with open mind, ready to understand each other and hope for concrete results. We desire not to be polemical because we have respect for everyone here. We assume mutual respect and faithfulness traditional friendships.

(b) We will be discussing matters of grave importance; they are not new but until now we have failed to reach agreement on them. Very fact of this conference can contribute to results, although conference itself not enough. We believe it will be useful to deal with these problems within the correct framework.

(c) Recent offer by US President [4] has universal implications. We have no illusions, however, as to difficulties involved. French attitude regarding Soviet proposals toward control of armaments well known. This is unchanged. Examination this problem while hostilities still going on anywhere premature. UN normal place handle this problem.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, and Moscow; transmitted in two sections.

[2] The meeting took place at 4:30 p.m. on Jan. 24.

[3] Representatives of the four delegations held three meetings, Jan. 18–20, to resolve questions dealing with the administration, communication, security, and press for the Foreign Ministers Conference. Minutes for these meetings are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 167, "Meeting of Experts in Preparation for the Conference".

[4] See footnote 2, Document 326.

(d) Asiatic problems should be considered in normal framework. They should not be mixed with other problems. This conference for European affairs. We are here for Europe. It would be bad for us to try to strike bargains between the European and Asiatic situations. If necessary to discuss the latter, let's have another conference on Asia.

(e) As to Europe, we are trying to unite not divide it. Division of Europe has led to situation where defensive alignments had to be set up. Strictly defensive in character, they are aimed at no one. They have defensive goals. We do not wish to negotiate on the defense efforts of our peoples. We are motivated by our understanding of the legitimate security requirements of all, including Soviets. We are interested in mutual security [illegible] separate national security.

(f) Reference will then be made to Austrian problem along familiar lines.

(g) Regarding Germany, we are trying to establish a peace treaty. For this purpose we need an all-German government and thus free elections and the necessary conditions therefor. Our objective is the peace treaty. Such treaty should not be based on vengeance or imposition of controls. We must avoid consequences of the first world war. There are two paths to a solution, coercion or association. History shows error of first path, hence need for system of defense to prevent aggression by means of association. As to suggestions regarding German neutrality, this would tend to make Germany an umpire rather than one of the players. Our goal is not to use Germany as an instrument in a policy of strength but to include it in a league of free peoples of the West.

(h) Bidault will conclude speech with what he calls certain "French shadings" and by general remarks on the conditions of peace and avoidance of war.

(i) He characterized the approach embodied in this speech as devoid of polemics, flexible, and low pitched.

Secretary and Eden complimented Bidault on his presentation and Secretary said that any minor suggestions he might have would be passed on privately. He also emphasized need to avoid any leaks to public re nature of speech until delivery.

3. Discussion of procedure re other speeches at opening meeting

On assumption he would be second speaker, Eden indicated he had in mind talking in general terms about our plan for free elections in Germany. Although it was not intended to table specific plan for free elections, Eden thought speech dealing with subject would introduce something concrete into discussion.

There was a discussion of the time which would be required for the delivery of the French and British speeches and the possibility Molotov might also wish to make opening statement tomorrow. Eden and Bidault both indicated desire, if Molotov should speak, for US also give opening statement tomorrow. Possibility that Molotov would insist on equality of right to make opening remarks on first day and also might wish present specific agenda proposals was discussed. It was agreed that when Secretary sees Molotov before meeting tomorrow (see separate telegram [5]), he would sound him out regarding these matters.

4. Western agenda

I agreed that our optimum agenda would be that contained in Paris tripartite group report. [6]

5. Austria

It was agreed Secretary's suggestion that various unagreed points regarding Austria (article 35, neutrality, security guarantees, Austrian military forces) would be discussed by tripartite committee experts set up yesterday's meeting (see paragraph 4, Secto 12 [7]).

6. Declaration of intent

It was agreed that this project should be reviewed by tripartite expert committee.

7. HICOMer report on discussion with Blankenhorn

British HICOMer reported to Foreign Ministers that we had outlined earlier in day to Blankenhorn reasons why we did not find it possible to accept latest German proposals re *Volkspolizei* and Soviet Zone elections. [8] Blankenhorn seemed to take our negative attitude calmly and indicated these matters had not been given full consideration on German side and had not been cleared with Foreign Relations Committee of Bundestag.

Blankenhorn emphasized desire Adenauer be informed daily re conference developments and was informed that every such effort would be made. Bidault thought daily briefings might be impracticable or unnecessary.

British HICOMer also reported decision to give reply to Adenauer's letter of January 18 to Blankenhorn tomorrow evening. [9]

No tripartite meeting set for tomorrow.

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[5] In Secto 13 from Berlin, Jan. 24, the U.S. Delegation reported that Molotov had agreed to meet Secretary Dulles one-half hour before the opening of the conference to discuss the procedural arrangements for the first meeting. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, "Sectos and Tosecs")

[6] The agenda in the Tripartite Working Group Report read:

"(A) Problems of German Unity

"(B) Austrian State Treaty

"(C) The Problem of Security in Europe

"(D) Other Matters". (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 178)

[7] Document 347.

[8] The U.S. Delegation reported on the meeting with Blankenhorn, substantially along the lines indicated here, in Secto 14 from Berlin, Jan. 24. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

[9] Not identified further.

No. 350

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY BERLIN, January 24, 1954.

I summarized for M. Bidault the procedural talks which we had heretofore with the Soviet, and indicated it was my intention here to propose to Molotov that we on our side would prepare a plan on the basis of President Eisenhower's proposal and would exchange it with the Soviet plan simultaneously at a date to be agreed upon.[1] M. Bidault said that he thought that was wise procedure postponing a conference meeting as long as possible.

I said nothing to M. Bidault as to when the French would be invited to consider the plan, but was implicit in what I said—that they would at least have a chance to see it and make comments on it before it was delivered to the Soviet.

M. Bidault indicated that he thought Franco was embarking on an ambitious plan to build himself up at the expense of France, and perhaps of Britain. He said he felt that (Franco) was encouraged in this regard by the Base Agreement which we had made; and also M. Bidault referred to a report which had considerable currency in Europe that the U.S. was considering shifting the headquarters of NATO to Spain as a more solid base than France. I told M. Bidault this was new to me, and he said that their information was that it had been suggested by some Congressional committee or subcommittee.

M. Bidault said that Franco was in a good position to stir up trouble in Africa, because Spain was not a member of the U.N., and therefore was not subject to being attacked in the U.N. as France had been.[2]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] For documentation on the procedural talks with the Soviet Union beginning Jan. 11 at Washington, which evolved from President Eisenhower's address on Dec. 8, 1953 to the U.N. General Assembly, see vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1334 ff.

[2] At lunch on Jan. 24 Secretary Dulles asked Bidault about possible bilateral talks with Molotov. Bidault did not show the enthusiasm which Eden had (see Document 348), but stated that if there were such bilateral talks, he would have to engage in some himself. Bidault commented further that it would be better if the initiative for such talks came from Molotov. (Dulte 4 from Berlin, Jan. 25, 110.11 DU/1-2554)

No. 351

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Austria (Davis) [1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 25, 1954.

Participants: Mr. G.W. Harrison, British Delegation
Mr. J. Sauvagnargues, French Delegation
Mr. Mille, French Delegation
Mr. Richard B. Freund, American Delegation
Mr. Richard H. Davis, American Delegation

I Troop Withdrawal

We stated that some thought had been given on U.S. side to need retreat positions beyond Paris tripartite agreement [2] should the Soviets insist upon their proposal or should the Austrians make a similar proposal at some time during Berlin or after, as the Austrian Chancellor has already stated publicly he would do.

The French argued that a distinction should be made between a proposal for complete withdrawal of troops and a proposal for reduction to symbolic token forces. Complete withdrawal would leave Austria defenseless and a military vacuum. They would oppose complete withdrawal but would be inclined to favor a reduction. Both British and French were agreed that the NATO Treaty plus the Greek-Turkish Protocol [3] brings Austria within the NATO umbrella as long as we have any armed forces there. Both British and French asked whether we had the idea of taking the initiative in proposing a reduction to token level and appeared to favor the idea in certain circumstances. We said we had no official U.S. position on this.

We discussed the conditions which we were thinking of attaching to any agreement with the Soviet Union in response to a Soviet proposal for withdrawal or reduction:

1. *Insist upon Agreement that Austria Be Permitted to Raise Armed Forces as Contemplated in Article 17 of Treaty:* British agreed that this condition should be advanced, but French while recognizing need Austrian defenses were worried over the principle

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[1] This meeting took place on Jan. 24; the U.S. Delegation reported the discussion in Sectos 21 and 23 from Berlin, Jan. 26. (Both 396.1 BE/1-2354)

[2] Under reference is the Final Report of the Tripartite Working Group, which met at Paris Dec. 16–21, 1953. For a summary of the conclusions of this report, see Document 320.

[3] For text of the protocol to North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17, 1951, see *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 853–854.

of permitting a pretreaty army (presumably concerned over a precedent for Germany).

2. *Insist upon Agreement for Disposition of Former German Assets More Favorable to Austria Than Presently Contemplated in Article 35.* The French opposed making this condition and the British were doubtful, although they saw a possible propaganda advantage in making a plea. The French felt it would be asking the Soviets to make another concession for having made what they already regarded as a concession. We suggested that point on disposition of German assets could be put forward by the West as something additional that Austria deserves now and possibly include mention of the undesirability of the Soviet extra-territorial position after troop withdrawal.

We also explained that in connection with a proposal for withdrawal or reduction, we should obtain an Austrian commitment to raise an authorized army or, failing Four Power agreement on an Austrian army, to increase the Austrian gendarmerie to provide adequate internal security. No withdrawal or reduction would take place until Austrian security forces were adequate. British went along on this but French appeared to have some doubts as expressed above under 1.

Both British and French agreed that if the Soviet proposal for withdrawal or reduction is conditioned upon a limitation on Austrian security forces, we can reject the proposal as leaving Austria defenseless.

We mentioned the propaganda advantage of an actual Soviet withdrawal or reduction in Austria, which would be the first Soviet withdrawal in Europe since the end of the war.

Conclusion: Both British and French must ask for instructions as they had no position beyond the conclusion of the Paris Working Group that we should reply to a possible Soviet proposal by insisting upon conclusion of a treaty; should refuse complete evacuation and consult the Austrians before responding to a demand for reduction to token levels.

II Security Declaration

We referred to the Paris Working Group discussion of this point which did not result in any agreement. We said that at the moment we were only interested in getting French and British agreement in principle, that a security declaration on Austria by the three Western Powers would not be needed until after ratification of the treaty or perhaps should be considered in connection with the Soviet demands for neutralization or perhaps should be made in event of agreement on complete withdrawal of troops. We also thought it should be mentioned to the Austrians if negotiations on the treaty at Berlin go far enough and that NATO should be informed at an appropriate time.

The French and British agreed in principle that Austria was part of the free world and that a way should be found to express the firm intention of the West that it should remain so.

The British asked in what form NATO would be notified and agreed that while other NATO powers should be invited to associate themselves with a Three Power Security Declaration, they should not be given veto power over its issuance.

Mention was made of the Austrian idea advanced once by Foreign Minister Figl that Austria would, in the face of a Soviet demand for neutralization, insist upon an "iron clad guarantee" from the Four Powers. The French opposed any idea of a quadripartite guarantee. The British saw objections but also pointed out that a Three Power security declaration might not be suitable. British opinion was that an Austrian treaty would probably be concluded only when the international atmosphere had greatly improved and the Ministers might not then consider the time and circumstances appropriate to a Three Power guarantee of Austria. We expressed the opinion that decisions could best be taken in light of the situation at the time, but cited our doubts about a quadripartite guarantee tying our hands.

As regards the various drafts discussed by the Paris Working Group, the British representative prefers B but British legal experts prefer A. The French definitely preferred A. The British thought perhaps a combination of A and B embodying the idea of a threat to the security of the Western Powers as well as providing for consultation on measures to be taken would be best. We said there was no necessity for agreement on the text of the declaration now.

While British and French were agreed in principle that a security declaration on Austria should be considered, they thought the three Ministers would wish to consult on the proposal at an appropriate time depending on developments.

III Military Talks with the Austrians

A. *Use of Austrian Manpower:* We referred to the plan recommended by the three High Commissioners in Vienna approximately a year ago to consult with the Austrians in regard to the use of Austrian manpower in the event of an emergency. The U.S. High Commissioner had received his instructions but the British and French High Commissioners were not authorized to go ahead with tripartite consultations with the Austrians.

The British said that it had been decided to authorize the British High Commissioner in Vienna to go ahead on talks with the Austrians if the situation has not changed after Berlin. The British

High Commissioner would be authorized to make only an oral approach and only in general terms.

The French have reached no decision being reluctant in principle, afraid of leaks and Soviet retaliation going so far as to split Austria. The French must ask for instructions.

B. *Austrian Commitment to Raise Post-Treaty Army:* We said we thought it necessary to obtain from the Austrians a definite commitment to raise a post-treaty army. We would also need Austrian agreement to accept military assistance for their forces.

The British have already authorized their representative in Vienna to go ahead on this. The French are in agreement to raise question when near conclusion of treaty but still must obtain instructions from Paris. Both British and French were opposed to having talks with the Austrians before further developments at Berlin.

According to the British, these commitments should be sought orally. We said we were not certain whether they should be oral or in writing, though they could be sought orally and confirmed later in writing through a memorandum of conversation.

IV Article 35

The French and British continue to be opposed to proposing the revision of Article 35 if the Austrians fail to make a plea for its revision. However, they are in agreement with the tripartite Paris Working Group decision which requires the three Foreign Ministers to consult if the Austrians fail to plead for the revision of Article 35.

We said that even if the Austrians did not raise Article 35, we would want to, but we were aware of the danger that our plea for revision might result in the Soviet Union being able to place the onus on us for failure to conclude a treaty unless we exercise care.

The British thought that we could safely plead in general terms for reconsideration of the economic burdens placed on Austria by the present Article 35 and perhaps suggest certain possibilities for revision but they were opposed to any definite proposal being made for revision, such as tabling a redraft of Article 35 in a ministerial meeting.

V The Working Group

There was general agreement that the three Ministers should seek to obtain Soviet agreement on the instructions on the principal treaty issues particularly Article 35 which should be issued to any working group which might be set up to discuss the Austrian treaty. However, it was evident that the British and French were restricted to making the attempt rather than insisting upon instructions before the Austrian treaty could be referred to a Working Group. They did agree that both reference to a Working Group and discussion of specific issues by the Ministers would not be worthwhile unless the Soviets showed serious intention of concluding a treaty.

VI Possible Soviet Charges Against Austrian Gendarmérie

It was agreed in view of recent Soviet press articles attacking our support of the Austrian *Gendarmérie*, that we must be prepared to reply. We said we had a paper prepared on this subject and we would get together to consult at an early date.

VII Yugoslav Observer at Berlin

In reply to our question, the French stated that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris informed Parodi last Wednesday or Thursday that Yugoslavia would send an observer to Berlin and wanted to be consulted about the Austrian question. The Yugoslavian Ambassador did not know why or in what form the Yugoslavian government desired to be consulted.

The British had not been approached and thought Yugoslavia's action might have some connection with the question of Trieste or might have been stimulated by the report that the Italians were sending an observer to Berlin. It was pointed out that the three Ministers had already agreed there could be no question of consulting with the Yugoslavs but we could inform them of matters affecting their interest in preparation of the Austrian treaty. We stated we were still awaiting information from our Embassy in Belgrade regarding the Yugoslavian move. All agreed that no further action was necessary unless the Yugoslavs raised the question again.

B. PROCEEDINGS OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE, JANUARY 25–FEBRUARY 18, 1954

January 25, 1954

No. 352

Editorial Note

Documentation on the Berlin Conference comes from three principal sources in Department of State files. The most extensive set of records is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193–216. Similar materials are in CFM files, lot M 88, boxes 167–168. The third repository is the central file 396.1 BE, which contains a small but significant amount of documentation. All three sources duplicate each other extensively.

Lots 60 D 627 and M 88 include in their records sets of the documents of the conference (designated FPM (54)–), United States Delegation background papers (designated BER D–), records of the Tripartite Working Group (designated BER MIN), records of the United States Delegation meetings (designated USDEL MIN), sets of the United States Delegation verbatim records of the plenary meetings (usually designated USDEL PLEN/), copies of the telegrams to and from the delegation (designated Secto and Tosec respectively), and records of the six restricted sessions of the conference. In general these records are more nearly complete in the Conference files than in the CFM files. In addition to these records the Conference files have complete sets of the telegrams to and from Secretary Dulles (designated Dulte and Tedul) and have a large collection of memoranda of conversations between members of the United States Delegation and Austrian, British, French, German, and Soviet officials who were attending the conference or were in Berlin while it met. The material in 396.1 BE is largely confined to telegrams to and from the delegation, records of the restricted sessions, and an occasional memorandum of conversation.

Supplementing these sources are two collections of documents on the conference which were made public shortly after its completion. A British publication, *Documents relating to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America, Berlin, January 25–February 18, 1954, Miscellaneous No. 5 (1954)* (hereafter cited as Cmd. 9080), presents statements from the plenaries and various documents of the conference. A United States publication, *Foreign Ministers Meeting, Berlin Discussions, January 25–February 18, 1954* (hereafter cited as *Berlin Discussions*), presents a similar record, although the texts of the several statements produced in it are not exactly the same as those in Cmd. 9080, nor are the same ones included in both publications. References to these two sources have been used to provide citations for the full texts of statements which are otherwise summarized in the following documentation. In addition to these publications, Foreign Secretary Eden has written his own account of the conference in Eden, *Full Circle*, pages 65–85 and 97–100.

The documentation that follows presents the conference in a day-to-day manner from the opening session on January 25 to the twenty-first and final plenary on February 18. The material for each day has been presented in the order in which the events took place as nearly as can be determined. Because of the vagueness concerning the times of some of the meetings and conversations, the editors have been forced to place some records at the end of a given day. Telegrams coming to the United States Delegation have been inserted at the time of their arrival, where possible, and telegrams from the delegation have been printed either at the time of their dispatch or at the time of the event that they are recording. Records of all the plenary and restricted sessions are included, as are records of the most significant conversations which were found in the three principal sources cited above. Unfortunately records of the tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings, which generally preceded a plenary, have not been found with the exception of a very few which have been printed. The editors have also included memoranda of conversations that took place during the conference, but which were not devoted to topics on the agenda. Conversations of lesser importance have been summarized in footnotes or editorial notes where appropriate.

Following the presentation of the daily evolution of the conference, the editors have presented the various documents introduced during the sessions. This section is not inclusive since many of the conference documents appear as parts of the records of the meetings or in the memoranda of conversations, but all those documents which are referred to throughout the conference are accounted for in one place or the other. In the final section the editors have set forth reports and analyses of the conference by major United States participants.

No. 353

Editorial Note

Principal Members of the Delegations to the Berlin Conference

This list is taken from the records of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168) It comprises only those individuals mentioned in the documentation that follows. Regarding Austrian and German officials, see the "List of Persons" at the front of this volume.

BRITISH DELEGATION

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Frederick R. Hoyer Millar, High Commissioner for Germany
Sir William Hayter, Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Anthony Nutting, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Frank Roberts, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Geoffrey W. Harrison, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

William Denis Allen, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Frederick W. Warner, Central Department in the Foreign Office

Michael S. Williams, Head of the United Nations Political Department, Foreign Office

Angus C. E. Malcolm, Minister and Deputy High Commissioner for Austria

Charles H. Johnston, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany

FRENCH DELEGATION

Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs

André François-Poncet, High Commissioner for Germany

Louis Joxe, Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Jean Sauvagnargues, Counselor for Foreign Affairs

Jean Mille, Central European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

François Seydoux de Clausonne, Head of the European Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jean Laloy, Counselor of the Foreign Ministry

Jacques Roux, Director for Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Vincent Broustra, Head of the Permanent French Delegation at the United Nations

Henri Bayle, Director General of Political Affairs, Office of the French High Commissioner for Germany

Konstantin Andronnikov, Official Interpreter, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Roger Lalouette, Deputy High Commissioner for Austria

SOVIET DELEGATION

Vyachselav Mikhailovich Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Vladimir Semyonovich Semyenov, High Commissioner for Germany

Yakov Aleksandrovich Malik, Ambassador to the United Kingdom

Georgiy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Ambassador to the United States

Sergei Aleksandrovich Vinogradov, Ambassador to France

O.A. Troyanovsky, Official Interpreter, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Georgiy Maksimovich Pushkin, Vice Minister for German and Austrian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Arkadiy Aleksandrovich Sobelev, Adviser to the Foreign Minister

D.A. Zhukov, Chief of Protocol

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

James B. Conant, High Commissioner for Germany

Charles E. Bohlen, Ambassador to the Soviet Union

C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President

Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense

Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff

David K.E. Bruce, Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community

Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Robert C. Creel, Chief of the Political Affairs Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany

Richard H. Davis, Counselor of Embassy, Vienna

Richard B. Freund, Officer in Charge of Italian and Austrian Affairs Department of State

Walter P. McConaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State

Brewster Morris, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs, Department of State

Edward Page, Counselor in the Office of the Special Representative in Europe

Henry Suydam, Chief of the News Division, Department of State

Ray L. Thurston, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State

William R. Tyler, Special Assistant to the Ambassador to France

Lt. Col. Edwin F. Black, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

Arthur C. Nagle, Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Peter Rutter, Political Officer, Embassy in London
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, General Counsel, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany
Loyd V. Steere, Director of the Office of Political Affairs, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany
Melvin F. Manfull, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Representative in Europe
Jack S. Herfurt, Security Officer
Alfred V. Boerner, Director of Public Affairs, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany
Robert H. Lochner, Chief of the Press Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany
Michael B. Lustgarten, Vice Consul at Berlin
Donald B. Eddy, Division of International Conferences, Department of State
Richard T. Hamilton, Information Officer at Bonn
John M. Anspacher, Chief of the Policy Staff, Office of the High Commissioner for Germany

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No. 354

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)[1]

SECRET

BERLIN, January 25, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. Michael B. Lustgarten (Interpreter)
Mr. V.M. Molotov
Mr. Andrei Gromyko
Mr. O.A. Troyanovski (Interpreter)

Subject: Procedural questions relating to first meeting of CFM

The Secretary stated that he had wished to talk to Mr. Molotov concerning procedures for the first meeting today and other questions related thereto. It had been suggested by the French and British Ministers that inasmuch as the building they were meeting in was in the American sector that Mr. Dulles might be the Chairman at the first meeting, the Chairmanship then to follow by rotation in the order established by previous four-power meetings (which would mean Mr. Bidault would come next, then Mr. Eden and then Mr. Molotov) but that a change in the rotation might be made when they moved to the Soviet sector so that Mr. Molotov would chair the first meeting there.

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[1] This conversation took place at the ACA building in Berlin at 2:30 p.m. on Jan 25.

Mr. Molotov expressed his agreement with this suggested procedure.

The Secretary then, turning to the conduct of today's meeting, said that in general the first meetings have been devoted to a general statement by each of the Ministers as cared to do so and he thought it would be advisable to follow this procedure. He said that he had been informed that Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden would speak about 20 minutes and he hoped this would be agreeable to Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Molotov said he agreed with the procedure but in view of the fact that he would probably have to answer at least two speakers he hoped the Secretary would be indulgent if he ran somewhat over the 20 minutes.

Turning to the question of translation, the Secretary said that equipment for simultaneous translation had been installed in the ACA building and he had thought that in order to save time some use might be made of it, or did Mr. Molotov prefer consecutive translations.

Mr. Molotov said that this was a question he had not thought about and that he felt, with ear-phones, simultaneous translation sometimes caused inconvenience particularly in verifying the accuracy of the translation. He thought this question should be studied by their representatives before changing the method previously used at such meetings.

The Secretary then inquired if Mr. Molotov had any objection to having the English and French done simultaneously while the Russian was consecutive.

Mr. Molotov's first reaction was that it was better to stick to the consecutive translation but when it was explained in detail to him how this would work—that only French and English would proceed simultaneously while translations to and from the Russian would be consecutive—he agreed to it.

The Secretary said that they could try it out today and that if it was unsatisfactory they could return to the consecutive translation in all languages but that this system would save one-third of the time.

It was then agreed tentatively that the meetings would start at 3 p.m. and would last up to 7 p.m. or thereabouts but that this would, of course, be subject to the decision of the Ministers at any given session.

During the discussion Mr. Molotov made a number of heavy joking remarks about the fact that the three other Ministers had been consulting separately.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

No. 355

396.1 BE/1-2554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 25, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 17. Department pass OSD. First session of four Foreign Ministers was declared open by Secretary Dulles, acting as Chairman, at 1518 hours this afternoon. [2] (First 17 minutes had been taken up with photographers and technical explanation to delegates of how to operate simultaneous translation equipment.) This telegram will summarize course of session up to 1650 hours, at which point Molotov proposed short recess.

After declaring meeting open, Secretary said he would preside at first session at suggestion of his colleagues, since conference building was in US sector. After referring in general terms to hopes held by entire world for success of conference, he turned to number of technical and procedural matters, all of which had been agreed in principle by Molotov in immediately preceding 30-minute private conversation. [3] He said principle of rotating chairmanship had been agreed upon and that in ACA Building chairmanship would rotate in same order as that of speaker (US, French, British, Soviet) but that new order of rotation would begin when meetings held in Soviet sector to permit Molotov to chair first meeting there if he so desired. Secretariat would keep general record of meetings (time of start and adjournment) and formal record of any decisions reached. Secretary suggested all meetings start at 1500 hours and endeavor adjourn around 1900; by mutual agreement certain additional private sessions might be held, limited to four Ministers and principal advisers. Secretary then suggested that if his colleagues had no other technical or procedural points to bring up, each in turn might wish make substantive statement of general character; he called first on M. Bidault.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections, the first covering the statements by Eden and Bidault and the second covering Molotov's statement. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Frankfurt, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the first meeting, USDEL PLEN/1, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193. For the texts of the three opening statements, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 1-14, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 5-24. For the text of Dulles' opening remarks, see *ibid.*, p. 4.

[3] For a record of this conversation, see the memorandum by Bohlen, *supra*.

Bidault, who spoke for 19 minutes, sounded at outset keynote of hope present conference would lead to lasting improvement in international relations and put end to present division of world; he stressed importance of doing nothing at conference to destroy this atmosphere of hope and of open-mindedness on part of delegates. He referred to two recent developments as already having contributed to some relaxation of international tension—cessation of hostilities in Korea (which proved similar development not impossible elsewhere) and bold offer of President Eisenhower, which gave first glimpse of how to solve grave problems arising from atomic threat.[4] Bidault also made passing reference to (1) need for big-power accord on limitation and international control of armaments, but said this problem should continue to be handled in UN and (2) pressing current problems in Asia but said these should each be treated on own merits and not mixed up with problems of Europe.

Bidault then stressed that present conference should be devoted entirely to European problems, with regard to which French long-term objective has always been a general settlement in which free peoples would bring about end to present division of Europe. Latter situation, while deplorable, had nevertheless made necessary certain defensive associations which were threat to no one. He said at this point that it was indispensable to establish firmly that this defense effort could not be made a matter for negotiation. On other hand must take into account legitimate aspirations of others for their own security and this French Government was prepared to do, on basis of assuring security for all and creating conditions for an enduring peace.

Bidault then stressed present discussions should bear on concrete problems capable of early settlement—peace treaties for Austria and Germany. Austrian treaty in particular should present no great difficulty, he said, in view advanced state of present draft treaty; if it proved impossible clean this up here, it would be bad omen for other more difficult problems. As for German treaty, Bidault said essential pre-condition was a government representing Germany as a whole, which could emerge only on basis of free elections; "It is the elections which make the government and not the government which makes the elections". Once agreement reached at this conference on necessary conditions to assure free elections, it should be possible to pass on rapidly to matter of peace treaty with participation of true representatives of a united Germany. As for general character of German treaty, he said it should not be based on revenge or on a strict interpretation of Potsdam agreement; also it should not be such as to leave Germany isolated or make possible renewed German aggression. To accomplish such result, French Government felt that experience had shown that principle of free association was much better formula than that of coercive control and that therefore Germany should be permitted to enter an association of a strictly defensive character which by its very nature would make impossible any aggressive act on part of its members; it was undesirable in any case to restore situation where country in center of Europe could play off East against West and develop from a pawn into the umpire.

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[4] See footnote 2, Document 326.

In conclusion, Bidault stressed special interest of France in a peaceful, stable and united Germany and asserted that French Government had drawn conclusion from recent evolution of West Germany that destiny of democracy in Germany was linked to association of Germany with the West.

Mr. Eden then spoke for 14 minutes, endorsing at outset "constructive and conciliatory spirit" shown by M. Bidault. He said it was sincere wish of British people that contacts re-established at this conference could be maintained and that our objectives here must be (1) to break down barriers within Europe and (2) to encourage "more confident" relations between West and Soviet Union. Emphasizing that he believed in doctrine of "limited objectives", he urged that conference concentrate its efforts on the two major European problems of Germany and Austria. He said Austrian question was simple one and there was "no conceivable reason" why agreement should not be reached on it here. He then made reference to problem of security and said that if despite guarantees afforded to Soviet Union by British Government's commitments under UN Charter and its treaty with Soviet Union, latter should still feel further assurances are needed re British defensive purposes, "we shall be ready to examine that problem with them".

As for Germany, Eden said its present division was "unnatural" and that as long as it remained there could be no unity or stability in Europe; on other hand peaceful reunification of Germany and conclusion of peace treaty would relax international tension throughout world. He then laid stress on free elections throughout Germany as essential first steps, since only through such elections could an all-German government be formed with necessary authority to act for German people and accept peace settlement. Eden went on to spell out sequence of free elections, preparation of constitution, formation of all-German government which should be free to assume any international rights and obligations of either previous German regime, and negotiation of peace treaty with this representative all-German government. He said a peace treaty drafted by four powers and imposed on Germany would be entirely unacceptable. On above principles, Eden said, he could not compromise, although he was ready join in seeking all acceptable ways of achieving what he hoped was our common aim—reunification of Germany as a free, peaceful and democratic state and conclusion of peace treaty with such a Germany. (Full texts Bidault and Eden statements released to press).

Course of session following brief recess proposed by Molotov will be summarized in subsequent telegram. [5]

Following is summary of second part of today's meeting:

Immediately after interpretation of Bidault's statement at 1655 p.m. Molotov asked and received unanimous agreement for brief recess. Meeting reconvened at 1725, at which time Secretary called on Molotov.

Molotov began his 40 minute statement by pointing out that present meeting has attracted widespread world attention. Some circles expect important results, but others already have been predicting failure. The Soviet Government is of the former opinion and hopes the other participants are also. Despite differences of opinion between France, the UK and USA, the USSR, as expressed in a lengthy exchange of notes before the conference, [6] all parties are agreed that there should be a conference. The conference will fill the expectations of millions of people in the degree to which it strengthens peace, reduces world tensions and guarantees European security.

Soviet delegation, Molotov continued, believes question of agenda of meeting must be regarded "not formally but according to its substance". It must be arranged that agenda should include questions, consideration of which would aid the strengthening of peace and a further arrangement of international relations, in connection with which definite results have been achieved during the past year. Not to be underestimated is the armistice in Korea, largely achieved as the result of the initiative of the Chinese People's Republic and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Positive results of this development have been expressed in Asia, Europe and America.

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[5] The report on the remainder of the meeting was also sent as Secto 17, but was dated Jan. 26, 11 a.m.; the two parts of Secto 17 are printed here as one telegram.

[6] Regarding the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union during the summer and fall of 1953, see Documents 257 ff.

As respects German question, which all believe should be on agenda, Molotov said, it is clear that German problem is related to European security and peace, and cannot be considered in isolation. It is well known that German militarism started World Wars I and II. The Soviet people cannot forget the sufferings and sacrifices of themselves and others, including German people in World War II. The German question must be solved so as to prevent a third adventure of German militarism. This was the purpose of agreements at Yalta and Potsdam and coincides with the interest of the German people themselves. These agreements point out the path to be taken by the Berlin conference in the interests of European security. They signify that neither a unified Germany nor part of Germany should be attracted to a grouping such as EDC, which represents a military bloc of some European states directed against other European states. Attraction of Germany into EDC not only would prevent attainment of German national unity but would also seriously increase the danger of a new war in Europe. If the door is opened to German militarism, danger of a new world war is inevitable. It is not surprising that the peoples of Europe are deeply worried over which road will be opened for German development: Peaceful collaboration with other countries or preparations for a new war which might lead, incidentally, to fratricidal strife among Germans themselves.

One might ponder one other serious result of renewal of German militarism. Creation of a European army, of which Germany would be strongest member, might call forth a new alignment of power in which the countries of Europe would form two mutually opposing military groups and still further increase the danger of a new war. Such continental European powers as the USSR and France would have to consider that their interests coincide with those of France, Poland, England, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and all other peace-loving peoples. This is why the USSR legitimately raises the point that the solution of the German question should meet the demands of security guarantees in Europe, and this can be done only by unifying Germany as a peaceful and democratic state and by barring from power German militarists and revanchists.

In the above connection, Molotov then made recall of the Franco-Soviet treaty against German militarism, the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942 and the Franco-British treaty of 1947, as well as the Potsdam agreements, arguing that they represent useful bases for guarantees of European security. All this, he said, show closely the German question is related to a reduction in world tensions.

Molotov then raised question of failure of three powers and USSR to agree on a five-power conference, including CPR, on measures to reduce international tensions. He proposed that this question be considered at Berlin conference and expressed readiness to offer concrete proposals on it, particularly that it should take place soon. He argued that only efforts of all the great powers can guarantee reduction of tensions and referred to responsibilities of UNSC and provisions of UN Charter in regard to responsibility of the five great powers for maintenance of peace. At this time, he said, these provisions are thwarted by US which prevents CPR from assuming its rightful place in the UN.

A meeting of the five powers is necessary, Molotov continued, to put an end to the armaments race which is so burdensome economically. Billions of dollars and pound expenditures on one side has only the effect of stimulating new measures on the other side. The same observation applies to American foreign military bases which, Molotov said, discredit themselves and whose underlying policy is headed for failure.

It follows therefore that one must recognize the urgency of such measures as reducing significantly all armaments and the adoption of measures for the abolition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction; the institution of effective international controls on their abolition; and as a first step toward this the refusal of governments to employ atomic weapons. Included among other problems whose solutions are pressing is that of admission of the CPR into the UN. Such action would have great effect in the settlement of important international political and economic problems, including the question of Korea.

As is known, Molotov continued the Korean political conference has run into serious difficulties. Agreement on its membership has not yet been reached. Sharp differences between the two sides have found their expression in a crude violation of the armistice agreement provision concerning prisoners of war. All this in no small degree traces back to the absence of normal relations between several great powers. There can be no doubt that a five-power meeting would help resolve not only the Korean but also other current international problems.

Some countries refuse to recognize CPR but refusal to recognize facts and important historical developments has never given positive results. Twenty-five governments, whose population approximates one billion, have established diplomatic relations with CPR. Many more governments would have liked to follow their example, and the reason they have not done so requires no explanation. The Soviet Government believes this situation cannot continue much longer. A five-power meeting would greatly aid in improving the international situation.

Another measure to relieve international tension, Molotov claimed, would be to improve trade relations between states. He referred to the American-led blockade against USSR and peoples democracies, saying its only result had been the formation of a second world market and closer economic relations between the Soviet-bloc countries. Many countries, Molotov predicted, would be interested in a five-power meeting leading to normalization of international trade. Soviet delegation would therefore like to hope that Berlin conference will reach agreement on a five-power meeting.

Besides the five-power meeting and the German problem, Molotov thought, present conference should also examine Austrian question. Strengthening of peace in Europe and national rights of Austrian people require rapid settlement of Austrian question in accordance with the four-power agreement and in such manner that independent Austria becomes neither a tool of aggressive forces nor an instrument of German militarism.

All this, Molotov said, lead him to make following proposals for agenda of Berlin conference.

First, measures for reducing international tensions and to convene a five-power Foreign Ministers meeting.

Second, the German question and the problem of guaranteeing European security.

Third, the Austrian State Treaty.[7]

In adopting such an agenda, Molotov concluded, conference would have opportunity to concentrate its attention on the questions which are at this time the most current and essential. Molotov's statements of Eden and Bidault and with introductory remarks of Secretary regarding hope that meeting will yield positive results, safeguarding security of peoples of Europe and consolidating peace of world.

Immediately after interpretation of Molotov's statement, Secretary proposed that because of late hour meeting be adjourned until tomorrow. Molotov announced that he wondered if it would not be unfair for Secretary not to have opportunity to make his statement today, as other three Foreign Ministers had done. Secretary explained that Molotov's strong criticisms of and attacks on US required answer, but that he would prefer to sleep on them tonight rather than to speak extemporaneously at this time. Molotov said that in that case he had no objection to adjournment. After reaching quick and unanimous agreement to meet again January 26 at 1500, meeting was adjourned at 1855.

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[7] For the final text of the agenda, as adopted at the second plenary, see FPM (54)4, Document 508.

No. 356

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 25, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
Mr. Michael B. Lustgarten (Interpreter)
Mr. V.M. Molotov
Mr. Andrei Gromyko
Mr. O.A. Troyanovski (Interpreter)

During the meeting today the Secretary of State said he expected in a day or two to have a talk with Mr. Molotov to pursue the procedural discussions in regard to atomic energy,[1] to which Mr. Molotov replied that he was ready.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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[1] See footnote 1, Document 350.

January 26, 1954

No. 357

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group at British Headquarters, Berlin, January 26, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-3[1]

PRINCIPALS

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. R. de Margerie
	Sir F. Hoyer Millar	M. Seydoux

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[1] Records of the two previous meetings of the Tripartite Working Group (BER MIN-1 and 2 for Jan. 24 and 25), during which various procedural matters, Austria, German unification, and an electoral law were discussed, are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192.

1. Soviet Proposal for Inclusion of Five-Power Item in Agenda

Mr. MacArthur summarized the Secretary's preliminary reaction to Molotov's proposal for putting the Five-Power item first on the agenda. [2]

De Margerie said that Bidault felt there were some advantages in accepting the Soviet proposal for considering the Five-Power item first. De Margerie made it clear that Bidault stood by his commitment to adhere at least for the present to the agreed "first position".[3] He said that at the same time if there is any chance of a peaceful settlement in Indochina by negotiation, no French Government could flatly refuse an exploration of such an opportunity. It was Bidault's thought that it might be possible to extend the Korean Political Conference, if held, to include Indochina after Korean questions were disposed of.

Bidault felt that it would be possible to explore the possibility of a Southeast Asian Conference (*not a Five-Power conference*) to bring about a settlement of Asiatic problems, primarily the hostilities in Indochina. He agreed with Mr. MacArthur's suggestion that it would be desirable for the three Foreign Ministers to get together at lunch today before the Secretary speaks this afternoon so as to be sure they present a united front. [4]

M. Roux said that there was no basic change in the military or political situation in Indochina which would call for a modification of the French position. The military situation was moderately good. The French had effected a junction of their forces in Central Laos and Northern Laos; Buu Loc [5] had succeeded in forming a new cabinet; the atmosphere in Cambodia was less tense. The situation was "not bad".

Roux recalled that in the National Assembly debate last November the Government had been requested to explore every possibility of a settlement in Indochina. If the Soviets were agreeable to a non-Five-Power conference which would include Indochina, it would be very difficult for Bidault to explain a refusal to accept the opportunity. Roux recognized, however, that the French could not negotiate at the present moment even if they wanted to and seemed to have an opportunity: the political and military situations in Indochina were not yet sufficiently favorable to permit it. Roux indicated that the French expected a political conference on

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[2] Regarding Molotov's proposal and the Soviet agenda, see Secto 17, Document 355. For Secretary Dulles' response to this proposal, see Secto 24, Document 360.

[3] Regarding the "first position" on a five-power conference, see paragraph 3 to Secto 12, Document 347.

[4] Regarding the Foreign Ministers luncheon meeting, see the memorandum by MacArthur, *infra*.

[5] Prince Buu Loc, Prime Minister of Vietnam.

Korea to be arranged eventually and that a conference on Indochina might come immediately thereafter.

De Margerie recalled that Bidault was careful to say as little as possible on the Chinese Communist conference issue in his formal speech of yesterday. Some members of the Cabinet would be disappointed that he did not go further. Bidault had taken something of a chance in being as noncommittal as he was. De Margerie said he thought it was sufficient to say that Bidault would *not* take any initiative on a ministers conference to include Communist China. The question would not arise so far as France was concerned unless Soviet Russia took a new initiative, abandoning the Five-Power theme.

Sir Frank Roberts said that he could not speak authoritatively for Eden although he believed he knew the general tenor of his thinking. Eden felt that we must avoid getting into a wrangle with the Soviets over the Chinese Communist issue. Eden had not gone as far or as fast as the other two Foreign Ministers in his reaction to the Soviet agenda proposal. However, Roberts guessed that Eden would welcome acceptance of the Soviet proposal to put the Chinese item first. However, two pitfalls must be considered: (1) Adverse public relations, especially in Germany, if it seems that the main business of the conference is being subordinated to the alien issue of Communist China; (2) the danger of serious delay in the proper business of the conference.

MacArthur recognized the possibility that the Soviets might try to weave the Five-Power issue into the proceedings throughout the conference but he felt we should not be deterred by this possibility.

Roberts said that the British would not take any initiative in moving away from the agreed "first position".

Roberts felt there was danger of our being put in an awkward position if Molotov got down to particulars and exposed the slight difference of approach of the three western powers toward the Communist China problem.

MacArthur felt that this danger could be avoided if we agreed not to get involved in a hassle. It should be possible to deal with the item without getting deeply involved in it if we refrained from being drawn into a cat-and-dog fight and forced Molotov to talk himself out. There were only a limited number of variations he could play on his theme. Molotov's filibuster could hardly last indefinitely if he received no encouragement from the other three Foreign Ministers.

Sir Frank Roberts raised the question as to how the Delegations would treat the press if the Soviet agenda were accepted in light of German expectations that Germany would be the first item on the agenda. Mr. MacArthur said we should state that we were accepting a procedural point in order to get quickly to the business for which the Western Powers came to the Conference. M. de Margerie said that we should avoid giving the impression that we were merely accepting the first item in order to quash it.

2. The Austrian Item

It was agreed that unless the Soviets raised the question of the participation of the GDR the three Ministers would not take the initiative to raise the question of Austrian participation prior to the time the Austrian item was reached on the agenda. If the Soviets raise the question of participation by the GDR prior to discussion of the German item, this would be answered on its own merits and at that time the Western Ministers could state that although we had not planned to discuss the point at this time there was also the procedural point of the participation of representatives of the Austrian Government.

3. Consultations with Other Governments

It was noted that the three delegations should respond to requests from other Governments to participate as an observer or to receive special consultation that machinery had been developed to keep other countries informed such as the NATO and EDC countries. Non-member countries of these organizations will receive information on matters directly affecting them through normal diplomatic procedures.

4. Germany

The Working Group had completed a revision of the Declaration of Intent (BER D-4/4 [6]) which will be submitted to the Working Group its next meeting. The "Plan for German Re-unification in Freedom" at (BER D-4/42b [7]) was discussed and the last paragraph of Section IV concerning rights of occupying powers was submitted to the HICOM legal advisers for further work.

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[6] Not found in Department of State files. A copy of BER D-4/4c, dated Feb. 1, 1954 is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200.

[7] Not printed. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, "Four-Power Meeting in Berlin")

No. 358

396.1 BE/1-2754

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) of a Luncheon Meeting, Berlin, January 26, 1954, 1 p.m. [1]

SECRET

Participants: Secretary Dulles
M. Bidault
M. Eden
M. MacArthur

At luncheon on January 26th there was discussion among Secretary Dulles, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Bidault of the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference. [2] M. Bidault said that despite serious problems with French public opinion he would stand absolutely firm in opposition to a five-power conference as proposed by the Soviets. He said, however, that if the Soviets subsequently came up with alternatives, particularly an alternative of calling such a conference for the sake of considering questions concerning Southeast Asia, the French would in all probability be obliged to accept.

Secretary Dulles said he understood that if the Soviets proposed a conference dealing with Indochina, the French might feel they had to accept. If, after weighing all aspects of such a possibility, the French decided such a conference was in their own best interest, the United States could not prevent them from accepting it. However, the Secretary said he did not see how a conference dealing with Indochina could be a five-power conference since he assumed that the Associated States would also participate.

M. Bidault said that if the Associated States participated in such a conference, the Vietminh would have to participate, and this would inflate the prestige of the Vietminh and give it the status of a government which was accepted at least as a *de facto* government. Therefore, M. Bidault had been toying with the idea of trying to get a proxy of some sort from the Associated States to represent them at the conference so that Ho Chi Minh would have no pretext for attending. M Bidault indicated that he was still turning this possibility over in his mind and had made no decisions with respect to it.

The conversation then turned to the tactics to be followed by the three Western Powers in the meeting with Molotov about an hour later.

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[1] Drafted on January 27. For a further report on this luncheon, see Dulte 6, Document 362.

[2] Regarding the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference, see Secto 17, Document 355.

Following the close of the quadripartite meeting this afternoon [3] Secretary Dulles requested Mr. MacArthur to get word to the French that if they accepted a five-power conference on Southeast Asia and Indochina, they should bear in mind that the question of whether the United States could participate in such a conference was extremely dubious to say the least; furthermore, that if a conference on Indochina were held without the participation of the Associated States where France purported to speak for them, this would obviously be interpreted as indicating that the Associated States were not free and independent and that the French Declaration of July 3 [4] was without real meaning. Finally, Mr. MacArthur should make clear to the French that if they got involved in negotiations and talks relating to a five-power conference, there might be an extremely adverse effect on the morale and will of the three Associated States and their peoples, who might somehow think France was in the process of negotiating their turn-over to Ho Chi Minh. Any such development which led to a deterioration of the military situation would be a cause for grave concern to the United States, which was pouring hundreds of millions of dollars of treasure and resources into the Indochinese war.

On the morning of January 27 Mr. MacArthur conveyed the foregoing to M. Roland de Margerie. M. de Margerie said he would pass the comments to M. Bidault at once. However, he could give the most firm and categoric assurances that M. Bidault did not have in mind side-tracking or by-passing the Associated States. He said M. Bidault was convinced the Associated States must participate in any negotiations relating to the future of Indochina. The question is whether they would prefer to participate directly, and thus enable Ho Chi Minh to appear at the conference table and have *de facto* recognition, or whether they would prefer to have France negotiating in their behalf, which would enable the exclusion of Ho from the conference table. Furthermore, M. de Margerie said M. Bidault had reached no firm decisions; that no negotiations of any kind had been decided upon; and that M. Bidault's thinking is still hypothetical.

M. de Margerie then said Bidault was under violent attack in the French Parliament because of the developments in North Africa. Bidault's Indochina policy, which involves remaining in Indochina and endeavoring to gain a position of greater strength from which future negotiations might be possible, was being strongly criticized.

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[3] For a report on the second meeting of the Berlin Conference, see Secto 29, *infra*.

[4] The French Declaration of July 3, 1953, offered the three Associated States simultaneous but separate negotiations for a review of their status in the French Union.

French parliamentarians were saying that if France had gotten out of Indochina last summer or autumn and had concentrated their strength in North Africa, Spain would not have dared to create the recent difficulties with respect to Morocco.[5] De Margerie said these arguments made no sense at all, but nonetheless French North Africa was an highly emotional subject with the French and in their dismay at the recent developments instigated by Spain they were looking everywhere for someone to pin the blame on. In this case, they were trying to fix the blame on Bidault.

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[5] At the close of 1953 Spain had refused to recognize the new Sultan of Morocco who would normally have had religious and secular powers in Spanish Morocco as well as French Morocco.

No. 359

396.1 BE/1-2754: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 27, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 29. Department pass OSD. Following summary of first part January 26 meeting,[2] Bidault presiding:

Meeting began with prepared statement by Secretary transmitted Secto 24.[3] Molotov followed with extemporaneous statement on Germany, China and five-power conference. In substance, he said Dulles was wrong in trying to place Soviet position in opposition French and British and that while it would be unrealistic to avoid fact that differences do exist, Foreign Ministers should seek find among such differences those on which they can achieve positive results. He recalled that Bidault, for example, had said it was wrong to have simultaneous discussion Austrian and Korean problems. To this the Soviets agreed, but believed Foreign Ministers should not by-pass either problem. Further, Eden had said British could not agree to a compromise contrary to its point of view on Germany. Molotov emphasized that if none were willing compromise, the Ministers might as well say their work was already over. He added that the Ministers must determine points on which they could agree and recognize others which are not yet ripe for agreement but which could be considered and agreed later.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the second meeting, USDEL PLEN/2, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193. For the full text of the statements by Bidault and Eden, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 29–31.

[3] *Infra.*

Molotov recalled that neither the British nor French Ministers had referred to Yalta or Potsdam, however, he felt it necessary refer these agreements since they have direct relation German problem. Further, Dulles had sought place Soviet views in opposition to those of British and French and had compared Potsdam to Versailles. While Soviets agree Versailles was bad Soviet Union had no responsibility for this. Besides, he saw no connection between Versailles and Potsdam.

Molotov added that Yalta and Potsdam, both signed by US, had as goals development peaceful, democratic Germany. Soviet treaties with France and Britain have same goal. He too believed that Germany interested in following democratic and peaceful path, for in Soviet view any other path for Germany would mean national suicide. While some Potsdam decisions had lost meaning, since only of temporary character, main objectives remained valid. Adherence to these objectives necessary if Germany to become great power, while safeguarding peace. Therefore, he could only regard critically Dulles light-hearted attitude toward these agreements.

He said statements that Soviet Union seeking promote hostility between France and Germany were untrue. On contrary, Soviet Union desired friendship between France, Germany and the Soviet Union. While this was a noble yet difficult task, it did not require opposition of three continental powers to UK and US. He believed that this desire for a *rapprochement* of three continental powers and the Potsdam and Yalta agreements should provide joint basis for the mutual work of the Foreign Ministers. On this basis the Foreign Ministers should attempt to win over majority of Germans as opposed to those Germans who do not desire firm peace. This task in turn would unite four powers.

China. Molotov continued that Chinese People's Republic is a great power and its founding a great historical event. Those failing recognize this may find themselves in difficult situation, from which conference might help them extricate themselves. Fact that all nations on UN Neutral Commission have recognized Chinese People's Republic indicates true situation. While true UN condemned China as aggressor, Soviet Union continues maintain objections this action. In contrast US action, Chinese troops entered Korea only when its territory directly threatened. The three powers must also remember war ended in Korea on initiative of Korean People's Republic and China.

Conference of five great powers. Molotov cited Dulles statements this subject and concluded that it was just as legitimate hold five-power conference as present four-power meeting. He claimed that in UN Security Council the five great powers have certain special rights and only the Chinese People's Republic should represent China in this body. In view special place of big five in international relations, four Foreign Ministers should support suggestion that five-power conference be held as soon as possible. Molotov then tabled following proposal in connection with "the first item on our agenda":

> "Measures to reduce tension in international relations and the convocation of a five-power conference of Ministers. (Proposal of the USSR delegation)
>
> In view of the need to strengthen world peace and the security of the peoples and to eliminate the threat of a new war and the need to create more favorable conditions for the development of political and economic relations between the nations in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,
>
> It shall be deemed advisable to convene in May–June 1954 a Foreign Ministers conference of France, Britain, The USA, The USSR and the Chinese People's Republic to consider urgent measures to reduce tension in international relations". [4]

Dulles then asked Bidault if an agenda had been adopted. Molotov replied there seemed to be no objections. Bidault said, of course, agenda had not been adopted, since "adoption of agenda" had not been placed before Foreign Ministers. He said he would listen to further general statements, but suggested short recess first. Meeting then recessed.

Following summarizes second part of January 26 meeting: Session reconvened at 1727 after 30-minute recess.

Bidault, as chairman, gave floor to himself. Stating that he wished to speak on subject of agenda as had Molotov yesterday, Bidault voiced objection to agenda proposed by Molotov on grounds that it places more general and more difficult problems first. He said that on such an agenda it is preferable to place the easier problems first. As respects the proposed conference of the five Foreign Ministers, Bidault noted that discussions at Berlin had already brought to light serious differences of opinion. As respects German problem, Bidault noted that Molotov's statement of yesterday showed him to be opposed to views previously expressed by Bidault. However, the conference must soon get into substance and must by all means avoid a "three month debate" on procedure. Molotov's proposed agenda is therefore acceptable to French delegation, Bidault concluded, providing that it is clearly understood that French acceptance is not construed as prejudging the substance of the discussions and that France has not accepted Molotov's viewpoints on substance.

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[4] This proposal with slightly different wording was circulated as FPM/54/6 in the records of the conference.

Eden said UK delegation had had in mind another agenda differing in several respects from the one proposed by Molotov. UK would have preferred to begin with German and Austrian questions. UK does not like Molotov's agenda, either in its order or its substance. However, UK is prepared to accept agenda proposed by Molotov with same provisos just stated by French Foreign Minister.

Eden continued that he would like to answer one point made by Molotov yesterday by stating that UK does not reject compromise on German question. What he had said yesterday and what he wished to repeat was that the UK could not compromise on the fundamental principle of free elections in Germany. Eden will be interested to learn during the course of the conference whether Molotov or he shows the better temperament for compromise.

Secretary replied in negative to Bidault's inquiry whether Secretary wished to make statement.

Bidault then declared adopted agenda proposed by Molotov and announced that meeting January 27 at 1500 will commence with point one of that agenda. Meeting was adjourned at 1755.

No. 360

396.1 BE/1-2654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY BERLIN, January 26, 1954.

Secto 24. Department pass OSD, USIA. Following is text of statement by Secretary Dulles at second quadripartite session: [2]

I. This conference affords us the chance to recapture the lofty spirit of those who, with sacrificial dedication, won for us the chance to make the peace. The United States has come here, and will perservere, in that spirit. During the nine years that have elapsed since the end of World War II, many hopes have turned to despair and many friendships have dissolved in bitterness. It is, indeed, five years since our four Foreign Ministers have even met together. Those five years have been marked by a major war in Korea; the intensification of war in Indochina; and growing fear that we are merely in another interlude between world wars.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Paris, London, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] For a record of the second meeting, see Secto 29, *supra*.

This conference provides the occasion for making a fresh start. We meet here in a city whose ruin and division symbolizes the tragic consequences of aggression. Here it should be possible, in a mood of equalizing humility, to work together for peace.

When we came here we knew that there were many matters where we disagreed. But we hoped to find an area of agreement which, if it were jointly cultivated, would invigorate peaceful principles which would finally encompass us all, everywhere. We thought that Germany and Austria provided such an initial field for successful effort.

That was the mood which was made manifest by the opening speeches of M. Bidault and Mr. Eden. Neither of them uttered a single word of recrimination. Both dealt constructively with the future and sought the cooperation which would enable the four of us to build here in the heart of Europe a society which, turning its back upon the tragic past, would be a monument of enduring peace.

II. It was thus a matter of profound disappointment to hear the opening address of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It was not that he said anything that was new. I have heard the same speech many times before. What was saddening was the fact that he seized upon this occasion, the opening of this new conference, this beginning of what could be a new chapter of history, to accumulate and repeat the old false charges and recriminations which have been heard so often from Soviet rulers.

III. If any one thing is certain, it is that the future will never be a future of peace unless it reflects new ideas and new vision. Peace is not had merely by wanting it. We all, I suppose, want peace, on our own terms. Men have always wanted peace on their own terms. Instead of getting peace, they have gotten an endless cycle of recurrent war. War has constantly bred war because, with rare exceptions, the victors in war have been so animated by the spirit of vengeance and hatred that they have been blinded and have themselves unwittingly become the causes of new war.

If, from this standpoint, we review the three speeches which were made yesterday, we cannot but be struck by the difference. M. Bidault and Mr. Eden both made constructive proposals for Germany, which, because they were just, would be lasting. They proposed a Germany which would be united under a government of its own choosing and which would bury its antiquated nationalistic and militaristic ambitions in a durable unity with those who in the past have been the victims of its aggression.

As I listened to the calm, wise words of M. Bidault, I could not but think of our own President Lincoln, who, animated by the spirit of "malice toward none and charity toward all", forged a political unity which has produced the largest measure of human welfare that the world has yet known.

As Mr. Molotov pointed out, France, equally with Russia, was a victim of Nazism. But M. Bidault evoked the spirit which can bind up and heal the wounds of war. Mr. Molotov evoked the spirit of vengeance and of hatred which marked the ill-fated treaty of Versailles. He recalled the decisions of Yalta. It was Yalta which called for the "dismemberment of Germany", for the stripping of Germany of all removable assets and for impressed German labor.

These decisions of Yalta, which my own government shared, were understandable in the context of the day. The German war was still in full vigor and wars are not won by a spirit of tolerance. But it is sad that today, nine years since the German armistice, one of the parties to the Yalta conference should attempt to revive the bitterness and the hatred of those days and the cruel decisions which that hatred and bitterness occasioned.

I had some part in the Paris conference which created the treaty of Versailles. It is easy for me to recall the mood of that conference. We then believed that the way to exorcise evil from the German spirit was to occupy Germany, to demilitarize Germany, to impose upon Germany humiliating discriminations so that she would always be a nation apart, branded openly with the stigma of Cain.

From that experiment, those who truly and wisely seek peace have learned that no great nation is made harmless by subjecting it to discriminations so that it cannot be an equal in the family of nations. Restrictions such as were imposed by the treaty of Versailles, and as are implicit in the Soviet proposals of yesterday, merely incite a people of vigor and of courage to strive to break the bonds imposed upon them and thereby to demonstrate their sovereign equality. Prohibitions thus incite the very acts that are prohibited.

IV. In contrast to the Soviet reversion to a sterile and dangerous past is the French approach as put forward by M. Bidault. France has resolved not to repeat that past. In the interest of permanent peace, she is striving to forge strong links of common interest and purpose to unite Germany with her neighbors.

We can well pause here to pay tribute to the genius of France which has drawn together the six nations of Western Europe in the Coal and Steel Community, which has conceived the European Defense Community and which stimulates the development of a European Political Community.

Such creative thinking marks freedom at its best. It condemns to ridicule those who would destine France to a humble place in the Soviet world of enforced conformity.

Mr. Molotov professes to fear that the European Defense Community would be dominated by German militarism. That is precisely what EDC is designed to prevent. It is a program which acceptably precludes any German national army and any German General Staff. I say "acceptably" because the treaty operates in a nondiscriminatory way. Each of the countries of the European Defense Community accepts for itself in Europe the same conditions as apply to Germany. Thus, there is brought into being a modest defense force in which individual Germans have a minority part and the whole of which is dedicated to defensive purposes. No part of the European army can ever be used to serve any national ends in Europe. That is a program which the Germans themselves willingly accept. The German people are eager, as are the people of France, to find a way to end forever the hideous spectacle of the European nations fighting each other. The treaty to create the European Defense Community was conceived by France, has been signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. The process of ratification is far advanced. There is no known substitute for EDC. Certainly the Soviet Union has proposed none except a return to the obsolete, bankrupt system of Versailles and other so-called "peace" treaties which have bred war.

Surely statesmanship can do better than to recreate the world's worst fire hazard. The country and people of the Soviet Union have been cruelly mutilated by the consequences of German hostility toward France. It seems incredible that Soviet leaders should now be devoting themselves to reviving that Franco-German hostility and to obstructing a unification which would realize the vision of the wise European statesmen who for generations have been preaching unity as the indispensable foundation for lasting peace.

V. The Soviet Foreign Minister suggested that the formation of a European or North Atlantic treaty military force might lead to the creation of a defensive alliance of other European countries, thus splitting Europe into two opposing military groups of states. This is a grotesque inversion of history.

Following the end of World War II, the United States withdrew its vast armies and air and naval forces from Europe and largely dismantled its military establishment. The United Kingdom did likewise. Western Europe itself was left totally devoid of military strength. The Western nations put their primary dependence in the pledges of the United Nations charter. They continued to do so until June 1951. Then the sudden outbreak of hostilities in Korea showed that the United Nations charter did not constitute any absolute guaranty against armed aggression. The free nations realized their insecurity if they remained disarmed and disunited in the face of a powerful military bloc combining the resources of 800,000,000 people.

Mr. Molotov, in his address, cited the principle that action provokes reaction. That is true, as we see; but not with the application which Mr. Molotov gave it.

Another disheartening aspect of the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement was its reiteration of the importance of accepting the Chinese Communist regime as one of the so-called "five great powers" which have world-wide responsibility for the establishment of peace.

This off-spring of Soviet Communism committed flagrant aggression in Korea, for which it was formally condemned by the United Nations. It is actively promoting aggression against Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. All of the nations which are the neighbors of this Chinese Communist regime feel menaced by its scarcely concealed aggressive purpose.

Although six months have gone by since it agreed to hold a political conference with relation to Korea, Communist China has constantly found excuses and placed obstructions in the way.

This convicted aggressor is the nation which the Soviet Union chooses to be its companion in its quest for peace and which it demands should be accepted by the US and others. I would like to state here plainly and unequivocally what the Soviet Foreign Minister already knows—the US will not agree to join in a five-power conference with the Chinese Communist aggressors for the purpose of dealing generally with the peace of the world.

The US refuses not because, as is suggested, it denies that the regime exists, or that it has power. We in the US well know that it exists and has power, because its aggressive armies joined with the North Korean aggressors to kill and wound 150,000 Americans who went to Korea in company with British, French and other United Nations forces to resist that aggression in response to the appeal of the United Nations. We do not refuse to deal with it where occasion requires. We did deal with it in making the Korean armistice. We deal with it today at Panmunjom in our effort to bring about a Korean peace conference. It is, however, one thing to recognize evil as a fact. It is another thing to take evil to one's breast and call it good.

Moreover, the United States rejects the Soviet concept that any so-called "five great powers" have a right to rule the world and to determine the destinies of other nations. The United Nations charter confers no such mandate. Nor is any such mandate to be found in principles of justice and fair dealing. Undoubtedly great power carries with it a great responsibility for promoting and protecting peace, but such power gives no right to dictate to smaller powers or to manage the affairs of the world. We believe in the principle, embodied in the charter of the United Nations, that there is a sovereign equality of all states, great and small.

Despite the discouragement which must be the first reaction to the Soviet Minister's speech, I propose that we refuse to be discouraged and get ahead with our business. We hope that there will be a genuine opportunity for us to explore together new ideas such as have been put forward in the addresses of the Foreign Ministers of France and of Great Britain. In this respect, Mr. Eden has made a series of concrete proposals regarding Germany which deserve our serious consideration.

Mr. Molotov has proposed an agenda. [3] It is not the agenda that we would propose, but it is an agenda which we will take for the sake of getting on with our work. We do not want to turn this conference into another Palais Rose conference [4] where our deputies met for many weeks in futile argument about the agenda. The Soviet Foreign Minister has proposed a first agenda item which includes the convening of a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. The US is willing to deal with, and dispose of, this agenda item.

Then would come the German question and the problem of insuring European security. Germany is a matter which primarily concerns us here, and the sooner we can get to it, the better.

Then the Soviet Union proposed discussion of the Austrian state treaty. Since the treaty was already substantially concluded five years ago, and since the Soviet Union has already received much more than the reparation which it originally demanded, this problem should be quickly disposed of. We would have preferred to deal with it earlier. But if the Soviet Union prefers to leave to the last what is the easiest to do, then we will accommodate ourselves to their wishes in this respect.

The important thing is that we quickly show a capacity to discharge our responsibilities toward others and not to waste our time in recriminations as amongst ourselves.

I have said that power carries with it a great responsibility today; as the four occupying powers in Germany and Austria, we possess a responsibility for which, unless it be well discharged, the verdict of history will find us guilty.

Therefore, I say, let us get on with our work. Let us truly discharge that responsibility on which the hope of millions center.

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[3] For the proposed Soviet agenda, see Secto 17, Document 355.

[4] Reference to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Conference at the Palais Rose) at Paris, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951.

No. 361

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 27, 1954.

Ambassador Joxe gave me the following account of Molotov's dinner last night for Mr. Bidault. On the Russian side there was Molotov, Gromyko, Vinogradov (Soviet Ambassador to France), Pushkin (Vice Minister for German and Austrian Affairs), Zhukov (Chief of Protocol);[2] and for the French, Mr. Bidault, Parodi, Ambassador Joxe and Laloy of the Quai d'Orsay (De Margerie did not attend as his health is poor and there may have been one other member of the French Delegation in his place).

Nothing of any importance transpired at the dinner which had the usual toast to the individuals present, to peace and to the success of the conference etc. Molotov, however, in a reminiscent mood, spoke of his acquaintanceship with world leaders and mentioned that he had personally known Hitler. After dinner, initially Gromyko took Mr. Bidault aside and Molotov took Ambassador Joxe. Molotov had little of interest to say to the Ambassador during this brief period, but Gromyko concentrated with Mr. Bidault on the importance and desirability of a five-power conference. According to Joxe, Mr. Bidault gave him a very short shrift and showed no inclination to pursue the conversation. After that Molotov, Bidault, Joxe, Laloy and the Soviet interpreter sat down around the table. Molotov first talked about Germany without adding anything new to what was heard at the conference, with emphasis on the dangers of German militarism etc., but without, however, even hinting at any concrete or any specific point or proposal. He then turned rather abruptly to the Far East and stated to Mr. Bidault that he felt France should make, at this session, some gesture in favor of a five-power conference. Without apparently troubling to hide the connection, but without definitely stating it, he shifted to Indochina, stating that "we in Moscow" (to which he added that he was not alone in this thought) did not understand exactly what France was after in Indochina. He said that the Soviet Union was very far from the Indochinese scene and had little first-hand knowledge of the situation there (and he implied little interest), but that France was on the spot and very much involved. He then said that if the Soviet Government knew the views of the French Government and whether they would like a settlement now or later or on what basis, his Government would be prepared to act as intermediary in the form of good offices in order to ascertain what the reaction to such a proposition would be. (It was not clear whether Molotov was proposing good offices with Communist China or Ho Chi Minh, or both. I will endeavor to clarify this point.) Bidault refrained from any particular show of interest in this question but merely said that in his view Indochina was not a matter so much of negotiation but first of all for acts of "acquiescence". According to Joxe, what Bidault had in mind was that the Chinese Communists could unilaterally take certain measures necessary in order to prepare the way for negotiations but that these measures were not, properly speaking, subjects for bargaining.

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[1] A notation on the source text by O'Connor indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it. Copies were also sent to Merchant and MacArthur.

[2] A notation on the source text indicates that Semyenov was also present.

No attempt was made by Molotov to link Indochinese matters with German questions. He was mild in his criticisms of the West and even of the U.S. during the evening. During the entire evening Molotov and all the Russians went out of their way to be cordial and pleasant. [3]

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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[3] A summary of this memorandum was transmitted to President Eisenhower in Dulte 8 from Berlin, Jan. 27. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 362

396.1 BE/1–2654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, January 26, 1954—8 p.m.

Dulte 6. Eyes only for the President from the Secretary. Distribute one copy to Acting Secretary.

"Meeting today preceded by lunch of Bidault, Eden with me concerning position on Soviet agenda proposal for five-power conference first, Germany and European security second, Austria third. [1] We agreed to accept to save endless agenda debate feeling no harm would result. I made my speech at opening of today's meeting. [2] Molotov made long rambling reply designed primarily to open up possible differences between US and UK and France, emphasizing the theme of Europe for the Europeans and implying Americans go home. Also sought to offset poor propaganda effect of Molotov opening speech which my speech exploited. Bidault dines with Molotov tonight.[3] He seems standing firm. Some slight sign of Eden desire play intermediary role with Molotov whom he has invited to dine with him Wednesday. I expect to be invited to dine with Molotov Friday and expect to accept."[4]

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[1] For a record of the second meeting of the conference, see Secto 29, Document 359. For a record of the luncheon meeting with Bidault and Eden, see the memorandum by MacArthur, Document 358. Text of the proposed Soviet agenda was transmitted in Secto 17, Document 355.

[2] For Secretary Dulles' speech, see Secto 24, Document 360.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[3] For a report on Bidault's dinner meeting with Molotov, see the memorandum by Bohlen, *supra*.

[4] For reports on Secretary Dulles' dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 29, see the memoranda by Jackson and Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.

No. 363

396.1 BE/1-2654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BERLIN, January 26, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 26. Both Eden and Bidault said today that Soviets are going to great lengths to be amiable in their contacts with members of British and French delegations who they are contacting daily. They indicated these Soviet tactics aimed at driving a wedge between the US on one hand and France and UK on other, are transparently clear and in marked contrast to the unconstructive tone and content of Molotov's opening speech.[2]

This morning Malik called on Nutting (UK) and exuded good will. He referred to agenda proposed by Molotov and blandly said Soviets did not want a long drawn out discussion on the five power conference but just agreement that such a conference would be held.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Regarding Molotov's opening statement, see Secto 17, Document 355.

No. 364

396.1 BE/1-2654 Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, January 26, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 28. Department pass OSD. GDR has endeavored transmit letter to "Conference of Foreign Ministers" requesting participation Berlin conference. [2] Copies were delivered to four Foreign Ministers office addressees. Subsequently, Soviet representatives tried unsuccessfully on January 26 get letter published and circulated by conference secretariat as official conference document. Tripartite agreed to refuse.

In view these developments, tripartite agreement reached with respect GDR and Austrian representation at conference as follows:

1. We will not raise the question of GDR representation, but if it is raised by the Soviets, we will reject it. (BER D-4/3a[3]).
2. If the Soviets do not raise the question of either GDR or Austrian representation, we will not raise question of Austrian representation until Austrian item is reached in agenda.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Vienna, Bonn, and Frankfurt.

[2] An English translation of this letter, which was circulated within the U.S. Delegation as BER D-4/3a, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200.

[3] Presumably BER D-4/3, Jan. 11, 1955, "Participation of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone Regime in the Berlin Conference". (CFM files, lot M 88, box 167)

January 27, 1954

No. 365

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, January 27, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

USDEL MIN-3 [1]

Present: The Secretary
Special Advisers
Advisers

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[1] For USDEL MIN-1, see Document 345. USDEL MIN-2, dated Jan. 26, 1954, reported briefly on the second U.S. Delegation meeting on Jan. 26. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205)

In opening the meeting the Secretary expressed the view that it would be desirable to hold a morning delegation staff meeting for an informal exchange of views, the exact time of the meeting being adjusted to the schedule of the principals.

[1.] The Secretary said he was concerned that most delegation members might become so occupied with their particular substantive problems that they would not be in a position to give reflective consideration to the conference as a whole. He observed that most of the members of the delegation came to Berlin feeling that the conference would not accomplish much and that the most we could hope for was that the *status quo* would remain undisturbed. This in itself would be an achievement, since the Soviet Union is obviously attempting to upset the *status quo*, particularly with respect to NATO, EDC, and collective defense programs. However, he felt that we should continually attune our mind and spirit to the higher objectives of achieving positive and constructive results from the meeting. With this in mind he designated Mr. Bowie and Ambassadors Bohlen and Bruce as the working group to keep the total situation under review and to attempt to come up with suggestions for achieving positive results. He suggested that they should follow any line that shows promise: for example, they might review carefully the verbatim records, pull together and analyze remarks made by the ranking Soviet delegates to members of the US, French and British delegations, etc.

2. *Afternoon Quadripartite Meeting*. The Secretary asked for views as to what might transpire in the afternoon quadripartite meeting, [2] particularly whether Molotov could be expected to make another long speech. Mr. Bohlen replied that the Soviets have a proposal outstanding with respect to the convening of the Five-Power Conference. Molotov could be expected to dwell on this question for a couple of days and would probably touch again on the Secretary's statement of yesterday. [3] Mr. Bohlen said he was surprised that the Soviets had proposed a date for the Five-Power Conference so far ahead, in May or June. In this connection, Mr. MacArthur referred to Malik's bland statement to Nutting (UK) to the effect that the Soviets did not want a long discussion on the Five-Power Conference but merely agreement that such a conference would be held. [4]

3. *Consultation among the three Foreign Ministers*. The Secretary pointed to the desirability of having a regular exchange of views

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[2] For a record of the third meeting of the Berlin Conference, see Secto 35, Document 367.

[3] For Secretary Dulles' statement, see Secto 24, Document 360.

[4] Regarding Malik's conversation with Nutting on Jan. 26, see Secto 26, Document 363.

with Eden and Bidault and the present problem of the time consumed in traveling from one official residence to the other. He requested that consideration be given to this problem and expressed the wish that procedures be worked out for a regular meeting of the three foreign ministers before each quadripartite meeting.

4. *Press Reactions.* In response to the Secretary's request, Mr. Jackson reported that the German press was in general giving the Secretary the upper hand with respect to the first two quadripartite meetings. Although the Soviets might shift their tactics abruptly, Molotov's present tactic of assiduously courting the French has received an unfavorable reaction among the Germans. Mr. Tyler reported that reactions of the morning papers in France had not been received, so he could not report on French reaction to the Secretary's statement of yesterday. However, French correspondents in Berlin have expressed the view that the Secretary's speech should receive a favorable response in France. French reaction to Bidault's opening statement was good.

5. *Indochina.* The Secretary asked Mr. Nash for his views on the extent to which a discussion of Indochina by the representatives of France and the USSR would adversely affect the military situation in Indochina. He added that the Indochina situation was a mixed political-military problem and that discussions of the subject would have to be handled properly if we were to avoid an unfavorable reaction in France and in Indochina. Mr. Nash replied that the French appear insistent on exploring with the Soviet Union the possibilities of an armistice in Indochina and the US is in no position to stop such efforts. While there are undoubtedly grave risks involved, they were risks that the U.S. must accept. The important thing was to keep such discussions in the proper framework. The Secretary agreed and added that the U.S. must not appear before the French public in the position of vetoing negotiations for an armistice in Indochina when we have negotiated an armistice in Korea. If the U.S. were placed in such a position we would lose not only with respect to Indochina, but also with respect to EDC and other important policy questions. Furthermore, it is necessary to keep any French and Soviet conversations within the proper framework to avoid a feeling on the part of the Associated States that they were being sold down the river. Mr. MacArthur agreed and pointed to the relationship of such talks to the French political scene and their reciprocal effect on the military effort in Indochina, particularly on the part of the Associated States. Mr. McConaughy summarized the evaluation of Ambassador Heath in Saigon that the effects of armistice talks would be catastrophic and that the U.S. should strongly oppose the French withdrawing to their "retreat" position.

No. 366

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, January 27, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-4

PRINCIPALS

United States	United Kingdom	France
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

[Here follows discussion of papers concerning reunification of Germany, an all-German Electoral law, and a declaration of intent.]

Tactics of the Third Session

Sir Frank Roberts said that Mr. Eden as Chairman at the third session would ask Mr. Molotov if the latter wished to talk to the proposal of the 5-Power Conference which the Soviet Minister tabled yesterday. [1] It was believed that Mr. Molotov might either make a speech reiterating the points made yesterday or he might merely ask for the opinion of the other 3 delegations. If Western opinion were asked it was assumed Sec. Dulles would then present the changed Tripartite position. The other two ministers would amplify the Secretary's remarks. The immediate problem lay in whether Molotov would make a long speech or whether he would merely point out the negative position of the three powers in refusing to make progress at Pan Mun Jom to reconvene the General Assembly and to hold a 5-Power Conference as suggested by the Soviets.

It was agreed that the Ministers would meet at 2:30 p.m. in the U.K. Delegation offices in the ACA Building. [2]

It was also agreed that the Chairman would not pass on to Item 2 in the unlikely event that the ministers concluded the discussion of Item 1 of the agenda today.

Mr. McConaughy, Mr. Allen and M. Roux will meet after the quadripartite session to discuss tactics relating to discussion of the five-power conference proposal. [2]

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[1] For text of this proposal, see Secto 28, Document 364.

[2] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

Austrian Participation

Mr. MacArthur noted and it was agreed that if it were tactically appropriate at any time but at least several days prior to reaching the Austrian item the Chairman of the day could inject the procedural question of inviting Austrian participation.

Consultations with Benelux Countries

M. Seydoux indicated HICOM consultations with Benelux had already commenced.

No. 367

396.1 BE/1-2754: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, January 27, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 35. Department pass OSD. Following summary of third Ministers' meeting January 27, Eden presiding: [2]

Molotov began by recalling he had stated views of Soviet delegation on first item of agenda, measures for reducing tensions in international relations and Five-Power Conference. He had also tabled specific proposal [3] he asked views of other Ministers on Soviet statement and proposal.

Secretary made prepared statement, text being transmitted separately, rejecting Five-Power Conference proposal and proposing Ministers pass to succeeding item of agenda. [4]

Bidault followed with prepared statement. He began by rejecting also concept that United Nations Charter gives Five-Powers right to run world. He said Charter gave them special responsibilities, but not privileges. Charter based in general on equality of all member countries. Turning to problem of Communist China, he said that settlement of world problems requires spirit of peace. He hoped future would hold more hope in this respect than past. He formally accused Chinese Communist Government of directly helping in many ways to prolong war which had cost France large number of lives and necessitated great sacrifices. This situation still continues. He did not think that simply adding one participant to the conference would do away with such causes of tension. It was necessary that participant be imbued with changed spirit in order to improve situation, France could not entertain such a suggestion so long as facts and situation remain as they are at present. When facts and situation change, France would consider matter.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Frankfurt, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the third meeting, USDEL PLEN/3, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193.

[3] For this proposal, see Secto 29, Document 359.

[4] For Secretary Dulles' statement, see Secto 31, *infra*.

Bidault said he wished to speak briefly about what would appear to be more practical and concrete method of dealing with matter. There had never been any refusal of contact. Belated signature of Korean armistice was proof of that fact. Problem must be dealt with in its own context which he said was not universal context, but context of Asia. There were in that area, problems of Korea and Southeastern Asia. In Korea there was armistice, but no peace. In Southeastern Asia, although hostilities began earlier, there was still no armistice. Means for establishing peace exist in Korea, in armistice terms calling for political conference. He thought it was necessary that conversations on this subject be resumed. Political conference could deal with Indochina problem. This would be normal way to deal with subject. French were open to any suggestion as to how to deal with it, but he pointed out that normal method had not been tried so that it could not be said to have failed.

Bidault concluded by saying that way to go about developing general settlement is to attach individual problems logically and successively on their merits and not to try to deal with everything at once in hope of miracle. Settlement of one issue would facilitate solution of next and thus total settlement would eventually emerge.

Eden also made prepared statement.[5] He understood that Five-Power Conference proposed by Soviets might deal with any or all problems throughout world. United Kingdom did not feel this was way to deal with international tensions. He believed objectives should be limited, and world problems could best be solved if Ministers dealt patiently with individual problems before them. They should begin in Berlin with problems of Germany and Austria, for which Four Powers shared certain clearly defined responsibilities. He agreed with Secretary's and Bidault's statements that Five Powers had not been accorded by United Nations Charter right to settle affairs of world. Legitimate rights and interests of other countries should not be overlooked.

Insofar as Asia was concerned, Eden said there was no evidence as yet Communist China Government is willing to collaborate in attempts to settle on acceptable basis Korean or Indochina, or any other Asian problems. Molotov had suggested that Five-Power Conference might discuss Korea. Machinery for settlement of Korean question with participation all five governments was provided for in form of political conference by armistice agreement. While Communist China has maintained it is anxious for this conference, it has in practice prevented its establishment. Best and speediest way of making progress would be for Communist China to give proof of its sincerity, by enabling political conference be convened without further delay. This would be best way of beginning reduce tension in Asia.

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[5] For Foreign Secretary Eden's statement, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 23–24.

Eden referred to Molotov's proposal that Five-Power Conference deal with disarmament. He said this and other questions of such wide international interest should be handled within framework of United Nations, which would permit all interested governments to be properly represented. He did not believe that any conference, regardless of number, would make progress if agenda undefined and if discussions range of every topic in international relations. Primary task of Ministers was to deal with outstanding European questions, i.e., Germany and Austria where four governments have special responsibilities. If they could do this, they would be in better position to consider other problems which were not first purpose of their meeting.

Molotov said that when Soviet delegation proposed Five-Power Conference, they had proposed three specific groups of questions to be considered by it: (1) General reduction of armaments; (2) political problems, in particular special emphasis on relations among Five Powers with Chinese People's Republic; (3) economic questions relating to improvement of international trade along normal lines.[6] Statements by other Ministers had referred only to the second group of questions and had ignored military and economic problems.

Molotov pointed out Bidault had raised the question of disarmament in his opening statement as one essential to easing of international tensions. He agreed with Bidault's statement and believed world would welcome it if Ministers could contribute to solution of this problem. Referring to economic problems, he said Dulles had several times recently mentioned that USSR, CPR and other peoples democracies now have territory with population 800 million. These 800 million are in some respects, cut off from markets with which they formerly had considerable contact. He doubted it was in interest of either party to place obstacles in way of trade between these 800 million and the remaining 1.6 billion people of world. This policy of separation is desired by only a few countries. He mentioned India and France as desiring trade relations with Soviets, as well as English businessmen, (despite preliminary discouragement by United Kingdom Government). Molotov said refusal to normalize trade relations meant desire to maintain international tensions, since discrimination in economic relations becomes political factor. USSR has no desire to be walled-off from rest of world and wishes to develop trade on basis of mutual advantage and equality. He believed conference of Five Powers who are most directly concerned would be of great importance in solving this question.

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[6] For Molotov's statement, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 34–40.

Molotov referred to Articles 23 and 24 of United Nations Charter as giving special responsibility to Five Powers for maintenance of international peace and security. He said he agreed with Bidault that Charter imposed responsibility, rather than conferred privileges. Important that Five Powers should meet from time to time to discuss important international problems. He cited Potsdam provisions creating CFM with Five-Power membership, which he pointed out was agreed after signature of United Nations Charter as evidence Five-Power discussions not inconsistent with Charter.

Molotov said he understood Eden had not confined discussions to Germany and Austria problems, but had said these should be dealt with first. He understood Bidault had been willing to discuss Korea and Indochina. He believed Ministers should not limit themselves to these two problems. While objections were being raised to Five-Power Conference, there had been Three-Power Conferences not limited in their agenda. Soviet proposal for Five-Power Conference was not limited to Asian problems. China is great power and would be helpful in solution of three groups of problems to which he had previously referred. In this connection, Molotov mentioned for discussion at Five-Power Conference, both improvement of relations among great powers, and between great powers and small powers. He alleged that Allied notes of November 3 [*October 18*] [7] had indicated willingness deal not only with European problems, but also such matters as Korean political conference in Four-Power meeting, and said this was why Soviets in reply [8] had emphasized Chinese participation. He laid blame for nonconvening of Korean Political Conference upon failure of United Nations to consult Chinese and Korean Communists and disregard of facts, the proposal that USSR take part in conference, although it was non-belligerent.

Molotov concluded that exchange of views had shown there was no common viewpoint on Five-Power Conference. He understood Dulles to be opposed to conference which was to discuss wide issues, but as leaving way open to discussion of certain specific Asiatic problems, such as Korea and Indochina at such conference. He understood Bidault's position as being that, if Five-Power Conference could contribute to easing of international tensions, it would be of value. Bidault had referred to certain Northeast and Southeast Asian problems, to solution of which he recognized Five-Power Conference could contribute.

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[7] Document 279.

[8] Document 280.

Molotov said that Five-Power Conference, including Chinese Communists could play part of intermediary in large questions of international interest where such a role would be useful.

Molotov said that Eden had not put forward any objections which could not be overcome. He believed further exchange of views could delimit questions to be considered in Five-Power Conference, and suggested further consideration of principal questions put forward by Soviet delegation and questions of particular urgency in Asia.

After recess for refreshment, Eden suggested that in view of lateness of hour and probable desire Ministers to make further observations after reflection, discussion should be adjourned to following day.

No. 368

396.1 BE/1–2754: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY BERLIN, January 27, 1954.

Secto 31. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary Dulles' speech [2] before the third plenary session January 27: [3]

"It is proposed by the Soviet Union that there be a five-power conference which would include the four of us plus the Foreign Minister of Communist China to consider 'measures for reducing international tensions'.

If I understand rightly what Mr. Molotov has said, this proposed meeting of the so-called five great powers is designed primarily to establish and implement the principle that these five powers have a special mandate to run the affairs of the world.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations gives special rights to the five powers by making them permanent members of the Security Council. From this, Mr. Molotov deduces that they have world-wide responsibilities which should bring them together in a five-power conference which would be held outside the framework of the United Nations.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] This speech was circulated as FPM(54)8 in the record of the conference.

[3] For a record of the third plenary session, see Secto 35, *supra*.

Mr. Molotov should, however, remember what I am sure the rest of us remember—and it so happens that all four of us were in San Francisco in 1945—that the conference which created the United Nations rejected the concept of world dominance by five powers. It was, it is true, agreed that the five powers should be permanent members of the Security Council . . .[4] but it was also agreed six other nations should be members of that Security Council and that even if the five permanent members were unanimous, their action would not be effective unless it was concurred in by at least two of the so-called 'small' powers. It also required that all parties to a dispute shall participate in any discussions relative to a dispute.

Mr. Molotov further stated that if it is legitimate for the four of us to meet together and confer, it is even more legitimate for five powers to do so.

This argument, it seems, bases the legitimacy of this meeting on a false foundation. We four are not meeting here because other nations have given us or because we have usurped a right to deal generally with world problems. We four are here to deal with the problem of Germany and the problem of Austria because we are the four occupying powers. There are no other occupying powers. Therefore, the liberation of Austria and the unification of Germany depend upon us alone. We are the proper and indispensable parties. There can be no end to the occupation unless we four end it.

Had the matter at issue been the liberation of Korea from foreign troops, then Communist China would be a proper party because it is, even though wrongfully, in occupation of a large part of Korea. The United States indeed actively seeks a Korean political conference in which Communist China would be a party. Also, of course, the Republic of Korea would have to be a party because its government, established by virtue of internationally supervised free elections, speaks for all the Korean people except those in the north who are not allowed to participate in such elections.

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons alluded to [in] my opening statement,[5] the United States rejects the conception of a five-power meeting to end international tensions.

As far as Asia is concerned, Korea and Indochina constitute the principal sources of tension in the Far East. Nothing that has happened up to date enables us to say that Communist China is willing to collaborate in efforts to bring about a solution on an acceptable basis of the Korean or Indochina questions, or for that matter of any other Asian problem.

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[4] Ellipsis in the source text.

[5] For this statement, see Secto 24, Document 360.

The means for settling the Korean political question with the participation of the five governments mentioned in the Soviet proposal is provided in the form of a political conference recommended by the Korean Armistice Agreement.

It is useless to speak of another Asian conference to deal with Korea so long as the so-called Chinese People's Republic with Soviet support employs all possible means to prevent the holding of the political conference which was agreed to by the Korean Armistice terms, and indeed proposed by the Chinese Communists themselves.

There already exist appropriate forums for the discussion of other matters which have been alluded to in the course of the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

If the Soviet Union finds it undesirable to avail [itself] of existing United Nations and conference procedures, there remain diplomatic channels through which any and all problems can be discussed. The United States, and I have no doubt, also the United Kingdom and France, are prepared to discuss by means of normal diplomatic channels all points which the Soviet Government wishes to explore.

We have no desire that tensions should persist merely because there is no mechanism for allaying them. We believe that such mechanisms do exist either through the United Nations, or through conferences on specific matters which will bring together the parties in interest, or through diplomatic channels.

We are not aware of any concrete problem the solution of which would be facilitated by establishing a new mechanism consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers here represented plus the Foreign Minister of Communist China. It seems to us that the proposal for a five-power conference to include the Chinese Communist regime is primarily a device to attempt to secure for that regime a position in the councils of the world which it has not earned or had accorded to it by the international community generally, including the United Nations. Certainly, this four-power conference is not the place to decide that matter.

We four have met here in Berlin to discuss two concrete problems—Germany and Austria. For this discussion we have a special and unique responsibility as occupying powers. These two problems are capable of solution and demand urgent solution.

It seems to me strange that we should be seeking to enlarge our task even before we have demonstrated that we can solve the particular tasks which primarily bring us here.

Surely, it would be wrong if, having come together for the first time in five years, we should fritter away our time in discussing whether and how to set up a new conference rather than in dealing with the substantive problems which the world expects us to solve.

The United States therefore proposes that we should take no action on the first agenda item and pass on to the second and third. If we can solve these two problems, then, and then only, can we stand before the world as capable of assuming other and heavier tasks. Then there will be opened up vistas of new hope."

No. 369

396.1 BE/1-2754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, January 27, 1954—9 p.m.

Dulte 10. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. At today's meeting [1] Molotov, while actually not giving up his basic position on five-power conference ended up his speech by dangling in front of French and British tempting idea that after dealing with problems Molotov had proposed, it might deal with and solve Asiatic questions (implying Korea and Indochina). The meeting then recessed. At recess I tried to get Bidault and Eden to agree to stand firm on positions they stated today rejecting five-power conference and thus throw the question back to Molotov. I could not get tripartite agreement on this and so we adjourned until tomorrow.

Eden is very wobbly on this and does not believe that British public opinion will stand for "totally negative approach to Far Eastern problems." Bidault also feels tremendous pressure in view of French public parliamentary and governmental opinion.

In view foregoing I may tomorrow advise Bidault and Eden:

1. We absolutely reject concept of five-power council, including Chinese Communists as proposed by Molotov which would deal generally with world problems and in effect constitute permanent world organization replacing United Nations.
2. Where, as in Korea, Chinese Communists necessarily involved we deal with them without diplomatic recognition.

Accordingly we are willing that the four Foreign Ministers here should invite the Foreign Ministers of Communist China, North Korea, Republic of Korea and of other countries which have participated in the Korean war, either personally or through the deputies to meet to settle the Korean problem at place and date which four Foreign Ministers here will name. (Note that this would involve participation we desire without neutrals but would let Soviet

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[1] For a report on the third plenary session of the conference, see Secto 35, Document 367.

Union be an inviting power and thus not initially classified as neutral or belligerent.)

3. Growing out of that conference could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. (This is quote from my September 2 speech.[2]) This would, of course, involve an appropriate change in the countries participating.

4. While I am far from sure that Molotov would accept proposal I believe that it would result in holding British and French in line, even if Molotov rejected it.

5. Nash strongly concurs.

Please cable promptest your reactions as I meet with Bidault and Eden 10 a.m. tomorrow (Thursday), Berlin time.[3]

DULLES

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[2] For text of Secretary Dulles' speech on Korea to the American Legion at St. Louis, Sept. 2, 1953, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Sept. 14, 1953, pp. 339–342.

[3] Dulte 10 was received in Washington at 4:02 p.m. on Jan. 27. At 5:17 p.m. the Department of State replied that Dulles' proposal had been discussed with President Eisenhower, who approved it. Dulles was told further that the plan should serve a useful purpose if rejected by Molotov. (Tedul 5 to Berlin, 396.1 BE/1-2754)

No. 370

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Embassy in Austria (Davis)[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, January 27, 1954.

Participants: Dr. Roessler, Member of the Unofficial Austrian Delegation
Mr. R.H. Davis

Subject: Austrian Inquiry on Developments Affecting Austria at the Four-Power Conference

At Dr. Roessler's request I saw him at 4:30 this afternoon.

1. Austrian Participation

Dr. Roessler inquired how we thought the conference was going along in regard to the Austrian question. I replied that there was little I could tell him beyond what he probably had read in the newspapers but I was authorized to say confidentially that the three powers had agreed to take up the question of Austrian participation in the discussions on the Austrian treaty question at the first appropriate moment and when such action promised success.

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[1] Copies were sent to Merchant and Freund.

I inquired whether the Austrian delegation had in its files in Berlin a copy of the Soviet note of January 16 to the Austrian Government, which referred to the Austrian note of January 5 requesting participation.[2] Dr. Roessler replied he did not know but if they had a copy with them, he would make it available tomorrow.

2. Position of Austrian Item on Agenda

I inquired in view of Dr. Schoener's comments to Mr. Merchant[3] whether the Austrian delegation was disappointed that an agenda had been adopted which placed the Austrian item at the end. Dr. Roessler replied that there were two points of view on this and no one could say whether it would be good or bad to have the Austrian item considered first or last. I assented to this and pointed out that some were of the opinion that the Austrian item had a better chance of success at the end of the conference. This opinion was based on reasoning that the Soviet Union would not like to see the conference completely without result; that Austria was a question on which they could give without paying too great a price and should the first two items on the agenda not produce any results, it was possible that something could come out of the discussions on the Austrian State Treaty.

3. Yugoslav Observer

Dr. Roessler inquired whether we had yet heard anything in regard to a Yugoslav observer. I said the Department of State had been informed orally by the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington that the Yugoslav Ambassador to Bonn, Ivekovic, had been named as an official observer to the Berlin Conference and the Embassy had been merely informed by the Department that the delegation in Berlin would be informed (see Deptel Tosec 35[4]). Also this morning the Yugoslav Military Liaison Office in Berlin had delivered an official note[5] addressed to the "Conference of the Foreign Ministers" which merely stated that Yugoslavia was sending its Ambassador at Bonn to Berlin as an observer at the Conference.

I said there was no present intention to reply to this note. I said that we did not recognize officially the status of an observer at the Conference and that if a Yugoslav representative made inquiry, we propose to inform him that as regards the Austrian treaty, Yugoslavia might be kept informed on matters affecting its interests.

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[2] No copy of the Soviet note has been found in Department of State files. The Austrian note was transmitted in telegram 1678 from Vienna, Jan. 5 (396.1 BE/1–554); for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 25, 1954, p. 111.

[3] On Jan. 25 Schoerner had paid a courtesy call on Merchant and Davis during which he expressed the hope that the Austrian Treaty would be discussed before the conference became deadlocked on Germany. (Memorandum of conversation, by Davis, Jan. 25, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203)

[4] Tosec 35 reported that Ivekovic had been named as the official Yugoslav observer to the Conference. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 211)

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

R.H. Davis

No. 371

396.1 BE/1-2954 Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT BERLIN, January 28, 1954—5 p.m.

Secto 38. Eden tells me that at his dinner for Molotov last night they first discussed agenda item 1 (five power conference). [2] Eden said he took the position that it was useless trying to go on reaching an agreement on this item and urged that after one more round at the conference table the Ministers pass on to the next two agenda items with the understanding that they could revert to item 1 when they had finished dealing with Germany and Austria. Molotov did not take a definite position. Eden could not be sure but Molotov seemed to take the line that he had or would make concessions by splitting the two parts of the "proposal" which he made in the last paragraph (summarized in penultimate paragraph of Secto 35 [3]) of his speech on January 27.

They then had a long discussion on Europe. Eden explained at length reasons why EDC should be brought into being. Molotov gave him no encouragement and what he said seemed to add up that there must be continuing four power control in Germany. Eden also stressed heavily free elections. Molotov pointed out that Hitler came to power as a result of free elections and, therefore, the important thing was to decide what kind of government would result from elections before they took place.

Eden (as did Roberts who was present) had the impression (not based on any specific statement) that if Germany were to be rearmed the Soviet might consider EDC as the least bad alternative. This impression in part due to fact that while Molotov stated his opposition to EDC he did not violently denounce it. When Eden asked him what his alternative to EDC was, Molotov replied "That's an easy question to ask but a difficult one to answer" and left it at that.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] For Eden's account of his dinner meeting with Molotov, see Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 73–75.

[3] Document 367.

No. 372

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, January 28, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-5

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. MacArthur	M. Seydoux	Sir Frank Roberts Sir Derek Hoyer Millar

1. *Tactics in Thursday's Quadripartite Session.* Sir Frank explained that Mr. Eden planned to try to pass over item 1 today having said all that he could on this subject. The French indicated agreement with this position.

2. *Plan for Reunification of Germany in Freedom* (BER D-4/42b [1]). Sir Derek had given this document to Blankenhorn who had no personal comments. Dr. Grewe, who was taking the document to Chancellor Adenauer, had raised the following points:

(a) Would it be desirable to take a stronger line so that under Soviet pressure it would be possible to fall back to the present draft which should be considered a minimum position. (Working Group agreed that this was not a serious point and that it was not desirable to build straw men to knock down.)

(b) Dr. Grewe expressed preference for ending the plan on the note that the peace treaty would be freely negotiated. (It was noted that this idea had already been expressed at the beginning of the document and no action need be taken on this subject.)

(c) Regarding the penultimate paragraph in Section IV, Dr. Grewe believed the present wording regarding the rights of each of the four powers could be construed to imply that the four powers might be obtaining more rights under this plan than they now possessed. His suggestion was to insert the word "respective" before "rights". (The Working Group agreed to make this insertion.)

(d) In connection with the last sentence in Section IV, Dr. Grewe had suggested that no stipulation be made as to the manner of voting. (The Working Group agreed that the stipulation on voting was essential but the three governments could give private assurances to the Germans that this sentence did not apply to the Constitution.)

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[1] For this document, presented by Eden on Jan. 29 at the fifth plenary meeting of the conference and circulated as FPM(54)17, see Document 510.

Representatives from the three Delegations will meet with Dr. Grewe when he returns from Bonn this afternoon. Mr. Morris will attend this meeting for the US. [2]

It was agreed that Mr. Eden would table the Plan at the first opportunity he had to speak on item 2 of the agenda. If it were not Mr. Eden's turn to speak at the beginning of consideration of item 2, the proposal would be circulated at that time through the international secretariat by the British. It was planned that the document would be given to the press with Mr. Eden's presentation remarks.

3. *Letter from Mr. Molotov regarding German Participation.* [3] It was agreed that Mr. Eden would merely acknowledge Mr. Molotov's letter and its enclosure without describing the enclosure. The intention was to leave the raising of this question in the quadripartite sessions to the Soviets.

4. *Declaration of Intent* (BER D-4/4a [4]). It was agreed that the German experts would continue work on this document, particularly with regard to the preamble and comments by Mr. Eden.

5. *Press Arrangements.* It was agreed that the press officers of the three delegations would get together at 2:40 today to make sure that all press treatment was identical among the three. It was noted that some of the press had been receiving running accounts of the quadripartite sessions.

6. *Work Schedule for Sunday.* It was agreed that the three working group principals would recommend to their ministers that Sunday would not be a working day.

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[2] For a report on this meeting, see Secto 50, Document 379.

[3] Not identified further; regarding German participation, see Secto 28, Document 364.

[4] Not found in Department of State files. A copy of BER D-4/4c, dated Feb. 1, 1954, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200.

No. 373

396.1 BE/1-2854: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, January 28, 1954—6 p.m.

Dulte 13. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Re Tedul 5. [1] Thank President and you for your prompt reply to Dulte 10. [2] I met with Eden and Bidault for lunch today to discuss this afternoon's meeting.[3] I urged that at today's meeting we all oppose Molotov proposal and suggest moving on to Germany and Austria. Eden took constructive position that after one more round at conference table, we propose passing on to Germany and Austria with proviso that we could return to item on five power conference after Germany and Austria.

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 369.

[2] Document 369.

Bidault said that in view of French public opinion which believed that Soviets had offered a solution for Indochina it was utterly impossible for him to propose, in his first statement this afternoon, that we move on to Germany and Austria. He would speak against five power conference as proposed by Soviets but, in view French opinion, must leave door open for hope that Soviets would be constructive.

In view above we believed it tactically wiser not to put forward to British and French the position set forth in Dulte 10 just two hours in advance of four power meeting but to hold it till we see where we are this evening.

Although I told Bidault and Eden we were thinking about a constructive proposal we might be able to talk over with them I have not yet revealed any details although believe Eden guesses rather closely. Please keep our idea secret till you hear further from me.

DULLES

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[3] For another record of this luncheon meeting, see the memorandum by Merchant, *infra*.

No. 374

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) of a Luncheon Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Berlin, January 28, 1954[1]

TOP SECRET

During the course of luncheon today at Bidault's residence[2] and in the process of stiffening Bidault's position on the Five-Power Conference issue, the Secretary at one point told Bidault, in Eden's presence, that all three of them should consider very carefully the ultimate consequences of weakening at this point on our hitherto agreed line. He said that he was genuinely concerned that if Bidault questioned Molotov with a view to ascertaining whether he had any specific proposal for negotiations which could cover Indo-China, thereby opening up this subject, Molotov would move into the gap. The end of this operation, the Secretary said, might well be a modified proposal from Molotov for a conference in a form which the United States could not accept, but which would be sufficiently seductive to the French to make it impossible for Bidault to refuse. This, he pointed out, would make the Berlin Conference a major victory for the Soviets and a rout for the West.

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[1] Copies were sent to Bruce, MacArthur, and Nagle.

[2] For another record of this luncheon meeting, see Dulte 13, *supra*.

Later, in a conversation with Bidault alone, Bidault, who was in an obviously nervous and excited frame of mind, said that the Secretary must realize that he had very few cards in his hand to play. The Secretary replied that might be true but that one of them was U.S. support and that one he must not throw away. Bidault hastily assured the Secretary that that was the last thought in his mind. The Secretary then said that he more accurately should have said that it was a card which should not be thrown away by the French people because he knew very well what Mr. Bidault's own beliefs and convictions were.

L.T.M.

No. 375

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) of a Luncheon Meeting, Berlin, January 28, 1954 [1]

SECRET

I lunched with Zarubin at his request yesterday. The luncheon took place at his billet in Karlshorst and we were alone the entire time.

In general, during the conversation which lasted well over an hour, Zarubin did not depart in any important particular from standard Soviet positions but was extremely moderate and in many respects realistic in his observations. His chief points seemed to be to impress upon me the seriousness of the Soviet desire to bring about some tranquility in international relations. He repeatedly referred to the domestic program in the Soviet Union as being predicated upon a period of relative calm in international affairs.

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[1] The source text bears a handwritten notation by O'Connor that Secretary Dulles had seen it.

The Five-Power Conference

Zarubin very briefly reiterated the standard Soviet arguments in favor of a five-power conference—namely, that Communist China was one of the great powers, that it was unquestionably the Government of China, and its alleged rights in the UN, etc. When he replied to my questions as to how long the Soviet Delegation was going to continue to argue the five-power conference, he said that they felt it would be most unfortunate if the "door was slammed on this question" at this stage of the conference. He said this would cause a most unfavorable impression in "Asiatic public opinion." I asked if by that he meant China, at which he merely smiled. I told him that having been in the United States, he knew very well how deep were the feelings of the American people—and I wished to stress people—on this point and therefore no American Secretary of State could or would be in a position to agree to the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference. Zarubin said indeed he understood this and recognized that this was a vital and controlling factor and that this question had entered deeply into public opinion. I asked him if Mr. Molotov understood this and he said that he did. I then added consequently Mr. Molotov must be aware that there was no hope of acceptance of his proposition. Zarubin then (forecasting that day's development on this subject) said that the Soviet Delegation did not wish to see their proposal finally and unqualifiedly rejected at this stage and wondered whether some form of provisional understanding which would indicate the question was still open might not be worked out. I said I didn't see any basis for even any provisional understanding on this point but that at previous four-power meetings frequently after general discussion they had moved on to other points on the agenda without foreclosing the possibility of returning to this subject later on.

On the general question of a five-power conference I told Mr. Zarubin that I thought this was a familiar example of Soviet diplomatic technique which, in effect, was to start with the conclusion rather than at the beginning. He laughed and admitted this was so. I then said that a conference in the true sense of the word involving Communist China would have to follow a whole series of events in the Far East which would demonstrate in deed and not in word that Communist China was prepared to live in peace with her neighbors. I said that I thought the people of the world and those of the United States in particular were tired of words and mechanisms such as conferences and had lost a good deal of faith in their efficacy; that what was required was some concrete demonstration that attitudes had indeed changed in the past year. I mentioned particularly in this connection that there appeared to have been an agreement in principle for a political conference on Korea but that this was being stalled by Chinese obstruction. Zarubin inquired if we attached importance to the political conference as one of the indications we had in mind. I said that I thought statements of the Secretary of State had made this very plain and that we could not understand why on the basis of the UN resolution the conference couldn't go on about its business. Zarubin developed the customary arguments about Indian participation and that of the Soviet Union in which he made it very clear that the Soviet Union under no circumstances would participate in a manner which might convey the impression that they had been active participants in the war in Korea. He said he could not understand why we wished to exclude India, a leading Asiatic nation. I told him I was not personally acquainted with all the details of the political conference but that I personally felt that the Indian issue was somewhat artificial since, while nobody had proposed it, Japan certainly would have a greater interest as an Asiatic nation. Zarubin reacted quite sharply to this and said Japan had nothing whatsoever to do in the Korean matter. I told him that I thought geography was against him and it certainly had for that reason alone a greater interest than India, but no one had suggested Japan. I repeated that I was not in a position to go into any detail with him on the subject of Indian participation but that the main thinking was that an agreed political conference should get under way and not be blocked.

The conversation was turned to Indochina in which I said that this was another place where the Chinese Communists without preconditions should be willing to demonstrate their professed desire for peaceful relations. I also told him that talk about reduction of tension seemed to be very general in character and that tension was not something which arose of itself but stemmed from certain unresolved questions. I mentioned that as long as Germany remained divided it was idle to talk about a tranquil situation in Europe; the same was true of Korea since divided countries by that very fact were clearly sources of tension. I added to this Indochina. Zarubin did not disagree and seemed interested since he returned to it and the thesis of deeds not words on the part of Communist China. I told him frankly that in my view the five-power conference and attendant subjects were merely a means of advancing the question of recognition and position of Red China as the Soviet Government desired and that we felt this was a question which had to be met squarely in the United Nations (and the US views on this point were well known) but in any case could not be obliquely settled by backdoor procedures arising from a four-power conference. Zarubin virtually admitted that this indeed was the purpose of the Soviet proposal but attempted to explain it as a step towards the normalization of what he called an abnormal situation, that one of the great powers of the world was denied its legitimate place, etc. I told him, as the Secretary of State said, we did not deny the existence of Communist China but felt that there were other considerations of a moral and ethical nature which were even more important since, in essence, there was no hope for the calm in international affairs he had spoken of unless accepted rules of civilized international conduct were observed by all nations and that the size of a nation in our view did not absolve it from the obligation to observe these rules. Zarubin, in closing this part of the conversation, again repeated the desire for some procedure in regard to this question at this stage which would indicate it had not been totally and finally rejected "slamming the door."

Disarmament

Zarubin, in emphasizing at considerable length the importance the Soviet Government attached to disarmament, developed the thesis that no one wanted war and added that he was convinced the United States did not wish war either, and that in those circumstances an arms race was totally unnecessary. He repeated all the obvious remarks about burdens on the people and interference with measures for improving the lot of humanity in general with again a reference to the Soviet domestic program.

In conclusion Zarubin said he thought that Ambassadors could play a useful role as channels of communication and means of talking frankly and in this fashion be of real assistance to their Ministers, to which I replied that in general Ambassadors were paid to be helpful wherever they could.[2]

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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[2] On Jan. 29 Bohlen also drafted another memorandum of his dinner conversation with Zarubin, this one for Secretary Dulles dealing only with the discussion of atomic energy. It reads as follows:

"Several times during my luncheon yesterday with Zarubin he emphasized the great importance the Soviet Government attached to these bilateral exchanges of views on atomic energy. He said at least twice that the Soviet Government fully and unqualifiedly approved the idea of bilateral talks between the U.S. and the USSR and stressed the importance of being able to conduct these talks in privacy, without publicity as to their content. In accordance with your instructions I told him that you would discuss with Mr. Molotov the fixing of the time and place for continuance of these procedural discussions inaugurated between you and Zarubin." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215)

No. 376

396.1 BE/1-2954: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 29, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 43. Department pass OSD. Following is summary of first portion of fourth meeting Foreign Ministers, chaired by Molotov, held January 28. [2] This telegram covers course of session from 1500 to 1640 hours, during which period Secretary Dulles, Bidault and Eden in turn addressed themselves critically to Molotov's long statement yesterday in support of Soviet proposal re agenda item 1 (five-power conference), at Molotov's suggestion meeting recessed at 1640 hours.

In response to Molotov's invitation after opening meeting for further expression of views on agenda item discussed yesterday, Secretary delivered prepared statement, full text of which transmitted by separate telegram. [3] Highlights of Secretary's statement were:

(a) His measured denunciation of Chou En-lai as a leader of regime guilty of many crimes, including open aggression;

(b) His detailed exposition documented by many references to UN Charter, of thesis that arrangement proposed by Molotov would have net effect of superseding and replacing United Nations with a Council of "so-called five great powers"; and

(c) His renewed suggestion that meeting now move on to discussion of the other agenda items relating to Germany and Austria.

Bidault then spoke at some length. [4] Main burden of his statement was that there was neither a legal nor a moral basis for a five-power conference having scope proposed by Molotov. He reiterated that while UN Charter entrusted certain powers with special responsibilities, it did not give them special rights or powers; thus Article 24 made it clear that Security Council acted as collective entity in name of all member nations. He further said it was clear that CPR had not measured up to obligations of member nations imposed by Article 2 of UN Charter.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fourth plenary meeting, USDEL PLEN/4, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193.

[3] Secto 42 from Berlin, Jan. 28 (396.1 BE/1-2854); for Secretary Dulles' statement, circulated as FPM(54)10, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 40–43, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 24–26.

[4] For Bidault's statement, circulated as FPM (54)13, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 43–48, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 27–31.

Bidault then spent some time in challenging wide scope of issues proposed by Molotov for consideration at five-power conference. Thus, he once again emphasized that reduction and international control of armaments were matters for UN and said that in any event problem of disarmament was subordinate to cessation of hostilities. He also made point that principal reasons for present absence of single world market were restrictive trade practices which had been adopted by Soviet bloc and Molotov's refusal in 1947 to participate in plan which could have led to economic integration of all Europe; as for unrestricted trade between France and China latter could herself understand French refusal to deliver goods which could later be used in hostilities against French forces.

As for various political problems mentioned by Molotov, Bidault said they could be settled by diplomatic negotiations or through other mechanism already in existence; big need was for good will, concrete evidence of which France was still awaiting from Chinese Communists and which it had reason to doubt as result of Chinese actions in Korea and Indochina Wars. Bidault said he wished to emphasize again what he had said previously on numerous occasions—that France desired peace everywhere and that it was ready to avail itself of every opportunity to bring about peace in Indochina, in agreement with the Associated States; "any form of conversation in any guise at all which would make it possible to accomplish real progress toward reestablishment of peace would be welcome to us." But he had sought in vain in Molotov's statement for indication that proposed five-power conference had any relation to establishment of just and equitable peace for all in Korea or Southeast Asia.

In conclusion Bidault said that what was needed was more reflection and exercise of imagination. He inquired whether his colleagues could not agree that no matter how far apart their positions might be at the moment there was still not an absolute impossibility of reconciling these viewpoints at least on certain matters.

In relatively brief statement [5] Eden reiterated his opposition to broad scope of issues proposed for discussion at five-power conference and said it was necessary to tackle certain specific problems in proper order. It was not possible to assign to a few powers responsibility for settlement of issues affecting entire world, such as reduction of armaments (a matter for UNO) and development of international trade. As for Asian political problems, Korea and Indochina were of special concern and he was prepared to continue search for some method of facilitating practical solutions of these problems. Eden said we needed to face stern realities of situation and engage in some hard, clear thinking. He therefore proposed that when present round of speeches completed, meeting defer further consideration of first item on agenda and pass on to questions of Germany and Austria; meanwhile all could reflect further re item 1 and if progress were made on other items we could come back to first item at later date.

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[5] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)11, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 48–50, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 26–27.

Meeting then recessed briefly at Molotov's suggestion.

Following summary second part January 28 meeting:

Molotov called meeting to order and proceeded to make speech on reduction international tension. Main line was that proposal for five-power conference not incompatible with UN Charter and that conference could discuss both broad and specific questions (such as East-West trade and reduction of armaments). He also replied to Secretary's earlier speech on Communist China. After Molotov's speech, exchange between Ministers resulted in agreement they have further exchange of views at restricted meeting.

Introducing comments on relationship five-power conference to UN Charter, Molotov said that Soviet Union likes Charter as it is and hopes that it will not be changed but implemented. He then made reference to several resolutions passed by United Nations (one in 1948 and another in 1950) and said these called upon permanent members of Security Council to meet from time to time. He drew from this inference that Soviet proposal for five power conference was in line with wishes of UN. He also pointed out that 1950 resolution was adopted year after Chinese People's Republic was established.

Molotov then said that while there were various opinions as to when five-power conference should be held and its agenda, it would be wrong to limit scope of conference because it could be used to solve both broad and specific questions. These could include reduction of armaments, including the question of atomic energy, and East-West trade, particularly end of embargo on trade with China.

As far as reduction of armaments was concerned, Molotov said that while it was true that this was in competence of United Nations, five powers should assist in solution this problem. He referred then to working paper regarding arms reduction introduced in the United Nations Commission on Disarmament on May 28, 1952[6] by the United Kingdom on behalf of the United States, United Kingdom and France and claimed this lent support to his thesis that five powers should set pace on disarmament. He concluded his remarks this subject by saying that the Soviet Union would table a resolution on it at this conference.

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[6] For this proposal, see *AFP*, vol. II, pp. 2760–2764, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, pp. 910–911.

Molotov turned then to defense of Chinese People's Republic, pointing out that CPR was not present to defend itself. He advised Dulles that if he would consult people who knew, such as Eden, rather than "dummy" Kuomintang, he would change his views. Molotov insisted further that rather than CPR being aggessor state, it was victim of aggression.

Molotov concluded speech by asking for agreement following conclusion: Proposal for five-power conference is not declined, although aims of such conference not agreed upon and need further study.

Secretary Dulles spoke next and said that in order avoid any misunderstanding he wished to state that United States does not agree to five-power conference which would include Chinese Communist regime. He added that the United States is not opposed to meeting representatives of that regime with respect to matters where, as practical fact, we have to deal with it. Such conference would not be five-power conference, however, because matters on which useful deal with Communist China would involve other powers. He pointed as example to Korea where it was essential have Republic of Korea represented. Since other countries had shared burden in Korea, they also entitled to participate. Secretary said further study required to determine whether possible to reconcile his position with Molotov's. This reinforced his proposal to pass on to discussion other agenda items.

Bidault, on other hand, said it was possible to conclude that conversations concerning Asia, in which all states concerned would be represented on specific questions has not been rejected. As far as nature of these conversations and the participants therein concerned, he felt this required further time for consideration.

Eden agreed that since there was no agreement on five-power conference, he also felt it best to move on to other agenda items.

Molotov then said that while there was no agreement question under discussion, there was evidently desire to continue quest for such an agreement. He then raised question whether committee might be set up to work on this matter while Foreign Ministers went on to "the consideration of other questions". Dulles replied that while he was not opposed to committee if others felt this desirable, he felt it better for heads of delegations to discuss matter between formal sessions. Bidault and Eden agreed it would be better discuss question informally among heads of delegations. When Secretary Dulles suggested restricted meeting of Ministers be held next week, Molotov said that since there were doubts regarding committee, Soviet delegation would reserve right to re-submit such a proposal at restricted meeting suggested by Secretary and supported by Eden and Bidault.

Molotov then submitted following resolution on the reduction of armaments:

> "Convocation of a world conference on the general reduction of armaments (proposal of the USSR delegation).
>
> "The Governments of the USA, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR, guided by the desire to strengthen peace and reduce tension in international relations, considering it necessary to take measures to relieve the heavy burden of military expenditure borne by the people in connection with the armament race, have agreed that the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France would take measures within the framework of the United Nations to convene in 1954 a world conference on the general reduction of armaments with the participation of both the members of the United Nations and the nonmember states.
>
> "Full agreement has also been reached that the plan of measures for the general reduction of armaments would be linked up with a simultaneous solution of the problem of atomic weapons." [7]

When he had finished reading resolution, he asked if anyone wanted to speak on subject tonight. Dulles proposed that meeting adjourn and, since neither Eden nor Bidault wanted say anything further at that time, meeting adjourned.

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[7] This proposal, with slightly different wording, was circulated as FPM(54)12 in the records of the conference.

No. 377

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 28, 1954.

As we left the Council Meeting for the intermission, [1] Mr. Molotov held out his hand in greeting to me, and I got the impression from this, and also from what Mr. Bohlen had told me Ambassador Zarubin had said, [2] that Mr. Molotov might want to exchange a word with me.

Accordingly, I walked down the corridor with him, and told him somewhat hurriedly and briefly that in my opinion, we had adequately exhausted discussion on the first item of the agenda so far as the regular meetings were concerned. I said that if we really wanted to make any progress, there should be an interval during which the Three Western Powers could exchange views privately and then have a private conversation with him.

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[1] For a report on the fourth plenary meeting of the conference, see Secto 43, *supra*.

[2] For a record of Bohlen's luncheon with Zarubin earlier in the day, see the memorandum by Bohlen, Document 375.

Mr. Molotov seemed at first prepared to agree outright, but then said "I will consider".

Mr. Troyanovsky and our Mr. Lustgarten were present to interpret. Otherwise we were alone.

John Foster Dulles

No. 378

396.1 BE/1-2954: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, January 29, 1954—2 p.m.

Secto 46. Department pass OSD. Tripartite group on Austria met over draft report resulting January 24 meeting (Sectos 21 and 23 [2]). Problems remaining are troop withdrawal and subjects in paragraphs 1 and 3 Secto 23.

1. *Troop Withdrawal*

a. In absence further message mentioned Tosec 42 [3] (now received) we could only state likelihood US would prefer complete evacuation to reduction to token levels as retreat position in face Soviet insistence troop withdrawal. Believe British and French have accepted our refusal consider Western initiative raise troop withdrawal although not inconceivable they will raise it with us at higher level. French and British present thinking is (as second position to previously agreed first) to counter Soviet suggestion complete withdrawal with proposal reduction to token levels because: (a) presence even small numbers our forces backed by NATO provision re occupation forces considered by far most effective deterrent; (b) uncertainty effectiveness tripartite security declaration in connection complete evacuation since only consultation required and "automatic" character present NATO provisions would not apply if one or more other NATO countries unwilling associate with declaration. They recognize (a) treaty involves full evacuation but consider that different situation, and (b) complete evacuation possibly more attractive from viewpoint Austrian public reaction but consider this point over-weighed by security considerations, fearing another Korea in Austria. They further argued reduction to token levels largely alleviates burdens occupation and irritants for public. They have yet consult their military authorities. We countered only briefly saying we expected further Washington views and would transmit theirs. We will suspend further action pending your views.[4]

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Vienna, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] See the memorandum of conversation by Davis, Document 351.

[3] Tosec 42 informed the U.S. Delegation that the Department of State did not accept the British and French suggestion for the reduction of Western forces in Austria. (396.1 BE/1-2654)

b. French more adamant against complete withdrawal than British, but spoke of possible acceptance if backed to wall as third and last position.

c. Both British and French prefer as second position making reduction to token levels without conditions paragraphs 2a and b of BER D-3/11 which they say make withdrawal tantamount to treaty.[5] We maintained desirability try both and pointed out further retreat in paragraph 4 same document. British and French remain willing obtain Austrian commitment re Army and military assistance in connection treaty. We confirmed agreement commitment need only be oral (Tosecs 43 and 46[6]) pointing out necessity obtaining Raab and Schaerf undertakings which may require tripartite action Vienna on short notice (foresee danger allowing Figl use own communications system this subject). Presume oral commitment to cover interim period prior to negotiation of some form bilateral on military assistance. Separate cable covers planning aspects.[7]

d. Until French and British as well as we receive further instructions, group will not reconvene although we pointed out importance being prepared meet this contingency at Berlin, however unlikely Soviets will raise it.

2. Meeting also agreed position on Article 35 which differs from Paris tripartite position[8] only by (a) omitting mention of Deputies as alternates to Ministers in arguing case for alleviation and (b) specifying aims Ministers will be

(1) Making case for alleviation,
(2) Suggesting general lines of alleviation, and
(3) Obtaining four power agreement on instructions to working group.

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[4] On Jan. 30 the U.S. Delegation was informed further that complete withdrawal appeared better than leaving a token force in Austria in the light of various considerations. (Tosec 59 to Berlin, 396.1 BE/1-2954)

[5] Under paragraph 2a the four powers would have agreed on an Austrian Army of 58,000 men; under paragraph 2b the Soviet Union would have agreed to give up control over economic enterprises in Austria. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, "Four-Power Meeting in Berlin")

[6] Neither printed. (396.1 BE/1-2654 and 1-2754)

[7] In Secto 47 from Berlin, Jan. 29, the U.S. Delegation reported that the French were without instructions concerning the possible use of Austrian manpower in the event of war. (396.1 BE/1-2954)

[8] For a summary of the final report of the Tripartite Working Group, see the memorandum by Fuller, Document 320.

3. There was brief discussion basis rebuttal to Soviet charges re *gendarmérie* during which we mentioned Adkins case.[9] In addition points in BER D-3/12[10] we offered some arguments from Vienna's 1876 to Department[11] and reassured French with information its paragraph 3.

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[9] Lt. William Adkins, USAF, had defected to the Soviet Union in January 1954.

[10] Not printed. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, "Four-Power Meeting in Berlin")

[11] Telegram 1876 listed eight points that might be used to rebut Soviet charges against the *gendarmerie*. (396.1 BE/1-2754)

No. 379

762.00/1-2954: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 29, 1954—9 a.m.

Secto 50. Department pass OSD. Reference Secto 34 repeated Bonn 934, Paris 102, London 91, Moscow unnumbered from Berlin.[2]

Tripartite working group met with Blankenhorn and Grewe at British headquarters at 11 p.m. January 28 to receive and consider points raised by Federal Government on Allied plan for German reunification taken to Bonn by Grewe day before.[3]

British chairman opened by stating Allies hoped conference would get to German question on agenda today and might therefore, wish table this plan which left little time for any changes. He could make no promises that any could be gotten in.

Grewe reported plan has been considered by Cabinet during afternoon with following results:

1. Germans hoped in future they might be given more time to consider plans particularly one of such importance.

2. Germans felt proposal should indicate election freedoms must be established well before actual elections and election law promulgated perhaps as much as 6 months in advance. WG indicated sympathy with points but stated that document was intended to be general without going into details. Latter were considered to belong rather in report of proposed separate working group. Germans seemed satisfied.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, and Moscow.

[2] Secto 34 transmitted the text of a "Plan for Reunification of Germany in Freedom". (762.00/1-2754) For text of this paper as revised in light of the suggestions below, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[3] Regarding the presentation of the plan to Grewe and his comments on it, see BER MIN-5, Document 372.

3. Grewe then advanced entirely new suggestion, i.e., that Assembly be given additional power during transitional period (prior to all-German Government) to legislate to protect people of Soviet Zone and perhaps reestablish laender if Soviet Zone developments should permit or make necessary. WG replied that seemed useless to give such legislative power in absence of executive to carry out and that it was felt plan providing for continuation of supervisory commission was sounder. WG also doubted Ministers could consider and agree such basis new idea so late in day. WG agreed inform Ministers of German proposal but definitely discouraged likelihood acceptance. (After departure Germans, WG agreed not to recommend this change to Ministers.)

4. Germans, as anticipated, found fault with formulation of reserved powers, particularly first part paragraph 4, Section IV as unnecessary restatement existing Allied rights. Discussion resulted in reformulation which omitted this feature and WG agreed to submit to Ministers.

5. Germans then suggested deletion next paragraph as having bad political impact from emphasis on Allied rights. WG was at pains to make clear that main objective this paragraph was to eliminate Soviet veto right. Both Blankenhorn and Grewe indicated at end a better understanding this matter and seemed satisfied they were in better position to explain matter to Federal Government. WG agreed, however, to revision of paragraph in regard to form (not substance) which the Germans welcomed.

6. Germans proposed once more we renounce right to disapprove constitution. Since neither British nor French willing to give way, WG expressed doubtful any change could be made.

7. Germans suggested two minor changes in language early in paper which were agreed; namely, a treaty would be "freely negotiated" and that elections must be "free and secret".

No. 380

396.1 BE/1–2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Secretary of State, at Berlin [1]

SECRET LONDON, January 28, 1954—5 p.m.

71. Embtel 3085, January 20 to Department, repeated Paris unnumbered.[2] During extended and frank conversation with Embassy official today, Rodionov, Soviet Embassy diplomatic contact, made following points:

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[1] Repeated to Paris and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] Telegram 3085 reported on a conversation between an official of the French Embassy and Rodionov in which the latter stated that no major agreements would be reached at Berlin. (396.1 BE/1–2054)

1. Press rumors that 12 Chinese Communist representatives had arrived in Berlin were "absolutely without foundation".

2. Nevertheless, presence Federenko with Soviet delegation in Berlin is significant. Federenko is foremost Soviet expert on China. "When writing in Russian, Federenko's script shows influence of Chinese characters".

3. USSR would welcome Korean political conference and would be glad participate on understanding it could attend (a) as neutral or (b) at round-table conference with identification with one side or the other. Communist insistence that USSR could not attend as member of Communist side was inspired by Moscow and was not result Chinese Communist initiative. Soviet Union was, and insisted on being regarded as, neutral in Korean struggle.

4. It is idle to hope for progress at Berlin on German and Austrian problems. Solution these problems can only be reached after Western powers have shown willingness relax tensions through agreement to (a) outlaw atomic weapons, (b) abandon advanced bases on iron curtain periphery, and (c) reduce percentagewise present armed forces.

5. Communist China, as one of five great powers, entitled to be represented in any discussions of problems of world significance, especially those indicated in immediately preceding paragraph.

Above discussion arranged on initiative Rodionov who, however, stated views expressed were his own and not necessarily those of his government.

ALDRICH

January 29, 1954

No. 381

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, January 29, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

USDEL MIN/4

Present: The Secretary
Special Advisers
Advisers

Tripartite Working Group Meeting

Mr. Morris reported that a tripartite meeting of German experts was held last evening on the general plan for German elections and the formation of an all-German government.[1] The group considered several minor drafting changes intended to make the draft more palatable to the Germans. Mr. Schwartz added that the Germans apparently felt that the Three Powers had not left sufficient bargaining room in connection with this problem and that, as a negotiating tactic, additional elements should be introduced from which we could retreat in face of Soviet opposition.

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[1] For a record of this meeting, see Secto 50, Document 379.

Press Reaction

Mr. Tyler reported that the tone of the French press on the whole was constructive and helpful. Except for the Communist press, there was no criticism of the conduct of the negotiations to date by the three Foreign Ministers. A few papers took the line that the Secretary's statement yesterday was intended primarily for U.S. domestic consumption. [2] A general thread running through most press comments is the hope that something will be realized, not necessarily a Five-Power Conference, which will help in a solution of the Indo China problem.

Mr. Lochner reported that there had been no significant German editorial reaction. The general press treatment is that: 1) the West has gotten over the first hurdle; and 2) an expression of hope that the four Ministers will soon take up the German problem.

Only one paper (SPD) objected to the strong tone of the Secretary's statement in yesterday's meeting.

Mr. Jackson commented that the U.S. press reaction was wide and varied and that the general tone was good. There was strong praise for the forceful tone and positive position taken by the Secretary. He added that he had obtained the impression from discussions with press correspondents last night that they had not sensed the real importance of what took place in the plenary session yesterday—the extent of unity of the Three Powers on the issue which was most likely to split them apart. Mr. MacArthur pointed out that a BBC correspondent had taken the line that the West was caught by surprise by Molotov's tabling of the proposal on world reduction of armaments. He thought we might informally correct this line, since we have always assumed that the Soviets would inject their standard battery of proposals for reducing international tensions.

Preparation for Quadripartite Session

Secretary Dulles observed that the delegation had a considerable procedural problem facing it. While the three Ministers desired to commence immediately with the discussion of the German problem, the afternoon session would open with the Soviet disarmament proposal outstanding. He said that he would meet with Messrs. Eden and Bidault before the afternoon session to work out our tactics.[3] His preliminary thought was that he, as Chairman, could call first on Mr. Bidault, who would then launch the discussion on the German item. A question was raised as to whether we should consider tabling a series of proposals: for example, the proposal for a world conference on slave labor. The Secretary replied that the phrasing of the first agenda item permits the tabling of any proposal which a Minister believed constituted a cause of tension. However, we would have to consider the above possibility in relation to our desire to move quickly to a discussion of the German and Austrian problems.

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[2] Regarding Secretary Dulles' statement at the fourth plenary meeting, see Secto 43, Document 376.

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[3] No record of Secretary Dulles' meeting with Bidault and Eden on Jan. 29 has been found in Department of State files.

No. 382

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, January 29, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET

BER MIN-6

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. MacArthur	M. Seydoux	Sir Frank Roberts Sir Derek Hoyer Millar

1. Group to Prepare Tripartite Positions on Five-Power Conference.

Sir Frank suggested that Mr. Allen, M. Roux, and Mr. McConaughy commence work on the tripartite position to be taken next Wednesday on the subject of a Five-Power Conference. Mr. MacArthur said that the United States might not be ready to start work today but in any event Mr. McConaughy would get in touch with Mr. Allen to set a time for the meeting of this group.

2. Group to Consider Soviet Disarmament Proposal.

At Sir Frank's suggestion that a group be set up on this subject, Mr. MacArthur said that the United States was not as yet sure who our representatives would be but that the Ministers would probably talk about this subject at our meeting at 2:30 this afternoon.[1] Mr. Williams and M. Broustra will be the representatives from the U.K. And French delegations.

3. Agreement on No Conference Session for Sunday.

Since this matter had been agreed with the Russians, it was decided that M. Bidault would mention the point at tomorrow's meeting.

4. Today's Tactics.

a. *United States Position.* Secretary Dulles on opening the meeting will turn to M. Bidault to commence the discussion on Item 2 of the agenda.[2] Final decision had not been made regarding Mr. Dulles' moves if he is interrupted by Mr. Molotov on a point of order. This was a matter that would probably be discussed by the Ministers at 2:30.

b. *French Position.* Mr. Dulles will open the discussion on disarmament and turn to M. Bidault who will make a speech on this subject and present a resolution to the conference.

c. *United Kingdom position.* Same as U.S. with the exception that if Molotov raises a point of order it would be preferable to listen to a day's discussion on disarmament or at least one speech from Mr. Molotov than to get into an endless harangue on a procedural point. The U.K. are always willing to have Mr. Eden speak first on Germany so that the UK proposal would be tabled immediately. Mr. Eden has prepared a half-hour speech. If it becomes so late that it would be difficult for Mr. Eden to make his speech he would merely table the UK proposal and speak to it on Saturday.

5. GDR Federal Representative Participation.

If Mr. Molotov raises this point, Mr. Eden would be prepared to say that the UK had always maintained the Germans should participate in discussion of the settlement of this problem. That is why they have held that there should be freely elected representatives of the German people to make such participation possible. If the East Germans were as well represented by their government as the West Germans were by theirs, there would be no problems.

6. Consultation with Representatives of the Federal Republic on the U.K. Proposal.

The Working Group agreed that five of the eight points made by the Germans could be met and would be reflected in the final version of the proposal.[3] The three points that could not be met were:

(a) To state that there should be a six-month period between the promulgation of the Electoral Law and the elections;

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[1] No record of the Foreign Ministers meeting at 2:30 has been found in Department of State files.

[2] Germany.

[3] For the final text of this proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

(b) To state that the plan would involve termination of the East German regime; and
(c) To set forth bargaining points which could be given up in favor of the present draft as the irreducible minimum (see BER MIN-5 [4]).

Sir Derek will tell Mr. Blankenhorn of the agreement reached in the tripartite Working Group and will explain that the UK must have full liberty to take over. In the event that it is not possible to table the proposal this afternoon, there will be no opportunity for further consultation with the Germans.

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[4] Document 372.

No. 383

396.1 BE/1-3054: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 30, 1954—noon.

Secto 53. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes first part January 29 meeting, Secretary presiding: [2]

Opening meeting at 1506, Secretary stated his understanding that, although minutes are not quite clear on point, conference has suspended discussion on item one for time being and will now begin item two.

Molotov expressed belief there must be some misunderstanding. He agreed that minutes are not entirely clear on point but said that as far as Soviet delegation is concerned, item one has three aspects: military, political and economic. Conference has discussed in some detail political aspect, particularly in that part relating to proposed five-power meeting. Decision taken by conference, he said, was to suspend for time being discussion on this aspect pending the restricted meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. On economic aspect, he continued, Soviet delegation has already expressed itself in some detail. In this connection, he expressed satisfaction that French and United Kingdom trade delegations are now in Moscow. He then suggested that conference should devote its attention to military aspect. He claimed that halting of armament race has very important and serious relationship to reduction of international tension and thought it would be appropriate therefore for US, UK and French Foreign Ministers to express themselves on question of disarmament. Indeed, he noted, Bidault had himself underlined this question in his speech of January 25. [3] Molotov said he expected to be told that disarmament question is now before UN which has created Disarmament Commission to study it. This commission, he alleged, is now idle and paralyzed. Efforts of Soviet delegation to disarmament commission in support of reduction of armaments have met with frustration. Majority of commission members, he said, seem to prefer dealing with other matters, such as collection of intelligence data on other armies. Thus it is illusory to think of UN as moving forward as far as reduction of armaments is concerned. For this reason Soviet delegation feels it desirable and knows it will meet with approval of all peoples for four Foreign Ministers to take question out of disarmament commission so limited in size and to call in its stead a world-wide conference of UN and non-UN members. This might better be proposed at a five power Foreign Ministers meeting but, rather than waiting for agreement on such meeting, which is still lacking, Soviet delegation therefore has proposed it to present four power meeting.

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[1] Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fifth plenary meeting, USDEL PLEN/5, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193.

Secretary replied [4] that he has no desire to use what limited authority he possesses as chairman to prevent anyone from speaking but that it seems to him item one is broad enough to encompass almost every problem in world. He had thought, however, that conference had finished with item one and was now prepared for serious business. Apparently he was mistaken. He continued that he would like to make several observations. US, he said, and he believes also UK and France, although he can speak only for US, came to conference with genuine hope it could help relax international tensions. He hoped this first four power conference in five years could prove its usefulness. He thought we had showed that when we accepted Molotov's agenda, [5] even though we did not like it, in the belief that procedural discussions on it would not help international climate. Item one, he continued, has as first part of its title "Measures for Reducing Tension in International Relations". Charges, replies and then counter-charges made under this item have probably not contributed to relaxation of international tensions. Secretary did not believe this conference, the first in five years, will justify itself unless it does better than it has and gets down to serious business. Conference should discuss problems we can and should solve rather than those we are not competent to solve and which contribute to an increase in tension. So far conference has spent time trying to find ways to set up new conferences. This will discredit conference itself and will cheapen our work in eyes of world. Secretary wondered if Soviet Foreign Minister really believes world tensions would be reduced by raising anew at this meeting an abortive proposal first presented by USSR to UN General Assembly two years ago and discussed there. If so, Secretary did not see how conference could fulfill hopes placed on it. Secretary continued that conference can do serious work on German and Austrian questions. If we can, as reasonable people, solve, make progress, talk seriously on them, or on either of them, that would go far to reduce world tensions. If, however, meeting is to discuss propaganda charges, make charges and countercharges, it will not fulfill hopes placed on it.

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[3] For a summary of Bidault's statement on Jan. 25, see Secto 17, Document 355.

[4] For Secretary Dulles' remarks, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 52–54, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 38–39.

[5] For the Soviet agenda, see Secto 17, Document 355.

Bidault said he would like at first to iron out any misunderstanding about his speech of January 25. He would like to repeat its main points on disarmament. Disarmament, he said, can not be achieved on a lasting basis except on the basis of agreement of the great powers, but it should be achieved within the framework of the UN. He had said this on January 25 and his views have not changed. Bidault then presented French draft resolution on disarmament [6] under which four governments would "pledge themselves to join their efforts to those of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in order that the latter may reach substantial agreement on the general principles of disarmament which would permit the convening of a general disarmament conference, in conditions favorable to its success, in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of January 11, 1952." Bidault explained that he raised disarmament question in this form not to prolong conference but because of its intrinsic importance. History since World War I has demonstrated question to be extremely difficult and complex. In order to avoid bitterness and differences of opinion, he concluded, he would suggest that disarmament question be set aside for time being and that conference return to it later.

Eden stated that as representative of a country which disarmed after World War II and then had to rearm, he found it difficult to understand the current discussion. He did not recognize Molotov's description of the status of the Disarmament Commission. To attempt to do so this afternoon would be to embark on a long and fruitless discussion, into which he refused to enter. He thought we could all endorse one general principle; progress on disarmament, in his own experience between two world wars, can only come about as international disputes are resolved and by an increase in mutual confidence. One thing we can do to speed progress is to begin discussion on German and Austrian questions. These are the questions we are here to discuss. We have not reached them yet in five days. He therefore agreed with Bidault's suggestion that meeting pass on from present discussion to item two of agenda.

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[6] For the French draft resolution on disarmament, see FPM(54)15, Document 509.

Molotov stated that Soviet delegation also does not consider it advisable to prolong discussion on any question and that he would consider any proposal to accelerate the work. Soviet insistence on examining disarmament problem, he said, comes from fact no CFM has met in five years and there has been no place to discuss question. Molotov said he could not agree that item one is not serious, whereas items two and three are serious. Soviet delegation believes all three items are serious; item one is of extremely serious nature. Soviet delegation, he said, does not look upon problem of disarmament as propaganda question. There is in international affairs no problem of greater importance to our nations and the whole world than efforts to reduce burden of armaments. Progress in this field would contribute greatly toward reduction of world tensions. He rejected implication that only USSR has anything to do with committing aggression. He then supported proposal of Eden and Bidault both that both Soviet and French draft resolutions [7] be held for study in a restricted meeting of the Foreign Ministers. After agreement is reached on this, he said, conference could proceed to discuss German problem.

Secretary stated he understands proposals made by Bidault had been accepted by Molotov and, he believed, also Eden. Secretary likewise accepted proposal.

In that case, Molotov said, he would like to make some remarks about procedure of conference. [8] On January 27 he had sent to Eden, as chairman for that day, copy of statement considered at appropriate moment by conference. [9] Copies also had been sent to Bidault and Secretary. GDR raised question of inviting representatives of GDR and of Federal Republic to conference when it discusses German question. Soviet delegation considers it important to examine carefully GDR request. West Germany, although it has not requested invitation, may well wish to attend also, although Soviet Government knows little of West German position as respects invitation. Soviet Government has consistently held to opinion that German people themselves must help reach German settlement along peaceful lines. Since German question is matter for Germans themselves, representatives of GDR and Federal Republic would assist considerably our discussions on Germany. Fact that nine million Germans in GDR have signed petition for invitation to both GDR and Federal Republic representatives at conference cannot be ignored. Soviet delegation therefore proposes GDR and Federal Republic Governments be invited to send representatives to participate in discussion of item two.

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[7] For the Soviet resolution, see Secto 29, Document 359.

[8] For Molotov's remarks, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 55–56.

[9] No copy of this statement has been found in Department of State files.

Secretary agreed that German question is of proper and intimate concern to German people.[10] Our problem, he said, is one of establishing legitimate representatives to speak for Germany as a whole. Perhaps our first task is to arrange by free all-German elections for a national assembly with which to deal. Secretary doubted there is any German government or combination of German regimes which can speak for German people as a whole. We know, Secretary said, that Federal Republic would not be willing to associate itself with regime governing East Germany for purpose of assuring all-German representation at conference. He doubted that GDR actually represents East German people. He expressed hope that as soon as possible conference will provide for all-German elections and formation of all-German government to represent German people in negotiations re the future of Germany. Secretary concluded that he therefore cannot now agree to GDR request of January 24.[11]

Bidault said French delegation agrees that legitimate representatives of entire Germany should participate in peace treaty. Our task now is to relieve division of Germany. He doubted that two sets of representatives so diametrically opposed in their views, would set a helpful tone to the discussions. Their polemics, which would take place in this semi-public forum, would not assist task for which Foreign Ministers of occupying powers are now responsible. He agreed that while it seems difficult to talk about Germany without participation of Germans, nevertheless such is preferable if conference wants to make progress toward unification of Germany.

Eden said UK Government had always urged that freely elected German representatives should participate in decisions re Germany. Free elections, on which he will soon have some proposals to make, should precede formation of an all-German government. He declared himself unable to accept Soviet proposal.

Following is summary of second part, plenary session, January 29:

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[10] For Secretary Dulles' statement, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 56–57.

[11] An English translation of this letter is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200

Molotov said Ministers were to consider German and Austrian questions; that during consideration of Austrian questions the Austrians should be heard and that during German questions representatives of both East and West Germany should be heard. Said he knew US, UK and France were prepared to invite Austrian representatives to conference during consideration of Austrian question and that nobody would understand unless Germans were similarly invited during consideration their questions. Stressed fact that no unified Germany now existed led particularly to conclusion that both East and West Germans should be heard. Recalled that when German question was considered by UN General Assembly in 1951, *ad hoc* political committee invited both East and West Germany, as well as representatives from both sectors of Berlin, to attend discussions and said that if conference is to move forward, instead of backward, it should do no less than did GA in 1951. Emphasized that while USSR has official relations with only East Germany and the US, UK and France with only West Germany, this whole matter should not be reduced to one of official relations only.

Molotov maintained that refusal of Big Four to invite representatives from East and West Germany might be misinterpreted and that this would add another obstacle in way of unification. Said lack of official relations did not exclude possibility that appropriate contacts and connections be established between Federal Republic and USSR and that such attempts as had already taken place were as yet insufficient. Recalled that representatives of big West German industrial firms had met with representatives of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade in August 1952 at Copenhagen and added that while there had been no further developments at that time it should not mean that present attempts should not be made to establish business contacts which would contribute to an appropriate development of economic relations. Said he was certain West Germans were no less interested in this matter than the USSR; that the Soviet people active in science would like cultural ties with West Germans.

Molotov repeated that purpose present conference to discuss German problem in Berlin and that people would not understand what the four Ministers were afraid of if they refused to meet the German representatives. Said USSR had been told that invitation to representatives of Western and Eastern Germany to participate must await action on questions like electoral law procedures et cetera, but Soviet delegation believed Germans themselves must be heard regarding these matters. Said no serious German question could be considered without hearing Germans and therefore he proposed to invite representatives from both East and West Germany to the meeting to hear their views prior to discussion before conference by the four Foreign Ministers of the German problems. Conference recessed and reconvened at 1800.

The Secretary said US had no further remarks on the matter of German representation and gave the floor to Bidault who pointed out fallacies in linking discussion of Austria and Germany. Said Foreign Ministers would be guilty of grave temerity if they now tried to establish solidarity on logic or geographical or political bases. Recalled that Austria would be discussed under Point 3 and that Austria had one government which was jointly recognized. Added that Ministers' purpose should be a German treaty; that unity and conditions must be established under which single German Government could be formed.

Eden expressed agreement with Bidault's statement on Austria and added that continued division of Germany meant instability and ultimate disaster for all. He then tabled UK plan for German reunification and freedom. (Text transmitted Secto 34 and Secto 51 [12]). Molotov followed with statement that Bidault and Eden, which were usually understandable, were not so today. He described Eden's speech as that of a scholarly constitutionalist of a strictly German type and construed it as saying that the best kind of German freedom the Ministers could propose would be from the hands of occupation authorities. He said it was unclear why Eden forgot to speak on subject of inviting Germans; that perhaps his colleagues felt it not necessary to consider these questions. Molotov emphasized he could not agree to this but considered lateness of hour precluded further discussion German representation problem at present meeting. Said points remaining for clarification were whether Ministers accepted or rejected idea of inviting Germans or, whether Ministers wanted to reject the proposal which had been made by the Soviet delegation on that score. Said if he could not have clear answer today, he had no objections to waiting until tomorrow, but difficult to consider matter as closed.

The Secretary pointed out there had been two rounds of general discussions on this subject with no agreement. He suggested the formalizing of the Ministers' position be left until tomorrow.

Meeting closed approximately 1920.

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[12] Neither printed. (396.1 BE/1-2754 and 1-2954) For the British plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

No. 384

396.1 BE/1-2954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, January 29, 1954—6 p.m.

Dulte 17. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. We start immediately preparing position and tactics with British and French for restricted meeting of four Ministers next week. I intend to submit tomorrow to working group now set up by three Western delegations substance of proposal contained in Dulte 10 [1] and approved by Tedul 5. [2] I would hope this could then become basis for agreed position of Bidault, Eden and myself.

I would appreciate, therefore, any necessary preparations in Washington being started at once, including, I would think, notifying confidentially USUN, Arthur Dean [3] and American Embassy Seoul in view possibility leaks from British or French. Of course we cannot be sure British-French concurrence so project must be regarded highly tentative.

DULLES

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[1] Document 369.

[2] See footnote 3, *ibid.*

[3] U.S. Special Ambassador for the Korean Political Conference.

No. 385

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Notes by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) on a Dinner at the Residence of the Soviet High Commissioner for Germany, Berlin, January 29, 1954

After handshakes all around the party remained standing and drank a glass of vermouth. Conversation was sparse and artificial. Gromyko, who looked like death warmed over, tried to be jovial by indulging in some banter with Semenov about his baldness which Gromyko attributed to his long tenure as High Commissioner. High Commissioner Conant's ample locks could only be explained by the fact that he had held office for only one year. This spirited exchange took place in the center of the large, hall-like room at the far end of which the dinner table was set. In the section of the room where we were standing there were two tables at opposite sides of the room surrounded by exactly the right number of chairs and loaded with fruit, candy, glasses, bottles of Russian cognac, plates and sugar bowls, indicating that after dinner we were to break up into equal sized groups, sufficiently separated to prevent easy overhearing of the other group's conversation.

Shortly, Molotov led a move toward the dinner table, lavishly set with china, silverware, four wine glasses, a bottle of vodka and a bottle of Georgian wine for every two persons and profusely spread with hors d'oeuvre type cold dishes.

The Russian hosts started the vodka act almost immediately. They all drew special attention to the vodka bottles which have several slivers of red pepper lying on the bottom. They all explained that the red pepper did not increase its intoxicating quality but simply served to give it a sharper taste.

A series of cold dishes, led off by caviar, were served, fish, meat, salads, vegetables.

Secretary Dulles sat between Molotov and interpreter Troyanovsky. Commissioner Conant sat approximately opposite Dulles.

Quite early, Mr. Molotov arose for his first toast, to Secretary Dulles. Molotov, who looked somewhat tired when we sat down, apparently enjoys the toasting ritual. His whole face changes. The downward curving lines of his face seem to develop an upturn and he smiles and twinkles. His humor, even in translation, has a really entertaining edge and never seems heavy.

After toasting the Secretary, Molotov toasted Dr. Conant, Merchant, Bohlen, Jackson and Frank Nash. He was a trifle confused on Nash's exact status and because of his Defense Department connection assumed that he was a military "character". Nash disabused him and then the Secretary referred to Nash as a bridge between the Defense and State. This idea started some lively chatter winding up with the suggestion that if Nash continued to do such a good job between Defense and State, he should be given the job of handling the bridge between Washington and Moscow. Molotov commented that in such a job the task of avoiding collisions would be heavier.

The Secretary during the course of the dinner referred to the fact that the President had asked him to convey his regards to Mr. Molotov whom he remembered meeting during the war. There seemed to be a little doubt as to exactly when the meeting had taken place, but Molotov cleared that up, the first time in Washington in 1942 and the second time in Moscow in 1945.

The President and President Voroshilov were naturally toasted and then Mr. Molotov got all wound up in a second toast to the Secretary in which he was laying it on rather thick. All of a sudden he stopped and said "I suppose I should not be speaking this way because I will be accused of polemics", a reference to the constant appearance of the word polemic during the Conference meetings where almost all speakers announce that they will avoid it and then launch into it.

All the other American guests each got their toast and the Secretary replied for the whole group.

Having no previous experience in such dinners I do not know if the consumption of vodka was up to standard. However, there seemed to be an impressive array of empty vodka bottles and an equally impressive array of erect Americans.[1]

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[1] For a record of the conversation following dinner, see the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, *infra*.

No. 386

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)[1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 29, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary of State
Mr. L.T. Merchant
Mr. V.M. Molotov
Mr. Andrei Gromyko
Mr. V.S. Semenov
Mr. O.A. Troyanovski (Interpreter)

The conversation after dinner[2] took place in a corner of the living room after the party rose from the table and lasted nearly an hour and a half. It continued for some time in the informal, non-serious tone of the general conversation at the dinner table. Molotov was quiet in his manner and almost avuncular in his discourse. He gave no indication of ill-humor or bad temper over his lack of success at the conference table during the afternoon. Semenov said nothing during the entire course of the conversation but followed it with rapt attention. Gromyko, in the earlier stages kept up a side conversation on trivalties with Merchant until Molotov directed the conversation to the subject of China. Thereafter he too followed the conversation with close attention but contributed nothing to it.

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[1] This conversation took place at the residence of the Soviet High Commissioner for Germany in Berlin on Jan. 28. Participants in the discussion, other than those listed below, are indicated in the text of the memorandum.

[2] For a record of the conversation during dinner, see the notes by Jackson, *supra*.

The Secretary and Molotov exchanged information as to their ages. Molotov, after saying that whereas he was 63, he would be 64 a month later. When the Secretary said that he would be 66 also in a month, Molotov said that just showed that he could not hope to catch up with the Secretary. The Secretary then said that he hoped that both of them would be in their own homes for their birthdays. Molotov contended himself with saying that would be much more pleasant.

Molotov then said that whereas, of course, it was well-known that newspapers in Moscow represent their Government's point of view, he was interested as to what newspapers in the United States reflected the administration's views. The Secretary replied that probably the *New York Herald Tribune* came closest to reflecting the administration's policies than any other paper, but that even within the paper there were conflicts and it carried some columnists who were critical of the President and the administration. In the previous administration he recalled, the *New York Times* had occupied a comparable position. In Washington the Secretary stated the *Post* was somewhat left of the administration policies, and the *Times Herald* to the right, but that *The Evening Star* probably came closer to the middle course reflecting the general policies of the administration. Molotov seemed genuinely interested in these observations.

Molotov commented on the fact that from the appearance of the U.S. Delegation in Berlin there had been a radical change in the State Department's personnel. The Secretary said that there had been a number of changes in the top levels and the key policy positions, but that the Foreign Service Officers were continuing to make their professional contribution. There was some chit-chat as to where Mr. Matthews had been assigned and on the appointment of Mr. Murphy whom Molotov had known, as well as several other persons Molotov had seen at previous conferences.

Then Senator Vandenberg's name came up and the Secretary deplored the loss to the United States represented by the death within a short space of time of Senator Vandenberg and Senator Taft. He pointed out that the former had been a power and authority on foreign affairs and that Senator Taft had occupied a similar position on domestic issues, and now the Secretary stated the power and authority in the legislature was more dispersed. The Secretary mentioned the coincidence that both had died of cancer. (At this point Gromyko (who is reported by the British here to have cancer) asked Merchant, with obvious concern, if it was really true that Taft had died of cancer. When Merchant confirmed this, Gromyko commented with feeling on the fact that it was a horrible disease.)

Molotov then asked the Secretary who was the true author of NATO. He asked if it was true that it was Senator Vandenberg's creation. The Secretary responded that he did not think so, and in fact he did not know who had given birth to the idea. He recalled that he had been summoned back from his vacation for a secret conference at Blair House to meet with General Marshall, Under Secretary Lovett and Senator Vandenberg. The purpose of the conference had been to lay the plans for the formulation of the North Atlantic Treaty and to judge the acceptability of the idea to the Congress. Gromyko, during this exchange had said on the side to Merchant that personally he had always regarded Walter Lippmann as the intellectual father of NATO, since in his writings since 1945, Lippmann had stressed the importance of the Atlantic Community. Merchant started to say that the author of NATO according to Gromyko was Walter Lippmann, but half way through the sentence it was misunderstood in interpretation and Molotov laughingly said that he had not realized that Gromyko was the father of NATO, but now we knew. Gromyko laughed heartily, but with visible effort.

About this point the Secretary said with great seriousness to Molotov that he hoped before the Conference ended at Berlin some area of agreement could be found which would enable the Conference to make a real contribution to the settlement of outstanding issues. He said that so far nothing had been accomplished.

Molotov replied seriously that he shared the same hope and that he felt that if we searched for such areas of agreement we would find them. He felt sure that Mr. Dulles had something in his pocket he had not yet produced, whereas he had already produced many things since Monday. The Secretary commented that Molotov's pockets seemed to him quite empty since all they had produced so far were rabbits which might be good for rabbit stew but were scarcely the stuff out of which successful conferences were made. Molotov agreed that rabbits were only good for stew, but insisted that he had not produced rabbits but some good ideas which could possibly be made better with modifications or additions.

Molotov then turned the conversation abruptly, and with obvious seriousness, to the question of U.S. policy toward Communist China. He said that he really could not understand it since it seemed so clearly contrary to the U.S. own interests. He asked how long we would continue to take seriously Dr. Tsiang the KT representative in New York. [3]

The Secretary stated that against the background of the demonstrated bitter animosity of the Chinese Communists to the U.S., it was inconceivable to consider a change in our attitude in the absence of prior action by the Chinese indicating a basic change on their part.

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[3] Dr. Tingfu Tsiang, Chinese Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

Molotov replied that he did not understand the basis for our China policy or where it was leading. He said that he had the feeling that it was dominated by emotion, but that he also had the feeling that apart (*sic*) from those in America who naturally would agree with him (Molotov) there was a large body of U.S. opinion which took a more sober view and felt that modification of present U.S. policy to Communist China was necessary. Molotov said that in politics, emotion should not be a factor; that policy should be based upon facts and the knowledge of what the future prospects were. He went on to say that he might better understand our policy if China were a small country, or if there were any chance of the Government being replaced. If it were a small country "external pressure" or other influences might be brought to bear to change the Government, but in fact, China was the largest and most powerful country in all of Asia. Moreover, he stated, Communist control of China was an historic event. He said that for a long time Russia had supported Chiang Kai-shek had given him credits, but he had gone bankrupt; he had failed to unify China, whereas, Mao Tse-tung for the first time in hundreds of years had succeeded in unifying all of China. This accomplishment has given the Chinese people a sense of national pride and has also sharpened their sensitivity to affronts or threats.

The Secretary said that the basis for our policy was very simple and he would be glad to explain it. The fact is that one does not strengthen one's enemy be giving him increased authority or prestige, or any other sort of help. To strengthen one's enemy merely increased his capacity to damage one. China seemed implacably hostile to us and had demonstrated this to us in many ways with which Mr. Molotov was familiar. The Secretary said there was no conceivable basis for a change in our policy in the absence of a change in China's action and policies supported by deeds.

Mr. Molotov went back to the sensitivity of the Chinese Communist regime. He said they had a great deal of experience in dealing with other nationalities and of course they had very close relations with Peking. He said, of course, he could understand Chinese attitudes, and he was satisfied that their attitude was fundamentally determined by their sensitivity and hence their reaction to discrimination, affronts and threats. He said it was of great importance to the United States to improve its relations with China. In this action he said that his proposal for a 5-Power Conference [4] would have been of great help. He pointed out that unlike the British, whose relations with China over the past century have been replete with difficulties and conflicts, the U.S. in its historical relations has a firm basis for the development of friendship.

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[4] For this Soviet proposal, see Secto 29, Document 359.

Molotov then made a curious statement that so far as he could see, the chief consequence to date of U.S. policy toward Communist China was to drive Peking into a closer relationship with Moscow. Naturally, he said, this was agreeable to Moscow, but he could not conceive how this development could be agreeable to the U.S. or in the true interests of the U.S.

The Secretary repeated the simple, fundamental basis upon which our policy rested. He then asked Mr. Molotov what Mr. Molotov considered were the possibilities of a settlement developing from the Political Conference on Korea.

Molotov remarked, of course, that the Conference was not even agreed upon yet, but that in any event in the existing embittered atmosphere he could not so far see anything important coming out of the Conference; possibly later, but not now.

The Secretary said then he thought he could understand some of the concerns of the Soviets; he assumed they would not want to see a hostile power or country near to Port Arthur or Vladivostok. Consequently, he wondered whether there might be any permanent solution or settlement which would involve the neutralization of Korea.

Molotov showed no surprise, nor any great interest in pursuing this subject, but dismissed it by saying maybe later something like that would be possible, but not at the present time with the embittered feeling of the Chinese toward the U.S. He said that Rhee[5] was "impossible." He asked the Secretary why we did not try to get in contact with the Chinese Communists to see if things could not be improved.

The Secretary said dryly that we had been in contact with the Chinese for many months in the armistice and subsequent negotiations in Korea.

Molotov rejoined that all that, of course, was at a low level. He said that possibly something at a higher level would be useful. He said that there must be some ways and means whereby that could be achieved. The Secretary indicated no interest.

Molotov went back again to the fact that he was frankly puzzled by the policy toward China. He assumed that we realized that it was complicating our relations with other Asian countries who looked at the way that China was being treated and thought that maybe some day they would be treated in the same fashion. In

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[5] Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea.

India, Nehru, for instance, does not like Communism, and he does not like the Chinese Communists, but he recognizes it as controlling China and he recognizes China as the most powerful country in Asia. Therefore, Nehru maintains normal relations with China.

In Japan, also, said Mr. Molotov, there are circles which are unfriendly to the Chinese Communist Government, but they are looking at China and looking at our policy toward China, and this cannot be a good thing for America's interests. Also, he said, the Japanese understand the Chinese well and sympathize with them.

At this point the Secretary indicated that it was late and rose to go. He said he thought that the exchange of views had been very useful, and that he wanted Molotov to understand our policy even if he did not agree with it. He also said that he was also interested in Molotov's advice, particularly since it was free, but that he knew Molotov would understand if he did not follow his advice.

Throughout, Molotov had talked quietly, occasionally with a light touch, and always so deftly as to create an appearance of friendly objectivity. At no point was he violent in his criticism of the U.S. He cast his discourse in the shape of an apparently genuine quest for information and tender of counsel.

During the entire after dinner conversation Molotov never mentioned Germany, EDC, or any other contentious issue. There was no mention of Indochina during the course of the conversation. Approximately a full hour was devoted to the discourse on China.

Secretary Dulles and his party left at about 11:15, with the entire Soviet group making every effort to be cordial and hospitable. [6]

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[6] On Jan. 30 Secretary Dulles transmitted to President Eisenhower a summary of this conversation and added that he expected to meet privately with the Soviet Foreign Minister that day to pursue atomic energy proposals. (Dulte 18 from Berlin, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

January 30, 1954

No. 387

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, January 30, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET
USDEL MIN-5

Present: The Secretary
Special Advisers
Advisers

Molotov's Dinner for the Secretary:

The Secretary reported briefly that all of his private and semiprivate talks with Mr. Molotov, at the latter's dinner, related to the U.S., political relationships to Communist China. [1] The Secretary said he had agreed to meet Molotov after today's quadripartite session to discuss a plan for discussion on atomic energy matters. [2]

Press Reactions:

Mr. Jackson reported that the general tenor of the U.S. press treatment was very good. By and large, comment on the meeting was favorable with praise for the conduct of the negotiations by the West. Mr. Tyler stated that the general tone of the French press continued to be good. In general, the French press felt the West had won a point in getting Molotov to discuss the German problem. There was no criticism of Mr. Bidault nor was there evidence of political pressure being applied.

Mr. Boerner characterized the German reaction as being that of the West forcing Molotov to debate on the German problem. The German Communist press played up the question of GDR representation at the meetings. Official German spokesmen in Bonn stated that the Eden plan for German reunification in freedom [3] was clear and logical and had expressed objections to GDR representation. In general, the U.K. and French press briefings stressed the Eden proposals. The Soviet press briefings emphasized the question of GDR representation. He said that a Communist organization in the East Sector (The Committee on Unity) called a press conference yesterday which developed the line that the Federal Republic was embarking on a war of revenge. The Committee's spokesman presented a program for creating conditions necessary for free elections. These conditions constitute the standard Communist charges (i.e. elimination of a standing army in West Germany, elimination of the revanchist clique, elimination of the militaristic press and propaganda agencies, etc.) and may indicate the new line which the Communist press may take on this issue.

Mr. Jackson stated that the stories filed last night by the correspondents developed the general theme that the West had won a victory in bringing the discussions to the German item; although paying tribute to Molotov's negotiating skill. There is a general speculation on the reasons to explain why Molotov has folded so soon on the critical issues and what he may have up his sleeve.

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[1] For reports on the dinner meeting with Molotov, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.

[2] For a report on the discussion of atomic energy matters, see Dulte 23, Document 393.

[3] For this plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Tripartite Working Group Meeting:

Mr. MacArthur announced that the Tripartite working group decided yesterday to establish a sub-group to deal with the disarmament question. The U.S. representative on this group will be Col. Black. Also the draft Declaration of Intent on the German Peace Treaty will be polished up in anticipation that it may be used in the future if the situation requires it. Mr. MacArthur said that the group would also explore tactics to be followed for this afternoon's quadripartite session.

Mr. Jackson expressed the view that the tripartite working group should attempt to plan as complete a schedule as possible for next week, since security problems at the Unter den Linden Building would preclude Tripartite discussions there. Mr. MacArthur agreed and added that it might be possible for the three Ministers to meet at the ACA Building for consultation prior to proceeding to the sessions in the Unter den Linden Building.

Quadripartite Meeting:

The Secretary observed that the afternoon session would probably open with Molotov taking the position that the Ministers were still discussing the question of GDR representation. Therefore it must be established clearly that no agreement has been reached on this question. He believed that either Eden or Bidault should speak first and emphasize that no agreement had been reached in order to establish a solid position to which the three Ministers could return in the second round of discussions. He said that consideration should be given to tabling of a concrete proposal to establish the proper platform.

Mr. Freund inquired whether anything need be said on the Austrian question. The Secretary replied that, particularly in view of Bidault's statement, we must insure that the Austrian question is not brought into the context of the German question.

The Secretary announced that he would meet with Messrs. Eden and Bidault at 2:40 PM today to discuss general tactics. [4]

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[4] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

No. 388

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, January 30, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-7

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. MacArthur	M. Seydoux	Sir Frank Roberts

1. Tactics for Today.

Alternative A. It was agreed that M. Bidault as chairman would open the meeting by suggesting that the question of East and West German participation be formalized. Mr. Eden would state briefly that he did not agree with the Soviet proposal. If Mr. Molotov makes a short speech indicating his position of the day before, Mr. Dulles will merely concur with Mr. Eden's views. Mr. Bidault will summarize the status of the question and proceed to make his speech on Germany. Mr. Eden will not make the speech at that time and Mr. Dulles will follow Mr. Molotov with the prepared statement in support of the UK proposal.

Alternative B. If Mr. Molotov in the first round replies to the question of GDR representation with a lengthy speech, Mr. Dulles may wish to give his long statement on Germany at that time. At the close of this statement Mr. Dulles would state his views on the GDR representation question.

It was hoped that a statement from the Federal Government would be forthcoming before the meeting today which would confirm the fact that the Federal Republic did not wish to come to the Four-Power meetings and would support the UK proposal. Sir F. Hoyer Millar would inform the delegations if this were received at the time of the 2:40 meeting. [1]

If Mr. Molotov proposes a restricted meeting on Germany, the tripartite position should be that since there has been a full exchange of views on the other problems slated for the restricted meeting there should also be a full exchange on Germany before going into a restricted session on that subject.

If Mr. Molotov raises the question of the time of the restricted session, it was suggested the three western ministers propose Wednesday or Thursday (not Friday when Mr. Molotov is in the chair). If Molotov does not raise this question today the three Ministers should discuss the matter on Monday in the Tripartite meeting in the ACA building. The restricted session will be a substitute for the regular plenary session.

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[1] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

2. Procedural Matters.

(a) The Working Group will continue to meet at the British headquarters.

(b) Preliminary tripartite ministerial meetings will be held in the ACA building at 2:30 p.m. when no tripartite lunch precedes a quadripartite session, unless decided otherwise.

(c) Following Mr. Molotov's chairmanship on Monday, rotation of the chairmanship will start anew. (This means that Mr. Eden would lose his turn.)

(d) Colonel Black will arrange with M. Broustra and Mr. Williams to attend Working Group meeting on disarmament.

(e) The experts preparing the proposed all-German Electoral Law have finished the first part which concerns elections and will report to the Working Group next week.

(f) Since the U.S. High Commissioner will be in the chair on Monday it was assumed by Sir Frank that Dr. Conant would take on responsibility for consultations with the Benelux representatives. Mr. Morris will prepare a memorandum for Dr. Conant informing him of this matter.

3. Declaration of Intent.

With regard to the Declaration of Intent, it was agreed that: (1) the three principals of the Working Group would attempt to get agreement from their ministers regarding the substance of the document;[2] (2) the Working Group would continue work on the revision of the alternative preamble; and (3) the Working Group will discuss this paper on Monday or Tuesday of next week in the light of Soviet opening moves on Item 2 of the Agenda.[3]

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[2] Under reference is the BER D-4/4 series, copies of which are in CFM files, lot M 88, box 168, "Four-Power Meeting in Berlin".

[3] For a record of the other subjects discussed at this meeting, see the memorandum, *infra*.

No. 389

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, January 30, 1954, 10:30 a.m. [1]

TOP SECRET

Participants: *UK Delegation*
Sir Frank Roberts
Mr. Denis Allen
French Delegation
M. de Margerie
M. Seydoux
M. Roux
U.S. Delegation
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Thurston
Mr. McConaughy

Subject: Five-Power Conference Issue

Mr. MacArthur said he would give the group a capsule account of Mr. Dulles' dinner with Molotov last evening. [2] Following routine dinner conversation and toasts, Mr. Molotov had engaged Mr. Dulles in an after dinner conversation on the subject of China. Mr. Molotov took the initiative in raising this subject and stayed on it exclusively. It lasted about fifty minutes. Molotov stressed the importance of "recognizing facts" and emphasized "China's important role in world affairs." He did not mention Indochina, nor did he raise any European questions for discussion.

It has been arranged for the Secretary and Molotov to meet briefly in the small room of the ACA Building today to discuss procedures relating to talks on the President's proposal for use of atomic energy. [3]

Sir Frank Roberts remarked on the contrast in the conversational tactics employed by Molotov at the three dinners for the Western Foreign Ministers. He had talked Indochina with Bidault, [4] had taken no initiative with British, obliging Eden to raise all the topics of discussion, [5] and had broached the subject of China with

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[1] Drafted by McConaughy. For a record of other subjects discussed at the meeting, see BER MIN-7, *supra*.

[2] For records of the dinner with Molotov, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.

[3] For a record of the discussion on atomic energy, see Dulte 23, Document 393.

[4] For a report on Bidault's dinner meeting with Molotov, see the memorandum of conversation by Bohlen, Document 361.

[5] For a report on Eden's dinner with Molotov, see Secto 38, Document 371.

Mr. Dulles. Roberts said that he was having lunch with Malik today.

De Margerie said that at luncheon the other day Vinogradov had mentioned a recent article in a French newspaper written by Pierre de Gaulle in opposition to EDC. Vinogradov had wanted to know if Pierre de Gaulle was considered the spokesman for his illustrious brother, General de Gaulle?

Mr. MacArthur then said that the Secretary had given much thought to the Five-Power Conference question. The Secretary wanted to find some means of taking an initiative on the issue. He had been casting about for some constructive step which might be taken. It has to be remembered that the question of public opinion had to be considered by us, as well as by the French and British. Mr. MacArthur then passed around copies of the top secret memorandum dated January 30. [6] He asked the British and French representatives to treat this as exceedingly sensitive and hold it very closely. Mr. MacArthur said it should be clearly understood that there was absolutely no water or fat in the proposal. It represented the utmost limit that the Secretary could see in trying to come up with a new and constructive approach. He did not think that it would be possible for us to go any further or to accept much tampering and changing of the fundamental elements contained in this idea.

Mr. MacArthur pointed out that it had something in common with the unagreed French "second position," but that it called for the inclusion of additional countries. There was provision for extension of the conference to deal with Indochina, with different composition from discussions on Korea. Some people in the United States undoubtedly would not like the proposal. It was tentative at this stage. But the Secretary wanted to get the French and British reactions as soon as they had had time to study the document.

Mr. Allen said after a quick reading that he took the proposal to be a new approach to the problem of convening a Political Conference on Korea, and that neutrals would be excluded from the Conference by the terms of the proposal. Mr. MacArthur confirmed this, and remarked that it seemed necessary to find a formula which would keep India out of the Conference, since the Republic of Korea was inflexibly opposed to the participation of India.

Roberts and de Margerie said that their principals and the advisers would give most careful study to the draft proposal which they found of great interest. They said some of the French had been thinking on somewhat similar lines. They hoped their Ministers would be able to comment soon.

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[6] Printed as an attachment below.

Mr. MacArthur suggested that the three Ministers should get together in the next few days to talk about this and in the meantime it was agreed that the Tripartite Working Group could meet again if this seemed desirable.

A copy of the memorandum is attached.

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared by the United States Delegation

TOP SECRET BERLIN, January 30, 1954.

1. We absolutely reject the concept of a Council including Chinese Communists as proposed by Molotov which would deal generally with world problems and in effect constitute permanent world organization replacing United Nations.

2. Where, as in Korea, Chinese Communists are necessarily involved we deal with them without diplomatic recognition.

3. Accordingly we are willing that the Four Foreign Ministers attending this Berlin Conference here should invite Communist China, North Korea, Republic of Korea and other countries which have participated in the Korean War to meet with these four countries to settle the Korean problem at a place and on a date which Four Foreign Ministers here will now fix.

4. Growing out of that Conference, if Red China wants it, could come an end of aggression and the restoration of peace in Indochina. This would, of course, involve an appropriate change in the countries participating. [7]

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[7] The text of this memorandum was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 20, Jan. 30 (396.1 BE/1-3054), together with a summary of the initial British and French reaction to it.

No. 390

396.1 BE/1-3054: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, January 30, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 56. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes January 30 meeting Bidault presiding: [2]

Bidault opened the meeting by recalling that at the end of previous session no agreement had been reached on Soviet proposal to invite representatives of governments in Western and Eastern Germany to appear together at meeting. He asked whether conclusion could be reached on this point. Eden and Molotov maintained their previous positions. Secretary said he maintained views he had previously expressed in opposition to Soviet proposal. He pointed out Federal Government, which is freely elected government of 50 million Germans, had expressed no desire to be represented and that Bundestag had decided only representatives of freely elected all-German government should appear at such meeting. Bidault repeated views he had expressed in previous meeting in opposition to Soviet proposal and concluded that there was no agreement on this point.

Eden requested views of other delegations on proposal regarding elections he had tabled in previous session. [3] Molotov said he would only make preliminary statement on Eden proposal, since it required detailed study. [4] He said that he wished to know what views of other delegations were on Eden proposal and whether they would submit proposals regarding Germany.

Molotov said exchanges of notes prior to conference [5] had indicated importance attached by Western Governments to question of so-called free elections which were subject of Eden proposal. Soviet Government also attached importance to free all-German elections, but its views in this regard did not coincide with those of Western Powers. Eden plan suffered from defect that elections would be turned over to occupation authorities. Plan showed distrust of democratic forces and too much concern with supervision of preparations and carrying out of elections by foreign powers. This he said was matter for Germans whose opinion should be sought, which Eden proposal did not provide for.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the sixth plenary meeting, USDEL PLEN/6, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193.

[3] For the British proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[4] For Molotov's statement, circulated as FPM(54)20 in the records of the conference, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 61-64, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 45-47.

[5] For text of the notes exchanged between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union in the summer and fall of 1953, see Documents 65 ff.

Molotov said position of all-German government which would emerge from elections proposed under Eden proposal was not clear, particularly whether it would be truly free both in internal and external matters. He referred to provision that all-German government would have authority to assume international rights and obligations of Federal Republic and Soviet Zone and to conclude such other international agreements as it might wish. This would retain Bonn and Paris agreements [6] in force and extend them to East Germany against wishes of population represented by the GDR. It was hardly possible, he said to speak of a Germany which is truly free in the light of bland assumption in Eden plan that all-German government would not be free to decide whether these agreements would remain in force. In fact, Bonn agreement would continue occupation for decades and Paris agreement would tie Germany to military chariot of certain powers for 50 years. This provided freedom for German militarists but not for German people.

Molotov said that after all-German elections Germany should not be committed by agreements to associate itself with any particular group of powers and that Germany should embark on peaceful and democratic path free to decide external as well as internal policy. Four powers should see to it that Germany is reborn as united, independent, democratic and peace-loving state. Such a truly free Germany would not be a threat to her neighbors, but would play role as a great power among peace-loving states of Europe. He concluded by saying that when he next spoke he would set forth views of Soviet delegation on German problem and submit proposal.

Secretary then made statement text of which has been telegraphed separately. [7]

After brief intermission [8] Bidault spoke for about half hour on German question much along lines Secretary's speech. [9] He stressed following points:

(1) Although there is close relationship between questions Germany and European security German question came first for solution that question would contribute to second.

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[6] For documentation on the agreements signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Documents 51 ff. Regarding the agreements signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 684.

[7] Secto 55, *infra*.

[8] For a record of Thurston's conversation with Semyenov during the intermission, see the memorandum of conversation, Document 392.

[9] For Bidault's statement, which was circulated as FPM(54)19, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 67–71, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 42–45.

(2) French Government always looked toward general European settlement. Molotov erred in stating that division Europe would result from establishment EDC. Exactly the opposite. EDC conceived only after creation Eastern bloc. But we not searching for causes this situation but for remedy.

(3) Destiny of Germany depends on peace treaty rapidly concluded which would establish basis lasting peace. Potsdam merely covered probationary period for Germany which cannot be prolonged. Peace treaty must be freely accepted by Germany and freely negotiated with German representatives. Imposed peace out of question. Bidault then fully backed United Kingdom plan German reunification in freedom.

(4) Peace treaty must assure durable peace. But there cannot be indefinite controls in Germany. Soviets maintain Germany can never join any coalition or military alliance directed against any power which waged war against Germany. Army would be limited. Such clauses in treaty without guarantees cannot be considered as forceful as EDC with all its controls. If Soviet proposals accepted real danger exists Germany being dominated militants. Controls and discriminations from outside would breed nationalism and militarism. We need new solution for Germany—formula of association which would make impossible individual revengeful German action.

(5) West and East occupational authorities have fulfilled their tasks. Time has come for new regime. Two different systems exist. That precisely why German people should be asked to decide their future. We in general agree Eden's plan for it provides unity in freedom.

Eden then assured Molotov that his plan, upon coming into force peace treaty, guaranteed full freedom to Germany in her external relations and that Germany would not be bound in any way by formal commitments either to East or West.

Meeting then adjourned with agreement convene February 1, 3 p.m., Soviet sector under the chairmanship Molotov.

No. 391

396.1 BE/1-3054: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY BERLIN, January 30, 1954.

Secto 55. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary Dulles' statement in sixth plenary session, January 30, on Germany: [2]

"This second item of our agenda deals with "The German Question" and also "The problem of insuring European security". History compels us to treat these two matters together. From this very city where we are, still largely in ruins, have been launched two world wars. Two of our four countries, France and the Soviet Union, have suffered land invasion both in World War I and World War II. The United Kingdom was invaded by air. All four of us have twice had to marshall to the full our human and material resources in order to withstand and finally to throw back the tides of German aggression. Surely we have a vital interest to do all that is in our power to make sure that such aggressions should never occur again. Indeed, that concern is shared by the German people themselves who have suffered cruelly from militarism and tyranny from some of their own people.

The sacrifices which have been made during these two world wars have now placed in our hands a large measure of power to influence the future, for better or for worse, and to determine whether the coming years will preface a durable peace or another disastrous war.

Nine years have now elapsed since the German armistice and peace is still unmade. In many ways, that delay is a reproach to us. But there is another side to the matter. The immediate aftermath of a bitter and exhausting war usually finds that reason is submerged by sentiments of hatred and revenge. The instinctive reaction at that time is to turn to repression as a means to future safety. But the lapse of time restores reason to its proper place and now, nine years having passed, we should be able to invoke wisdom and statesmanship to be our guides.

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[1] Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] For a record of the sixth plenary meeting of the conference, see Secto 56, *supra*. Secretary Dulles' statement was circulated as FPM(54)18 in the records of the conference.

The problem that we face here has two major aspects. First, there is the taks of uniting Germany; and secondly, there is the task of insuring that united Germany shall be a peaceful Germany. I shall first speak of the problem of German reunification.

The partition of Germany creates a basic source of instability, and there is little merit in our talking about peace if at the same time we are perpetuating conditions which endanger the peace.

I am firmly convinced that a free and united Germany is essential to stable peace in Europe and that it is in the interest of all four nations which are represented here around this table.

How did it come to pass that there is this disunity—this disunity of Germany which is, as I say, a danger to peace? We here are not free from responsibility in that respect, because it is the disagreement of our four nations which has created the present division of Germany. It is the disagreement of our four nations which perpetuates the present division of Germany; and, it is only we who can end this division of Germany. As I pointed out in some earlier remarks that I made, that fact—the fact that we four have a unique responsibility in Germany—should make this German problem a central theme of our work here. It can be the test as to whether or not we are really qualified to work together for peace.

There exists this partition of Germany which is a threat to the peace if it is in our power to end it. All that is needed to end it is that we should have the will to end it. If we do not have that will, then I say we may be peace-loving nations, but we are not peace-seeking nations. Mr. Eden yesterday submitted a precise and a detailed plan [3] to achieve the unification and freedom of Germany by an orderly series of actions that would start with free elections. It seems to us that this British proposal is clear, is reasonable and is well designed to achieve at the earliest practical moment a full German settlement, including a German peace treaty.

I have no doubt that our discussions here around the table, as we debate this intricate matter, may suggest the desirability of some modifications in detail of the plan which Mr. Eden has submitted and perhaps some clarifications. Certainly, I think we must all have an open mind on that, and I certainly have an open mind. But I do say that in general, I endorse the proposal that has been submitted on behalf of the United Kingdom and associate myself with it.

There are one or two observations which I would make particularly suggested by some remarks that have been made by Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov has, for example, suggested that the proposal of the United Kingdom would be in essence an attempt on the part of the four occupying powers to impose unification upon Germany rather than letting the Germans work out their own affairs. As I read Mr. Eden's project, it would be just the contrary.

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[3] For the British plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Under his proposal, the essential steps in the entire unification process, including their timing, are left up to the freely-elected representatives of the German people. Who is it under this plan who will draft the new constitution? It will be the freely-elected German national assembly. Who will set up a provisional all-German authority and later on the all-German government? The all-German national assembly. Who decides when powers shall be transferred from the existing regimes in Eastern and Western Germany to the all-German government, and what international rights and obligations it shall assume? Again, the national assembly and the all-German government. As I read the plan, the entire emphasis seems to be on enabling freely elected German authorities to make the crucial decisions all along the road to a final German settlement. That observation brings me to comment on another point upon which Mr. Molotov has commented, namely, this problem of free elections. Any proper plan for German reunification must provide adequate safeguards of election freedoms. This, it seems, is covered by the proposal that we are considering. Conditions of genuine freedom must exist not only on election day itself, but for a reasonable period of time before the votes are cast, and also after the elections, in order to insure that there shall be no reprisals, and that everyone may safely vote his convictions.

To take care of this latter point, the United Kingdom plan would maintain the supervisory machinery in operation until the all-German government assumes full control and is able to assure democratic freedoms throughout Germany in accordance with its constitution.

We can be sure that the fifty million inhabitants of Western Germany are willing and anxious to cooperate to insure such free elections. The same can be said for my government and also, I believe, for the French and British Governments. The eighteen million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone deserve the same kind of assurances, and I trust that my Soviet colleague will agree to the importance of providing those assurances.

Mr. Molotov has made some observations about the pending proposal, which seem to me to imply a lack of full understanding of that proposal, or possibly, I might suggest, the need of further clarification of the proposal. I will not attempt to go into those matters myself, because I am confident that Mr. Eden, who submitted the plan, will himself deal with these matters. But as I read the plan, it is not subject to the type of objections which Mr. Molotov has indicated, and I hope that, on the basis of further clarifications, he would find that the plan itself, at least in its broad outlines, is reasonable and one that we could proceed to adopt as providing a way of bringing an end to this dangerous condition of the continued partition of Germany. Let me turn to what I referred to as the second aspect of this problem, that is the problem of security. We want Germany united, but we also want to be sure that a united Germany will be a peaceful Germany. As I have said, the elapsed time since the armistice should enable us now calmly—and I hope wisely—to consider how best to achieve this indispensable result.

On this point, history has much to teach us. It teaches us that a stable peace cannot be achieved by some countries imposing upon other countries discriminatory restrictions. These methods fail by their very nature. They fail because they present a direct challenge to the spirit of nationalism, and themselves. They provoke efforts to demonstrate sovereign equality. The very provisions which are designed to create controls, in themselves breed international lawlessness and violence. The tragic failures of the past should warn us not to resort here to the methods that have so often been tried and as often failed. If we do not want a revival of German militarism and excesses of nationalism, we must ourselves admit the natural and proper desire of the German people to be equals in the family of nations. We must enable them to contribute to a system of security, which, threatening none, defends all.

Our problem consists, most of all, in finding a worthy outlet for the great energy and the vitality of the German people. Whether we like it or not, that vitality is a fact. It is a fact that cannot be forcibly repressed for long, and it is a fact which need not destroy the welfare of all of Europe, but which can be brought to serve that welfare.

The essential thing is to find a way in which the energies of all of the European countries which form a natural community will be pooled in common constructive tasks rather than perverted to struggles by one to dominate the other. That vision is already being translated into reality. Under the leadership of France, six nations of continental Europe are establishing a community. Already, the Coal and Steel Community exists. The same six countries have signed a treaty to create a defense community, and other aspects of community association are being actively explored.

We have welcomed the steps which the United Kingdom has taken to associate itself with and support this community. The United States also, although not itself a European power, would associate itself durably with the community through the North Atlantic Treaty, which, I recall, is much more than a mere military alliance.

The Soviet Union professes to fear that this community which is being born might be dangerous to it. This community, it is true, will make Europe healthy, more prosperous and in that sense more strong, but that is nothing to fear if at the same time Europe is made more peaceful. That is the purpose and that would be the sure result.

No more will there be national armies to fight each other and to invade others in a quest for national triumphs. There will be only the common army so interlocked so that no single member of the community could in practice commit armed aggression. There would be no more German Army. There would be no German General Staff, and the military service of individual Germans would be closely restricted.

Such a European Army could go into action only in response to great and pressing needs of self-defense. It could not be used without the concurrence of countries which themselves have had bitter experience with German militarism and which could never be a party to its revival.

The West German Republic, representing over two-thirds of the German people, has eagerly turned toward the building of a European community in which its own nationalism would be submerged.

It is indeed a historic moment when the Germans have come to realize the danger to themselves and to all of Europe if their energies are confined to nationalistic channels and if their future success must be measured only in terms of national grandeur.

The German desire to bury the excesses of German nationalism is a desire that cannot be repulsed without grave hazards for the future.

Surely, this is a matter which the four of us ought to be able to consider together with a feeling that we are bound together by the same interests. The United States credits the Soviet Union with a sincere desire to achieve security in Europe. Certainly that is our own desire.

It would be a tragedy if a division between us on this matter created the very insecurity which we all would banish.

My plea is, therefore, that we explore this matter not in any sense as representing opposing sides, but as a group of countries which, with the Germans, seek a single goal—the transforming of Europe from a cockpit of war to a home of abiding peace."

No. 392

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Thurston)

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, January 30, 1954.

Participants: Mr. Semenov, Soviet High Commissioner in Germany
Mr. Thurston
Mr. Lustgarten, interpreter

During the break in today's meeting Mr. Lustgarten asked me if I would like to meet Mr. Semenov, who was standing nearby and after I was introduced to him, we had a short and not particularly revealing conversation. Mr. Semenov opened up by asking where I had come from and when I told him, he asked me whether I was working in German Affairs. When I told him that my duties pertained to Eastern European Affairs, he replied that that was not very far away from Germany. I answered that I too could see a close relationship between Germany and the problems of Eastern Europe. He apparently thought this had unintended implications of some kind and replied that he could offer no opinion on my observation, since he thought that the people of each country should be concerned only with their own affairs. I told him that I had expected his reply to be that there was also a close connection between Germany and the problems of Western Europe, but that I agreed 100% with his statement about people handling their own affairs. He continued on the theme that there should be no interference in any form by one country in the affairs of another. I said that we had reached rather rapid agreement on this point in principle and that the only problem was whether actions on the part of given parties were to be described as "interference" or "cooperation". His reaction to this comment was that no matter what I said, he did not believe in interference in other people's affairs. When I repeated that this was a principle on which we both were apparently in hearty agreement, he said that that was a good omen and should afford a foundation for agreement here in Berlin.

I picked up his reference to Berlin to say that it was not far from here that the American and Soviet armies had met almost nine years ago and that the times indeed seemed ripe for such agreement. At the mention of armies he told me that he had been present when the two armies met and that he was the political adviser to General Konef at that time. He said he remembered meeting General Bradley at that time.

No. 393

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, January 31, 1954—5 p.m.

Dulte 23. Eyes only Acting Secretary. Please pass to President and on eyes only basis to Wilson and Strauss. I saw Molotov after plenary session yesterday afternoon [2] to pursue procedure for next step in atomic discussions. Merchant and Bohlen accompanied me and Molotov had Zarubin and Troyanovski (Interpreter).

I told Molotov I thought we should discuss next step in procedure atomic talks since I did not wish procedural questions to interfere with results in this matter. I said in view of interest other countries in this matter such as UK, Canada, France and certain countries such as Belgium which contain sources of raw material if we should adopt conference method we would be faced with problem of what other countries should be present. Therefore for next stage we thought it was best to keep discussions confined between US and USSR on bilateral basis. I said US Govt was preparing memorandum setting forth our concept of application of President's Dec. 8 proposal [3] and that in its preparation we would take into account views of certain of the countries mentioned above but it was not our view that they should be brought into discussions with Soviet at this stage. This document when completed could be submitted to Soviet Govt through Ambassador Zarubin in Washington and at same time Soviet Govt could, if it desired, submit its proposal.

Molotov replied he had only preliminary comments to make and said Soviet Govt already awaits with interest US memorandum. He added that since question of other countries had been mentioned he would like to refer to Soviet memorandum delivered by Zarubin [4] which made reference to involvement at later stage of countries bearing special responsibility for peace and security and in this connection he referred to five powers including Communist China. He said Soviet Govt had already prepared a document setting forth their proposal which he handed to me. (This document which is in form of draft declaration is transmitted in rough translation in part two of this message.)

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[1] Drafted by Bohlen and transmitted in two parts.

[2] For a record of the sixth plenary meeting, see Secto 56, Document 390.

[3] See footnote 2, Document 326.

[4] For the text in translation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Oct. 4, 1954, pp. 478–479. The memorandum was among the documents released as the result of Soviet-American agreement in September 1954, to make public the correspondence between the two governments concerning the question of an "atomic pool".

Molotov inquired whether I had any objection to Eden and Bidault being informed of this document but said it was not his intention to have them involved in present talks since Soviet Govt agreed that at this stage bilateral basis preferable in interest of privacy.

I told Molotov that I would not be in any position to give him our memorandum while here in Berlin since it involved a number of delicate matters requiring expert consideration in Washington and that it would be only after my return that I would be in a position to give it to Ambassador Zarubin.

I said I would examine the document he had given me and we could have a further conversation while we were both here in Berlin, to which he agreed. He assured me in response to my question that he would not give this document to the press or make any reference to the fact of its submission.

Following is text rough translation of document Molotov handed me yesterday afternoon:

"Draft declaration of Govts of USA, England, and France, Chinese People's Republic and Soviet Union concerning unconditional renunciation of use atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction.

The Govts of the USA, England, France, Chinese People's Republic and USSR determined to deliver humanity from the threat of destructive war with the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction,

Desirous of assisting in every way in the utilization of the great scientific discoveries in the field of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes for the well being of peoples and the amelioration of their living conditions,

Considering that the unconditional renunciation by states of the use of atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction correspond to the basic purposes of the organization of the United Nations and would constitute an important step on the road to the complete withdrawal from national armaments of the atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction with the establishment of strict international control guaranteeing the execution of agreement concerning the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes, animated by the aspirations of the peoples for a reduction in international tension,

Solemnly declare that they take upon themselves the unconditional obligation not to use atomic, hydrogen and other forms of weapons of mass destruction;

Call on other countries to adhere to the present declaration." [5]

DULLES

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[5] In Dulte 24 from Berlin, Jan. 31, Secretary Dulles reported that he briefed Bidault and Eden on his talk with Molotov and had given each of them copies of the Soviet proposal. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 394

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET

BERLIN, January 30, 1954.

The attitude and positions taken by Molotov at this conference during the first week I think provided useful and confirmatory indications of certain factors of a general nature which I believe play an important, if not controlling, part in Soviet actions at this conference. In the belief that to set them down might be useful for the planning of our strategy and tactics, I am briefly summarizing them in this memorandum.

1. The first point to bear in mind is that the Soviet Government did not desire a conference at this time but was against its will forced into it as the choice of the lesser evil. They did not desire a conference because I believe they were fully aware of their weakness on the German problem stemming from their inability or unwillingness to risk in any sense the East German Communist regime. On Austria, their position this summer was clearly revealed as a determination not to yield until something had been accomplished on Germany. I will come back to the question of Austria as it is barely possible that with proper strategy here we might be able to force them into giving on the Austrian Treaty.

2. Molotov has given a rather more clear expression to the basic contradiction confronting the Soviet Government at the present time—namely, on one hand, a real desire for some improvement in Soviet international relations stemming from domestic necessity as against an equal determination not to give up any territory acquired as a result of World War II. The very fact of these acquisitions resulting in the extension of Soviet control has severely limited the field of Soviet maneuver at international conferences.

3. As to strategy and tactics, at this meeting Molotov is clearly trying to pose as a European and to this end is visibly trying to avoid direct conflict with the British and French while inviting (i.e. first day's developments), within limits, a conflict with the U.S. In other words, he would like to have the disputes develop in such a way as to appear that they are between the U.S. and the USSR, with the latter speaking in part at least for the concept of Europe. I believe this factor more than any other has resulted in his failure—unusual for a Soviet diplomat—to stick to certain initial posi-

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[1] Copies were also sent to Bowie and Bruce.

tions, i.e., five-power conference item and disarmament conference proposal. I believe that he temporarily abandoned insistence on these points because he realized to do so would now, as in the past, have solidified the Western Powers against him. I think a clear recognition of the limitations imposed on Molotov by his desire to avoid conflict with the British and French could be very useful to use in planning our future course of action.

It is very probable that Molotov expects no concrete result of any kind from this conference but, on the other hand, does not desire it to end in a complete breakdown between East and West, or even in total sterility. He would prefer therefore that some indication of future tactics or negotiation should be made evident at this conference and this would appear to be what he had in mind in proposing two future conferences. We can expect to have certain variations on this theme such as an attempt to appoint Deputies etc.

In examining questions of substance before the conference it would appear that only Austria offered any hope of progress. Austria, as distinct from Germany, does not involve the Soviet Government with the abandonment of a Sovietized area; and while certainly up to the present the Soviet position is not to give on Austria, if confronted by the choice of absolutely nothing at this conference with the attendant risk of heightened international tension or doing something about Austria, there may be an outside chance that they would find the latter course less disadvantageous. I am not sanguine on this point, but I think it is worth keeping in mind.

4. As to the Far East, there would seem to be some indications that Molotov is hinting at the possibility of some serious business in regard to Indochina. These indications are still nebulous but there is a consistency about them which would indicate some purpose other than mere propaganda.

The foregoing brief outline is submitted to you in the hope that at some time in the near future it will be possible in a small group to consider what might be called the policy implications in the Soviet position as against the day-to-day tactics and procedures.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

January 31, 1954

No. 395

Editorial Note

According to the United States Delegation records, no meetings took place on Sunday, January 31. Secretary Dulles held a press conference that afternoon in which he responded to questions concerning the progress of the meetings. The full text of the press conference was transmitted in telegram 832 from Berlin, February 1. (396.1 BE/2–154)

February 1, 1954

No. 396

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, February 1, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

USDEL MIN-6

Present: The Secretary
Special Advisers
Advisers

Press Reactions

Mr. Tyler reported that the general tone of the French press was calm. There was no significant editorial comment. Most papers point out that, although the tone of the four-power discussions have been friendly, this does not mean that agreement is any easier or nearer. There was a good play in the non-Communist press of the speech by M. Bidault on Saturday. The U.S. position is favorably commented on. In general, note of resignation as to the outcome of the Conference seems to be entering the press treatment.

Mr. Boerner said that the two small papers in Berlin continued along the line of restrained optimism. In Western Germany the general theme is that the first week of discussions have gone well. The SPD papers have adopted a carping line on certain details of the negotiations. For example, they have objected to the references to the Versailles Treaty made by Secretary Dulles and the provisions of the Eden plan [1] for leaving the GDR and West German governments in power for a certain length of time after the elections. The Communist press in Germany gives top treatment to the Grotewohl letter to the Conference [2] and are trying to develop the theme that this is what the East and West German people really want.

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[1] For this plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[2] A copy of this letter, dated Jan. 30, which contained seven numbered proposals for a peaceful solution to the German question, is attached as Annex 4 to BER D–4/1a in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the letter in telegram 833 from Berlin, Feb. 1. (762.00/2–154)

Mr. Jackson stated that the telegraphic summary of the U.S. press reaction had been received. However, the stories filed by the U.S. wire services all point to the progress made last week, although stressing that the tough decisions lie ahead. In general stories do not strike a very hopeful note. All wire services filed feature stories on the visit of correspondents to the Soviet Unter den Linden Building.

Official German Reactions

Ambassador Conant commented on the sharp contrast in views revealed in his discussions of yesterday with the SPD and the Adenauer government representatives.[3] He said that the SPD representatives are more hopeful of the outcome of the Conference and are apparently more willing to make concessions in order to reach agreement with the Soviets. Mr. Blankenhorn on the other hand did not hold high expectations for the success of the Conference and talked frankly about how the talks might eventually be broken off.

Tripartite Meetings

Mr. MacArthur stated that the Tripartite Working Group had discussed security precautions to be taken by the three delegations at the meetings to be held at the Unter den Linden Building. It was the general view that the delegations should arrive immediately prior to the time of the meetings. He anticipated that the working group would go more fully into the subject of security this morning. The working group will also discuss tactics for today's meeting and the Austrian question.

Quadripartite Meeting

The Secretary stated that for this afternoon's quadripartite meeting Molotov probably would make a long speech on the German problem to which he would have to reply. Since it would be his turn to speak immediately after Molotov, his remarks would in large measure be extemporaneous. He inquired as to what was being done in the way of supporting material. Mr. Bowie replied that a series of questions had been drafted which the Secretary could use to probe the soft spots in the Soviet position.

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[3] On Feb. 1 Conant had reported that Bonn political parties had been unable to agree on a joint statement supporting the British proposal (FPM(54)17) and rejecting dealings with the East German Government. (Telegram 2435 from Bonn, 762.00/2-154)

The Secretary then announced that he probably would hold a preliminary meeting with Messrs. Bidault and Eden at 2:20 p.m. in the ACA Building.[4]

Security Precautions at the Unter den Linden Building

Mr. Herfurt, Delegation Security Officer, concluded the meeting with a detailed briefing on precautions to be taken by all Delegation members at the Unter den Linden Building.

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[4] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files. A paper dated Feb. 1 in the records of the U.S. Delegation indicates that Secretary Dulles was to raise the three following points: (1) tripartite proposal for a five-power meeting, (2) security precautions at Unter den Linden, and (3) tactics for the plenary meeting. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204)

No. 397

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Memorandum of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 1, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-8

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. MacArthur	M. Seydoux	Sir Frank Roberts

1. Tactics for Today

Mr. Molotov may:

(a) Turn to Mr. Dulles for opening remarks;
(b) Make a long speech regarding the Soviet proposal (perhaps on point of order to place GDR letter released Sunday in the press before the conference (Annex 1—BER D-4/1[1]).

If (a) above is followed Mr. Dulles will make a prepared speech. M. Bidault will wish to re-enforce comments on the UK proposal[2] so that the emphasis of today's session will not be placed on any new Soviet proposal. He will stress the complete freedom of Germany under the UK plan to form alliances with the East or the West. Mr. Eden will note that item 2 is a dual item; that it was quite right German unity should come first; but it was also agreed discussion of security should be closely connected with the discussion on Germany. Under the UK proposal Germany gets freedom but only in a form which makes it safe for all. The Soviet position on Germany does not provide for European security.

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[1] Regarding the GDR letter, see footnote 2, *supra*.

[2] FPM(54)17, Document 510.

If Mr. Molotov raises the GDR letter the tripartite position will be that we will examine the proposal on the basis that Mr. Molotov has asked us to do so. At first glance there seems to be nothing new in the proposal and the ministers have already enough matters before them that must receive attention.

Only in the event that Mr. Molotov raises the timing of the proposed restricted session the three western ministers should indicate their preference for Thursday. (The U.S. and the U.K. provisionally stated that there should be approximately five on the side for these meetings. The French indicated their desire for a fewer number and possibly only their Minister with one person accompanying him. Sir Frank noted that in addition to an interpreter, an adviser, and the Ambassador to Moscow, it was very advantageous to have an officer present who would have time available for preparing the record of the meeting. It was agreed that there should be no stenotypists present since this would inhibit the informality of discussion.)

It was agreed that there would be no 2:30 tripartite ministerial meeting at the ACA building today unless the French Delegation phoned to the contrary by 2:00. If a 2:30 meeting is held it will be in Mr. Eden's office at the ACA building. [3]

2. Austria

It was agreed that the Austrian Experts (Freund, Warner and Sauvagnargues) would again consider the position with regard to the withdrawal of troops so that the Ministers' attention could be brought to this unagreed point in the position on Austria as soon as possible. [4] This matter will be discussed again in the Working Group on Wednesday, February 3. The Austrian Experts will also consider the procedure to be taken with regard to the invitation to the Austrian Federal Government.

3. Declaration of Intent (BER D-4/4b)

There was tripartite agreement on this document subject to changes made at the meeting (see BER D-4/4c) and further work to be done on the preamble at the time of issuance. [5]

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[3] No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files, but see footnote 4, *supra*.

[4] For a further discussion by the Austrian Experts, see Secto 62, Document 401.

[5] For text of the draft Declaration of Intent, BER D-4/4c, see Document 511. No copy of BER D-4/4b has been found in Department of State files.

4. Procedural Points

1. Regarding press arrangements for the restricted session, it was assumed that nothing but the facts of the time and place of the meeting would be issued to the press. Delegation press officers were to be notified so that they should meet to make final arrangements for press handling on the day the restricted session will occur.

2. Sir Frank requested that consideration be given tomorrow to the question of trade offers Mr. Molotov had made in the quadripartite sessions.

No. 398

396.1 BE/2-254: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 2, 1954—10 a.m.

Secto 65. Department for OSD. Following summarizes first part of Seventh Meeting Foreign Ministers held February 1 in residence Soviet High Commissioner East Sector, Molotov presiding: [2]

Secretary said he would have comments on Molotov's statement at previous meeting, but since Molotov had made only preliminary comments, Secretary said he would defer remarks until later.

Bidault said [3] he wished to make preliminary comments on Eden's proposal [4] and Molotov's declaration of January 30. [5] Regarding Eden plan, he said primary problem to which Ministers should devote their attention was organization of free elections. This involves two essential points. First, organization of elections must necessarily be worked out by four powers. Second, freedom of elections must be guaranteed, particularly through Control Commission's functioning in impartial fashion which would assure that guarantees be observed before and after elections. Eden proposal satisfied these requirements. While reserving right to raise points of detail in further discussion of Eden proposal, he had only one immediate substantive comment. He felt there should be neutral participation in election commissions, which would guarantee impartiality and would facilitate adoption of majority vote which he described as essential to effective functioning of commissions.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the seventh plenary meeting, USDEL PLEN/7, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 193. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 66, *infra*.

[3] For Bidault's statement, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 47-50, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 71-74.

[4] For this proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[5] Regarding Molotov's declaration on Jan. 30, see Secto 56, Document 390.

Turning to Molotov's statement, he understood Molotov agreed on need for holding free elections. He asked whether Molotov envisaged as he did that elections would come first and organization of all-German Government second. He was encouraged by Molotov statement that all-German Government should have complete freedom in external and internal affairs. This was position which had been taken by the Western powers in their notes of the last two years.[6] He said Soviet proposal that Government should not be free before treaty to participate in coalitions and alliances was not consistent with Molotov statement. Molotov had misunderstood West position in this respect. There was no question of extending automatically to all-German Government agreements made by Federal Government. All-German Government would be wholly free to choose whether or not it desired to assume obligations previously undertaken by Federal Government, and no conditions in this respect were being laid down by West. While he understood that Mr. Molotov looked at the problem differently he stressed that it was only way in which problem could be resolved, that is, to accept decision of German people. France, does not make entrance of United Germany into EDC condition to unification. It cannot however accept converse condition of prohibition on Germany's entrance into community.

Bidault said Molotov had misunderstood Bonn and Paris treaties and their relation to reserved powers. These powers would disappear when peace treaty came into force. During pre-treaty period, Western powers would reserve certain rights they have in common with Soviets for purpose of insuring peaceful reunification of Germany and conclusion of peace treaty. There was no question of imposing on Germany occupation controls over long period of years. On contrary, purpose was to hasten treaty.

Bidault stressed that essential decisions such as those relating to German constitution, formation of Government, transfer of powers to Government, and negotiation of peace treaty would be made by Germans. Occupying powers would do only those things which they alone capable of doing. He saw no possibility of Germans working out electoral law or organizing elections. It was impossible to conceive of two regimes based on completely different political principles agreeing regarding such matters. It was also necessary to guarantee complete freedom of expression. In present state of affairs, impossible for that to be done without international supervision. In conclusion Bidault said that Allies alone are in position to end division of Germany.

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[6] For documentation on the exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union concerning all-German elections (1952) and the convening of a four-power conference (1953), see Documents 65 ff. and 257 ff.

Eden said [7] agenda item was German problem and European security. This was Molotov wording and order in which Molotov had placed problems was, he thought, proper one. Main problem of Ministers was to reach agreement on reunification of Germany and conclusion of peace treaty with all-German Government resulting from free elections. He wished to explain relationship of his plan to problem of security. Allies were pledged by Potsdam agreement to assist Germans in reconstruction of their life on peaceful, democratic basis. This did not mean that all provisions of Potsdam were applicable today. Molotov himself had admitted that some had been overtaken by events. Problem must be looked at in light of actual situation and and not as things were nine years ago.

Eden said he assumed Soviet delegation envisaged giving Germany right to provide for her defense in view of Soviet proposals regarding peace treaty of March 1952 and August 1953. [8] However, there must be safeguards against new aggression by Germany. UK does not believe that imposed settlement can be maintained and thinks aim can be achieved only by associating Germany so firmly with other peaceful countries that she will neither seek nor be able to commit aggression. This can best be done through EDC.

Eden said EDC treaty is designed to contribute to maintenance of peace and its aims are purely defensive. In view of British association with EDC, he wished to describe it and character of guarantees which it offered, stressing revolutionary character of concept embodied in EDC. He described institutional arrangements which, he said, would make it impossible for any member of community to launch war with its own forces. He asked Molotov whether such a European army would not be better guarantee for peace than series of national armies, including German national army as proposed by Soviets. Summing up, Eden said UK Government would not revert to type of control provided by Potsdam. He reiterated statement in previous session that United Germany would not be obligated to join EDC. UK Government feels it should have a right to do so and believes it would wish to do so.

Regarding Molotov statement on Saturday, Eden said he agreed with comments made by Bidault. In particular, he felt occupying powers must draft electoral law and put it into force. They could consult German Governmental authorities. West would certainly work very closely with Federal Government. He also stressed importance of supervision of elections. Concluded with appeal for settlement not based on narrow and bitter recollection of past.

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[7] For Eden's statement, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 50-52.

[8] For text of these proposals, see the notes from the Soviet Union, Mar. 10, 1952, Document 65 and Aug. 15, 1953, Document 263.

No. 399

396.1 BE/2-254: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 2, 1954—10 a.m.

Secto 66. Department for OSD. Following is summary second part of meeting February 1: [2]

After brief recess Molotov made lengthy prepared statement. [3] He opened by recalling losses suffered by USSR in the war at hands of Germany which were greater than those of any other country. Soviet Government feels grave responsibility for prevention rebirth German militarism and prevention new war. In approach to German problem Soviet Government feels that allies should be guided by basic principles of agreements they have already reached which were designed to maintain peace and prevent new aggression by Germany. Four powers should jointly prevent re-emergence of German militarism and thus avoid threat new world war. If they did not do so and allowed German militarism to revive, no international agreements could be adequate guarantee to prevent new world slaughter which would be terrible in its consequences and would involve fratricidal war among Germans themselves.

Molotov remarked that conference was in awkward situation, in that it was discussing German problem without presence of Germans. This resulted from refusal of three Western Ministers, basing themselves on Adenauer's views, to hear GDR. Federal Republic's opposition to sitting at same table with GDR was, he said, politically shortsighted. Mistake could still be rectified, however, and Ministers could hear views of East and West authorities on important specific issues.

Molotov said German problem was primarily one for solution by Germans themselves. World war had required allies to assume certain responsibilities but this will only be so until peace treaty, when Germany will become full-fledged member of European community. Pending conclusion of peace treaty, four governments should jointly restore German unity and create conditions which would ensure that Germany would not again become source of aggression.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] For a report on the first part of the sixth plenary meeting, see Secto 65, *supra*.

[3] For Molotov's statement, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 52–62.

Molotov said that EDC constituted effort by three powers and West German regime to form military bloc directed against Soviet Union. Plan permits West Germany to provide German militarism. In his January 25 speech,[4] Bidault said there were only two alternatives dealing with Germany: Either indefinite compulsory control or process of association. Process of association was a peculiar one. Under this vague formula Bidault seeks West German army which would recreate Wehrmacht. In plain terms it was military association of certain European states directed against other states. Its authors are not preparing for peace but for a new and most dangerous war in Europe.

Molotov said that it was strange some French representatives believed that France did not need an alliance with USSR, but military bloc with part of Germany directed against USSR and certain European countries. These countries formed most trustworthy support of peace and European security and would like to be allies of France. He pointed out France and USSR had both been occupied by Germany and stressed their mutual interests. If they acted together, no one in present condition would dare break peace of Europe and European security would be safeguarded. Difference in social systems need not serve as barrier between them. They should strengthen their relations and cooperation with Germany. This policy would be opposed by German militarists. Although Bidault supported Bonn and Paris agreements, opposition to agreements in France was constantly growing.

Molotov ridiculed statement of previous session by Secretary that EDC would contribute to European health and prosperity. Bonn and Paris agreements are a part of larger American military plan in which France and Italy were being used as implements of American policy. These agreements would make Germany into base of preparation for new war supplementing network of American bases spread around world. He also mentioned network of British bases. In addition to these bases and agreements directed at USSR and Eastern Europe, US and UK were taking other measures against people's democracies. He cited appropriation of $1 million under MSA act of 1951 for subversive purposes in Soviet orbit and suggested that additional amounts had been devoted to this purpose since 1951.

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[4] For a summary of Bidault's speech on Jan. 25, see Secto 17, Document 355.

Molotov drew parallel between Versailles Treaty and Bonn and Paris agreements. Versailles was one of main causes of Second World War because it was instrument of oppression. Same was true of Bonn and Paris agreements, which would maintain Germany in state of semi-occupation for 50 years. He said that even West Germans would not accept these arrangements under which three Western powers could at any time interfere in German internal affairs, declare emergencies, and in general dominate German life. If some West German officials had agreed to this, Molotov intimated they had no real intention of carrying out agreements. Agreements would recreate German militarist machine. First 12 divisions would be set up. No one [who?] was not naive would have difficulty imagining what would follow and German militarists would soon speak in their own aggressive language. We all know that the German militarists know no half-way measures.

Molotov said that GDR would never enter into this pattern. Implementation of agreements would place insurmountable barrier to unification of Germany and make it impossible for country to be unified for some time to come. He said that Bonn and Paris agreements had another feature in common with Treaty of Versailles, that they were directed against Soviet Union. Their fate would be no better than that of Versailles. Either they would not be implemented, or if they entered into force, from the very beginning the system of international relations upon which they were based would disintegrate. He intimated that those who embarked on this course could expect no sympathy from the Soviet Union. The treaties did not correspond to the realities of the present state of affairs and their only real significance is to permit remilitarization of Germany.

Following several earlier allusions to need for immediate beginning of work on peace treaty, Molotov pointed out Soviet Government had submitted draft principles of draft peace treaty two years ago.[5] Western powers had not commented upon them nor submitted proposals of their own. Soviet delegation wished to make three additions to its previous proposals as follows (exact text of proposals not yet circulated in English):

(1) Add following provision to section on political clauses: "No obligations of a political or military character arising out of treaties or agreements concluded by Governments of Federal Republic or GDR prior to signing of peace treaty and reunification of Germany shall be imposed on Germany." Molotov said this should not meet with any objections as Eden's views stated at last meeting met with those of all three Western Governments.

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[5] For this Soviet draft, see the Soviet note of Mar. 10, 1952, Document 65.

(2) Add following to clause on economic matters: "Germany shall be fully exempt from payment to USA, UK, France, and USSR of post-war state debts with the exception of those arising out of trade obligations."

(3) Clarify provision in Soviet draft that Germany will have forces necessary for defense. Add following section on military clauses: "These armed forces shall be limited to those required to meet the needs of internal security, local border defense and anti-aircraft defense." Molotov said this would be in accord with provisions in previous peace treaties.

Molotov proposed that drafting of German peace treaty be taken up immediately. He pointed out that four powers had drafted previous treaties and at London CFM [6] Western powers had urged that preparation of treaty proceed simultaneously with organization and holding of elections. Final considerations and adoption of treaty could only take place with the participation of all-German Government formed on basis of elections, would be subject to ratification of all-German Parliament. However, Germans should participate in all stages of development of treaty. Pending formation of all-German Government, representatives of East and West regimes should participate in work. Beginning treaty drafting would show new and important stage of work on Germany had been undertaken, in the course of which allied difficulties would be overcome. This would also contribute bringing two parts of Germany together and expedite solution of questions such as formation of all-German Government and elections.

Molotov said he was submitting amended draft proposals for peace treaty in light of foregoing and draft on preparation of treaty and convening of peace conference. [7] He indicated he would submit draft proposals on other German problems.

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[6] Reference to the fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at London, Nov. 25–Dec. 15, 1947.

[7] For text of these Soviet proposals, see FPM(54)24 and 25, Documents 512 and 513.

No. 400

396.1 BE/2-154: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 1, 1954—11 a.m.

Dulte 26. Eyes only for President, copy for Acting Secretary, from Dulles. First week's negotiation gives following impressions:

1. Bidault showing strength and firmness. His two principal statements have been lofty in tone and statesmanlike in substance. So far as we can judge, he has not pursued Molotov's hints that Indochina peace might be bought for price of concessions on Germany and EDC.

2. Molotov shows obvious desire appear reasonable to extent of making tactical concessions without substantive concessions. Significant moment was Thursday.[1] He suddenly injected new proposal for world disarmament conference—obvious purpose being propaganda and dilatory tactics so he could open on Germany in the East Sector Monday. I called him hard, stating we were making ourselves ridiculous and hinting continuance of old propaganda about insoluble matters would mean no more such conference. Molotov quickly allowed his proposal to be passed over and German discussion to begin. Then Molotov allowed himself to be out-maneuvered in his effort to interpose procedure on meeting East Germans so we got down to substance.

3. Molotov injects China recognition at every possible turn. This not only main theme of his official conference statements, but also theme of his private dinner discussion with me,[2] and Saturday at bilateral talk on atomic plan,[3] he again introduced necessity of China being brought in. Two possible interpretations are: (A) China-Soviet relations such as to obligate him make insistent case on behalf China, or (B) he is deliberately pressing China on theory that this will make us more than ever determined not to recognize China for fear of doing what Soviet wants. Conceivably, two considerations combine.

4. UK, which at beginning seemed wobbly, has strengthened and informal talks with Eden have contributed to joint position to oppose India call for UN assembly, and better understanding and cooperation for northern tier security grouping in Middle East.

5. While Bidault has so far not mentioned EDC specifically, his expressed philosophy about German treatment leads logically to EDC.

6. See no prospect of any substantial agreement on German problem, but slight theoretical possibility agreement on Austria if Molotov concludes this is price worth paying to demonstrate four-power meetings can achieve some successes and are worth continuing.

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[1] For a record of the fourth plenary session, Jan. 28, see Secto 43, Document 376.

[2] For reports on Secretary Dulles' dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 29, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.

[3] For a report on this conversation, see Dulte 23, Document 393.

thereby perhaps enabling him to keep his fingers in West Europe pie and still work against EDC, NATO and bases.

DULLES

No. 401

396.1 BE/2-154: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 1, 1954—4 p.m.

Secto 62. Department for OSD. Following receipt Tosec 59 [2] tripartite group on Austria discussed troop withdrawal February 1. French and British position unchanged but British now have support their Chiefs of Staff. US representative explained in some detail reasons for US preference for complete withdrawal and conditions under which US would agree withdrawal particular necessity that Austria raise adequate security forces. British and French will consider and steering group will discuss problem February 3.

Only discussion of consequence was query by French concerning status control agreement under complete withdrawal. British reported their legal experts inclined believe control agreement lapses and French agreed. Questions we must be prepared answer Wednesday are:

1. Would AC agreement stand?
2. Would we assume AC agreement stands or insist upon positive Soviet reaffirmation?
3. What is relation of any German assets question to maintenance control agreement after complete withdrawal?
4. Would we gain by making agreement on Soviet proposal withdrawal conditional on abolition control agreement?

Re point 4 above, British and French not convinced that with withdrawal Soviet troops from Austria control agreement would continue provide any significant protection against Soviets or that threat division Austria would remain.

Views including legal aspects urgently requested.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] See footnote 4, Document 378.

No. 402

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212

The President to the Secretary of State [1]

ROUTINE WASHINGTON, February 1, 1954.

Many thanks for your informative reports. I find them valuable and extremely interesting and hope you will continue to keep me up to date. I know that your mission is a fatiguing one, but I know also that you are equal to every requirement of your exacting task.

With warm regard,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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[1] Transmitted to Berlin in Tedul 14, Feb. 1. On Feb. 2 Secretary Dulles replied as follows:

"Many thanks your message which gives us encouragement. It is work running late into every night. But we feel some real gains are being made and whole delegation cooperating in fine spirit." (Dulte 29 from Berlin, Feb. 2, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 403

Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson papers

The Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to Marie McCrum, White House Secretary [1]

BERLIN, February 1, 1954.

DEAR MACHARI: [Here follows a paragraph in which Jackson discussed his staff at the conference.]

Bidault is really emerging as quite a hero. He made the best speech of the whole week last Saturday. [2] I hope it was reproduced in full in the *Times* as you should read it. If it wasn't printed I am sure State has a transcript. He has consistently shown a lot of guts and by now has come out so squarely for EDC and so boldly for German elections and freedom that he will never be able to crawl back on that limb.

JFD is also quite a hero. He has consistently made courageous sense and if we covered so much ground the first week it was due to his generalship and constant tactical brilliance during debate. Time after time he outmaneuvered Molotov and put him in the kind of corner from which the only way out was either filibustering which public opinion would not tolerate or giving way which he did three times last week. I am not implying that we have won but I am saying that we are putting up the kind of hard, smart fight that Mr. M is not accustomed to from our side and most of the credit should go to JFD. It was his instant decision to accept M's agenda and it was a brilliant key move which threw M off balance and permitted us to get to the German question within the first week. We might still be hassling over the agenda and would have had to face the 5 Power issue anyhow. Even though it hasn't been killed but only referred to a meeting of the Ministers alone it can never come back with the same bloom.

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[1] The C.D. Jackson papers include another shorter version of this same letter. It is not clear to the editors how these two different versions may have been used.

[2] For a record of the sixth plenary meeting on Jan. 30, see Secto 56, Document 390.

You are quite right that the Western solidarity is greater today than when we first met in Bermuda.[3] That is due to a few successes and the feeling that diminishing returns have set in on M's shopworn techniques. He just doesn't frighten them any more, and here again credit should go to JFD. He showed them how to talk up to the invincible and omnipotent Mr. M. When he said the equivalent of "Now listen Mr. M, that is a lot of obscenity, very old obscenity, which you have been trotting out for years, and you know it. We came here to solve the problems of Germany and Austria. The people of the world are not going to tolerate this ridiculous performance. Now when are you going to stop the nonsense and get on with the job?" and it worked, the other two realized that maybe we did have the initiative and that all three should crowd him.

Speaking of Bidault, I don't see that the dictionary does anything more than give him an option.

By all means take the time off.

Today was the first day in the Soviet sector,[4] rather exciting. I felt like an old hand as I had had dinner in the Embassy last Thursday.[5] The mechanical facilities are nowhere near as good as in our building. Smaller room, therefore limited delegation. No microphones or electrical translation equipment. Molotov talked for 50 minutes and that meant two hours and a half when you add on the English and French translations.

However, their buffet was superb with Zarubin trying to funnel vodka down my throat. JFD dropped by our little table and Zarubin offered him a glass of Georgian wine. JFD said, "No thanks, I'd rather have vodka" and did. Wonderful. He is also very good at working with his staff. He consults them constantly and listens and frequently takes suggestions contradicting his ideas without a quiver.

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[3] For documentation on the Bermuda conference, Dec. 4-8, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

[4] For a report on the seventh plenary meeting of the conference, see Sectos 65 and 66, Documents 398 and 399.

[5] For a record of the dinner meeting at in the Soviet Embassy on Jan. 28, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.

My day starts at 7:15, breakfast and papers. Office a little before 9 to start reading the cables of which there is an incredible pile each day, about an inch thick. At 9 I have a meeting with my little Berlin OCB consisting of Tyler, Griffith, Boerner, Anspacher, Hamilton. At 9:30 the entire delegation meets to hear world press reaction, exchange problems, receive announcements and get the line from JFD or MacArthur. Then begins a fairly hectic series of meetings preparing for the day's conference, drafting speeches, editing, batting up ideas, getting research lined up for emergencies etc. There is just barely time to get this done and we frequently wind up doing the last bit in the car on the way to the conference, like on the plane on the way up from Bermuda, only every day. Around 2:30 we leave for the conference. Each of us has a car and military driver assigned. As most of the drivers were brought up from Munich or Heidelberg and had never seen Berlin which is a tremendous sprawling city, the chances of getting lost are rather high. The meetings last until 6 or 7. We then have a meeting with the press briefing boys and decide on the line. I then go to the briefing to keep a fatherly eye on the performance. Then back to the office, at 8, 9, 10 depending on length of press meeting. Try to clean things up with Mildred A. [6] Then dinner which frequently doesn't start until 10 or 11. Then two or three nights there is stuff to prepare for the next day so that I never manage to get to bed before 12 and I guess my average is closer to 2. And then I have to wash my goddam nylons which is fun the first time but after that a chore of the first magnitude. So I would say that the tax-payers are getting their money's worth.

Today Molotov really uncorked his major filibuster on German elections and rearmament and EDC. He threw in everything, the U.S. bases, the Kersten amendment, Hitler, American subversion, the Nazis in the Bonn government, the German military spirit, etc., etc., etc. All of it old stuff. He practically wooed Bidault in public. In the middle of it I slipped Merchant a note saying "I didn't think he would get his hand above Bidault's knee so soon". Merchant laughed and left the note in front of him where it was solemnly read by JFD a while later. He turned around and winked. Tomorrow will be a big day because we will have to slap him down hard and try to get him back to the central business. In fact tomorrow may be decisive. I have some interesting things on the stove with some friends.

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[6] Mildred Avallone, Jackson's secretary during the Berlin Conference.

Well, my dear, the time is now 12:55 and this little negotiator is going to bye-bye. I have no dope whatsoever on Rome or on windup of this business. Will let you know as soon as there is something. I think of the inmates of 234 often and with great affection and gratitude.

CD

P.S. You might consider excerpting some of these paragraphs and circulating to a few real pals, Craig, Bobby, Beedle, Allen, Abbott, Ann. [7] Don't do it unless you think it is a good idea.

Triple best

CD

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[7] The identity of these people is not certain. Beedle, Allen, and Ann are respectively, Under Secretary of State Smith, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, and Ann Whitman, President Eisenhower's secretary. Craig and Bobby are possibly Peter Craig of the OCB, and Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President. The reference to Abbott has not been identified further.

February 2, 1954

No. 404

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 2, 1954, 10:30 a.m. [1]

SECRET

BER MIN-9

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. MacArthur	M. Seydoux	Sir Frank Roberts

1. *Tactics for Today.* It was agreed that Mr. Dulles should speak first today after pointing out that he had not had an opportunity to speak yesterday. M. Bidault will then touch upon the points in Mr. Molotov's speech which particularly affect France. Mr. Eden wishes to speak briefly in an attempt to bring the discussion back to Molotov's comments on the UK proposal and on his and M. Bidault's speeches of yesterday.

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[1] Secretary Dulles did not meet with the U.S. Delegation on this day.

2. *Preliminary 2:30 Meeting.* It was agreed that there would be no meeting of the three Ministers today but that they should meet on Wednesday.[2]

3. *Letter from Chancellor Adenauer.*[3] To balance the East German approach to the conference, Chancellor Adenauer has sent through Blankenhorn a letter which can be published. The letter expresses the appreciation of the German people for the skill of the western ministers in bringing the discussion of the four ministers to bear on the German problem. Mr. Eden will acknowledge this letter.

4. *Restricted Meeting on a Five-Power Conference.* It was agreed that if Molotov raised this matter the three powers should request that the restricted meeting be held on Thursday. Unless Mr. Molotov takes the initiative, the three powers will not raise this subject today.

Mr. Eden has agreed that there should be five delegation members on a side for restricted sessions while M. Bidault prefers to have a more restricted meeting with perhaps merely the minister, an interpreter and one adviser.

5. *Discussion on the Soviet Proposals on a Disarmament Conference.* The experts working on this subject suggested that during the restricted session M. Bidault should speak on his counter-proposal and that Mr. Eden should attack the Soviet proposal. Mr. Dulles would give general support to the comments of the other two ministers. When the general line of argument to be taken by the other two delegations has been worked out, the U.S. will prepare its supporting material.

6. *Austria.* The British expressed the desire to have a meeting on Austria as soon as possible in the Working Group. It was suggested that the differences between the positions be defined by the experts for consideration of the problem at the Working Group tomorrow.

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[2] For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum by MacArthur, Document 411.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

No. 405

396.1 BE/2-354: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 3, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 73. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes first part eighth meeting on February 2: [2]

Meeting opened at 1506, Secretary presiding.

Secretary delivered first statement, text of which being transmitted separately. [3]

Bidault began his statement [4] by noting that apparently all are now agreed Germany is central question of present conference. He noted that USSR wishes priority to be given peace treaty as proposed in its amended 1952 proposal, [5] whereas France considers peace treaty should be negotiated after, not before, establishment of German government. There would be no point in drawing up a treaty as proposed by Molotov if it were going to be disowned immediately by government of united Germany. Apparently Molotov fails to recognize that four powers cannot at this moment determine what will of German people is. Germany must speak with one voice, not with two voices saying opposite things.

There is inconsistency between Molotov's statement of yesterday that leaders of Western Germany do not express sentiments of German people and his proposal that Bonn government be invited to express its views on Germany settlement. Bidault did not understand why Molotov has altered stand he took in July 1946 [6] at which time he felt it necessary to form German government before beginning treaty negotiations.

Bidault also noted Molotov's reference to following provision in draft treaty of March 10, 1952, [7] which provided that "it goes without saying that peace treaty of that type should be drawn up with participation of both Germanies represented by government of whole of Germany." Bidault construed this as meaning that four occupying powers, which have discharged control functions in Germany, should also consider question of creation as soon as possible of unified and representative German government.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this meeting, USDEL PLEN/8, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.

[3] Secto 70, Document 407.

[4] For Bidault's statement, circulated as FPM(54)27, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 66-71, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 85-88 and 138-142.

[5] For this proposal, see FPM(54)24, Document 512.

[6] Reference to the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in Paris in 1946.

[7] Document 65.

Bidault refused to discuss history of Versailles Treaty on grounds that conference has enough difficulties to cope with in 1954, without dealing also with those of 1919. He thought essence of problem is that no peace settlement can be imposed on German people without that peace becoming precarious. It therefore is necessary for four conference members to agree among themselves first on free elections before negotiating with German government.

Unfortunately, Molotov appears opposed to the only view which can lead to concrete results during this conference. Furthermore in regard to Germany Molotov has raised general East-West problems and has impugned our motives.

In its long indictment, particularly as respects Bonn and Paris agreements, Soviet delegation has levelled contradictory charges that, on one hand, occupation of Germany is being maintained on more or less permanent basis and, on other hand, hands of German militarists are being freed. Bidault thought it unnecessary again to set record straight on erroneous interpretation given by Soviet delegation to Bonn agreement. He also rejected discussion on state of French opinion as respects Paris agreements, and he could not see why Molotov feels entitled to speak on subject. In any event, if Molotov believes Bonn and Paris agreements are bad treaties, why should he be so reluctant to subject them to free decision of future government of united Germany? In this connection it also is surprising that Soviet delegation agreed that freedom of choice Bidault wishes given to German government would be valid only after conclusion of peace treaty, while according to Soviet delegation Bidault wants to postpone indefinitely conclusion of peace treaty. Bidault expressed belief that German government should have complete freedom in assuming obligation as soon as it is set up, even before peace treaty. As far as treaty itself is concerned, Bidault would have no difficulty in accepting eighth clause suggested by Molotov. He would like to see same spirit embodied in seventh clause concerning Germany's association with other states. Bidault thought that clause should be deleted.

Bidault went on to challenge statement that Bonn and Paris agreements are substitute for peace treaty and emphatically rejected thesis that agreements would prevent reunification of Germany. He noted that it would be contrary to welfare of German people for Molotov to put as a preliminary condition for holding of free elections denunciation of agreements by Federal Government.

Bidault thought it necessary to set record straight as regards Molotov's contention that Western policy, and particularly French policy, is behind division of Europe and renders impossible unification of Germany.

It is a blinding fact, he said, that since 1945 Western side has demobilized its forces and is trying to reach peace settlement while simultaneously it is faced with bloc of states becoming progressively more integrated politically, economically and militarily by close network of pacts, all made between 1945 and 1948. This bloc is essentially based on USSR itself. Bidault noted that while these pacts may be directed against renewal of German aggression, nonetheless, they can also be brought into play against any other state USSR may choose to consider as associated with Germany. Between 1945 and 1948, armies of Soviet bloc have been reorganized and trained along strictly Soviet pattern. In those years there was not even the beginning of such a system in Western Europe, and what has developed since then is strictly defensive and directed against no one.

Bidault then referred to his understanding that USSR would like to see established a European system in which France, USSR and Germany would together safeguard European security. He thought that desirable, provided other two governments represented at conference table are not excluded. He welcomed Molotov's statement that other states in Eastern Europe wish to become friends of France and welcomed the invitation. In this connection, however, he noted resistance on Eastern side to fact that France wished to keep her independence agreeing with Molotov that conference should seek German settlement which will prevent birth of German militarism, Bidault noted that, though aims are shared, no agreement has been reached on methods to be employed. Bidault referred to Molotov's statement that three powers had not yet reacted to Soviet draft treaty of March 10, 1952, and in this connection explained that it would have been idle and dangerous to embark on treaty negotiations without legitimate representation of whole Germany.

As respects Potsdam agreement, Bidault agreed with Molotov's observation that many of its provisions have become obsolete. He agreed also that Germany should become peaceful, democratic and independent state, but he recalled that at Moscow conference Molotov had considered democratization of Germany as involving measures analogous to those applied by USSR in her own zone, measures which are direct source of division of Germany. It would be regrettable, Bidault thought, if reference to Potsdam agreement would return us to exact situation we are trying to leave.

Bidault believed it essential that Germany not be permitted to have, under full sovereignty, unlimited military forces and said he failed to perceive any third course of action apart, on one hand, from outside control and, on other hand, from association. Molotov, he said, is urging repetition of experience which has twice failed, first after 1806 when, despite Napoleon's limitation of Prussian powers, 7 years later resurgent Prussia defeated Napoleon at Leipzig and, second, after Versailles Treaty which limited to 100,000 men German army which so rapidly grew to Wehrmacht under Hitler. From this tragic experience, Bidault said, France is unshakeably convinced that reconstitution of new German army is dangerous for German democracy and incompatible with security.

Soviet plan for Germany, according to Bidault, calls for a Germany isolated in heart of continent. She would have to rely on herself alone for her defense, for her freedom to contract agreements with other states would be severely limited. Such a concept forces one to recognize that Germany perforce would be entitled to maintain considerable armed forces to protect herself from possible attack. Danger in such a formula lies in fact that isolated Germany with powerful army would soon throw off restrictions imposed by treaty. Molotov's formula to limit German forces to minimum level would not insure security of Europe. It would lead again to situation which followed Versailles, when a Germany subjected to restrictions tried to get rid of them by playing off one group against the other. Soviet proposal appears open to criticism even outside strictly European field where its consequence would be to bar Germany from UN and prevent her from expressing herself on subjects under discussion.

Summing up, Bidault expressed belief that Soviet draft treaty of March 10, 1952, does not jibe with reality and, indeed, is in line with treaties which Molotov has himself criticized. If Molotov feels it impossible to return to a system which has not prevented Germany from becoming a militaristic power, then we must use imagination and change our ideas. France has tried to do precisely that, and we must hope that French formula will so appeal to others that they will be able to associate themselves in their turn to that formula. It is in this framework that place has been set aside for Federal Republic so that, instead of being isolated, Germany, which has so often proved fatal for herself and for Europe, can associate herself with other states whose good faith is indubitable. Europe which we are trying to build threatens no one.

Meeting was recessed at 1800. [8]

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[8] For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 74, *infra*.

No. 406

396.1 BE/2-354: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 3, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 74. Department pass OSD. Summary second portion Foreign Ministers eighth meeting February follows: [2]

After recess Eden made succinct statement [3] in which he summarily rejected Molotov proposals re Germany advanced thus far and pressed for more specific exposition of Soviet views on Eden plan for German reunification by early free elections. [4] Molotov indicated he would make detailed statement tomorrow and also submit proposals on elections issue.

Eden said at outset he wished to register deep disappointment over Molotov's speech yesterday. [5] Despite acknowledged pressing need for reunification of Germany in interests European stability and despite fact all four Ministers had agreed on principle that new all-German government must result from free elections, Molotov still refused to deal with realities of free elections problem and was merely marking time on position taken by Soviets two years ago. Eden was disappointed, he said, that Molotov had made only passing reference to carefully worked out Eden plan for early all-German elections; despite Molotov's lip-service to principle of free elections it was obvious that all his suggestions were designed to delay them as long as he could, possibly because he was fearful of outcome of free elections.

Eden was also strongly critical of meager role envisaged by Molotov for freely elected all-German government with respect to peace treaty, stating that apparently Molotov proposed that new truly representative government would be nothing more than "rubber stamp" empowered merely to sign a treaty negotiated by someone else. Eden next took issue with Molotov's remarks re extent of popular support enjoyed by two existing German regimes and asserted true situation appeared exactly the opposite, in particular with regard to Molotov's claim East German Government had been elected by "crushing majority;" he said he thought word "crushing" in this context might well be employed in an entirely different sense.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] For a record of the first part of the eighth meeting, see Secto 73, *supra*.

[3] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)28, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 71–73, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 88–90.

[4] For this plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[5] For a summary of Molotov's speech at the seventh plenary meeting, see Secto 66, Document 399.

Eden once more emphasized that first essential step was early free all-German elections and that until these were held and free all-German government had been formed it was pointless to engage in discussion of terms of peace treaty. Stressing that he wished to get discussion back on main track, he said Molotov had thus far indicated only preliminary views on Eden plan and that not until he had commented in detail on plan as a whole would it be possible to tell whether conference could make any further progress on German problem.

Molotov declined opportunity to make statement, pleading lateness of hour. He stated merely that he would have something to say tomorrow re statements of his three colleagues, adding in specific reply to Eden that he intended to speak at greater length on elections problem and to submit proposals on that score.

Meeting adjourned at 1855 hours.

No. 407

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY BERLIN, February 3, 1954.

Secto 70. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary Dulles statement in eighth plenary session February 2. [2]

"Yesterday, Mr. Molotov delivered himself of a major polemic. [3] Apparently, he felt that we had left far behind us the first agenda item. That item dealt with the relaxing of international tensions. But, since we were on the second agenda item, Mr. Molotov felt moved to intensify international tensions, so he made bitter accusations against France, the United Kingdom and the United States. He charged us with conspiring to start a new world war with the help of revived German militarism.

If it is desirable to relax international tensions, and I think it is, I wonder whether it is not desirable for us to seek this all the time, and not merely as item 1 of an agenda.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] For a record of the eighth plenary meeting, see Sectos 73 and 74, Document 405 and *supra*.

[3] For a summary of Molotov's statement at the seventh plenary, see Secto 66, Document 399.

I have said that I was prepared to assume, at least for the purpose of this meeting, that the Soviet Union honestly wants peace.

I do not know what the Soviet Foreign Minister really thinks about us. Whatever his judgment is, he must know that he is not infallible. He has sometimes been wrong, and he might have been wrong when he accused us yesterday of being the enemies of peace.

I recall that Mr. Molotov was wrong in October 1939 when he condemned France and Britain as being aggressors and praised Hitlerite Germany as being the peace-seeking country. I have in my hands a speech which the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs made in Moscow on October 31, 1939. Already the war was on and, in Molotov's words: 'It needed only one swift blow to Poland first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing remained of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty.' In that speech, Mr. Molotov boasted of the *rapprochement* and the establishment of friendly relations between the USSR and Germany." He then said that 'as far as the European great powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a state which is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, whereas Great Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favour of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace.' 'It is', said Mr. Molotov, 'not only senseless, but criminal to wage such a war—a war for the "destruction of Hitlerism" camouflaged as a fight for "democracy".'

Perhaps Mr. Molotov would admit that he then made a mistake—we all make mistakes. That fact should lead us not to be so confident of our judgment that we hurl across the table accusations of criminal intent.

It is quite natural that we should disagree with each other and reason with each other in an effort to get agreement. But I suggest that we should not here recklessly attack each other's motives.

I should like to reason with Mr. Molotov about his plan for solving the German problem with major dependence upon the so-called German Democratic Government of East Germany.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has made yesterday one statement with which we completely agree. He says:

'The German problem is first and foremost a problem to be solved by the German people themselves,' and that Germany should participate 'at all stages of the peace treaty's preparations.'

Precisely for that reason we believe that the first task is to establish a single German government which can speak authentically for the German people as a whole. It will not help us to have a tumult of conflicting opinions.

It is the thesis of the Soviet Union, if I understand rightly, that in the making of the peace treaty we are to consult with the

German people through what the Soviet Foreign Minister calls 'the representatives of Eastern and Western Germany.'

We know that in West Germany there is a government which draws its authority from the German people as a result of free and vigorously contested elections. The people of the West German Republic had an opportunity to hear all the issues debated from opposing viewpoints and to vote for candidates of their own choosing. The Government of the West German Republic is, without question, entitled to speak for that large majority of the German people who reside in the West German Republic and we do not doubt that it reflects the overwhelming judgment of the West Germans as well.

But how about the so-called 'government' of the German Democratic Republic which rules in East Germany? According to the Soviet Foreign Minister, it was 'called to power by the overwhelming majority of the population of Eastern Germany'.

It is true that 98 percent of the eligible voters appeared at the polling places. They came because they had been told that, if they did not come, they would be treated as "enemies of the peace" and subjected to grave penalties as such. The entire population of many villages was forcibly rounded up and marched to the polls.

It is true that 99.7 percent of the voters were recorded as having 'elected' the government of the German Peoples Republic. The story behind this is that after the voters arrived at the polls, they were handed a ballot. It was a ballot which had been secretly printed. And it was not made public until election day. I have a copy of that ballot here. It is simply a list of names. No place is provided on the ballot to indicate approval or disapproval. There was no way to vote 'no'. There was not even a way to mark the ballot with a 'yes'—a privilege, which as I recall, even Hitler conceded to his subjects. The voters were merely ordered to put the ballot in the ballot box.

It might be noted in passing that the name which heads the list on the ballot which I hold here in my hand is the name of Mr. Ulbricht, a one-time Soviet citizen.

I wonder whether Mr. Molotov really believes that this type of so-called 'election' gives the so-called 'government' a mandate to speak for the people of East Germany.

I myself doubt that that performance provides the means of finding out what the East Germans really want. That doubt springs not only from the character of the so-called elections themselves, which I have described, but also from what has happened since.

Since the October events that I describe,[4] nearly a million East Germans have fled the East Zone to the West Zone and West sector of Berlin. Does that prove the popularity of the rulers and their capacity to speak for the ruled?

Last year hungry Germans under the rule of their so-called government sought and obtained five million food parcels from the West. Does that prove that the people are satisfied with their rulers?[5]

In the Eastern area there is an armed force of 250,000 to keep order. That is one guard for 80 persons. In West Germany there is one policeman for 330 persons. Does this shocking discrepancy prove that the East Germans freely accept the order that their rulers impose?

If the facts I mention do not suffice to prove to Mr. Molotov my point, I can mention more. But I hope it will not seem necessary to do so.

As I understand the proposals of the Soviet Union, they treat it as of the essence that four of us should accept the so-called German Democratic Republic as one of the principle organs whereby the German problem is to be solved. We cannot accept that position.

We know that the German people would regard as contaminated any decisions which were fastened upon them through the interposition of the 'German People's Republic'.

Mr. Molotov has said: 'Only they themselves, only the Germans, can really solve the German problem. Any other solution of the German question would be unreasonable and unfair to the German people.'

Because we believe that premise, we are compelled to reject the Soviet proposal and return to that which the three Western powers support.

We urge that Mr. Molotov agree to create quickly by free, all-German elections, a German government which can genuinely speak for all of Germany and thus provide the indispensable basis for a peace that will last, because it will be a peace of consent.

In his speech yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Minister sought to divert us from the serious discussion of this urgent topic by injecting a series of charges against the United States, Great Britain and France, which he claimed 'are trying to form a military bloc directed against the Soviet Union.'

I will not take time at this conference to reject these charges in detail. There is nothing new in them. The same familiar charges have been made year after year in the United Nations. They have been refuted time after time, year after year.

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[4] Regarding these events, see Document 778.

[5] For documentation on the delivery of food parcels to the people in the German Democratic Republic during 1953, see Documents 734 ff.

For example: Mr. Molotov says that $100,000,000 was appropriated by the US Congress for 'subversive' activities within the Soviet satellite countries. That charge, often made, was completely rejected when raised by Mr. Vishinsky in the United Nations. I refute it again as being totally untrue. That legislation has been utilized solely for the purpose of assistance to refugees fleeing from the Soviet bloc, such as the one million who, as I mentioned, fled from East Germany to the West.

It is elementary kindness to assist these refugees to make a new start in life.

Perhaps there would have been fewer of them if, in 1948, the Soviet Union had allowed its satellites to share the thousands of millions of dollars which the United States made available to relieve conditions of economic distress abroad. Perhaps then, too, a Soviet mistake was made.

I would recall to the Soviet Foreign Minister that the United States is one of the nations which paid a very heavy price for two German aggressions. We came into World War I, and we came into World War II, when it seemed that German militarism might gain decisive victories in Europe and dominate the Eurasian continent.

It would not be profitable for us here to engage in unseemly competition as to the importance of our relative contributions to the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany. That defeat required blood and steel, and the United States contributed both. There was a time when the Soviet Union paid tribute to that contribution.

In light of that history, the United States feels that it has earned the right to shrug off, as foolish chatter, the accusation that it now seeks to recreate the very force that has twice so cruelly hurt it.

The United States is dedicating its material, intellectual and spiritual resources to building a world of peace.

We took a leading part in creating the United Nations. We take seriously our obligation under that charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. That obligation will apply to Germany when she becomes a member of the United Nations.

We take seriously the undertaking of that organization to insure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with that principle. That undertaking applies to Germany until she becomes a member.

Mr. Molotov has claimed that the North Atlantic Treaty is aimed at the Soviet Union. That treaty, made pursuant to the United Nations Charter, contemplates the use of force only if there is an armed attack against one of the parties. I hope that Mr. Molotov does not imply that the Soviet Union intends to bring that tragedy to pass. If it does not, then it need not fear the treaty.

The Soviet Union, which dominates a military bloc of 800,000,000 people, seems to be fearful if any other nations combine for their defense. The reasons for such combination are simple, and the combination conceals nothing sinister.

If any one of the Western European nations were alone to be strong enough to defend itself against possible attack from the Soviet bloc, it would from an internal standpoint endanger its economy and from an external standpoint, endanger its neighbors.

The Soviet Union proposes that Germany should be allowed to have defensive strength on a national basis. But if Germany had national forces strong enough to defend itself from external attack, it would be so strong that it would threaten all of Western Europe.

The only way in which nations can obtain necessary defensive strength without themselves becoming an aggressive menace is by community efforts. Under those circumstances no single nation is strong enough to attack alone; but the combined strength deters aggression. This system, it is true, sometimes involves one member of the community helping to maintain deterrent forces on the territory of another member of the community. Mr. Molotov had particularly complained of this aspect of the security arrangements participated in by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in cooperation with their associates. The fact is that such arrangements are a mighty safeguard against aggression. They mean that only the combined will of many nations can set the defensive system into action.

The greatest danger to world peace lies in the fact that in some cases a vast military establishment can be made to attack by the decision of a single nation, sometimes indeed by the decision of a single man. That is a situation which is understandably terrifying.

But where a military establishment cannot act without the combined will of many countries, then only a clear defensive need can bring about the necessary concurrence of national wills.

Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to get adequate defense without forcing the people, and particularly the workers to suffer by requiring them to toil unproductively. It is understandable that the Soviet Union should want to force on the free nations a system which will drag down their higher standard of living. But, we shall have none of that, Mr. Molotov. We shall have both security and human welfare.

When I spoke here a week ago today,[6] I pointed out the United States' course of conduct following World War II. We promptly withdrew our vast armies and air and naval forces from Europe. We largely dismantled our military forces to a mere fraction of about one-tenth of their World War II strength. We reversed that course only when Communist aggression in Korea aroused us to the fact of danger. Then, in concert with the many others who shared our fear, we undertook to recreate a reasonable defensive posture. Now that that position is in sight, we are levelling off our national expenditures for military purposes and the NATO countries are doing the same.

This conduct cannot be reconciled with any aggressive purpose.

The Soviet Minister must know that fact. If he does not admit it, it can only be because he believes that to misrepresent the truth will serve some ulterior purpose.

Mr. Molotov has rightly said that we live in a modern age, and should take into account the lessons or models of modern history. That is precisely what we are trying to do. We are seeking to apply in the international field these principles which every civilized community applies as among its members to get peace and security at bearable cost. That is the effort in which the United States wholeheartedly joins with others who are likeminded.

No single act that the United States has taken or will take carries any threat to the Soviet Union so long as the Soviet Union itself abides by the principles of the United Nations to which it has solemnly subscribed.

Let this conference now get back to the problem of Germany and of how to welcome and nurture the desire of the new Germany to find for her energies an outlet which, better than unbridled nationalism, will serve the needs of Germany, of Europe and, indeed, of all the world."

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[6] For Secretary Dulles' statement at the second plenary meeting on Jan. 26, see Secto 24, Document 360.

No. 408

396.1 BE/2–354: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 3, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 78. Eden dined with Molotov last evening and following is Eden's account (supplemented by Roberts who was also present) of conversations:

Molotov appeared tired and although courteous he made no effort to raise any subject with Eden during course of evening. Consequently, Eden had to make all conversational overtures of substance.

Almost entire conversation was about Europe, with emphasis mainly on Germany, NATO, EDC, and western military bases. Eden spent considerable time explaining to Molotov organic structure of NATO and EDC, pointing out that system by its very structure was purely defensive and that west military forces were not under control of single country. Therefore, they could only be used if participating members agreed. This was in itself best guarantee against aggression. Molotov countered with long speech about aggressive intent of west as shown by NATO, EDC, military bases, et cetera, saying that despite Eden's explanation NATO military forces were under command of an American general, implying that US could use them at will. Eden countered by saying SACEUR although an American was responsible to an international body (NAC) and that therefore he did not have freedom of action to use NATO military forces as he might wish. In other words, while Soviet generals were responsible only to higher political Soviet authority, NATO commanders were responsible to higher international political authority. Re American generals, Eden then said he thought Molotov had met President Eisenhower during or shortly after war, and no one could accuse him of harboring any aggressive intentions or purposes. Molotov confirmed that he had met President and indicated he had seemed a reasonable man. He added, "of course, soldiers don't like war".

Eden asked Molotov what alternatives he had in mind for NATO and EDC since he was opposed to both. Molotov made no reply. Earlier when Eden made point Soviet had tight military arrangements with satellites, Molotov replied these were directed against Germany as threat whereas NATO was aimed not at Germany but at Russia. Eden said current four-power discussions on Germany were disappointing and asked if Molotov wanted an agreement. Molotov replied he did want an agreement. Eden then said he hoped something could come from the Berlin conference and asked what about Austria. According to Eden, Molotov replied, "possibly, but I would have to have something on Germany". Molotov then referred to the Eden proposals re German elections as a sort of ultimate.[2] He said from past experience, USSR had good cause to be suspicious of Germany. Eden countered by saying Adenauer was a wise man who would not lead Germany back on path of militarism. Molotov nodded reflectively but said Adenauer was old and would not live long. (During dinner Eden asked Molotov what he thought of Secretary's statement yesterday. Molotov replied by saying he thought it seemed "defensive".[3])

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[1] Repeated to London and Moscow.

Eden also asked Molotov whether there was any chance for any kind of an agreement on Far East matters. Molotov simply replied, "possibly yes".

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[2] For the British proposals, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[3] For text of Secretary Dulles' statement at the eighth plenary meeting, see Secto 70, *supra*.

February 3, 1954

No. 409

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, February 3, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

USDEL MIN-7

Present: The Secretary
Special Advisers
Advisers

Press Reaction

In response to the Secretary's request for a summary of press reactions, Mr. Tyler reported that the general tone of the French press was becoming more pessimistic as to a successful outcome for the Conference. The Secretary's speech of yesterday received a heavier play in the French press than Mr. Bidault's speech.[1]

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[1] For Secretary Dulles' speech at the eighth plenary meeting, see Secto 70, Document 407. For a summary of Bidault's statement, see Secto 73, Document 405.

While the U.S. position was fully and favorably presented, there is a general feeling that the Conference was bogging down. The Secretary's speech was said to have had an overwhelming effect on the persons present in the conference room and on the Western press.

Mr. MacArthur said that he had received a report that the French press briefing officer had characterized the Secretary's speech as a major polemic, although this had been denied by members of the French Delegation. In view of reports of similar antics on the part of the officers briefing the French press, it was the general view that steps should be taken informally to correct this situation.

With respect to the German press, Mr. Boerner said the general tone was that the "honeymoon is over", although some hope is held out that progress can be achieved in the restricted sessions of the Ministers. The SPD papers are following the line that the West should not reject the Molotov plan [2] since it is probably the first negotiating position of the Soviets. Rather, the West should explore the plan fully since it might lead to negotiations which would be acceptable to the German people. However, an SPD paper in Berlin took a different line to the effect that the Molotov plan would put Germany in chains before all-German elections. This paper believed that the West had given the right reply to Molotov, but expressed the hope that the Conference would soon get down to business. The article concluded with a statement that Germany did not wish to be ground between two opposing blocks. Mr. Boerner continued that the Bundestag yesterday adopted a resolution to the effect that the Molotov proposals were totally unacceptable. Reports from information coverage in the field indicated that most German papers held little hope for genuine progress in the talks. The East Zone and Communist press coverage of the Secretary's speech was completely distorted. The Communist press briefing passed over the speech and stressed the aggressive nature of EDC.

Ambassador Conant summarized his conversation with a ranking SPD leader yesterday, whose response to the Western position on all-German elections and the formation of an all-German government was gratifying. In substance, the SPD leader: 1) believed that all Germans would agree that the elections must be supervised; 2) was pleased with the concept of the continuation of supervision after the elections in order to prevent pre-election pressure on voters in the East Zone or post-election reprisals; and 3) believed that the question of Germany's relationships with the East and West should be decided by the freely elected German Government.

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[2] For text of the Molotov plan, see FPM(54)24, Document 512.

As a result, Ambassador Conant felt that the Western position was strong and would commend itself to most Germans.

Mr. Jackson stated that the weekend press in the U.S. was good although many papers continued to harp on the fact that Molotov's real intentions are unknown. In the stories filed by the wire services last night, the correspondents felt that the West had punched back hard and effectively at Molotov. There continues to be little expectation for a successful outcome of the Conference.

Tripartite Working Group

Mr. MacArthur announced that the Tripartite Working Group would meet at 10:30 a.m. and would discuss primarily the question of Austria and tactics to be followed in today's quadripartite meeting.[3] The Secretary then added that he would meet with Messrs. Eden and Bidault at 11:30 a.m. at Mr. Eden's residence.[4]

Security Precautions at the Unter Den Linden Building

Mr. Herfurt reported that the security precautions on the part of the U.S. delegation at the Unter den Linden Building have been effective to date. He and his staff were continuing to work closely with the British and French to improve the general security arrangements. It was noted that as a natural reaction, delegation members would tend to relax the longer meetings are being held in the Unter den Linden Building. Therefore, measures would be taken to remind delegation members to maintain the highest possible level of security.

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[3] For a report on the meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, see BER MIN-10, *infra*.

[4] For a report on the Tripartite Ministers meeting at 11:30 a.m., see the memorandum by MacArthur, Document 411.

No. 410

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 627

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 3, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-10

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. MacArthur	M. Seydoux	Sir Frank Roberts

1. *Tactics for Today*. It was believed that Molotov would make a long speech and present more proposals today. The Secretary was being prepared to take a preliminary crack at the Soviet proposals as set forth in the letter from the GDR. [1]

2. *Restricted Session*. Sir Frank Roberts said that at dinner with Molotov last night the British had received the impression that Molotov might want to have a restricted session on Germany. [2] Mr. MacArthur pointed out that it would not be desirable to have it known that the four powers were discussing Germany behind the latter's back. Moreover, Molotov is in a bad spot on the German item and we should not be eager to move him off that spot.

It was agreed that the three powers would not raise the question of the convening of a restricted session. If Molotov raises the question the three powers should suggest Saturday. Sir Frank asked whether a member of the tripartite secretariat should sit in on restricted sessions in the event there were decisions to record.

3. *Austria*. (a) It was agreed that the three powers should not raise Austrian participation at Berlin prematurely with Molotov.

(b) Since we were not at all sure that withdrawal of troops would be raised, the three powers should wait until the question is before them before making up their minds on the course of action to be taken. If we are faced with the question of withdrawal of forces we should find out the views of the Austrians with regard to total evacuation or leaving a token force in Austria. Austrian views would not be a governing factor, however.

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[1] Presumably this is the letter referred to in USDEL MIN-6, Document 382.

[2] Regarding the dinner meeting with Molotov, see Secto 78, Document 408.

No. 411

396.1 BE/2-354

Memorandum of a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Berlin, February 3, 1954, 11:30 a.m.[1]

TOP SECRET

The following agreements were reached at the Tripartite Ministerial Meeting today at Mr. Eden's house at 11 a.m.[2]

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[1] Drafted by MacArthur.

[2] For a further report on the Foreign Ministers discussion of the Far Eastern question, see Secto 80, *infra*.

1. The three Ministers will meet Friday morning, February 5, at Secretary Dulles' residence.[3] Mr. Eden has a luncheon engagement, but M. Bidault and his associates will remain for luncheon with the Secretary.

2. Since M. Bidault has already accepted Molotov's invitation to the concert in East Berlin tomorrow night (Thursday), Mr. Eden and the Secretary agreed they should all appear at the concert so that a solid front would be maintained.

3. *Restricted Meetings:*

a. Regarding the restricted meeting proposed last week to examine Agenda Item 1, it was agreed the three Western Foreign Ministers would not raise this subject this afternoon. If Molotov raises it, the Western Ministers would propose the restricted meeting occur on Saturday, February 6, but if Molotov insisted on Friday, they would accept it. In agreeing to such a meeting, it would be made clear that the Conference had not moved on from Agenda Item 2 and that following the restricted meeting, discussion of this item would be resumed, if this seemed desirable.

b. There was some discussion as to whether there should be a restricted meeting on Germany. Mr. Eden seemed to think such a meeting would be necessary at some stage of the game, but Ambassador Conant and Sir Derick Hoyer Millar (and privately two members of the French Delegation) expressed the very greatest reservations, pointing out the effect on German public opinion, the fact that Molotov seemed to damage himself every time he spoke on Germany, and there would be no public reports on what took place in restricted meetings.

c. It was agreed that at restricted meetings the Western Ministers would propose a total of four from each Delegation to attend. That would be, the Foreign Minister accompanied by three of his associates. It was also agreed that the three Ministers could rotate their three assistants in the event different subjects were discussed in the restricted meeting.

d. The Ministers agreed that when a restricted session was held it would be limited to Agenda Item 1 and that in view of the Conference record, the five-power meeting issue would probably be raised first. Subsequently the question of disarmament could be raised with M. Bidault carrying the ball in connection with the latter item.

4. *Austria*

The three Ministers agreed with the recommendation of the Steering Group that it was not desirable to inject the question of Austria into the four-power meeting at this time. When it seems clear that the German item is about to be wound up, it might be appropriate to raise the question and fix a date for the discussions on Austria so that the Austrian Ministers could arrive in time for the opening of discussions on their country. The Steering Group, therefore, will continue to follow this matter.

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[3] For a report on this meeting, see Dulte 40, Document 425.

5. *Five-power Meeting*

There was a discussion by the three Ministers concerning the five-power conference. As indicated above, it was agreed that they must meet before this item was discussed in restricted session, and it was also agreed to meet on Friday morning. M. Bidault said he had, in his conversations with Molotov at dinner [4] tried to make clear that if the Soviets were disposed to use their good offices in connection with Indochina, he meant by good offices a degree of Soviet support for the French position. Bidault then said his situation with respect to this item is difficult in light of French opinion. He is obliged to give the French hope that peace will come about in Indochina. At the same time, a conference on Indochina or Southeast Asia cannot be called under circumstances and conditions which would undermine the morale of the French and Associated States military forces in Indochina and also the morale of the governments of the Associated States. This would be to lose the game in advance. Furthermore, since, unlike Korea, there is no front in Indochina, the suspension of hostilities itself presents very real difficulties for France and the Associated States (he did not so state, but implied that the Vietminh would be able to do a great deal of dirty work even if hostilities were suspended).

Secretary Dulles said that the United States particularly wanted peace in Indochina. At the present time, the danger is to accept or fall for Soviet maneuvers which could lose the war in Indochina in the immediate future. The Soviets are maneuvering to capitalize on the natural desire for peace and peaceful solutions everywhere of existing tensions and hostilities by suggesting new conferences on which they put a very high price. The danger is to pay the price for such a conference if there is not a certainty that something will come out of it. As it is now, the Soviets ask for the price to be paid, and when they receive payment they have given up nothing and are under no compulsion to do anything constructive in a conference. Indeed, they are under no compulsion even to have one.

Specifically, the danger in Indochina is that if the Associated States believe a conference is being held which will result in Ho Chi Minh coming to power, their resistance to the Vietminh may collapse, and the USSR and Chinese Communists will have won a major victory before a conference has even been firmly agreed. Therefore, if we do not know that there is a strong probability of something constructive coming out of the conference from the point of view of our own interests, we should be very wary about agreeing to it or paying any price whatsoever for it.

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[4] For a report on Bidault's dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 26, see the memorandum by Bohlen, Document 361.

No. 412

396.1 BE/2-354: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 3, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 80. Far Eastern discussion at informal tripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting February 3 as follows: [1]

All surprised that Molotov has not yet pressed for agreed restricted meeting on Item 1. Eden thought it important we should avoid impression we seek to evade or indefinitely postpone this meeting. Ministers will meet fifth to discuss their substantive position and tactics for meeting, which may be held early next week. [2] Agreed that each Minister should have maximum of three assistants with him at restricted meeting.

Bidault reported that Molotov has intimated Soviets disposed to use "good offices" as to Indochina, but did not specify what he meant. Bidault told Molotov it should mean degree of Soviet support for French position. Molotov gave no assurances of such support. Bidault's situation complicated by demands French public. Is obliged to hold out hope of peace in Indochina. Yet he is aware of dangers of seeking conference now, with resultant undermining of morale French expeditionary and Vietnamese forces and impairment position governments of Associated States. He knows that cease-fire now would put French and Vietnamese forces in untenable position.

Secretary mentioned costly nature of operation in Indochina for US as well as France and said US shared earnest hope of France for peace. But we must be certain we do not accept Soviet formula for "peace" in Indochina which would in fact lose war for us. New Communist technique is to capitalize on hopes for peace of war-weary people by putting such high price on agreement to participate in supposed peace conference that Communists have in effect won before conference starts. Then nothing comes of conference.

He said Communists are talking about need for conference to relax world tensions, but first we would be required to accept as a world power Communist China, a principal source of increased tensions. That would be a price far too high to pay for a conference. We do not know what would come out of such conference, but we are entitled to suspect it would be nothing. Molotov had admitted in private conversation after dinner January 29,[3] in answer to question from Secretary that he did not think anything could be accomplished at political conference on Korea now.

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[1] For another report on this meeting, see the memorandum by MacArthur, *supra*.

[2] For a report on the Foreign Ministers meeting on Feb. 5, see Dulte 40, Document 425.

Secretary asked why should we pay high price for unpromising prospect? As to Indochina, if France and Vietnam should accord any status to Ho Chi Minh, as they were being pressured to do, the will to resist Viet Minh would collapse and war would be lost.

Eden specifically endorsed Secretary's analysis and Bidault also expressed agreement.

Secretary recalled recent Eden statement that if there is strong likelihood something worth while may come out of a conference, it may be justifiable to make a limited compromise to bring it about. Secretary added that unless one knows what can reasonably be expected from a conference, he can easily make a fool of himself by making costly concessions in order to hold meaningless conference.

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[3] For reports on Secretary Dulles' dinner meeting with Molotov on Jan. 29, see the notes by Jackson and the memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Documents 385 and 386.

No. 413

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 3, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 79. Following Bidault's departure from tripartite meeting,[2] Eden said to Secretary that joint appraisal from United States-United Kingdom Embassy [in] Cairo due tomorrow and he would then see what could be done.

Secretary said we are still holding up economic aid to Egypt and cannot do so much longer. Planes which United Kingdom recently planned for Israel have not helped matters with respect to economic aid for Egypt. Eden replied he was under impression planes were Mosquitoes and not very important, but perhaps they were meteor jets. He would let me know. He then said United Kingdom was sending 6 night fighters to Syria and had offered to hold up delivery if United States held up delivery military items to Saudi Arabia. Secretary expressed personal view it desirable work out some kind of system between United States and United Kingdom, which would result in better coordination of deliveries of military equipment to Middle East. Referring back to Saudi Arabia, Eden said he hoped to have some new proposals regarding terms of arbitration for Saudis "in the next week or so". [3]

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[1] Repeated to London, Jidda, and Cairo.

[2] For reports on the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, see the memorandum by MacArthur and Secto 80, Document 411 and *supra*.

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[3] Dulles and Eden also discussed Iran and Turkey at this meeting. With regard to the former they considered the composition of the oil consortium that would operate in Iran and with regard to the latter they discussed the placing of a military dump near the Turkish-Iraqi border. The U.S. Delegation reported on these discussions in Sectos 75 and 76 from Berlin, Feb. 3. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

No. 414

396.1 BE/2-454 Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 4, 1954—10 a.m.

Secto 81. Department pass OSD. Following is summary of first part Ministers meeting February 3, Bidault presiding: [2]

Molotov began discussion by asking questions relating to EDC, [3] importance of which he remarked was indicated by time which French and Italian Parliaments were taking to consider it. He reiterated charge that Bonn Convention [4] gives three Western Powers right to interfere in German internal affairs at any time for indefinite future period, saying that no answer had been made to his comments on this point. He said that Eden statement Germany would not be bound by Bonn and Paris agreements and Bidault statement that France does not make entrance of unified Germany into EDC a condition to unification were contradicted by terms of agreements themselves. He cited paragraph 2 of Article 7 of General Convention and last sentence of paragraph 3 as evidence that FedRep would be obligated not to agree to any unification of Germany which would not provide inclusion of unified Germany in EDC. These obligations were inconsistent with the holding of free all-German elections and with freedom for united Germany.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the ninth plenary, USDEL PLEN/9, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 82, *infra*.

[3] For Molotov's statement, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 142-146, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 73-76; it was circulated as FPM(54)29.

[4] For text of the Convention between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

Molotov further cited fifth paragraph of tripartite declaration of May 27, 1952 [5] as evidence that, once West Germany had entered into EDC, there would be "no road back," since any attempt by Germany to leave EDC would be regarded by US and UK as threat to their security. This means that if West Germany should try to leave EDC, Three Powers would prevent such action by any means at their disposal including use of force. This demonstrated Eden and Bidault statements regarding Germany's freedom of choice to decide whether it wished to be member of EDC had no foundation.

Referring to Secretary's quotation of his speech in fall of 1939, Molotov said that Secretary did not indicate circumstances in which it was made. USSR had sought throughout summer of 1939 to negotiate with UK and France to insure maintenance of peace. Chamberlain and French did not wish agreement with USSR. Chamberlain, who was supported by US, had encouraged Germany to attack USSR. Chamberlain and his French colleagues helped expedite German attack on Poland and bore responsibility for unleashing war in 1939. He recommended publication issued in Moscow, 1949, entitled "Falsifiers of History" for statement of true facts.

In regard to Secretary's statement that authorities in East Germany do not represent people, Molotov suggested that referendum be held in Germany to ascertain whether German people favor Bonn and Paris agreements or whether they favor conclusion of peace treaty. Results of such a referendum would indicate that GDR, which favors peace treaty, represents wishes of German people.

Secretary commented one could take satisfaction from fact that Molotov's remarks had been addressed to heart of problem although he would have preferred to hear also clear statement of Soviet proposals which Molotov had promised. Text Secretary's remarks cabled Secto 77. [6]

Replying to Molotov, Bidault said Bonn Convention does not run for 50 years but only until there is peace treaty. Once peace treaty enters into force, Bonn Convention will cease to have force. He reiterated with reference to Paris EDC treaty, [7] there is no question of automatically extending treaty to all of Germany and that unified

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[5] For text of the Tripartite Declaration, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 686.

[6] Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) For Secretary Dulles' remarks, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 147–148.

[7] For the EDC Treaty, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116–162.

Germany would have freedom of choice to determine whether it would accept obligation. Article 7 paragraph 2 of Bonn General Convention contains statement of purpose which is shared by Three Powers and FedRep. FedRep has no veto over unification and text of General Convention does not constitute obstacle to unification nor does it have binding force on united Germany. It does bind Federal Republic. Under Western proposals, German people would decide through free elections what course of action united Germany would take. West hopes results of election will be that Germans will choose course of action desired by the West, but there is no certainty of this and all-German Government will be completely free to make decision. He said this involved risks which were felt by some to be drawback but this of course was inevitable.

Bidault said tripartite declaration involves no threat to freedom of choice of all-German government. The language cited by Molotov applies to community in existence. It will exist for all-German government only if all-German government chooses to enter community, in which case it will have to accept rules of community. Molotov suggestion of referendum involved two problems. First, whether one voted for men or ideas it was necessary to guarantee freedom of vote. Second, suggestion of referendum involved problem of presenting proposal in such clear terms as to permit people to choose. He could not accept Molotov formulation since in his view there was no contradiction between Bonn and EDC treaties and the conclusion of a peace treaty. If Ministers could reach agreement on Eden proposals [8] or proposals Molotov [9] might put forward for holding elections it would be possible to make progress without going into substance of Bonn and EDC treaties. In conclusion he urged that Ministers devote themselves to organization of all-German elections and measures to guarantee their freedom.

Eden said that he did not wish to go into history. However, he felt obliged to say that it was fantastic to say that Chamberlain was responsible for German attack on Poland, pointing out that Chamberlain government gave guarantee to Poland openly and honorably and that, in response to this guarantee, had declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.

He felt that Secretary's and Bidault's comments in interpretation of Bonn Convention had made clear that it relates only to period before treaty, and agreed with their statements regarding complete freedom of decision of all-German Government.

He also supported Bidault's remarks on undesirability of attempting to settle issue by referendum. Eden said that Ministers had had general exchange of views on German problem and suggested that they proceed to details, addressing themselves to main questions of principles raised by his proposal. He asked whether agreement could be reached on following points:

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[8] For Eden's proposals, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[9] For text of Molotov's proposals, see FPM(54)24, Document 512.

1. Free elections to be held throughout Germany as first step.
2. Safeguards to insure freedom of elections will be established well in advance and guaranteed throughout. Further, in view of present abnormal conditions, there would be adequate supervision.
3. Election law would be prepared by four powers which will provide for principles of free elections, guarantees of freedom, and supervision.

Eden remarked Bidault had expressed preference for inclusion of neutrals in supervisory commission and asked for views of other Ministers on commission and composition. He pointed out that successive steps envisaged would be preparation of election law, holding of elections and convening of national assembly whose first task would be preparation of constitution.

No. 415

396.1 BE/2–454: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 4, 1954—10 a.m.

Secto 82. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes second part of February 3 meeting: [2]

Resuming discussion Molotov charged Western Ministers evaded specific points he had raised and dealt with question in generalities. He said he felt Soviet delegation could ask for clear explanation of significance of clauses he said cited in Bonn and EDC treaties. He said Paris agreement established closed military group of six countries from which other countries are excluded. It was not mere matter of suspicion. It had been openly admitted that EDC was directed against USSR and People's Democracies. It was also fact that American bases were being built throughout Europe. He suggested that, if provisions to which he had referred in Bonn and Paris agreements did not have significance, they could perhaps be omitted. He suggested agreements might be dispensed with entirely. He pointed out that Article 128 of Paris agreement [3] provides that its duration will be 50 years and that preamble and Article 11 of Bonn convention [4] link that agreement with EDC treaty. He drew conclusion from this that Bonn convention would also remain in force 50 years. If Paris agreement would lose its force upon entry into force of peace treaty, why did it provide for duration of 50 years? This was clearly effort of Western Powers and Western Germany to impose EDC upon western part of Germany and on Eastern Germany as well. However, Eastern Germany would never agree to this. If Paris agreement is to remain in force for 50 years, peace treaty with Germany would be impossible. Either Paris and Bonn treaty must be denounced and peace treaty could be signed, or Western Powers' insistence on Paris and Bonn agreements means that they are opposed to peace treaty and unification.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a report on the first part of the ninth plenary meeting, see Secto 81, *supra*.

[3] For the EDC Treaty, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 116–162.

Secretary said he could reply to Molotov's questions very simply by making change in Eden's proposal. [5] He suggested that in paragraph of Section IV of Eden's proposal which states that all-German government shall have authority to assume international rights and obligations of Federal Republic and Soviet Zone of Germany, words "or reject" might be added after "assume". He thought this would answer Molotov's questions and was sure it was in spirit of proposal.

Molotov asked whether conclusion of EDC treaty would be postponed under this proposal in view of its 50 year period of duration. Secretary replied that if new all-German government has right to accept or reject existing treaty duration of treaty is immaterial.

Bidault said he thought answer to Molotov's question was clear and simple change in text of Eden's proposal. All-German government would be free to accept or reject any treaties concluded by Federal Republic or GDR. He had attempted to answer Molotov's questions and would do so again as clearly as he could in following session.

Eden commented regarding Bonn convention that special rights of Western Powers to which Molotov had referred represent mitigation of rights they now enjoy and in any case relate only to period before peace treaty. He thought Molotov had misunderstood Bonn convention and pointed out that in quoting it, Molotov had omitted words "pending the peace settlement" in paragraph 2 of Article 7. This made it clear that unified Germany need not accept integration into EDC. He thought that it was generally recognized principle that new state (which unified Germany would be in relation to Federal Republic) cannot be bound by obligations of its predecessors unless it undertakes them voluntarily by treaty or other means after new state is created. He said that he accepted Secretary's proposed amendment.

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[4] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 50.

[5] For Eden's proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Molotov asked whether EDC treaty contains any provision stating it should remain in force only pending conclusion of peace treaty with Germany. He did not believe it did. He said Western Germany and Western Powers have undertaken to maintain EDC in force for 50 years and that Western Germany is under threat of reprisals to comply with this undertaking. This effectively restricted freedom of a unified German state. [6]

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[6] The meeting adjourned at 7:05 p.m. following this statement by Molotov.

February 4, 1954

No. 416

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, February 4, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

USDEL MIN/8

Present: The Secretary
Special Advisers
Advisers

Press Reaction

With respect to the French press reactions, Mr. Tyler reported that the Conference for the first time was not receiving top headline treatment in the French press. Two important papers carried yesterday's stories on page 3. Nearly all the papers follow the line that the Molotov proposal for an all-German referendum is not worthy of consideration. A left-wing non-Communist paper says that Molotov is stalling and speculates that the Soviets may come around to an acceptance of German participation in EDC as a lesser evil. With respect to EDC, all papers state that Western Germany should have a free choice. The neutralist press, however, take the line that the present discussions pose problems with respect to ratification of the EDC and inquiries how France could join EDC if Germany has the free option to join or not to join.

In the Communist press the crypto-Communist "liberation" headlines the Molotov referendum proposal. Mr. Jackson observed that it was remarkable that the French did not give top play to the

Soviet referendum proposal, since the substance of Molotov's proposal was leaked to the French press early in the Quadripartite session.

Mr. Boerner reviewed the German press reactions. The majority of the papers treat the Soviet referendum proposal as a propaganda trick to gain time and to avoid meeting directly the issue of free German elections. Even the SPD papers say that the proposed plebiscite is not a genuine alternative, although they hold to the line taken by Ollenhauer that Molotov's speech on Monday contained points which might provide a basis for negotiations.[1] In an all-day session yesterday, the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee issued a unanimous statement expressing its bitter disappointment over the Molotov proposal. The news emanating from official Government sources develops the line that the Molotov proposal is not a genuine alternative and is superfluous in any event, since all-German elections would provide the answer as to German views.

The East Zone *Volkskammer* presented another resolution on the proposed referendum and demanded annulment of the Paris and Bonn Treaties. In the East Zone press, Molotov was not given top billing. In the Soviet press briefing last night, the Soviet briefing officers merely read Molotov's speech and gave no indication that the other Foreign Ministers had replied. Only one Communist paper, which has a small circulation in West Berlin, mentioned the fact that anything happened after Molotov's statement.

Mr. Jackson reported that US press statement yesterday was devoted almost entirely to the Secretary's statement on Tuesday,[2] characterizing it as an effective counter-punch. The stories filed by the wire services last night emphasized the Molotov proposal for an all-German plebiscite but rejected it as not being a genuine alternative. The proposal was interpreted as a propaganda move and Molotov's present tactics as one of stalling on the issue of all-German elections.

Tripartite Meeting

Mr. MacArthur announced that the Tripartite Working Group would discuss tactics for today's meeting. The Group will also discuss any problems with respect to the invitation issued by the Soviet Delegation for the other Delegations to attend a concert at the Unter den Linden building.[3]

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[1] For a summary of Molotov's speech at seventh plenary on Feb. 1, see Secto 66, Document 399.

[2] For text of Secretary Dulles' statement on Feb. 2, see Secto 70, Document 407.

[3] For a report on the meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, see BER MIN-11, *infra*.

No. 417

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 4, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-11

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. *Tactics for Today.* (a) It was agreed that M. Bidault would be asked by the Chairman, Mr. Eden, to speak first. It was suggested that M. Bidault begin by stating the fundamental importance of the principle of free elections, then a brief, definitive statement on the Bonn-Paris agreements, and close with further remarks on free elections.

(b) Mr. Eden would ask Mr. Molotov for his comments on free elections.

(c) If Mr. Molotov tables a proposal, Mr. Dulles might suggest that the meeting adjourn for fifteen minutes for consideration of the proposal. Mr. Dulles will then make preliminary comments on Mr. Molotov's proposal. If Mr. Molotov raises again the question of an all-German referendum, Mr. Dulles will carry the burden of argument.

(d) On the second round it was suggested that M. Bidault and Mr. Eden would continue to comment on free elections. Mr. Eden would prod Mr. Molotov to answer questions on the UK Plan. [1]

2. *Possible Tripartite Document on Bonn-Paris Agreements.* Sir Frank suggested that if it appeared that Mr. Molotov planned to continue discussion of the Bonn-Paris agreements it might be desirable to consider tabling a document setting forth the western views on this subject. Mr. MacArthur reserved the U.S. position but said if the British prepared a draft we would be glad to consider it further.

3. *Restricted Session.* Sir Frank said Mr. Eden wished to avoid the appearance that the three western powers were attempting to delay the holding of a restricted session. Mr. Eden had stated his preference for holding the restricted session on Saturday. The views of the other ministers will be sought.

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[1] For the British plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

4. *Declaration of Intent.* The Declaration of Intent [2] should be considered again tomorrow in light of any proposal Mr. Molotov might make today.

5. *Tripartite Ministerial Meeting.* It was noted that the three Ministers would meet tomorrow at 12:00 at Mr. Dulles' residence. [3] The U.S. Delegation will prepare a resume of the work in progress in the Working Group.

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[2] For the Declaration of Intent, see BER D-4/4c, Document 511.

[3] For a report on this meeting, see Dulte 40, Document 425.

No. 418

396.1 BE/2-454: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 4, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulte 35. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Regarding Dulte 10 [1] we have handed following US draft to British and French on top secret basis this afternoon. Eden and Bidault will meet with me tomorrow morning to consider it and also discuss whether useful purpose might be served in tabling it at restricted meeting. [2]

Any comments from Department should reach me before 10 a.m. February 5, Berlin time.

Now anticipated that restricted meeting in which this resolution would be introduced may take place February 6th or early next week.

"The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, meeting in Berlin,

Taking into account the need to establish by peaceful means a unified and independent Korea as an important step toward the reduction of international tensions;

Noting, in connection therewith, the difficulties which have been encountered in concluding the requisite arrangements for the arrangements for the convening of a political conference on Korea, pursuant to paragraph 60 of the Korean armistice agreement and the United Nations General Assembly resolution of August 28, 1953;

Agree to invite representatives of the Republic of Korea, such other countries which provided armed forces to serve under the United Nations Command in Korea as may desire to participate, the 'Chinese Peoples Republic', and the 'Korean Peoples Democratic Republic', to meet with representatives of these four countries at a political conference at blank on blank to settle the Korean question;

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[1] Document 369.

[2] For a record of this meeting, see Dulte 40, Document 425.

Agree further that, before the adjournment of the said political conference on Korea, if developments at such conference are productive of positive results, and if the 'Chinese Peoples Republic' disassociates itself from warlike activities beyond the borders of China, the representatives of the four inviting powers will consult on steps to bring about a conference designed to restore peace in Indochina;

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned political conference shall be deemed to imply any diplomatic recognition of the 'Chinese Peoples Republic' or the 'Korean Peoples Democratic Republic'." [3]

DULLES

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[3] The Department of State replied the same day stating that it liked the draft and suggesting minor changes or alternatives if difficulty arose. (Tedul 22 to Berlin, Feb. 4, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 419

396.1 BE/2-554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 5, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 86. Department pass OSD. Summary first portion tenth plenary session Foreign Ministers February 4, chaired by Eden, follows: [2]

Eden called first on Bidault who had yesterday reserved right to reply to questions posed to him by Molotov. [3] In fairly lengthy statement Bidault rebutted in detail Molotov charge that Bonn and Paris agreements would be binding in advance on all-German government resulting from free elections under Eden plan. [4] After paying "tribute" to Molotov's "tenacity" and "obstinacy" on this issue, Bidault said he would repeat once more for Molotov's benefit that new united Germany would not and could not be bound by political commitments entered into either by Federal Republic or GDR. He developed this theme at some length, dwelling in turn in his rebuttal upon each article of Bonn and Paris agreements which Molotov had brought into issue yesterday. Bidault concluded this aspect his statement by saying he now found it impossible to conceive that anyone could still contend the new all-German government would be bound by commitments entered into by Federal Republic; if anyone continued to advance such a thesis, it was only because his purpose was to postpone expression of will of German people.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the tenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/10, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 87, *infra*.

[3] For the full text of Bidault's statement, which was circulated as FPM(54)31, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 151–155, or Cmd. 9080, 76–79.

[4] For text of the Eden plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Bidault then inquired why Molotov felt impelled to employ all dialectics at his disposal to postpone consulting wishes of people in "normal" and "classical" manner, when it was evident that free elections were the one thing most ardently desired by German people. Why was Molotov not willing to take same risks as Western powers—was he possibly not able to await with as much calm the judgment of electorate? He charged Molotov with imposing unjustified pre-conditions to free elections and said such procrastination in seeking solution German problem was something he could not accept. Bidault next made short shrift Molotov's suggestion for referendum, asserting that only possible motivation behind such a proposal was to maintain Pankow government in power as long as possible and to undo without any risk to Soviets all progress made by Western powers in recent years.

In conclusion Bidault once again strongly challenged Molotov's assertion that 1952 agreements by Western powers were responsible for division of Europe, drawing attention anew to system of Eastern European military, political and economic alliances built up between 1945 and 1948 under Soviet leadership and with support of Red Army; he said GDR had been completely integrated into this Eastern bloc, factor which constituted serious obstacle to German reunification. For correction, which was urgently needed, of resulting division of Europe he called on Molotov to give serious consideration to proposals already put forward by Eden for setting up all-German government as result of free elections.

Eden, after expressing complete agreement with Bidault reply which he hoped could be considered as settling issue at hand, expressed additional hope meeting could now move on to real issue of free elections and called on Molotov to speak.[5] Latter then delivered in rapidfire tempo long tirade extending (with consecutive translations) over two hours in length and concluding with submission of specific proposal re Germany (already forwarded by separate telegram[6]).

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[5] For Molotov's statement, circulated as FPM(54)32, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 90–100, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 80–87.

[6] For Molotov's proposal, transmitted in Secto 85, see FPM(54)33, Document 514.

Highlights of Molotov statement were following: Unification of Germany cannot be undertaken without agreement between the two parts of Germany and without taking their mutual interests into consideration. In postwar period two Germanies had developed along different lines—in East Germany under Potsdam Agreement monopolies were liquidated, property of Nazi war criminals turned over to people and democratic land reform carried out; in West Germany cartels continued stranglehold over economy, no land reform, and war criminals becoming even more important in political and economic life. In light of this situation reunification of Germany was not a formal matter of technical organizational character as envisaged by Eden plan but a question of substance. Molotov then delved into German history in 1932-1933 period to prove point that Nazis came to power through parliamentary processes (he referred in this connection to alleged role played by Von Papen, Adenauer, Schleicher, Hindenburg and industrialists such as Thyssen and Krupp) and to support conclusion that "we should not be carried away too much simply by parliamentary formalities;" this, he said, had been recognized in Potsdam Agreement which provided that peace treaty should be "accepted by a German Government considered appropriate for that purpose". Therefore it was now necessary that "fascist degenerates" not be allowed take dominating positions, even by parliamentary means, in new all-German government. Eden plan and its five stages made no provision to prevent this and did nothing to insure reunification of Germany as "democratic" and "peaceful" state. Under his proposal "anti-democratic" elements, industrial and banking magnates, and "desperate adventures of revanchist type" would be likely to come to power, presenting real threat to German people and particularly to working class. For this reason Soviet Government could not support Eden plan.

Molotov then stressed that Four Powers could not be relieved of responsibility of assuring that after elections Germany would develop along "peaceful" and "democratic" lines. He said there were two prerequisites in this regard—internal matters and those of external character. Re internal matters he said German elections must be free and democratic and therefore should be carried out by Germans themselves and by their "democratic organizations," not by foreign occupation authorities. But Western election plan was imbued with distrust for Germany's "democratic forces" in proposing that occupation powers rather than Germans draw up electoral law, supervise elections, et cetera. Best means, Molotov said, to ensure early all-German elections was to agree this was matter for Germans themselves. He, therefore, proposed formation of "a provisional all-German government by Parliaments of GDR and FedRep with wide participation of democratic organizations," such provisional government to replace East and West German Governments either at once or over certain period of time. He further proposed calling urgent conference of representatives GDR and FedRep to agree on composition, functions and powers of all-German government, which would enable carrying out of free all-German elections and convocation of all-German Constitutional Assembly. All these measures, Molotov said, should be carried out by agreement among all Four Powers.

Molotov then stated: "All-German elections should naturally be carried out under conditions which would assure freedom of activity for all democratic organizations. But that does not mean we should not take measures directed against activation of fantastic and militaristic organizations. We should also exclude possibility of attempts at pressure on part of big monopolists during preparation and carrying out of elections".

Turning to external prerequisites for "peaceful" and "democratic" Germany, Molotov said Paris and Bonn agreements were intended to bind within EDC net not only Western but Eastern Germany, and that was impossible. He stated only possible conclusion was that for there to be German reunification and German peace treaty, Germany could not be made member of "a war grouping of Western European countries," since this would be contrary to interests of German people and of European security.

Molotov then summed up by stating that Eden plan was unacceptable since it involved turning all-German elections over to occupation authorities and by-passing Germans themselves: it did not provide for prevention of political pressure from foreign states during the elections; it was based on maintenance of present status of occupation forces in Germany, which was "incorrect"; it limited rights of all-German government in advance by providing latter would be bound by provisions of Paris and Bonn agreements; and it would permit coming to power of "aggressive German militarists".

Molotov then submitted his specific proposal for unification of Germany and free all-German elections, including concept of withdrawal all occupation forces, other than "limited contingents," from Germany prior to the elections.

Meeting recessed briefly at 1810 hours.

No. 420

762.00/2-554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 5, 1954—noon.

Secto 87. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes second part tenth session, February 4: [2]

Following 15 minute recess, session resumed at 1832.

Secretary spoke first. His impromptu remarks have been reported by separate telegram. [3]

Bidault said he feared it would be fruitless to repeat again what he has already stated on three or four previous occasions. His statement this afternoon covers most of points raised by Molotov. He will, of course, examine Molotov's proposal [4] but at first glance it is hard to see how any conciliation or even move toward conciliation will be possible.

Eden said he will not reply to Molotov until tomorrow. He simply noted that his plan for free all-German elections has been rejected by Soviet delegate apparently because man should not be free because he is sometimes bad and parliamentary institutions are bad because they are sometimes abused by totalitarians. He accepted neither premise and promised to argue them further tomorrow.

Molotov expressed view that confusion of participants comes from their fatigue. He believed to be unfair assertion that Soviet policy at conference is marked by zigzag. If Soviet plan is not completely satisfactory, he said, it could be amended, but he did not think it too complex to be understood. He emphasized that plan has two features, one old and one new. Old feature calls for formation of provisional all-German government on basis of prior agreement between East and West Germany. New feature provides that, in order to insure real freedom in elections, all occupation troops be withdrawn from East and West Germany before elections, leaving behind only limited contingents to fulfill protective functions. Neither Secretary, Bidault nor Eden, he noted, has rejected proposal directly, so perhaps it is not so bad after all. There is no reason to accuse Soviet policy of zigzag merely because he has added new feature to old proposal. Noting suggestion made that withdrawal of occupation forces except for limited contingents represents threat to Germany and all Europe, Molotov thought those fears are result of fatigue rather than reality. He believed next step should be to study Soviet proposal, after which fears will disappear and ground for agreement could be sought.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a report of the first part of the tenth plenary, see Secto 86, *supra*.

[3] Secto 90, *infra*.

[4] For Molotov's proposal, see FPM(54)33, Document 514.

Meeting adjourned at 1910.

No. 421

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 211: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY BERLIN, February 5, 1954.

Secto 90. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary's impromptu remarks following the tabling of Soviet proposal on Germany at tenth plenary session, February 4: [2]

I have been told that the zigzag was an essential part of the Soviet practice. If so, I think that the discussions of the last few days form a classic example.

I have seldom been as confused in my life as I am at this moment. We have been debating for several days the plan which you tabled, [3] Mr. Chairman, and we discussed a section to which Mr. Molotov devoted his attention. And after we finally had agreed, the three of us, to amend it to meet what we understood were Mr. Molotov's views, then he said he rejected the whole plan.

I wonder why we spent so long debating one paragraph of the plan if the whole plan was unacceptable.

Then, Mr. Molotov, as I understood, attacked our proposal on the ground that it did not give the Germans sufficient freedom of choice as to what they would do in relation to their future international relations. And when we had painstakingly explained that the plan did give them complete freedom of choice in that matter, then apparently the plan could not meet Mr. Molotov's approval because it gave the Germans too much freedom.

He explained at great length how the Germans could not be trusted with freedom; how they had abused freedom in the past; and from that it is to be inferred that they should not have the freedom that they had in the past. And there again I am completely confused and bewildered.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a record of the tenth plenary meeting, see Sectos 86 and 87, Document 419 and *supra*.

[3] FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Then there was a question of the all-German elections. The plan which you tabled, Mr. Chairman, provided for the careful supervision of the elections, not only supervised by the four occupying powers, but also possibly by neutrals, to be sure there would be true freedom of elections.

But, Mr. Molotov says that that proposal indicates that we do not trust the Germans and the elections are not sufficiently free. And in the same breath he also says the elections must be so conducted that what he calls the "non-democratic" elements in Germany are not going to be allowed to vote.

I am curious to know as to how that can be accomplished without a supervision of the elections.

I cannot but believe that what he really has in mind is that there must be conducted in all of Germany the type of elections which I described earlier, which had brought the "government" of East Germany into power, where everybody was compelled to put in a ballot to assure that there would be no possibility of any "undesirable" person being chosen.

We discussed at great length the Paris and Bonn treaties yesterday and again today and explained in simple words—words of one syllable—that the unified Germany would have the choice as to whether or not to adhere to those treaties. Nevertheless, the Soviet Foreign Minister continues to make the assertion that they still would be bound by these treaties and he insists upon his formula which would, as he interprets it, prohibit adopting such treaties.

The fact is that there is a compulsion on the part of the Germans to align themselves with the Western European community. It is not a compulsion of law or treaty. We have made that perfectly clear. It is a kind of compulsion which draws inevitably the East Germans toward the West. It is the same compulsion that has drawn one million East Germans to seek sanctuary in the West, and it is that compulsion Mr. Molotov would prohibit by legal and military action, because despite what he says about wanting the Germans to have freedom of choice, the fact is his formula would deny them that freedom which they seek by themselves—which are irresistible attractions unless held back by military power.

I speak only of the compulsion of the spirit, of the human aspirations which under the plan we have proposed would enable the Germans freely to seek their own future.

I, of course, will study carefully the proposal which has been submitted by the Soviet Foreign Minister.[4]

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[4] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

But certainly on the basis of his own explanation of it, I am regretfully compelled to feel that it indicates that the conditions attached to German elections and the establishment of an all-German government are such that they are calculated to make them operative only if there is an extension of the system of the East German Republic to all of Germany.

If that is in fact the interpretation which his proposal seems to bear, that would indeed be a very tragic conclusion for this conference to have to end on, as far as Germany is concerned.

I felt, however, that after all the zigging and zagging perhaps the Soviet Foreign Minister's last words about troop withdrawal from Germany, indicated the object to which all else had led up to—namely, the ending of any defense of Western Germany; its complete exposure to the vast forces that lie to the East.

And we must also recognize that if all of Western Germany is so exposed, that exposure also endangers all of Western Europe.

No. 422

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen)[1]

SECRET [BERLIN,] February 5, 1954.

Last night Zarubin made some remarks which might afford some clue as to the manner in which the Soviet Delegation contemplates the final outcome of this conference in regard to Germany. I had told him that if the Soviet performance at yesterday's meeting had been anywhere near up to the performance at the concert,[2] we would have some grounds for optimism in regard to the outcome on Germany. He laughed. I asked him if he thought that the three Western Governments had lost their minds, to which he replied "no." I then asked him if they realized it was apparent that there was no basis for agreement in Mr. Molotov's proposal, to which he replied "maybe you are right." He went on then to say that, however, there would be a *de facto* situation in Germany even in the event of no fundamental agreement and that possibly the Ministers might address themselves to consideration of measures which would prevent that situation from becoming a major source of tension and danger to the world. I did not pursue the matter any further since other people came up.

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[1] Copies were sent to MacArthur, Merchant, and Bowie; a notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.

[2] The three Foreign Ministers and some of their advisers had attended a concert in the Soviet Zone during the evening of Feb. 4.

It is possible that Zarubin was giving us a hint as to what the Soviets have in mind. As I have frequently stated, I have always been convinced that they did not expect any agreement on Germany but at the same time they do not wish this conference to add to world tension and danger. It may well be therefore that, given those circumstances, they would like to have something come out of this conference which would be reassuring in that sense, that the two halves of Germany would live together without becoming a hotbed of tension and possible war. We might consider carefully if there are any tactical or practical measures which we might find of great advantage to our position in Germany and especially here. If there are such measures which could be agreed on without implying recognition of Pankow, we might be able to make the Soviets pay a price for their desire for some indication from the conference that despite its failure (1) the situation will not get worse, and (2) some contact with the West will be maintained.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

February 5, 1954

No. 423

396.1 BE/2–554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 5, 1954—10 a.m.

Dulte 36. For President from Secretary, copy for Acting Secretary. We were somewhat worried Wednesday [1] night when Molotov seemed to have struck pay dirt in exploiting possibility that United Germany might elect not to remain in EDC and withdraw, leaving United Germany without controls. This has always worried French. However, yesterday Molotov made German proposal so extreme, calling in effect for complete Sovietization all Germany and withdrawal US, UK and French forces, that we believe Western position has been greatly strengthened by exhibition of his uncompromising approach.

DULLES

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[1] Feb. 3.

No. 424

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 5, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-12

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. *Tactics for Today.* It was agreed that Mr. MacArthur would set forth at the Ministers 12:00 meeting the points raised in the discussion of the Working Group meeting. [1]

The question was raised as to whether Mr. Eden, as the author of the UK plan, [2] should begin the discussion today or whether the Secretary should pass to M. Bidault so that two statements would be on the record before Mr. Molotov spoke and possibly reverted to other matters. The French and British would concentrate on Molotov's rejection of the UK plan and the western position on free elections. The reasons for Mr. Molotov's position and the unacceptability of his proposal would be made clear.

Mr. MacArthur noted the Secretary's hope that M. Bidault and Mr. Eden would carry the burden of the argument with regard to Molotov's proposal for the withdrawal of occupation troops.

Since there was danger that Molotov might have created the illusion that he accepted free elections in principle, the Secretary felt it was important to examine Soviet philosophy in relation to elections. He would also point out that Mr. Molotov had demonstrated their position was not dependent on the EDC.

Restricted Session. The British believed it would be important to be able to say that the Western ministers had done all they could to reach an agreement with Molotov including the discussion of Germany in a restricted session. Mr. MacArthur pointed out that any suggestion now of a restricted session would be bad since there would be implications that the Western Ministers might be making deals on Germany or compromises on the basis of the Molotov Plan. [3] It would be preferable to keep our position flexible on the question of a restricted meeting.

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[1] Regarding the Foreign Ministers meeting, see Dulte 40, *infra*.

[2] FPM(54)17, Document 510.

[3] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

2. *Five-Power Conference.* The British suggested the deletion of the quotations around the Chinese People's Republic on both pages of the draft proposal for a convocation of a Korean Political Conference.[4] They considered whether it was necessary to include the last paragraph since this might well be done in the introductory speech. The British further considered the necessity of the statement in the penultimate paragraph regarding the condition that the Chinese People's Republic disassociate itself from warlike activities beyond the borders of China. The French indicated that M. Roux was currently preparing another version of this paragraph.

3. *Letter from the GDR of January 30.* It was agreed in conversations just prior to the Working Group Meeting that this letter to the three ministers would not receive a reply but would merely be tabled.[5]

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[4] For this draft proposal, see Dulte 35, Document 418.

[5] Regarding the German Democratic Republic letter of Jan. 30, see footnote 2, Document 396.

No. 425

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 6, 1954—1 a.m.

Dulte 40. Regarding Dulte 35.[1] At meeting three Western Foreign Ministers noon today French proposed revised version as follows in translation of last two paragraphs regarding Indochina:

> "Agree further that as soon as the conversations incident to the said political conference on Korea are favorably begun (*favorablement engagees*) and the Government of the French Republic deems that the attitude of the Chinese Popular [*People's*] Republic provides the necessary guarantees for negotiations, the representatives of the four inviting powers will consult as to measures to be taken to convene another conference designed to restore peace in Indochina.
>
> It is understood that neither the invitation to the political conference envisaged above nor the holding of such a conference will signify any change in the international status of China".

When immediate US reaction to proposed change was negative French suggested minor change first paragraph their version as follows:

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[1] Document 418.

> "Agree further that the representatives of the four inviting powers as soon as they consider that the said political conference on Korea has made a satisfactory beginning and the Government of the French Republic deems that the attitude of the Chinese Peoples Republic provides the necessary guarantee for negotiations, will consult to bring about a conference designed to restore peace in Indochina".

French tentatively inquired if we would be willing to terminate our draft with the paragraph on the Korean political conference and allow them to introduce their paragraph on Indochina as an added amendment.

The British are adopting a rather passive attitude indicating that they believe they can accept any version which the French and ourselves may be able to agree to. They express some reservations about the use of quotation marks in connection with Chinese and Korean Communist regimes and do not like phrase "if the Chinese People's Republic disassociates itself from warlike activities beyond the borders of China". They also wanted last paragraph of US draft to read as follows:

> "It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above political conference should be deemed to imply any diplomatic recognition of the countries named which has not already been accorded to them".

Urgent talks with French and British on item I slated for tomorrow in preparation for restricted meeting February 8.

Dulles

No. 426

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 6, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 95. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes first part eleventh session February 5: [2]

Secretary spoke first. Statement reported by separate telegram. [3]

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the eleventh plenary, USDEL PLEN/11, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 96, *infra*. The plenary began at 3 p.m.

[3] Secto 92, Document 428.

Bidault then stated [4] he had studied carefully Soviet proposal [5] which was devoid any possible practical application as based on idea establishment German provisional government of East and West before elections. Appeared to Bidault that main purpose Soviet delegation keep in force long as possible GDR. Impossible for two diametrically opposed regimes agree on text electoral law. Elections would be postponed indefinitely.

Soviet plan lays down six conditions before holding elections: (1) West must recognize legitimacy GDR; (2) Federal Government must associate itself with GDR; (3) Both governments must agree text electoral law it being understood no safeguards; (4) Federal Government must renounce Paris-Bonn agreements and disassociate itself from West; (5) Reforms must be introduced in West to break power of trusts and junkers; (6) Occupational troops must be withdrawn. All these conditions impossible.

Bidault then referred to militarized German units in East Zone and political and police organizations there. It is fact Soviets could easily send back troops if "anti-democratic" forces returned by elections. He then advocated international supervisory commission for elections. He considered Molotov's proposal for provisional German Government as moving in direction of anarchy, as setting up type of permanent conference, in which GDR would have right of veto and which could say "either accept my concept democracy or I won't move single step toward unity". No agreement or compromise this plan possible. Western powers want unity, but unity in freedom. Unity of German people could never be attained from juxtaposition two regimes based on contrary political principles. Free elections must come first. View fundamental differences Eden Molotov Plans question arises whether any possible meeting of minds. Western spirit compromise inspires no counterpart and for moment nothing has happened to encourage patience and hope of West.

Eden then stated [6] Molotov Plan based on distrust democratic and parliamentary institutions. His plan attempted to deal with problem of Germany divided into two incompatible political systems. Molotov Plan does not take this into consideration thus unworkable as agreement and common action between GDR and Federal Government impossible.

Eden then dwelt on advisability occupation authorities drawing up electoral law, adequate supervision and necessity to guard against Nazis revival. He felt Molotov unwilling run risks free elections which would sweep away regime in East. He did not want elections until he knew results. This not free elections. People decided results. Molotov statement could be summed up one sentence: "Soviet delegation convinced free elections great mistake."

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[4] For Bidault's statement, circulated as FPM(54)36, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 89-92.

[5] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

[6] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)37, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 92-95.

Eden continued withdrawal occupation forces unacceptable. Only German armed forces in East. None exist in West. West Germany would be denuded, left at mercy East, security of Western Europe destroyed and West Germany undefended. Molotov had referred to collapse democratic institutions in Germany in 30's, but didn't mention role German Communist Party. He didn't mention failure democratic institutions Czechs to prevent Communists seizing power.

Eden concluded Molotov Plan direct conflict Eden Plan on three basic issues: (1) Occupation powers should forego their responsibility for insuring German people enabled freely express their will and decide their fate; (2) Future of Germany decided by provisional government which could not be brought into being and which not representative; (3) Future German Government not free external relations. Molotov Plan wholly unacceptable, negative and unconstructive.

No. 427

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 6, 1954—1 p.m.

Secto 96. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes second part of February 5 meeting: [2]

Molotov opened post-intermission speech by stating difficult problems and wide divergencies faced by conference necessitated careful attention. [3] Through over-simplifying terms of discussion one easily got into easy criticism and polemics. Simplifying of other delegations' position does not simplify one's own. Regarding Dulles' assumption that he could easily criticize Soviets because he knew Molotov's thought, Molotov knew he had better information on that score. Molotov then turned to review of Soviet proposal. [4] He had adduced certain proofs from books and documents about German events in 1930's which had been ignored by other speakers except Eden's cursory reference. Parliamentary methods had certain advantages for previous age but failed to prevent rise of Hitler and resultant world war. Four powers should take precautions to prevent recurrence of German events.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] For a record of the first part of the eleventh plenary, see Secto 95, *supra*.

[3] An extract from Molotov's statement is in *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 110–117.

[4] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

Molotov then asked why reference in Potsdam Agreement which is still in force regarding establishment of German Government appropriate for signing of peace treaty was ignored in this discussion.

While over-simplified arguments implied Soviets did not want free elections, they did in truth favor reunification, quick progress toward this goal and free elections which would not be postponed. This was Soviet position.

Free elections were serious matter because of historical experience with Germany, previous commitments of Allies and question whether West really favors free elections. Whereas West called elections under supervision of occupation powers free, to Soviets German supervision of elections meant freedom for Germans. In any event discussion oversimplified because held while German representatives absent. This is wrong approach. Regarding Bidault's proposal to add neutrals to Supervisory Commission he had already replied presence of outsiders on Election Control Commission not desired.

Many sharp words regarding GDR regime had been said, including assertion it was going under. Of course some people did not like West German regime. Everyone knows events of June 17 [5] (he thought that was date) had resulted from hands stretching out from West Berlin to do improper things and this showed weakness of GDR. Events cannot be repeated "because they have no ground under them". (Quote omitted from Molotov's first phrase and he hastened to amend sentence.) Also some people do not like China though its people do. Therefore, they call it Formosa, a place kept going only by foreign aid, but many millions like China which is not represented at UN as it should be.

Two aspects to substance of Soviet proposal. (1) Four powers should render their assistance to reconcile views of East and West Governments so that through negotiations they may set up one government. Meanwhile powers would not surrender any occupation powers. (2) Troop withdrawal to insure independence of elections. This was an equitable proposal which equally affected all four powers.

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[5] For documentation on the uprisings in the Soviet Zone of Germany beginning June 16, 1953, see Documents 713 ff.

Why is establishment of provisional government as Soviets proposed termed impossible? It should be short lived and also four powers in conjunction with Germans would set time limit for elections. Germans will question fairness of elections run by occupation powers but not those administered by themselves. Five or six conditions for Soviet proposal mentioned by Bidault not in accord with realities. On Eden's points that two regimes were irreconcilable, "that too is incorrect". They are not irreconcilable and should talk to each other. Four powers had different kinds of regimes but could still negotiate together with peaceful ends in view.

To reduce fears expressed about GDR Molotov wished to cite facts. After 1945 number of states had Communists in their governments. Some later became People's Democracies; others did not omitting Communists (Molotov does not know if this strengthened these regimes). Apprehensions not understandable when only purpose is to find common ground for democracy, peace and German interests.

Apprehension over troop withdrawal would not hold water. Whereas it was alleged West Germany or even West Europe would be left undefended, all troops would be withdrawn simultaneously except for small contingents left behind. Matter could well be discussed because it is practical question. Such actions would please Germans and other countries and would facilitate free elections. Large size of GDR police forces compared to West German is not proved and cannot be because assertion has no basis in fact. At any rate in January 1951 GDR proposed willingness to discuss size, equipment, and location of police in both parts of Germany. This can still be done.

Molotov reached two conclusions on substance of Soviet proposal. (1) Four powers should assist in establishing provisional government and instruct that government to hold free elections. Simultaneously withdraw troops except for "certain limited contingents". (2) Regarding paragraph 7 of Soviet Proposal for Peace Treaty[6] (Germany should not enter alliances directed against any country which fought Germany), four powers should agree to this principle reached during war if they value signatures and accords reached thereby. While some of statements during day may be regarded as reflecting unwillingness to reach agreement, USSR does seek agreement.

Secretary proposed devoting Monday to agenda item (1) and procedural questions. Bidault interjected to say he too believes four powers should reach agreement but they cannot. Molotov's speech raised no new elements. Does not propose ending discussion items but suggests recourse in Monday's meeting to procedure which as Molotov knows has sometimes proven successful before. Eden said all were anxious to find way out of difficulties of which all are increasingly conscious. Asked if Monday restricted meeting would be devoted to item (1) and nothing else. Secretary declared item (1) would be only substantive point.

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[6] FPM(54)24, Document 512.

Molotov agreed to restricted meeting. Ministers also agreed each Minister would bring four advisors including interpreter and confirmed Saturday meeting.

No. 428

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 219 Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

BERLIN, February 5, 1954.

Secto 92. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary's statement eleventh plenary, February 5:[2]

"Since our meeting yesterday,[3] I have read the transcript of Mr. Molotov's remarks and have studied his proposal.[4] I can still find no encouraging interpretation of what we heard yesterday afternoon.

The basic impression which strikes me is this: Mr. Molotov is afraid of genuinely free elections in the East Zone. He is afraid that the 18 million Germans in the East Zone, if given a chance to speak, would overwhelmingly reject the present imposed regime. Mr. Molotov has good reason to be afraid.

Consequently, the Soviet Foreign Minister has categorically rejected the proposals for genuinely free elections which have been put forward by the Western powers. In its place he proposes his own blueprint. In the name of peace, he proposes a method for extending the solid Soviet bloc to the Rhine. In the name of what he calls democracy, he has set forth the classic Communist pattern for extinguishing democracy as that word has been understood for 2000 years.

The cornerstone of the Soviet proposal is the so-called government of the German Democratic Republic. That government was put in office by Soviet power. It was confirmed in office by Soviet power. If it had not been for elements of 22 Soviet divisions, including tanks and armored cars, it would have been forcibly ejected from power by the workers who in their desperation rose up against it last June.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.

[2] For records of the eleventh plenary, see Sectos 95 and 96, Document 426 and supra.

[3] For records of the tenth plenary of Feb. 4, see Sectos 86 and 87, Documents 419 and 420.

[4] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

It is that regime which under the Soviet plan would negotiate on a basis of equality with the government of the German Federal Republic. However, the scales are to be still further weighted in favor of the Soviet puppet regime, because it is provided by the Soviet plan these initial negotiations shall also involve 'wide participation of democratic organizations'.

In the Soviet dictionary the words 'democratic organizations' have a clear, precise meaning. They mean those front organizations—captive trade unions, youth organizations, women's organizations—which promote the Communist purposes without openly presenting themselves to the people in their true guise.

It is under these auspices that there would be prepared the 'all-German electoral law', and the establishment of election conditions.

We can visualize in advance the type of elections upon which the East German regime would insist because we already know those conditions from its past. I have already told of the election conditions which were established in East Germany where the voters were compelled by armed force and penalties to go to the polls and, when there, were compelled to put in the ballot box a list of names which had been previously prepared for them and which was made public only on election day.

Indeed, the Soviet plan expressly stipulates in Communist language that the election conditions would in fact be what they were in the Soviet Zone. The election must be so conducted as to assure its so-called 'democratic' character. It must provide for the participation 'of all democratic organizations'. It must preclude 'pressure upon voters by big monoplies', and it must exclude from voting privilege any organizations which by Soviet standards are of a Fascist or militaristic nature.

If we take the tragic pattern which has spread all over Eastern Europe in the wake of the Red armies, it does not require much wit to see what that means. It means that anyone who dares to express the slightest doubt concerning Communism is automatically deemed a Fascist or a militarist or a monopolist.

If this system were to be applied to Western Germany, no organization opposing the Communists or the policies of the Soviet Communists, which are the same thing, would be permitted to take part in the elections.

It would only be the Communist Party and the Communist front organizations which under Mr. Molotov's plan would participate in the elections.

I have no doubt that the Soviet Foreign Minister would protest that his plan does not really involve the Sovietization of Western Germany.

I recall that in the October 1939 speech to which I have already referred, the Soviet Foreign Minister explained that the mutual assistance pacts which he had recently negotiated with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 'no way implies any interference on the part of the Soviet Union . . . [5] as some foreign newspapers are trying to make out. . . . we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs.'

The memory of what happened within a few months to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and of having seen that same pattern extend to the countries of Eastern Europe by the use of the methods which the Soviet proposal prescribes for Germany, will, I hope, explain some skepticism at the Soviet proposals for restoring freedom to Germany.

Mr. Molotov is too intelligent to believe that the people or government of West Germany would accept his proposals or that the three Western powers would suggest that they do so. The Western German Bundestag, representing 70 percent of the entire German people, has unanimously refused to accept the East German regime as having any legitimate status or right to speak for the people of East Germany."

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[5] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

No. 429

396.1 BE/2-554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT BERLIN, February 5, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 94. After consultation with Eden and Bidault, it was agreed that at the conclusion of this afternoon's quadripartite meeting I should propose that the restricted meeting on agenda item I (which last week the four powers agreed to have) be held on Monday, February 8.[2]

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

Accordingly, I made this proposal at the end of today's meeting and it was accepted by all four delegates. Molotov's only comment was "the Soviet Delegate has no objection".

In making the proposal I made clear that the restricted meeting would deal only with reserved subjects under agenda item I (i.e., five power conference and disarmament proposal) and possibly procedural questions. On latter, we have in mind seeking agreement on date next week to invite Austrians to appear for opening discussion on item III (Austria) if we do not in fact settle this matter at regular meeting tomorrow. Latter depends, however, on agreement of French and British which not yet obtained. Under above formulation [*of*?] topics to be discussed at restricted meeting we are in position to make clear publicly that Germany will not be discussed at such meeting.

This telegram is not being repeated to Vienna in view iffy status on timing for item III. We will, of course, notify Vienna after tomorrow morning's tripartite steering group meeting[3] if there is tripartite agreement to raise date for Austrian appearance at tomorrow afternoon's quadripartite meeting.

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[2] Regarding the conclusion of the eleventh plenary, see Secto 96, Document 427.

[3] For a record of the meeting of the Tripartite Working Group on Feb. 6, BER MIN-13, see Document 432.

No. 430

396.1 BE/2-554

The President to the Secretary of State, at Berlin[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 5, 1954—5:38 p.m.

My impression agrees with yours that Western position has been strengthened.[2] Possibly this is partly due to uncompromising approach of Molotov, but it certainly is equally the result of your skillful tactics and of Bidault's heartening display of courage and stamina. He apparently gained great confidence from your example, and I hope that his attitude will be reflected in a like increase in the confidence of the French Parliament and population.

With greetings to your party and warm regard to you.

EISENHOWER

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[1] Transmitted to Berlin in Tedul 24, Feb. 5, with the instruction that it be delivered to Secretary Dulles.

[2] President Eisenhower is replying to the message from Secretary Dulles, transmitted in Dulte 36, Document 423.

February 6, 1954

No. 431

Editorial Note

According to the United States Delegation Order of the Day (USDEL(OD) 14, February 6, 1954, CFM files, lot M 88, box 168) MacArthur, Merchant, Nash, Bohlen, Bowie, Freund, Davis, Rutter, and Manfull met at 9:45 a.m. in Secretary Dulles' office to discuss Austria. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

According to the same Order of the Day, Secretary Dulles met in his office with Federal Minister of Justice Dehler at 10:30 a.m. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

This Order of the Day also states that there would be no United States Delegation meeting on February 6.

No. 432

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 6, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-13

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. *Tactics for Today.*

First Round. Mr. Dulles will be in the chair and M. Bidault and Mr. Eden will make brief statements emphasizing the unacceptability of Mr. Molotov's proposal [1] and the possibility of modification of the UK proposal [2] within the framework of its basic principles.

Second Round. Mr. Dulles will summarize the points on which we have reached the present impasse and request the views of his colleagues as to what can be done. Mr. Bidault will note that the Austrians have asked to come to the Conference to discuss their item and have suggested a forty-eight hour advance notice. Without prejudicing a return to Item 2, at a later time he will suggest that the Ministers invite the Austrians on Tuesday. Mr. Eden will agree with M. Bidault's proposal and suggest that the Chairman send a note to the Austrian Foreign Minister.

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[1] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

[2] FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Under these circumstances the question of the type of Austrian participation is left to Mr. Molotov. If Mr. Molotov raises the question of participation we should suggest discussion on this point in the restricted session Monday. If he presses for an answer we should say that the Austrians have made it clear in their note [3] that they want direct participation. If Mr. Molotov demands further clarification, we should suggest that the Austrians interpret their note when they come on Tuesday. If Mr. Molotov agrees to invite the Austrians and suggests full participation we should agree. If he suggests limited participation we should agree but reserve final decision until hearing the views of the Austrians when they are at the conference table. If Mr. Molotov requests that further time be given to Item 2 on Tuesday, we should suggest Wednesday as the day for opening the Austrian item.

A draft note to the Austrians is being prepared for the Secretary to read in the event that an invitation should be sent.

It was agreed that the meeting will be kept as short as possible today, adjourning if possible by 6:00.

2. *Austria.* It was pointed out that there were some substantive problems with regard to Austria which the three Ministers should consider. The U.S. and the British will be prepared by Monday to consider further outstanding differences. It was provisionally suggested that the Ministers meet on Monday at 12:00 noon, preferably with a luncheon following.

3. *European Security.* Sir Frank Roberts raised the question as to what should be done with regard to the second part of Item 2. It was generally agreed that this discussion of security should be held when the Ministers return to the second item.

4. *Entertainment.* Sir Frank noted Mr. Eden's desire to return the invitation of Mr. Molotov by some appropriate form of entertainment. There were two possibilities: (a) Individual delegation entertainments. (This would necessitate functions on three nights next week.) (b) A joint entertainment given by the three Western Foreign Ministers. Reactions will be obtained from the Ministers.

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[3] Presumably a reference to the Austrian note of Jan. 5, 1954, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 25, 1954, p. 111.

No. 433

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Political Affairs, HICOG (Steere) [1]

SECRET [BERLIN?,] February 6, 1954.

Subject: German Views on Progress of Conference

I called on Ambassador Blankenhorn this morning to ascertain the Federal Government's reactions to the latest developments in the Four-Power Conference. Blankenhorn opened his remarks by stating that the Chancellor was "completely satisfied" with the handling of the Conference by the Foreign Ministers and with the position which had now been achieved. Blankenhorn said he had had this information first hand from visitors from Bonn and by telephone this morning from Professor Hallstein. He repeated this assurance in two or three different formulations and voiced his own opinion that the situation was "excellent".

Blankenhorn then stated that the Chancellor and his associates in the Coalition were of the opinion that the situation had now reached the point where the Conference should be broken off as soon as this could be appropriately done. The issues between the Soviets and the Allies had now been defined with the greatest clarity and the relative position of the Allies vis-à-vis the Soviets could scarcely be improved upon. German public opinion was strongly opposed to the Soviet proposals and equally strong in support of the Allied position. It was the Federal Government's view that termination of the Conference would be supported as justified, by the great majority of the German people, notwithstanding their disappointment at the lack of results.

The Federal Government naturally understood that the Conference could not be broken off suddenly and that some further discussions would have to take place. On the other hand, Blankenhorn expressed the view that it was of the utmost importance not to run any unnecessary risk of destroying the psychological advantage which the Allies had now gained. He thought there were dangers in discussing the German problem any further, particularly at today's meeting, as it might result in the Allies being treated with the "brush" of intransigence that has touched the Russians.

In further discussions with Blankenhorn the thought was developed that there might be advantages in today's meeting "in laying aside", without necessarily terminating, the discussion of the German question, and suggesting that the Conference pass to the discussion of Austria at the beginning of the week. Next week's developments might make it easy not to return to the German question.

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[1] Sent to Secretary Dulles, MacArthur, and Merchant. A notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.

I pointed out to Blankenhorn that numerous German papers were suggesting that the only hope for progress now on the German question was to take the matter up in a restricted meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Blankenhorn immediately said that he thought it would be a great mistake to transfer discussions of the German problem to such a meeting because it would immediately arouse great hopes in the minds of the German people which were bound to be disappointed, and possibly great fears as well. Later he suggested that if it were possible for the four Foreign Ministers to discuss the German question at a dinner, and the results of this could later be drawn upon to show that an effort had been made to make progress in a secret meeting, this would go a long way to satisfy those who place their hopes in a secret meeting, and would tend to still the criticism of those who might criticize if no restricted meeting were to take place.

No. 434

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 6, 1954—1 p.m.

Dulte 42. For President, copy eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Greatly appreciate your message. [1] We approach critical aspect in relation to Indochina. Yesterday I proposed restricted conference Monday on Far Eastern agenda items. This had been agreed to last week when we left full conference discussion of first agenda item. Had hoped events might make this restricted session unnecessary or at least that specific discussion Indochina could be avoided. But French insistent and British strongly press for some "constructive" move our part in Asian area. Under circumstances felt it was best for me to make the proposal for restricted meeting as indicating less weakness than if others made it. Also if further discussion inevitable, felt desirable initiate it prior to worse news from Indochina. Last night I urged Bidault to pass over any suggestion of Indochina negotiation, [2] saying that even to initiate discussion put us on slippery ground, and might lead to further deterioration morale in Indochina and France. However, he feels that bottom will fall out of French home situation unless he does something here to indicate a desire to end Indochina war.

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[1] Document 430.

[2] The occasion on which Dulles spoke to Bidault has not been identified further.

I shall do everything possible minimize risks, but dare not push Bidault beyond point which he thinks will break his position in France, as he our main reliance both for EDC and Indochina, although on latter Laniel also seems to be firm for continuing French effort.[3]

DULLES

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[3] A note attached to the source text indicates that a copy of Dulte 42 was transmitted to the White House on Feb. 6.

No. 435

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 6, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 100. Department pass OSD. Following summary of twelfth Ministers' meeting February 6, Dulles presiding:[2]

1. (a) Bidault reverted Molotov's misgivings re emergence Hitlerism in Germany despite existence parliamentary regime; said clear lesson of history was that Hitler's rise due not to working but to failure of parliamentary system. Agreed a parliamentary regime not the only safeguard of democracy, nevertheless an essential condition; whereas USSR argues we should cripple parliamentary regime by interference and control; but this would cause very result—desire for revenge—which we trying to avoid.

(b) Turned to Molotov's contention possible co-existence Communist and non-Communist elements in single government and said in fact when Communists remained in such coalition governments they took over generally in proximity to military force. In any case Germans do not want such government.

(c) Molotov's proposal[3] has three parts:

First, the Four Powers should help the two German Governments to form a joint provisional government; but this is impossible and it foolish say that since we can sit around conference table together, therefore two opposing types of government could coalesce. We are a conference, not a government. A government must be able to take action sometimes promptly.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the twelfth plenary, USDEL PLEN/12, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.

[3] FPM(54)33, Document 514.

Secondly, there should be a substantial withdrawal occupation forces before elections which we cannot agree.

Third, the German unified state should have no right of association with its neighbors; this we cannot accept and besides it not relevant.

(d) Therefore, Bidault urged, let us examine what concretely can be done. The essential things if there is to be a freely elected all-German government are an electoral law and some impartial supervision of elections to insure that they genuinely free. Provision government not needed for these purposes. Promulgation of electoral law under auspices occupying powers not intended force French or American or British electoral law upon Germany. No objection using pattern of electoral law rooted in German institutions, e.g., electoral law of Weimar Republic. As regards supervision, it seemed agreed supervision was necessary, only question being who would supervise, USSR apparently wanting supervision to be altogether by Germans themselves. Bidault suggested possibility supervision at each level being by tripartite group, one West German, one East German, one neutral.

(e) Objective should be get process started of forming united freely elected German government. Occupying powers alone can do since they the only general power in all Germany. No other issues need detain us. Freely elected German government will not solve whole German problem, but it will be a sign we sincerely trying.

2. Eden contrasted two plans now in deadlock, [4] said it evident that essential difference in order of events. Molotov proposal called for (in this sequence): (a) Establishment provisional government; (b) promulgation of electoral law; (c) elections. Whatever comparison of other merits may be, it obvious Soviet plan more complicated, more arduous and requiring more difficult pre-consultations. From Western viewpoint, it unacceptable for three reasons: (a) Postulates agreement between (indeed merger of) two incompatible types of government (Eden supported Bidault's argument no valid analogy between this conference table and establishment of provisional government); (b) involves concept of free elections radically different from that acceptable to West; (c) requires prior troop withdrawal which creates new difficulty in way of free elections since there can be endless argument about scale and staging of such withdrawals and over definition of troops to remain for "protective functions". Besides Molotov wants Germany not to be free enter into

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[4] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)39, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 112–115, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 96–97.

association with Western states whereas we say Germany must be so free.

Eden asked could we not, as Bidault had suggested, concentrate on practical questions of an electoral law and impartial supervision of elections. UK willing discuss any proposal for an electoral law; as concerns supervision, since Molotov apparently rejected both Four-Power supervision and neutral supervision, we should consider Bidault's proposal (1(d) above).

In conclusion Eden discounted Soviet fears that German association with Western collective security system would support aggressive or vengeful German militarism or could pose any threat to security USSR. He said objective was to achieve simultaneously freedom in Germany and security in Europe. The two are inter-related; while democratic parliamentary system does not provide absolute guarantee against aggressive policy, experience in modern world shows you cannot lead a genuinely democratic nation into aggressive war, whereas aggressive policy might well emerge as result of imposed settlement resented by Germans and repeating errors of the past. Concluded by saying we favor German admission to UN and resultant commitment to principles UN Charter. UK has 20-year treaty with USSR which could be extended if necessary and UK would examine any other proposal that might mitigate Russia's fears for its own national security.

3. Molotov said [5] he assumed this discussion (i.e., on German unification) would continue, meanwhile he wanted to raise another question, namely cancellation of Germany's financial and economic obligations as proposed Soviet note of 15 August 1953, [6] since it is now time to think of measures to strengthen Germany's economy and raise Germany's living standards. He said since no agreed action regarding proposals in 15 August note, USSR had (effective January 1, 1954) proceeded unilaterally in this matter vis-à-vis GDR, i.e., had terminated reparations payments, turned over Soviet enterprises in East Germany, reduced payments for occupation costs to 5 per cent of GDR budget and relieved GDR of debt-burden for external costs of occupation since 1945. It unfair not do same for Federal Republic which still obligated pay seven billion DMs in post-war state debts plus occupation costs running (for budget year 53-54) at 9.6 billion DMs or about 35 per cent of Federal Republic budget and which still obligated in matter of reparations since solution this question postponed (by Bonn agreement [7]) until peace treaty settlement.

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[5] For Molotov's statement, circulated as FPM(54)40, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 98-99.

[6] Document 264.

[7] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

He then submitted formal proposal [8] exactly along lines of note of 15 August.

4. Three Western delegates understood Molotov preambular sentence to mean he wished discontinue discussion German unification. This point not clarified until later (see 8 below).

5. Secretary expressed regret discontinuance discussion German unification but hoped this might be given further thought. [9] Said that before summarizing position on unification question he had few remarks on Molotov's new subject. Said he happy USSR so concerned over Federal Republic's economic position which, however, according OEEC, has recorded phenomenal rise in production, supply of consumer goods, reconstruction, etc. Said this suggested Western powers have also shown themselves concerned and in a more practical way, particularly US which has given about 3.5 billion dollars in aid to Federal Republic. Federal Republic's economic recovery the more remarkable because it concomitant with absorption large number (over one million) refugees East Germany, attracted by superior economic conditions in Federal Republic as contrasted GDR.

Summing position regarding German unification, Secretary said we had Eden's plan [10] which he understood rejected by USSR. We had Molotov's plan which had following component stipulations: (a) Federal Republic and GDR must come together in coalition government; (b) they must agree on a German electoral law over which therefore GDR would have veto power; (c) there must be, in elections, no participation of "non-Communists", who characterized as monopolists and Nazis; (d) there must be no supervision of elections; (e) Germany must be perpetually barred from entering a collective security system with Western nations; (f) occupation troops except for token-forces must be withdrawn from Western Germany which thus left defenseless. These terms form an integrated whole which unacceptable to US; stated by Eden and Bidault unacceptable to UK and France; known unacceptable to West Germans; and presumed unacceptable to East Germans who want to be reunited with West Germany, but hardly credible they want to be reunited by virtue of extending to all Germany the conditions prevalent in GDR.

Secretary concluded with plea to Molotov to reconsider his terms and try to conform them to elementary principles proposed by Western powers.

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[8] For the Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)38, Document 515.

[9] For Secretary Dulles' statement, circulated as FPM(54)41, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 116–119, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 99–101.

[10] FPM(54)17, Document 510.

6. Bidault expressed regret supposed discontinuance discussion Germany and regret that this effort reconciliation futile. Said it appeared useless these circumstances prolong this discussion, but he wished join Dulles' plea for reconsideration. Said no comment this stage on Molotov's economic and financial proposals.

7. Eden spoke briefly in same vein. Then asked for procedural decision on what work to do next. He understood it agreed to hold restricted session Monday. If on Tuesday we should proceed to Austrian question this should be decided now so that Austrians can be notified immediately and be here for discussion Item 3 of agenda.

8. Molotov said he did not consider German question adjourned. He will take up points made at today's session when discussion resumed. He should not, however, be accused of not responding to any new points since in his opinion no new points had been made, only details re points already made. He also said he thought main question was being ignored, namely who will conduct elections, the Germans or the occupying powers. As for future work, he said it was agreed to hold restricted session Monday. Therefore discussion Item 2 of agenda should be resumed Tuesday.

9. Balance of session was devoted to inconclusive discussion of when notification should be sent to Austrians and when Item 3 of agenda likely to be reached. Finally conference accepted Molotov's proposal that at restricted session Monday consideration be given to procedural question of when Austrian item might be reached and when Austrians should be notified.[11]

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[11] The U.S. Delegation transmitted a more detailed account of the balance of the session in Secto 101 from Berlin, Feb. 7. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

No. 436

396.1 BE/2–654: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 6, 1954—9 p.m.

Dulte 44. Eyes only for the President, one copy for Acting Secretary. After difficult negotiation,[1] have agreed with Bidault on fol-

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[1] The negotiations on the resolution had begun that morning at a meeting of McConaughy with Allen and Roux during which the French had produced a draft which was considered by the other two delegations. In subsequent talks two further drafts were prepared before the Secretary of State met with Bidault and Roberts at 6:45 p.m. and worked out the text transmitted below. A record of the events described above was drafted by McConaughy on Feb. 6. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204) A memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Bidault and Roberts, at which

Continued

lowing text of resolution to be introduced at restricted meeting Monday, but probably publicly available thereafter. Bidault has to obtain Laniel's approval as text is less explicit on possible Indochina conference than Laniel instructed. Also Eden objects to language requiring proofs of Chinese People's Republic spirit of peace. However, believe Eden will in last analysis accept what Bidault and I agree on.

None of us believe that there is any chance that Molotov will accept proposal in anything like present form, and I made clear that this is farthest we can go. Bidault asserts, we believe sincerely, that he and Laniel consider something like this a gesture necessary to enable them to carry on war with vigor.

Text follows:

(*Verbatim text*)

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, meeting in Berlin,

Taking into account the need to establish by peaceful means a unified and independent Korea as an important step toward the reduction of international tensions and the re-establishment of peace elsewhere in Asia;

Noting, in connection therewith, the difficulties which have been encountered in concluding the requisite arrangements for the convening of a political conference on Korea, pursuant to paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement and the United Nations General Assembly's resolution of August 28, 1953;

Agree to invite representatives of the Republic of Korea, such other countries which provided armed forces to serve under the United Nations Command in Korea as may desire to participate, the Chinese People's Republic, and the Korean People's Democratic Republic, to meet with representatives of these four countries at a political conference at blank on blank to settle the Korean question;

Agree further that whenever developments at the said political conference on Korea are encouraging for peace, and if the Government of the French Republic, in consultation with the Associated States, deems that the conduct of the Chinese People's Republic in Southeast Asia provides the necessary proofs of its spirit of peace, such four powers' representatives will settle by common agreement the conditions under which a conference to restore peace in Indochina might be convened.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned political conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

DULLES

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the draft in Dulte 44 was agreed, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204. None of the first three draft resolutions referred to above has been found in Department of State files.

No. 437

762.00/2–654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Bohlen)[1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 6, 1954.

Participants:

The Secretary	Mr. Molotov
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Gromyko
Ambassador Bohlen	Mr. Zarubin
(toward the end,	Mr. Troyanovski
Mr. McCardle joined the group)	

Mr. Molotov, after an exchange of amenities after dinner,[2] asked the Secretary what he thought the prospects of success at the Berlin Conference were and on what particular points they might reach agreement.

The Secretary replied that he thought possibly there was more chance for agreement on the Austrian question because Austria, after all, was a little country which could not appreciably affect the balance of power in Europe. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought there was a possibility of some success on Germany. The Secretary asked Mr. Molotov what he had in mind and where he thought progress on Germany might be made. Mr. Molotov, in reply to the Secretary's question, inquired whether there could not be some progress made along the line of a small German army, with a German government which would be directed neither against the United States, France, Great Britain, nor the Soviet Union. He wondered if that possibility was totally excluded.

The Secretary said that in our view, the European Army constituted the best device we could think of to prevent the revival of German militarism, and he wished to assure Mr. Molotov with all the sincerity at his command that this idea not only was not directed against the Soviet Union, or any other country, but provided the best means of preventing Germany from threatening Soviet security. Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Union had great apprehensions concerning the European Army, and inquired whether the Secretary did not feel it was setting one part of Europe off against the other. He said that despite all the assurances and arguments he had heard, the Soviet Union was seriously disturbed over this development, and that this was not just an idea of his but one that was held very widely in the Soviet Union, and not only in the Soviet Union.

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[1] This memorandum of conversation was drafted jointly by MacArthur and Bohlen.

[2] According to another memorandum of this conversation, Molotov and the other members of the Soviet Delegation had arrived at the Secretary's residence at 8:30 p.m. The predinner conversation had centered around authors and journalists in the United States, while the conversation at dinner had revolved around the political experience of the two Foreign Ministers before they entered the diplomatic service. (Memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, Feb. 6, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 263)

The Secretary outlined in considerable detail why in our view the European Army concept afforded the greatest possibility of guaranteeing European security as against any other means of dealing with this problem. He pointed out that discrimination and control in the past has been of little value over the long run in preventing the rise of German militarism; that the great advantage of the European Army was that it did not discriminate against Germany, but on equal footing made it subject to the restraining influence of the countries in Europe who had, along with the Soviet Union, suffered from German militarism.

Mr. Molotov repeated his view that a limited German army, with a government which was directed against none of the four powers, was a possible line of development. The Secretary then stated that he felt this was not a very workable solution, since it in effect raised the main issue which had been brought out here at this Conference. In the first place, any such system would involve a high degree of control from without, which all experience had shown was unreliable as a means of controlling Germany. Secondly, he stated that it in effect brought into conflict the difference in our physiological type of government. He did not believe you could dictate nor guarantee the type of government a country would have without violation of our deepest principles concerning free elections.

Mr. Molotov repeated the serious concern the Soviet Union felt from the point of view of its security over the concept of a European Army including German armed forces. He said they were asking for no privileges for the Soviet Union, but they did not wish to be discriminated against, and quite apart from statements he made at the Conference, there was real concern not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere, over the prospect of Germany's rearming. He said you had only to read statements which have appeared in the press in West Germany, and especially those of General Kesselring, who was practically being accepted by the former German Officers' Corps as their leader. He inquired whether a German Army would not, under the leadership and control of men like Kesselring, soon be running both Germany and the EDC. He added that what the Secretary had described might be the beginning of EDC, but what would be the end? He doubted very much whether the other members of EDC would have sufficient power to restrain the German militarists, which in the end might come to dominate not only Germany but the EDC as well.

The Secretary repeated his arguments concerning the EDC, stating that this was indeed a difficult question; that this concept was in no sense directed against the Soviet Union, but on the contrary its chief purpose was the prevention of revival of German militarism; that it was only within a Western European framework that we felt this purpose could be achieved; and that any German armed force on a national basis, however limited at the beginning, would inevitably lead to the same results that had followed the Treaty of Versailles. The Secretary reiterated the belief that a Germany in EDC was the greatest safeguard the Soviet Union could have. He said some elements in France which opposed the EDC did so on the basis that they did not wish to see France in EDC because it would mean the elimination of a French national army, as it would the elimination of a German national army. These elements would prefer to see Germany in NATO. Germany in NATO, the Secretary said, would in his own personal view give less security to the Soviet Union than Germany in EDC. In NATO there were not the restraints on national forces that there were in EDC. If, however, the EDC did not come into being, the United States could not exclude the possibility that an acceptable alternative might be the entry of Western Germany into NATO.

He inquired of Mr. Molotov whether he had read recently the Treaty of Versailles, and said it was very interesting reading. Mr. Molotov said he had. The Secretary then stated that Marshal Foch, who was a very good general, had written into the Treaty of Versailles almost every limitation and control you could imagine, including prevention of sporting associations, use of rifles, etc. Nevertheless, this had permitted the rebirth of German military forces, and he felt that an attempt to repeat this process would have the same results. He said there may be other alternatives, but he had not been able to think of them, and felt that possibly Mr. Molotov would have some ideas on the subject.

Mr. Molotov said that the trouble had been that the Allied Powers did not keep control over the German Government. If the wrong kind of government got into power, then it was difficult to control what it did. The important thing was to be sure that it was a government that we could control and that would not work against any one of the Four Powers.

Mr. Dulles said that this raised a basic ideological point on which we split. The Soviet Communist belief was that the people generally could not be trusted, and therefore it was necessary for a smaller group to keep control of the election machinery so as to assure that the "right" people were elected. We did not believe in that system, and were willing to trust the people and give them real freedom of elections. That seemed to be a very basic issue between us as this Conference developed.

The Secretary went on to say that he could understand very fully the preoccupations of the Soviet Union; that there were people who believed that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the countries allied with it, which were still considerably larger than those of Western Europe, were directed against the West and constituted a threat to other countries. He personally did not believe this, since he felt the Soviet leaders had created this force for defense, and he, therefore, hoped the Soviet Union could take the same attitude toward the EDC. He said if this was the chief Soviet preoccupation, it should not be impossible to find a formula whereby a correlation of actual military forces between the EDC and the Soviet system would be so adjusted as not to constitute a threat in either direction. He said that in the past and at present the forces of the Soviet system were considerably greater than those of the Western powers in Europe. He believed it might be possible to develop some formula for a ratio between the ground forces of the Soviet Union and its associated states on the one hand, and the ground forces of the EDC and other Western nations which are stationed in Europe on the other. Since the Soviet Union, because of its large territory and many frontiers, had multiple responsibilities, such a formula would mean that the strength of the ground forces of the Western states, including the United States, stationed in Western Europe, would be numerically less than the forces of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states associated with it.

Mr. Molotov said the question involved not only the forces of the proposed European Army and the Soviet Union, but forces on a worldwide scale, which would involve all the great powers. He said the Soviet Union was prepared to consider a reciprocal reduction of armaments, as it had already made plain.

The Secretary stated that by the forces of the EDC he, of course, had in mind all of the forces, including those of the United States, which were stationed in Western Europe. He added that the United States was already in the process of reducing its own forces, and that shortly the ground forces of the United States would be materially curtailed.

Mr. Molotov stated that this problem was one of deep concern in the Soviet Union, and he felt that any German army was a "very unquiet" army. He repeated his belief that a small German army with a German government directed against none of the four powers might be possible, but he left the impression that if this was excluded, other courses might be considered. He made no specific reference to the Secretary's formula statement, but he seemed to imply that this could at least be examined.

The Secretary said Mr. Molotov should think this matter over, and if he had any thoughts on the subject, he would be very glad to talk to Mr. Molotov again before they left Berlin, adding that he felt the German question was the most serious one that confronted them.

Mr. Molotov agreed and said he thought they should both think over their *whole conversation* this evening and give it the attention which its importance merited. [3]

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[3] On Feb. 7 Secretary Dulles transmitted to President Eisenhower a one-page summary of the discussion following dinner. (Dulte 45 from Berlin, 110.11 DU/2-754)

No. 438

396.1 BE/2-654: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Berlin

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 6, 1954—5:26 p.m.
PRIORITY

Tedul 27. Re Dulte 40. [1] Appreciate French pressures for negotiated Indochina settlement. We wonder whether preliminary private conversations between French and British and/or Russians might not have occurred. If some formula envisaging eventual negotiations is unavoidable, we hope it will conform as closely as possible to language penultimate paragraph Dulte 35. [2] You, of course, will know best whether to recall that French associated themselves at UNGA last August with view that favorable developments at Korean political conference should precede discussion of other Asian questions with states concerned with those questions. If that position is abandoned and we appear to be suing for negotiated peace, Communists may well conclude situation so desperate in Indochina they need only stand firm to win full victory. Negotiations in such circumstances not likely produce agreement but could further sap French will to resist in Indochina.

SMITH

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[1] Document 425.

[2] Document 418.

February 7, 1954

No. 439

Editorial Note

According to the records of the United States Delegation, with the exception of the events described in Dulte 47, *infra*, no meetings took place on Sunday, February 7. However Secretary Dulles held a press conference that afternoon at which he responded to questions concerning the progress of the meetings. The full text of the press conference was transmitted in Secto 103 from Berlin, February 8. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

No. 440

396.1 BE/2-754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET [illegible]ACT BERLIN, February 7, 1954—8 p.m.

Dulte 47 [illegible] for the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. As result [illegible] raised by Bidault on instructions from Paris this morning [illegible]hina paragraph of draft resolution on Political Conferen[illegible] we had provisionally agreed to last night (Dulte 44 [1]), following revision drafted by me this morning has just been definitely accepted by the French: [2]

"Agree further that as soon as actions of the Chinese People's Republic at the Korean Political Conference and in Southeast Asia provide proofs of its spirit of peace, such Four Power representatives will settle by common agreement the conditions for the convening of another conference designed to restore peace in Indochina."

At meeting late this afternoon, Eden expressed misgivings about this paragraph. He argued that it would be impossible for the Soviets to accept a resolution which stigmatized and placed on probation their Chinese partner. He said draft imposed two conditions on which Communist China alone would be required to meet. He felt that the specific reference to the Chinese foredoomed the resolution to rejection by the Soviets. He believed we would be vulnerable to future criticism along the line that we were bound to have known the Soviets would not accept this language; hence we could not have been serious about introducing the resolution; and therefore presumably do not actually want conferences on Korea and Indochina with Chinese Communist participation. He said that he did not want to make a nuisance of himself in regard to a difficult issue on which his American and French colleagues, who were more directly concerned, had already reached agreement. However, he felt he should telegraph the text to London immediately.

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[1] Document 436.

[2] The exchange of correspondence between Bidault and Dulles on Feb. 7, in which Bidault indicated the reaction in Paris and Dulles transmitted his draft, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215.

Secretary pointed out that this language applied only to a proposed Four-Power agreement, and was not proposed to use in an invitation. It was somewhat risky to propose a conference on Indochina under any conditions at this time. If publicized, it might undermine the will to resist of the French Union. The fixing of express conditions provided the only safeguard. It would be unthinkable to remove the conditions imposed on Communist China.

Bidault supported the Secretary very strongly and effectively. He said that from French standpoint it was essential to insert specific conditions in the proposal.

We expect to introduce resolution tomorrow assuming that British will reluctantly concur. We are considering recommending Geneva as place, April 15 as date for Korean Political Conference.

DULLES

February 8, 1954

No. 441

Editorial Note

The United States Delegation staff meeting at 9:30 a.m. on February 8 was largely concerned with press reaction to the conference. (USDEL MIN/9, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205) Following the delegation meeting MacArthur met with Roberts and Seydoux for the session of the Tripartite Working Group at 10:30, which was devoted to the tactics for the restricted quadripartite meeting to be held at 3 p.m. (BER MIN-14, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192) At noon the Foreign Ministers met for lunch at Bidault's residence to consider the question of a five-power meeting. No record of their discussion has been found in Department of State files, but it is referred to in BER MIN-14. At the same time C.D. Jackson and Tyler had lunch with Erich Ollenhauer who consistently probed for "a substitute for the EDC as a means of obtaining Soviet consent to reunification of Germany on Western terms."

(Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203)

No. 442

396.1 BE/2-854

United States Delegation Record of the First Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 8, 1954, 3-7:05 p.m. [1]

SECRET

Present:
U.S.
- Secretary Dulles
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Bohlen

France
- Mr. Bidault
- Mr. Parodi
- Mr. De Margerie
- Mr. Andronikow

U.K.
- Mr. Eden
- Mr. Roberts
- Mr. Allen
- Major Birse

USSR
- Mr. Molotov
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Malik
- Mr. Troyanovski

Mr. Bidault who was in the chair opened the meeting by stating that this was a restricted session called to deal with the points under Item 1 of the agenda and certain procedural matters. He called on Mr. Eden.

Mr. Eden said that he did not have much to say at this stage. He was glad that Mr. Molotov had desired to discuss this topic in restricted session since in his view the Far East was as important as Europe. He did not think that a five-power conference with a broad agenda was a good method to deal with the Far Eastern question and, therefore, he did not agree with the Soviet position. There were, however, a number of specific problems in the Far East and a practical approach to these seemed to him to be the best method. For example: After three years an armistice had been achieved in Korea which provided for a political conference; but for six months now agreement on the political conference had not been reached. In Indochina the fighting was going on and while it was not for him to speak on this point, he thought this was another of the specific topics which might be dealt with rather than a conference with a wide agenda.

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[1] A summary of this restricted meeting was transmitted in Dulte 53 from Berlin, Feb. 9. (396.1 BE/2-854)

Mr. Molotov said that it seemed they had the following questions before them. The first point was the five-power conference as proposed by the Soviet Delegation. [2] They should discuss the agenda and the date of that conference. Naturally, the Soviet Delegation liked its own proposal but there might be different views on this subject. It would, therefore, be desirable to hear the views of the other Ministers on these points and there might be other proposals. He added they should bear in mind that [in] a five-power conference any of the participating nations could bring up any questions they desired.

The second question was that dealing with the reduction of armaments. There was a Soviet and a French proposal on this point. [3] He could only say that the French proposal appeared to them impractical since it would leave matters in their present state. It would refer the matter to the UN Commission but this would hardly produce fruitful results in the light of past experience. The Soviet proposal was more practical since it named a specific date. He would like to have the views of his colleagues on this question during this meeting.

The Secretary said he had only a few words to say at this time in regard to the practical problems in Asia which might be dealt with by any conference and that later he would speak on the subject of disarmament. Since they are meeting in restricted session this afforded them an opportunity to speak very frankly in order to permit greater understanding. He, therefore, wished to state that the United States Government was not prepared to accept the Communist Chinese regime as one of the five great powers and any proposal, however indirect, to that effect would not be acceptable to the United States. This is not merely the view of a number of people only, or even of the present administration or President Eisenhower, but is strongly held by the nation and particularly in Congress by both Democrats and Republicans. It is inconceivable, therefore, that any administration could depart from the views he had expressed. He said he would not go into the reasons behind this position since they were well known and would merely start a debate which would not be productive here. The United States recognizes that Communist China is a fact and that there are certain areas where this fact must be taken into account and dealt with as such, but not, however, in such a way as to increase the authority and prestige of a regime that has fought the United States and continuously builds up the propaganda of hate against the United States. We would, therefore, deal with this regime on specific questions which might be conducive to the re-establishment of peace in Asia. Proceeding from that premise he said he had a proposal to make and he circulated a document in English, French and Russian (Attachment no. 1 [4]). He said that when his colleagues had had time to read the paper he would be glad to hear their views, but in the meantime he could offer the following explanatory comments:

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[2] For the Soviet proposal, see Secto 29, Document 359.

[3] For the Soviet proposal, see Secto 43, Document 376. For the French proposal, see FPM(54)15, Document 509.

Paragraph one was self-explanatory since no one would deny the need to establish by peaceful means the unification of Korea and the desirability of bringing peace to other parts of Asia.

Paragraph two is simple and factual in that it took note of the difficulties which had arisen in connection with the political conference on Korea despite the fact that the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953 at which time it was expected that a political conference would take place within three months but now almost seven months had passed. This paragraph also referred to the resolution of the UN which should not cause difficulties since, as he recalled, all four nations had voted for it.

Paragraph three involves using the authority and influence of the four powers here to convoke the political conference. This suggestion might eliminate one of the difficulties encountered at Panmunjom—namely, the status and manner of participation of the Soviet Union at the political conference. It has been the strong desire of the United States that the USSR should be a participant not only because of its influence in the situation but also because of the fact that any results should be accepted by the Soviet Union. Under this formula the Soviet Union would be one of the sponsors of the conference and thus would avoid the problem of which side it should represent. It will be noted that this third paragraph contains two blanks for a place and date. He said he would be glad to make suggestions on these two points later because he believed that the four of them could agree here. They could get acceptance from other countries but he would do this later since he felt, if they could reach substantive agreement here, the problem of date and place would not be difficult.

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[4] No copy of this document was found attached to the source text. The summary referred to in footnote 1 above indicates that it was the draft transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

The fourth paragraph deals with the war in Indochina. It is naturally a desire of all those who bear even any part of the heavy burden which this war involved to see peace restored. It is also of interest to all peace-loving countries to see an end put to a war which has gone on already seven or eight years. The question of whether or not it is proper to consider calling a conference on Indochina can only be examined after the Chinese Communist regime had shown a greater will for peace than in the past. He said he was aware of the fact that Mr. Molotov had cited the conclusion of an armistice as evidence of the Chinese desire for peace. The Secretary felt, however, that it was not so much a desire for peace that led the Chinese Communists to this position, since at any time in the past two years they could have brought it about, but rather a desire to avoid ultimate serious defeat. He was not asking Mr. Molotov to accept this interpretation of these historical events but merely wished to mention it as the view of the United States Government. The subsequent conduct of the Chinese Communists in carrying out the terms of the armistice and the stream of hatred against the United States continuously poured out from the highest sources in that regime gave grounds for doubting the peace-loving character of the Chinese Communists. The French Government has on numerous occasions, including this conference, expressed similar views in regard to the necessity for demonstration of Chinese intentions in regard to the situation in Southeast Asia. Both of these points of view are expressed in the paragraph to which he was referring and both are indispensable from the point of view of the United States. The Secretary added that the final paragraph specifies that the calling of a conference does not alter the existing situation in regard to diplomatic recognition—that is, it does not mean that the USSR is recognizing the Chinese Communist or North Korean regimes. He concluded that it has not been easy for the United States to make this proposal and no doubt there would be criticism for having done so, but we have tried very sincerely to find a basis for—or to put it more accurately—the terms on which the four powers could contribute to the establishment of peace in a situation where in one case there was merely a precarious armistice and in the other there was actual warfare. Having gone as far as we can, it was his hope that his colleagues would be able to go along on this basis which would demonstrate that when the four powers got together they were capable of constructive action which could do much to restore confidence in international relations. He added that the US proposal went as far as it could without doing violence to certain fundamental principles which we were not prepared to abandon.

Bidault then inquired whether the other Ministers would like time to study this proposal or whether they should continue the debate.

Mr. Molotov suggested they proceed to make their comments in turn.

Mr. Bidault then said that this proposal was a substantial contribution and contained several positive elements. The French Delegation, therefore, approved it. Going back to the origin of this subject, the French Delegation did not believe that a proposal for a five-power conference including China was consistent with the attitude and behavior of the Chinese Communist Government. The French Delegation considered that a conference of five was not by its nature a meeting to deal with specific questions. The present proposal contained formulas which would help surmount certain difficulties and afforded a basis upon which Communist China could be included. The suggestion in regard to the calling of the Korean political conference seemed to be satisfactory. Insofar as Indochina was concerned the French Government had already said that it would seize any opportunity for a peace with honor which would safeguard the rights of the inhabitants of Indochina but the attitude of the Chinese Communists raised a problem since everyone knew that the Chinese were contributing in a very material sense to the struggle in Indochina by supplying the Vietminh forces with arms, provisions and instruction. The Chinese Communist regime thus bore a heavy responsibility for the continuance of the war in Indochina and must give some evidence of its desire for peace. France has done this. At the last session here it was stated that time was needed for reflection. He said that the French Government was prepared to re-examine the problem of Communist China when the Chinese Communist regime had re-examined its attitude toward Indochina.

Mr. Eden said he had always felt that if there was to be any meeting on the Far East, it must satisfy three conditions: (1) It must deal with the subject in a practical manner; (2) All interested countries should be involved; and (3) The problems to be considered should be specific. He felt that all three conditions were met by Mr. Dulles' proposal and he welcomed it and believed on this basis progress could be made out of the deadlock in which they found themselves.

Mr. Molotov said that they were considering Chinese participation in a five power conference without China being present and this should not be forgotten. He said that he had before him a statement of January 29 in which Chou En-lai had declared that the Chinese Government supported the Soviet proposals for a five-power conference. The Chinese attitude towards other types of conferences at which they were to be present was not known and, therefore, they should obtain the views of the Chinese Government on this point.

Mr. Dulles' proposal contains certain accusations against the Chinese People's Republic. If the Chinese were here they would be able to answer, but the Soviet Union could not associate itself with these accusations which were presented in the absence of China.

They believed that those who accused China were more to blame themselves. In any event, accusations gave rise to counter accusations and he did not think that these accusations should be made here.

On specific points he stated that in regard to paragraph three (paragraph two in our enumeration) he must state that the Soviet Delegation in the UN had voted not for but against that resolution. Paragraph four (our three) was merely a repetition of an old proposal for the composition of the political conference which the Soviet Government had opposed and continues to oppose. Paragraph five (our four) excludes Communist China which would not be wise and for that reason alone was unsatisfactory.

To sum up, this proposal is not acceptable as a basis for agreement. The Soviet Delegation suggests that we should renounce accusations and not put forward proposals which would make agreement more difficult. Mr. Molotov continued that although Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault approved Mr. Dulles' proposal, he felt that they should consider a different approach to the problem. In regard to Mr. Bidault's remarks, this was not the first time that Mr. Bidault had accused the Chinese People's Republic of aiding Vietminh. Statements of this kind could be made at a meeting where the Chinese were present so that they could reply to the accusation and give explanations. The Soviet proposal had in view a five-power conference with a wider scope of questions as they all knew, but another path might be followed which would unfold a narrow range of questions. At the same time it should be borne in mind that all participants at the five-power conference could explain their views on any question which might contribute to a better understanding. There were two matters which had been mentioned: namely, Korea and Indochina. A five-power conference could give appropriate attention to these questions.

The Secretary stated that Mr. Molotov seemed to have misunderstood his proposal. On paragraph four, it is true that the question of convoking a conference would be decided without preliminary consultation with the Chinese Communists, the North Koreans or ROK or other interested countries. But he had thought it appropriate for the four powers to take an initiative in calling a conference, as indicated, particularly since the Soviet resolution on disarmament envisaged the four powers taking a comparable initiative in regard to inviting other powers. Mr. Molotov appears to have misunderstood the meaning of paragraph five. Although the four powers would take the initiative, the other countries, like Communist China and the Associated States, would be invited to restore peace in Indochina if the conditions indicated were met. He said he had tried to avoid offensive and vituperative statements in order not to compromise the success of this meeting. He had made it clear that he did not expect Mr. Molotov to accept the interpretation held by the United States but he merely wished to be clear that this was the opinion of his Government. He did not desire to argue the point here.

Mr. Bidault said he did not think there were any accusations against the Chinese Communists in this proposal. There was, however, a desire to see them give evidence of a pacific spirit. Mr. Molotov had said that the Chinese should come and explain these things. The facts, however, are very clear and, until Chinese intervention in Indochina ceases, no further explanations are needed. It is not a question of explanation; their actions are very clear and they are unpleasant. If the Chinese should change their actions we could see things in a different light. There is no ambiguity in regard to what the Chinese Communists are doing in Indochina. He added that Mr. Molotov preferred a five-power conference with a broad field but that his indication that there might be a more limited range of questions was precisely what Mr. Dulles' proposal suggested. France is interested in peace and felt that the proper procedure was to begin at the beginning and not at the end.

Mr. Eden stated that Mr. Molotov was correct in pointing out that the Soviet Delegation had voted against the August 28 resolution but he felt they should not accept the principle that just because they had voted against the resolution once they would have to abide by it eternally. He mentioned in this connection the UK negative vote on a UN resolution because it did not include India, but nonetheless the UK had accepted the will of the majority. In regard to paragraph four, he said that Communist China had already accepted the principle of a political conference and in regard to paragraph five agreed with Mr. Dulles' interpretation that China would be invited.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Dulles had indicated that China and other countries would be invited to the conference, but would it be wise to take a decision to invite China and then have that country refuse. He felt this would be inadvisable. We should be certain in advance that any such invitation would be acceptable to the Chinese. Mr. Eden had said he recalled that the Soviet Union had voted against the August 28 resolution but he apparently believes the Soviet Government should change its position. This advice he found curious since he did not see how you could vote one day against something and then the next day for it if your attitude towards it had not changed. He also understood Mr. Eden to say that China had voted for the political conference which was inaccurate since China was not present and did not accept the composition of the political conference as set forth in the resolution.

In regard to paragraph five Mr. Dulles had said that it does not exclude Chinese participation in the conference. We could not accuse China in China's absence and then take these accusations as a basis for an invitation. China would not accept an invitation on such terms. He said the Soviet Government held diametrically contradictory views on Communist China and their right to participate in a five-power conference.

He said Mr. Bidault had stated that he does not require explanations from China concerning Vietnam. That is his right. Any document from this meeting could not express the views merely of one or another of the Ministers but must be acceptable to all of them. The proposal of Mr. Dulles was one-sided and contained accusations which would inevitably lead to counter-accusations which would not advance matters. The Soviet Delegation had already expressed its views on the five-power conference but could agree to the following: that all complex questions between the five powers and other countries should not be raised. Naturally, if Korea was considered at a five-power conference, both Korean regimes should be there; and if Vietnam is considered, all parties concerned should take part if necessary. There must, however, be an agreed proposal which would be acceptable to China and they must try to work out an agreed formula to that end.

The Secretary said he was somewhat perplexed as to exactly what to say at this point. He had made a proposal which he hoped would be acceptable and which contained what he regarded as real concessions. As he understood it, however, the Soviet Government had rejected this proposal. The Soviet Foreign Minister had vaguely hinted that he might accept some modifications of his five-power proposal in regard to an agenda and possible participation in order to examine specific questions. As he understood Mr. Molotov's view, the hard core of the conference would be the five powers including the Chinese Communist regime. The United States believes that Communist China, a proclaimed and declared aggressor by the UN, is not entitled to that position. We agree with the French Foreign Minister who said that the attitude of the Chinese Communist regime is such that its peace-loving intentions cannot be accepted until there is some demonstration to that effect. Therefore the United States Delegation would be unable to accept the proposal of the Soviet Delegation even with the modifications vaguely hinted at by Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Bidault then said, as Chairman, he thought the situation was as follows: The Soviet Delegation objects to paragraph three because of the mention of the UN resolution. Perhaps this is not a substantial difference. In regard to the next paragraph the Soviet Delegation rejects it because it is an old proposal which it has opposed. The Soviet Delegation also suggests that we should ask the Chinese before inviting them. However, it seemed to him that if the Chinese should reject the invitation, it would be because they would only participate in a conference of five powers. The French Delegation has never accepted the idea of a five-power conference for its own sake but has in mind a conference on its merits and he could only repeat the desirability of starting at the beginning and not at the end. In regard to paragraph five, the French Delegation wants some evidence of peaceful intention, not to be stated here but on the spot. He then inquired where the discussions stood: namely, if Mr. Dulles' proposal was accepted or rejected.

Mr. Eden said, in regard to paragraph three, he felt that it was most important that the countries which had contributed forces in Korea be included. He could not accept a document which excluded such countries.

Mr. Molotov said, first of all in regard to the five-power conference with the participation of China, Mr. Dulles had said that such a conference would not be acceptable to the United States because the UN had branded the Chinese People's Republic as an aggressor. The Soviet Union has directly opposite views and felt this resolution was unjust, unfounded and undermined the authority of the UN. The differences now are so great that it is hardly worthwhile to raise this point if we wish to create favorable conditions for the reduction of international tension. He stated that in its present form the draft could not afford the basis for agreement. If radically amended, and given a desire to meet each other, they might find a solution on its basis. Mr. Molotov added that in regard to specific comments, he understood that paragraph three might be amended to exclude the reference to the August 28 resolution. Mr. Bidault said they should begin at the beginning in regard to Indochina. He wished to point out that events there had begun before the Chinese People's Republic had been in existence and that this was the heart of the matter and therefore it was clear who was responsible and attempts should not be made to shift the blame to others; that in his view, in order not to make matters more difficult, paragraph five should be deleted. As for paragraph four, Mr. Eden had said that this should be accepted since it agreed with the armistice terms. He did not believe this was correct, but on the contrary paragraph four should not be accepted because it does not agree with the views of some of the representatives here. He said it was perfectly clear that the USSR did not have any connection with either side in the Korean hostilities and therefore could not attend a conference in the capacity suggested. He concluded that they should attempt to find some formula which all at this table could accept.

The Secretary said Mr. Molotov, as he understood his remarks, was suggesting such radical changes to his proposal as to amount to mutilation. Paragraph six, [was acceptable?] but paragraphs three, four and five were not, although three might be made acceptable by the elimination of the reference to the UN resolution. He did not regard this as a fatal blow to the proposal. Mr. Molotov, however, rejects paragraph four but does not propose any substitute and he would eliminate paragraph five entirely. Following Mr. Molotov's amendments we would have a very feeble effort. He did not know what substitutes, if any, Mr. Molotov had in mind. It would hardly seem that Mr. Molotov had accepted his proposal as a basis for argument if his amendments in reality mean that all substance is eliminated. Mr. Molotov said he had reminded them that the events in Indochina began before the Chinese Communist regime had seized power. That was true, but it was equally true that had it not been for the Chinese Communist intervention, the situation would have been terminated long ago. He merely wished to state the obvious; namely, that in order to have peace, one must stop making war. He stated that there seemed to be agreement on the first and second paragraphs, the third could be modified but that four and five were the chief difficulty. Perhaps the best thing would be to consider that they had gone as far as they could this afternoon and to turn the page and to proceed to the other topic they had before them.

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov believed that countries which had contributed armed forces in Korea should be included in the Korean conference.

Mr. Molotov said there were certain paragraphs on which no views were expressed. Although these were less complicated, they still needed additional study and perhaps they would not cause great difficulty. He said Mr. Eden had asked whether others could take part. Any interested country could take part provided we reached agreement on the calling of a five-power conference. If we don't agree on a five-power conference the reply to Mr. Eden's question will be unclear since it is not clear how matters stand.

Mr. Bidault then said it was getting late, that we were not making any progress and that there were other matters to discuss. He therefore suggested that they should turn to them with the possibility of coming back to this item. He mentioned also that on the disarmament point there were two resolutions, French and Soviet, and in addition the procedural question concerning the third item on their agenda which was very urgent because of the problem of inviting the Austrians. He said there would be a plenary session tomorrow and that they could possibly take up Austria Wednesday or Thursday; or he said they could have the plenary session on Germany tomorrow and Wednesday there could be another restricted session with Austria on Thursday.

Mr. Eden stated that he thought in view of the forty-eight hours necessary to notify the Austrians, Thursday might be a good day.

Mr. Molotov proposed Friday.

The Secretary said he preferred Thursday. At this point the Secretary asked the indulgence of the Chairman, to state that the United States Delegation might find it necessary to submit the proposal he had made today as a public conference document since the Soviet proposal on this point had been so treated.

Mr. Molotov said that was up to the United States.

Mr. Bidault added that they were all free to do what they like in regard to their own proposals.

After a further exchange in regard to Austria it was agreed that the Austrians would be heard not later than Friday and possibly Thursday; that the invitations could be sent out, from Mr. Bidault as Chairman, to that effect to the Austrians.[5]

During the discussion on Austria Mr. Molotov emphasized they had not yet completed discussion on Germany and that he thought two or three more days of discussion on this point was necessary since everybody agreed that this was the most important subject before them. In regard to a future closed meeting, while Mr. Bidault had suggested Wednesday for a closed meeting for continuance of discussion on point one, Mr. Molotov said he felt it unnecessary to set a date for a closed meeting in advance since that could always be done on short notice as no preparations were involved. There was accordingly no date set for a restricted meeting.

The Ministers agreed that there should be no press briefing and accepted the text of an agreed communiqué.[6] The meeting broke up at 7:05 p.m.

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[5] For Bidault's note to Chancellor Raab, Feb. 8, see *Berlin Discussions*, p. 175.

[6] The text of the communiqué circulated as FPM(54)42, was transmitted in Secto 106 from Berlin, Feb. 9. (396.1 BE/2-954)

No. 443

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[1]

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, February 8, 1954.

Subject: Restricted Session of February 8, 1954.

At his request, Herbert Blankenhorn called on me this evening to ascertain what happened at today's restricted meeting.[2] I gave him a very brief report, saying that for three and a half hours we discussed Agenda Item 1 and that the Secretary had tabled a proposal which dealt essentially with the convening of a Korean conference from which, if the Chinese Communist attitude and actions were satisfactory with respect to Korea and Indochina, might come another conference dealing with Indochina.[3]

I did not show Blankenhorn the Secretary's resolution, but simply sketched generally the idea behind it. I told him we then turned to the question of an invitation for Austria and agreed that an invitation should be sent by the Chairman of today's meeting and that the discussions on Austria would begin on Thursday or Friday.

I said there was no discussion whatever of Germany or of a future restricted meeting about Germany. The only time Germany had been mentioned was when we had pressed to have the Austrian item brought up on Wednesday or Thursday and Molotov had countered by proposing Friday on the basis that he thought there should still be two or three days' discussion on Germany.

Mr. Blankenhorn thanked me for the information and said he would pass it on to Chancellor Adenauer on a most confidential basis and it would be held very tightly.

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[1] Copies of this memorandum were transmitted to Dulles, Conant, Merchant, and Morris.

[2] For a report on the restricted session, see the U.S. Delegation record, *supra*.

[3] For text of this resolution, see Dulte 44, Document 436.

February 9, 1954

No. 444

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 9, 1954, 10:30 a.m. [1]

SECRET
BER MIN-15

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. Tactics for Today

The precise tactics for today were to be discussed at the Ministers meeting. The Ministers would also discuss the possibility of raising the subject of European security, the Austrian Treaty, and further handling of item 1. [2]

2. General Posture Towards Item 2

Mr. MacArthur made clear that the U.S. felt it would be a mistake to so elaborate the discussion on Germany that we would be drawn into a maze of details which would detract from our present strong position on free elections. The Soviets were at a disadvantage while the question remained as to whether or not Molotov was fundamentally opposed to free elections but the western position would be confused if the conference were drawn into endless arguments with regard to the details of porposals before the Conference. The UK and the French felt that while we should not get into detailed discussion on Germany this was probably the time to discuss the general question of European security. Sir Frank noted that Mr. Eden had already opened this discussion on Saturday in connection with his statement on the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and that perhaps Mr. Eden need go no further.[3] The precise nature of the possible remarks of M. Bidault was not made clear.

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[1] According to the U.S. Delegation Order of the Day (USDEL/OD)16, CFM files, lot M 88, box 168), a meeting was held in Secretary Dulles' office at 9:30 to discuss Austria. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

[2] The only record of the Foreign Ministers meeting at noon is in an undated memorandum from McConaughy to MacArthur which reads as follows:

"1) *Noon Meeting of Tripartite Foreign Ministers.* The Secretary met with his two Western colleagues at Mr. Eden's residence at noon to discuss tactics as to Agenda Item I, and whether the U.S. Draft should be released to the press. I understand it was decided to propose at today's session another Restricted Meeting for tomorrow; and to postpone publicity for the U.S. proposal." (Conference files, lot 60 D 527, CF 204)

3. Item 1

The Working Group relegated to the Ministers the decision as to what should be done on the U.S. proposal for a conference on Korea. It was agreed that the western ministers should say nothing regarding another restricted session or raise the question of disarmament. If Mr. Molotov raises the point we should suggest the discussion of disarmament be held in a regular session. If pressed would agree to a restricted session on this subject.

4. Entertainment

It was suggested that the three western powers not attempt to outdo the Soviets on their entertainment and perhaps a reception would be adequate. The reception could be held at a cocktail buffet (7:00–9:00 p.m.) at the ACA Building. No final decision was made.

5. Berlin

It was agreed that Messrs. Morris and Steere from the US, Johnson from the UK, and Bayle from the French would form a group to consider steps the three western ministers might take to ameliorate conditions in Berlin. This same group would consider possible approaches to Molotov with regard to the conditions of the war criminals.

6. Austria

It was agreed that there would be a meeting tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. at the UK Headquarters with the Austrians and the Austrian experts of the three delegations to prepare for a tripartite ministerial meeting with Foreign Minister Figl at 12:00 noon.[4] The Ministerial meeting would be held in Dulles' residence.

At the tripartite ministerial meeting today the following matters would be discussed with regard to Austria:

1. Procedural arrangements
2. Matters connected with the Austrian Treaty:
    a. Article 35
    b. Article 42
    c. The Probable charge of *Anschluss* with Germany (Article 4)

3. Other matters on which the three delegations have not reached agreement:

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[3] For a summary of Eden's remarks on Saturday, Feb. 6, see Secto 100, Document 435.

[4] Regarding these meetings, see Documents 448 and 449.

a. Withdrawal of troops
b. Neutralization
c. The Allied Declaration

7. Informing the NATO Council of the Restricted Session

It was agreed that the NATO Council should receive a résumé of yesterday's session.

No. 445

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 9, 1954.

In my judgment we have reached the point of the Conference where we can reasonably accept that:

(a) the fundamentals of the Soviet policy with respect to Germany and the Far East are unaltered.

(b) Molotov has in all probability shown his full hand on the Five Power Conference and Germany. (He is still incompletely tested on Austria but the combination of the revelation of his position on the major issues and informal conversations indicate that it is improbable we can get at this time from Russia an Austrian State Treaty).

(c) we are entering the period of diminishing returns on the Conference in terms of world public opinion (by Friday night[2] I think Molotov must have recognized, as well as we did, that he had placed himself in the worst possible position vis-à-vis not only German, but world opinion on the central question of the reunification of Germany. He must realize, what seems to me obvious, namely, that he cannot hope to gain and may lose by his prolonging the debate on Germany).

On the Five Power Conference, I believe we are in a situation wherein protraction of the discussion will be confusing to American public opinion and conducive to further erosion of Mr. Bidault's and Mr. Eden's resolution.

The disarmament issue seems to me simple and one that can be satisfactorily knocked off in a half hour. It poses no real difficulty.

It goes without saying that we should avoid restricted meetings as we would the plague. In the absence of any real possibility of a drawing together of the position of the Soviets and the West, these meetings can produce only a ferment of rumors and a field day for

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[1] Copies were also sent to MacArthur, Bowie, Conant, Bruce, and Bohlen. Notations on the source text indicate that Secretary Dulles saw it and that MacArthur and C. D. Jackson agreed with its substance.

[2] Feb. 5.

Soviet propaganda. In this conference our position is so unassailable that we should really try to keep it in a goldfish bowl.

From the foregoing I have reached the conclusion that we should now concentrate on breaking off the conference at the earliest possible moment. Obviously, we must first test the Russians on Austria. Two days of discussion of this agenda item at the most should be sufficient to ascertain whether or not they are so anxious for an agreement on something that they are prepared to conclude an Austrian State Treaty.

I urge that we now invoke the agreement reached in Bermuda on December 7, which was to the effect that after two weeks or so at Berlin the three Western Foreign Ministers would consult as to the utility of continuing the Berlin Conference.

I strongly recommend that at noon today you raise this question with Eden and Bidault. [3] If you do not raise it today and reach agreement thereafter among the three of you I think we may well lose a week of everybody's time. I recommend that you summarize the general position as you see it and express the belief that the three of you should now direct your primary attention to the tactics of disengagement. My impression is that Adenauer is also convinced that the sooner the conference is ended, the better. Insofar as American public opinion is concerned, I see no problem in this regard. I think our aim should be to wind up by the middle of next week unless, by the most improbable chance, we find that the Soviets are seriously interested in concluding the Austrian Treaty.

I do not think we should permit ourselves to be diverted from a clear cut conclusion of the conference by any suggestion that, in the absence of agreeing on major issues, we should seek to find agreement on minor measures of relaxation of East-West tensions in Germany, such as lowering the barriers between East and West Germany. If such a proposal should be made here by Molotov or our Allies, I recommend that you refuse to become involved in the discussion but suggest that the Four High Commissioners in normal course discuss among themselves possible alleviations. I think it even more important that no vestigial elements be left behind at this conference, other than the High Commissioners. I also feel strongly that the Conference should end not on the note of a final break nor on any agreement for a reconvocation of the Four Ministers on any fixed future date. The last note, I believe, should be one which expressed some usefulness in the exchange of views, the recognition under existing circumstances that the positions of the two sides were irreconcilable, and that at some future unannounced date it might be useful for the Ministers to meet again to again exchange views.

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[3] Regarding the Foreign Ministers noon meeting, see footnote 2, *supra*.

L. T. MERCHANT

No. 446

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 9, 1954—noon.

Dulte 54. For President, eyes only for Under Secretary, from Secretary. French political pressure for Indochina Conference is mounting, and Bidault believes Pleven's return will increase the pressure. We here are working strongly against this, but believe it should be realized in Washington that this political exertion on our part against Conference carries moral obligation to continue to sustain military effort. We are proceeding here on that premise. I am somewhat disturbed by various indications that dissatisfaction with French military activity might lead Pentagon or Congress to lose interest in continuing financial and material support of French effort or to attach conditions which sensitive French would reject as inconsistent with their sovereignty.

If we succeed here in stopping French pressures for Conference—which is by no means certain—and should thereafter also stop financial support or attach to it impossible conditions, the anti-American reaction in France would be very severe and almost certainly defeat EDC. Obviously, we should, if at all possible, seek to assure success both in relation Indochina and EDC. But also, we must be on guard lest Indochina also carry EDC down the drain.

Would appreciate any guidance you see fit to give.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by the Secretary of State.

No. 447

396.1 BE/2-954: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 9, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 109. Department pass OSD. Following summary of 13th plenary session Ministers meeting, Tuesday, February 9. [2] Eden in chair.

1. Molotov opened with 91 minute speech essentially repeating points made last week. [3] Principal points, in order of presentation, follow.

(a) USSR starts with assumption possible complete treaty this year but start needed immediately since nine years elapsed since end of war and Germans have right know where stand.

(b) But Western three have not put forward a treaty draft or said start should be made immediately; they should instruct their deputies proceed promptly to prepare a draft.

(c) All who took part in war against Germany should participate treaty negotiations.

(d) Representatives of Germany should participate all stages; only practical way to do this, there not now being a unified German government, is have representatives both Federal Republic and GDR participate, as suggested by USSR.

(e) Soviet delegate had made proposals re relieving Germany financial and economic obligations, e.g., reparations, occupation costs, etc. [4] (there followed long résumé of proposal advanced 12th plenary); but Western delegates ignored or opposed and even Federal Republic showed no apparent interest relieving tax burden its citizens; Dulles' comments ignored higher rates economic progress in East than in West Germany, and large unemployment Federal Republic.

(f) No merit in Western arguments that representatives of East and West Germany, standing for opposing types of regimes, cannot work together on practical tasks as four powers do around this conference table.

(g) No merit in argument coalition government (at least for temporary and limited functions) impossible.

(h) Fundamental principle Soviet approach is that Germans, not occupying powers, should bring about German unification; hence troop withdrawal proposal.

(i) Soviet draft emphasized Germany should not be free enter military alliance against any power victorious in anti-Hitler war;

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the thirteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/13, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.

[3] For Molotov's speech, circulated as FPM(54)43, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 101–107.

[4] For this proposal, see FPM(54)38, Document 515.

West rejects this and indeed (by EDC) is trying draw Germany into just such alliance.

(j) Since EDC stated to be not a transitory relationship; since fifty year duration; since peace treaty surely not to be postponed fifty years; and since after peace treaty Federal Republic will cease exist—it follows West intention is to bind unified Germany into EDC for fifty years.

(k) Remilitarized Western Germany within EDC is a threat to Europe's peace; would restore aggression in heart of Europe; and would indefinitely postpone reunification since GDR cannot embrace a Federal Republic militarized "under Hitler's generals."

(l) Tripartite declaration 27 May 1952 [5] (supplement to Paris treaty) makes it clear that Western Germany, if unwilling continue adherence EDC, will be compelled by force of arms. Hence absurd claim Germany free adhere or reject EDC.

(m) Quadripartite objective should be security of all Europe, not just six nations which not even the whole of Western Europe. EDC not a means to European security but an instrument of North Atlantic military bloc pointed at USSR and East.

(n) In conclusion, do Western three have any proposals make re "European security" which in drafting of agenda was linked with German problem?

2. Dulles: Have heard nothing new, have nothing more to say.

3. Bidault: Brief statement re relief Germany from economic, financial obligations:

(a) Tempting but unprofitable extend comparison economic conditions and policies East and West Germany;

(b) Other countries have rights and interests in German reparations; hence this issue not properly discussed or settled here;

(c) Occupation costs will cease when occupation terminated, i.e., when independence and reunification Germany achieved; hence this our primary object.

4. Bidault continued with brief commentary on Molotov's general statement; expressed regret no Western conciliatory efforts had changed the "unswerving rigour" of Soviet approach. Essence of problem is that there must be a unitary government of Germany to be represented at negotiations of peace treaty; hence there must first have been free elections.

Bidault next said he would answer briefly few of questions raised Molotov's statement.

(a) Re EDC, Dulles had made statement confirmed by French and UK that united Germany could accept or reject obligations of Federal Republic and GDR. This is decisive; what more can be said?

(b) Molotov requests West do away with EDC. He does not propose to do away with anything.

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[5] For the Tripartite Declaration, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 686.

(c) Molotov suggests that Foreign Ministers deputies pursue task. This foolish since deputies can do nothing where Ministers have failed.

Following summarizes second part of 13th plenary session, February 9:

Eden spoke first after 25 minute recess. He recalled that he had spoken on European security at both first and last plenary meeting and confirmed that offer he made then still stands. He said he regarded as irrelevant Soviet economic proposals for Germany. As regards reparations, UK has never taken any from current production and has taken none at all during last four years. On contrary, UK has furnished economic assistance valued at 200 million pounds to Federal Republic, and latter has freely agreed to repay part of debt. As far as internal occupation costs are concerned, people of West Germany understand very well comparisions between two German budgets on a percentage basis are entirely misleading. Commenting that discussions on German question have been long, if good-tempered, he noted that two views still remain diametrically opposed. Essence of Western proposals is free elections leading to formation of all-German government with which peace treaty can be negotiated. Soviet proposal for cooperation of two German governments, he regarded as impracticable and leading to great delay in bringing about free elections. Since discussion of recent days has not narrowed gap between two views or improved international understanding, he suggested conference face reality by recognizing it cannot now make progress on item two.

Speaking next, Molotov recalled that title of agenda item two is "German Question and Problem of Insuring European Security." He had attempted today to show connection between German and European security. To be objective, one must admit that EDC does not offer solution to problem of European security as a whole for it relates to plans of only a few European countries. German question is related not only to EDC but also to security of all Europe. Unsuccessful Soviet efforts today to elicit US, UK and French comments on whole question of European security lead one to conclude that conference had not yet faced up to this problem and that Western Powers have nothing to offer on this subject.

Secretary's reply is reported in separate telegram.[6]

Bidault recalled he already had spoken in detail of French views on European security and had stated Article 7 of Soviet proposal[7] is unacceptable to France. Not only Germany, but also Eastern Europe, is important factor in question of European security. Since no compromise on subject is evident, Bidault thought meeting Wednesday should be restricted and should continue Monday's unfinished business. Conference later could return to subject of European security.

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[6] Secto 107 from Berlin, Feb. 9. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) In this statement Secretary Dulles reviewed his previous statements on European security, stressed the U.S. belief in the United Nations, and repeated his endorsement of Eden's views. The full text is printed in *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 128–130.

[7] FPM(54)24, Document 512.

Eden said he several times has tried to explain why a Germany linked to EDC is best protection against German militarism. Secretary, he recalled, has spoken of obligations set forth in UN Charter. Eden himself has several times expressed readiness to extend Anglo-Soviet Treaty or to examine other means to assuage Soviet fears for her security. Soviet proposal that Germany should again have national army, however, would repeat a great danger, well recognized by people of both Germany and Western Europe. He therefore, endorsed Bidault's suggestion of restricted meeting on item one for Wednesday.

Molotov thought it would be premature to break off discussion of item two at this time, for it has not yet been completed. He preferred restricted meeting on item one in next few days. He has concrete proposal on European security which he wishes to present.

After several rounds of statements, conference accepted Eden's suggestion that meeting on Wednesday be devoted to Molotov's proposal on European security, restricted meeting on Thursday be devoted to item one, and Friday meeting be devoted to Austria.

Session adjourned at 1855.

February 10, 1954

No. 448

Editorial Note

According to the United States Delegation Order of the Day (USDEL/OD/17, February 10, CFM files, lot M 88, box 169) the morning of February 10 was filled with various meetings to discuss Austria. The delegation met at 9:30 a.m., but no record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files. At the same time the Austrian Experts met at British headquarters to discuss the tripartite position on Austria, and following this meeting they discussed their position with members of the unofficial Austrian Delegation at 10 a.m. A memorandum of these two meetings, which dealt largely with the form of Austrian participation in the conference and amendments to the proposed speech by Foreign Minister Figl, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203. At 10:30 the [illegible] partite Working Group met at British headquarters. The discussion was concerned with the tactics for the fourteenth plenary, the date for the next restricted session, Austria (a review of the two meetings on Austria earlier in the day), participation by Austrian officials at receptions and dinners, visits by the three Foreign Ministers with Chancellor Adenauer, and a report on war criminals. The record of this meeting, BER MIN-16, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192. At noon the three Foreign Ministers met to review the substance of the morning's meetings. A memorandum of their conversation and their subsequent meeting with Foreign Minister Figl at 12:30 p.m. is printed *infra*.

No. 449

396.1 BE/2-1054

Memorandum of Conversations, Prepared by the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

Participants:

First Stage—Three Western Ministers and Advisors

Second Stage—The Same with Addition of Austrian Delegation

Subject: Austria

First Stage

Austrian Presence at Reception:

The Ministers agreed that it would not be appropriate to invite the Austrian delegation to the Tripartite Reception on February 11th on the grounds that with no Germans present, such action might be misinterpreted in Germany.

Austrian Participation:

The Ministers discussed the situation arising from the opening paragraph of Dr. Figl's speech before the conference,[2] in which he thanks the Four Powers for granting full participation to the Austrian delegation, and from Figl's press statements along the same line. In the view of Mr. Eden, there were no real obstacles to full Austrian participation in the sense that they should be present at the meetings and be allowed to speak at appropriate times. The Secretary concurred but thought occasions would arise when the presence of the Austrians would be undesirable either in their own interests or in those of the Western Powers. After reviewing the quadripartite record on this matter, it was agreed that the Soviet position had been left open, although from the invitation sent by Mr. Bidault to the Austrian Government the implication was clear that the Austrians would not have full participating status. In view of the several elements in Dr. Figl's speech which the West would like to remove or alter (participation, oil field development, and neutrality), it was thought advisable to support some greater participation for the Austrians so that they would not feel under compulsion to put in their opening speech all the matters they wished to lay before the conference. The Secretary summarized the position by proposing the following. The Austrians would give their speech and then the meeting would be recessed. When discussions would be resumed, with the Austrians absent, the three Ministers would seek Soviet agreement to having the Austrians admitted and to have it understood that they could express their views later in the discussion of the Austrian item but the four Ministers would reserve the right to meet without the Austrians. Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden concurred.

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[1] The first conversation (first stage) took place at noon at the Secretary of State's residence; the second conversation (meeting with the Austrian Delegation) took place at 12:30. Copies of this memorandum were sent to London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] No copy of Figl's draft speech has been found in Department of State files.

Austrian Neutrality:

Mr. Bidault reacted strongly against the sentence in Dr. Figl's speech referring to the Austrian readiness to abstain from all military alliances. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden agreed that efforts should be made to have this point omitted.

Meeting After Entrance of Austrian Delegation

Introduction:

The Secretary stated that it had been the original intention of the three Ministers to place the Austrian item first on the conference agenda. The Austrian negotiations had gone so far in the past that for their conclusion now only Soviet good will was necessary, since the success of the Ministers in this matter would have engendered success on other items on the agenda. However, when the Soviets had proposed a reverse order of the agenda, the Western powers had accepted in order to avoid a long wrangle on the agenda. At the time, the Secretary had remarked that Austria was the easiest problem to resolve. He hoped this was true in the light of the poor results of the conference on other matters. He wished Figl good luck in his aim and hoped that he would bring good luck to the conference. Before the discussions turned to the points which appeared in the morning meeting, of the Western and Austrian experts,[3] the Secretary asked if Dr. Figl wished to speak.

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[3] Regarding this meeting, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Dr. Figl expressed his thanks for the opportunity to meet the Ministers and to discuss certain procedural matters. He was happy that Austria was on the agenda even if it was the last item. Perhaps this was just as well.

Participation:

The Secretary stated that the precise form of Austrian participation had not yet been decided among the four Ministers. The Western Ministers anticipated "a large measure of participation" but thought that in the interests of Austria, the Ministers should be allowed, on occasion, to meet in the absence of the Austrians.

Dr. Figl pointed out that the desire of his government for full participation arose from the fact that the government would have to bear the consequences for the results before the Austrian people.

The Secretary then set forth the procedure the Western Ministers would follow. The Austrian statement would come first, followed by a recess. After the recess, the four Ministers, in the absence of the Austrians, would consider the form of participation in the light of the Austrian request. Mr. Eden pointed out that if this procedure were adopted, the Austrians would have other opportunities to express their views; hence certain points in Dr. Figl's speech could be postponed until later. The Secretary informed Dr. Figl that he could take it for granted that he would be heard more than once. Mr. Bidault thought the Austrians were certainly not in Berlin on a symbolic trip.

Reference to Nazi Development of Oil Fields:

Dr. Figl explained that the language used in his speech had been inserted in order to stress that the oil in question is Austrian, and not German, property. This was the same principle as the UN had enunciated. The Soviets have no right to the oil but only to the installations for its production. He was willing, however, to insert the phrase "to a considerable extent". The oil was in Austria a long time before 1938 and some of it was produced before the *Anschluss*.

In Mr. Bidault's view, Dr. Figl's argument made the entire sentence unnecessary. Mr. Eden added that the sentence strengthens the Soviet claims to the installations as German assets. Dr. Figl disagreed with these interpretations, saying that the sentence was meant to indicate that first the Germans and now the Soviets had exploited the oil illegally. Mr. Bidault then remarked he did not understand how the reference to the Nazis strengthened the Austrian request for alleviation of Article 35. To this, Dr. Figl replied that the sentence established the basis for alleviation, including the division of oil fields on a 60–40 split. By making the statement under reference, the Austrian Government removed the Soviet argument that the assets are all German. The Secretary concluded discussion of this point by recommending that the experts look into the matter further. He wished to say, however, that he was very gratified with the general Austrian approach to the subject of Article 35.

Acceptable Treaty Clauses:

With regard to willingness of the Austrian Government to accept each treaty provision, Dr. Figl wished to insert the word "Draft" before "treaty" and substitute "in every respect" for "on all sides" in the last sentence of the antepenultimate paragraph.

Neutralization:

Dr. Figl declared that Austria's intention to abstain from military alliances had been said repeatedly by the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Austrian Parliament. When, as anticipated, the Soviets raised the arguments of remilitarization, U.S. bases, EDC, NATO, etc., the Austrians would have cut the ground from under them. It was better to anticipate these arguments by showing Austria with a force of only 53,000 men and excluded from any military alliances. It was better to keep the initiative by laying all the cards on the table at the start rather than being forced into the defensive by waiting for the inevitable attack.

Mr. Bidault stated that there was a difference between the statement of the Austrian Government and one made in the four power conference. What did Dr. Figl propose to do if Molotov wished to pursue the matter further and put the statement in as a treaty article? With some hesitation, Dr. Figl answered the Soviets would have a hard time introducing a new treaty article as it would limit Austrian sovereignty. Since the present government cannot commit future ones, a treaty article would mean that a country which is about to be freed would have its freedom restricted indefinitely. Thus the statement would have to be sufficient. In Mr. Eden's view, the Soviets would immediately ask for a treaty article on neutralization if the sentence were retained.

Dr. Figl said that he would have to consult on this matter with Chancellor Raab since the sentence was an important and integral part of the speech. He would inform the three Ministers tomorrow. The Secretary concurred with Mr. Eden's and Mr. Bidault's views. If the sentence were postponed until after the Soviets had raised the matter, an Austrian statement on this subject might be a sufficient compromise. Dr. Figl doubted if this tactic would be successful. Mr. Eden thought the present wording is bad, whether made now or later, provided, of course, that the Austrian Government did not wish to bind itself permanently. The Secretary concluded the discussion by remarking that the Soviets were very shrewd traders—if you tried to meet them halfway at the outset, they would want you to go farther.[4]

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[4] A summary of this meeting with Figl and the reaction to his proposed speech was transmitted in Secto 112 from Berlin, Feb. 10. (396.1 BE/2-1054)

No. 450

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

Subject: Five Power Conference: Developments of February 10, 1954

Meeting with British and French Far Eastern Men:

I met with Allen and Roux at 10:00 a.m. We had a long and important discussion which revealed that both the British and French are in favor of giving some ground on our draft Resolution,[2] as a result of the position which Molotov took at the first Restricted Meeting. They jointly worked out a proposed new draft which embodies their ideas. The new draft undoubtedly reflects the views of Eden and Bidault. A copy is enclosed.

This draft would eliminate the references to conduct of Communist China and its proof of "spirit of peace". It would hinge the Four Power consultation on the conditions for an Indochina Conference merely on the discussions at the Korean Political Conference and the situation in Southeast Asia. In the preamble, all reference to the difficulties encountered in convening the Political Conference, and to the Korean Armistice Agreement and the UNGA Resolution would be eliminated as needlessly offensive to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. I gave them due notice of the serious doubts I entertained as to the possibility of our going along with any of these changes.

In view of the importance of the views expressed and the likelihood that they will be pressed by Eden and, less vigorously, by Bidault when they meet with the Secretary tomorrow, I have written a full memorandum on the subject addressed to the Secretary and sent through you.[3]

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[1] A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

[2] Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

It would seem highly desirable that the Secretary allow sufficient time tomorrow morning for a thorough airing of this issue with Eden and Bidault, so that a firmly agreed position may be reached before the second Restricted Meeting.

[Enclosure][4]

Draft No. 13, Prepared by Members of the British and French Delegations at the Berlin Conference

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, meeting in Berlin,

Taking into account the need to establish by peaceful means a unified and independent Korea as an important step toward the reduction of international tensions and the re-establishment of peace elsewhere in Asia;

Agree to invite representatives of the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and such other countries which provided armed forces to serve under the U.N. Command in Korea as may desire to participate, to meet with representatives of the four countries at a Political Conference at Geneva on April 15 to ensure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

Agree further that in the light of the discussions at the above mentioned Conference and of the situation in South East Asia, the four powers will settle by common agreement the conditions for the convening of another conference designed to restore peace in Indo-China.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned Political Conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

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[3] A copy of this four-page memorandum is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215.

[4] No enclosure was attached to the source text. The enclosure printed here was attached to the memorandum referred to in footnote 3 above.

No. 451

396.1 BE/2-1154: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 11, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 117. Department pass OSD. Fourteenth plenary session, Molotov in chair. [2]

1. Before presenting two proposals, one on German question and one on a European collective security treaty (verbatim texts forwarded Secto 115 and Secto 116 [3]), Molotov made following preambular statement: [4]

a. Despite divergences on German question, this discussion should be continued.

b. Key object should be avoid division Europe into military groups (cited Eden's statement of 25 September 1936 before League of Nations to this effect). Both world wars were preceded by division of Europe into opposing military groups. (Molotov then gave recital European history pre-World War I period and inter-war. With reference latter period, mentioned anti-Comintern pact group had been found culpable by post-World War II Military Tribunal and by Cordell Hull.)

c. Therefore, necessary take sober view of events now going on because prevention third world war is on our hands if we learn from history that way to prevent war is to prevent development of opposing military groups.

d. Key role of Germany in military groups promoting both world wars must be borne in mind.

e. Anti-Russian bloc now beginning be implemented through NATO under UK and US leadership. NATO in many ways resembles anti-Comintern pact, no reason to think its results will be any better.

f. Soviet delegation keeps emphasizing dangers of EDC relative to collective security Europe; Eden and Bidault assertions (that EDC not pointed against East Europe and that guarantees of security for East might be provided) are illusory since any effective guarantee Eastern security must be guarantee against resurgence German militarism whereas EDC plans necessarily lead to such resurgence. Federal Republic has greatest military, industrial, and manpower resources in Western Europe and would play leading role in EDC. To link guarantees with existence EDC is tantamount providing guarantee of Eastern security by resurgence German militarism which is principal threat to Eastern security.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. verbatim record of the fourteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/14, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.

[3] Neither printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) For text of these proposals, see FPM(54)46 and 47, Documents 516 and 517.

[4] For Molotov's statement, circulated as FPM(54)45, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 107–113; it includes the text of the Soviet proposal on European security.

g. EDC (formation of which would be facilitated by early unification Germany on Western terms) means six nations against rest of Europe; will deepen division of Europe, aggravate tensions and threaten all rest of Europe. EDC is a narrow and exclusive group to which only six nations may belong.

h. West plans with formation EDC enter Bonn and Paris treaties [5] into force, permitting foreign armed forces in Europe for 50 years which quite contrary to Eastern security interests and to normal peaceful life of Europe. Furthermore, would postpone unification Germany and German peace treaty.

i. Verbal guarantees from US, UK on Eastern security of dubious value since these countries dominant members NATO of which EDC integral part.

j. Therefore, what alternative EDC? Answer: Practical implementation of project for collective security pact for all Europe, somewhat after pattern Inter-American Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Why would such undertaking not be completely consistent UN Charter? Therefore, Soviet delegation welcomes such pact embracing all European countries and having appropriate concrete (including military) obligations. USSR had favored such pact before World War II but Hitler opposed.

k. Re unification Germany and settlement German problem, we have difficult task but practicable. What cannot be done here can be postponed to an early future conference but we must finish that job. Occupation troops must be withdrawn now from both East and West Germany; this would reduce tensions in Europe and outside Europe.

l. Big Four, however, should hasten to facilitate collective security treaty with appropriate guarantee against aggression of Europe. Pending settlement German question, both East and West Germany should participate in such pact.

m. Effective conclusion such pact (terms of which would require dismantlement NATO and abandonment EDC project) could precede definitive settlement German question.

2. Molotov then read verbatim text of two Soviet proposals and subsequently distributed copies before asking comment. Dulles suggested recess to enable other delegations study Soviet proposals.

3. Upon resumption after recess Dulles made statement verbatim text of which reported Secto 114. [6]

4. Bidault:

a. Had listened carefully to Soviet presentation; noted no change re German settlement; noted, however, abandonment NATO and EDC now made prominent issue. Thought that Molotov's historical exercise unrealistic; not all alliances can be treated as being identical. There were, indeed, military groups in Europe before both world wars, but clearly the aggressors were Wilhelm II and Hitler. France, on other hand, had in both cases belonged to defensive alliances without which defense would have been impossible. NATO is similarly defensive alliance.

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[5] Regarding the agreements signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Documents 51 ff. Regarding the agreements signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 684.

[6] *Infra.*

b. Soviet proposals show clearly Soviet delegation now wants (for 50 years) not only neutralized Germany but also neutralized Western Europe by compulsory abandonment EDC and NATO; and would prolong division Germany for 50 years by postponing peace treaty.

c. Molotov's point on exclusivity EDC is clearly refuted by Article 129 which makes EDC open to accession; reason why only six countries now involved are well-known.

d. Soviet proposition is that Western defensive alliance needs to be disrupted; but no reference made to present existence Eastern bloc. If Soviet proposal is, indeed, intended to be so one-sided, it not acceptable. Security of Europe includes, but is not limited, to security of USSR.

e. Re guarantees against German militarism, it seems dangerous to leave an independent Germany in center of Europe free to choose sides; this danger aggravated by proposal to impose military limitations on Germany which likely be ignored since history teaches that "no one treads path of barracks unless prohibited to do so."

f. Re Molotov's critical reference British-American troops in Europe would only say that had such troops been in Europe 1919 to 1939 there would have been no World War II. France has no intention shaking off a worthwhile friendship.

g. Re proposed collective security pact, that agreeable in principle but it must be real not verbal, must recognize necessity settling German and Austrian questions first. Furthermore, mutual assistance arrangements meaningless unless preceded by clear frontiers which follow not precede peace settlements.

h. Would appreciate explanation repeated Molotov reference to "32 states"; this figure not meaningful.

i. Soviets renew proposals for troop withdrawal from Germany; but is now evident that withdrawals would be only partial and anyway only theoretical since under Soviet proposal troops could be returned to Germany without prior notice.

j. Amazed at Soviet suggestion US observer status proposed collective security pact could be compensated by similar [status?] Red China, since this suggestion seems overlook "revered Potsdam Agreement".

k. Stated more positively, French view on problem of European security is that it necessary open new paths along which Europe can leave behind ancient rivalries and conflicting aims. This is meaning of Western efforts in last few years. It was necessary to note existence of a different system in the East; without exploring in detail the merits of the two systems it must be noted that Eastern system is a political, military, economic whole supported by Soviet Union; and on the other side there exist the outlines and the first foundations of a new community based on destiny and freedom of choice. Within this concept, France convinced that basic principles must be (1) never permit Germany again become center of aggression, and (2) achieve this end by free association Germany with other free countries of Europe. Also put unified Germany in world security system with benefits and obligations of UN Charter. This has been France's policy; it not a militaristic policy nor even primarily military, but envisages other forms of association, economic, cultural, etc. This policy being pursued in full awareness of great intrinsic difficulty German problem and distinctly for France in German development and expansion. Objectively this policy cannot be achieved at one stroke or by miracle. Progress must be concrete and systematic.

l. In conclusion, the path on which West has moved was dictated by a situation which West did not create. The East and particularly East Germany did not wait upon a collective security pact before raising and strengthening military force. How can defensive efforts of West create such a threat to security of Europe as Molotov alleges? EDC excludes possibility any individual armed action. EDC system provides organic security guarantee of a new type by associating Germany with countries whose desire for peace cannot be questioned. Molotov does not deny this but fears Germany might cut loose from this association; if that were really the problem we could consider firmer clauses; but he does not seem to want anything except abandonment EDC and NATO and exclusion US from Europe. Soviet must face the facts of Europe today, facts which face us all.

5. Eden: [7]

a. Soviet proposals appear resemble sort of Monroe Doctrine for Europe designed break up NATO and exclude US forces from Europe. To many countries, however, America's part in European affairs has been very generous in many ways not the least of which economic in which respect was salvation of Western Europe. Marshall Plan is part of history and a generous chapter; it is not fault of Americans if it does not figure in every history book.

b. NATO is foundation UK policy; under it physically impossible initiate aggression. It offers threat to no one; we cannot give it up. Within it, we have useful associations with other nations, not limited to military matters; and as necessary military build-up tapers off other aspects of association (economic, cultural) will become more important. NATO involvement does not exclude friendship with others; but is vital part of life of free nations of West.

c. New Soviet proposals as applied Germany appear based on assumption German unification will not take place. Practical result is ensuring recognition GDR.

d. Furthermore, imply abandonment Soviet confidence in Germany which now to be neutralized by our decision; and whereas supervision of German elections was last week an affront, now it is proposed that German police strength be predetermined and subjected to inspection. Free elections seem to have disappeared and German problem is shelved.

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[7] For Eden's statement, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 116-117.

e. The general collective security plan, like the German arrangements, appears to put things in the wrong order. These broad horizons of collective security must come after settlement German problem.

f. Soviet collective security proposals would require us (Article 7) give up our right of association in non-aggressive alliances; to deprive us of our freedom of choice while not apparently (Article 10) depriving USSR its freedom of choice.

g. Insofar as new proposals are directed at abandonment EDC and NATO, it appears Soviets have ignored all that was said in past two weeks about defensive character of these arrangements and about West's willingness guarantee Russian security. Indeed, Molotov implied US, UK are parties to revival German militarism, all I can do is repeat assurances I have already given and refer again to UN Charter and Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

h. In summary, all Soviets want is dismantlement of NATO and Western defensive alliances without any comparable dismantlement their apparatus. This is not a possible foundation for work we have to do.

6. Molotov wished make brief clarification on some of questions raised:

a. Re Germany, reiterated Soviet proposals, viz.: No German army in either zone; problem to be settled by Germans not by occupation troops; no interference in German internal affairs (as distinct from external security matters with respect which Four Powers have rights and obligations until conclusion peace treaty); determination of size, composition, etc. of German police forces by agreement among the Four Powers; withdrawal occupation troops.

b. Re collective security pact, Soviet delegation had simply proposed that security in Europe was problem for 32 countries not 6. These 6 constituted themselves a closed group and despite Bidault's citation Article 129, the fact remains entry for other countries so hedged with reservations as to be impossible in practice. Molotov conceded intent of Soviet proposal was against NATO and EDC because both these arrangements directed against USSR and People's Democracies. Re mention by Eden and Bidault of Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties, Molotov wondered what is left of these undertakings since UK and France both busily engaged in efforts remilitarize Germany and consolidate NATO, both of which "spearheaded" against USSR. Hence, references to present force or possible extension these bilateral treaties are "incomprehensible to people in USSR".

c. Much had been said about Eastern European bloc. Admittedly Soviet relations with People's Democracies are good and are developing; but there exists no treaty within this bloc directed against any nation represented at this conference or designed for any purpose except to safeguard peace and security and prevent aggression by remilitarized Germany.

d. Soviet collective security proposal has as prime objective prevention emergence military groups directed against other groups of countries and to unify European countries in pursuit of collective security of Europe.

e. Re US, there can be no complaint against citation of fact that US is an American country not a European country. All that Soviet leaders beginning with Stalin have said about the great services rendered by US during the war against Hitler was true and USSR stands by it and is grateful for that help. Lines of policy, however, deviated only after World War II and only because US deviated from common war time policies; USSR is in no way responsible for that.

f. Soviet delegation had tabled certain proposals for collective security in Europe. There has been much criticism, most of which apparently based on insufficient knowledge or on misunderstanding. It appeared only Eden had categorically rejected Soviet proposal. Some remarks, however, seem imply rejection idea of collective security in Europe. Soviet delegation would appreciate clear statement on this since if idea unacceptable obviously Soviet draft of no use; but if idea viable, perhaps amendments possible.

7. Dulles:

a. Two papers had been submitted by Soviet delegation. Paper dealing with Germany not acceptable. Other paper had reference to a proposed collective security treaty to which US would not be party; therefore, not called upon to state position. For information, however, he could assure Molotov that US would not respond to invitation in Article 9 to serve as observer. If this invitation intended as "a poor joke", it will not be received as such by American people who still have fresh in memory their outlay of blood and treasure in Europe.

b. Called attention to ambiguity in translation since language in Article 7 read "enter" in English text but read "participate" or "take part in" in French and Russian text. If Russian text determinative, it would be entirely clear that this article intended to supersede North Atlantic Treaty. He assumed this was Molotov's intention.

8. Bidault: Idea of European collective security system acceptable on two conditions:

a. Unification of Germany and German peace treaty must come first; and

b. There must be no exclusion of right of association in defensive arrangements. The text presented by Soviet delegation is not acceptable.

9. Eden: His answer had already been given.

10. Molotov: Had not spoken on question raised by Dulles, but would not refuse to speak on it. Molotov immediately shifted to his capacity as session chairman and proposed continue with items discussed today. After interchange, Foreign Ministers agreed to leave today's subject matter as unfinished business and to decide (after Friday's meeting on Austria) when to return to it.

No. 452

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 220: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

Secto 114. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary's statement, 14th session, Foreign Ministers meeting, February 10: [2]

Mr. Dulles: Since Mr. Molotov has been kind enough to say that the United States can be an "observer", I thought it would be in order to make some observations on his plan.

The proposals submitted are in two parts, one of which deals primarily with Germany and the other of which represents the draft of a proposed European treaty on collective security. [3]

The paper with reference to Germany contains the statement: "That we shall continue our efforts to seek a settlement of the German problem", and that, of course, the United States is disposed to do.

Then the paper in its paragraph 2 goes on to repeat the proposal which has heretofore been made a number of times by the Soviet Union with reference to the withdrawal of so-called occupation forces from East and West Germany.

There is one translating question which I would like to raise. In paragraph 2(b) there is a reference to putting the occupation forces back in case security in Germany is threatened. The English text reads: " . . .[4] In case the security of either part of Germany is threatened . . ." and I understand the Russian text reads: ". . . In case the security in either part of Germany is threatened . . .". In other words, I interpret that paragraph 2(b) to relate to internal security, but I would be happy to have confirmation of that point from the Soviet delegation.

Mr. Molotov: I would ask you to be guided by the Russian text.

Mr. Dulles: That confirms my view, then, that the proposal with reference to Germany is substantially the same as heretofore submitted by the Soviet delegation.

It makes it relevant, therefore, only for me to repeat what has been said before by me and others around this table: That the proposal would leave West Germany and consequently much of Western Europe exposed to any threat of external aggression.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, New York, Vienna, Moscow, Bonn, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a report on the fourteenth plenary, see Secto 117, *supra*. Secretary Dulles' statement was circulated as FPM(54)49 in the records of the conference.

[3] FPM(54)46 and 47, Documents 116 and 117.

[4] Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.

A third paragraph of this paper contemplates the calling of another conference, and it is perhaps in order for me in this connection to say what I have said before; namely, that it seems whenever we have a conference which is unable to settle anything, the Soviet Union proposes that we have another conference which can only breed other conferences is the best we can do. That is a rather disheartening conclusion.

The second paper is the text of a proposed general European treaty on collective security in Europe. Since the United States would presumably not be a part of that treaty, my observations are not directed primarily to the actual text of the treaty, although there are certain implications in it which do affect the United States. It is perhaps implicit in the draft, although not entirely clear, that it is designed to replace the North Atlantic Treaty. I assume that from the provisions of Articles 7 and perhaps 10, and the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister in introducing his text, made a serious attack upon the North Atlantic Pact "as resembling in many ways the anti-Comintern Pact which led to the unleashing of the Second World War". He went on to say that "there are no reasons than that of the anti-Comintern Pact".

So, I presume, although the Soviet Foreign Minister can correct me if I am wrong, that his proposed treaty for European collective security would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European countries should get together for their own collective security without the participation of the United States. The United States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and we do not have any intentions of doing so in the future.

The American people have a very deep and legitimate interest in Europe. Most of us derive from Western Europe. We share the culture and traditions and religion of Western Europe, and there are many bonds which tie us very closely together. But we do not feel that on that account we have any right to demand participation in European affairs.

The United States sent its armed forces to Europe in the First World War when the West was threatened by German militarism under the Kaiser. We delayed somewhat in doing so. But at the urgent appeal and desire of the threatened peoples of Western Europe, and because our own interests became involved, we did participate and certainly contributed to the final defeat of the German militarists represented by the Kaiser.

When that war was over, we took our troops home at once. Then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World War, and again, after some delay and when the danger not only to Western Europe but also the Soviet Union, was immense, and when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made gigantic effort of putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from the renewed militarism of Germany.

And, after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for occupation purposes in Germany.

Now, for the third time in this century, we have sent forces back to Europe and again the reason was that there were many in Europe who were afraid and who asked us to do so. That fear is, I imagine, a fear which cannot be allayed by new words and new promises, because the fear was inspired by a country which was already bound by the United Nations Charter not to use force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state. Whether that fear will be allayed by any repetition of that pledge is not for me to decide.

It has been suggested that our participation in the present Defense of West Europe to which I now refer caused the division of Europe. That is one of these strange reversals of history—the upside-down talks—to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves. Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because of the division of Europe.

It cannot, I think, be forgotten that when the United States proposed the Marshall Plan, which involved the contributions of many billions of dollars to the rehabilitation of Europe, that plan was initially made available to all of the European states. It was at that juncture that the Soviet satellites, under the direction of the Soviet Union, were not permitted to share in that plan. Perhaps if that plan had been carried out in its original scope, it would have prevented the division of Europe—or at least mitigated the division of Europe—which unfortunately was intensified by the Soviet action.

The division of Europe, I am afraid, comes from causes which considerably ante-date the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty and the proposed European Defense Community. It goes back to the date when the Soviet control initially confined to the Soviet Union itself, was extended to a vast area which now includes one-third of the human race.

I recall the pacts of mutual assistance which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time described in language which is almost exactly the same as the second preamble of the proposed new European treaty.

The pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Mr. Molotov said on October 31, 1939, "strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each others affairs".

The second preamble to which I refer speaks of the "respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs".

What quickly happened to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has gone on and on and has, I suggest, created the division to which the Soviet Foreign Minister refers.

It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed.

Whether or not the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be considered by other states than the United States.

So far as the United States is concerned, we are determined that we will not be absorbed.

No. 453

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212

The President to the Secretary of State, at Berlin [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 10, 1954.

I refer to your number 54 of 9 February. [2] It is true that certain legislators have expressed uneasiness concerning any use of American maintenance personnel in Indochina. They fear that this may be opening the door to increased and unwise introduction of American troops into the area. Administration has given assurances to guard against such developments and has promised categorically to withdraw recently shipped increment of 200 air technicians no later than June 15. This we must do even if we have to recruit civilian technicians to take their place.

There is no ground whatsoever for assuming we intend to reverse or ignore US commitments made to French. Those commitments were based upon assumptions that French would act comprehensively and vigorously in prosecuting war; and their commitment in this regard is as binding as is ours in providing additional money and equipment. The so-called Navarre plan visualized substantial victory by summer of 1955.

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[1] Transmitted to Berlin, eyes only for the Secretary from the President, in Tedul 37, Feb. 10.

[2] Document 446.

General O'Daniel's [3] most recent report is more encouraging than given to you through French sources. I still believe that the two things most needed for success are French will to win and complete acceptance by Vietnamese of French promise of independence as soon as victory is achieved. To summarize administration has no intention of evading its pledges in the area providing the French performance measures up to the promises made by them as basis for requesting our increased help. [4]

With warm regard,

EISENHOWER

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[3] Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, Chief of the U.S. military survey mission in Indochina.

[4] In a supplementary message the same day the Department of State reported that it was aware of French sensitivities, but believed that some form of understanding would be necessary regarding U.S. participation in an advisory capacity in Indochina. (Tedul 38 to Berlin, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 454

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 10, 1954—3 p.m.

Dulte 62. For Acting Secretary, please pass to Wilson and JCS, from Secretary. I have carefully reviewed the arguments for full withdrawal of forces from Austria versus reduction of force levels to token forces, and have come to the conclusion that in the event we are faced with making a choice between these alternatives, we will be obliged to go along with reduction of forces to token level. My primary concern is that full withdrawal of forces will remove the 3 Western zones of Austria and Vienna from the protection of the North Atlantic Treaty. The substitute assurances which might be given by the 3 Powers would raise constitutional questions for us and require acceptance by other NATO members which might prove exceedingly difficult of accomplishment. A further consideration is that I do not feel the U.S. can hold out against the combined UK-French preference for this type of solution in the event that this alternative is advanced by the Austrians or the USSR. We will of course make every effort to maintain our initial position of seeking the full Austrian Treaty and we have reached tripartite agreement here on this point.

Nash has discussed this matter informally with General Arnold in Salzburg, who, while preferring full withdrawal, has suggested that we should take as our first line of attack with the Soviets a counter proposal that the Western Powers have already, in effect, reduced their occupation troops far in excess of their requirements. The Western Powers would be ready to consider the question of further reduction in their forces when the Soviets have made a proportionate reduction in their present troop strength in Austria. Should the Soviets accept this approach, the matter could be referred to the Allied High Commission in Austria for further development. Should we be forced to accept the token force concept, I feel that we should exact the following conditions: A. That there be quadripartite agreement to permit the Austrians to raise armed forces up to the treaty level of 58,000. We could perhaps accept, as a minimum, agreement to permit 28,000, which figure we are prepared to equip and which represents the minimum estimated force to guard against subversion. B. We insist upon the right of freedom of movement and access to all parts of Austria so that some enforcement safeguard against increasing the agreed levels will exist.

These two matters should be settled as matters of principle before quadripartite agreement on token forces is given.

C. The allies should obtain an agreement with the Austrians to raise the treaty armed forces . . . . I intend to press strongly with the British and the French that in the event we accept the token force principle, the Western Powers move ahead rapidly with the development of planning for the wartime use of Austrian manpower.

I would appreciate your comments on this proposed course of action urgently so that I may take it up with Bidault and Eden as soon as possible.

Nash concurs in the foregoing.

DULLES

No. 455

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 10, 1954—4 p.m.

Dulte 64. Eyes only for Acting Secretary. Eden has just handed me an *Aide-Mémoire* text of which follows. In giving it to me he said that he was not quite sure that it accurately reflected our views and that he would like me to examine it and redraft any appropriate passages so that it set forth our views.

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[1] Drafted by Merchant.

I read it hastily and said I would be glad to study it but that I must tell him that the third paragraph did not represent the U.S. position since insofar as I knew we had not taken a final position on the countries to which the proposals would be referred before they were submitted to the Soviet Government.

You will of course also note extent to which Eden is attempting to secure our agreement to further steps not yet decided by us. I shall give him no reply beyond my immediate comment reported above until I hear from Washington. I regard it as important, however, that I should give him written reply here promptly.

Verbatim text follows:

"President Eisenhower's Atomic Energy Proposals [2]

On January 31 I told Mr. Dulles that I was sure that we were ready to open discussions on the proposals to be put to the Soviet Government as soon as the State Department desired. I have now confirmed that H. M. Embassy are ready to open discussions with the State Department in Washington at any time.

My understanding of the procedure which has been agreed for the discussion of the President's proposals with the Russians is as follows:

The proposals will first be agreed between the United States, British and Canadian authorities and then be put to the French, Belgian, Australian and South African Governments. Thereafter the proposals will be submitted to the Soviet Government through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. We understand that from that point the United Kingdom, Canadian and French Governments will participate fully with the United States and Soviet Governments in the subsequent negotiations.

As regards the Soviet counter proposal to ban the use of atomic weapons, [3] my understanding is that a discussion on this subject will also take place to begin with through diplomatic channels in Washington, and that the participants shall be the same as for the discussion of President Eisenhower's proposals. It is also my understanding that it will be open to any of the participants to the talks to propose at any stage that the discussions should be transferred to the United Nations Disarmament Commission should this seem to be desirable".

End verbatim text.

DULLES

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[2] See footnote 2, Document 396.

[3] For the Soviet proposal presented by Ambassador Zarubin at a meeting in Washington on Jan. 19, see footnote 4, Document 393.

No. 456

Eisenhower Library, C D Jackson papers

The Special Assistant to the President (Jackson) to Marie McCrum, White House Secretary

BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

DEAR MACHARI: This has been the most dramatic day yet. I will try to give you a blow-by-blow but don't think I can do justice to it. You have to hear the sound, see the faces change from pleasure to pain and vice versa, feel the danger of looming booby traps and get the thrill of coming through with the enemy visibly shaken.

Yesterday had definitely been our round. Molotov had talked interminably and said nothing new. When Dulles, next in turn, very quietly said, "I have heard nothing new. I have nothing to say," the Russians were thrown off base and started whispering to each other. Then Bidault and Eden both felt called upon to say something which gave M a chance at another round. When he was finally cornered he pulled out what we had been expecting all along, the announcement that he would present a formal Soviet proposal for European Security. [1]

All evening and part of the night and this morning we were trying to dope out what it would consist of. The boys had it pretty well taped, although they could not guess that having succeeded in embarrassing us, M would throw the whole thing away and give us the greatest chance we have had thus far. By two incautious or arrogant or just ill-informed (I don't know which) statements the tide of battle swung right around and we nailed him so hard that I don't think he will be able to squirm out of it.

The beauty of the nailing is not just the satisfaction of scoring in the meeting. The real victory is that in one package he has been made to alienate East and West Germans and, most important, the slightly neutralist SPD, plus the French, plus the British, plus anybody who wants to listen.

By the time this reaches you, you will have all the news stories and the full texts of the speeches so I won't try to give you anything but color. I am enclosing the full text of Dulles' talk because I want to be sure you see that. [2]

Molotov was in the chair and asked if he could talk first. The chair generally calls on the person to his left to open but every one agreed and Molotov started a long harangue on Germany and European security winding up with a specific plan for the unification of Germany[3] and a draft of a collective security treaty for Europe.

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[1] FPM(54)47, Document 517.

[2] For Secretary Dulles' remarks, see Secto 114, Document 452.

We were feeling less and less happy because although his proposals were phoney all through nevertheless they contained bits and pieces that could not help have appeal to the French and the Germans, withdrawal of troops, neutralization of Germany and a lot of subtle little twists that might look good to the folks in Paris or the Socialists in East Germany, etc., etc. EDC was roundly denounced, but NATO was left vague.

Then came the block buster. The U.S. was specifically excluded from the collective security pact but was permitted to be an "observer" along with communist China. At that point we all laughed out loud and the Russians were taken completely by surprise at our reaction. Molotov did a double take and finally managed a smiie, but the Russian momentum was gone.

When he was through he turned to Dulles who was next to speak. Dulles said that this was something new and complicated and asked for a twenty-minute recess for study, and we all filed out.

Dulles, Bidault and Eden got together for about ten minutes and then Dulles had another ten minutes with his staff, and we went back feeling that we were in a tight spot but that we might get out of it. One of the reasons for our uneasiness was that Dulles had simply listened to the advice that everybody was tossing at him but had not given any indication that things had jelled in his mind. Personally, I didn't think they could possibly have jelled, because there had not been enough time.

He started very slowly, literally sentence by sentence, with long pauses while it was translated first into Russian and then into French. This was one of the rare times when consecutive translation was a blessing. Generally it interferes with the effect; this time it accentuated it.

As he got into it we all realized that he was on exactly the right pitch, leaving to the Europeans the job of defending the U.S. presence in Europe and NATO and sticking to those matters of history and principle which would force Bidault and Eden to close ranks.

For you alone I will say that my only contributions were the opening paragraph and the section on the Baltic States with the deadly parallel of Molotov's words in 1939 and his words today.

When he got toward the end there wasn't a sound in the room. By that time he was pausing between paragraphs instead of sentences so that the final paragraph stood out in letters of gold. When he said that every country could make its own choice but that the United States would not be absorbed I almost bawled, and I am sure a lot of others felt the same way.

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[3] FPM(54)46, Document 516.

Then came Bidault who was superb, and then Eden who put the lid on it by saying very simply that the proposal was "unacceptable".

The whole Russian house of cards had come tumbling down and it could be seen on the Russian faces. Molotov was drawn, gray and angry and they were all scribbling furiously and avoiding looking up in our direction, which they always do when they think they are doing well. This business of Russian omniscience and omnipotence in conference is nonsense. They are so rigid and inflexible that if one comma gets knocked out of place they don't know what to do. That is somewhat of an exaggeration as Molotov is so agile, but even he can't take two paragraphs being knocked out of place.

Molotov's rebuttal was pathetic and practically ruined him because he had practically to admit that his plan called for the liquidation of NATO which is the one thing France and England *know* is their salvation. He also admitted that his scheme would probably perpetuate the division of Germany for 50 years which certainly will endear him to his German audiences and he also admitted that this business of troop withdrawal was a phoney because the Russians could come back any time they wanted, literally without any pretext other than the unilateral announcement that they felt like coming back.

Finally, when Foster, toward the end, said that classifying the Americans as "observers" may be considered by some a poor joke but by Americans as an affront after the blood and treasure the U.S. had expended in Europe, Molotov actually went white and then red.

We have maintained an advantage up to now, sometimes precarious, sometimes solid. I think that today has won the battle of Molotov's momentary bulge and that he won't be able to reform his forces.

The session lasted from 3 to 8:15 and then I went to the opera with Foster and Conant and some of the delegation. It was Valkyre and the emotional shock of stepping into that music after what we had been through in the afternoon just about did me in. The orchestra was wonderful, Brunhilde and Siegmund excellent, Sieglinde okay, Wotan lousy. No comments on Hunding as we only got there in the middle of the second act. *

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* When the audience spotted Dulles during the intermission everyone rose to his feet, applauding wildly and shouting, "Mr. Dulles, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Dulles." Tremendously moving. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.]

This has been a day. My net reaction is that I am damn proud to be an American and that I know we will win.

CD

February 11, 1954

No. 457

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 11, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-17

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. Tactics for Today

a. Five-Power Conference. Mr. MacArthur said that in place of submitting a modified proposal as suggested by the British and French yesterday, the Secretary wished to open the restricted session by requesting Molotov's views. If Molotov has nothing new the conference could pass on to disarmament. More probably, Molotov will set forth strong views in which the concept of a Five-Power Conference will be basic. In this event, the three powers should point out the unacceptability of this matter and move on to the disarmament question. This matter will be discussed among the Ministers this noon. [1]

It was noted that Mr. Dulles might wish to announce his intention of making the U.S. proposal [2] a conference document. The document would not have to be released to the press tonight but could be released tomorrow with appropriate comments.

b. Disarmament. It was agreed that an attempt would be made to wind up this topic today so that another restricted session would not be necessary. It was hoped that the sessions would not last longer than 6:30 but it was more important that all business at this session be finished.

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[1] There is no record of a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon in Department of State files.

[2] Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

c. Press Communiqué. The British circulated a draft press communiqué which will be taken up with the three Ministers in their preliminary meeting.[3]

d. Approach to Molotov re First Session on Austria. It was suggested that M. Bidault approach Mr. Molotov at the dinner tonight with regard to the possibility of the Austrians remaining in the room while the four Ministers give their initial statements on Item 3. The three Ministers will discuss this at their preliminary meeting.

e. Treatment of War Criminals. The Ministers will discuss at their preliminary meeting an approach by either Mr. Dulles or Mr. Eden to Mr. Molotov regarding this subject.

f. Procedure for Austrian Discussion and the Termination of Item 2. The three Ministers may discuss today the question as to whether the Ministers should continue the discussion of the Austrian item on Saturday in the hopes of concluding it, or whether the four Ministers should return to Item 2 on Saturday. Both the U.S. and the UK felt it was important to have discussion on all items on the agenda and then come back to unfinished business in final statements.[4]

2. Meeting Place for the Conference Next Week

The three Ministers will be reminded today that a decision on this subject must be made shortly. The factors involved are: (1) it would not be advisable to haggle over this procedural point if Mr. Molotov wants to have it in the Soviet Sector; and (2) if the Austrian question can not be concluded by the end of this week, it would be preferable to continue this discussion at the ACA Building where simultaneous translating facilities are available.

3. Austria

The Austrian experts will continue work on Figl's opening speech and on the proposal on Austria to be tabled by Mr. Eden.

4. Post-Conference German Problems

The German experts will report to the Working Group tomorrow or Saturday on measures to be taken with respect to the amelioration of conditions in Berlin.

5. Final Tripartite Communiqué

It was argued that the German experts would prepare a draft section on Item 2 to be included in a possible tripartite communiqué to be used at the end of the conference. It was suggested that the Far Eastern experts and the Austrian experts prepare similar sections for their items on the agenda.

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[3] No copy of this communiqué has been found in Department of State files.

[4] Attached to the source text is a more detailed record of the discussion of Item 1, prepared by McConaughy and dated Feb. 11.

No. 458

Editorial Note

According to the United States Delegation Order of the Day, USDEL(OD)18, the Austrian Experts met twice on February 11. The first meeting took place at 10:30 a.m., but no record of it has been found in Department of State files. The second meeting took place at 5 p.m. and included a member of the unofficial Austrian Delegation. In this second session Figl's speech (see footnote 4, Document 449) was again discussed and the Austrians agreed to delete the references to neutrality and Nazi development of the Austrian oil fields as well as redrafting the opening paragraph to express thanks for being invited to the conference and to include a plea for full participation. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

No. 459

396.1 BE/2-1154

United States Delegation Record of the Second Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 11, 1954, 3–5:10 p.m. [1]

TOP SECRET

Participants: *United States*
  Secretary Dulles
  Mr. Bohlen
  Mr. Merchant
  Mr. MacArthur (Mr. Nash replaced Mr. MacArthur for the second half of the session.)
Soviet Union
  Mr. Molotov
  Mr. Gromyko
  Mr. Malik
  Mr. Troyanovsky (interpreter)
United Kingdom
  Mr. Eden
  Sir Frank Roberts

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[1] A summary of this meeting was transmitted to Washington in Dulte 65 from Berlin, Feb. 12. (396.1 BE/2-1254)

Mr. Denis Allen
Mr. Birsie (interpreter)

France

M. Bidault
M. Parodi
M. Roux
M. Andronikof (interpreter)

(Chairman of Meeting, Secretary Dulles)

First half of session:

Secretary Dulles opened the meeting by saying that at the last restricted meeting on Monday, February 8, [2] of which today's meeting was a continuance, the United States Delegation submitted a proposal [3] which it understood was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles said he would be glad, however, to know whether the Soviet Foreign Minister had any further observations, suggestions, or counterproposals to submit.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation was in a position to submit a proposal on the subject considered at the last meeting. On some points it came close to the United States proposal. On others it was different, and he would now submit this new Soviet proposal. [4]

Mr. Dulles asked whether Mr. Molotov had any explanatory comments he wished to make.

Mr. Molotov said he believed it was a clear proposal. If any explanations were required, he would be glad to give them.

(There was a delay in the proceedings of about five minutes while Secretary Dulles, Mr. Eden, and M. Bidault read the Soviet proposal.)

Mr. Dulles said he had a few questions to ask about the new Soviet proposal but would give M. Bidault the first opportunity to comment.

M. Bidault said, if Mr. Dulles wished.

Mr. Eden said he would be interested in hearing Mr. Dulles' questions.

Mr. Dulles said he would be glad if Mr. Molotov would clarify the last paragraph of his proposal. Mr. Dulles quotes point one of the last paragraph (-6(1)-), referring to the items to be considered: "Statements by the delegations of the above-mentioned countries which would take part in the conference and an exchange of views on such statements."

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[2] For text of the U.S. Delegation record of the first restricted meeting, see Document 442.

[3] Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

[4] For the Soviet proposal, see Document 518.

Mr. Molotov asked what was the question which arose?

Mr. Dulles asked if this statement in the Soviet proposal that "the statements by the delegations of the above-mentioned countries, etc. . . ."[5] referred to the five powers mentioned above in paragraph 4 of the Soviet proposal?

Mr. Molotov said that the five powers mentioned could, of course, make statements. Naturally, other countries could be invited to the conference for consideration of specific subjects which concern them, and they, too, could make statements.

Mr. Dulles continued by asking if these statements would refer to any matters covered in the first paragraph? He asked whether the reference to "other urgent questions including" meant that any question on international affairs would be discussed at this conference.

Mr. Molotov asked if there were other questions, or whether he should reply now.

Mr. Dulles said these were his only questions for the moment.

Mr. Molotov asked if any of his other colleagues had questions.

M. Bidault said that at first sight he thought the new Soviet text contained elements which seemed close to the proposal submitted by Mr. Dulles last Monday which the French supported, but in examining the complete Soviet text, this did not appear to be so. What was proposed was a five-power conference—a conference with four countries inviting another country. These five countries would then invite other countries.

He said that furthermore, in the last paragraph of the Soviet proposal (paragraph 6 of the Soviet proposal), Korea was specifically mentioned, but Indochina was not. Indochina was presumably alluded to indirectly in the second paragraph of the Soviet proposal, by the reference therein to "other urgent problems, etc. . . ." Thus, Indochina was referred to only by implication. What had happened to the specific reference to Indochina contained in the proposal tabled last Monday?[6]

Furthermore, he continued, why did the Soviet proposal suggest such an agenda if a conference acceptable to all of us was desired? He had never seen an agenda formulated on as general a basis as a mere reference to statements by the participants; that this was too vague and did not indicate what the conference was supposed to deal with. What we wanted were results. General statements about general subjects would simply widen the debate and make more difficult the attainment of concrete results.

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[5] All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

[6] A reference to the U.S. Delegation proposal; see footnote 3 above.

To sum up, five powers would talk, on the basis of four inviting powers and one power to be invited. These would in turn invite other powers on subjects which might concern them. There was no mention of Indochina. He was afraid there was not enough substance in the Soviet proposal to correspond with realities. That was all he had to comment on for the moment.

Mr. Eden said he had only one question for the moment. Regarding paragraph 5, which read "Agree further that the other countries concerned shall also be invited to take part in the said conference during consideration of appropriate matters thereat," was it left to five powers to decide what other countries would be invited and what subjects would be discussed? Mr. Molotov said today that there were parts of his proposal similar to the United States resolution, and other parts that were not. It seemed to him, Mr. Eden, that there was a fundamental difference. The chief difference was that Mr. Molotov started on the basis of five powers and a wide agenda which would be fixed by the statements of the five powers themselves, and only subsequently did we turn to the immediate and urgent problem of Korea. He believed it would be better to begin with a conference on Korea, with the participation of all the interested parties including the four powers here, the "Chinese Peoples Republic", and those countries which had contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea which wished to attend.

Mr. Dulles asked if Mr. Eden had purposely omitted Korea.

Mr. Eden said he had not. He had meant to include North and South Korea when he referred to "the interested parties".

Mr. Molotov said he would give the reply to the questions in the order in which they were put. He wanted first to reply to Mr. Dulles' question regarding the last paragraph (6) of the Soviet proposal. This paragraph was, of course, related to paragraph 2 of his proposal, but before they went further he believed they should decide how to number the paragraphs in his proposal. (The paragraphs were numbered 1 through 6, with 6 having a sub-paragraph (1) and a sub-paragraph (2).) When they spoke of paragraph 6, they should bear in mind that it was closely connected with paragraph 2. That meant that the questions which would be raised under paragraph 2 would relate to the discussion in paragraph 6.

Now, as for substance, the Soviet Delegation had tried to meet the views expressed in the United States proposal by limiting in its own proposal the questions which the conference should consider. In other words, they had proposed a more limited agenda than they really liked. In this connection, paragraph 2 of the Soviet proposal indicated the questions which should be discussed at the conference.

In both paragraph 2 and paragraph 6 specific reference was made to Korea. Furthermore, paragraph 2 spoke of other urgent problems in Asia including peace in Asia. Paragraph 2 also would cover Indochina. Therefore, in view of the relationship he had mentioned between paragraphs 2 and 6, Indochina was also covered in paragraph 6. In other words, in paragraph 5 of the United States proposal, specific mention was made of Indochina, whereas in paragraph 6 of the Soviet draft, no specific mention was made, but it was implied. If it was important to mention Indochina, he thought it could be arranged.

Mr. Molotov said he had answered Mr. Dulles and I had partly answered M. Bidault. Now he wanted to refer to another remark by M. Bidault. The Soviet Delegation had in mind that under paragraph 6 (1) questions raised by the discussion and statements in paragraph 2 could be considered by the conference. That would cover Indochina. They believed the formulation in paragraph 2 of their proposal was better, since it provided the different delegations to the conference the opportunity to talk about those matters which were of primary interest to them. Here at Berlin there were present only four of the participants in this future conference. There was a fifth participant—the "Chinese Peoples Republic", which was not present at Berlin. As a courtesy, they wanted to give the fifth participant an opportunity at the future conference to make statements, because it had no opportunity to express its views at Berlin.

He wanted to say again that if it would be helpful specifically to mention Indochina, he saw no objection.

Now, to reply to Mr. Eden's question as to who would decide on the invitations, the invitations would be left to the five Foreign Ministers as provided in the Soviet draft. In reply to Mr. Eden's question as to what countries should be invited, he, Mr. Molotov, would say that paragraph 4 of their draft clearly provided that all interested countries should be invited, and he didn't think there should be any limitations placed on that.

He continued by saying that as for the agenda, Mr. Eden had suggested that they were proposing a very wide agenda, but if he would examine the text of the Soviet proposal he would see that they had agreed not to have a wide agenda, but an agenda which would be limited to questions which would arise from the statements made in paragraph 2 of the proposal—i.e., "urgent problems including peace in other parts of Asia". As for the order of the agenda set forth in paragraph 6, he believed the order suggested in the Soviet proposal would best conform to the interests of the conference.

Mr. Dulles asked M. Bidault if he had any observations.

M. Bidault said it was difficult for him to consider that paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Soviet proposal were identical. Insofar as Indochina was concerned, it was perhaps implicit only in paragraph 2, and not mentioned in paragraph 6. In paragraph 2, Indochina could only be inferred from the phrase "other urgent questions in Asia", whereas Korea was specifically referred to as "Korea" in the Soviet proposal.

He said that Mr. Molotov also referred to the Soviet proposal as containing a limited agenda. This was true because paragraph 6 of the Soviet proposal terminated the agenda after Korea, but at the same time paragraph 6(1) was very wide and elastic because anyone could talk about anything.

M. Bidault said Mr. Molotov also mentioned that courtesy should be shown to the fifth member of the proposed conference. M. Bidault said he would be more inclined to talk about courtesy if the country referred to were not sending shells and bullets against them. The agenda was so wide that it would lead to a general discussion of broad considerations which would not advance the solution of specific questions.

In view of the ideological differences, specific questions would be subordinated to ideological discussions, which would make any real progress on specific subjects difficult. He wished to repeat that our objective was not a conference, whether it be of five, nineteen, two, or three, but to arrive at solutions of concrete problems. In Korea, there was an Armistice, while war was still going on in Indochina. One of the first objectives of such a conference should be the stopping of bloodshed where it was now taking place, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations.

Because the Soviet proposal started out at the end of the problem rather than at its beginning, and because implicit in it was the fact that the five inviting members might oppose an invitation to others such as Indochina, he could not take this text as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Dulles said the Soviet text seemed a very defective one if our purpose was to make any practical progress. The second paragraph, which Mr. Molotov pointed out controlled paragraph 6, was not limited. It included all urgent problems. While the third paragraph spoke of the difficulties encountered in convening a political conference on Korea, it did not lead to any concrete solution to the problem because it left very vague the countries which would be invited to participate in the conference, as Mr. Eden had pointed out. Mr. Dulles was aware that Mr. Molotov had said that all countries concerned should be invited to the conference. But did he really mean that? For example, Japan is very much concerned in the problems of Asia. Did Mr. Molotov envisage Japan would be invited? He thought not. He took it that each of the five countries would have a veto power on the invitations. He also took it that the first task would be discussion envisaged in paragraph 1 and statements that would be made in connection therewith could cover all the agenda problems in this world. This might in itself take a month or two before the conference came to the question of invitations, on which point it could be deadlocked.

Therefore, Mr. Dulles did not see that the proposed text advanced in any appreciable fashion the holding of a political conference on Korea, and if the statements which would be made under paragraph 6(1) and the negotiations envisaged under paragraph 6(2) regarding the political conference all took place first, it would be a long, long time before we would get to grips with any problem on a concrete basis.

As he had made clear at this conference in earlier discussions on the Soviet proposal to convene a five-power conference, the United States Government would not sit down with the Chinese Communist government except in those instances where there was a concrete case where the Chinese Communists because of their actual position must be dealt with. Korea was such a case, as was Indochina. And, the United States would only sit down with the Chinese Communists on the basis of a clear understanding that such discussions did not constitute recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, as had been made very clear in paragraph 6 of the United States proposal. Mr. Dulles said he begged Mr. Molotov to believe that when he said this, he meant it. He interpreted the Soviet proposal of today as only a slight re-write of the Soviet original proposition which was rejected.[7] Insofar as the United States was concerned, he found the present Soviet text basically unacceptable. This proposal would solve nothing which was now unsolved, and would require the United States to recognize the regime of the Chinese Communists as one of the five great powers of the world. This we were not prepared to do, and he could not but interpret the Soviet proposal as other than a waste of our time.

Mr. Eden said that all he could add was some explanation as to why the terms of the proposed agenda and the definition of the countries to attend were so unsatisfactory. As he had often said, we could only hope to make progress in solving the problems of Asia if we limited ourselves to definite and specific topics. There were two such topics—these were Korea and Indochina. Therefore, he would like to see the agenda limited to Korea and Indochina. This in itself, would help us to solve other problems connected with this entire question, since it would clearly delineate who should attend such a conference. Under the Soviet proposal there was nothing to prevent any one of the five powers from vetoing an invitation to other interested participants. He couldn't possibly agree to a situation where a five-power conference was accepted and then later one of the five made it impossible for an interested party to attend. That is why he strongly favored the United States proposal, which provided that the invitations would be issued from here by the four countries meeting at Berlin. We must hold to this unless we wished to see the question of who may come to such a conference revised by the five powers, and to this he could not agree.

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[7] For the original Soviet proposal for a five-power conference, submitted at the second plenary on Jan. 26, see Secto 29, Document 359.

Mr. Molotov said he would like to deal with the major differences which had been mentioned here. First of all, regarding paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft, it was true that it called for a wider agenda than that proposed by the United States draft. But, it was a narrower agenda than that originally proposed by the Soviet Delegation. He believed, however, that they could take the formula proposed by the United States. Accordingly, paragraph 6(1) could be revised so that it conformed with paragraph 2 of the United States proposal. Furthermore, we could change the order of the two subparagraphs of paragraph 6 of the Soviet proposal so that paragraph 6(2) became paragraph 6(1), and 6(1) became paragraph 6(2). This could be done by a change of wording. He had no new wording ready at hand at this time, but was sure they could develop it. This would mean that in paragraph 6, the first sub-paragraph would deal with the Korean matter and the second sub-paragraph would relate to other questions.

He continued by saying that Mr. Eden attached great importance to the question of invitations. The invitations were, of course, important, but in seeking solution to this question in Berlin we should bear in mind that if our invitations did not meet with favorable response we would not advance a solution to the problem which we were trying to achieve here. The Soviet Union could not speak for the "Chinese Peoples Republic" and could not estimate its reaction to any proposals which might be agreed at Berlin. It was desirable, therefore, to be sure that when we agreed to a proposal here it would be met with favorable response from others.

He wanted to say a few more words about the question of invitations. Regarding Korea, the United States draft mentioned precisely the countries which should take part. The Soviet Delegation had no objection to the substance of the United States draft. Each of the interested parties should be included if they so desired, but the conference should not be limited to Korea. There were other questions which should be discussed by the interested parties. His draft provided that other countries concerned could take part in a conference, but he wanted to reply to Mr. Dulles that they did not have Japan in mind.

They also believed we should avoid a situation where there is a veto on invitations. Therefore, the formula which was agreed here should be such as to avoid any difficulty on problems such as the veto on invitations, etc.

Finally, he continued, paragraph 6 of the United States proposal stated that the convening of such a conference did not involve diplomatic recognition. They believed it would be better not to include this statement in any common proposal which the four made. The United States would, of course, be at liberty to make a separate statement on this, as would anyone else. But, if it was important to have this in the proposal, they might even be able to find a formula to deal with it.

Mr. Dulles said he was sure they all appreciated the explanation which Mr. Molotov had given them. It had cleared up many of the questions which were raised. He still had to ask himself, however, whether Mr. Molotov's proposal, if adopted, would solve any of the problems which were now unsolved. Or, did it merely mean that all the present unsolved problems remained, with the hope that with the presence of Communist China they would all be solved? If he understood the statement of Mr. Molotov clearly, he, Molotov, found acceptable the language of paragraph 4 of the United States proposal dealing with the countries to be invited to the political conference. If this was a fact, it was encouraging and would seem to mark some progress. His satisfaction was somewhat mitigated, however, by the fact that as he understood Mr. Molotov the Chinese Communists would have also to pass judgment on this question, and Mr. Molotov could not speak for it. Since the United States, on behalf of the United Nations Command in Korea, had been debating the question of a political conference, and who should attend, with the Chinese Communist regime for the last six months, and given the differences which had developed in these discussions, there would seem to be some difficulties. What he wanted from Mr. Molotov was clarification as to whether the four Ministers could invite Communist China to the conference which they had envisaged. Would Mr. Molotov care to enlighten them on this?

Mr. Molotov, in replying, said that as for the question of China, he could only repeat what he said at the first restricted meeting last Monday, which was that the Soviet Delegation was not authorized to speak for the "Chinese Peoples Republic", and if the Ministers want their views they must get in touch with them and ask them. As for the other point, the Soviet Union voted against the

United Nations resolution of August 28 [8] and it had not changed its position. The "Chinese Peoples Republic" also objected to this resolution, and insofar as he knew it had not changed its attitude. On the other hand, the Soviet proposal for the convening of a five-power conference was supported and approved by the government of the "Chinese Peoples Republic", as was made clear by the January 29 statement of Chou En-lai.

It remained for him only to say a few words regarding the question of invitations. He said Mr. Dulles should bear in mind that the Soviet Delegation raised no objection in substance to the United States proposal in its paragraph 3, but the formulation of this question would have to be agreed. The Soviet Delegation considered that not only Korea but other problems including Indochina should be discussed. Therefore, you could not reduce the number of countries to attend the conference to just those interested in Korea.

As for the repeated derogatory remarks regarding the "Chinese Peoples Republic", its government, and its policies, he did not consider these remarks wise. Nor did he believe they would advance our work, but he did not intend to reply to them.

Mr. Dulles asked if it were clear that so far as the Korean question was concerned the Soviet Delegation accepted the formula set forth in paragraph 4 of the United States proposal.

Mr. Molotov said he had already replied to that. Instead of paragraph 4 of the United States draft, they were proposing that paragraphs 4 and 5 of their draft be combined to replace paragraph 4 of the United States draft.

Mr. Eden said he did not believe that five countries had the right to sit down and settle the fate of the world, but they did have the right to sit down with other interested countries to discuss certain specific problems which concerned them and other specific countries. In connection with this entire matter of a future conference, he had only one other observation for the moment. If there were to be such a conference, we must get the matter entirely straight here. We could not repeat the Panmunjom exercise, which has involved arguing for months and months regarding invitations and participants.

(As it was 5:15, Mr. Dulles suggested a recess.)

The Restricted Meeting reassembled from recess at 5:35 (Nash replaced MacArthur at this point).

The Secretary having ascertained that the other Ministers were ready to resume turned to M. Bidault.

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[8] Under the terms of the 15-power resolution, passed by the U.N. General Assembly on Aug. 28, 1953, all states which had fought on the U.N. side in Korea should be represented at the Korean Political Conference.

M. Bidault stated that the French Delegation had a proposal to submit and that before tabling it he would like to make a few explanatory remarks. He said that he would not stress the place assigned to Indochina in paragraph 6 of the Soviet proposal. He would merely content himself with remarking that the place assigned was extraordinary considering that Indochina was the only area in which open warfare was being conducted at the present time. He went on to say that the central point of the Soviet proposal seemed to be paragraphs 4 and 5 and that according to paragraph 4, it was contemplated that the Four Ministers should agree here at Berlin on only one invitation, i.e., to Communist China. This, he added, had the effect of disinviting all the other participants provided for by the United Nations. The U.S. text, on the other hand, took account of this difficulty, as well as of the factual situation. He went on to say that it was no doubt important, as Mr. Molotov had suggested, that the attitude of Communist China toward the acceptance of an invitation was important. He said, however, that he understood Mr. Molotov as saying that we were agreed on the substance of this and that therefore Communist China could accept the invitation without great difficulty. However, he said that Mr. Molotov had said nothing concerning the participants in a conference of problems other than Korea and that the Soviet proposal had made no suggestions in this connection.

M. Bidault then made some remarks to the effect that obviously a Five Power Conference could have no fewer participants than five. He then went on to read in French the text of the French proposal. The informal English translation of the French text follows:

> "The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, meeting in Berlin,
>
> *Considering* that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tensions and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,
>
> *Agree* to invite representatives of the Chinese People's Republic, of the Republic of Korea, of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and of any of those countries which contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea which may desire to participate, to meet with the representatives of the Four Powers in a Conference to be held in Geneva on April 15th for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korea question.
>
> *Agree,* further, that, if and when the discussions of the abovementioned Conference and the situation in South East Asia show that favorable prospects for peace exist, the representatives of the Four Ministers will jointly agree on the conditions for calling another conference for the restoration of peace in Indochina.
>
> *It is understood* that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned political conference shall be deemed to imply

diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded."

After reading the text, M. Bidault said that he believed it took account of much that had been said at the table during the two restricted meetings and that in large measure it reflected the discussion of February 8 of the U.S. proposal which had been supported by France and the U.K. He pointed out, however, that it did not contain the accusations against Communist China which had appeared in the U.S. text and to which Mr. Molotov had objected. Nevertheless, he said that these accusations had not been withdrawn. M. Bidault concluded by saying that he believed his text should meet the Soviet objections and that the language could not offend anyone, however bad their conscience.

The Secretary then turned to Mr. Eden for comment.

Mr. Eden said simply that he agreed with the text of the French proposal and felt that it represented a good compromise.

Mr. Molotov said that he had only had a very brief look at the French proposal, which was not yet available in the Russian language, but as a preliminary comment, it appeared to him the question of Indochina would be left for the very distant future. First, he said, apparently would come the Korean Political Conference, then its success and only thereafter would Indochina be raised. In general, he said, M. Bidault's draft seemed to him similar to the U.S. text but more complicated. Moreover, Mr. Molotov said, paragraph 3 of the French text was worth serious attention because the Soviet Delegation had previously objected to this point. It maintained its objections to the paragraph in its present form. Mr. Molotov said that naturally the Soviet Delegation would study this French proposal more carefully and would express its views in more specific form later. He then suggested it might perhaps be best to revert to the Soviet text. He added that he had certain amendments to propose to it.

The Secretary opened by noting that the French proposal seemed to eliminate paragraph 3 of the U.S. text which dealt with the UNGA resolution to which the Soviet Delegation had objected.

The Secretary said that paragraph 3 of the French text corresponded to paragraph 4 of the U.S. text to which he had understood Mr. Molotov had said that he had no objection. Mr. Molotov's discussion at this point, however, had been obscure and consequently the Secretary felt he could speak with little confidence on this point. The Secretary said that this paragraph contained a date and place acceptable to the U.S.

The Secretary added that paragraph 4 of the French proposal naturally modified paragraph 5 of the U.S. text in that it eliminated any specific testing of the Chinese Communists spirit of peace. He said that he felt bound to state that the U.S. preferred its text in this matter. He added that in all frankness he should also say that there seemed little use in thinking of a conference for peace in Indochina unless, in fact, the Chinese Communists gave proof of their spirit of peace both in the Korean Political Conference and in their conduct in promoting the war in Indochina. However, the U.S. in a spirit of conciliation, and in order to attempt to meet the views expressed on February 8 by Mr. Molotov would be willing to accept the French text which lacked any specific expression of the need for proofs from the Chinese Communists. Consequently, if the French proposal commended itself to the other three Ministers, the U.S. was prepared to accept it.

The Secretary went on to say that the French text had the great virtue of settling certain matters, whereas as he read it, the Soviet proposal settled nothing. Mr. Molotov had indicated that he did not believe that the French text advanced the holding of a conference on Indochina but to him the fact seemed to be exactly the contrary. The Secretary pointed out that the French proposal provided for the settlement of the question of composition, date and place for the Korean Political Conference which had been left unsettled in the Soviet text. The Secretary further pointed out that the French text did not require that the Korean Political Conference be concluded as Mr. Molotov had suggested before the conference on Indochina could be considered. It merely said or implied that if the conduct of the parties at the Korean Political Conference made it seem desirable to have another conference and that if the conduct of those who were influencing events in Southeast Asia was inspired by peace, then it would be possible to have a conference on Indochina.

The Secretary concluded by saying that the pessimistic view expressed by Mr. Molotov could only be justified if Mr. Molotov assumed that the Chinese Communists would be obstructive at the Korean Political Conference and continued their aggressive actions in Southeast Asia. He said he hoped that it would not be necessary to accept this assumption. The Secretary then turned to M. Bidault.

M. Bidault said that he had little more to say at this point. He referred to Mr. Molotov's suggestion that Indochina was distant in the French draft and said that it seemed to him that Indochina was out of sight in the Soviet text. He pointed out that it was perfectly reasonable to demand that the Korean Political Conference, which had been promised for months, should in fact be held. He said that the French text in paragraph 3 retained the essence of the U.S. comparable stipulation for this obvious reason.

M. Bidault went on to say that quite clearly a conference on Indochina should not have the same composition as one for Korea. He said that an Indochinese conference depended on a Korean Political Conference and on the attitude of China. He concluded by expressing his conviction that the French proposal merited the most serious attention and that it took account of the prolonged discussion and the realities of the situation.

Mr. Eden, who spoke next, said that on rereading the French draft, it seemed to him that it met those points which had been of concern to him, as well as quite a number of those points raised by Mr. Molotov. He said that he hoped that with the help of the French proposal the Ministers could make progress on this topic.

Mr. Molotov said that he recognized certain positive aspects of the French proposal which, he agreed with the Secretary, contained a number of advantages and made some points more precise. He agreed that this made a contribution to the proposal.

Mr. Molotov noted that a time was named for the conference and said he believed that agreement could be reached on this point. He also thought agreement could be reached on the place.

With respect to paragraph 3 of the French proposal, it seemed to him that the composition remained as before and that this provoked doubts in the mind of the Soviet Delegation. He would, therefore, suggest another version.

Mr. Molotov then suggested approximately the following (which was read from a heavily marked up hand written text) as a substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Soviet draft:

> "4. *Agree* to call a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned, and also
> Agree that in addition to France, the U.K., U.S. and USSR and the Chinese People's Republic, who would take part in the consideration of the questions to be discussed at this conference regarding Korea, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and other countries directly concerned in the Korean question would be invited to take part in the conference. Also, in connection with the consideration of matters relating to the restoration of peace in other parts of Asia (Indochina) the representatives of the appropriate areas of Asia be invited."

The Secretary asked Mr. Molotov how this proposal differed from the U.S. and French proposals insofar as Korea was concerned. He said that both the U.S. and French texts referred to "countries who contributed forces to the UN Command". Mr. Molotov had referred to "nations directly concerned". The Secretary asked whether there was any difference.

Mr. Molotov replied that the sense of the Soviet proposal was that the Foreign Ministers of the Five Powers would take part in the conference. When Korean problems were considered the two Korean Republics and other countries directly concerned would be invited. When matters regarding other parts of Asia were under consideration, representatives from other appropriate areas of Asia would be invited.

The Secretary at this point rejoined that it might be better to withhold further discussion until all the Ministers had the text of the Soviet proposal before them. Meanwhile he wished to bring up another matter unless his colleagues had anything further to say at this time. M. Bidault said he had a great deal to say but not today.

Mr. Eden indicated that he would wait happily for a future time to express himself.

The Secretary then said that he desired to ask his colleagues to consider the program for the next few days. He said that his own time was not unlimited. The Secretary noted that the three Western Powers had proposed an earlier date in January for a Berlin conference but had acquiesced to the Soviet suggestion that it open on January 25. He went on to say that as was well known, there was a quadriennial meeting of the American States in Caracas on March 1, which meant that he would have to leave Washington for that conference before the end of February.

Meanwhile the Secretary said it would be necessary for him to be in Washington to report to the President and to Congress, among other things, and to make plans in connection with the Caracas conference. The Secretary then inserted the suggestion that he imagined Mr. Molotov would be the last to desire that he neglect his duties in America, as the representative of an American country. He hoped that the Four Ministers could shortly agree on a date for the adjournment of the Berlin Conference and that he hoped they could do so sufficiently in advance as to enable them best to organize the remaining time. The Secretary noted that they had still to dispose finally of the Five Power Conference matter, as well as Disarmament. He went on to say that there was also the question of Security in Europe where there may be more to be said, though insofar as the U.S. was concerned, there was little to be said, given the framework in which the matter had been raised.

The Secretary went on to note that the discussion of Austria would begin the following day. He said that he was anxious that his other responsibilities should not interfere with any possible success of the Berlin Conference and that it was for this reason that he lay before his colleagues the problem of rationing the remaining time.

When called on for comment, M. Bidault said that he agreed entirely on the importance of organizing their time, that the Ministers must find means to examine all the principal problems remaining before them.

Mr. Eden contributed the thought that it might be well to drive ahead on Austria once started and to resolve it if possible.

At this point the Secretary said that he would be glad to consider a Sunday meeting if it would help.

Mr. Molotov (who gave the impression of having been taken aback by the Secretary's opening of this subject) said that he had no objection to organizing the Ministers work in the best possible manner and that likewise he had no objection to "making use of Sundays".

The Secretary then suggested that each Minister appoint a representative to attempt to work out a program to allocate the future time available to the conference.

Mr. Molotov replied "No objection".

The Secretary then suggested that each Minister designate by name a representative to meet tomorrow to consider the problem of rationing the time.

The Secretary suggested, and his colleagues agreed, that a Restricted Meeting should be called for Friday morning, February 12, at 11:30 to run until 1 o'clock to continue the discussion of Item 1 of the Agenda. He suggested (and Mr. Molotov agreed) that it would be of assistance if the text of the Soviet amendment were available in advance.

The Secretary (as Chairman) then proposed that the communiqué be confined to stating simply that the Four Ministers had met in Restricted Session in the Allied Control Authority Building at 3 p.m.; that they had continued their discussion on Item 1 of the agenda and that the meeting had concluded at 7:15 p.m. The Ministers agreed to the issuance of this communiqué which was immediately thereafter handed to the Executive Secretary.[10]

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[10] A copy of the final communique, circulated as FPM(54)50 in the records of the conference and which was substantially along the lines suggested by Dulles, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197.

No. 460

396.1 BE/2-1254: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 12, 1954—6 p.m.

Dulte 67. For the President from the Secretary. At the close of the restricted session February 11,[1] and with the prior agreement of Bidault and Eden, I raised the question of concluding the conference. I pointed out that as everyone knew I had a long-standing engagement at the quadriennial meeting in Caracas of the American states. I said that this would require my leaving Washington toward the end of the week after next and that I felt confident that Mr. Molotov would be the last to object to my faithful execution of my responsibilities as the representative of an American state. I reminded my colleagues of our original suggestion for starting the Berlin conference on January 4 which had been rejected by Molotov and that we had accepted his proposal of January 25. I went on to say that I would have much work to do in Washington in the way of preparation for the Caracas conference, in addition to the need for my reporting to you and the Congress on the Berlin Conference. This meant that it was necessary for me to depart before the end of next week. I said that I was anxious to lay this consideration before my colleagues in ample time so that we could effectively ration the use of our remaining days. After brief discussion it was agreed that we would appoint a quadripartite committee from our delegations to make recommendations to the four of us regarding the schedule of our remaining tasks.

Eden is as anxious as I am to break away as soon as possible. Bidault does not seem disturbed. Molotov was impassive but left with me the impression that he was a little shaken by my raising the issue at this point.

The foregoing, of course, is still secret but I think it is important to let the press know shortly that we are working toward adjournment next week in light of my prior commitment. The earlier this becomes known the less risk there will be, in my judgment, of European opinion blaming the US for abruptly bringing the conference to a conclusion. Molotov undoubtedly has additional rabbits in his briefcase but I am inclined to think the remaining ones are of modest size.

There is no doubt that Bidault is in difficulty on the question of an Indochina conference which we have been discussing, as you know, in restricted session but he is holding up well and I am inclined to think that we will come out of this all right. In many ways this is the most tricky aspect of the conference.

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[1] The U.S. Delegation record of this session is printed *supra*.

We are meeting twice a day and we will meet on Sunday in the effort to carry the conference as far as the Russian position permits it to be carried.

DULLES

No. 461

Editorial Note

On February 11 the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France gave a dinner and reception for the participants in the Berlin Conference. Each of the four delegations sent eight officials to the dinner while the reception which followed was open to much wider participation. No record of the dinner has been found in Department of State files but occasional references to it in miscellaneous memoranda indicate that Dulles, Bohlen, Conant, Jackson, Nash, Merchant, MacArthur, and General Timberman attended for the United States. From the other delegations only Molotov and Gromyko, Eden and Hayter, and Bidault and François-Poncet are mentioned in connection with the dinner. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 215)

February 12, 1954

No. 462

Editorial Note

There was no meeting of the United States Delegation or the Tripartite Working Group on February 12. At around 11 a.m. the three Foreign Ministers met at the ACA building and discussed, *inter alia*, the question of a five-power conference. According to a memorandum by McConaughy, dated February 12, the conversation went as follows:

> "The Secretary explained why it would be highly undesirable to have a premature conference on Indochina. The Secretary considered it essential to go ahead with the Korean Political Conference first and proceed with the Navarre Military plan for Indochina while we observe the course followed by Communist China in the Korean Political Conference and in Southeast Asia.
>
> "Mr. Eden called the Secretary's analysis 'decisive' as far as he was concerned and indicated that he agreed with the Secretary.

"The Secretary pointed out the dangers in our getting involved in detailed discussions of the devious and ambiguous Soviet proposal. All three Ministers agreed to stand together in support of the French proposal and in opposition to that of the Soviets." (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204)

No other record of this Foreign Ministers meeting has been found in Department of States files.

No. 463

396.1 BE/2-1254

United States Delegation Record of the Third Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 12, 1954, 11:35 a.m.–1:15 p.m. [1]

SECRET

Participants: *United States*
Secretary Dulles
Mr. Nash
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Bohlen
France
Mr. Bidault
Mr. Parodi
Mr. De Margerie
Mr. Andronikow
United Kingdom
Mr. Eden
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen
Major Birse
USSR
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Malik
Mr. Troyanovski

Mr. Bidault, as Chairman, opened the meeting at 11:35 a.m. (Mr. Molotov arrived 5 minutes after the other delegations and the other members of his own delegation had been seated.)

Mr. Bidault stated that the Ministers had received the evening before the text of the new amendment to the Soviet proposal. He said he understood that the new paragraph 4 was in substitution for paragraphs 4 and 5 of the original Soviet proposal.[2]

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[1] The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of this meeting in Dulte 68 from Berlin, Feb. 12. (396.1 BE/2-1254)

Mr. Molotov acknowledged this to be the fact.

Mr. Bidault then said that he had read the new amendment and had tried to determine whether or not it constituted a positive step forward. It seemed to him that the original principle of paragraph 4 in the Soviet text had not been altered and that what was now suggested was still a conference of Five with a possibility of its enlargement.

Mr. Bidault then asked the Soviet delegation seriously to consider the situation as it existed and specifically the French proposal.[3] He said that it covered, in his view, one important Soviet concern, which was the matter of accusations directed against Communist China. Mr. Bidault added that the French text reflected the exchange of views of all on a Five Power Conference, with particular reference to the dependence, insofar as Indochina was concerned, on the prospects for peaceful developments in Southeast Asia. In conclusion, Mr. Bidault said that he considered the French text to be the only one on which the Four Ministers could reach agreement without any one of them abandoning a question of principle.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet delegation had for its part carefully considered the French proposal and that as a result, he desired to confirm the following views of his delegation. He said that the principal point in paragraph 3 of the French text reflects the United Nations Resolution which, as Mr. Bidault knew, was unacceptable to the Soviet Government. The Chinese Communists were not present here but all present knew by Chou En-lai's statement that it was also unacceptable to the Chinese Communists. How, therefore, Mr. Molotov asked rhetorically, can we agree on that text?

Moreover, Mr. Molotov, continued, he felt it necessary to point out the practical complexities of the French text. Indeed, it seemed to him instead of getting down to the business of discussing matters in which all were interested, there were three stages proposed.

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[2] This proposal, which replaced paragraphs 4 and 5 of the previous Soviet proposal, Document 518, reads as follows:

"Agree to call a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the interested countries.

"Agree also that in addition to the USA, France, UK, USSR, and the Chinese Peoples Republic as participants in the discussion of questions under examination at this conference, there shall be invited to take part in the conference during the examination of the Korean question, the Korean Republic, the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic, and other countries directly concerned with this question, and also, in connection with the examination of questions relating to the reestablishment of peace in other regions of Asia (Indochina)—representatives of the corresponding Asiatic regions." (Dulte 70 from Berlin, Feb. 13, 396.1 BE/2-1354)

[3] For the French proposal, see the U.S. Delegation record of the second restricted meeting, Document 459.

This obviously complicated matters. The first stage of the French proposal would be the conference along the lines of the United Nations Resolution. On that the Soviet attitude was well known. The second stage would be that a conference of the Four Ministers would be required to agree on the convening of still another conference. The third stage would be a new conference on Indochina but of undefined composition. This, Mr. Molotov said, seemed to be a long drawn out plan hampering the settlement of any issues. Mr. Molotov then asked whether it would not be possible to find a middle way which would not give 100% satisfaction to everyone but which would not be in direct contradiction of the positions held by any of the Four Ministers.

Mr. Eden said that he did not understand Mr. Molotov's difficulty with regard to the French proposal. He said he liked it because it was definite as to composition, place and date. Mr. Eden went on to say that the Soviet proposal tabled yesterday was indefinite on all these matters and that we would have to start discussing when we get to the conference the question of agreeing on what nations had the right to attend. This would lead us back to Panmunjom. Accordingly, Mr. Eden said, there were two basic reasons why he felt the French text reflected exactly Her Majesty's Government's views. First, the fashion in which the Big Five was treated did not result in raising Communist China to a special position to which it was not entitled. Second, the proposal does deal with the composition of the conference. If difficulty persists on this point here, then Mr. Eden said, there is no value in trying to find a text which conceals disappointment and merely postpones solution until the Conference meets.

Mr. Bidault then intervened to say that he believed the French proposal did constitute a middle way. He pointed out that the original U.S. text [4] referred specifically to the United Nations Resolution which Mr. Molotov found objectionable, whereas there was no specific reference to it in the French draft.

Paragraph 3 of the French draft, according to Mr. Bidault, corresponded to the facts. The fact was that invitations had been already issued and could not be withdrawn. Moreover, it avoided the problem of the status of the Soviet Union at the conference, since it placed the latter in the position of a sponsoring power. Mr. Bidault said that the French proposal represented a serious effort at conciliation. He said that Mr. Molotov said that it contained certain stages but he wished to point out that the Soviet proposal started with a general discussion as its first stage. As for the alleged three stages, Mr. Bidault said that the Korean Political Conference had been envisaged for a long time; and that it had encountered great difficulty in getting started. According to the French text the Korean Political Conference could start at once.

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[4] Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

Mr. Bidault said that Mr. Molotov was wrong in envisaging a second conference as necessary to decide on a third conference on Indochina. This could all be arranged though diplomatic channels. Indeed, that was what Ambassadors were for. Mr. Bidault went on to say that the conference on Indochina could be held very shortly after the Korean conference started, if progress was being achieved in the latter.

Mr. Bidault said no single conference was feasible since, as he had pointed out, the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of Korea have nothing whatsoever to do with Indochina. Therefore, it was quite clear that one could not hold a single general conference. He said that it was quite true that the French proposal did not suggest the composition of the conference on Indochina, but that was something that could be discussed. The Soviets, he said, had made no proposal on composition, and had said that it would be. necessary to ask the Chinese Communists and other possible participants whether they would accept, before issuing invitations. Mr. Bidault concluded by saying that the French draft permits us to get started immediately a Korean Political Conference and, thereafter one on Indochina. The French proposal represented a serious effort and should receive serious attention.

The Secretary then said that he had a few remarks to make since he had not yet spoken. The Secretary stated that, as he had said yesterday, the U.S. is prepared to accept the French proposal if it is acceptable to the other Three Ministers, though he still preferred the U.S. text.

The Secretary said that Mr. Molotov's objections to the French proposal seemed to him the most convincing reasons why it should be adopted. The principal objection of Mr. Molotov seemed to be paragraph 3 of the French text because it was precise on the three matters which have been blocking for seven months a Korean Political Conference. If the purpose of the Soviet Foreign Minister is to throw in doubt the composition of the Korean conference, then surely there is little that can be accomplished here for that has been the principal difficulty so far at Panmunjom.

The Secretary said that it seemed to him the basic underlying theory of the French proposal was that the way to make progress was to settle difficulties that exist rather than multiply them. Since July there has been agreement that a political conference should be held. The reason why it had not been held so far is due to difficulties, not one of which would be resolved by the Soviet text. Apparently, the Soviet theory is that if you are in difficulty the best thing to do is to double your difficulties. From the standpoint of the U.S., the first thing to find out is whether or not the Chinese Communists are willing to hold a political conference on Korea which was promised seven months ago. The Secretary went on to say that if the Chinese Communists continue to avoid peaceful processes regarding Korea and also continue to avoid peaceful procedures with respect to Indochina, then calling a conference with time, place and composition undetermined would not merely prevent progress but in fact it might mark a retrogression from peace. The Secretary said that he was particularly disappointed in the fact that Mr. Molotov today seemed to find paragraph 3 of the French text objectionable, whereas yesterday he had understood him to say that he saw no difficulty insofar as the substance of that paragraph was concerned.

Mr. Molotov intervened to say that he would like to discuss first the question of whether or not there should be one or two conferences. The Bidault proposal would lead to two, one on Korea, the other on Indochina. The Soviet delegation preferred a single conference because the chief participants would be the same for both. A conference to discuss either Korea or Indochina, Mr. Molotov blandly noted, without the presence of the Four Foreign Ministers plus the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, "would yield no fruitful results". However it is entitled—whether as one or two conferences—the main participants remain the same in both conferences.

Mr. Molotov said that we were now discussing principally French paragraphs 3 and 4 and he would like to deal with paragraph 4, which speaks of certain "favorable prospects" in the course of the discussions of the Korean problem and says that in such case a second conference on Indochina would be found possible. By following this approach, Mr. Molotov said we would subordinate the solution of one hard problem to the solution of another hard problem. This, he considered, inadvisable. Mr. Molotov said that the question then arises as to what constitutes "favorable prospects" in the Korean conference. He did not know and this puzzled him but perhaps his colleagues could enlighten him. Moreover, Mr. Molotov said if one speaks of a period of trial before discussing Indochina then he must state that this could not be taken to refer to Communist China because it was Communist China which had shown initiative in solving the Korean problem. If it had not been for that initiative, where would the Korean problem be today? Accordingly, Mr. Molotov thought it would be well if others could show initiative in Indochina since it was not proper that one party should show initiative all the time.

Mr. Molotov then reverted to the Soviet proposal which, he said, named two items. If the French preferred, he said, it would be possible to be more precise. We could stipulate both Korea and Indochina. In fact, Mr. Molotov said we could then have the following agenda for the conference:

"1. The Korean Political Conference.

"2. Statements on subjects mentioned above (which would include or specify Indochina) and the exchange of views on these subjects." This would then provide a definite framework for the conference and for the statements which would be made at it.

Mr. Molotov then said that the Secretary yesterday, and Mr. Eden today, had emphasized the good aspects of the French text, specifically that it gave precision to time, place and composition. Mr. Molotov said that he likewise recognized these good points, particularly the first two and he felt that the time and the place could be agreed without great difficulty. This left only the question of composition. Perhaps, Mr. Molotov said, we could draw the conclusion from that that the Four Ministers have reached two-thirds of an agreement. In that case, only one-third of the problem was left and on this the Soviet delegation had certain views. Would it not be reasonable, Mr. Molotov asked, since he was ready to meet the wishes of the French on two points, for the other Ministers to meet the Soviet views on the third point?

On the matter of composition Mr. Molotov said he would like to repeat what he had already said, which was to the effect that the language of the United Nations Resolution should not be reiterated because the Soviets had opposed it. He said he would repeat that he had no objection to the participation in the conference of the countries specified in the U.S. and French drafts. It would be possible to make the formulation more precise perhaps, along the following lines: "that the countries directly concerned in the consideration of the Korean problem and who would take part would be the Republic of Korea and the Korean Democratic Republic and the other countries whose armed forces had taken part in the hostilities in Korea and who desired to attend." Mr. Molotov pointed out that this would avoid the possibility of vetoing any country who desired to attend. This, he said, constituted a suggested amendment to the Soviet paragraph 4.

Mr. Molotov concluded by saying that it might be wise to make more precise the composition of the conference on Indochina.

At this point the Secretary said, that insofar as the U.S. was concerned, the U.S. was not prepared to accept a formula in any guise which promoted Communist China to a community of big powers with special responsibilities; nor does the U.S. accept the theory of an hierarchy among nations under which any member number—2, 3, 4, or 5—has a predominant position.

The Secretary said that Mr. Molotov had said that the five named Big Powers are indispensable to solutions both in Korea and in Indochina and that he would be implying that others are of secondary importance. As far as Korea is concerned, the Secretary said that the U.S. considers the Republic of Korea the most indispensable country of all. Insofar as Indochina is concerned, there are certainly others, including the Associated States, which are more indispensable than the U.S. Therefore, the Secretary concluded, the general theory of the Soviet text is unacceptable to the U.S. and he would greatly desire that Mr. Molotov should address himself to the scheme of the French proposal.

Mr. Bidault then said unfortunately he did not have any written text of the new Soviet amendment but that nevertheless it seemed to him to still rest on the basic Soviet principle which seemed to him nonutilitarian. He was being told that the solution of Indochina depended upon the solution of the Korean problem. Mr. Bidault pointed out that it depended not on the solution of the Korean problem, but on progress in the Korean discussions. This was a moral and not a technical problem. What was needed was the development of a new and peaceful climate in all of Asia which would apply both to the situation in Korea and in Indochina. "Favorable prospects", Mr. Bidault said meant constructive and visible prospects toward peace.

With respect to Southeast Asia, Mr. Bidault said that he had called very clearly for cooperation from Communist China. He said that the question of one or two conferences was not a matter of substance but that it was clear that the composition could not be the same for a discussion of both questions. Mr. Bidault said it was immaterial whether there were two separate conferences or the first one transformed itself into the second conference. Obviously, the two Korean governments have nothing to do with Indochina.

Mr. Bidault said that it might be well to discuss composition since this very question had prevented the convening of the Korean Political Conference for months. The method used for the Korean matter seemed a poor approach. Moreover, it was not useful to send out invitations to countries by name when the first problem was to establish an environment of peace in the whole of Asia. After that everything would be easy.

Mr. Bidault concluded by saying that the Soviet text, even as amended, was not likely to lead to agreement and that in any event he could not reserve any special position for the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Bidault then, in his capacity as Chairman, noted that it was 1:10 P.M. and made the suggestion that the committee of experts set up the day before to make plans for the future work of the conference should take into account the rationing of time for Restricted, as well as Plenary Sessions. [5]

Mr. Bidault then asked for the names of each Minister's representative.

The Secretary named Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Bidault named Mr. Seydoux, Mr. Eden named Sir Frank Roberts, and Mr. Molotov named Mr. Sobolov.

It was then agreed that the communiqué would merely state that the Four Ministers had resumed their discussion of Agenda Item I in Restricted Session at 11:30 A.M. and had adjourned at 1:15 P.M. [6]

All agreed to Mr. Bidault's suggestion that the Plenary Session this afternoon should be deferred until 4 o'clock. [7]

The Restricted Meeting adjourned at 1:15 P.M.

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[5] The quadripartite working group, consisting of Seydoux, Roberts, MacArthur, and Sobolev, met immediately following the conclusion of the restricted session, and drafted the following schedule: Feb. 13 and 14, plenary sessions on Austria; Feb. 15, morning, restricted session on Item I, afternoon, plenary on Germany; Feb. 16, plenary on Austria; Feb. 17 and 18, sessions as necessary to wind up the conference. This schedule was drafted *ad referendum*. (Secto 128 from Berlin, Feb. 12, 396.1 BE/2-1254)

[6] A copy of the communiqué, circulated as FPM(54)51 in the records of the conference, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197.

[7] For a record of the plenary session, see Secto 129, *infra*.

No. 464

396.1 BE/2-1254: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 12, 1954—11 p.m.

Secto 129. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes 18th meeting under chairmanship of Bidault: [2]

Meeting was convened at 1600 and, after brief welcoming statement of Bidault, Figl made initial speech. [3]

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, Vienna, Moscow, Paris, and London.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the fifteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/15, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.

[3] For Figl's speech, circulated as FPM(54)52, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 175-178, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 131-133.

Figl began by requesting that Austrian delegation enjoy full participation in discussions on Austrian state treaty. He recalled Hitler's subjugation of Austria in 1938 and the loss of her international freedom of action. Austrian people were overjoyed when in 1943 Moscow declaration declared annexation void and expressed desire to see Austria re-established as free and independent state. When in April and May 1945 victorious allied armies liberated Austria, Austrian people enthusiastically welcomed them and regarded occupation of their country as provisional measure necessitated by military exigencies of postwar period.

After war Austrian Government speedily normalized conditions and in November 1945 arranged for election of Austrian Parliament. In December 1945 coalition government was formed on basis of free elections. This government achieved remarkable results in economic reconstruction and in stabilizing political conditions, with assistance of allied powers. Negotiations on state treaty begun in 1946 have not been concluded owing to circumstances beyond Austria's control. Developments seven years ago in London and progress in 1947 in Paris, London and New York gave rise to hope for speedy recovery of Austrian freedom and sovereignty. Few unagreed articles in draft treaty could be settled immediately, given good will on all sides.

Fact that state treaty not yet signed gives rise to strange situation that first country victimized by Nazis will be last to obtain freedom. Former enemy states have received their peace treaties long ago. Continuation of occupation imposed heavy burden on people. Apart from sacrifices directly connected with occupation, Austrian economy suffers also great material losses and hindrance in utilization of its resources. Although Austria is prepared to assume burdens in return for sovereignty, Austrian people and government feel economic terms laid down in draft treaty, particularly Article 35, unduly hard and inconsistent with economic capacity of country. Amount provided for redeeming German assets and its payment in dollars instead of goods appears inequitable, all the more so since agreement on article reached in 1949 and Austria has had to make further extraordinary sacrifices during subsequent five years. Furthermore, Article 35 clauses regarding mineral oil deposits are hardly consistent with Austrian sovereignty, for, as was stated in unanimously adopted resolution 626 of 6th GA of December 21, 1952, right of every nation freely to use and exploit its natural wealth and resources is inherent in its sovereignty and is in accordance with purposes and principles of the Charter. This GA resolution also recommended that member states refrain from all acts impeding exercise of these sovereign rights. Figl then proposed revision of economic terms of draft treaty, particularly Article 35, in sympathetic and generous spirit.

Figl declared acceptance of every term of present draft of state treaty which would secure Austria's full independence, freedom and sovereignty. He recalled that at beginning of conference Soviet Foreign Minister had said millions of people expect answer to question whether Berlin conference will contribute to strengthening of peace, relaxation of tension and guaranteeing security in Europe. This, Figl concluded, could be done and also long overdue freedom could be granted seven million Austrians, by giving state treaty to Austria.

After thanking Figl for his statement and expressing pleasure at his presence, Eden began statement by recalling first Austrian Government was formed eight years ago.[4] He complimented it on its economic and parliamentary successes and on its wisdom in international matters. He expressed hope that agreement will be reached on some arrangements to permit Austrian delegation to play appropriate part in conference. He endorsed Figl's expressed hope that four powers will reach agreement on Austrian state treaty before end of conference and recalled that more than ten years have passed since Moscow declaration.

Eden did not think it should be too difficult to reach agreement and noted that 47 articles are already agreed. Surely conference can reach agreement on remaining five. Austrian question stands on its own, and its solution need not await solution of unrelated problems in any other part of world. Signature of treaty would be practical sign that way has been found to relax international tension.

Referring to Article 35, Eden recalled that article was agreed on with intention of compensating USSR for damage suffered. But during past four years, Austria has already fulfilled more than original intention. Eden was sure Molotov will wish to make some suggestion how to meet Figl's appeal and assumed all present want to make sure Austria's economy is sufficiently robust to enable her to maintain her independence.

In conclusion, Eden expressed hope speedier progress will be made on Austrian item than on earlier ones. All that need be done is to complete treaty on which so much agreement has already been reached. He thereupon made following formal proposal:

"The delegation of the United Kingdom (recalling) that agreement has previously been reached by the four powers on 47 articles of the draft Austrian state treaty, (Proposes) that the four Foreign

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[4] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)53, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 179–180, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 133–134.

Ministers conclude the said treaty at this conference by reaching agreement on the points hitherto reserved in Articles 16, 27, 42, 48 and 48 bis and by consideration of the request of the Austrian delegation concerning Article 35." [5]

Molotov began by expressing pious hope for urgent settlement of Austrian question, conclusion of state treaty and reestablishment of free and independent Austria which would meet interests of European peace and ensure recognition of Austrian national rights. [6] He thought it abnormal that seven years of negotiation have not yet produced treaty and recalled that it took two years to agree in 1949 on former German assets and on most of the treaty clauses.

Then, he continued, new obstacle arose due to unwillingness of US, UK and France to fulfill their obligations under Italian peace treaty in regard to Trieste which they turned into Anglo-American military base. It is quite natural, therefore, for Soviet Government to seek to preclude same thing happening in Austria. Another obstacle arose in 1952-53 when Western powers with Austrian connivance, pressed for draft abbreviated treaty which ignored Austrian democratic rights and Soviet rights under Potsdam Agreement to former German assets. He understood this draft has now been withdrawn.

Molotov thought it should be possible to abolish all four power occupation bodies in Austria if new article is written in state treaty which precludes drawing Austria into any military alliance against any of allies and which prevents building foreign military bases on Austrian territory. He alleged that West German militarists and monopolists, abetted by certain representatives of Austrian ruling circles, are planning a new Anschluss and that in the absence of a German peace treaty no satisfactory guarantees are possible against resurgence of West German militarism and revanchism. Therefore, he contended, the four powers should take measures to preclude Anschluss and preserve Austrian independence. Soviet proposals for German peace treaty are well suited for this purpose.

Molotov welcomed presence of Austrian delegation during discussion of item three, although he thought it unfortunate three Western powers had rejected invitations to East and West Germans. He agreed to Figl's proposal that sum stipulated in Article 35 to pay USSR for former German assets should be paid in goods rather than dollars, but expressed view that new discussions on other provisions of Article 35 would yield nothing but new complications and postponements as far as state treaty concerned.

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[5] This proposal was circulated as FPM(54)58 in the records of the conference.

[6] For Molotov's statement, circulated as FPM(54)54, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 134-139; it includes the text of the Soviet proposal referred to below.

Despite all that has been heard of Austrian sacrifices during war, one must not forget that Austrian troops caused enormous damage in Soviet Union. Moscow declaration also provided that Austria bears responsibility for her part in war. Despite that, no obligations have been placed on Austria to make good damage she caused Soviet Union. Article 35 refers only to former German assets, and these would become Austrian property after termination of period prescribed in treaty.

Molotov then put forward proposal on Austria, which has been reported in separate telegram. [7]

Secretary's statement, which followed, also has been reported in separate telegram. [8]

Next statement was that of Bidault who began by referring approvingly to Figl's statement. [9] France has always tried to second claims considered justified on part of Austrian delegation and has strived to have returned to Austria those sovereign rights solemnly pledged to her over ten years ago. Bidault saw no excuse for further procrastination on Austrian state treaty. Reestablishment of Austrian sovereignty would be important token for stability of peace itself and independence of Austria is fully guaranteed by terms of treaty. He did not think Austrian question, which is ripe for solution in its own right, should be linked to any issue foreign to Austrian question itself. Discussion may well elicit justification of Austrian contentions that economic provisions of draft treaty should be altered to make them less stringent. France supports British proposal that conference should conclude treaty by reaching agreement on the as yet unagreed six articles.

Following 20 minute recess, four Foreign Ministers agreed that Austrian delegation might be present at any meeting when Austrian problem is discussed. Foreign Ministers also agreed to continue discussion of Austrian question at February 13 meeting at 1500. [10]

Session adjourned at 1905.

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[7] For the Soviet proposal, transmitted in Secto 130 from Berlin Feb. 13 (396.1 BE/2-1354), see FPM(54)55, Document 519.

[8] Transmitted in Secto 126, *infra*.

[9] For Bidault's statement, circulated as FPM(54)57, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 141-142.

[10] On Feb. 13 Thompson informed the U.S. Delegation that he did not believe Molotov's proposal was hopeless, but suggested that it should be probed deeply to see whether the Soviets were willing to conclude an agreement at that time. (Telegram 3494 from London, 763.0221/2-1354)

No. 465

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

BERLIN, February 12, 1954.

Secto 126. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary's statement, fifteenth session Foreign Ministers' meeting, February 12: [2]

We are here today in a meeting which may have historic consequences. From it may come the kind of accomplishment which the whole world has been expecting of this conference; but which after nearly three weeks has not yet been forthcoming.

Some may explain and even excuse our failure to date on the ground that the problems and tasks we have previously undertaken have been vast and complex. Such is not the case today.

In agenda item No. 3—the conclusion of an Austrian state treaty—we have a problem of completely manageable magnitude.

In the occasional moments of mediation which this conference has permitted, I have given thought to the dilemmas which seem to confront our Soviet colleagues. I try to see their problems from their viewpoint, and I admit that they face hard problems.

But no stretch of philosophical speculation can bring me to believe that Austria constitutes a really hard problem. Surely the mighty Soviet empire cannot really fear lest 7 million peace-loving Austrians should have freedom. Nor can I believe that the economy of the 800 million people within the Soviet-dominated bloc depends upon being able to continue to bleed the economy of the small and naturally poor Austrian state. It seems incredible that a Soviet grocer's bill for some dried peas should have stood in the way of honoring the 1943 signature of the Soviet Foreign Minister to the Moscow declaration of Austria's independence.

We have just heard the statement of the Austrian Foreign Minister. [3]

We agree that the Austrian problem does not simply call for eventual solution, it cries aloud for immediate solution, no matter what measurement of politics or economics or humanity or international decency is applied to it. What is asked for is nothing more than what was solemnly promised over 10 years ago—the rights of sovereignty we all insist upon for ourselves. Furthermore, the gap which separates the Austrian Minister's plea from realization is so small that this treaty could be signed here and now, if all four of us had the will to sign it. I for one do have that will, and I note that each of us has in statements at this conference recognized our obligation to act and act quickly. Mr. Molotov put it well when on January 25, 1954, he said "the interests of strengthening peace in Europe and the need to assure the national rights of the Austrian people demand the earliest re-establishment of a free and independent Austria".[4] The call of the Austrian Foreign Minister is a call to action to which we must respond quickly for many reasons.

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[1] Repeated to New York, Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a record of the fifteenth plenary, see Secto 129, *supra*.

[3] For a summary of Figl's statement, see Secto 129, *supra*.

Austria was the first victim of Hitler's aggression and if we have, as we say and know we have, a responsibility for re-making the Europe which Hitler so largely destroyed, the liberation of Austria from the bondage of occupation still stands after nine years at the head of the list of actions we should take.

We should also respond quickly because only in that way can we eradicate the sorry record of past negotiations on the Austrian state treaty.

I have no wish at this time to enumerate the long and shabby story of delay, disillusion and lack of candor which has thus far characterized the Soviet negotiations on Austria.

This time there should be a clear-cut end to all of that. Can we sit here as the Foreign Ministers of our four countries solemnly and seriously addressing ourselves to agenda item No. 3 and dare admit that the 374 previous discussions on this one item over a seven-year period have not explored every conceivable nook and cranny of the Austrian state treaty?

We should also respond quickly in recognition of the extraordinary performance of the Austrians themselves. Compare the Austria of today with the Austria that met our eyes in the spring of 1945.

At that time a provisional government struggled in the ruins left by Hitler. The economy—there was no economy. Today the Austrian people pursue their daily lives peacefully and industriously under the protection of their democratic constitution.

Few governments in the world today can present a record of real achievement comparable to that of the Austrian Government installed in 1945 after free elections and twice freely re-elected since then. This Austrian Government has brought the Austrian economy to a state of productivity and stability which it has not enjoyed for decades, despite the syphoning off, for the benefit of Soviet Russia, of the products of East Austria. To be sure foreign aid has helped—and I am proud that much of it has been contributed by the United States—but foreign aid without national will could not have produced the Austria of today.

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[4] For a summary of Molotov's statement on Jan. 25, see Secto 17, Document 355.

It can truly be said that the harmony of Austria's internal and external relations, created in nine years out of the ruins of aggression, is a model of what can be done when there is a will to do it. And yet despite this abundantly apparent demonstration of political maturity, democratic institutions, social peace and economic well-being, the Austrian people remain under the burden of occupation and exploitation. Some sixty thousand foreign troops, over 2/3 of them under Soviet command, garrison Austria. That is practically one soldier for every 100 inhabitants.

We should also respond quickly because of the shameful economic burden which has been imposed upon Austria during the past five years by the delay on the treaty. Since 1949 the Soviet Union has extracted from so-called "German assets" in its zone of Austria at least 200 million dollars in net profits. This is a sum larger than the lump-sum indemnity which in 1949 was set by the Soviet Union as the price for the return to Austria of only some of these assets. This is reason enough for acting on the Austrian Foreign Minister's request for alleviation of Article 35.

Austria was not an aggressor—Austria is not a defeated enemy. Austria was a victim of aggression. Austria is, by our own statement in the Moscow declaration of November 1, 1943, a liberated and not an enemy country. As Dr. Figl has said, it is ironical that we have long since concluded treaties with all but one of the European nations which were our enemies.

In a proclamation to the citizens of Vienna in March 1945 the late Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian forces in Austria, said, "The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops, and the liberation of Austria. The Red Army backs the Moscow declaration of the allied powers on the independence of Austria".

To fulfill the pledge of the Moscow declaration, so eloquently underscored by Marshal Tolbukhin and reinforced by innumerable statements, declarations and resolutions since then, requires pathetically little. That was also true in 1949.

All that lies between the Austria of today and Austria we promised in 1943 is agreement on 5 articles—actually only parts of 5 articles—of the present draft treaty, and consideration of Article 35 in the light of the Austrian Foreign Minister's statement today.

The American delegation supports Mr. Eden's proposal listing the few points which need to be settled in order to reach the goal of an Austrian state treaty. [5] After 374 discussions and ten years of unfilled pledges, I believe my colleagues will agree with me that these and only these steps need to be taken, not other issues are relevant to our task.

Last April President Eisenhower spoke to the world on the subject of world tensions. [6] At that time he called for deeds, not words, to prove the will to peace, and, in fact, he cited the Austrian state treaty as just such a deed—a deed requiring only the simple will to do it. That deed will shine in a world which has become darkened by fear and disillusionment. If the Soviet Union will join us in doing this deed, the whole world will rejoice in the demonstration that our four nations can indeed cooperate to serve the cause of peace and justice. Out of that beginning, greater things could come.

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[5] For Eden's proposal, see Secto 129, *supra*.

[6] See footnote 2, Document 182.

No. 466

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Austria (Davis)

SECRET

BERLIN, February 12, 1954.

Present:
British Delegation
  Mr. Warner
  Mr. Malcolm
  Mr. Blair
French Delegation
  M. Sauvagnargues
  M. Mille
Austrian Delegation
  Dr. Schoener
  Dr. Roessler
  Dr. Gudenus
U.S. Delegation
  Mr. Freund
  Mr. Tyler
  Mr. Davis

Subject: Austrian Reaction to Molotov's Proposals [1] and Future Tactics

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[1] FPM(54)55, Document 519.

The Tripartite Group on Austria met with the Austrians tonight. The Tripartite Group also met alone and this meeting is the subject of a separate memorandum. [2] After brief indication from Mr. Warner that we considered the Soviet proposals on Austria made this afternoon by Molotov were impossible to accept, Dr. Schoener was asked whether the Austrian Delegation had formulated its views.

Tentative Austrian Views on Soviet Proposals

Dr. Schoener said the Austrian Delegation viewed the Soviet proposals negatively. He made the following points:

1) While Austria was willing to make sacrifices to obtain a treaty and restoration of its independence, the Soviet proposal that Austria should in reality continue to pay for and still retain occupation troops was impossible to accept. The Austrian Parliament would never accept this. Therefore, this was the Austrian principal objection.

2) Dr. Schoener referred to paragraph 1(b) . . . [3] the Soviet proposal to insert into the text of the State Treaty an additional article beginning "Austria undertakes not to enter into any coalition, etc.". Yet what does "coalition" mean? Does it apply to non-military organizations such as the Council of Europe, Coal and Steel Community, EPU, OEEC? Perhaps this should be clarified.

3) Dr. Schoener referred to paragraph 2 of the Soviet proposal and remarked that to postpone withdrawal of troops meant, in fact, indefinite occupation.

4) He referred to the proposal to withdraw troops from Vienna which he characterized as particularly dangerous. It would mean Vienna was isolated in a sea of Russian soldiers and, in fact, he might mean the partition of Austria.

5) As for the special agreement to be prepared by the Four Powers with the participation of Austria on the legal status of the troops remaining, he remarked this would, in fact, mean a new control agreement and probably one worse than the existing control agreement. In reality the Soviet proposal was a promise to give the Austrians a straight treaty with a new control agreement, the contents of which were unknown.

In reply to a queston by Mr. Warner whether the Austrians thought the Soviet proposal should be rejected as a whole or some points were acceptable, Dr. Schoener replied that while he could only speak unofficially, he thought the whole proposal was unacceptable. He remarked Parliament would never accept a continuance of the occupation while Austria was forced to continue making economic sacrifices. However, Dr. Schoener could not say now whether the Austrian Delegation would reject the Soviet proposal as a whole or only on certain principal points.

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[2] *Infra.*

[3] Ellipsis in the source text.

The Austrians appeared to agree with the argument of the Tripartite Group that we should not ask the Soviet Delegation to clarify points in the Soviet plan since to do so would lead confusion in the public mind and would give the false impression that we accepted the plan as a basis for discussion.

In reply to a question whether the Austrian Delegation intended to make any new proposal, Dr. Schoener indicated they had nothing new to suggest and would probably keep within the line laid down in Dr. Figl's opening speech.

Tactics at Saturday Session

A discussion followed on whether the Austrian Delegation should speak first and reject Mr. Molotov's proposal or alternatively the first word would go to the occupation powers. Dr. Schoener was unable to give any opinion and it was agreed that this question should be decided by the Ministers. Dr. Schoener then said that Dr. Figl would like to meet with the three Western Ministers before tomorrow's meeting. We promised to take this up and inform the Austrians tomorrow morning whether the Ministers could meet with Dr. Figl possibly at 12:30.

No. 467

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Austria (Davis)

SECRET BERLIN, February 12, 1954.

Present: *British Delegation:*
Mr. Warner
Mr. Malcolm
Mr. Blair
French Delegation:
Mr. Sauvagnargues
Mr. Mille
U.S. Delegation:
Mr. Freund
Mr. Tyler
Mr. Davis

Subject: Mr. Molotov's Proposal on Austria: Future Tactics

At the close of the meeting with the Austrians, the tripartite group on Austria met alone. Subjects discussed with the Austrians present are contained in a separate memorandum. [1]

French Suggestion for Four-Power Guarantee Against Anschluss

Mr. Sauvagnargues said we must all be agreed that in the face of the Soviet proposal [2] this afternoon there was no chance for an Austrian treaty. In view of this, he wondered whether we should not show some flexibility and perhaps offer something to the Russians since they lay such stress on Germany and the *anschluss* question. He recognized Article 4 in the present draft treaty was an all-inclusive prohibition against *anschluss*, but the treaty itself did not offer particularly effective means of guaranteeing this. He asked whether we would think of offering a Four-Power guarantee against *anschluss* with some provision to consult when any of the Four Powers believed there was a danger of *anschluss*. He saw in the Soviet emphasis on the danger of *anschluss*, a possible appeal to Western public opinion and he wondered whether this would not be undercut by an offer of a Four-Power guarantee.

He said he had mentioned this briefly to Mr. Bidault who appeared favorably taken with the idea. Mr. Warner and Mr. Freund argued against the French suggestion on the grounds that Article 4 of the present draft was sufficient and it might provoke endless debate and possibly would set a dangerous precedent on the German question.

Mr. Sauvagnargues remarked that we must do something about a security guarantee on Germany before the end of the conference. (This is the first indication those present have had that the French may be thinking of tabling a definite proposal on European security.)

Conclusions

1. It was agreed that further thought would be given to the French suggestion on offering a Four-Power guarantee against *anschluss*.

2. In general, it was thought unwise to have the Austrians speak first at Saturday's session although this was a decision for the Ministers.

3. On general tactics to be followed at tomorrow's session, it was agreed that Mr. Molotov's proposal should be rejected *in toto* and we should, at least for the first round, attempt to return to the simple proposal made by Mr. Eden. [3]

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] FPM(54)55, Document 519.

[3] For Eden's proposal, see Secto 129, Document 464.

Discussion on How to Break Off Austrian Item

There was some discussion on the proposal to break off the Austrian item by offering to accept the present draft treaty with the Soviet version of the Articles and with the Soviet offer of today to accept payment of the $150 million in kind. This offer could perhaps be made on Sunday, giving Mr. Molotov only until Tuesday to accept. The French rather favor this course, although the British do not think so much of the idea in the present circumstances. In this connection, the French thought it would be important to emphasize that Article 4 of the treaty contained absolute prohibition against *anschluss.*

It was agreed that this suggestion for breaking off the Austrian discussion would have to be considered further.

RICHARD H. DAVIS

No. 468

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Berlin

TOP SECRET
NIACT

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1954—11 a.m.

Tedul 44. Eyes only for Secretary. Reference: Dulte 64.[1] The Eden *Aide-Mémoire*[2] is wrong on several counts.

1. Prior to submitting the proposals to Soviets, the general lines thereof should be concurred in by the U.K., Canada and France. They should also be given to Belgium, Australia, and South Africa, not for concurrence but for information.
2. No decision has yet been taken as to who should participate in the negotiations with the Soviets after the proposals have been presented to them. The preference indicated thus far is that these negotiations should remain, at least initially, solely between the U.S. and the USSR. Whether others should be brought in later will depend on the way the negotiations go and in part on Soviet desires on this point.
3. As regards discussions concerning the Soviet counter proposal to ban the use of atomic weapons, our view thus far has been that these should be conducted also in diplomatic channels in Washington, at least initially, and that they too should be on a bilateral basis with the U.S. keeping in close touch with the U.K., Canada and France.
4. There has thus far been no decision taken as to when or whether discussions on the Soviet counter proposal should be transferred to the United Nations disarmament commission.

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[1] Document 455.

[2] Transmitted in Dulte 64.

It seems plain that Eden is trying to force decisions on which we have not yet made up our minds. It would seem highly desirable to stress to him that some of these decisions can best be taken only after we see how the initial substantive talks with the Soviets proceed.

It is expected that the statement designed to be given the Soviets will be fully cleared in the Executive Branch by the end of the week and consultations with the British, Canadians, and the French can begin early next week. Would very much appreciate, therefore, knowing whether the line-up of countries in sub-paragraph 1 above is agreeable to you.

SMITH

February 13, 1954

No. 469

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 13, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

SECRET
BER MIN-18

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. Tactics for Today

It was agreed that Mr. Eden as Chairman would note that the Austrians had not had an opportunity to comment on Mr. Molotov's and Mr. Eden's proposals [1] and he would ask for the Austrian views. Mr. Figl would give a speech in which he would reject the Soviet proposal. Mr. Eden would then turn to Mr. Molotov. Mr. Dulles would emphasize the unacceptability of Mr. Molotov's proposal and would set forth the thought that agreement on the Austrian Treaty was possible at this conference. M. Bidault would concentrate on knocking down the Molotov proposal, and Mr. Eden in addition rejecting the Soviet proposal will suggest agreement to his proposal of yesterday.

The three western ministers would meet in Mr. Eden's office after the quadripartite session to decide whether tomorrow the offer could be made to take the long version of the Treaty with the Soviet versions of the various unagreed articles. After this decision is made, it would be necessary to consult with Figl on this tactic. In the meeting with the Austrians it would be necessary to obtain certain verbal assurances.

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[1] For Molotov's proposal, see Document 521. For Eden's proposal, see Secto 129, Document 463.

Depending on the outcome of tonight's meeting, a tripartite ministerial meeting would be set up for around noon on Sunday at Mr. Eden's residence.

2. Other Problems on Austria

Sir Frank raised the problem of handling Austria in the final tripartite communiqué, the possibility of a separate communiqué on Austria, and post-conference problems on Austria. He also noted the French suggestion for a four power guarantee regarding an *Anschluss* with Germany. Neither the UK nor the U.S. delegations could accept this suggestion.

3. Post-Conference German Problems

The report of the German experts was accepted. [2] It was believed there was no need for ministerial approval of the letters from the High Commissioners and Commandants to their Soviet opposite numbers but it was agreed that the Commandants and the High Commissioners themselves should consider these texts. It was pointed out that it would be necessary to consult with the Germans before the letters were sent. It was agreed that the chairman of the High Commissioners should personally deliver the letter at a meeting with Semenov to emphasize the importance of the letters.

4. Possible Final Communiqué

A UK draft of a final communiqué was circulated. [3] The question was left open for ministerial decision as to whether several communiqués would be issued, or whether there would be a tripartite communiqué at all. The various items suggested for the communiqué to cover were: Germany, Austria, Item 1, Berlin, and a statement of the effect of the Berlin Conference on relations with the Soviet Union. The three delegations would examine the present draft and prepare comments. On Monday, machinery would be set up for tripartite consultation.

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[2] The origin and development of the Tripartite Working Group on Post-Conference Moves re Germany is obscure. Its composition and work are described briefly in BER MIN-15, Document 443, and BER MIN-17, Document 457. However, the report under reference, which presumably stressed the need for amelioration of conditions in Berlin, has not been identified further. Regarding the letters to be delivered to Dengin and Semyenov, see Document 601.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

5. Place of Meeting for the Conference Next Week

It was assumed that the conference would be continued in the Unter den Linden Building. Representatives of the three delegations would ask Mr. Sobelev for his views when they met with him this afternoon at 2:40. [4]

6. Conference Schedule

After the tripartite meeting M. Seydoux proposed that the following schedule be proposed to Sobelev which changes the schedule for Monday and Tuesday worked out at the tripartite official meeting yesterday:

Sunday, February 14
  3:30 p.m., plenary, Austria
Monday, February 15
  11:00 a.m., plenary, Austria
  3:30 p.m., restricted meeting, Agenda Item 1.
Tuesday, February 16
  11:00 a.m., restricted meeting or otherwise, if needed and desirable
  3:00 p.m. (or 3:30 depending upon what happens in the morning), plenary on Agenda Item 2.

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[4] At the quadripartite meeting at 2:40 p.m. it was agreed that there would be a plenary meeting on Austria later that day and on Feb. 14, a restricted session on Item I in the morning, and a plenary session in the afternoon on Item II. Sobelev reported that Molotov agreed that the conference would terminate on Feb. 18, but the site for future meetings was left to be determined by the Foreign Ministers. (Secto 132 from Berlin, Feb. 13, 396.1 BE/2-1354)

No. 470

396.1 BE/2-1354: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 13, 1954—11 a.m.

Dulte 69. For the President from the Secretary. Eyes only for the Acting Secretary. Molotov's presentation last night [2] regarding Austria seemed to destroy last lingering hope of any substantial agreement here. It turned the clock back on Austria and cut heart out of proposed treaty by providing for indefinite Soviet occupation so that treaty would not be treaty of liberation but of servitude. Am seeing Molotov alone this afternoon at his request, presumably in connection with atomic procedure. Hope to use this meeting to get further insight regarding basic Soviet political attitude.[3]

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[1] A memorandum, dated Feb. 13, states that a copy of this message was delivered to the White House at 12:25 that day. (396.1 BE/2-1354)

[2] Regarding Molotov's statement on Austria, see Secto 129, Document 464.

The quadripartite committee mentioned in my message to you of February 12[4] met last night and the three Western representatives were in general agreement that the conference should terminate on Thursday afternoon.[5] While the Soviet representative raised no objection, he simply said he would report this view to Molotov and give us the latter's reaction this afternoon.

I shall try to stop Bonn to see Adenauer for few hours on way back. Best regards.

DULLES

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[3] Regarding Dulles' meeting with Molotov, see Dulte 71, *infra*.

[4] Dulte 67, Document 460.

[5] Regarding this meeting, see footnote 5, Document 463.

No. 471

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 14, 1954—noon.

Dulte 71. From Secretary, eyes only Acting Secretary to determine distribution. At Molotov's request I met with him this afternoon (13 Feb.) at the ACA Building before conference plenary session.[2] Molotov (who was accompanied, as before, by Ambassador Zarubin and interpreter Troyanovski) opened by saying that he had promised to clarify the Soviet views on the question of the participation of other countries at a subsequent stage in the negotiations. He thereupon handed me an *Aide-Mémoire*, a verbatim text of which follows:

"1. In the *Aide-Mémoire* presented by the Ambassador of the USSR in Washington to the Secretary of State of the USA on January 19, 1954,[3] the Soviet Government expressed the view that at a subsequent stage of the negotiations on the atomic problem all the powers bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security should be invited to take part.

In a private talk with Mr. Dulles on January 30[4] last, V.M. Molotov explained that the powers referred to are the five powers, namely the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the Chinese People's Republic.

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[1] Drafted by Merchant.

[2] A memorandum of this conversation, the same in substance as the report below, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203.

[3] Regarding the meeting at Washington on Jan. 19, see telegram 487 to Moscow, vol. II, Part 2, p. 1345.

[4] For a report on this meeting, see Dulte 23, Document 393.

2. In that talk Mr. Dulles expressed the view that Britain, France and also Canada and Belgium should be invited to join in the negotiations on the atomic problem, and he explained that Canada and Belgium should take part as countries possessing resources of atomic materials.

3. In connection therewith the Soviet Government states that it would have no objection to the participation in the negotiations on the atomic problem at an appropriate stage, besides the five powers, of Canada and Belgium, and also believes it necessary to have Czechoslovakia invited to take part in the said negotiations as a country possessing atomic materials."

I glanced at the document and said that I could only take note of it without expressing an opinion on it at this time. I then went on to say that we were agreed that the first stage would be bilateral and would involve consideration on our part of the memo Molotov had given me at our last meeting [5] together with the consideration by the Soviet Government of the U.S. plan now in process of preparation which I hoped to hand to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington shortly after my return. I added that I hoped we could make progress through diplomatic channels in this phase and not, in so important a subject, become involved in the procedural difficulties which would arise from the question of participation of Communist China.

Molotov merely replied that negotiations in Washington between Ambassador Zarubin and myself were in accordance with the U.S. proposal. [6]

DULLES

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[5] For text of this memorandum, see Dulte 23, Document 393.

[6] On Feb. 16 Secretary Dulles wrote to Bidault and Eden briefing them on his discussion with Molotov and enclosing copies of the Soviet *aide-mémoire*. Copies of these messages are in file 600.0012/2–1654.

No. 472

Eisenhower Library, John Foster Dulles papers, "1951–1959, Berlin"

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

BERLIN, February 16, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herewith a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Mr. Molotov alone with the addition only of his interpreter Troyanovski. This talk followed a talk which I had with him on atomic energy procedure at which Merchant, Bohlen and Zarubin were present. [2] At this point they left as indicated in the enclosed memorandum.

The fact of having had this private talk is of itself of considerable importance. I particularly wanted to be sure that Molotov appreciated the seriousness of possible developments in Asia.

I am not at all certain as to the degree of influence which Soviet Russia can exert on this situation. It is entirely possible that the Chinese Communists will continue to run amuck until we recognize them and deal with them directly rather than through the Soviet Union as an intermediary. On the other hand, there can be no assurance that if we do recognize them, they will not continue to misbehave.

Our conference here breaks up on Thursday. I hope to be back by Friday afternoon after stopping off to see Adenauer briefly en route.

I understand that you will be away but that we are having breakfast on Wednesday. I will go into these matters more fully at that time, but I thought it might be useful and of interest to you in the meantime to see the enclosed memorandum, which is of course highly secret. Nothing that happened made it seem useful for me to report the talk to Eden or Bidault.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[1] The source text was sent as an enclosure to a letter from Dulles to Under Secretary Smith, dated Feb. 16, which stated that it was the only extant copy and had been seen by Merchant, MacArthur, Bowie, and Nash. Smith was instructed to get it "into the President's hands under conditions of complete secrecy."

[2] For a record of this conversation, see Dulte 71, *supra*.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

BERLIN, [February 13, 1954?]

Participants: Mr. Dulles
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Troyanovski (interpreter)

Mr. Dulles: Disturbed by lack of any concrete substantive agreement by conference. There has been bilateral agreement as to the next procedural phase of atomic talks, but this is no great achievement. Had hoped for some positive results at least on Austria until yesterday when Soviets made totally unacceptable proposals. [3] This leaves us with nothing to show as reason for another such conference. This regrettable because conferences if they can justify themselves also offer useful opportunities for informal personal contacts such as this moment.

Particularly disturbed about conditions in Asia. Fear Communist Chinese regime is recklessly seeking to show off its strength and extend its power. This could lead by one step after another to a chain of events which would have a result none of us wanted. We assume Soviets want peace and we hope Soviet Union will exert some restraint upon Communist China. A Korean conference might help to begin to normalize the situation and establish in this limited sphere some direct high level talks which, if serious, could be a useful replacement to the belligerent words and deeds which were now characteristic of Communist China. All this is said out of our sincere desire for peace.

Mr. Molotov: Thanks for frankness of Dulles' expression. Believes fact of holding Foreign Ministers conference is itself a gain. It would hardly be expected that in a few days much results would come, having regard to the long interruption of nearly five years. As to Austria, no doubt part of Soviet proposal unwelcome, but it went much of the way to give Austria what it wants. At least it should make it possible to carry forward the talks in the future with good prospect of a positive result. As to Korea, Political Conference would be possible if US would accept India which has great interest in Korean affair. As to Indochina, the trouble does not come from Communist China but from bad French colonial practices. Molotov had offered Bidault the good offices of the Soviet Union and China in effecting an Indochina settlement but Bidault made no response.

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[3] Regarding the Soviet proposals on Austria, see Secto 129, Document 464.

Dulles: Agreed there was some advantage in having this FM conference but difficult to continue the conference method if no positive results from the conference. As to Austria, continuing Soviet occupation quite unacceptable. Regarding Soviet proposed neutralization, if Austria wants to be a Switzerland, US will not stand in the way, but this should not be imposed.

As to Korea, Dulles hoped Molotov would not interject India. Had thought Soviets accepted the US-French formula as to substance of composition of conference, but merely desired to avoid use of talk UN formula. As to Indochina, does not desire to use this either to criticize Communist China or defend French colonial policy. Importance now is not with the past but present and future. Whatever be the origins, situation now pregnant with danger of a vast scope because while Indochina is not itself of concern to the US, it could easily threaten vital interests of US. Therefore restraint should be exercised. It seemed that the danger of war in Europe was perhaps less and that the situation was somewhat stabilized, but the same could not yet be said of Asia.

Molotov: Thought that this exchange of views was very useful. As regards the possibility of a Korean Political Conference, he suggested that after the next meeting on the matter a representative of our two governments might meet to see if some formula on composition could be agreed upon.

The foregoing took place between 2:30 and 2:55 p.m., February 13, 1954, at the ACA Building, Berlin. The atmosphere was calm, each participant expressing himself soberly with deliberation of manner.

No. 473

396.1 BE/2-1454: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 14, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 134. Department pass OSD. Following summary of 19th Ministers meeting February 13, Eden presiding: [2]

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the sixteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/16, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.

1. *Figl:* [3] Appreciated opportunity speak yesterday; wished emphasize ardent desire Austria for freedom and independence and Austria's willingness accept burdens and sacrifices for sake troop withdrawal and termination of military occupation. Necessary express disappointment Austrian Government and people over Molotov's proposal postpone troop withdrawal from Austria until after conclusion German peace treaty. [4] This would destroy all Austrian hopes and postpone liberation indefinitely, while imposing upon Austria heavy burdens implicit in state treaty. All this for fear Austria might again lose its independence and become an unwilling military ally of Germany or some other power. This impossible after Austria's experience World War II and in view Austria's firm adherence article 4 draft treaty. It unreasonable tie fate of Austria to settlement of difficult problem over which Austria has no influence.

2. *Molotov:* Restricted nature Figl's remarks fails give clear idea Austria's reactions to total Soviet proposals; assume will discuss more fully. Similarly other delegations (not having had time to study Soviet proposals) and had not perhaps fully expressed their views. Suggested further statement views.

3. *Dulles:* Verbatim text Secretary's remarks transmitted Secto 133. [5]

4. Bidault had studied Soviet proposals carefully and had concluded they constitute complex and complete argument why it impossible conclude Austrian treaty or restore Austrian independence. [6] In such circumstances, little profit in point-by-point discussion Soviet proposals; nevertheless would express himself briefly on each component so that USSR could appreciate why French thought proposals unjustifiable.

a. Proposal to refer to deputies: Matters already beyond this state; Ministers are seized of problem; 47 articles agreed; five not agreed plus need for consideration Austrian requests re article 35. Anyway if we delegate we admit we renounce our task; we did delegate in 1949; no grounds for optimism that to delegate again would serve any useful purpose.

b. Proposal for linkage to Trieste problem: Trieste already discussed tediously at Palais Rose in 1949. [7] When agenda for this meeting agreed, Trieste not included.

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[3] For the full text of Figl's statement, circulated as FPM(54)59, see Cmd. 9080, p. 143, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 187–188.

[4] For text of the Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)55, Document 519.

[5] *Infra.*

[6] For Bidault's statement, circulated as FPM(54)61, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 146–148, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 191–194.

[7] Presumably Bidault is referring to the Four-Power Exploratory Talks, held at Paris Mar. 5–June 21, 1951.

c. No-alliance proposal: This absurd in a treaty purporting reestablish Austrian independence and sovereignty (but Molotov by proposal for continued occupation conceded he not really seeking that end).

d. Proposal link and subordinate Austrian state treaty to German treaty: This proposal has no consequence except require Austria pay war indemnities without being rid of occupation troops, thus leaving Austria worse off than now since four-power occupation and control agreements provide some guarantee against unilateral pressures on Austria. Specific part of proposal that entails troop withdrawal from Vienna would leave that city isolated and surrounded by Russian armed forces, therefore subject all kinds of pressures.

e. Fears of renewed *Anschluss:* This fear groundless since article 4 precludes what Soviet delegation fears; precludes precisely and completely; binds four powers as well. Hence this groundless fear, a poor excuse for refusing to Austria independence and sovereignty promised 10 years ago.

Concluding: We must work towards a treaty, this treaty, which already almost agreed. Western powers had withdrawn proposed abbreviated treaty; USSR should accept this as evidence in good faith of desire get forward. Soviet proposals attempt link everything to everything else; but for once we have a clear and relatively simple problem; we should negotiate on that problem not on something else and thus be able to show the world we can agree on something. Concluded by urging conference proceed to consider five disagreed articles.

5. *Eden:* [8] Figl left no doubt that Austria cannot accept Soviet proposal. This not surprise since this proposal would postpone settlement indefinitely. Soviet delegation began yesterday by stressing importance Austrian settlement; therefore suggested almost every possible way to avoid settlement. He said, e.g. that even after conclusion Austrian treaty occupation troops should stay in Austria until German settlement; but in an earlier meeting he had said German peace treaty might be impossible; therefore he appears envisage indefinite occupation Austria. This Eden could not accept. What right have we to plan to keep troops in Austria pending settlement an unrelated problem?

He appreciates and was sure Figl (with his concentration camp personal experience) could appreciate Molotov's fears of a second *Anschluss* and another war; but necessary repeat this covered by article 4 to which Figl and the Austrians adhere.

Re proposal reference to deputies this not conspicuously successful in past. Deputies failed once on this Austrian treaty project; if we now facing failure, how could they succeed?

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[8] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)62, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 148-149.

He considered it important give fair consideration Figl's requests relative article 35 and himself could see no reason why agreement could not be reached. Other differences outstanding on present draft treaty so slight that there no reason why could not be settled in single afternoon.

Job before us is to conclude a treaty, not make excuses for not concluding one. He (Eden) had tabled a procedural proposal yesterday. Why could not conference accept this proposal, get on with job, justify conference at one stroke, and give fresh hope to world.

6. *Figl:*

a. Principal problem is to end occupation Austria.

b. Proposal to refer to deputies not appealing after 1949 experience.

c. Austria wants discussion on available draft state treaty which up until day before yesterday Austria understood Soviet accepted as basic discussion.

d. Re danger Austria cooperation in resurgent German militarism, he authorized and prepared say Austrian people want to live in freedom and friendship with all countries and have no intention enter military pact with any country; willing abide by principles UN charter and want to live as respected member that community of nations.

e. Re article 35 Austria happy accept Molotov's offer receive payment in goods deliveries rather than dollar payments; but this not completely responsive Austria requests; article 35 contains other provisions.

f. Re Trieste settlement: Austria not competent deal with this problem; but it seems to Austria unfair to couple Austrian treaty and end of occupation with something which not an Austrian problem at all.

7. *Molotov:* In lengthy (90 minute) speech characterized by heavy sarcasm, much repetition and backtracking, Molotov undertook clarify the "sense" of the Soviet proposals which he said others had attempted make as unclear as possible, thus complicating and drawing out the matter. His principal points, somewhat rearranged, were as follows:

a. Soviet proposals need study.

b. Essence Soviet proposals is that: (1) there should be immediate decision to terminate occupation and, while leaving troops, to leave no one with control powers or organisms; (2) there should be immediate decision to turn over to Austria all former German assets committed so to be turned over by provisions existing draft treaty.

c. USSR unable understand apathy toward Soviet proposal for referral to deputies; if three-month period too long, term of deputies assignment could be shortened; but after lapse of five years he unable understand what harm if three more months spent in ensuring that final steps are correct.

d. Re status troops that under Soviet proposals would remain in Austria, perhaps possible devise better formula express Soviet intention these troops be non-occupational in character; but this really unimportant since their presence would be only temporary pending completion German treaty. Others around table had insisted that leaving troops in Austria tantamount to continuing occupation; but this interpretation hardly consistent with existence US military bases in France, Italy, Greece, Norway, Iceland, et cetera. (He said there were 80 such bases in Europe and "adjacent territories," later upped figure to "almost 100".) Does this represent military occupation France, Italy, et cetera?

e. He unable understand opposition to Soviet proposal that all troops be evacuated from Vienna; doubtless certain "our officials" in Vienna would not like this but surely the Austrian people would. In any case such evacuation would be simultaneous with conclusion Austrian state treaty which by its terms would permit Austria have its own army to protect Vienna.

f. Other delegates had contended that since 47 articles of draft treaty already agreed it should be possible conclude other five in three days or so; but 47 articles were agreed in 1949 and since then certain things have changed e.g. (1) numerous US bases have been established in Europe and adjacent territories causing concern for European security; (2) plans had been made for establishment EDC and [illegible] resurgence German militarism; (3) there had been m[illegible] talk in West German (and indeed in Austrian) circles [illegible] new *Anschluss* evidence cited on this score included an alleged statement by a West German Minister, Keyser, expressing confidence that 1945 frontiers would fall; frequent meetings, to discuss *Anschluss*, of "hundreds of thousands" of members Hitler's former armies, now members various soldiers unions; statement by Stenderbach, leader of "independent union" in Austrian Parliament in August 1953 urging Austria not accept provisions Austrian state treaty especially provisions in article 4.

Therefore, if the three Western powers willing to reject EDC and prevent resurgence German militarism; or if German peace treaty concluded and signed to provide for peaceful democratic development Germany—then Soviet apprehensions would no longer be in force, matters would be facilitated, and some of Soviet proposals re Austria might be superfluous.

g. In discussions thus far, there had been too much guessing about what real thoughts of Soviets were, also too much discussion in terms moral standards and concepts; matter under discussion has nothing to do with moral concepts and indeed such concepts better invoked against those who would hamper conclusion treaty.

h. Only real objection raised to Soviet no-alliance proposal was French statement that Austria would object; but if neither we nor Austria object to Austria neutrality, why are French attempting speak for Austrians. RIAS recently said Austria would not join any military alliance; why therefore should anyone attempt convince conference and Austrians that Austrians should reject no-alliance proposal.

i. Re linkage Austrian question with Trieste question, significant factor is that Trieste is now Anglo-American military base; and since this situation directly in conflict with provisions Italian peace treaty (to effect that Trieste should be demilitarized and neutral and void of armed forces, except as directed by security council), it necessary in drafting any new treaty e.g. Austria, to consider measure to which existing treaties not being fulfilled.

j. Austrian statements had emphasized sacrifices and burdens imposed upon Austria; but it necessary remember 1,500,000 Austrians served in Hitler's army, 17 divisions were active on Soviet-German frontier, despite this record USSR makes no claims against Austria except what was agreed in draft treaty re former German assets. This provision should remain in force but USSR, as explained yesterday, will waive dollar payments and accept goods deliveries.

8. After customary recess, procedure discussion developed in course of which Molotov kept recurring [*referring*?] to his contention that "the principal points" i.e. the Soviet proposals should be considered first before conference allowed itself get bogged down in details; while other three ministers kept urging proceed systematically with consideration five disagreed articles, plus Austrian request re article 35. Both Bidault and Eden said their government would accept Soviet counter drafts on all five these articles, (Eden qualifying by making conditional on four ministers being able reach definitive agreement at this conference; failing such definitive agreement, UK would have to reserve and reconsider if matter were not to be settled until some indefinite future date). Dulles said US accepted Soviet draft article 16; did not speak on other four. Bidault said Soviet proposals appeared make certain other articles (e.g. article 33 paragraph 3) now disagreed and suggested might be necessary draw up new table of disagreed articles. Molotov said article 9 also now disagreed; and said he still wanted hear Austria's views on sum total Soviet proposals. (Figl declined speak further at this session.)

Toward end Molotov suggested appointment sub-committee to consider, Sunday morning, procedure to be followed Sunday afternoon; but after Bidault expressed a reservation that this not be interpreted as resurrecting procedure of referral to deputies and after Dulles said he skeptical whether sub-committee could solve problem, Molotov withdrew his proposal. It then agreed that ministers would reconvene Sunday afternoon to determine their procedure and then to try complete discussion.

9. Before adjournment Eden announced schedule tripartitely agreed as contained Secto 132. [9]

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[9] See footnote 4, Document 469.

No. 474

396.1 BE/2-1354: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 13, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 133. Department pass OSD, IBS/NY. Following is text of the Secretary's statement [2] at the 19th plenary session, [3] February 13, on the Austrian question:

Verbatim text.

Yesterday afternoon the Soviet Foreign Minister presented us with a rather peculiar sandwich. [4] The top and the bottom of his remarks stressed the necessity for the early conclusion of an Austrian state treaty, which would reestablish a free and independent Austria. But in between the top and bottom he inserted some poisonous proposals. They meant that the treaty, instead of re-establishing a free and independent Austria should establish an Austria without freedom and without independence.

I earnestly hope that these new proposals will be withdrawn, so that we may in fact conclude an Austrian state treaty at this very meeting, as promised in 1943.

The Soviet Foreign Minister's statement completely confirms the view I expressed yesterday that if we adhere to the present draft of the Austrian state treaty there remain only minor differences between us. As the Soviet proposals state, that draft treaty "was in the main agreed among the four-powers in 1949". Only five articles remain partially unagreed, and I am confident that with good will those articles could quickly be agreed upon. It will not take, as the Soviet Union suggests, three months to reach that agreement. It can be reached in three days or even less, so that we can in fact conclude the treaty at this conference in accordance with the proposal made yesterday by the three Western powers.

However, the Soviet Union has now introduced new proposals which would totally alter the situation. They would cut the heart out of the proposed treaty and turn the clock back, not to 1949, not to 1947, not even to 1943, but to the darker, earlier period when by Hitler's action Austria seemed hopelessly doomed to be forever the victim of alien occupation.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, Paris, London, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] Secretary Dulles' statement was circulated as FPM(54)60.

[3] For a report on this session, the sixteenth plenary, see Secto 134, *supra*.

[4] For the Soviet proposal on Austria, see FPM(54)55, Document 519.

The Soviet Union proposes to continue the military occupation of Austria "pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany".

Since the Soviet Union has rejected all proposals for the unification of Germany on the basis of free elections, and by its own latest German proposal, [5] treats the division of Germany as a semi-permanent condition, the Soviet Austrian proposal would mean an indefinite occupation of Austria. By requiring the withdrawal of all allied troops from Vienna, while retaining Soviet forces in the Soviet Zone, the capital of Austria would thus be left as a defenseless island, surrounded by a sea of Russian soldiers.

That occupation of Austria could never be terminated by any action of her own. It would be wholly within the power of the Soviet Union to prolong the occupation forever merely by perpetuating the division of Germany and blocking an all-German peace treaty.

If the Soviet proposal were adopted, it would pervert the Austrian state treaty and require its being rewritten from the preamble to the end.

How could we any longer in the preamble describe the treaty as being one designed to liberate Austria and to make it a free and independent state?

How could we any longer stipulate by Article 1 that "Austria shall be reestablished as a sovereign, independent and democratic state"?

How could we any longer declare as in Article 2 that we "will respect the independence and territorial integrity of Austria"?

Article 33 entitled "withdrawal of allied forces" would be obliterated and have to be replaced by an article entitled "the indefinite military occupation of Austria".

The treaty would thus become not a treaty for the liberation of Austria, but a treaty for the subjection of Austria.

A second major and related change in the treaty is proposed by the Soviet Union in terms of subjecting Austria to "neutralization".

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian state treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to choose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects the comparable choice of the Swiss nation.

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[5] For this Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)33, Document 514.

However, it is one thing for a nation to choose to be neutral and it is another thing to have neutrality forcibly imposed on it by other nations as a perpetual servitude.

A state subjected to such imposed neutralization is not in fact a sovereign and independent state. Such a demand makes a mockery of the language which the Soviet proposal retains that "Austria shall be reestablished as a sovereign, independent and democratic state".

It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union, at this moment when an Austrian state treaty seemed to be on the point of realization, should now propose provisions which would basically alter the entire character of the treaty and which would violate the Moscow declaration on Austria of November 1, 1943, whereby the three powers with the subsequent adhesion of France undertook "to see re-established a free and independent Austria". If the Soviet proposal were accepted, there would be not a free Austria, but an enslaved Austria; not an independent Austria, but a subject Austria.

If this four-power meeting accepted the Soviet proposal, we would expose ourselves before the world as being morally and politically bankrupt. We would have forfeited all right to the confidence of others in our willingness to fulfill our solemn pledges.

We do not know, we can only suspect, the reasons which prompt the Soviet to make its present proposal. The reasons given are grotesquely inadequate.

It is given as a reason that there is lacking a treaty with Germany, whereby Germany undertakes to respect the independence of Austria. It is said that until that undertaking is given, Austria must remain occupied.

The Soviet Foreign Minister would have us believe that during the period when Germany is occupied and totally disarmed—at least in the Western zones—the danger to Austria from Germany is so great that Austria must be occupied to protect it against that German danger; but that once Germany is restored to a unified and independent status with a national army of its own, then it will be safe to end the occupation of Austria. Such reasoning will not carry conviction anywhere.

A plausible explanation is the fact that Article 22 of the treaty of peace with Hungary and Article 21 of the treaty of peace with Roumania provide that the Soviet Union may maintain armed forces on the territory of these countries so long as this is needed for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria.

I can understand that the Soviet Union fears a withdrawal from Austria which would also require it to withdraw its Red armies from Hungary and Roumania.

Is it, however, really decent that little Austria should have to continue to be an occupied state so that the Soviet Union will have a pretext for continuing to occupy also Hungary and Roumania. So cynical an attitude will surely shock the conscience of the world.

We have heard from the Soviet Foreign Minister many words condemning "militarism". But everything which he proposes, whether it be in relation to Germany or in relation to Austria, or indirectly in relation to Hungary and Roumania, shows dependence on military power. No consideration of humanity prevails as against naked force.

The Soviet Minister has introduced in his Austrian proposal a proposal for the four of us to consider the question of Trieste. That proposal is unacceptable to the United States. In any event, it has no proper relationship to the Austrian question. I hope that its introduction does not mean that it is the intention of the Soviet Foreign Minister to make a conclusion of a state treaty with Austria dependent upon the prior solution of all other European questions, so that the first victim of Hitlerite aggression would automatically be the last to be relieved of the consequences of that aggression.

I earnestly plead with the Soviet Foreign Minister to withdraw the two Austrian proposals which he made yesterday, which, as I say, would completely revolutionize not only the text but also the character of the Austrian state treaty. If he will make that withdrawal, then I have every confidence that the remaining differences, which are very slight, can be composed. Then we could in fact conclude the Austrian state treaty at this meeting of the Foreign Ministers and crown our efforts here with an honorable success.

No. 475

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of Embassy in Austria (Davis) [1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 13, 1954.

Participants: *French*
M. Lalouette

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[1] A notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.

U.K.
Mr. Malcolm
Mr. Blair

Austria
Dr. Schoener
Dr. Leitmaier
Dr. Roessler
Dr. Gudenus

USA
Mr. Davis

Subject: Tactics on Austrian Question at Sunday Session

Mr. Malcolm began the discussion by asking the impression of the Austrians after today's session. [2] Dr. Schoener expressed a very pessimistic attitude toward the possibility of obtaining a State Treaty.

Mr. Malcolm, speaking on behalf of the Tripartite Group on Austria, then said he had come to tell the Austrians about our tactical plan for tomorrow, though this was of course subject to final approval of the Ministers. He said in our view there was practically no chance that Mr. Molotov could be deflected from his proposal and persuaded to conclude a treaty at this time. Mr. Molotov's speech today made it abundantly clear that he connected the settlement of the Austrian question with a multitude of other conditions having little or no relation with the Austrian problem.

Therefore, Mr. Malcolm continued, we thought the best tactics to follow tomorrow were as follows. Mr. Molotov in the Chair would open up and would either speak on procedure or would ask Mr. Dulles to speak. He might even request the Austrians to speak first on the Soviet proposals. [3]

If Mr. Dulles spoke first, he would agree to accept the Soviet versions of the five unagreed articles as the French and British already have done this afternoon. He would also agree, if Mr. Molotov insisted, upon the Soviet addition to Article Nine after reading the precise text into the minutes. Article 35 with the Soviet amendment by Mr. Molotov would then be confirmed. This was all that was needed to complete the treaty and the above offers were conditioned upon no additional articles being added to the treaty and upon having the treaty concluded at this Conference.

M. Bidault and Mr. Eden would make similar points.

Mr. Malcolm then pointed out that undoubtedly Mr. Molotov's tactics would be to have the discussion centered on his proposal, particularly the article concerning neutrality. This was a very dangerous point and we intended to make it absolutely clear that additional amendments to the treaty were unacceptable. It was therefore important that we know the position of the Austrian Delegation which we hoped would be able to support our points.

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[2] For a report on the sixteenth plenary session, see Secto 134, Document 473.

[3] For the Soviet proposal on Austria, see FPM(54)55, Document 519.

Dr. Schoener replied that he would have to consult with Dr. Figl and Mr. Kreisky. He remarked that their instructions from Vienna would not permit them to go beyond the statement they made today declaring it was not the intention of the Austrian government to join any military alliance. This was not, however, an authority for them to reject any amendment to the treaty. However, he understood the import of this point and he thought that Dr. Figl, who would see Mr. Eden at 11 a m on Sunday morning, would be able to support the position outlined by the Tripartite group.

H. M. DAVIS

No. 476

396.1 BE/2-1354: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Berlin

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1954—2:01 p.m.

Tedul 45. Limit distribution. Dultes 68 and 70.[1] Appreciate difficulties negotiation with Molotov this subject in light special problems of French. We agree, however, it necessary avoid giving Chinese Communists Great Power status or discussing Indochina before Korea. Occurs to us status problem might be finessed by device like that we suggested at Panmunjom talks—namely, that Berlin Conference resolution might list in alphabetical order all states which four Foreign Ministers recommend should participate in a Korean Conference at a stipulated time and place if they so desire. A second list could also be included for a subsequent conference, or second phase of original conference, when discussions at Korean Conference and Southeast Asia situation show favorable prospects for peace exist.

We of course not in position know whether negotiating situation warrants introduction this idea. If it is feasible it would furnish basis for getting rid of undesirable elements in revised Soviet draft and would demonstrate negotiating flexibility which might be helpful with French.

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[1] Dulte 68 transmitted a summary of the third restricted session (see U.S. Delegation record, Document 463). Dulte 70 transmitted the revised paragraph 4 of the Soviet proposal for a five-power conference (see footnote 2, *ibid.*).

SMITH

February 14, 1954

No. 477

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum for the Record, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 14, 1954.

Mr. Roland de Margerie telephoned to me at 9:30 this morning to say he wished to call urgently to show me a proposal which Mr. Bidault was considering submitting to the Berlin Conference, with respect to Agenda Item 2 (Germany and European Security). Mr. de Margerie had previously spoken to me about this possibility. (See Attachment 1, Memo of Conversation.[2])

Accordingly, Mr. de Margerie called on Mr. Merchant and myself at the U.S. Headquarters at 10:15 a.m. and gave us a copy of the French text of the proposal on European Security which Mr. Bidault was thinking of tabling. (Rough translation by U.S. Delegation is Attachment 2). Mr. de Margerie explained that the Molotov proposal on European Security[3] had struck no responsive echo in terms of French public opinion, and in fact had had a poor reception. On the other hand, the situation with respect to the French Parliament was quite different, and there was a great deal of insistence that the West take a positive stand with respect to European security rather than simply refuse to accept the Molotov plan.

After we had read the Bidault proposal Mr. de Margerie asked for our reaction. Mr. Merchant and I said we thought the proposal was extremely dangerous on a number of grounds. In the first place, it was not a document which could be just tossed in lightly to the four-power conference, and as far as the United States was concerned, it would require most careful study because there were certain implications, notably in paragraph 4 on page 3 (of unofficial translation) [which] raised very real constitutional considerations for the United States.

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[1] There are no records for meetings of the U.S. Delegation or the Tripartite Working Group on Feb. 14.

[2] This memorandum reported that on Feb. 12 de Margerie had informed MacArthur that Bidault was "toying" with the idea of a new proposal on Germany and European security.

[3] For this proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.

Furthermore, and of great importance, was the fact that Molotov's proposal on European security had fallen flat in terms of Western opinion, and by inserting a new proposal which was broad and fuzzy in many details, we would risk taking the focus off the fundamental and basic fact that the Molotov proposal was preposterous, thereby injecting some apparently new and different ideas which Molotov would most certainly exploit. For example, he might say there were now two proposals for security and that after the Foreign Ministers left Deputies should meet to reconcile them. This kind of tactic would confuse public opinion, take the heat off the Soviets, and might be extremely difficult for the French, for example, to resist. Since we had all agreed that it would be disastrous in terms of EDC and other policies for the Conference to break up with the work being passed on to Deputies, the Bidault proposal seemed a very bad one.

Mr. de Margerie said while he did not agree with all the reasons we had set forth, he would let Mr. Bidault know our reaction, and it was left that the three Western Ministers themselves would discuss this matter when they met at 3 this afternoon.

Subsequently, Mr. de Margerie called on Sir Frank Roberts, who called me by telephone to tell me that he felt just as strongly as Mr. Merchant and myself that the proposal was dangerous.

The Secretary met with the other two Western Ministers in accordance with arrangements made, and the first item discussed was Mr. Bidault's security proposal.[4] Mr. Bidault opened by saying he understood his proposal had had a very poor reception with both the United States and United Kingdom Delegations, and that in view of this he thought the best thing to do was for him to withdraw the suggestion, and that we should forget about the entire idea. Mr. Eden welcomed this suggestion, as did Secretary Dulles. Accordingly, it was agreed that the proposal would be dropped and that Mr. Bidault would concentrate on making a strong speech at the afternoon session of February 15 when Agenda Item 2 was again to be considered, pointing out the fallacies and illusory character of the Molotov proposal.

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[4] The three Foreign Ministers met at 3 p.m. in the ACA building. In addition to Bidault's proposal they also discussed Austria and the announcement of the termination date for the conference. (Memorandum by MacArthur, Feb. 13, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204)

[Attachment]

Proposal by the French Delegation [5]

SECRET

BERLIN, undated.

RESOLUTION

ON THE SUBJECT OF SECURITY

The Governments of the United States, of France, of the United Kingdom, and of the U.S.S.R.

Renew the expression of their attachment to collective security,

Reexamine their will to fulfill the obligations which they have assumed in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, worldwide security organization, without prejudice to the right granted to each of the members of the organization to participate in defensive regional associations,

Recall that the member States are free to define the extension of such associations, taking into account the community of ideals and of interests which binds them to other peoples, and that they can underwrite, with this in view, with other peace-loving States, all arrangements of a defensive character which appear desirable to them,

Declare their resolve to pursue their efforts within the framework of the United Nations with a view to reaching gradually the truly satisfactory form of collective security which would be constituted by a general disarmament, simultaneous and controlled, which would alone be able to eliminate the military preponderance of any State in Europe,

Recall that the success of certain efforts supposes as a preliminary condition the cessation of hostilities wherever they are taking place.

The four Governments emphasize that an essential element of security would be European settlement through which the free and reconcilable peoples would give back this part of the world to its true destiny which is to divide and not to unite the world.

This settlement in their opinion can only be achieved through stages, of which the first is necessarily the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany and of the Austrian State treaty.

They consider that in order to contribute to security and to make impossible the rebirth of militarism, the German settlement must be inspired by the following principles:

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[5] Attached to the source text was the French language version.

The peace treaty must not be imposed but negotiated with a government which is representative of the whole of Germany, in no case should the freedom of action of this government have the result of endangering the security of Germany's neighbors.

The four powers therefore agree to uphold, insofar as they are concerned, the necessity of inserting the following clauses in the German peace settlement:

1. The four powers undertake to uphold the candidacy of Germany for the United Nations so that she will thereafter be bound by the obligations of Article 2 of the Charter.

2. Germany shall not have a national army at its disposal. She will be free to furnish a contribution in men and in armaments to a regional defense organization of her own choosing.

The clauses foreseen to this end should, in the opinion of the four powers, include guarantees of an organic character without recourse to coercive controls.

3. A united Germany shall never take any initiative susceptible of altering the purely defensive character of this organization.

She shall undertake not to have recourse to force in any case whatsoever in order to solve the differences which might arise between her and other States.

4. In the event that Germany should undertake armed action in violation of the above commitments, the four governments would consider such action as a threat against their own security and would take in common all measures necessary to reestablish peace within the framework of the United Nations.

With regard to the period before the peace treaty, the four governments agree not to subordinate to any preliminary conditions the organization of free elections in order to achieve the rapid formation of a German government.

They note that the maintenance of troops of the four powers in the zones up to the time of the peace treaty renders impossible any action by the German government which might threaten security.

They agree consequently to renounce the usage of exceptional powers borne up with the protection of the security of troops except by unanimous agreement in case of grave threat of internal trouble.

The four governments consider it indispensable to favor the progressive reestablishment among the European countries of normal relations founded on the respect of the individual and of the fundamental rights of the individual.

They consider that the objective to be reached in the long run is the pulling together among these countries of bonds freely entered into and the establishment of relationships which assure the security of all through the rest of the obligations of the Charter.

They emphasize that the creation of a system of European security will have to take into account the fact that certain states of

Europe and especially the three great European powers represented at this Conference have territories or responsibilities outside of Europe.

They consider it necessary not to interfere with security organizations in which there are both European and non-European States.

They affirm that such a system of organization of relations between the European States in which these States could envisage the establishment of common institutions with the aim of making impossible any recourse to force on the part of one of them, must represent the crowning of an effort tending to put an end to the consequences of the war and to stabilize the territorial situation in conditions susceptible of assuring in durable form the pacification of Europe and of the world.

No. 478

Editorial Note

On Sunday, February 14, before the seventeenth plenary meeting (see Sectos 144 and 145, *infra* and Document 480), Secretary Dulles held a press conference in Berlin to respond to questions concerning the progress of the conference. The United States Delegation transmitted the transcript of the press conference in Secto 148 from Berlin, February 15. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210)

No. 479

396.1 BE/2-1554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 15, 1954—2 p.m.
PRIORITY

Secto 144. Department pass OSD. Following summary first part of twentieth Ministers' meeting February 14, Molotov presiding: [2]

Secretary Dulles spoke first and read proposal transmitted Secto 137. [3] Bidault and Eden then associated themselves with US proposal. Figl said that before speaking he would like to hear Molotov's response to position advanced by US, UK and France.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the seventeenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/17, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195. The record of the second part of the meeting was transmitted in Secto 145, *infra*.

[3] For the U.S. proposal, see FPM(54)63, Document 520. Secto 137, which transmitted it, is not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1454)

Molotov spoke then at some length on theme that while US proposal removed number of differences between four powers there were still several to be overcome; including following:

1. *Article 48 bis.* Molotov said this article not agreed because it would require an agreement between Austria and Soviet Union, which should be concluded prior conclusion of treaty.
2. *Trieste.* After withdrawing proposal for meeting of deputies in view of agreement on disagreed articles, Molotov submitted proposal on Trieste contained in Secto 138.[4]
3. *Article 35.* Molotov circulated proposed revised text of paragraph 6 contained Secto 139.[5]
4. *Article 4 bis.* Molotov submitted proposed amendment contained Secto 140.[6]
5. *Article 33.* Proposed revised text transmitted Secto 141.[7]

Molotov then defended at length Soviet proposals regarding retention occupation troops in Austria after conclusion of treaty, along lines previous statements.[8] He stressed that proposals on Articles 4 bis and 33 represent minimum Soviet requirements. He concluded by expressing hope signature of treaty would not be prevented and that Austria would understand that Soviet proposals would benefit Austria.

Figl spoke next and said that he had pointed out repeatedly that a number of treaty clauses placed heavy burden on Austria. Austria was willing to assume these but wanted in return that occupation troops be withdrawn and leave country independent. He welcomed proposal advanced by US, UK and France and said he was prepared to sign treaty in that form. With regard to new Soviet proposals, Figl said that his authorization extended only to previous draft and that he could make no statement on Articles 33 or 4 bis. He stressed however that Austrians want freedom and independence and that main criterion for independence is withdrawal of troops.

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[4] Not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1454) This proposal, circulated as FPM(54)64, reads as follows:

"The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the U.K. and France would like to suggest to the Security Council that it should resume consideration of the question of implementing that part of the Italian Peace Treaty which is concerned with the Free Territory of Trieste."

[5] Not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1454) For text of this proposal, see FPM(54)67, Document 522.

[6] Not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1454) This proposal, which was circulated as FPM(54)65, reads as follows:

"Austria undertakes not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Germany and in the liberation of Austria.

"Austria undertakes further not to permit the establishment on its territory of foreign bases, and not to permit the use of foreign military instructors and specialists in Austria."

[7] Not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1454) For this proposal, see FPM(54)66, Document 521.

[8] For the Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)55, Document 519.

Secretary Dulles then made statement transmitted Secto 136.[9]

Bidault, in reference to Molotov's statement that Article 48 bis required negotiation of an agreement between Austria and Soviet Union before conclusion of an Austrian treaty, said that this was not true if Soviet text were accepted. Bidault pointed out that there was no reference to Trieste in Soviet formulation of item three of agenda and emphatically declined to discuss Trieste in connection with Austria. With regard to Molotov's new proposals for amendments to articles previously agreed, Bidault pointed out that deputies had met as recently as February 9, 1953. He said there had been no change in European situation since that time which would warrant reopening these articles. He deplored fact that after discussing the treaty for so many years and just when agreement seemed in sight, these new factors should be introduced. He wondered if this did not raise some question as to whether all of four powers were equally willing to conclude treaty.

Bidault's statement was followed by recess.

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[9] Document 481.

No. 480

396.1 BE/2-1554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 15, 1954—2 p.m.

Secto 145. Department pass OSD. Following is summary on second part plenary session February 14:[2]

Eden stated West had accepted Soviet text on previously disagreed articles, thereby showing spirit conciliation but Soviets now insist no Austrian treaty until Security Council debated and agreed upon Trieste question and Austria not permitted enter into coalitions nor military alliances. This last condition should not be imposed on any independent government. Furthermore, Soviets make final departure foreign troops dependent upon signing German treaty which they themselves delaying by withholding free elections. Molotov also states must get rid of NATO, EDC if you want

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] For a report on the first part of the seventeenth plenary, see Secto 144, *supra*.

Austrian treaty. This would give Western Europe same kind of security and independence as Hungary and Rumania. UK ready to sign Austrian treaty accepting Soviet text on disagreed articles.

Figl stated Austria ready accept all Soviet proposals but could not agree additional burdens. He only authorized to agree old proposals.

Molotov spoke at length on US bases abroad maintaining strong measures and pressures used before agreement reached to establish them. He maintained that proposal to refer Trieste question to Security Council need not delay signing Austrian treaty. He again referred to proposal leave troops in Austria for short time stating that this would not be occupation and would contribute international peace. He continued harp on *Anschluss* theme and danger resurgence German militarism as justification leaving troops Austria. He insisted he did not make abandonment EDC as condition for Austrian treaty although he did admit that discarding EDC plans would facilitate conclusion treaty. He maintained Soviet proposal was modest one taking into account present situation in Europe and laid especial emphasis on leaving certain foreign detachments in Austria with no occupation functions. He made it clear that Soviet proposal prohibiting Austria enter into coalitions had not been withdrawn.

Secretary referred to Molotov's "upside down" reasoning. He was not surprised that much of Molotov speech defending imposition of foreign troops upon Austria, was devoted to exposé of what a terrible system it is when you have foreign troops on soil of another sovereign nation.

Bidault pointed out French delegation had accepted Soviet versions of controversial articles, that last meeting of Deputies held February 1953. [3] Therefore there could be no comparing situation with that of five or seven years ago. Questions such as bases in Iceland, Trieste, et cetera, had nothing to do with Austrian matter. He agreed that appropriate clause regarding *Anschluss* should be contained in German treaty.

Eden stated in view certain decisions Security Council he did not think it wise to adopt Soviet proposal on Trieste. Furthermore, this question had nothing to do with Austrian treaty. Seemed to him that Soviets were merely finding new pretext for delay. He expressed hope that agreement could be reached on Secretary's proposal which would place Berlin Conference in fine position in history and do great service to small country which richly deserves it.

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[3] For documentation on the meeting of the Deputies for Austria in February 1953, see Documents 843 ff.

Figl repeated Austrian delegation had gone as far as possible within the limits its authorization.

Molotov concluded meeting by stating Austrian problem would be discussed again at time to be set the next plenary meeting.

No. 481

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210 Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

BERLIN, February 14, 1954.

Secto 136. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary's statement, 17th session Foreign Ministers meeting, February 14: [2]

Mr. Chairman, I have listened attentively to your presentation and to the proposals which you submitted. Some of the proposals involve technical treaty changes, and I cannot fully appraise them until I have seen the texts. However, I think I have seized the general import of what you have said.

The Austrian treaty which we are considering concluding is a treaty which imposes very heavy economic burdens upon Austria, economic burdens which we believe are not justifiable to be placed upon Austria. But the Austrian Foreign Minister has indicated that his government is prepared to assume these heavy burdens in order to get independence.

It is the proposal of the Soviet Union as I understand, that Austria should be compelled to make all these payments and then get nothing in the way of independence at all. The whole heart and core of independence is being able, if you want, to have foreign troops off your soil; or, if you want, to invite foreign troops to your soil as allies. Both of these privileges of sovereignty are denied to Austria by the Soviet proposed treaty, so she will have paid, and gotten nothing for what she has paid.

The United States is not prepared to be a party to trying to compel Austria to pay a great price for independence, and then denying that independence.

We believe that would be a fraud, and we are not prepared to be a party to such a fraud.

The Soviet Foreign Minister makes a very curious argument, yet seeks to justify requiring Austria to accept for an indefinite period the presence of foreign troops, which he says are not occupation troops.

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[1] Repeated to New York, London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a report on the seventeenth plenary, see Sectos 144 and 145, Document 479 and *supra*.

But they certainly are occupying Austria. They do not stay suspended in the air somewhere; they are in Austria. They occupy Austria.

There is no parallel between that and the so-called United States bases, which Mr. Molotov is constantly referring to. If having foreign troops in a country is comparable to a base system, and is as evil as Mr. Molotov suggests, then why does he insist on perpetuating that system and inflicting it upon Austria?

The United States, and France and the United Kingdom, want the elimination of troops from Austria. That, I would think, would be in line with what the Soviet Foreign Minister professes to be good international policy. But all of a sudden, he is the one who is contending for imposing a base system upon Austria.

It is, however, not a base system as the United States understands it, but something infinitely different and infinitely worse. There is no sovereign state in the whole world where the United States has any troops except at the express invitation and will of the sovereign country which asks us to be there as a contribution to its own defense.

There is really a difference, although the Soviet Foreign Minister seems not to appreciate it, between being in a country at a freely given invitation of that country, and imposing oneself on a country forcefully, which is a form of subjugation. This the United States will have no part of, and it will have no part of it in relation to Austria, an Austria which is subjected to the conditions which the Soviet Foreign Minister proposes would not become free and independent Austria which all of us have solemnly promised time after time after time.

It would be an indefinitely subjugated country and that would be to make a mockery of all of our promises.

The Soviet Foreign Minister constantly uses the word "temporary" in order to make his proposals sound a little less harsh and brutal than it is.

But "temporary" is a word which, under the conditions which are prescribed, could more accurately be put "indefinitely". I recall the "temporary" nature of the stationing of Soviet forces in Hungary and in Rumania. They were only to stay there until an Austrian treaty would end the Austrian occupation. Now that an Austrian treaty is in sight, the Soviet forces are to stay in Austria until there is a German treaty. And no one in the world can tell what new conditions will be imposed if it ever seems likely that there will be a German treaty—rather Soviet Union to permit the all-

German free elections which are the indispensable foundation for a German treaty.

Reference has been made to the reason for the delay in the concluding of a treaty with Austria. Anyone who is familiar with the record knows that it has been repeatedly made clear to the Soviet delegation over the past several years that the Western allies were prepared to accept the provisions of the treaty, to which we now formally indicate agreement, and every time that that suggestion has been made the Soviet Union has thought up some other reason as to why it could not proceed with the treaty—Yugoslavia, Trieste, the failure to settle its bill for the dried peas. One after the other excuse has been brought up.

Now we could understand that that shabby performance could be carried on at meetings of the deputies, which had largely ceased to attract the public's attention, because they had been going on so many years.

But we really did not think that that performance would be repeated here, at the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers themselves, with the eyes of the world focused on what we do, and that new excuses would be thought up, new reasons given, not to conclude the Austrian treaty, just at the moment when it seemed to be in our grasp.

I really would like to urge on the Soviet Union's Minister that he drop these new proposals, which were never heard of before we came here a few days ago, and allow this great humanitarian task to be completed, redeeming our promise to give freedom and liberation to Austria.

In conclusion, I recall that the United States' proposal [3] stated that the United States was prepared to accept certain articles in the form proposed by the Soviet Union on the condition that the four Foreign Ministers would confirm their past acceptance of article 4 and article 33, among others.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has proposed basic changes in both article 4 and article 33, which had previously been accepted. I take it he refuses to confirm their acceptance as proposed by the United States. If that is the case, that would involve a rejection of the United States' proposal, because the United States is not prepared itself to accept the changes in articles 4 and 33 which have been proposed by the Soviet Foreign Minister to impose "neutralization" and continuing occupation.

There are some other changes he has proposed which are technical and on which I do not pronounce myself, dealing only with the two major proposals relating to the change in the previously accepted articles 4 and 33.

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[3] FPM(54)63, Document 520.

No. 482

396.1 BE/2-1554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Embassy in Austria [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 15, 1954—1 a.m.

97. 1. Separate cables [2] give you comprehensive story today's meeting on Austria and Secretary's statements. In short West offered for this conference only and without alterations or additions all previously agreed articles, five unagreed articles with Soviet versions, article 35 with Soviet amendment allowing payment $150 million in goods and article 9 with Soviet addition since originally agreed. Molotov immediately added requirements in his February 12 proposal, [3] modifying but not basically altering Trieste conditions. Figl expressed readiness accept Western proposal in spite burdens.

2. West reiterated its rejection maintenance foreign troops in Austria after treaty (Soviets proposed revision article 33 to cover their point) and neutrality clause (submitted as article 4-bis using exact language February 12 proposal). West also rejected Trieste point, requirement that German peace treaty be achieved before troop withdrawal and Soviet objections EDC and US bases.

Figl asked by Molotov for views and held to line that Austrian people ready only accept 1949 draft treaty, retention troops not restoration independence and his instructions do not permit him going further than 1949 draft. Meeting closed with inference that Figl would take opportunity obtain instructions re Soviet proposals before next session on Austria, probably Tuesday.

3. After meeting tripartite agreement reached on following:

(a) At dinner tonight Bidault will stress to Figl importance Austrian rejection Soviet proposals in spite certainty heavy Soviet pressure.

(b) Acting High Commissioners Vienna should see Raab and Schaerf to ascertain their reactions and make sure West views clearly understood. Three High Commissioners should concert but decide among themselves whether make *démarche* singly or together.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Washington. The source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] Sectos 144, 145, and 136, Documents 479 and 480 and *supra*.

[3] FPM(54)55, Document 519.

4. Generally agreed line most of which obvious to you is:

(a) After ascertaining reactions, Raab restate West position on both troops and imposed neutrality: West rejects both unequivocally but equally important, he realize offer sign long draft with Soviet versions unagreed articles remains open until end of conference but only then. Hope he stands by his February 13 communiqué[4] though it was slightly weak on neutrality.

(b) We appreciate pressure he is undergoing but dangers Soviet subversion all or part Austria plain if Soviet proposals accepted.

(c) Important instructions to Figl treat Soviet proposals as whole. Austrian acceptance article 4-bis on neutrality (least difficult for Austrians) would not result treaty since Soviet version article 33 and Trieste problem would remain in path restoration Austrian freedom and sovereignty. Moreover, important principle international policies free world would be jeopardized and there would be no guarantee Soviets would not merely pocket Austrian concession and move on to new demands.

(d) Retention troops in Austria clearly of paramount importance to Soviets and not to be traded for other concessions. (Figl seems firm in refusing this point so far.)

(e) Only if Raab inquires re possible alleviations in lieu of treaty should you say that we are beginning cast about for possibilities but of course can suggest nothing specific at this time. (Appreciate Vienna's 63,[5] would like Department's thoughts and will discuss subject at tripartite working group February 15.[6])

Will do our best here stiffen backs Austrian delegation but play obviously now in Vienna.

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[4] The Embassy in Vienna transmitted a summary of this statement in telegram 2046, Feb. 13. (663.001/2-1354)

[5] Telegram 63 assumed that there would be no agreement on Austria at the conference and transmitted a series of suggestions looking to the gradual liberation of Austria. (663.001/2-1454)

[6] No record of the discussion at the Tripartite Working Group on Feb. 15 has been found in Department of State files.

No. 483

396.1 BE/2-1554: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 15, 1954—1 a.m.

Dulte 75. Limit distribution. Reference Dulte's 68 and 70. [2] Slightly revised version French draft sponsored by UK delegation with participation of French delegation as to Indochina section, was considered by tripartite Foreign Ministers early this evening. [3] British under cabinet instructions to seek version as unobjectionable to Soviets as possible, while standing firm on five-power issue. Eden prepared present it at restricted meeting tomorrow. Text follows with minor amendments adopted during meeting:

"The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, meeting in Berlin, (*considering*) that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia, (*propose*) a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and any of those countries that contributed forces to the United Nations command in Korea which may desire to participate, to meet in Geneva on April 15 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

(Agree), further, that, if and when the discussions of the above-mentioned conference and the situation in Southeast Asia show that favorable prospects for peace exist, they will jointly agree on the conditions for calling another conference for the restoration of peace in Indochina, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the Chinese People's Republic, and the appropriate states of Southeast Asia will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference on Korea shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded."

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[1] Drafted by McConaughy and repeated to London and Paris.

[2] See footnote 1, Document 476.

[3] McConaughy had met with Allen and Roux during the afternoon to discuss a new British draft for which the French had participated in preparing the paragraph on Indochina. The British draft *mutatis mutandis* was presented to the Foreign Ministers immediately following the seventeenth plenary (see Sectos 144 and 145, Documents 479 and 480) and they approved it with some minor amendments. McConaughy recorded these events in a memorandum, dated Feb. 14, not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204)

At the suggestion of Secretary it was agreed to hold this draft in reserve for use only if Soviet tactics should make its introduction by Eden or Bidault seem advisable.

Although this draft not as good for our purposes as our own, believe we can acquiesce in it if tactical situation seems to call for it, since our basic principle is not compromised.

Note Korean paragraph follows closely suggestion in Tedul 45. [4] Indochina paragraph somewhat unfortunate in that no countries specifically named except five including Communist China. However, specific inclusion of "appropriate states of Southeast Asia" clearly maintains principle of no five-power conference. French strongly oppose specific mention Associated States because they think it would inevitably lead to Soviet demand for specific mention of Viet Minh, which is unacceptable.

DULLES

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[4] Document 476.

February 15, 1954

No. 484

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 205

Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference, February 15, 1954, 9:30 a.m.

SECRET

USDEL MIN/10

Present:	The Secretary Special Advisers Advisers

1. Press Reaction

Mr. Tyler reported that the conference had received relatively lighter treatment in the French press. Most papers headlined the fact that the conference would end on Thursday. They described the tight deadlock on the Austrian State Treaty giving sympathetic treatment to the Western position and attributing the deadlock to Soviet intransigence. Most papers commented to the effect that the Soviets will not give ground on any question which might involve withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria or Germany. However, the neutralist *Combat* appeals to the West to be more patient with Molotov.

A review of the French press indicates that the attitudes of the various groups in France, both inside and outside the government, have become more firmly drawn on the question of EDC and Indo-China.

Mr. Boerner said that the Austrian Treaty discussions were the top story in the West German press. The majority of the papers held little hope for a successful outcome of the conference and placed the blame on Molotov for the extreme nature of the Soviet demands. However, the SPD papers are still critical of Adenauer, particularly his efforts to push the EDC, and still see some "positive elements" in Molotov's proposal for European security. [1] One SPD paper even suggested that the problem of German unification should be placed before the UN and concerted effort made to obtain agreement there.

With respect to the East German press, the general coverage of yesterday's discussions were extraordinarily factual. Mr. Boerner added that he could not recall an instance in the East German press of a more factual reporting on any subject in which the East and the West were directly involved.

Mr. Jackson stated that the U.S. press all emphasized the sudden "surprise move" to achieve the conclusion of an Austrian State Treaty. Most papers commented on the high degree of unity among the Western Ministers. The stories filed by the wire services last night all write off the conference as foredoomed to failure because of Molotov's intransigence.

The Secretary pointed out the relationship of the negotiations on Austria to the German problem. It seemed to him that the experiment in trying to get Soviet agreement on the Austrian Treaty disproves the theory that we could obtain an end to the occupation in Germany or the withdrawal of troops. Even when the West offered the Soviets their own plan for Austria, the Soviets turned it down. The Secretary noted that this was a powerful argument which could be used in connection with German unification issue.

Mr. Boerner then reported that the German press had engaged in mixed reporting as to a possible meeting between the Secretary and Chancellor Adenauer. Some papers had stated that Adenauer plans to come to Berlin to see the Secretary and to make a major speech aimed primarily at the East Germans. Others stated that the Secretary intended to see Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn at the conclusion of the conference. The Secretary remarked that he could shed no light on this particular subject as yet. However, he was concerned regarding the necessity for some statement by the West reassuring the Germans of its continuing interest in Berlin. There was the danger that unless the West strongly re-affirmed its interests, the disillusionment following the conference might lead to Berlin's withering on the vine. There then followed a discussion of this problem in which it was noted that the UK and France are vacillating and weak on this point. Efforts at the working level to get French and British agreement to a reaffirmation of the tripartite declaration of March 1952 [2] have been unsuccessful. It was the consensus that we should press the UK and France further on this point and that in the end they would probably agree to a strong statement.

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[1] FPM(54)46, Document 516.

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[2] Presumably a reference to the tripartite Foreign Ministers declaration on Berlin, May 26, 1952, Document 538.

No. 485

396.1 BE/2-1554

United States Delegation Record of the Fourth Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 15, 1954, 11 a.m. [1]

SECRET

Present:
- *United States*
  - Secretary Dulles
  - Mr. Merchant
  - Mr. Nash
  - Mr. Bohlen
- *France*
  - Mr. Bidault
  - Mr. Parodi
  - Mr. De Margerie
  - Mr. Andronikow
- *United Kingdom*
  - Mr. Eden
  - Mr. Roberts
  - Mr. Allen
  - Mr. Birse
- *USSR*
  - Mr. Molotov
  - Mr. Gromyko
  - Mr. Malik
  - Mr. Troyanovski

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[1] A summary of this meeting was transmitted in Dulte 79 from Berlin, Feb. 16 (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

The Secretary, as Chairman, said he understood that this restricted meeting was for further discussion on point one of the agenda. There was before them the matter of a resolution concerning one or more conferences on Far Eastern matters and also there was still the problem of disarmament. He inquired whether his colleagues wished to continue the discussion on the possible Far Eastern conference. He pointed out, however, that at some time they would have to deal with the question of disarmament.

Mr. Bidault stated that the French Delegation was ready to talk on this proposal concerning disarmament but he felt that they had not clarified the situation which resulted from their last session on Asiatic problems. Consequently, they had an interest in continuing discussion of that question.

Mr. Eden agreed that the Far Eastern conference should be discussed.

Mr. Molotov also agreed and said that there should be later an exchange of views on the disarmament conference.

Mr. Bidault said that there was some uncertainty after their last discussion as to exactly what was the substance of the Soviet amendments to their original proposal, particularly in regard to paragraph 5 of their draft and its relation to paragraph 3 of the French proposal. [2] He said it seemed obvious to the French Delegation that there would have to be a different composition for the discussions of the two subjects they had in mind—namely, Korea and Indochina. He said he felt the reference which had been questioned by the Soviet Delegation to "favorable prospects for peace" in the French resolution was certainly clear as far as Communist China was concerned. What was needed was the creation of a favorable climate for the beginning of peace as against hostilities in Asia. This climate would affect the whole of Asia. In conclusion, if the Soviet proposal, as amended, in regard to the composition of these conferences was compatible with the French draft, he would be glad to examine it, but he wished to repeat that any text which gave China a privileged position was unacceptable.

Mr. Eden said he had nothing to say at this moment.

Mr. Molotov said for the Soviet Delegation he could say that they had put forward an amendment to their earlier proposal and that now he could circulate in written form the full text of their present proposal including these amendments. It was true that the original proposal was unclear with regard to the participants. For the consideration of the Korean question and the Indochinese question he felt that the draft which he was now circulating would clarify this point and respond to Mr. Bidault's statements (text of amended Soviet proposal attached [3]).

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[2] For text of the Soviet proposal, see Document 518. For text of the French proposal, see the U.S. Delegation record of the second restricted meeting, Document 459.

The Secretary asked if he could make a few observations. He said, as he interpreted the revised Soviet proposal, it contemplates a five-power conference which would then itself decide whether, when and under what conditions a conference on Korea and similarly a conference on Indochina would be held. The United States had made it clear that it would not participate in a five-power conference as such. The U.S. would be prepared to participate with other indispensable parties in a conference on Korea in which Communist China would also participate. The original U.S. proposal [4] had contemplated that they here would actually call a conference to deal with the Korean question and this feature was also embodied in the French proposal. Both proposals contemplated a definite date and place for the meeting of the Korean conference, but both date and place were absent in the Soviet amended text. Furthermore, the Soviet proposal was unclear as to whether the list of states to attend the Korean conference was exclusive and was not subject to reexamination when the five powers meet. The U.S. and French texts contemplated a possible Indochinese conference if and when developments at the Korean political conference and in Southeast Asia showed favorable prospects for peace. This point is not contained in the Soviet proposal. In summary, the Soviet proposal seemed to us to settle nothing but merely contemplated, what apparently had been the Soviet aim from the beginning, transferring to the five-power conference the problems they were struggling with here. For these reasons the United States Delegation could not consider that the Soviet amended proposal was much of an advance.

Mr. Bidault said it was difficult offhand to give views on a proposal which on the surface was somewhat different but in substance appeared to differ little from the original text. It seemed to him that paragraph 4 concerning the participants in the conference and the conditions under which the various parties would meet was not clear. It should not, however, be impossible, taking into account what had been said at these meetings, to overcome these difficulties. Paragraph 5 (Indochina) was not acceptable to the French Delegation and paragraph 6 (final paragraph) was also rejected.

Mr. Eden stated that Mr. Dulles had clearly outlined the difficulties which they or at least he felt on reading the Soviet text. He agreed with Mr. Bidault that these difficulties were conceivably reconcilable. On the Soviet agenda, point one was the political conference on Korea. He would like to be clear that when they assembled at this conference they would not begin to discuss a Korean political conference but that such a gathering would, in itself, be a political conference and would not merely consider if one was to be held. Then, if matters went reasonably well, as they would hope, there would follow at a later stage a conference on Indochina. When he said "we", he meant not only the five powers but the other powers that would attend. As Mr. Molotov knew, he did not want the five powers in any way to have any special position of authority who would then discuss who else would be entitled to attend a Korean political conference.

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[3] No text of the amended Soviet proposal was found attached to the source text, but see Document 523 for this proposal.

[4] Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

Mr. Molotov said he wished to draw the attention of his colleagues to a difficulty which the Soviet Government faced and which should not be forgotten. If they were considering the matter of participation of the Chinese People's Republic, they must be sure that their invitation would be acceptable to it. The Soviet Union is not in a position to speak for the Chinese Communists today and China should be asked if the proposal was acceptable to her. His second remark was that both the US and French proposals made discussion of Indochina dependent upon the Korean political conference. The Soviet Delegation did not understand this dependence. It was proposed that both subjects should be discussed but there was no decision as to whether the second question, Indochina, would be discussed since it was impossible to know in advance what would be the result of the discussions on Korea. We would not and could not know what the results of this discussion would be in advance. Mr. Dulles has raised a question as to date and place. The Soviet Delegation has already stated that this question presented a little difficulty and he would again say that it would not be hard to agree on these two points. In any event, a fortnight more or less would not be serious. The date and the place could be agreed after the composition had been decided. Mr. Dulles had said it was desirable to decide the membership here. The Soviet Delegation agreed, but they should be certain that their decision would be acceptable. The Soviet Delegation thought their proposal was clear concerning the composition of the Korean conference and they had, in fact, accepted the substance of the U.S. and French proposals on this point. The composition of the Indochinese conference had not been clarified but he believed that the wording of the Soviet proposal would present no difficulty in clarifying this point in a form acceptable to all four.

Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden had criticized the last part of the Soviet proposal. This could be clarified. What would Mr. Bidault suggest concerning the composition on point 2? If Mr. Eden objected to the composition on point 1, how would he propose to amend it? In any case, these details should present no great difficulty. Mr. Dulles said that it was difficult for the United States to accept a five-power conference. The Soviet Delegation understood this difficulty and has tried to make a proposal which would avoid this difficulty although their original proposal had provided for a five-power conference. The Soviet Government also had its difficulty and Mr. Eden had mentioned it. In considering the Korean conference, they could not agree to a proposal, the same as that contained in the UN resolution, which the Soviet Government had voted against and which was unacceptable to the Chinese People's Republic. He felt, however, that both these difficulties could be overcome.

The Secretary said he appreciated the Soviet reference to the problem and certainly he would wish to reciprocate in the same spirit expressed by Mr. Molotov. In order to see if some acceptable formula could be found, he said he would appreciate it if Mr. Molotov could clarify three points in regard to paragraph four:

1) Which country would send out the invitations? Would it be the four of them here or would others be involved?

2) How does Communist China get invited.

3) Are countries referred to in the paragraph on the Korean conference the only countries who would be invited?

He said he had some other observations on other parts of the proposal to make, but would Mr. Molotov prefer to answer these questions now, or hear his other observations.

Mr. Molotov said he would be glad to hear Mr. Dulles' other observations.

The Secretary stated the Soviet Foreign Minister had indicated that the questions of time and place could be settled when the composition had been agreed on. He would assume that the time and place, however, would be included in the invitation. Acceptance in some cases might depend on the time and the place. He said on the question of priority, in the U.S. and French drafts, of Korea over Indochina, he wished to state that in the U.S. view it was no priority at all. The problem of peace in Indochina was one of primary importance, but the first step towards peace in Indochina would be to find out if the intentions of the Chinese People's Republic were peaceful. The most convenient way of finding this out, in his opinion, was to find out whether the Chinese were now willing to attend a conference on Korea as they had promised and also whether the Chinese People's Republic was prepared to cease its military support to the Communist forces in the Associated States. These intentions could best be found out by ascertaining whether the Chinese would accept and participate in a conference on Korea to which they had been committed and in informal conversations in connection with this conference which would undoubtedly take place there. He could not himself think of any quicker way of finding out the possibilities of peace in Indochina. Certainly it was the case in either the U.S. or French texts that it was contemplated there would be no Indochinese conference until the Korean question was settled. In this connection he concluded it was not clear from the Soviet text who would determine the persons or countries to be invited to the conference on the restoration of peace elsewhere in Asia. Would it be the four powers or five?

Mr. Molotov said he had one basic observation to make: If responsibility in any way was to be placed on the Chinese People's Republic for events in Indochina, this would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Delegation believed that the Chinese People's Republic would not take part in any conference on that basis, as could be seen from statements their representatives had made. As to Mr. Dulles' question as to who would invite the Chinese People's Republic and others, this was an important question. If they were able to reach an agreement on the character of this conference, they could find the way out and agree on the form of invitation. The Soviet Delegation would like to have the preliminary views of its colleagues as to procedure on invitations. If this could be ascertained, he believed, in the next few days, they could ascertain the Chinese view and if there was no refusal they could then find the best form in which to address invitations to the Chinese People's Republic and to other countries. One point remains unclear, and that is: Does Indochina depend on Korea? It was his impression that Mr. Dulles had not been definite on this subject nor was Mr. Bidault clear. The Soviet Delegation was prepared on the other questions raised by Mr. Dulles to do all it could to meet the views of the other delegations.

The Secretary said that the U.S. views were the same as those expressed in the French proposal on this point. If the atmosphere of the Korean conference and events in Southeast Asia showed favorable prospects for peace, then an Indochinese conference could be arranged. He had probably chosen the words badly when he said "no priority". He meant no subordination of importance of the Indochinese question to Korea, but on point of time, the Korean political conference would presumably occur first since it had already been agreed in principle for seven months. The Chinese Communists' participation in this conference would, in itself, be a step towards an Indochinese conference. Mr. Bidault said, if Mr. Molotov would permit him to say, the French government had no doubt as to the responsibility of Communist China for events in Indochina;

but, if he would be good enough to read the French text, he would see that no mention was made of this therein and in his opinion there was no need for anyone to talk about the feelings and views of the French Government on this point. In regard to the relative position of Korea and Indochina, he wished to say there was no subordination of Indochina to Korea but both questions were subordinate to the will for peace. It was useless to talk in any other terms than that of the need to establish peace. It was for this reason that the French text contained the terms to which Mr. Molotov previously referred: "favorable prospects for peace". This covers the suspension and end to hostilities. In such a way we would be sure that no violation of peace is possible. In regard to paragraph 4, it seemed to him possible to assume from Mr. Molotov's remarks that the problem of invitations could be resolved. He would say again to put Indochina in brackets was not appropriate for the one place in the world where war was still going on. The agenda as contained in the last paragraph was not acceptable to the French Delegation. In conclusion he could say that this subject was still very complicated but that the difficulties were not insurmountable and he hoped that they would be overcome.

Mr. Eden said that each of his colleagues had submitted a draft and upon reflection the British Delegation had felt the time had come for them to try also. He said he would have a text to distribute and apologized that the Russian text would not be ready for an hour. He stated that in his proposal the third paragraph in regard to Korea stated that the four Ministers in Berlin should propose a conference in Geneva on April 15, listing all countries who were to attend in order to avoid any distinction between them. In paragraph 4, concerning Indochina, it was clear that the Chinese People's Republic would participate on an equal basis at that conference. Mr. Molotov said he could not speak for the Chinese. The British Delegation tried to meet his views on this point and he expected that Mr. Molotov would find this a reasonable proposal. [5]

Mr. Molotov said that, insofar as he was concerned, he would have to have the Russian text before him.

After some exchange it was agreed that they might go on to consider disarmament.

Disarmament

Mr. Bidault said that they had two resolutions: one French and one Soviet. [6] The French text in his view avoided many of the difficulties which were present in the Soviet text. There is a long history of discussion in the UN on this question and they have before them the precedent which they must think over. The Soviet proposal bore witness to the consistency of the Soviet Government on the question since a similar proposal had been put in five times, or, if not five, several times by Mr. Vishinsky in the United Nations. He felt they all were agreed on the principle of a new effort in the field of disarmament since they were all conscious of the financial and other burdens which armaments put on the peoples of their countries and that if some measures in this field could be adopted it would increase the well being of all peoples. A conference was not, in itself, a reality but a means and it would only justify the hopes placed on it if the preparations were adequate. If not, it would result in disillusionment. Five years of experience in Geneva had indicated that without proper preparations no results except war or armistice came out of such discussions. It was probable that these conferences had not been properly prepared. Reality must not be confused with method and the important thing was adequate preparation. The French Government felt that the proper place for such preparation was the Disarmament Commission in the UN. This is the essential theme of the French proposals.

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[5] The British proposal, a copy of which was attached to the source text, is the same as that transmitted in Dulte 75, Document 483, except for the deletion of the words "further" and "of Southeast Asia" in the second paragraph.

[6] For the Soviet proposal, see Secto 43, Document 376. For the French proposal, see FPM(54)15, Document 509.

Mr. Eden said he also had rather bitter memories of the Geneva Disarmament Conferences and he agreed with Mr. Bidault that it was useless and even dangerous to call a world conference until the basic principles had been agreed. He felt the proper method was to renew and intensify their efforts in the UN Commission in order to agree on these principles, which he thought was in accord with the wishes of the General Assembly, before calling a world conference. He repeated that without adequate preparation a world conference would be useless but that if the fundamental principles could be agreed on in the UN Commission then he would take a different view of calling a world conference.

Mr. Molotov said that in view of the lateness of the hour would it not be a good idea to postpone this discussion until their next restricted meeting.

Further procedures were then discussed and it was agreed that the next restricted meeting would be held in the ACA Building at 11 A.M. on Wednesday but that on Tuesday morning the experts of the four powers would get together for a discussion of the new British proposal on the Far Eastern Conference to report to the restricted meeting on Wednesday. The Soviet Delegation named Mr. Malik as their representative and the French Mr. Joxe. The British and American Delegations said they would name their representatives later.

No. 486

396.1 BE/2-1654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 16, 1954—2 a.m.

Secto 151. Department pass OSD. Foreign Ministers' plenary meeting afternoon February 15 held at Soviet residence, Secretary presiding. Following is summary of first part of meeting. [2]

Bidault made lengthy prepared statement. [3] He remarked that exchange of views on this subject has not made it possible to find specific and limited fields on which agreements could be reached of mutual interest to all. On contrary, during discussions Soviet delegation had put forth broader and broader proposals which appeared to be solely for propaganda purposes. Referring to Soviet security proposals, [4] Bidault recalled he had asked which 32 countries were to be included. He said that Soviet proposal raised problems from viewpoint of neutrals whose positions could not be prejudged by four powers. It also raised questions regarding countries with which Soviet does not maintain relations. Molotov had not made any answer on this point.

Bidault characterized Soviet proposals "as Europe for Europeans". He said this was formula of superficial attractiveness. However, previous efforts to isolate Europe from rest of world had only led to domination of Europe for purpose of dominating world. Concept of Europe itself was ambiguous one, to which geography is no sure guide. Several European powers, including USSR, have responsibilities which extend far beyond borders of Europe. France is particularly conscious of this dual role. Europe should be, he said, a community of spirit, of heart and of will which goes beyond mere limits of geography.

Bidault said that Europe, like world, is divided. Across continent is frontier which is not geographic and which divides what have been called "the two camps". This frontier not only limits but isolates and separates. He hoped that it would not be permanent and that gradually through peaceful co-existence it would become possible to heal division to which we are not resigned. Bidault said that manifesto of Soviet Communist Party on occasion of elections referred to "peace camp" which would "grow and become stronger together with USSR". Such growth could not be reconciled with European idea unless all Europe eventually wound up in this camp. He intimated that this was general theory upon which Soviet proposals were based.

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[1] Transmitted in three sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, Paris, London, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the eighteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/18, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.

[3] For Bidault's statement, circulated as FPM(54)68, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 151–155.

[4] Presumably Bidault is referring to FPM(54)46 and 47, Documents 516 and 517.

Bidault said that if Europe isolated itself from rest of world, one single power which also extends into Asia would have absolute preponderance in Europe. It was not necessary to suggest possibility of aggression. Fact of military preponderance involves political and other consequences which cannot be ignored. In part of Europe where this preponderance exists, it has produced striking results. Mr. Molotov had contested term "bloc" but not its existence and had said that it was directed solely against Germany, which Mr. Bidault felt difficult to reconcile with documents which are known to all. As far as existence of bloc was concerned, he felt that simple criterion could be applied, i.e., whether there was freedom to disagree or to show difference of opinion. Whole world knows what kind of independence exists in Eastern European countries. East bloc also includes Germany—politically, economically and militarily. KVP, which is called police, is in fact army of more than 100,000 equipped with tanks, planes and heavy weapons. Soviet delegation had reproached French for having ignored Franco-Soviet alliance. USSR had not asked French advice on any of matters which he had mentioned and in particular on rearmament of Eastern Germany. Soviet proposal on security as it relates to Germany, Bidault said, legalizes division and perpetuates it. He characterized alleged Soviet solution as insubstantial and artificial; one which would, without saying so, restore quadripartite control by return to Potsdam. Germany would be placed in position of indefinite tutelage. Possibility of sending occupation troops back would constitute means of permanent pressure on center of Europe. He did not think that any of the four countries could face up to tragic riddle of knowing whose troops would arrive back in Germany first.

As to proposed security treaty[5] he remarked the preamble stated it was directed at prevention of formation of one group of states against others. Not only is such a group present in Eastern Europe but is maintained by Article 10. He asked what would happen to community of Western countries and to their ties with other countries which existed over long time and which they could not break. Text of Article 7 was unclear and Soviet comments had not clarified it. He asked Molotov point blank whether or not Soviet delegation considered NAT compatible with its draft.

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[5] See FPM(54)46, Document 516.

Bidault stated that there were other difficulties. If there were frontier incidents between two German states, situation which had occurred elsewhere, and these developed into armed conflicts, would all European states be able to agree on responsibility for aggression. He suggested that result would be either to nullify treaty or to apply it as desired by strongest party. He did not think solution of problem lay in text but in willingness to end division of Europe.

Bidault said that he had already outlined French idea of security which took into account legitimate interest of East and West. France believes it can only be achieved by limitation and controlled reduction of arms. In absence of this, one would be brought back to conception which does not wholly satisfy anyone, i.e., resigned acceptance of shortcomings of others which is known as peaceful co-existence. While West did not regard this as satisfactory, it would not impose its ideas by force on East. It would never accept imposition by others of system it had not chosen. He said that Western European countries wished to maintain their alliances, including those with US. They were seeking solution of German problem by collective effort in framework which had been imposed on them. Europe would be built on basis of free choice and cooperation and not on various geographic or theoretical concepts. Unification of Europe is not directed against anyone. It is progressive and can adapt itself to new situations, and would be accomplished with respect for freedom of choice of each participant. While directed toward common well-being, primary aim was maintenance of peace.

Summing up, Bidault outlined French conceptions on security as follows:

1. Collective security is in first instance assured by World Security Organization, the UN. In this general framework regional organizations of purely defensive character, whose limits are determined by community of ideals and interests which links certain nations, naturally find a place.
2. Regional defense organizations cannot be limited by principle of geographical limits of single continent.
3. General European settlement would be essential contribution to general security. Consequences of war and stabilization of territorial situation in Europe under conditions capable of assuring durable peace are first requisite. First thing to be done is therefore to conclude German settlement and Austrian State treaty. Crowning of such territorial settlement would be establishment of common institutions among European states designed to strengthen security safeguards already provided by existing organizations. Creation of such organization requires gradual re-establishment among European countries of normal relations based upon respect of human person and fundamental individual rights.

4. As concerns Germany, security of her neighbors must under all circumstances be insured. Their security cannot be threatened before peace treaty because of presence of allied troops. After treaty Germany, included within a binding association, would not have independent control of her own military forces. Security regarding Germany would be assured as follows:

a. Treaties of alliance concluded during war come into operation in the case of aggression.

b. Germany cannot act independently in military field, which rules out all possibility of aggression.

c. Germany, assuming obligations of United Nations Charter would participate without restriction in world solidarity system.

d. Government of United Germany should undertake not seek to alter rules which restrict its freedom of action in military field.

Bidault said these provisions would give Germany her rightful place in community of peaceful states while eliminating any threat by her to security of European peoples. He added that effort should be continued within framework of UN to achieve gradually only completely satisfactory form of collective security which would be general disarmament simultaneous and controlled.

Bidault said these concepts were new but they appeared to be better than methods which had been tried before and which had always ended in disaster. Program does not involve effort to change things in one single stroke but to introduce the first element of stability in the situation which can form solid basis for relationship among nations and which would give some hope of eventual stabilization and true reconciliation in Europe and world.

Eden recalled his first comment on Molotov proposal on February 10 that it had been clearly designed to break up NATO.[6] At the previous session Molotov had said that dissolution of NATO was not precondition of this plan and criticized Eden for assuming so. Eden pointed out, with reference to paragraph 7 of draft security treaty however, that Molotov had himself referred to NATO as directed against USSR and as obstacle to wider European security. Furthermore, Molotov had attacked existence of military basis on which NATO security depends. Molotov had underscored his intention to break up NATO by deliberate exclusion of US which was relegated role of observer together with China. Canada, which had twice fought in Europe was excluded completely.

Eden said that while attempting to break up Western security system, Soviet proposal clearly permits continuation of Soviet system in Eastern Europe. He said he had never asked Soviet to imperil its own security and had twice offered extension of Anglo-Soviet treaty. Molotov had professed inability to understand how this assurance could have meaning so long US, UK, remain members of NATO. In UK view there is no conflict since NATO can never be used [except] for defense purpose.

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[6] For a summary of Eden's comments on Feb. 10, see Secto 117, Document 451. For Eden's remarks on Feb. 15, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 155-156.

Eden recalled that he had offered to consider any other proposals Soviet delegation might wish to put forward regarding search for common security. Any such proposal, however, must be consistent with security in West as well as security of USSR; that is, consistent with continued existence of NATO.

Summing up UK position on item 2, Eden said UK has proposed as first step practical solution of German problem. Without German settlement there can be no effective security system for Europe. UK proposals provided only basis on which reunification and peace treaty can be achieved. They have been rejected by Soviet delegation, which has not offered any practical alternative.

Eden said all were bound by provisions of UN Charter and that NATO and EDC are consistent with Charter, being entirely defensive in character. He had not come to Berlin to apologize for NATO, still less to discuss its dissolution. UK will not cast aside means of assuring its own safety and freedom.

Following is summary of second part of Ministers' plenary meeting, February 15:

Molotov said that Soviet Delegation had submitted two proposals on European security; one respecting matters of immediate importance, the second dealing with longer range problems. It attached importance to both. He remarked Dulles had indicated agreement with first paragraph of Soviet proposal in relation to Germany which states that four powers will continue their efforts towards satisfactory solution of German problem, and noted Eden and Bidault had not raised objection on this part of proposal.

Turning to other parts of Soviet proposal, Molotov said objections had been raised principally by Bidault and he would answer those. With regard to withdrawal of troops, Molotov said that in view of disagreement it would obviously take some time to ascertain which aspects of German problem it will be possible to reach agreement on. Some measures should be taken which would relieve burdens of Germans. He saw no reason why withdrawal of forces should not be acceptable to all four powers. He suggested that Ministers study matter more concretely to determine under what conditions forces could be withdrawn. He said Bidault's suggestion that Soviet wished to control system was misunderstanding. He had proposed four power supervision of withdrawal on practical grounds but was prepared to consider other methods of supervision and in fact to discuss dispensing with it, although he was not certain such solution would be acceptable. He wished to make clear that USSR would oppose anything resembling Control Council which was thing of past and out of place under present conditions.

Molotov noted that paragraph three of Soviet proposal had raised great objections. He asked why Pan American organization was unobjectionable but European was objectionable. With reference to Bidault's question regarding figure of 32 countries and related questions which he had asked, Molotov said that all these matters could be clarified in mutually acceptable way. Article 9 of Treaty on Security contained special clause relating to US which had been objected to. Perhaps clause could be formulated in different manner or position of US defined differently or clause could be excluded entirely. He did not understand Eden's remarks regarding Canada which is not member of Pan American organization. Idea Canada should be member of European organization surprised him but it could be considered. He suggested that other Ministers should not limit themselves to criticism but propose specific amendments to Soviet draft which could be considered and discussed.

Regarding Bidault's comments on two camps, Molotov said that while there are two camps from viewpoint of social and economic systems, Soviet feels there should be only one camp as far as peace is concerned. This thought has motivated Soviet proposals. He said Bidault had asked against whom general European security treaty is directed. He had concluded it was directed against NATO, as had Eden. Bidault had asked for yes or no answer, but this approach reflected misrepresentation on subject which one could find in British and French newspapers. It did not, however, according to Bidault's question, he said treaty is alternative to EDC and directed against it because EDC aims at German militarism. He suggested that France, US, UK were also interested in preventing revival of German militarism. It had been stated that proposal was directed against NATO. He suggested that matter should be studied to see what other treaties organization proposed by Soviet delegation is directed against. He reiterated that his reply was that draft European security treaty is alternative to EDC. He remarked that it had been said that certain countries are to enter EDC because they have no alternative.

Molotov remarked that criticism had been directed against certain articles of proposed treaty, particularly Articles 7, 9 and 10. He was prepared to discuss any amendments which might be desired on these articles or any other article of the treaty and suggested that the other Ministers present amendments. He said he was also prepared to discuss any proposals which might be directed toward apprehensions that one state would dominate entire European system, or of any other matter. He concluded by asking other Ministers whether they accepted or rejected idea of collective security in Europe.

Secretary made statement, text of which has been telegraphed separately.[7]

Bidault said he had already replied that there could be no collective security exclusively for one continent or one part of the world, however regional agreements which fall within provision of UN Charter, such as NATO, must be maintained. This was precisely reason for EDC. He said it was impossible for the Four Powers to draw up a treaty for 32 signatories, some of whom are unknown. It is also difficult to have such a treaty before problem, which the Soviet delegation said is most disquieting for Germany's neighbors, that is, German problem, has been solved.

Bidault pointed out that the question Molotov had imputed to him was not correct; what he had asked was whether Soviet delegation does or does not believe that NATO is compatible with treaty it has proposed. Perhaps it was superfluous to ask this question since he had statement made by USSR on March 21, 1949 regarding NATO but he repeated question once more. He said that when he had received reply, would discuss EDC and alternatives.

Discussion followed on agenda for next session. It was agreed to ascertain whether Austrian delegation would be ready for meeting, in which case Ministers would take up Austrian question. If Austrians not ready, they would resume consideration of item 2.

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[7] Secto 150, *infra*.

No. 487

396.1 BE/2-1554: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

BERLIN, February 15, 1954.

Secto 150. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary's statement February 15:[2]

"I would like first of all to answer the last questions which the Soviet Foreign Minister put. He said, do we want collective security in Europe? The answer to that is, we want collective security everywhere in the world. We have tried to get that security during the war and postwar years in many different ways.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to New York, London, Moscow, Vienna, Paris, Bonn, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a report on the eighteenth plenary, Feb. 15, see Secto 151, *supra*.

"We tried to get it by the Atlantic Charter, to which all of our governments subscribed. I am afraid none of us can feel that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter have been lived up to, provisions which assure the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been deprived of them.

"We tried to get it by the declaration of Yalta, which provided—among other things—a declaration on liberated Europe which provided for the establishment of free governments by the free elections throughout Europe.

"And then we tried to get it by the UN Charter, which requires all of us—and most of the nations of the world—not to use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of other states.

"Why have we not gotten European security and world security out of these documents we have signed? Nothing is wrong in the wording.

"What has been wrong is—at least in the opinion of some—that other parties to the agreements have not lived up to these agreements and there has followed a great sense of insecurity in the world because of lack of trust and confidence in men's and nations' will to live up to their pledged word.

"That is why there has grown up in the world, in addition to the proposed universal system of the United Nations, other regional collective security arrangements exercising what the Charter calls 'the collective right of self-defense'.

"These special security arrangements do not have any words that add anything not already in the United Nations Charter. The addition which they provide is that they are agreements between nations which, over long periods of time, have come to trust and have confidence in each other. They provide the element of confidence which unfortunately has not been present on a universal basis.

"The Soviet Foreign Minister has asked why, if the 21 American nations had made a Rio pact, is it not equally logical that the mysterious '32' nations of Europe should not make a pact if Rio pact, the pact of the Americans, is not just a regional pact. It is a pact which, as the treaty itself provides, contains this declaration:

"Peace is founded on justice and moral order and the moral order and the protection of human rights and freedoms.

"Those are not mere words, in the case of the pact of the Americans, that is an expression of reality which has been demonstrated by close association for 150 years. And the ingredient which makes the Rio pact a dependable reality is the fact of confidence which is based upon 150 years of peaceful association.

"And so it is that groups of countries have sought to augment the words of the United Nations Charter with the essential element of confidence based upon long historic association.

"That is true of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is true of the nations which are bound together by the North Atlantic Treaty.

"The North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the expressed determination of their peoples to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of Democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

"And those words, again, are not just ink on paper. Those words are the expression of a reality which has been demonstrated over many generations and which are bound not by ink, but by blood which has been shed in protecting that common heritage.

"It is suggested that this North Atlantic Treaty is a cause of division. It is clearly evident that history has revealed that the coming into close association of the Western nations is not a cause of disunity, but is caused by the fear and apprehension which, to an increasing degree, seized hold of these countries as the result of actions which occurred elsewhere.

"I recall that this postwar coming together had its first major beginning in the Brussels pact of March 17, 1948. I recall, however, that that was preceded by the Communists' armed efforts to overthrow the lawful government of Greece and by the forceable *coup d'ètat* whereby the Czech Government was overthrown and a Communist Government installed in its place.

"Then I recall that there was the blockade of Berlin, which brought war very close to Europe.

"And it was during that period that the idea of strengthening the Brussels pact by bringing in the United States, Canada, and other countries first was conceived, and that treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, was then realized in 1949.

"Even then, however, it was not thought to be necessary to implement that treaty with any large military organization.

"I recall that I was in the US Senate at the time of the ratification of that treaty, and we did not think it would be necessary actually to implement any large military organization under the Atlantic treaty.

"But then came the armed aggression in Korea, in June 1950, followed by the Chinese Communist aggression of November 1950. And these events created fear to such a degree that it seemed necessary to build a sufficient strength in Europe to create a respectable balance of power.

"General Eisenhower came over at the end of December 1950 to be the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and under his inspiration there was developed military strength in Europe. Now that there is at least a reasonable defensible posture in sight, that expense is being leveled off.

"I think it would be very difficult for any impartial observer to say that the North Atlantic Treaty, or the organizations under it, have created the division of Europe. It has been responsive to a division of Europe which already existed and the danger of which was accentuated by such events as I have outlined.

"The Soviet Foreign Minister has asked us to study and analyze the precise words and drafting of his project. [3] I must say in all frankness that I am not interested in the words. I could heap this table high with past words that are just as fine as the human hand and mind can pen. I have referred to some of them this afternoon. What I ask is, will these words bring with them confidence? The words already exist; they exist in the United Nations Charter. They have existed in many other documents. The essence is not the words, but whether in fact the proposal will bring a confidence which will end the disunity of Europe.

"I can say with, I hope, assurance that I will be believed, that there is no international objective which is as dear to the hearts of the American people as real peace and security in Europe. That ought to be our wish, because the lack of that has cost us very dearly and very heavily in the past.

"I have, however, grown skeptical of the possibility of solving great problems merely by repeating old words or inventing new words. I do not believe, myself, that the division of Europe, which so desperately needs to be cured can be cured by a formula of words. I believe there are some things which need to be done *first*.

"One of the things that needs to be done is to end the division of Germany. Here is a problem which is our own particular problem. It lies here on this table, it is symbolized by the city in which we meet. And yet we seem unable to even make that start in ending the division of Europe.

"Mr. Eden has laid before us a plan for the unification of Germany, [4] a reasonable plan which, unhappily, it seems is not acceptable. And I would be forced in all candor to say that the reasons which make it impossible for us four to agree upon the unification of Germany are precisely the reasons which deprive the fine words which are presented in the Soviet proposal of the value which I wish deeply they carried.

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[3] Presumably Dulles is referring to the Soviet proposals on European security, FPM(54)46 and 47, Documents 516 and 517.

[4] FPM(54)17, Document 510.

"What is the reason that makes the United Kingdom's plan unacceptable? It is because it is based upon having supervised free elections in Germany and one of us four is not willing to trust the results of these elections. That is why the perpetuation of the division must go on.

"There is unhappily a long history which suggests that the rulers of the Soviet Union are not willing to trust anything which they cannot themselves control. That is the reason, it seems to me, fundamentally why we around this table have been unable to bring about the unification of Germany. And I say if that ground for distrust exists and if there cannot be unity except by control, control by the Soviet Union, then I am very skeptical if any good can come out of the plan which has been submitted by the Soviet Foreign Minister."

February 16, 1954

No. 488

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 192

Minutes of a Meeting of the Tripartite Working Group, Berlin, February 16, 1954, 10:30 a.m. [1]

SECRET
BER MIN-19

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Mr. MacArthur	Sir Frank Roberts	M. Seydoux

1. Tactics for Today—Agenda Item 3.

It was agreed that the Austrians should be asked by M. Bidault to explain their new instructions. It would be preferable if Mr. Figl while not mentioning Article 4 bis would explain that his instructions confirmed the fact that there could be no discussion of the Treaty if the Soviet proposed Article 33 [2] was under consideration. Mr. Eden will present argumentation noting that still more obstacles were being placed in the way of obtaining the Treaty. Mr. Molotov would probably raise Article 4 bis. Mr. Dulles would say that it was impossible for the US to lend itself to something that was as fraudulent as Article 4 bis.

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[1] According to the U.S. Delegation Order of the Day, USDEL/OD/23, Secretary Dulles met with the staff of the Berlin Element of HICOG at 9:30 and the Austrian Experts met at 10 a.m. No record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 168)

[2] FPM(54)66, Document 521.

M. Bidault wished to interject a proposal with regard to alleviating the situation in Austria. The UK and the US delegations felt that this would unnecessarily confuse the unassailable position the west were now holding. The Germans would also expect such treatment. Statements along these lines could be incorporated in the tripartite communiqué on Austria.

It was agreed that the Ministers should discuss this. It was further agreed that if the consideration of Austria concluded early that the meeting should adjourn and the Ministers should not commence discussion of Item 2.

2. Item 2.

M. Seydoux proposed that the Security Declaration and the Declaration of Intent [3] be set forth at the close of the meeting. The US and UK strongly objected to the use of these Declarations at this time. The US and UK would prefer the presentation of tripartite communiqués, one dealing with Austria as a separate matter and the other a general one concluding with a statement of present relations between the USSR and the West. Unless agreement is reached with regard to the proposed conference under Item 1, the UK and the US believed that the communiqué should be issued in the three capitals Friday evening while the Ministers were on their way home. It was proposed that the French produce a text of their proposal along with a revision of the communiqué which would cover their comments. The drafting group would then meet at 5:00 at the UK Headquarters to consider the texts so that they might be submitted to the three Ministers tonight.

3. Secretary's Departure Plans.

Mr. MacArthur announced that the Secretary was tentatively planning to leave Berlin after the Plenary Session on Thursday and would stop at Wahn Airfield to speak with Adenauer for about an hour before resuming his flight to Washington.

4. Four-Power Communiqué.

In the event the Soviets suggested a four-power communiqué the three powers would maintain that there was nothing the four could agree upon to say.

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[3] For text of the U.K.-French Draft Security Declaration, see Document 314. Regarding the Declaration of Intent, see BER MIN-3 and -5, Documents 357 and 372.

5. Further Quadripartite Meetings.

If Mr. Molotov raised this subject the three Ministers would stand firm that there should be no continuing deputies meeting. Without precluding future Big Four meetings the Ministers should avoid naming a specific date.

No. 489

396.1 BE/2-1754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 17, 1954—2 a.m.

Dulte 84. Following summarizes meeting of deputies of Foreign Ministers morning February 16 on draft proposals under agenda item Number 1. [2] Merchant and McConaughy attended for US, Malik for USSR, Allen for UK and Joxe and Roux for France. Allen gave argument for UK proposal [3] saying it made concrete arrangement for early meeting on specific question of Korea. Conference could get down immediately to matters of substance. He criticized Soviet text [4] as vague and obscure in its provisions for Korean conference. Unclear reference to conference of Foreign Ministers was disturbing. Soviet proposal seemed to contemplate that initial conference would only deal with arrangements. There must be no more long debates over arrangements. Under British proposal CPR would not be discriminated against and would be invited rather than summoned to conference. There was provision for conference on Indochina as soon as situation warranted holding it.

Merchant confirmed original adverse US reaction to Soviet proposal. It did not abandon five-power conference nor was it clear as to issuance of invitations. It did not confirm that composition provision was final. There might be possibility late dispute over inclusion other countries.

Joxe objected to mere parenthetical mention of Indochina at end of Soviet draft and paragraph 4 provision consultations with Communist China as to matters to be discussed.

Malik said Soviet revised draft represented attempt to meet views of colleagues. Five-power conference phrase avoided, although CPR would naturally be present at all discussions. USSR could not agree that Indochina conference should follow or be related to conference on Korea. Two separate conferences not permissible. This would require an interim conference to decide if subsequent conference on Indochina should be called. Reference to Southeast Asia not useful. "Favorable prospects for peace" an obscure phrase and subject to differing interpretations. USSR unable to accept any formula which placed on China responsibility for situation in Indochina. This responsibility rested entirely on France. Requested reference to UN in British draft be deleted since if conference should result from Berlin conversations it would not rest on decision of UN but would be done another way. Hence no reference to UN would be necessary. Soviet delegation preferred its reference to countries whose forces participated in hostilities in Korea. USSR also would want to change paragraph 3 of UK draft by calling upon Foreign Ministers of five-countries to consult with "representatives" of other countries. He objected to final paragraph of UK draft as to no implication of recognition on grounds that it was out of place and pointless. He believed conference could be held in Geneva and said April date was satisfactory to USSR but Peiping should be consulted as to date. Views of Peiping should be sought on any agreements reached.

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[1] Drafted by McConaughy.

[2] The meeting took place from 11 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. at the ACA building. A more detailed summary of the meeting is in file 396.1 BE/2-1654.

[3] Transmitted in Dulte 75, Document 483, except for the minor differences noted in footnote 5 to the record of the fourth restricted session, Document 485.

[4] Document 523.

Merchant said if Soviets had basic objection to paragraph 4 of UK draft concerning conditions for conference on Indochina, then disagreement was fundamental. Allen and Joxe supported this view. Joxe said reference to situation in Southeast Asia was necessary. French were showing great forbearance in not mentioning responsibility of Communist China and not including judgment against Communist China. This was a substantial French concession. France greatly desired an appropriate conference on Indochina but conditions must be maintained as stated in UK text.

Allen indicated dissatisfaction with Malik's evasive replies on invitation procedure and inconclusive list of countries to be invited. He said any conference provided for in Berlin must be real one, not merely new forum for endless debates on arrangements. If USSR could not accept UK draft on Indochina, indications were no agreement could be reached and matters could not be advanced much by further discussions.

Malik said he was optimistic and deplored Allen's pessimism. He said we should continue to seek agreement. Said French request for deletion of provision in Soviet draft for discussion with CPR as to questions to be considered at conference would be taken under advisement. Only four Ministers could say whether list of countries to be invited is a final one. USSR has in effect accepted Western list with omission of UN reference.

Merchant remarked that despite efforts at reconcilement, deep division remained. Indochina conference not subordinated to Korean conference but conditions prescribed were logical, clear and necessary in light of situation. Soviet proposal still contained principle of central meeting of five to which representatives of various other countries would be invited according to subject under discussion. Unnecessary to repeat Secretary's explicit rejection of such five-power conference. Suggestion to invite Foreign Ministers of five-countries and mere "representatives" of other countries gave impression of five-power representation at high level with other countries represented at another level. Impression conveyed by this was repugnant.

Joxe said that any acceptable text must contain specific provisions for early conference on Korea. No preceding conference with CPR as to questions to be considered. Provision for Indochina conference must include conditions alluded to in UK text.

Allen and Merchant expressed doubts that their Ministers would be able personally to attend protracted Korean conference. However, all three Western representatives agreed to obtain views their principals as to mention of five Foreign Ministers in paragraph 3 of UK text and also as to requested omission of UN reference in same paragraph.

Malik showed strong desire for another meeting of deputies before restricted meeting of Foreign Ministers tomorrow. Joxe evinced some interest. Merchant and Allen were noncommittal. Question was left open. Late this afternoon Malik stated he would not press for another meeting of deputies. There will be no further quadripartite meeting before restricted session tomorrow. Tripartite meeting will be held immediately before restricted meeting to map western tactics.

DULLES

No. 490

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Italian and Austrian Affairs (Freund) [1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 16, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Minister Figl

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[1] According to a paper dated Feb. 16, Secretary Dulles met with Figl at 12:30 "to stiffen him up before his 1:30 luncheon with Molotov." This is the only reference to the time of this conversation. No record of the meeting between Molotov and Figl has been found in Department of State files.

Dr. Kreisky
Dr. Schoener
Mr. R.B. Freund
Mr. Lochner—Interpreter

Subject: Plans for Discussion on Austria at Four-Power Conference February 16, 1954

The Secretary said he had asked to see Dr. Figl to go over likely developments this afternoon. He said Mr. Bidault would be in the chair and would ask if Dr. Figl had anything to say. The Secretary supposed that Dr. Figl would speak about Article 33. Dr. Figl said he would and outlined his "rough draft" statement—main points of which are:

> The Austrian Delegation came to Berlin with justified hopes of a treaty. Since the three Western Powers had conceded on the outstanding points of the present draft, agreement appeared to be unanimous. Austria is ready to take on the burdens of the treaty, provided all troops are withdrawn. Dr. Figl will then refer to his previous declaration of military neutrality and point out the inconsistency of Mr. Molotov in wanting to erect military bases on Austrian soil. Dr. Figl will say that if the Soviets think that this is necessary to prevent *Anchluss*, Austria categorically opposes its resumption. All the burdens of Article 35 will then be listed and once more, a solemn appeal made for alleviation. The Austrian Government has instructed him to refuse any changes in the "available" draft treaty. Austria requests its freedom for which it will take all the burdens in the draft, but no new ones.

The Secretary pointed out the importance of not weakening on the neutrality question unless there has been agreement on full troop withdrawal. He cited Soviet negotiating methods. If a concession is hinted at, it would be snatched up by the Soviets who will go on to new demands. Dr. Figl agreed. The Secretary reiterated as in his opening statement,[2] U.S. willingness for Austria to remain neutral as it wishes. Dr. Kreisky intervened to say that Switzerland is more neutral than Austria should be, as Austria wishes to join the UN, Council of Europe, and other such organizations. The Secretary said that Article 4 bis may prove the most important bargaining point and should be saved for the end if it is to be taken up at all. Dr. Figl said he thought his statement was in line with that view, and that as negotiations develop we would have to see where we went later.

Dr. Kreisky said that if neutrality is a bargaining point in the end and if Molotov withdraws his troop proposal but insists on neutrality in binding form in the treaty, why in Mr. Dulles' judgment, should that not be accepted. There are other limits on Austrian sovereignty in the treaty, Dr. Kreisky said. The Secretary suggested that if that unlikely point is reached, Dr. Figl should ask for a recess to permit consultation with the three powers, in accordance with his instructions. He went on to point out the dangers and disadvantages for Austria in staying out of collective security arrangements and becoming a vacuum, stressing the importance of raising an Austrian Army. He noted that Austria could become an inviting invasion route to the South comparable to Belgium in 1914. He reiterated that the US would not wish to stand in the way of an Austrian policy in favor of military neutrality, but said that the cost to Austria would be heavier and that the Western Powers and, he supposed, the Austrian Government would not wish to leave a vacuum in Austria. Dr. Figl and Dr. Kreisky belittled the risks once Soviet forces are out of Austria and the Secretary pointed out the danger of Soviet military forces returning under the guise of techicians in the oil fields.

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[2] For Secretary Dulles' opening statement, see Secto 24, Document 360.

It was agreed that should the Soviets withdraw the troop proposal, Dr. Figl would ask for a recess until the next day, giving him time for consultation with the three powers and Vienna.

Dr. Kreisky speaking on behalf only of his own party in the coalition, considered the neutrality declaration just a device for obtaining a treaty, and expressed a wish to have the security of NATO if that were possible. He felt that it is not. The Secretary cited the present protection of NATO under the occupation and called attention to one disadvantage of the Soviet proposals. If, he said, the Western Powers could not keep sufficient forces in Austria they might not be effective in putting the NATO treaty into force in case of a Soviet attack, since a small number might be bypassed and no actual contact made. Dr. Figl said he understood the point.

The Secretary closed by thanking the Austrian representatives for coming to see him and expressed his bitter disappointment over the conference results. He said he had hoped that the Soviets would wish to bring one positive result out of the conference and that they might have chosen an Austrian treaty. Dr. Figl said he had had similar hopes.

No. 491

396.1 BE/2-1654: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BERLIN, February 16, 1954—midnight.

Secto 155. Department pass OSD. Following is summary Foreign Ministers 19th plenary session, Bidault presiding, held ACA building afternoon February 16 and devoted to Austrian question. [2]

Bidault called first on Figl, [3] who declared new Soviet proposal of February 12 [4] would rob Austria of most important advantage of state treaty, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria, and that Austrian Government had empowered him to state categorically it could not accept any amendment of draft treaty along this line. Figl reasserted Austria would not grant any military bases to foreign powers and would do everything to keep itself free from foreign military influence. Insofar as Molotov had proposed retention of troops as safeguard against possible *Anschluss*, Figl assured him Austrian Government yielded to none in its desire prevent repetition of 1938 *Anschluss* in view memories of catastrophic consequences that event for Austria. He enumerated again in detail economic burdens Austria was willing undertake as price of freedom under articles 35, 38, and 48 of draft treaty. He concluded with appeal to Ministers not to leave this conference without giving Austria its state treaty and freedom; signing of treaty, he said, would constitute act of peace visible throughout world.

Eden spoke briefly, [5] reaffirming unacceptability of proposed Soviet amendment to article 33 and recommending account be taken of Austria's wish not to have foreign troops on its soil after treaty in effect, particularly since Molotov himself had said several times it was wrong to maintain troops in countries where they were not wanted. After attacking Molotov's argumentations regarding supplementary agreements between Soviet Union and Austria allegedly required under articles 48 bis and 35, Eden stated that

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the nineteenth plenary, 19 PLEN, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195. No record of the Western Foreign Ministers meeting at 2:30 p.m. has been found in Department of State files.

[3] For the full text of Figl's statement, which was circulated as FPM(54)71, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 159-160, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 200-202.

[4] For this proposal, see the record of the third restricted session, Document 463.

[5] For Eden's statement, circulated as FPM(54)72, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 160-161, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 202-203.

Soviet proposals, taken individually or as a whole, left little hope for early conclusion of state treaty, and urged Molotov to withdraw his new demands.

Molotov said he wished emphasize at outset that after action of three Western ministers in withdrawing their long-standing objections to certain articles of draft treaty, way was now cleared to sign treaty. He said conclusion of financial agreement under article 48 bis would involve no difficulty and that only problem was to find acceptable wording for articles 4 bis and 33. As for article 4 bis, Molotov said he believed Secretary Dulles had supported idea Austria should be neutralized and should therefore be able accept Soviet version of this article; also Figl's statement that no foreign military bases would be allowed on Austrian territory was welcomed by Soviet delegation and seemed to present no conflict with Soviet proposal. As for article 33, Molotov said he believed Soviet proposed text was necessary in view of changed state of world affairs.[6] While it would limit somewhat Austria's rights this would be only temporary and matter of wording could be worked out. Basic reason for proposed amendment, Molotov said, was to take account of plans now in progress for establishment of EDC, which would open road to revival German militarism and in turn create danger of new *Anschluss;* latter would not, as history has shown, be entirely dependent on will of Austrian Government.

Molotov then chided Figl for having said nothing new today and asserted he would have expected Austrian Foreign Minister to be more interested in concluding treaty than was shown by his statement. It was not true, Molotov said, that acceptance of Soviet proposal would, as alleged, mean indefinite stay of foreign troops on Austrian territory; they could be withdrawn once peace treaty with Germany concluded, and Soviet Union would do its part to make term a short one. Soviet delegation did not insist on every word of its formula and there appeared no reason why Austrian Government should not accept "modest" proposal of Soviet Union. Molotov concluded by appealing that all cooperate to conclude Austrian treaty "within next few days".

Secretary's statement, which followed, likening Austrian state treaty to mythological Sisyphus, telegraphed separately in Secto 154.[7]

In brief statement Bidault said Soviet behavior in bringing up new obstacles after 300 meetings of deputies and western concessions in Berlin was "extremely disturbing" and would discredit whole concept of international conferences. As for Soviet concern over *Anschluss*, first step to pervent such development was to recognize independence and integrity of Austria; it was also important not to link Austrian and German problems together in our discussions because this gives impression of solidarity between these two questions, which was precisely what we wished to avoid. Bidault said independence could not be measured in percentages and that nothing less than total independence for Austria would suffice. He reiterated that Soviet proposal regarding article 33 was unacceptable and urged treaty should now be signed without further delay.

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[6] For this Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)66, Document 521.

[7] Not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1654) For Dulles' statement, circulated as FPM(54)74, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 161-163, or *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 203-207.

Figl then said merely he could only repeat this request and urge ministers to do their action of peace and give Austria her state treaty.

After brief recess, Eden said he only wished to make preliminary comment on article 4 bis: It was one thing for a government to make a public declaration to its own parliament or elsewhere of what its policies are and quite another for such a declaration to be put into a treaty with other powers; in latter event there might be questioning later by other powers as to whether treaty engagements were being fulfilled, and by giving such engagement power would thus be limiting its sovereignty. Eden then repeated previous objections to Soviet text Article 33, and queried Molotov why he had suddenly and for first time raised *Anschluss* problem within context of EDC, which had been signed almost three years ago. He again appealed to Molotov to withdraw his new proposals and sign treaty.

Molotov then made lengthy statement largely covering previous ground regarding Soviet dislike for EDC and fear of German militarism, *Anschluss* and establishment military bases on foreign soil. In latter connection he made giving reference to Bidault's statement that independence should be 100 percent and implied France's sovereignty limited by foreign bases on its territory. Molotov then said Eden had made some interesting observations regarding Article 4 bis and that he would like to postpone his remarks on these until he had had a chance to familiarize himself with text of these remarks.

At this point, Molotov submitted amendment to his proposal regarding Article 33. Proposed new text as follows:

"In connection with the delay in the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the Governments of the USA, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union shall have the right, after the coming into force of the treaty with Austria, to postpone temporarily the withdrawal of their troops from the territory of the respective zones of Austria. At the same time the governments of the four powers deem it necessary to reconsider again, not later than 1955, the question of the date of the withdrawal of the troops of the four powers from the territory of Austria." [8]

Secretary then said new amendment did not alter fact Soviet Union would have right to maintain troops indefinitely on Austrian soil and fact that matter could be reconsidered meant nothing; proposed amendment therefore did not appear to alter original proposal to any material degree.

Bidault then took sharp issue with Molotov's intimations regarding France's lack of complete independence; again urged avoiding giving impression Austrian and German problems were linked; expressed distaste for imposing neutrality on Austria since "whole course of history has taught us that things which are imposed are not respected and observed;" and said he could not assume responsibility for postponing to 1955, as proposed by Molotov, what should be done in February 1954.

Figl said he could not sign treaty which on one hand recognizes Austria as sovereign, independent and democratic state and on other talks about withdrawing foreign troops on basis of discussions in 1955; he was not in position to agree to this in name his government.

Eden said he wished make it plain that principle he could not accept was that foreign troops should remain on Austrian soil after treaty signed and therefore new Soviet text no improvement and unacceptable.

Molotov again said he would study Eden's observations regarding Article 4 bis and state his views subsequently. Molotov suggested other delegations also study his new proposal and said that if these "modest" Soviet proposals were rejected responsibility for failure of treaty would lie on those doing the rejecting.

Secretary expressed interest in Molotov's twice-repeated reference to Eden's remarks regarding Article 4 bis and inquired whether he correct in understanding Eden had made no proposal for changing Article 4 bis.

Molotov said Soviet delegation believed we should not make haste but consider patiently matters before us; he repeated he would like to study attentively Eden's observations on Article 4 bis.

Eden then emphasized he had made no proposal of any kind regarding Article 4 bis and that to best of belief he had said nothing not already said at least once around this table; he wished to state again he could not accept Soviet amendments to Articles 4 bis or 33.

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[8] This proposal was circulated as FPM(54)73.

After some rather confusing discussion between Bidault and Molotov as to which agenda item would be discussed in next plenary session, it was agreed that item two would be discussed February 17 but that time would be left on February 18 for consideration of Austrian question.

Meeting adjourned at 1845 hours.

No. 492

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert Lochner of the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference [1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 17, 1954.

Participants: Austrian Delegation—Foreign Minister Figl
State Secretary Kreisky
Ambassador Bischoff
Dr. Schoener

United States Delegation—Secretary Dulles
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Nash
Mr. Jackson
[Mr. Lochner]

Subject: Conversation between Secretary Dulles and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Figl at the Secretary's house, evening of February 16, 1954

Dr. Figl stated he and his staff felt under pressure to come up with some kind of counter-proposal at Thursday's [2] meeting in view of Molotov's insistence that the Austrian delegation should make known its ideas and in view of the danger that Communist propaganda in Austria could exploit the alleged sterile attitude of the Austrian delegation at the Berlin conference where it said nothing but that it had no instructions allowing it really to negotiate. Dr. Figl outlined what he called a very rough idea he and his staff had hastily thought about in the car and in the hotel and which they wouldn't even discuss with Vienna before they had heard what Mr. Dulles thought about it.

To prevent the Soviets from saying that the Austrian delegation had been completely rigid and had not made any allowance for

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[1] Merchant also prepared a memorandum of this conversation, but since he arrived after the meeting started, it does not cover the entire session. (Eisenhower Library, C. D. Jackson papers)

[2] Feb. 18.

Molotov's fear of *Anschluss*, the Austrian delegation might propose a supervisory, Allied military commission roughly similar to that of 1918-9 with which, Dr. Figl said, Austria had not had bad experiences at all. This commission, which would have no actual control powers and no right to interfere in the political etc. life of the country, would be stationed in Vienna, the seat of all political developments, but be free to roam the country. It would be charged with supervising Austria's adherence to the prohibitions against *Anschluss*, foreign military bases in the country and the like. Each of the four powers could have a maximum of 250 members (Austria would start out by proposing 100 each), entitled to wear uniforms, but really forming an enlarged military attaché's staff of an Embassy with the one difference that they would, together, form a commission. There would be a time limit to the existence of this commission—1 Jan. or at most 1 April 1955.

If, as Dr. Figl thought likely, the Soviets were to turn this down, too, then it would be apparent to every last Austrian that they simply were not willing to give Austria its independence.

Mr. Dulles saw the danger in this proposal that such a concession might mean abandoning the whole basic principle that the limitations on *Anschluss* and the like laid down in the original treaty draft, e.g. Art. 4, are sufficient and that Austria can be trusted to abide by them. If the need for supervision during a limited time is conceded, Molotov could argue that this proves Austria cannot be trusted fully and if supervision for a year, why not supervision over a longer period?

Mr. Dulles agreed with Dr. Figl that the Berlin conference must not end on the note that the Austrian problem is insoluble. Answering Dr. Figl's suggestion that the Four Foreign Ministers should set a date for another conference say in May or June at which they would continue where they had left off in Berlin, i.e. Austria would be the first point on the agenda, Mr. Dulles said he himself just could not afford to waste another month or even longer this year in such futile discussions with Molotov as the ones just being concluded. On the other hand he agreed the Austrian problem must not be referred back to the Deputies. He said he and his staff were trying to find some formula in between these two alternatives and that he agreed that the Austrian question must be kept alive.

In general, Mr. Dulles said, he was doubtful concerning the advisability of rushing into the conference with concrete counter-proposals in the last dying hours since careful study and deliberation was required in working out such counter-proposals, particularly in view of the tricky Soviet conference tactics.

Dr. Figl did not give the impression of having abandoned the idea after hearing Mr. Dulles' attitude but suggested at one stage that maybe Mr. Dulles could discuss the idea with his British and French colleagues and then send a staff member to let the Austrian delegation know.

No. 493

600.0012/2-1654

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden

TOP SECRET PERSONAL BERLIN, February 16, 1954.

DEAR ANTHONY: I am writing in reply to the *Aide-Mémoire* which you handed me on February 10, on the subject of President Eisenhower's atomic energy proposals. [1]

With respect to the third paragraph of that *Aide-Mémoire*, it has been our thought that our first substantive presentation to the Soviet Union by diplomatic channels should be along general lines and that prior to its submission to the Soviets, through Ambassador Zarubin in Washington, the essential lines of that plan should have been concurred in by the United Kingdom, Canadian and French Governments. It would also be given to the Governments of Belgium, Australia and South Africa, not for concurrence but for information.

We, for our part, have not reached any conclusions as to other countries participating in any subsequent negotiations. We would naturally desire that you, the Canadians and the French participate with us in the study of the Soviet plan and in the preparation of any reply thereteo. The manner of negotiation beyond that stage of course in part will depend upon the Soviets' views.

I believe the foregoing substantially answers the fourth paragraph of your *Aide-Mémoire* since the Soviet counter proposal deals with the question of banning atomic weapons. It is, also, my understanding, arising from my talks in Washington with Ambassador Zarubin, that any of the participants in the talks may propose, at any future stage, that the discussion on this phase of the problem be transferred to the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In closing I desire to emphasize the importance I attach to conducting these exchanges step by step, with maximum privacy and with a flexibility which will permit us to reach procedural decisions as they arise, without binding ourselves too far in advance as to methods. It is unnecessary of course to repeat our desire and intention to work on terms of extreme intimacy with your Government in this matter.

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[1] Transmitted in Dulte 64, Document 455.

Incidentally, I have had word from Washington that the statement under preparation for transmission to the Soviets will probably be in form to enable us to pass it to you, the Canadians and the French for study this week.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

February 17, 1954

No. 494

396.1 BE/2-1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Embassy in Austria [1]

SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 17, 1954—2 a.m.

105. Re Secto 155. [2] No reason believe Soviets prepared retreat from basic insistence maintain troops in post-treaty Austria, although they may well produce proposal Thursday, making situation less unattractive Austrians. On other hand, believe Molotov's tactics re 4 bis were not purely to gain time. Likely he will attempt maneuver Austrians into acceptance military neutrality in some form in treaty. Even should west refuse he will have established partial concession for use in future negotiations should he succeed with Austrians.

Regardless what tactics we develop here (we have dropped notion submitting alleviation plan until after conference) basic plan will be that west continues reject imposition neutrality on any nation to whom sovereignty being returned. Above all, no point discussing neutrality seriously so long as Soviets refuse withdraw proposal maintain forces in Austria after treaty.

Appreciate effectiveness your dealings with Raab Monday and hope you, and if so instructed other two HICOMs, can repeat performance stressing foregoing. [3] Austrians obviously have little to lose in their view by accepting neutrality in treaty, and weight of argument should continue be that Soviet version Article 33 no matter how dressed up is unacceptable and that there is no point discussing neutrality question unless it is withdrawn.

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[1] Repeated to Washington, Paris, and London; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.

[2] Document 491.

[3] The "dealings" under reference have not been identified further, but presumably a meeting took place on Feb. 15 between Embassy officials and Raab during which proposals for the alleviation of conditions in Austria were discussed.

No. 495

396.1 BE/2-1754

United States Delegation Record of the Fifth Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 17, 1954, 11 a.m.

TOP SECRET

Present: *United States*
Secretary Dulles
Mr. Merchant
Mr. Nash
Mr. Bohlen
France
M. Bidault
M. Parodi
M. DeMargerie
M. Andronikof
United Kingdom
Mr. Eden
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Birse
USSR
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Malik
Mr. Troyanovski

Mr. Eden, as Chairman, stated that they had two items before them; disarmament and the Far East. On disarmament, Mr. Bidault had made a speech in support of his proposal [1] and he inquired what his colleagues wished to do: to finish the disarmament discussion and then go on to Far Eastern questions, or what.

It was agreed to start with disarmament.

The Secretary said he had nothing to say on the disarmament question. They had two proposals—one from Mr. Molotov, [2] and one from Mr. Bidault. Perhaps Mr. Molotov would wish to explain his proposal and then, subject to what the Chairman might wish to say, they could go on to the Far Eastern matter.

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[1] For the French proposal, see FPM(54)15, Document 509.

[2] For the Soviet proposal, see Secto 43, Document 376.

Mr. Molotov said that it appeared to the Soviet Delegation valuable to have a short exchange of views on disarmament even though they had little time left. It was worthy of note that two of the delegations had considered it important to discuss this matter and had submitted proposals. World public opinion expected them to devote some attention to this important question and this fact should be taken into account as well as the general desire they all had to see some reduction in international tension. The Soviet proposal had been of a specific nature and, while it had not been rejected *in toto,* it had not been accepted. The French proposal in many respects was not satisfactory but at least it did favor the general idea of disarmament. The Soviet Delegation therefore could accept the first two paragraphs of the French proposal with the addition in the second of the words "or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments." To this could be added an additional paragraph stating that they would want an exchange of views to contribute to a satisfactory solution of this problem.

The Secretary said he wished to be sure that this new Soviet proposal was in conformity with the UN resolution calling on a smaller group of powers to explore the disarmament question.

Mr. Bidault said he did not think there was any incompatibility with the Soviet amendment to the French draft and the point Mr. Dulles had made. He thought they could accept the Soviet proposal subject to drafting changes to bring it into harmony with the French text.

Mr. Eden said he saw no incompatibility either.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had tried to reduce the armaments question to a minimum and he saw no contradiction with any UN matter.

Mr. Dulles suggested that possibly this might be made clearer by inclusion of specific reference to GA resolution of November 28, 1953. [3]

[Mr. Bidault had been under a misconception as to the meaning of the Soviet proposal which was intended to replace all the balance of the French draft with the exception of paragraphs 1 and 2.] [4]

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[3] For this resolution, see *United Nations General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17, Resolutions,* pp. 3-4, or Department of State *Bulletin,* Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.

[4] Brackets in the source text.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation wished to avoid disputed questions and that there were several points of dispute in the French resolution. To meet the views of the US Delegation he was prepared to add a sentence to the effect that these exchanges of views would take place within the framework of the United Nations.

The Secretary then said he wished to be sure that the exchange of views envisaged between the four were not designed to replace or affect the current discussions on atomic energy matters which at this stage were being conducted bilaterally between the US and the USSR.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation agreed with Mr. Dulles and that the proposed exchange on disarmament did not affect in any way the current talks on atomic matters.

Mr. Bidault, referring to the radical alteration of the French draft said it was not an amendment but an amputation of the French draft.

The Secretary said he was bound to say that while he saw no serious objection to the Soviet proposal, it would not evoke much enthusiasm in the world or at least in the United States. He felt that the French draft had had a substantive paragraph on the nonencouragement of aggression and that it was too bad this substantive point would be lost.

Mr. Bidault said that he must say that the Soviet proposal did not give evidence of the interest in this subject which the French put in their own proposal. He wondered if the Soviet amendment could not be added to the French text.

Mr. Molotov said that the new Soviet text does not satisfy them completely and they preferred their original, but this was the amendment. The French text had certain disputed questions—for example: the definition of aggression on which no agreement existed between them. If they began to debate that they would be led into a jungle from which they would hardly have time to get out. He felt that their version was the minimum which would indicate that the conference had not neglected the question of disarmament.

Mr. Eden then proposed that a specific reference to paragraph 6 of the UN resolution of November 28, 1953 should be added.

Mr. Molotov asked for the views of his colleagues on Mr. Eden's amendment.

The Secretary said he felt if it was not practical to adopt the French text that Mr. Eden's amendment would strengthen the document.

Mr. Bidault said he had rather strong feelings on this subject. In fact, only three lines were left of the French resolution and those dealt with the obvious—peace is strengthened by disarmament. He felt that Mr. Eden's addition improved the Soviet suggestion and that while he had no objection, he had little enthusiasm for the text.

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation could accept Mr. Eden's amendment.

Mr. Bidault said he thought they wished to be clear that the draft they were at present discussing provided that they must reach agreement on disarmament or at least on reduction of armaments.

The text was then agreed with the inclusion of Mr. Eden's amendment (text attached).

Mr. Eden asked Mr. Molotov if he had any comments on the UK proposal put in at the last meeting.[5]

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation could agree on the third paragraph of the UK draft provided that there were included the words "Soviet draft dealing with the countries who had participated in hostilities in Korea," in place of the reference to forces placed under UN Command, so it would then read "countries whose forces had taken part in hostilities in Korea."

The Secretary said this form was acceptable to the US Delegation.

Mr. Eden likewise agreed.

Mr. Molotov then said, as to time and place, the Soviet Delegation could accept Geneva as the place and April as the month and he hoped before the end of the day to be able to give a final answer on the exact date.

Mr. Eden remarked that there appeared to be nothing more in paragraph three.

Mr. Molotov said he had one more question—namely, what was meant by the word "representatives".

Mr. Eden said, as it was his draft, he could state that he had in mind not committing the Foreign Ministers definitely at this stage; they could of course, however, attend. The word "representatives" could cover attendance by the Foreign Ministers or by other officials.

Mr. Molotov remarked that this left the question vague.

The Secretary stated that if this conference was held, he hoped to attend at least for the opening; but since it might be a long conference, he could not undertake to commit himself to stay for the duration. He added that it was our custom to appoint special representatives for conferences. For example: He had been the special representative for the US charged with negotiating the Japanese

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[5] For the British proposal, see Dulte 75, Document 483.

Peace Treaty and that only at the final stage had the Secretary of State taken part.

Mr. Bidault said it seemed to him that the word "representatives" certainly did not exclude Ministers and simply meant that they were not bound to come. He said the problem was easier for France since they were in a privileged position insofar as distance was concerned.

Mr. Eden said that if he personally was not able to attend or to stay for the whole conference, he envisaged a British representative of Ministerial rank.

Mr. Molotov said he thought this point could be accepted but he would like a little time to think it over and possibly the wording might be improved. The discussion then turned to paragraph 4 of the British text.

Mr. Molotov, turning to paragraph 4 of the British text, said he thought it should be shortened and improved. As written, it dealt with many problems in a few words; he thought they should try to find some simpler form which would make matters clearer. In reply to Mr. Eden's suggestion, Mr. Molotov said he would have some thoughts to offer.

The Secretary said that he agreed and that the original US paragraph on this point was more precise.[6]

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation likewise favored their original draft. He then said that if the British paragraph was amended, excluding the words beginning "if and when" and ending with "Indochina," and the following wording substituted—namely: "the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at a conference," the balance of the paragraph could be accepted.

Mr. Bidault said that this was a question in which his Government was deeply interested. He would therefore like to think it over and possibly consult with his Government and then maybe later in the day or tomorrow he could give a final reply.

The Secretary said they all recognized that this was a question of particular importance to the French and he would await the words of the French Delegation before expressing his.

Mr. Eden said he held the same view. He added that there only remained the last paragraph which should not encounter objection.

Mr. Molotov said he felt this statement might best be left to those delegations who wished to make such a declaration.

The Secretary said that the United States could not join in this resolution which seemed to imply recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as the legal Government of China unless this reservation was included. He thought that the Soviet Union would wish to take a similar position in regard to other countries such as the Republic of Korea. He said this reservation did not involve only China but other countries as well—for example, the countries which would be involved in the Indochinese discussion including the Associated States.

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[6] Transmitted in Dulte 44, Document 436.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation understood that this reservation affected other countries as well as China and that it also would affect countries other than the four represented here. He would have to repeat therefore what he had said earlier—namely, that the Soviet Delegation could not speak for the Chinese People's Republic or for the Korean People's Democratic Republic. He felt that if they could reach an agreement here on the conference it would not be difficult to avoid undermining the authority or national dignity of any of its participants. He felt that agreement could be reached on this point not only by the four but by others. The Soviet Delegation did not consider it desirable to include the last paragraph but if the United States considered it desirable the Soviet Delegation will study the question and see if they could find some acceptable language. Possibly the United States Delegation might think it over and might find it possible not to insist on this point.

Mr. Bidault said that he saw in this paragraph merely a statement of the *status quo* with no obligation either way. It merely meant that the preceding paragraph did not have any meaning beyond what it says. He said the French attitude towards the Chinese People's Republic was well known and he did not have to explain it.

Mr. Eden said he agreed it was a statement of fact that added nothing and bound no one. He said the UK position was likewise known—namely, that they recognized the Chinese People's Republic, but they don't seem to recognize them much.

The Secretary said he wished to be clear that the first two paragraphs of the UK resolution were accepted by the Soviet Government.

Mr. Molotov confirmed this view.

It was agreed that they would meet again tomorrow morning in restricted session and would merely tell the press that the discussion on point one had been continued today and would be resumed tomorrow.

At the restricted session this morning the Secretary pointed out again that he had heard that he might encounter headwinds on return flight to the United States and therefore he would like to be able to take off from Berlin at about 7:30 p.m. tomorrow evening.

The Ministers also discussed the last day's session which it was agreed would begin at 3 p.m. and there would be time at the end for each Minister to make some remarks of a general nature.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether there was any joint or common conclusion that they would record and how they were to express such agreements as may have been reached.

The Secretary said he thought this was worth considering and the Ministers agreed to appoint a Committee of Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Malik, Mr. Roberts and Mr. Seydoux to consider the question of how they would record officially any agreements reached. [7]

[Attachment]

Resolution on Disarmament Agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union

Berlin, undated.

The Governments of the United States of America, of France, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United Kingdom,

Convinced that the solution of international controversies, necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments,

Will subsequently hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of the United Nations Resolution of November 28, 1953. [8]

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[7] For a report on the work of this committee, see the memorandum by MacArthur, Document 501.

[8] The text of this resolution was transmitted in Secto 164 from Berlin, Feb. 18. (396.1 BE/2-1854)

No. 496

396.1 BE/2-1754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 17, 1954—11 p.m.

Dulte 86. For the Acting Secretary. Re Dultes 75 and 77.[1] Following is revision proposed by Soviets today of UK draft.[2] This is the text which is being seriously considered overnight and which will be accepted or rejected at final restricted meeting tomorrow morning. Soviets may insist upon deletion of final paragraph. Their commitment to accept other three paragraphs is firm although exact date April 15 subject to confirmation, probably tomorrow.

"The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,

Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the other countries, the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to do so, shall meet in Geneva on April 15 for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question,

Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded."

DULLES

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[1] Dulte 75, Document 483. Dulte 77 transmitted the Soviet proposal submitted at the fourth restricted meeting on Feb. 15. For a record of this meeting, see Document 485.

[2] For a record of the fifth restricted session at which this proposal was made, see the U.S. Delegation record, *supra*.

No. 497

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 17, 1954.

Participants:

The Secretary of State	M. Bidault
Mr. Merchant	M. Alphand

The four French prerequisites to EDC [2] are:

1. Accord with the UK.
2. US undertaking re troops.
3. Saar settlement.
4. Question of "democratic control" of EDC Army.

Regarding 1, Bidault felt that the arrangements now practically agreed upon would suffice provided there was a satisfactory understanding under 2. The British would not give adequate undertakings if they thought the US was going to pull out. Bidault expressed the personal view that if they started out with close association with EDC, the UK would end up with membership.

Regarding 2, there should be some undertaking to maintain Anglo-American forces on the Continent; also, some declaration that we did not regard the North Atlantic Treaty as expiring in twenty years, but as an agreement which normally would continue.

There should be agreement on maintenance of the forward strategy rather than peripheral strategy and acceptance of the concept of some contribution by the US to maintaining an appropriate balance of strength on the Continent. Also, it would be desirable that the US would indicate its willingness to sit in on talks which would otherwise confront the French with the Germans so that the French would not be left alone. There was some discussion as to the possible form the US action might take. Alphand suggested a Congressional resolution. I said that this matter of troop disposition was under our Constitution primarily a matter for the President. Even the proposed constitutional amendment would probably expressly reaffirm the authority of the President to make agreements as Commander-in-Chief without the necessity for any Congressional participation. I thought that an appropriate communication from the President, perhaps sent with the knowledge and informal approval of some of the Congressional committees, would give the maximum that could be expected under our constitutional provisions.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a message from Merchant to O'Connor, dated Feb. 24, which stated that Merchant had compared the memorandum with his notes and had found nothing to add or modify. This conversation took place at the Secretary's residence at lunch on Feb. 17.

[2] For documentation on the EDC, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.

With regard to 3, there would have to be a general settlement of the Saar matter, although not every detail would have to be settled. It could be contingent upon the EDC, as obviously you could not Europeanize the Saar unless there was going to be a Europe. Adenauer should realize the importance of this Saar matter and be willing to talk about it seriously and above all soon and quietly. Bidault complained that there had always been too much publicity, even by Adenauer to prior talks with him and with Francois-Poncet.[3]

As to 4, there was long discussion between Bidault and Alphand as to where the most votes could be gotten—whether by playing to the socialists in favor of establishing democratic control or from the right which feared an all-European political organ. Since this was not a matter on which the US could be helpful, we did not take any part in this discussion. However, Bidault indicated he thought this was the most difficult point of all to solve.

Regarding procedure, Bidault indicated his belief that the present government would probably hold on until the EDC vote. He thought that whatever was done under points 1, 2 and 3 should, as far as possible, be done simultaneously at the moment when they would have the greatest impact. I asked as to whether we could work this out in Washington with Bonnet. Bidault said Bonnet had his full confidence, but that he lacked technical qualifications. Alphand suggested working these things out with Bruce in Paris, but I said I doubted whether this was the best place. It should preferably be done where the President and I could be in personal touch with the matter. Also, Bruce, as former Under Secretary, could not, from a Congressional standpoint, usefully be given too great a role in this matter. Bidault agreed and said that he would send Alphand to Washington, but wanted him to come under some cover which would avoid wide-spread speculation in France.

I said that I wanted Bidault to know that we wanted to do everything possible to help put the EDC through. I saw no acceptable alternative. Some want to proceed at once to arm the Germans to a large extent and to proceed to put the contractuals in force without French concurrence. Others would want to adopt a peripheral strategy based on Britain and Spain primarily. Others would want to return to isolationism. I could not see what the outcome would be, but surely it would not be anything good, and it would almost surely mark the end to the role of France as a great power. Bidault said he fully accepted all of this, and he was dedicated to accomplishment of the EDC. It was not precisely what he would have liked, but it was better than any alternative. I said EDC was not precisely in the form I would have negotiated it, but the President and I either had to elect to go ahead on what was or had to try to make a fresh start, and the first course seemed preferable. Bidault said it was the same with him. [4]

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[3] Regarding these talks, see Documents 607 ff.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[4] According to Secto 165 from Berlin, Feb. 18, Secretary Dulles also asked Bidault to instruct the French High Commissioner for Austria to proceed with planning for the use of Austrian manpower in the event of an emergency. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) According to another telegram, Dulles also stated during the lunch "that if EDC failed ratification in France many unpleasant things would happen, including great pressure in certain American quarters for resumption of special US-UK relationship which had existed during World War II." (Dulte 89 from Berlin, Feb. 18, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

No. 498

396.1 BE/2-1754: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 17, 1954—10 p.m.

Secto 159. Department pass OSD. Following summary first part February 17 For Minister's meeting, Eden presiding: [2]

Molotov spoke first on European security. He asked that other Ministers address themselves to Soviet proposal for partial withdrawal of troops from Germany. [3] He insisted that this would both reduce international tensions and would alleviate situation of German people. Molotov then turned to Soviet proposal for European security treaty. [4] Referring to Bidault's inquiry as to whether Soviet Union considered its security proposal compatible with NATO, he once again avoided direct reply. He repeated previous statement that security treaty was alternative to EDC, with which it was incompatible. He said Soviet Union willing study question whether security treaty compatible with NATO and intimated that latter might be so amended as to overcome difference of views between East and West regarding its defensive nature. Finally, in reply to previous statements by Bidault regarding the garrisoned people's police in Soviet Zone, Molotov suggested that joint effort be made introduce clarity into this question. He then read following proposal:

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The meeting began at 3:30 p.m. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the twentieth plenary, USDEL PLEN/20, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195. For a record of the second part of the plenary, see Secto 162, *infra*.

[3] For this proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.

[4] For this proposal, see FPM(54)47, Document 517.

> "The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the USA and the USSR, consider it desirable to have agreement achieved by the parties (*storon*) on the German police, both in Eastern and Western Germany, involving matters relating to the strength and armament of all types of police." [5]

Secretary Dulles then made statement transmitted Secto 160. [6]

Bidault pointed out again that Soviet proposals would destroy Western security system, while leaving own unimpaired. He insisted European security arrangements must crown a European settlement, which would involve settlement of German and Austrian questions. We find ourselves however in situation where cannot face breaking up security arrangements, and it will not help to substitute for these agreements with countries which make statements that are anything but reassuring. Bidault then drew attention to fact that Soviet security proposals provided for participation of one country which stretches from Europe to the Pacific and is allied with Communist China. He saw no reason therefore to exclude other non-European powers which have historically been concerned with Europe.

Bidault observed that Molotov had again failed to answer his question regarding compatibility of NATO and Soviet security proposal. He recalled then various statements made since 1949 in Soviet notes regarding the aggressive aims of NATO. He insisted that security must be considered in intercontinental framework and could not be predicted upon withdrawal US troops. He concluded by expressing hope Soviets would give careful consideration to proposals on European security advanced by French delegation.

During course this statement, Bidault referred to question garrisoned peoples police and said that, whatever Molotov said, troops in barracks are generally considered an army.

Meeting recessed following Bidault's statement.

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[5] This proposal was circulated as FPM(54)76.

[6] Document 500.

No. 499

396.1 BE/2-1854: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 18, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 162. Department pass OSD. Following summary second part February [17] session Foreign Ministers, Eden presiding. [2]

Discussion resumed by Eden after intermission. Remarked he would consider Soviet proposal on German police (see first part summary) especially since Soviet figures on East German police conflict with those available to British. In view previous Soviet comments on security, he considered Soviet plan aimed at NATO and as alternative to EDC. But these not aimed at anyone. Troop withdrawal according to Soviet plan [3] would greatly weaken West. Latter had fitted security into broader framework which Soviets had rejected. Referring to earlier Soviet speeches Eden concluded Soviets placed both NATO and EDC in same category of condemnation. Agreed with Secretary no useful results could be achieved regarding security until German problem settled for this is main cause of European insecurity. If this not done, further discussion on security unrealistic. Concrete British proposal made early in conference because German problem is key to effort for peace. [4] Soviets did not accept proposal for discussion and rejected principles, and reasons for their doing so are clear from Soviet speeches. Further discussions this subject thus theoretical. In conclusion Eden reaffirmed firmness of West alliances and their defensive character.

Molotov then gave police figures for West German (230,000 militarized detachments plus 150,000 under control of occupation powers which were cadres of German militarism). NATO and EDC not same thing. One exists; the other only on paper. Germany not in NATO but will be in EDC. Present differences between powers will be increased by EDC. Agreed solution of German problem was biggest problem and admitted little progress made on reconciling differences of two plans. Still troops must be withdrawn before elections to insure their freedom. USSR wanted to continue efforts to reach solution and others should do likewise. Despite delay on principal aspects no need to postpone certain practical matters, viz., those facilitating connection between two sections of Germany. Then tabled proposal to establish two committees to facilitate economic and political ties between East and West Germany (for text see Secto 161 [5]).

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] For a record of the first part of the twentieth plenary, see Secto 159, *supra*.

[3] For this Soviet proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.

[4] For the text of this British proposal, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.

Secretary quoted from Senate Foreign Relations Committee's NATO report (section on European integration) [6] to show US concept on NATO from start was that it would facilitate integration of Germany into Europe which is essential to insure security. Glad to note Soviet proposal to relieve unnecessary and unwarranted hardships on people in East Germany but by 1949 CFM communiqué [7] ministers already committed to alleviate effects of division of Germany and Berlin. Would consider proposal overnight which seemed feeble substitute for Eden proposal to establish all-German Government after free elections. Has little confidence in dealings with regime which tyrannizes its people.

Bidault said he would consider proposal to improve conditions which were recognizably bad. Matters in proposal were no longer for allied powers to handle but could be done by two German regimes.

Eden thought his original proposal much best solution but this failing he would consider Soviet proposal. Did colleagues consider discussion of item finished?

Molotov stated he would like consideration of his proposals on police and East-West German cooperation so that they can be agreed February 18.

In Secretary's view proposals called for more consideration than time permitted. He suggested their consideration through diplomatic channels; Eden thought HICOMers could handle matter.

Molotov proposed ministers indicate February 18 their views on disposition of his proposals.

February 18 agenda—restricted session in morning and Austrian item in afternoon.

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[5] Not printed. (396.1 BE/2-1754) For this proposal, see FPM(54)75, Document 524.

[6] The quote under reference here is in the verbatim record of this plenary, USDEL PLEN/20, in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.

[7] *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, p. 1062.

No. 500

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

PRIORITY BERLIN, February 17, 1954.

Secto 160. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary's statement February 17: [2]

"I will comment on the observations made by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

He supports his proposal for troop withdrawal [3] in East and West Germany on the basis that this would give satisfaction to the German people.

I am sure he can speak with authority as far as the Eastern Zone is concerned; I doubt whether he can speak with the same authority as far as the Western Zone is concerned.

I can say that there has been no intimation of any kind received from the authorities of West Germany, or from the people of West Germany, that they would like to see the withdrawal of troops of the Western powers which are in Germany.

On the contrary, there is evidence that there would be very considerable concern if these troops were withdrawn, given the situation which exists in the East.

Therefore, I am afraid that, while the proposal might give satisfaction in the Eastern Zone, it would not give satisfaction in the Western Zone.

If the Soviet Union is eager to give people satisfaction by troop withdrawals, I would suggest that a good place to begin would be in Austria, where there is no question but what all the people eagerly desire all the troops to be withdrawn. There we are assured of a chance to give satisfaction. The Soviet delegation might give further consideration to that matter and perhaps indicate their acceptance of the Austrian State Treaty when we take that up tomorrow afternoon.

There is, however, a reason more fundamental than any I have indicated so far why the United States does not feel itself able to accept the Soviet proposal which is entitled, "on ensuring European security". That is the paper which calls for the final withdrawal of forces.

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[1] Repeated to New York, London, Paris, Vienna, Moscow, Bonn, and CINCEUR.

[2] For a record of the twentieth plenary on Feb. 17, see Sectos 159 and 162, Document 498 and *supra*. Secretary Dulles' statement was circulated as FPM(54)77.

[3] For this proposal, see FPM(54)46, Document 516.

What the Soviet Union asks the Western powers to do, presumably in the name of European security, is what we did under very analogous circumstances in Korea immediately preceding 1950. Our withdrawal in that case did not produce security; it produced war.

Korea, like Germany, was divided. Korea, like Germany, was divided under conditions so that roughly two-thirds of Korea was occupied by Western forces and the other third occupied by the non-Western forces.

The analogy is closer because the indigenous forces in North Korea, like the forces in Eastern Germany, were highly organized and trained, whereas those in Southern Korea and in Western Germany were only police forces.

Moreover, Molotov has questioned Mr. Eden's statements with reference to the East German military personnel. The United States has very reliable information to reveal that the East German military personnel now total 140,200 men under arms. Of this number 100,000 are in the ground forces with an additional 25,000 serving in security formations. There are seven organized divisions of which three are mechanized. Air forces constitute 60 jet fighters manned and trained by 5,000 officers. These forces are commanded by ex-officers of the Nazi Wehrmacht and of the SS. They are additional to 100,000 East German police.

I can assure the Soviet Foreign Minister that there is nothing comparable in West Germany.

There are ample means of access to information so that anyone can ascertain that fact readily for himself.

There is in West Germany a total of 150,000 police, none of whom have any more than normal police armament. That number is to be thought of in terms of the population of the Western Zone, which is, of course, many times that of the Eastern Zone.

The situation in Germany is thus comparable to the situation which existed in Korea prior to 1947. Up to that time the United States had its own armed forces in South Korea; and there was peace. The United States took its troops out of South Korea in 1949, and in 1950 there was war.

It is not necessary at this point to indulge in argument as to just where the responsibility for that war lay. No one can dispute the two facts: First, that the United States troops were taken out; and, immediately following that, there was war.

Therefore, I am sure that Mr. Molotov will understand, even if he does not agree with our state of mind, when we say that we are highly skeptical of a proposal put forward in the name of peace which involves our following the same course of action which, under remarkably similar circumstances, in fact led to war.

It is to fly in the face of the teachings of history, and indeed of elemental reasoning to seek peace by continuing the disunity of a people who are bound together by sentiments of patriotism and by ethnic unity.

The way to get peace and promote peace in Europe is not simply to think of various devices whereby we can mitigate the dangers of a disunited Germany. We should seek a united Germany.

That is why I regret that in this topic of Item Two the Soviet Union has gotten lost in its great grandiose scheme, piling words upon words, and it has left the central problem, which is the peaceful unification of Germany.

It is not an accident that the three Western Ministers, under this Item Two, have concentrated their attention on the problem of Germany and the creation of a united Germany through free elections. It is because we believe that this goes to the heart of the problem of security for Europe.

We are also convinced that a united Germany should be allowed to develop along peaceful lines of its own choosing. A Germany which is coerced, which is told what it cannot do, is a Germany which almost surely will follow the same course that was followed by the Germany which succeeded the Treaty of Versailles. There the restrictions which were imposed were the very thing that enabled the extreme nationalists to come to power.

Therefore, our second point is that Germany must be allowed to pursue her inclinations so long as these are peaceful and compatible with the security of the rest of us. Since, in fact, Germany wishes to associate herself with the Western countries of Europe, it is essential to peace that she be allowed to do so. If she had wished to associate herself with the powers of Eastern Europe, we would not have wanted to force her otherwise. The main point is that we should not attempt to apply such a coercion to Germans that they will not feel that Germany is an independent sovereign state. In that way, I repeat, lies great danger.

It is a fact, which all of us who really want peace should eagerly welcome, that certainly the greater part of the Germans want to adopt a course which will end, for at least 50 years, and I believe for all time, a distinctively national army, and equally end the German general staff. The fact that the Germans want to do this gives us a unique opportunity to go to meet them, and to consolidate that present will. That will may not always be with us. If today we reject that will of the German people which goes in the direction of peace, if we try to substitute provisions which will be forcibly imposed upon Germany, if we perpetuate the division of Germany, if we impose limitation and controls of the nature of the

Versailles Treaty, then, I say we would be accepting a heavy responsibility before history."

No. 501

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET BERLIN, February 17, 1954.

I met with Malik, Roberts, and Seydoux after the plenary session this afternoon. [2] Malik produced a paper from which he read, saying it was a rough outline of a communiqué. It was blocked out along the following lines:

> An opening sentence said the four Foreign Ministers had met from January 25 to February 18 in Berlin to consider (the agreed agenda of the Conference was listed here).
>
> There was then, apparently, four paragraphs following. The first one said the four Ministers met to consider Agenda Item 1 (which was listed again in full). There was a blank to be filled in tomorrow, depending on the outcome of the restricted session tomorrow morning. The next paragraph dealt with Agenda Item 2 and said the Ministers had discussed this matter and it would be useful to continue examination of German questions in the interests of peace and European security, etc. The next paragraph dealt with Agenda Item 3 and was to be filled in following the discussion on Austria tomorrow. A final paragraph in essence said the Berlin Conference had been useful in enabling the Ministers to exchange views and would greatly facilitate the future consideration and solution of the problems examined.

It is perfectly obvious that the Soviets are doing what we expected they would do and are trying to build up expectations that we have made real progress and that solution of Germany and Europe is just around the corner. This would be seized upon in France by neutralists and opponents of EDC to block EDC.

I told Malik I believed he was under a misapprehension about the purposes of our meeting. As I understood it, there had been no agreement by the Ministers this morning [3] to a quadripartite communiqué. The purpose of the meeting of the four of us, as I understood it, was to exchange views as to whether in the event of further agreement were reached tomorrow, in what form these agreements might be published. One possibility was simply that they would be agreed Conference documents and released to the press at the conclusion of the session. I added that if the only agreement that is registered is the one on disarmament, it would hardly be worthwhile issuing a communiqué. On the other hand, if an agreement were reached on Agenda Item 1, it might be worth registering this agreement publicly in some way, but as we saw it, under any circumstances any communiqué that might be issued would be a simple announcement of the agreed decisions of the four Ministers and nothing more.

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it. Copies of this memorandum were also sent to Merchant, Bowie, Tyler, Morris, and Nagle.

[2] For a report on the twentieth plenary, see Sectos 159, 162, and 160, Documents 498, 499, and *supra*.

[3] For a report on the fifth restricted session, see the U.S. Delegation verbatim record, Document 495.

Seydoux and Roberts took a somewhat similar line, although Roberts was perhaps a little bit more "diplomatic" and left the door open a bit, it seemed.

I feel very strongly that if there is to be any communiqué it should be simply: an opening sentence to the effect that the four Ministers have reached the following agreement (or agreements)—the item on disarmament as agreed this morning would then be listed, and if there is an agreement on Item 1, that would be listed, and that would be all. Do you agree?

I should add that Alphand is desperately worried that if we imply that Berlin will result in a solution by further discussions of the problem of Germany and European Security, EDC is a dead, dead duck.

Douglas MacArthur II

No. 502

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BERLIN, February 18, 1954—11 a.m.

Dulte 90. For Acting Secretary for discretionary distribution from Secretary. Eden met with me tonight with the following results:

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[1] Drafted by Secretary Dulles.

1. EDC. We reviewed together conditions precedent to EDC and found ourselves in substantial agreement along lines of my lunch with Bidault and Alphand. [2] Cable follows. [3]

2. Egypt. Eden indicated that if Iran could be included with Turkey, he personally would be satisfied and ready to make concession on uniforms.

However, he said Churchill was very difficult on this subject, and he could not be confident of result until he saw situation after return to London. He said that if no new agreement could be reached, they would have to get along as best they could under the present treaty, and I said I thought we would then have to give economic aid to Egypt, particularly having regard to Soviet proposal regarding upper dam. Eden seemed acquiescent.

3. Iran. I said I did not think Anglo-Iranian could hold 50 percent position. We were not trying to get larger US position, but only trying to meet political realities in Iran. Eden said that he had thought 50 percent probably unobtainable, but hoped to get as close to this as possible with position for Dutch Shell. I emphasized US companies were not themselves seeking large participation, but only going along at government request and that our judgment would be entirely a political judgment based on estimate Iran situation.

4. East-West Trade. I urged only gradual relaxation on item-to-item basis, and Eden said he completely concurred in this approach, and would look into the matter on his return.

5. Middle East Defense. I said we were encouraged by degree to which Turkey, Pakistan plus possibly Iran and Iraq had developed spontaneously on basis of mild suggestion our part. I felt this very encouraging but recognized UK had problems in relation to India. Eden said he recognized these problems, but felt that on balance the project was good.

DULLES

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[2] For a report on Dulles' luncheon meeting with Bidault, see the memorandum of conversation, Document 497.

[3] Presumably a reference to Dulte 91 from Berlin, Feb. 18, which stated that Dulles had had lunch with Bidault and that he was bringing a memorandum of the conversation with him when he returned to Washington. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)

February 18, 1954

No. 503

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BERLIN, February 18, 1954—1 a.m.
NIACT

Dulte 87. For Acting Secretary from Secretary. Re Dulte 86 [2] Bidault is instructed by Cabinet to accept this latest Soviet offer and we consider it acceptable in itself apart from necessity avoiding break with France which would imperil both Indochina and EDC.

(1) Principle of no five power conference is upheld; (2) there is no promotion of Communist China to position of authority and prestige; (3) we are negotiating with Communist China only on *de facto* basis in relation to concrete local problems of war and peace where that regime is a necessary party; (4) composition for Korea is as we sought and India is excluded; and (5) our choice of place is accepted.

I have emphasized to Bidault that prospect of conference on Indochina will increase Communist effort for knock out this season and must be met with corresponding determination to win good negotiating position.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Secretary Dulles.
[2] Document 496.

No. 504

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 206

United States Delegation Record of the Sixth Restricted Meeting of the Berlin Conference, February 18, 1954, 11 a.m.

TOP SECRET

Present: *United States*
  Secretary Dulles
  Mr. Merchant
  Mr. Nash
  Mr. Bohlen
France
  Mr. Bidault
  Mr. Parodi

Mr. De Margerie
Mr. Andronikof

United Kingdom

Mr. Eden
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Birse

USSR

Mr. Molotov
Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Malik
Mr. Troyanovski

Mr. Molotov was in the chair.

Mr. Bidault said that, as he stated yesterday, he wished to consult his Government concerning yesterday's meeting and the paper they had discussed: that is, the United Kingdom resolution as amended by the Soviet Delegation. [1] It seemed to the French Government that this was the result of a joint effort to deal with the problems and the French Government found it acceptable as a whole. As to the date, it was only three days before Easter which would be difficult and therefore he would suggest Monday, April 26 instead. He pointed out that the experts would meet to verify the text in all languages since it now existed in only one.

Mr. Molotov said he would like to examine the text and after study inquired whether the last paragraph was really necessary.

The Secretary said from the point of view of the United States it was indispensable.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Delegation considered this text acceptable. They would like to think over the last paragraph before the plenary session this afternoon but he wished to express the hope that it would not cause any difficulty.

Mr. Eden recalled that at yesterday's meeting Mr. Molotov had wished to think over the use of the word "representatives."

Mr. Molotov said the Soviet Delegation had gained a definite impression which he hoped was not merely subjective but was a reflection of objective reality. He said the Soviet Delegation understood they would meet in Geneva at least for the beginning. He said he felt this was important not so much from the point of view of interest of the Soviet Union but from the point of view of interest of the questions to be discussed. In reply to a question of the Secretary he stated that the date proposed by Mr. Bidault, namely, April 26, was acceptable.

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[1] For a report on the fifth restricted session, see the U.S. Delegation record, Document 495.

The Ministers then discussed the problem of inquiring of the Swiss Government whether they would be agreeable to having such a conference and it was decided that the French Delegation should communicate immediately by telephone with their Ambassador in Bern who is Doyen of the Corps there in an endeavor to obtain a reply from the Swiss Government today before this afternoon's meeting.

Mr. Bidault then raised the question about the manner of sending invitations and proposed that the Soviet Government should transmit the invitation to the Chinese People's Republic and to the North Korean Government; that the United States should invite the Republic of Korea and all other countries who participated in the war in Korea; and that France and Great Britain would merely invite themselves.

This proposal was accepted.[2] The Ministers agreed that nothing would be given to the press on this morning's meeting and that the agreed text would be tabled this afternoon.

Mr. Molotov again repeated that he hoped there would be no difficulty concerning the last paragraph.

At today's closed session the Ministers discussed certain matters connected with the close of the conference. Mr. Molotov said that he would like to hear the views of his colleagues concerning the two proposals on Germany put in by the Soviet Delegation yesterday—namely, one on police and the other for the establishment of two committees.[3] He said he did this since Mr. Dulles indicated that he would have to leave this evening and that possibly, if they exchanged views now, their experts might have something to work on before the afternoon session.

The Secretary said he was not in a position to express an opinion on these points at the moment. However, one of his advisers was studying it and he doubted that time would permit a decision on these questions; but, as he suggested yesterday, it could be pursued through diplomatic channels or as Mr. Eden stated by the High Commissioners. There were certain aspects of these questions which from our point of view at least would require reference to the Federal Government since some of these points were not within the competence of the High Commissioners.

Mr. Bidault said he was in the same situation and his advisers were working on a procedure as to how to handle these questions. He therefore couldn't either take any decision on the matter now or give any indication as to how these questions should be handled in the future.

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[2] This proposal is printed as an attachment below.

[3] For text of these Soviet proposals, see Secto 159 and FPM(54)75, Documents 498 and 524.

Mr. Eden said he was also in the same position and that he expected to talk to his High Commissioner this morning. He inquired therefore whether it wouldn't be best if the present meeting adjourned in order to give them time to consult with their experts before the afternoon session.

The Secretary then raised the question of a communiqué and stated that he thought it should really merely contain the agreements that they reached here, since he felt that to deal with other questions would merely raise the same differences that they had encountered at the conference.

Mr. Bidault agreed with this statement and said that he thought the agreements only should be registered in the final communiqué; that seemed to him more reasonable than attempting to deal with what had not been accomplished at the conference.

Mr. Eden also agreed and thought there was nothing to gain in trying to reproduce their arguments and differences.

Mr. Molotov said he agreed that the communiqué should register the agreements that they had reached and should not include statements of their differences or polemics. The chief part therefore would be the two agreements they reached on Item 1. As to the second point on Germany, if after consultation with their experts the heads of the delegations agreed on something, this should also be in the communiqué. He said each delegation would, of course, have an opportunity to express its views on any of the subjects under discussion at the conference. He was not sure, however, that the people that surrounded them, namely, the Germans, would understand if there was no mention in the final communiqué of the German problem. From the exchange of views on this subject, the Soviet Delegation believed that they might express the general idea which emerged from this exchange without referring to their disagreements. He had in mind a sentence somewhat as follows: "That the Governments of France, the United States, United Kingdom and USSR will continue their efforts for a satisfactory solution of the German question in the interest of strengthening peace and security in Europe."

The Secretary said he was in general agreement with Mr. Molotov but not in detail. Under Item 1 they had two agreements, on an Asian Conference and on Disarmament, which would be in the communiqué. Under Item 2 they might have some agreement which would be reflected and something in any event might be said that they all recognized they had not discharged their responsibilities towards Germany and that they would continue their efforts to make possible the fulfillment of these responsibilities. He thought Mr. Molotov's wording was not acceptable since it seemed to imply a greater measure of common understanding on Germany than in fact existed. He felt it was very important not to create a sense of false illusion that there had been greater agreement here than in fact had taken place. On the third point, Austria, he had not abandoned all hope that the Soviet Union this afternoon would make it possible to conclude a treaty. But, if not, here again we should recognize that our responsibilities to Austria had not been discharged and some reference should be made to our intention to continue our efforts in that direction.

Mr. Bidault said he had no thoughts on the text but was in general agreement with Mr. Dulles. He felt that what they had done here would have more effect than any expression of hope. It would seem therefore wise to limit the communiqué to what has been done and possibly in regard to Germany give some modest but realistic indication of what might be done. He felt that the feelings of the people would be better satisfied by an honest indication of what had been done than by cloudy phrases of hope for the future. He said the German people know full well the extent of their disagreements and he doubted if any general words of hope would be well received.

Mr. Eden said he agreed with Mr. Bidault and suggested that their experts should be asked to give them a draft since in general he felt their views were not too far apart.

Mr. Molotov agreed with Mr. Dulles that we should not create the illusion of more results than had been achieved and also agreed that the formula on Germany would be very limited. He inquired whether they did or did not intend to continue their efforts on this question. He believed this was their intention and it therefore should be reflected in the communiqué. He said it is not enough merely to state that an agreement to hold a conference in Geneva had been reached but the conclusion should be drawn from the present conference which would facilitate the achievement of the desired results not only in Berlin but also in Geneva. As to Austria, the Soviet position is well known and the only point of importance that remains is to fix the period, which should be as short as possible, for which troops should be left in Austria after the conclusion of the treaty. He felt that the other questions presented no great obstacles.[4]

The Meeting then adjourned.

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[4] For the final four-power communiqué of the Berlin Conference, see Document 525.

[Attachment]

Text of Agreement Reached With Respect to Conference on Korea and Indochina

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 18, 1954.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,

Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April ——— for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

No. 505

396.1 BE/2-1954: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 19, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 176. Department pass OSD. 21st (and final) quadripartite plenary, Molotov presiding: [2]

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, Paris, London, Vienna, and Moscow.

[2] The meeting began at 3:10 p.m. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this plenary, USDEL PLEN/21, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 195.

I. Item 3—Austria.

a. Figl said reluctantly and with misgivings Austria would agree extend period of occupation; but not to some indeterminate uncontrollable date, e.g., conclusion German peace treaty; rather to some definite date, e.g., 30 June 1955. [3]

b. Molotov had three points:

1. Soviet delegation willing accept implication Eden's observations, i.e., willing accept unilateral Austrian declaration intent not enter military alliances; such declaration possible as appendage treaty.
2. Soviet delegation reiterated its proposal that postponement troop withdrawal be indefinite but be reconsidered some time 1955.
3. Figl's proposals met situation to some extent, but not sufficiently. Hope Austrians after further discussion may be willing accept latest Soviet version Article 33. [4]

c. Dulles expressed profound regret that even after considerable and "sacrificial" efforts by Austrians, Soviet delegation still unable conclude treaty. Since treaty not to be signed at this conference, US delegation reserves right reconsider its acceptance previously disputed articles; therefore withdraws earlier concessions.

d. Bidault made three points:

1. France cannot accept (re Article 33) any subordination Austrian independence to extraneous issues, i.e., German peace treaty, since to link Austrian and German issues is in nature of an *Anschluss.*
2. Since treaty not being concluded, necessary French delegation withdraw its concessions on disputed articles.
3. Under terms Article 35 Austria cannot regain control and benefit its oil resources until fixed period after conclusion treaty. Beginning this fixed period now in indefinite future; but oil resources not inexhaustible; hence this an additional argument for promptest possible conclusion treaty.

e. Eden: (1) Expressed regret nonacceptance Austrian offer. (2) Said Article 33 is essential point and UK Government could never accept Soviet version. (3) Re current Soviet offer substitute declaration intent for Article 4-bis, Austrians had already made declaration—"which should suffice," therefore, UK entirely opposed appending any such declaration to treaty. Eden withdrew UK concessions on disputed articles.

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[3] On Feb. 17 the Embassy in Vienna had informed the U.S. Delegation that new instructions were being sent to Figl including authority to offer the proposals made in this final plenary. (Telegram 71 to Berlin, 663.001/2-1754) The Tripartite Group on Austria met with the Austrian Delegation late on the evening of Feb. 17 to discuss these instructions and the U.S. Delegation reported that it was faced with the following dilemma: to satisfy Austrian public opinion with the counterproposals or to deny Molotov any opportunity for creating uncertainty as to who was to blame for the conference ending without a treaty. (Secto 163 from Berlin, Feb. 18, 396.1 BE/2-1854) Apparently the U.S. Delegation decided that it was better to allow Figl to make these proposals in the hope that Molotov would reject them.

[4] For the Soviet proposal on Article 33, see FPM(54)66, Document 521.

f. Figl made alternative proposal, i.e., extend (from 18 months to indefinite) period for residual supervision by four-power Ambassadors.

g. Molotov took note positions other governments which he said Soviet delegation would study; but with view to concluding discussion this agenda item, tabled draft resolution to effect that conference deems it advisable continue efforts conclude Austrian treaty through diplomatic channels in Vienna. [5]

h. The three Foreign Ministers studied Molotov's draft resolution, Figl made terminal speech voicing regret at no settlement and hoping for better outcome earliest possible.

i. Dulles proposed amendment Molotov resolution to make it provide for resumption discussion through diplomatic channels in Vienna whenever USSR prepared name definite date at which it would agree to troop withdrawals; pointed out that it would be most misleading to imply, as Soviet resolution does, that solution is possible by continuing negotiation. This implication completely wrong since prime obstacle has been Soviet desire keep troops Austria fundamentally incompatible with purposes treaty. This difficulty not removable by talk but only by change Soviet attitude which could be evidenced by willingness fix definite date for troop withdrawals. Bidault and Eden seconded Dulles amendment. Molotov "took note" Dulles resolution and UK French support thereof. It, however, hampered conclusion treaty. He reiterated real difficulties are attempted revival German militarism, EDC, danger *Anschluss*, etc.—all of which not fault of Soviet Government.

II. Agenda item 2—Germany and European security.

a. Molotov called for views on two latest Soviet proposals. (Secto 159 and Secto 161 [6]).

b. Dulles' comment confined to proposals for study police forces in Germany. Said they did not seem, as drafted, have sufficient substance be worth pursuing. Wondered if they indicated USSR now willing reconsider 1948 UN proposal for general census military forces. Such inquiry would be more useful since enumeration forces and armaments in GDR would only touch part of total problem of forces as causing international tensions.

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[5] For this proposal, circulated as FPM(54)80, see *Berlin Discussions*, p. 241, or Cmd. 9080, p. 173.

[6] Secto 159, Document 498. Secto 161 is not printed, but see FPM(54)75, Document 524, for the second Soviet proposal.

c. Bidault agreed with Dulles re Soviet proposal for study police forces. Thought both proposals consistent with Soviet position throughout conference which had single purpose promoting appearance unification while perpetuating division Germany in fact. Re Soviet second proposal, of little value since facilities already exist for promoting commercial, cultural, etc, contacts which anyway primarily business of Germans, not occupying powers. With view to facilitating "small solution" (since a big one seemed impossible) Western authorities were preparing a concrete program which they would communicate shortly, through their High Commissioners, to their Soviet colleagues.

d. Eden dismissed police proposal on grounds it needs more time for study than we now have. On two-committee proposal, he amplified Bidault remarks by saying Western study, now nearing completion, would cover these points.

1. *Re inter-zonal:*

    a. Abolition residence permits.
    b. Opening zonal crossing points.
    c. Liberalization transport services.
    d. Control procedures over inter-zonal transit.
    e. Relaxation restrictions on circulation printed matter.

2. *Re Berlin:*

    a. Reduction formalities on inter-sectoral movement of persons.
    b. Elimination obstacles for movement of goods.
    c. Relaxation of frontier control between sectors.
    d. Improvement communication facilities.

These proposals would and should be taken up by High Commissioners in normal conduct their business. Soviet proposal establish two committees improper since occupying powers should not go beyond their area present responsibilities in order enlarge area purely formal contacts between governments East and West Germany.

e. Molotov briefly defended both Soviet proposals; police proposal on ground it desirable tamp down rumors re militarization police forces in East and West Germany: two-committee proposal on ground four Foreign Ministers ought be able agree something as simple as that. He then introduced new resolution to effect four governments would continue their efforts reach satisfactory solution German problem for purpose insuring peace in Europe.[7] All three Western Ministers objected to introducing this late date an illusory and over-optimistic statement which not an accurate reflection of area of disagreement.

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[7] For this proposal, circulated as FPM(54)81, see *Berlin Discussions*, p. 230, or Cmd. 9080, p. 130.

III. Agenda item 1—Disarmament; five-power meeting.

Conference considered two draft resolutions (see Secto 164 and Secto 171 [8]). Both accepted without discussion. Dulles pointed out disarmament resolution does not supplant or interrupt current discussions including those re Eisenhower atomic pool proposal. [9] Bidault advised conference that Swiss Government had confirmed to French Ambassador Bern Swiss Government willingness conference be held Geneva.

IV. Quadripartite communiqué.

Accepted without discussion. For text, see Secto 171.

V. Concluding statements.

a. Dulles verbatim text, see Secto 175. [10]

b. Bidault's statement [11] largely lecture on "realism." Said it necessary recognize great differences not only on policies but on facts and interpretations thereof. It necessary recognize division of world not remediable by waving magic wand. Given fundamental differences, it desirable try find practical solutions where possible and proceed step by step concretely on basis of inescapable facts.

c. Eden statement [12] quite brief, containing these points:

1. Recognition problems Germany and Austria was basis Western approach. They still basic and sooner or later it will be recognized that we must start there rather than with wider, more pretentious security schemes.
2. Until such recognition, it clearly desirable do what possible in way of small solutions through High Commissioners in Germany and Austria.
3. Failure conclude Austrian treaty most regrettable.
4. On other side of ledger:

    A. Disarmament resolution not great thing but shows seriousness with which powers view this problem.

    B. Korea-Indochina resolution may break an existing deadlock and open way for constructive solution tangible problems.

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[8] Secto 164 transmitted the text of the agreed resolution on disarmament; see Document 495. Secto 171 transmitted the text of the final four-power communiqué which included the agreement on the conference on Korea and Indochina. (Both 396.1 BE/2-1854) For the text of this communiqué, see Document 525.

[9] See footnote 2, Document 326.

[10] *Infra.*

[11] For Bidault's closing statement, circulated as FPM(54)88, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 211-212, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 175-176.

[12] For Eden's closing statement, circulated as FPM(54)87, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 212-213, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 176-177.

5. Even in area where policies fundamentally opposed discussion at this conference not valueless inasmuch as understanding of opposing views was increased.

d. Molotov's statement[13] largely repetitive points previously made in specific context. Re Germany, gave brief summary Soviet position as stated many times before—elections should be supervised by Germany; dangers of military groupings; EDC; *Anschluss;* et cetera. Re Austria, again reiterated EDC, *Anschluss*, German militarism themes. Expressed gratification re disarmament Korea-Indochina resolution. Took occasion to emphasize conflicts of interest between munitions merchants on one hand and masses of people on the other. Suggested "some governments" influenced by former, USSR only by latter. In conclusion stated that resumption of direct contact was good since it facilitated consideration urgent problems and itself went part way toward reducing tensions. Hoped unsolved problems would remain on four-power agenda and further efforts be made find solutions.[14]

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[13] For Molotov's closing statement, circulated as FPM(54)89, see *Berlin Discussions*, pp. 213–216, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 177–179.

[14] The plenary adjourned at 7:01 p.m.

No. 506

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State[1]

BERLIN, February 18, 1954.

Secto 175. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary's statement at closing session February 18.[2]

"As I speak for the last time at this conference, I cannot but record a large measure of regret. We have failed to satisfy the hopes which many throughout the world placed in us. I refer particularly to the peoples of East and West Germany and of Austria.

It seems to me that our failures are not however due to lack of effort, or to inadequacies of detail. Our failures are of a kind which could not have been avoided by mere diplomatic or negotiating skills at this conference. We encountered a fundamental difference between the views of the East and the West.

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[1] Repeated to New York, London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.

[2] Circulated as FPM(54)83. For a record of the twenty-first (final) plenary, see Secto 176, *supra*.

This is not the time or the place to discuss philosophies or creeds. It is, however, important to observe that all of our basic differences here have revolved around the question of whether it was right, or indeed safe, to give man and nations a genuine freedom of choice.

The Western powers were willing to place trust in the German and Austrian peoples. The Soviet Union was not. Its delegation pointed out that the Germans, if given freedom, might again follow such warlike leadership as was presented by the Kaiser and by Hitler; and that the Austrians, if left alone, might not abide by their solemn engagement to maintain their independence and to avoid absorption by Germany.

The Western powers realize that no one can know with certainty the use to which men and nations will put their freedom. History records abuses of freedom. Doubtless it will do so again. Nevertheless, we are convinced that no social system has ever been invented which is better than that which puts its trust in human freedom, guided by education and by religion.

The Soviet delegation, in multiple ways, has made manifest its fears of freedom and its determination, through its occupation forces and its control of election processes, to try to make certain that freedom cannot be exercised in a way which might be prejudicial to it.

That is why, it seems, the Soviet Foreign Minister found it impossible to agree to the unification of Germany through genuinely free all-German elections, as we proposed, and why he has insisted that Soviet troops must remain indefinitely in Austria.

Our discussion of European security has revealed that the Soviet Union believes that its security depends upon maintaining such a huge preponderance of power that every other country of Europe will in fact be subject to its coercion. The Soviet Union opposes any integration of the Western European countries, or any association with the United States, which would create sufficient defensive strength so that the peoples of Western Europe would in fact feel that they are masters within their own homes and can develop their own distinctive ways of life.

The Atlantic Charter, to which we all subscribed, called for 'freedom from fear'. Today, unhappily, the dominant note in much of the world is 'fear of freedom'. It is the conflict between those two concepts which has made it impossible here to achieve any large measure of agreement.

We are confident that the impasse which we reached here will not be permanent. We do not believe that the peoples of Germany and Austria, or for that matter of other neighboring nations, need to bury their hopes. The Soviet leaders will surely come to see that freedom is not so greatly to be feared. It develops in men a basic respect for the rights of others, a sense of human dignity, a longing for fellowship and community welfare, which are the most solid props of peace.

I am confident that if these basic realities become better understood by the Soviet Union, it will become possible to achieve the free and independent Austria which we promised in 1943, and the unified Germany which, we said in 1945, was a purpose of our occupation.

Despite our conflicts of basic principle, we have made some progress here.

The four of us have reached an agreement, which we hope will be acceptable to the others concerned, which will permit the holding of a Korean political conference. [3] The possibility emerges of effecting the unification of Korea, in freedom, as had been promised.

There is also provided the chance, if Communist China wants it, of restoring peace and order in Indochina and thus enabling the three Associated [States] of Indochina to have freedom and enjoy it in security.

We have agreed to pursue the four power search of agreement on reduction of armaments, as recommended by the United Nations. [4]

We shall pursue means to alleviate the plight of peoples of Germany and of Austria.

In addition to what we have done here, we have learned much. That has a value which is not to be ignored. It makes it less likely that any of us should by inadvertence and miscalculation do what would risk another war.

This does not mean that the Western nations will suspend the doing of what strengthens freedom and makes apparent its glorious potentials. If this conference were to result in a paralysis of freedom, then indeed it would be a tragic failure.

The three Western Ministers, each acting freely for his sovereign and independent nation, have found agreement on every aspect of our work. Thus we have exemplified a society of consent. If, in that spirit, our nations go on with others of like mind, to build the strength of freedom, then we shall win, everywhere, respect. It will be shared by all who look to us for leadership, for we shall be guarding and serving their freedom, with our own.

Let me, in conclusion, say a personal word. I thank each of my three colleagues for the clarity and candor of their participations in this conference, and for the uniform courtesy and consideration which each has shown me."

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[3] For this agreement, see part (a) of the final four-power communiqué, Document 525.

[4] For this agreement, see part (b) of the final four-power communique.

C. DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

No. 507

Editorial Note

In addition to the documents presented in this section, many of the conference documents appear in the records of the 21 plenaries and in various memoranda and telegrams printed in Section B. Additionally most of the statements of the four Foreign Ministers were circulated as conference documents and these have been identified at the appropriate places in the records of the meetings.

No. 508

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

FPM(54)4 Berlin, January 25, 1954.

DRAFT AGENDA

1. Measures for reducing tension in international relations and the convening of a meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and the Chinese People's Republic.
2. The German question and the problems of ensuring European security.
3. The Austrian State Treaty.

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[1] This proposal was made at the first plenary on Jan. 25 and adopted at the second on Jan. 26. For records of these meetings, see Sectos 17 and 29, Documents 355 and 359.

No. 509

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the French Delegation [1]

[Translation]

FPM(54)15 BERLIN, January 29, 1954.

DRAFT RESOLUTION REGARDING THE CALLING OF A GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The Governments of the United States of America, of France, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United Kingdom,

Convinced that the solution of international controversies, necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace, would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament,

Persuaded that such an agreement on a coordinated disarmament programme, accompanied by indispensable guarantees, placed under international control and authorizing only those armaments necessary for the individual or collective security of the different States, would lessen the burden which military expenditure entails for the different countries, and would contribute to the re-establishment of confidence among the nations,

Declaring that any sincere effort to attain this goal demands that, in order to achieve the ending of all hostilities, the encouragement and support of aggression be condemned and outlawed everywhere,

Pledge themselves to join their efforts to those of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in order that the latter may reach substantial agreement on the general principles of disarmament which would permit the convening of a general disarmament conference, in conditions favorable to its success, in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of January 11, 1952. [2]

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the fifth plenary on Jan. 29. For a record of this meeting, see Secto 53, Document 383.

[2] For this resolution, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 31, 1952, pp. 507–508.

No. 510

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the British Delegation [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)17

BERLIN, January 29, 1954.

PLAN FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN FREEDOM

METHOD OF REUNIFICATION

German reunification and the conclusion of a freely negotiated Peace Treaty with a united Germany should be achieved in the following stages:

I. Free elections throughout Germany.
II. The convocation of a National Assembly resulting from those elections.
III. The drafting of a Constitution and the preparation of Peace Treaty negotiations.
IV. The adoption of the Constitution and the formation of an all-German Government responsible for the negotiation of the Peace Treaty.
V. The signature and entry into force of the Peace Treaty.

I. FREE ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT GERMANY

Free and secret elections should be held throughout Germany including Berlin at the earliest possible date. These elections must be held in conditions of genuine freedom. Safeguards must be agreed to assure this freedom before, after and during the elections. The elections must also be supervised in such a manner as to make sure that these safeguards are observed and that the elections are properly conducted.

(1) Preparation for the Elections

(a) *The Electoral Law*

The Electoral Law should be prepared by the Four Occupying Powers, taking into consideration the electoral laws already drafted for this purpose by the Federal Bundestag and the Soviet Zone Volkskammer. When approved, it should be promulgated throughout Germany by the Four Powers. Elections should take place as soon as possible thereafter.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the fifth plenary on Jan. 29. For a record of that meeting, see Secto 53, Document 383. This proposal was initially agreed by the three Western powers on Jan. 27, submitted to representatives of the Federal Republic that day, and then revised slightly on Jan. 29 before being introduced by Foreign Secretary Eden. (Secto 34 from Berlin, Jan. 27, 396.1 BE/1-2754)

(b) *Guarantees for Free Elections*

The draft electoral law must contain provisions which will guarantee the genuine freedom of the elections. These include, amongst others:

Freedom of movement throughout Germany.
Freedom of presentation of candidates.
Immunity of candidates.
Freedom from arbitrary arrest or victimisation.
Freedom of association and political meetings.
Freedom of expression for all.
Freedom of the press, radio and television and free circulation of newspapers, periodicals, etc.
Secrecy of the vote.
Security of polling stations and ballot boxes.

(c) *Supervision of the Elections*

Supervision should be carried out by a *Supervisory Commission* throughout the whole of Germany. There should be a central body with subordinate bodies at *Land* and local levels. All votes should be counted and verified at local headquarters in the presence of the Supervisory Commission.

(i) *Composition of Supervisory Commission*

The Commission should be composed of representatives of the Four Powers, with or without the *participation of neutrals.*

(ii) *Organisation of the Commission*

The Commission should work on a Committee basis. Its decisions should be taken by majority vote.

(iii) *Functions and Powers of the Commission*

The principal task of the Commission will be to ensure that the elections take place in genuine freedom and in strict conformity with the provisions of the Electoral Law.

(2) Method for Completing the above Preparations

The Foreign Ministers must in the first place agree on the principles contained in this Plan. They will then give instructions accordingly to a Working Group, consisting of the High Commissioners in Germany of the Four Powers, or their representatives, which will work out the necessary details and submit a report.

This report should include, in particular:

(1) the draft of the all-German Electoral Law;
(2) detailed recommendations regarding the supervision of the elections.

The Working Group should begin work not later than two weeks after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference. It should submit its report to the Four Governments not later than one month after beginning its work.

II. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The all-German elections will establish an all-German National Assembly. The first task of this Assembly will be the preparation of a Constitution.

During the period between the end of the elections and the full assumption of control by the all-German Government, it will be desirable for part of the Supervisory machinery to remain in operation, in order to prevent action after the elections which would impair the conditions of genuine freedom under which they will have been held. Recommendations on this subject should be included in the report of the Working Group.

III. DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL ALL-GERMAN AUTHORITY

The National Assembly will begin drafting the Constitution as soon as possible after its meeting. Meanwhile, it may form a provisional all-German Authority charged with assisting the Assembly in drafting the Constitution and with preparing the nucleus of the future all-German Ministries. If the Assembly so decides, the Authority may also open with the Four Powers, on a preliminary basis, negotiations for the Peace Treaty.

IV. ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FORMATION OF AN ALL-GERMAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY

The Constitution will be submitted to the Assembly as soon as possible after the final draft has been agreed. Immediately it has been adopted an all-German Government will be formed. This Government will then be responsible for the negotiations and conclusion of the Peace Treaty. At the same time, such other institutions as may be provided for in the Constitution shall be established.

As soon as the all-German Government has been formed, the National Assembly will determine how the powers of the Federal Government and the German authorities in the Soviet Zone shall be transferred to the all-German Government, and how the two former shall be brought to an end.

The all-German Government shall have authority to assume the international rights and obligations of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany and to conclude such other international agreements as it may wish.

Until the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, each of the four Powers will exercise, with respect to the National Assembly and the all-German Government, only those of its rights which relate to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security; Berlin; the reunification of Germany; and a Peace Treaty.

Decisions of the National Assembly and the all-German Government in carrying out this Plan will not require the approval of the Four Powers. Such decisions may not be disapproved except by a majority vote of the Four Powers.

V. SIGNATURE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE PEACE TREATY

The signatories to the Treaty should include all States, or the successors thereof, which were at war with Germany. The Treaty should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by Germany.

No. 511

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 200

Position Paper Agreed by the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [1]

SECRET
[BER D–4/4c]

BERLIN, February 1, 1954.

DECLARATION OF INTENT REGARDING GERMAN PEACE TREATY

FOUR-POWER MEETING IN BERLIN, JANUARY 1954

I. On January 29, 1954 the United Kingdom Delegation tabled proposals for free elections to be held throughout Germany at the earliest possible date with a view to forming a National Assembly and an all-German government which would proceed to negotiate with the four occupying powers a peace treaty for Germany. [2] The Delegation therefore recommends that the four occupying powers should hold themselves ready to open negotiations for a German peace treaty as soon as representatives of a reunited Germany have been appointed in the manner envisaged in the proposal of the United Kingdom Delegation.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a cover sheet which indicates that it was circulated in the records of the U.S. Delegation as BER D–4/4c and that it represented a slightly revised version of BER D–4/4b, a copy of which has not been found in Department of State files. The cover sheet indicates further that it had not been shown to the Federal Government and that it had not been decided whether or when to use the declaration. The text was agreed at a meeting of the Tripartite Working Group on Feb. 1 (see BER MIN–8, Document 397), but there is no indication in the records of the conference that it was ever introduced.

[2] FPM(54)17, *supra*.

II. The Delegation considers that such a peace treaty should embody the following principles:

1. Germany shall be recognized as a sovereign State.

2. Germany shall apply for membership in the United Nations. The other Powers signatory to the peace treaty will undertake to support this application.

3. Pending admission to the United Nations, Germany shall declare her intention of conforming to the principles of the Charter and shall undertake to conduct her foreign relations in accordance therewith. Germany shall also be authorized to assure her defense as provided by Article 51 of the Charter. Germany shall accept the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter, in particular:

(a) to settle her international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(b) to refrain in her international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(c) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action;

For their part, the Signatory Powers would be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter in their relations with Germany.

4. The question of frontiers shall be settled by the peace treaty as a result of free negotiations between the interested powers, including the government of a unified Germany, in the spirit of points 1 and 2 of the Atlantic Charter and Article 1 of the UN Charter.

5. The return of all remaining German prisoners of war and civilian internees should be carried out within the shortest possible time and shall be completed without exception not later than 90 days after the coming into force of the peace treaty.

6. The all-German Government, subject to the provisions of the peace treaty, shall determine whether to put into force, with respect to unified Germany, international agreements concluded after May 8, 1945, and before its assumption of office, with the consent of the other parties to those agreements.

7. The peace treaty should contain no provisions which might prevent the people of unified Germany from building and maintaining a sound economy. The treaty should ensure to Germany, subject to its international obligations, the unfettered freedom to regulate its own economy, which is the normal prerogative of every sovereign State.

The treaty should dispose finally of all claims arising out of the war and occupation. Any industrial enterprises in Germany whose ownership or control was acquired after May 8, 1945, by or on behalf of any foreign government, should be surrendered and disposed of in accordance with appropriate German legislation unless such acquisition has quadripartite approval and the interest so approved is subject to German law.

8. The signatory powers to the peace treaty should include all States, or the successors thereof, which were at war with Germany.

No. 512

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)24

BERLIN, February 1, 1954.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

Almost nine years have elapsed since the end of the war with Germany, and Germany still has no peace treaty, it is still divided, and continues to be in a position of inequality in relation to other States. It is necessary to put an end to such an abnormal situation.

This is consonant with the aspirations of all peace-loving peoples. Without the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, it is impossible to ensure equitable treatment of the German people's legitimate national interests.

The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is essential for the reinforcement of peace in Europe. A peace treaty with Germany would permit a final solution of the problems resulting from the second world war. The States of Europe, which suffered from Hitler's aggression, and especially Germany's neighbours, are vitally interested in a solution of these problems. The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would contribute to the improvement of the international situation as a whole and thus facilitate the establishment of lasting peace.

The need to expedite the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is dictated by the fact that the danger of the re-establishment of German militarism, which twice unleashed a world war, has not been removed, owing to the fact that certain provisions of the Potsdam Conference have not yet been complied with. A peace treaty with Germany should ensure the elimination of the possibility of a rebirth of German militarism and of German aggression.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the seventh plenary on Feb. 1. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 65 and 66, Documents 398 and 399.

The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany will create lasting conditions of peace for the German people, will further the development of Germany as a unified, independent, democratic and peace-loving State in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam provisions and will afford the German people the possibility of peaceful cooperation with other peoples.

Accordingly, the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the U.S.A., of Great Britain and of France have decided to start without delay on the problem of working out a peace treaty with Germany.

The Governments of the U.S.S.R., of the U.S.A., of Great Britain and of France consider that Germany, as represented by an all-German government, should participate in the preparation of a peace treaty and that a peace treaty with Germany should be based on the following principles:

I. Basic Points of a peace treaty with Germany

Participants:

Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and those other States whose armed forces participated in the war against Germany.

II. Political Provisions

1. Germany shall be restored as a unified State. Thus, the division of Germany shall end and a unified Germany shall be given the opportunity to develop as an independent, democratic and peace-loving State.

2. All the armed forces of the Occupying Powers shall be withdrawn from Germany, not later than one year after the date of the coming into force of a peace treaty. All foreign military bases on the territory of Germany shall be liquidated simultaneously.

3. Democratic rights shall be guaranteed to the German people, so that all persons under German jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, may enjoy human rights and basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religious creed, political convictions and assembly.

4. The unfettered activity of democratic parties and of organisations shall be ensured and they shall be accorded the right freely to decide their internal affairs, to hold meetings and assemblies, and to have freedom of press and publications.

5. The existence of organisations hostile to democracy and to the preservation of peace shall not be permitted on German territory.

6. All former members of the German army, including officers and generals, all former Nazis, excepting those who are serving court sentences for crimes committed by them, shall be accorded the same civil and political rights as all other German citizens so

that they may participate in the re-building of a peace-loving, democratic Germany.

7. Germany shall undertake not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power whose armed forces took part in the war against Germany.

8. Germany will not be required to take over any obligations of a political or military character resulting from treaties or agreements concluded by the governments of the German Federal Republic and of the German Democratic Republic before the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the restoration of Germany as a unified state.

III. Territory

The boundaries of the territory of Germany are to be those established by the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers.

IV. Economic Provisions

1. Germany shall not be subject to any limitations on the develoment of its peaceful economy which shall promote the welfare of the German people.

Neither shall Germany be subject to any limitations on trade with other countries, on shipping, or on access to world markets.

2. Germany shall be fully released from the payment to the U.S.A., to Great Britain, to France and to the U.S.S.R. of her postwar State debts with the exception of her trade indebtedness.

V. Military Clauses

1. Germany shall be permitted to have her own national, armed forces (land, air and naval) necessary for the defence of the country. The strength of these armed forces shall be limited in accordance with requirements of an internal nature, local defence of frontiers, and anti-aircraft defence.

2. Germany shall be permitted to produce military supplies and equipment, the number and types of which shall not exceed the needs of her armed forces, as established by the peace treaty.

VI. Germany and the United Nations Organisation

Those States which conclude a peace treaty with Germany shall support Germany's application for membership in the United Nations Organisation.

No. 513

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)25

BERLIN, February 1, 1954.

PREPARATION OF A PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY AND CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE ON A GERMAN PEACE TREATY

1. In conformity with the understanding previously reached by the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. on the procedure for the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany, the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers will be instructed to prepare, within three months, a Draft peace treaty with Germany.

2. The Allied States whose armed forces took part in the war against Germany will be given the opportunity of presenting their views on a peace treaty with Germany while the Draft peace treaty is in preparation;

3. Provision will be made for appropriate participation of representatives of Germany at all stages in the preparation of the peace treaty. Pending formation of a provisional all-German Government, representatives of the existing Governments of Eastern Germany and Western Germany will participate in the preparation of the Draft peace treaty with Germany;

4. A Peace Conference will be convened within six months, and in any case not later than October, 1954, with the participation of the States duly concerned and also of representatives of Germany, to consider the Draft peace treaty.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the seventh plenary on Feb. 1. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 65 and 66, Documents 398 and 399.

No. 514

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)33

BERLIN, February 4, 1954.

FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL ALL-GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND THE CARRYING OUT OF FREE ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS

Considering it necessary to end the division of Germany and, in accordance with the agreements reached between the Four Powers, to achieve a national reunification of Germany on a democratic and peace-loving basis, the governments of the U.S.S.R., France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. have arrived at the following agreement:

1. To consider as a task which cannot be postponed the formation of a Provisional All-German Government by the parliaments of the German Democratic Republic and of the German Federal Republic, with a wide participation of democratic organisations.

Such a Provisional All-German Government may be set up to replace the existing governments of Eastern and Western Germany, or, should this prove difficult at the present time, those two governments may temporarily remain in existence.

2. The main task of the Provisional All-German Government shall be the preparation and the carrying out of free All-German elections, namely:

(a) the working out of a draft all-German electoral law ensuring that all-German elections are really democratic in nature with the participation of all the democratic organisations and the carrying out of these elections in conditions of real freedom, which would eliminate the possibility of any pressure by powerful monopolies on the voters;

(b) should it be considered necessary, the carrying out of an investigation to determine the presence throughout Germany of conditions essential for the carrying out of democratic elections, and the application of adequate measures to ensure the existence of such conditions;

(c) the carrying out of all-German elections, as a result of which the German people would take their decisions, without any interference on the part of foreign countries, concerning the social and state organisation of a democratic Germany, and on the basis of which shall be formed an all-German Government.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the tenth plenary on Feb. 4. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 86 and 87, Documents 419 and 420.

3. To establish as the tasks of the Provisional All-German Government the following:

(a) representation of Germany in the preparation of a peace treaty and German representation in international organisations;
(b) prevention of Germany's being drawn into coalitions or military alliances directed against any Power whose armed forces participated in the war against Hitler's Germany;
(c) questions of German citizenship;
(d) ensuring the free activities of democratic parties and organisations, and banning of the existence of fascist, militarist and other organisations hostile to democracy and to the preservation of peace;
(e) development of economic, trade and cultural relations between Eastern and Western Germany; questions of transport, of postal and telegraph services, questions of the free movement of people and goods throughout the whole territory of Germany and other questions concerning the interests of the German people as a whole.

4. With a view to ensuring that the German people should have the right to solve their national affairs independently, to recommend to the Government of the German Democratic Republic and to the Government of the German Federal Republic to immediately convene a conference of plenipotentiary representatives of Eastern and Western Germany, in order to agree on a procedure for setting up a Provisional All-German Government, its composition, functions, tasks and powers.

5. The governments of the U.S.S.R., France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., on their part, will take measures directed at the establishment of conditions which would contribute to the successful execution by the Provisional All-German Government of the tasks imposed upon it, and would eliminate any interference and pressure on the part of foreign powers in the carrying out of all-German elections. For these purposes the governments of the Four Powers have agreed to withdraw, prior to the holding of elections, their occupation forces from both the territory of Eastern Germany and the territory of Western Germany, with the exception of limited contingents which would remain to carry out guard duties arising from the control responsibilities of the Four Powers: those of the U.S.S.R.—for Eastern Germany, those of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France—for Western Germany.

No. 515

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 196

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)38

BERLIN, February 6, 1954.

MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THE FINANCIAL-ECONOMIC OBLIGATIONS OF GERMANY, ARISING FROM CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

Considering that Germany has already fulfilled a major part of her financialeconomic obligations to the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, arising from the consequences of the war,

recognising that measures for the alleviation of the financial-economic obligations of Germany, arising from the consequences of the war, will prove to be of real assistance in the development of Germany's peaceful economy and in the improvement of the material welfare of her population,

the Governments of the U.S.A., France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. have agreed that, beginning January 1, 1954:

1. Germany is completely released from the payment of reparations in any form and also from the repayment to the Four Powers—the U.S.A., France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.—of postwar state debts, with the exception of debts arising from trade obligations.
2. The payment of expenses connected with the presence of troops of the Four Powers on German territory is reduced to an annual limit not to exceed five per cent of the revenue of the state budgets of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic.
3. Germany is fully released from the payment of the indebtedness for external occupational costs of the Four Powers which has accumulated since 1945.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the twelfth plenary on Feb. 6. For a record of that meeting, see Secto 100, Document 435.

No. 516

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)46

BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

ON ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY

1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. undertake to continue their efforts towards a satisfactory solution of the German problem in conformity with the principles of national freedom and the maintenance of peace and also towards the recognition of the rights of all other European states seeking protection against the violation of their national interests and security by any other state.

2. Pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany and the re-unification of Germany on a democratic and peace-loving basis, the following measures will be implemented:

(a) Within six months, occupation forces shall be simultaneously withdrawn from the territory of both Eastern and Western Germany, with the exception of such limited contingents as are necessary for the performance of protective functions connected with the control responsibilities of the Four Powers: the U.S.S.R. with regard to Eastern Germany; the United States, U.K. and France with regard to Western Germany.

The size of such contingents shall be subject to agreement among the governments of the Four Powers.

(b) In the event that a threat to security in either part of Germany should arise, the Powers at present performing occupational functions in Germany shall have the right to call in their troops: the U.S.S.R. into Eastern Germany and the U.S.A., U.K. and France into Western Germany.

(c) For the maintenance of internal order and frontier defense the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic shall have police units, the strength and armament of which shall be determined by agreement between the Four Powers.

In order to ensure compliance with this Agreement in Eastern and Western Germany, inspection teams composed of representatives of the Four Powers shall be formed.

3. In conformity with the provisions set forth above, the implementation of which will ensure that neutralisation of Germany and

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the fourteenth plenary on Feb. 10. For a record of that meeting, see Secto 117, Document 451.

the creation of conditions favourable to a solution of the German problem in the interest of stabilizing peace in Europe, the Four Powers shall take immediate steps to facilitate the conclusion between European states of a Treaty on Collective Security providing adequate guarantees against aggression and violation of peace in Europe. To this end the Four Powers agree to take the initiative in calling an appropriate conference of European states.

No. 517

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)47

BERLIN, February 10, 1954.

GENERAL EUROPEAN TREATY ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE

(BASIC PRINCIPLES)

For the purpose of ensuring peace and security and of preventing aggression against any state in Europe,

for the purpose of strengthening international co-operation in conformity with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and of non-interference in their internal affairs,

striving to prevent the formation of groupings of some European states directed against other European states, which gives rise to friction and strained relations among nations, and to achieve concerted efforts by all European states in ensuring collective security in Europe,

the European states, guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, shall conclude a General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe, the basic provisions of which shall be as follows:

1. All European states, irrespective of their social systems, may become party to the Treaty provided they recognise the purposes and assume the obligations set forth in the Treaty.

Until the formation of a united, peace-loving, democratic German state, the German Democratic Republic and the German

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the fourteenth plenary on Feb. 10. For a record of that meeting, see Secto 117, Document 451.

Federal Republic may be parties to the Treaty enjoying equal rights with other parties thereto. It is understood that after the unification of Germany the united German State may become a party to the Treaty on an equal footing with any other European state.

The conclusion of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe shall not affect the competence of the four powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France—to deal with the German problem which shall be settled in accordance with decisions previously taken by the Four Powers.

2. The Parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from aggression against one another and also to refrain from having recourse to the threat or the use of force in their international relations and, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to settle by peaceful means and in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security in Europe any dispute that may arise among them.

3. Whenever, in the view of any Party to the Treaty, there is danger of an armed attack in Europe against one or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the latter shall consult each other in order to take effective steps to remove the danger and to maintain security in Europe.

4. An armed attack in Europe against one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states shall be deemed to be an attack against all the Parties. In the event of such an attack, each of the Parties, exercising the right of individual or collective self-defence, shall assist the state or states so attacked by all the means at its disposal, including the use of armed force, for the purpose of re-establishing and maintaining international peace and security in Europe.

5. The Parties to the Treaty undertake jointly to discuss and determine as soon as possible the procedure under which assistance, including military assistance, shall be provided by the Parties in the event of there arising in Europe a situation requiring a collective effort for the re-establishment and maintenance of peace in Europe.

6. The Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, shall immediately inform the Security Council of the United Nations of any action taken or envisaged for the purpose of exercising the right of self-defence or of maintaining peace and security in Europe.

7. The Parties to the Treaty undertake not to participate in any coalition or alliance nor to conclude agreements the objectives of which are contrary to the purposes of the Treaty on Collective Security in Europe.

8. In order to implement the provisions of the Treaty concerning consultation among its Parties and to consider questions arising in connection with the task of ensuring security in Europe, the following shall be provided for:

(a) regular or, when required, special conferences at which each State shall be represented by a member of its government or by some other specially designated representative;

(b) the setting up of a permanent consultative political committee the duty of which shall be the preparation of appropriate recommendations to the governments of the states which are Parties to the Treaty;

(c) the setting up of a military consultative organ the terms of reference of which shall be determined in due course.

9. Recognising the special responsibility of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Parties to the Treaty shall invite the Governments of the U.S.A. and the Chinese People's Republic to designate representatives to the organs set up in accordance with the Treaty in the capacity of observers.

10. The present Treaty shall not impair in any way the obligations of European states under international treaties and agreements to which they are party, provided the principles and purposes of such agreements are in conformity with those of the present Treaty.

11. The duration of the Treaty shall be 50 years.

No. 518

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 11, 1954.

1. The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States, meeting in Berlin,

2. *Taking into account* the need to settle definitively the Korean problem on the basis of establishing a unified, independent and democratic Korea as an important step toward the reduction of

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the second restricted meeting of the conference on Feb. 11. For the U.S. Delegation record of that session, see Document 459. This proposal was transmitted in Dulte 65 from Berlin, Feb. 12. On the evening of Feb. 11, Bohlen was given a revision of the fourth and fifth paragraphs. For their texts, see footnote 2, Document 463.

international tensions, and the need to consider other urgent problems, in particular those relating to the re-establishment of peace in the areas of Asia;

3. *Noting*, in connection therewith, the difficulties which have been encountered in concluding the requisite arrangements for the convening of a Political Conference on Korea, pursuant to paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement;

4. *Agree* to convene at a Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic;

5. *Agree further* that the other countries concerned shall also be invited to take part in the said Conference during considerations of appropriate matters thereat;

6. *Agree moreover* that the following items shall be considered at the Conference:

1. Statements by the delegations of the above-mentioned countries which would take part in the Conference and an exchange of views on such statements;
2. Political Conference on Korea.

No. 519

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)55

BERLIN, February 12, 1954.

CONCLUSION OF THE STATE TREATY FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC AUSTRIA

The Governments of the USSR, France, the United Kingdom and the USA recognize that the consolidation of peace in Europe and the need for ensuring the national rights of the Austrian people require an early re-establishment of a free and independent Austria, and that, the settlement of the Austrian question should be in conformity with the existing Four-Power agreements.

Accordingly the Governments of the Four Powers agree:

1. To instruct the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs to draft, within a period of three months, the final text of "The State Treaty

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the fifteenth plenary on Feb. 12. For a record of that meeting, see Secto 129, Document 464.

for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria", on the following lines:

a) To conclude the preparation of the draft State Treaty with Austria, which was in the main agreed among the Four Powers in 1949, according to which Austria shall be re-established as a sovereign, independent and democratic state and shall be freed from control by the Four Powers, the existing control machinery—the Allied Commission for Austria and all its organs—being abolished and the occupation of Austria being terminated.

b) To insert in the text of the State Treaty with Austria the following additional article:

"Austria undertakes not to enter into any coalition or military alliance directed against any Power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Germany and in the liberation of Austria.

"Austria undertakes further not to permit the establishment on its territory of foreign military bases and not to permit the use of foreign military instructors and specialists in Austria".

The Governments of the USA, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR on their part shall assume the obligation to observe the provisions of this Article;

c) Note shall be taken of the communication of the Soviet Government to the effect that, being desirous of meeting the wishes of the Austrian Government, it agrees that Austria shall pay, in the form of deliveries of goods the sum which, in accordance with Article 35 of the draft State Treaty, is due to the Soviet Union on account of the former German assets.

2. In order to prevent any attempt at a new *Anschluss*, to postpone, pending the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the withdrawal of the troops of the Four Powers stationed in the territory of the respective zones of Austria.

To withdraw from the city of Vienna all foreign troops simultaneously with the abolition of the Allied Commission.

The troops of the Four Powers temporarily left in Austria shall not be occupation troops and shall not perform the functions of occupation, nor shall they interfere in the affairs of the Austrian Administration nor in the social and political life of the country.

The legal status of these troops shall be determined by a special agreement which shall be prepared by the Four Powers with the participation of Austria, and which shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the State Treaty with Austria.

3. To instruct the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs to consider the question of Trieste in connection with the proposal of the Soviet Government that the City of Trieste and the territory adjacent to it shall not be used as a military base.

No. 520

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the United States Delegation [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 14, 1954.
FPM(54)63

BASIS FOR IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY

Considering that the draft Austrian State Treaty was agreed by the Deputies of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. in 1949, with the exception of Articles 16, 27, 42, 48 and 48 bis; [2] and

Convinced that the signing of this Treaty at the present Conference is essential in justice to Austria;

The Four Foreign Ministers:

1. Confirm their acceptance, in the form agreed by their Deputies, of the Preamble and Articles 1-7; 7 bis; 8; 10-15; 16 bis; 17-19; 21; 25; 26; 28; 30-34; 36; 38; 39; 44; 45; 49; 50; 52; 52 bis; 53-59; Annexes I; II; VIII; IX; X.
2. Agree to accept Articles 9, 16, 27, 42, 48 and 48 bis; in the form proposed by the Soviet Deputy in the course of the negotiations and reproduced in the English version in the Annex attached hereto.
3. Agree to Article 35, with the modification proposed by the Soviet delegation, to authorize payment by Austria in goods deliveries of the amount due to the Soviet Union for former German assets under Article 35 of the draft State Treaty.
4. Agree to sign the Treaty in the foregoing form on Thursday, February 18, at 3 p.m.
5. Direct their representatives to prepare the final text of the Treaty in the Russian, English, French and German languages in time for such signature.

Note: This proposal is submitted as an interdependent whole.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the seventeenth plenary on Feb. 14. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 144 and 145, Documents 479 and 480.

[2] For the unagreed articles of the Austrian Treaty as they stood in 1949, see *Foreign Relations*, 1949, vol. III, p. 1131.

Annex

Text of Articles 9, 16, 27, 42, 48, 48-bis as Proposed by the Soviet Deputy

BERLIN, undated.

ARTICLE 9

DISSOLUTION OF NAZI ORGANIZATIONS

Austria shall complete the measures, already begun by the enactment of appropriate legislation approved by the Allied Commission for Austria, to destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, including political, military and para-military organizations, on Austrian territory. Austria shall also continue the efforts to eliminate from Austrian political, economic and cultural life all traces of Nazism, to ensure that the above-mentioned organizations are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity and propaganda in Austria.

Austria undertakes to dissolve all Fascist type organizations existing on its territory: Political, military, para-military as well as other organizations which carry on activity hostile to any United Nation or which intend to deprive the people of their democratic rights.

Austria undertakes not to let, under threat of penal punishment which shall be immediately determined in accordance with order established by the Austrian Laws, the existence and the activity on Austrian territory of the above-mentioned organizations.

ARTICLE 16

DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Austria undertakes within the period determined by the Allied Commission for Austria to take all necessary measures to complete the voluntary repatriation of Displaced Persons within its territory.

2. Austria undertakes to render full assistance to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned in regard to the voluntary repatriation of their nationals and will enter into direct bilateral negotiations for this purpose.

3. Austria further undertakes:

(a) to permit accredited representatives of any Allied or Associated Power whose nationals are in camps or assembly centers allotted to Displaced Persons now in Austria to visit freely such camps or centers for the purpose of conferring with its nationals;

(b) to prohibit in such camps or centers any propaganda hostile to the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers and any activities designed to induce such Displaced Persons not to return to the countries of which they are nationals;

(c) to dissolve immediately any "committees," "centers" and other similar organizations existing in those camps and assembly centers that may be found to be engaged in activities opposed to the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(d) to prohibit the recruiting of Displaced Persons into military or para-military organizations;

(e) to provide the means of transportation necessary for the transfer of repatriates to the frontier of their countries of origin nearest Austria.

4. Austria undertakes to grant to such Displaced Persons the same rights in all respects as those normally accorded to non-Austrians who have been legally admitted into Austria.

5. No relief shall be given by Austria to persons who refuse to return to their native countries, if these persons fought on the side of the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers, or voluntarily collaborated with the enemies of these Powers, or engaged in hostile activities against their countries of origin, as well as against any of the United Nations, or are members of organizations and groups which encourage Displaced Persons not to return to their countries of origin.

6. This Article shall be applied without prejudice to the provisions of Article 11 of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 27

PREVENTION OF GERMAN REARMAMENT

1. Austria shall co-operate fully with the Allied and Associated Powers in order to ensure that Germany is unable to take steps outside German territory towards rearmament.

2. Austria shall not employ or train in military or civil aviation or in the experimentation, design, production or maintenance of war matériel:

persons who are, or were at any time previous to March 13, 1938, nationals of Germany;

or Austrian nationals precluded from serving in the Armed Forces under Article 18;

or persons who are not Austrian nationals.

ARTICLE 42

UNITED NATIONS PROPERTY IN AUSTRIA

1. In so far as Austria has not already done so, Austria shall restore all legal rights and interests in Austria of the United Nations and their nationals as they existed on the day hostilities commenced between Germany and the United Nation concerned, and

shall return all property in Austria of the United Nations and their nationals as it now exists.

2. The Austrian Government undertakes that all property, rights and interests passing under this Article shall be restored free of all encumbrances and charges of any kind to which they may have become subject as a result of the war with Germany and without the imposition of any charges by the Austrian Government in connection with their return. The Austrian Government shall nullify all measures of seizure, sequestration or control taken against United Nations property between the day of commencement of hostilities between Germany and the United Nation concerned and the coming into force of the present Treaty. In cases where the property has not been returned within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, application shall be made to the Austrian authorities not later than twelve months from the coming into force of the Treaty, except in cases in which the claimant is able to show that he could not file his application within this period.

3. The Austrian Government shall invalidate transfers involving property, rights and interests of any description belonging to United Nations nationals, where such transfers resulted from force exerted by Axis Governments or their agencies between the beginning of hostilities between Germany and the United Nation concerned and May 8, 1945.

4.(a) In cases in which the Austrian Government provides compensation for losses suffered by reason of injury or damage to property in Austria which occurred during the German occupation of Austria or during the war, United Nations nationals shall in no event receive less favorable treatment than that accorded to Austrian nationals; and in such cases United Nations nationals who hold, directly or indirectly, ownership interests in corporations or associations which are not United Nations nationals within the meaning of paragraph 8 (a) of this Article shall receive compensation based on the total loss or damage suffered by the corporations or associations and bearing the same proportion to such loss or damage as the beneficial interest of such nationals bear to the capital of the corporation or association.

(b) The Austrian Government shall accord to United Nations nationals the same treatment in the allocation of materials for the repair or rehabilitation of their property in Austria and in the allocation of foreign exchange for the importation of such materials as applies to Austrian nationals.

5. All reasonable expenses incurred in Austria in establishing claims, including the assessment of loss or damage, shall be borne by the Austrian Government.

6. United Nations nationals and their property shall be exempted from any exceptional taxes, levies, or imposts imposed on their capital assets in Austria by the Austrian Government or any Austrian authority between the date of the surrender of the German armed forces and the coming into force of the present Treaty for the specific purpose of meeting charges arising out of the war or of meeting the costs of occupying forces. Any sums which have been so paid shall be refunded.

7. The owner of the property concerned and the Austrian Government may agree upon arrangements in lieu of the provisions of this Article.

8. As used in this Article:

(a) "United Nations nationals" means individuals who are nationals of any of the United Nations, or corporations or associations organized under the laws of any of the United Nations, at the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that the said individuals, corporations or associations also had this status on May 8, 1945.

The term "United Nations nationals" also includes all individuals, corporations or associations which, under the laws in force in Austria during the war, have been treated as enemy.

Only those United Nations nationals who possessed United Nations nationality prior to the date on which their property suffered damage in Austria shall, however, be entitled to compensation in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article.

(b) "Owner" means the United Nation, or the United Nations national, as defined in sub-paragraph (a) above, who is entitled to the property in question, and includes a successor of the owner, provided that the successor is also a United Nation or a United Nations national as defined in sub-paragraph (a). If the successor has purchased the property in its damaged state, the transferor shall retain his rights to compensation under this Article, without prejudice to obligations between the transferor and the purchaser under domestic law.

(c) "Property" means all movable or immovable property, whether tangible or intangible, including industrial, literary and artistic property, as well as all rights or interests of any kind in property.

9. The provisions of this Article do not apply to transfers of property, rights or interests of United Nations or United Nations nationals in Austria made in accordance with laws and enactments which were in force as Austrian Law on June 28, 1946.

10. The Austrian Government recognizes that the Brioni Agreement of August 10, 1942, is null and void. It undertakes to participate with the other signatories of the Rome Agreement of March 29, 1923, in any negotiations having the purpose of introducing into its provisions the modifications necessary to ensure the equitable settlement of the annuities which it provides.

ARTICLE 48

DEBTS

1. The annexation of Austria by Germany shall not be deemed to have affected the obligations of the Austrian Government in respect of external loans issued prior to March 13, 1938. The Allied and Associated Powers recognize that the Government of Austria has no obligation in respect of German Government securities freely accepted by the holders thereof in exchange for securities of the Government of Austria, or in respect of these Austrian securities regarding which after March 13, 1938, payment agreements were concluded between Germany and the creditor States.

2. The Allied and Associated Powers recognize that interest payments and similar charges on Austrian Government securities falling due after March 12, 1938, and before May 8, 1945, constitute a claim on Germany and not on Austria.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers declare their intention not to avail themselves of the provisions of loan agreements made by the Government of Austria before March 13, 1938, in so far as those provisions granted to the creditors a right of control over the government finances of Austria.

4. The existence of the state of war between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany shall not, in itself, be regarded as affecting the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts which existed, and rights which were acquired before the existence of the state of war, which became payable prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Austria to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Government or nationals of Austria.

5. Except as otherwise expressly provided in the present Treaty, nothing therein shall be construed as impairing debtor-creditor relationships arising out of contracts concluded at any time prior to September 1, 1939, by either the Government of Austria or persons who were nationals of Austria on March 12, 1938.

ARTICLE 48-BIS

Austria acknowledges as a debt, payable by her, monetary loans and also the value of all supplies and services delivered to the Austrian Government by any of the Allied or Associated Powers between May 8, 1945, and the coming into force of the present Treaty.

No. 521

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)66

BERLIN, February 14, 1954.

ITEM 3 OF THE AGENDA:

THE AUSTRIAN PEACE TREATY

ARTICLE 33

1. The Agreement of 28th June, 1946, on the Control mechanism in Austria [2] will terminate on the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty..

2. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, the Interallied Kommandatura set up in accordance with Clause 4 of the Agreement of 9th July, 1945, on occupation zones in Austria and the administration of the town of Vienna will terminate all its administrative functions in Vienna. The troops of the Allied and associated Powers will be removed from Vienna not later than 90 days from the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty.

3. The personnel of the Allied Control Commission for Austria will be recalled from Austria at the earliest possible date and in any case within 90 days from the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty.

4. The Allied and associated Powers undertake to restore to the Austrian Government, within the specified period of 90 days, all Austrian property, requisitioned by the Allied Control Commission for its needs and those of its organs throughout Austrian territory and also all property that was requisitioned by the Interallied Kommandatura and the troops stationed in Vienna which is still in their possession.

The obligations assumed in accordance with this clause will be implemented without prejudice to Article 35 of the present Treaty.

5. The Governments of the U.S.A., the U.K., France and the Soviet Union will have the right, after the entry into force of the Austrian Treaty, to postpone temporarily the withdrawal of their

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the seventeenth plenary on Feb. 14. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 144 and 145, Documents 479 and 480.

[2] For text of the agreement, signed June 28, 1946, see *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949* (revised edition) (Washington, 1985), p. 255.

troops stationed on the territory of the respective zones of Austria pending the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Germany.

The troops temporarily left in Austria shall not perform occupation functions nor shall they interfere in the affairs of the Austrian Administration nor in the social and political life of the country. The legal status of these troops shall be determined by a special agreement which shall be accepted by the Governments of the U.S.A., the U.K., France, the U.S.S.R. and the Austrian Government and will enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Austrian State Treaty.

No. 522

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)67

BERLIN, February 14, 1954.

ITEM 3 OF THE AGENDA:

THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY

ARTICLE 35 (CLAUSE 6)

6. The Soviet Government will hand over to Austria property, rights and interests withheld or claimed as German assets together with available installations and will also hand over war-industry enterprises, together with their available equipment, residential houses and other real estate, including landed property situated in Austria which is withheld or claimed as war booty, excepting the assets indicated in clauses 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the present Article. Austria on the other hand undertakes to pay the Soviet Union 150 million U.S.A. dollars in the form of deliveries of goods over six years in equal yearly parts.

The designation and quantity of goods to be delivered, together with the exact dates and conditions of delivery, will be specified by supplementary agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Austria and will enter into force simultaneously with the present agreement.

The prices for the goods delivered by Austria will be fixed according to world prices.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the seventeenth plenary on Feb. 14. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 144 and 145, Documents 479 and 480.

The U.S.A. dollar, calculated on its gold parity on January 1, 1954, i.e. 25 U.S.A. dollars for one ounce of gold, will serve as basis for the transactions provided for in the present Article.

In order to ensure timely deliveries of goods due to the U.S.S.R., the Austrian National Bank will issue promissory notes to the U.S.S.R. State Bank within a fortnight from the date of the entry into force of the present agreement, for the total sum of 150 million U.S.A. dollars payable in installments of 25 million dollars every 1st January for the six years during which the deliveries of goods will be effected.

The promissory notes issued by Austria will be interest free. The U.S.S.R. State Bank has no intention of discounting the promissory notes if the Austrian Government and the Austrain National Bank duly fulfill their obligations at the periods fixed.

No. 523

396.1 BE/2-1554

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

TOP SECRET BERLIN, February 15, 1954.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the UK, the USSR and the USA, meeting in Berlin,

Taking into account the need to settle definitively the Korean problem on the basis of establishing a unified, independent and democratic Korea as an important step toward the reduction of international tensions and the re-establishment of peace elsewhere in Asia;

Agree to convene a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries concerned;

Agree further that besides the USA, France, the UK, the USSR and the Chinese Peoples Republic, which shall participate in discussing the questions to be considered at this conference, invitations shall be addressed to the Republic of Korea, the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic and the other countries, the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea and which would desire to do so, to take part in the conference when the Korean question is considered.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the fourth restricted meeting on Feb. 15. For a record of that session, see Document 485. This proposal represents a slight revision of the Soviet proposal introduced on Feb. 11, Document 518.

And to the representatives of the appropriate areas of Asia in connection with the consideration of questions regarding the re-establishment of peace elsewhere in Asia (Indochina);

Agree moreover that the following items shall be considered at the conference:

1. Political conference on Korea;
2. Statements by the delegations on other questions mentioned above and an exchange of views on such statements.

No. 523

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Proposal of the Soviet Delegation [1]

[Translation]

CONFIDENTIAL
FPM(54)75

BERLIN, February 17, 1954.

ITEM 2 OF THE AGENDA:

THE GERMAN QUESTION AND THE PROBLEM OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY

Realising the importance for Germany of easing and expanding economic ties between Western and Eastern Germany as well as of creating more favourable conditions for developing German national culture, a recommendation should be made to the appropriate organs of Western and Eastern Germany that:

(a) an all-German Committee should be constituted whose functions would be to agree and co-ordinate all questions relating to trade, financial transactions, transport, frontiers and such other questions as are connected with economic relations;

(b) an all-German Committee should be constituted for promoting the development of cultural and scientific ties and of sporting events in order to remove obstacles in the way of the development of German national culture.

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[1] This proposal was introduced at the twentieth plenary on Feb. 17. For a record of that meeting, see Sectos 159 and 162, Documents 488 and 489.

No. 524

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 197

Final Communique of the Berlin Conference [1]

CONFIDENTIAL BERLIN, February 18, 1954.
FPM(54)86

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, Mr. John Foster Dulles, M. Georges Bidault, Mr. Anthony Eden and M. Vyacheslav Molotov, took place in Berlin between January 25 and February 18, 1954. They reached the following agreements:

(a)

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Berlin,

Considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia,

Propose that a conference of representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26th for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question;

Agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China will also be discussed at the conference, to which representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned Conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

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[1] The final communique was discussed at the sixth restricted meeting and adopted at the twenty-first plenary on Feb. 18. For records of these meetings, see the U.S. Delegation record, Document 504, and Secto 176, Document 505. For the final tripartite communique, see *infra*.

(b)

The Governments of the United States of America, of France, of the United Kingdom, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Convinced that the solution of international controversies necessary for the establishment of a lasting peace would be considerably aided by an agreement on disarmament, or at least on a substantial reduction of armaments,

Will subsequently hold an exchange of views to promote a successful solution of this problem as provided for in paragraph 6 of the United Nations Resolution of November 28, 1953.[2]

The four Ministers have had a full exchange of views on the German question, on the problems of European security and on the Austrian question but they were unable to reach agreement upon these matters.

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[2] For this resolution, see *United Nations General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17, Resolutions*, pp. 3–4, or Department of State *Bulletin*, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 838.

No. 526

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 213

Tripartite Communiqué on the Berlin Conference[1]

No. 80 BERLIN, February 19, 1954.

The major problem facing the Berlin Conference was that of Germany. The three Western Delegations urged that the reunification of Germany should be achieved through free elections, leading to the creation of an all-German Government with which a peace treaty could be concluded. They put forward a practical plan to this end. Their proposals were not accepted by the Soviet Delegation, even as a basis for discussion, and they were forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Government is not now ready to permit free all-German elections, or to abandon its control over Eastern Germany.

The three Western Governments will continue their efforts to achieve German reunification in freedom and by peaceful means. In the meantime, they have suggested certain measures which could reduce the effect of the present division of Germany and its consequences for Berlin. They have proposed that the three High Commissioners should study these questions with the Soviet High

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[1] Released to the press on Feb. 19 with an embargo until the following day.

Commissioner. As regards Berlin, the three Governments reaffirm their abiding interest in the security of the city as expressed in the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952. [2] They will do all in their power to improve conditions in Berlin and to promote the economic welfare of the city.

The three Western Ministers did their utmost to secure agreement upon the Austrian State Treaty. They accepted the Soviet version of all the remaining disagreed articles. The Austrian Foreign Minister, who was present at all the discussions on this question, declared himself ready to sign the Treaty in this form. The Soviet Foreign Minister, however, insisted upon adding new provisions to the Treaty. The effect of these would have been to leave foreign troops in Austria for an indefinite period after the entry into force of the Treaty, and to impair Austria's right to play her full part in international life.

The Treaty could therefore not be concluded in Berlin, despite an Austrian offer accepted by the Western Ministers, that troops of the Four Powers should remain in Austria until the 30th of June 1955. The three Governments are prepared to continue their efforts to conclude the Austrian State Treaty, but progress depends on the Soviet Union modifying its attitude. Meanwhile, they will continue to seek every means of lightening the burden of occupation on Austria.

The three Governments remain ready to take advantage of any further opportunity which may arise to promote, by renewal of the contacts established at Berlin or by other means, a solution of the German and Austrian problems.

The three Ministers explained and reaffirmed the purely defensive character of Western security arrangements.

Offers were made to discuss how the undertakings which already protect the Soviet Union against aggression could be reinforced. The Soviet Delegation made no response to these offers. Their own proposals would have involved the dissolution of the Western security system, while the military power of the Soviet bloc in Europe remained intact. The three Powers do not intend to be deflected from their efforts to develop the system of defense on which their survival depends.

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[2] For the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952, see vol. v, Part 1, p. 686.

D. REPORTS AND ANALYSES OF THE CONFERENCE

No. 527

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 204

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, February 20, 1954.]

Participants:
Secretary Dulles
Ambassador Conant
Mr. Merchant
Mr. MacArthur

Chancellor Adenauer
Dr. Walter Hallstein
Mr. Hans Heinrich von Herwarth (Interpreter)

Chancellor Adenauer opened the conversation by saying that he wished to express his most heartfelt thanks to Secretary Dulles for all he had done at the Berlin Conference. He said he spoke from the bottom of his heart.

Secretary Dulles thanked the Chancellor and said he had just concluded four very difficult weeks. The three Western Powers had gone into the Berlin meeting with some hopes and some fears. While the hopes had not been realized neither had been the fears.

Chancellor Adenauer said that in his opinion the Secretary had done more than could have been hoped for or expected. A satisfactory four power communiqué had been issued. [2] But even more important the communiqué had made reference to Indo-China. This latter point was most important because of the good effect it would have in Paris which in turn would help with French action on EDC. The date of April 26th for the Far Eastern Conference in Geneva was well chosen because before that date EDC will have been acted on in France. The Chancellor believed EDC would be settled by the end of March. He felt that the Berlin Conference was new evidence of the fact that present Western policy was the only possible policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He believed that the Berlin Conference will prove the basic soundness of the Western position and, in this connection, he believed the Soviets did not want increased tension with the West.

Secretary Dulles said the Conference was very revealing of Soviet unwillingness to let go its hold of any territory it has seized and also the continuance of Soviet desire to extend its control. He believed the Soviet rulers had a real fear of freedom as we understand that word. The Secretary said that he had had private talks with Molotov during which the Secretary had expressed the opinion that the concept of Versailles, that is to try to control Germany by imposed restrictions was wrong and would not work since the very controls resulted in a resurgence of extreme nationalism and a revival of militarism. Molotov had replied that the only thing wrong with the Versailles Treaty was that it had not been enforced. If it had been properly enforced the German Government would have lived up to it. This observation of Molotov summed up the way the Soviets looked at areas which had come under their control. It was evident in the Soviet attitude towards German unification resulting from free elections. The Soviets would only be willing to have elections if they could control the electoral machinery, insure that the "right" people were chosen, and thus have a government which could in turn be controlled.

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[1] Following the adjournment of the final plenary Secretary Dulles left Berlin at 7:16 p.m. for the flight to Wahn Airport near Bonn where this conversation took place. Dulles subsequently departed from Wahn at 10:30 p.m. for Washington.

[2] Document 525.

The Secretary said that the Soviet attitude towards Austria told the whole story. It was a good example of what he had been saying. Austria was a small inoffensive country. The Austrians had given an undertaking not to join NATO or EDC. However, the Soviets were unwilling to relinquish their control in Austria and insisted on maintaining their military power there for an indefinite time. The case of Austria, the Secretary said, should be the answer to those people in Germany who believe that in return for a neutralized Germany the Soviets would relinquish their control. The Soviets will accept every concession and then find reasons to continue their control. The Secretary said he knew the Chancellor had thought it important to have the Berlin Conference to demonstrate that the Soviets were unwilling to compromise. The Soviets had certainly demonstrated this. He did not know what the public opinion reactions in Western Germany had been, but he had the impression from such summaries of opinion as he had seen that there was an understanding that no compromise was possible on the basis of neutralism. He had much appreciated being kept informed of the Chancellor's views by Blankenhorn who had been most helpful.

Chancellor Adenauer said that he fully agreed with the Secretary and that it was impossible to find any compromise on a neutralization formula. The Soviets were only willing to talk with the strong. The Berlin Conference had been useful and had proved this. Once EDC has been consummated there will be a new situation of strength in Europe which will cause the Soviets to reconsider matters and adopt a new policy.

The Secretary said that new and stable conditions will not develop in Europe till it unites and develops real strength. After this happens the Soviets will eventually be forced to reanalyze their policy towards the satellite states and give them some form of semi-autonomous character. In other words when there is a really united and strong Western Europe the Soviets will not be able to maintain their total control of the satellite states by their present methods but will probably have to transform them into buffer states, perhaps they will evolve into a status somewhat similar to Finland. It is after there is evolution in this direction that East Germany may be able to join with West Germany. For then conditions in East Germany and West Germany would not be such a startling contrast as at present. If the Soviets are obliged to grant more independence to Poland and Czechoslovakia they would be almost forced to give Germany to avoid an unfortunate comparison between East Germany and its satellite neighbors. This would in effect be the beginning of a form of revolutionary process.

The biggest obstacle today in the path of East Germany being able to join the West is the impact that the Soviets know this would have on the satellites. The Soviets are not ready now to remove their iron grip from East Germany but when they feel obliged to give more freedom to the satellites it will also come to East Germany.

The Chancellor said, "I think what you have just said is absolutely correct. As long as Western Europe remains weak and divided the Soviets can carry out any policies that they wish because they are faced with no real strength." The Chancellor added that he was in full accord with the Secretary's views which had been stated simply and clearly.

The Secretary then said he had had luncheon privately on Wednesday with Mr. Bidault and Mr. Alphand with only himself and Mr. Merchant present. [3] The Secretary said Bidault had handled himself at Berlin courageously and had grown in stature. The Secretary said he had known Mr. Bidault since San Francisco in 1945, and had seen him subsequently at meetings in London and elsewhere. Mr. Bidault had developed remarkably since those days and was conducting himself with statesmanship and courage.

Chancellor Adenauer agreed and said that Mr. Bidault had changed greatly in recent months and had shown qualities which he understood had caused him to rise in the esteem of the French. This was good and important.

The Secretary said Mr. Bidault's prestige had increased very much in the U.S. and he understood the same thing was true in the United Kingdom.

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[3] For a record of this luncheon meeting, see the memorandum of conversation, Document 497.

The Secretary then reverted to his lunch with Bidault on Wednesday and said that Mr. Bidault had discussed with him the four points which must be dealt with if EDC is to be ratified.

The first was a closer relationship between the U.K. and the EDC.

The second involved some form of assurances regarding the maintenance of substantial U.S. military forces in Europe and the continued acceptance by the U.S. of the forward strategy concept of NATO. The Secretary said he believed we could do something along these lines but there were constitutional and Congressional questions that would have to be handled carefully. Furthermore the U.S. obviously couldn't commit itself to maintain a specific number of forces anywhere for 50 years or any protracted period. (At this point Chancellor Adenauer interrupted to make a comment about the French asking for commitments from others that they were unwilling to give themselves. The Secretary said he knew the French reserved the right to withdraw forces if they were needed in France's overseas possessions. This, however, was understandable.) The Secretary went on to say that it is the intention of the U.S. to maintain substantial elements of its armed forces on the European continent. He believed there were ways that we could do something to meet the French problem and he believed that if we did so it would help to persuade the British to do something similar and take further constructive steps which would be helpful in obtaining EDC ratification in France.

The third problem which Mr. Bidault had discussed in connection with EDC ratification was the Saar. Mr. Bidault had expressed the strong hope that Adenauer would make a great effort to reach a satisfactory Saar settlement. Bidault did not envisage that every detail must be settled. What he had in mind was a broad general settlement. Bidault hoped there would be an early occasion to talk to Adenauer quietly and inconspicuously about the Saar, since a settlement of this issue was essential to French ratification. The Secretary said he had the impression that Mr. Bidault recognized that the Germans could not be expected to make definitive concessions on the Saar prior to EDC ratification and he felt sure the French would agree that any Saar settlement would come into effect only when EDC was ratified.

The Secretary then said there was no point in any of the interested countries making a final contribution to meet the French requirements on these three problems which he had discussed with Mr. Bidault until their respective contributions would have a maximum impact and effect on French ratification of EDC. If the contributions are made too early the French parliament will accept them and ask for more and we will have nothing more to give. The British share this view. Therefore the U.S., the U.K. and Germany must make their final contribution to French ratification of the EDC at about the same time and when they will be decisive with the French. We understand from Mr. Bidault that serious French parliamentary consideration of EDC will occur about mid-March and in the meantime we will keep in close touch with the situation through the French Ambassador in Washington. Mr. Eden, on his part, will send someone to Paris about the end of next week to follow developments and be in touch with the French. We should focus on making our real effort about mid-March to have a decisive effect.

The Secretary had asked Bidault about the life of the present French government and whether it would survive and be in office to bring about a vote on EDC. Bidault believes the Government will be in power. Should it fall, however, a new situation involving further delays would occur.

Chancellor Adenauer replied that he hoped to reach an understanding with France on the Saar. He was now inclined to take the Van der Goes report (of the Council of Europe) as a basis for a settlement.[4] One point in this report, however, makes it very difficult for the Germans to accept. He would discuss this in detail with Ambassador Conant. (Hallstein indicated the problem was that the Van der Goes report in paragraph 19 envisaged the U.S., U.K., France and Germany agreeing now that the Saar would be Europeanized and separated from Germany and that its frontiers would be definitively accepted. If the Federal Republic accepted the definitive settlement of its Western frontier with respect to the Saar, the GDR would be provided with the pretext to finalize the Oder-Neiser [*Neisse*] line and turn over definitively the territory to the east over to Poland. Therefore, while the Germans might use the Van der Goes report as the basis of a settlement there should be a provision that final settlement of the Saar frontier could only be reached at the time of the Peace Treaty by an all-German Government.)

The Secretary replied that he did not know anything about the details of the Saar problem. Nor did he wish to. He recognized that it was a very complicated and technical problem. The point he was making was that to secure EDC ratification the U.S., the U.K. and Germany each had to make a contribution. For the U.S. it was some arrangement about the continuation of armed forces in Europe which would be extremely difficult to formulate because of Congress. For the U.K. it would perhaps be some improvement in the form of association with EDC which the U.K. would develop.

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[4] Regarding the van der Goes van Naters report on the Saar, see Document 640.

The Secretary said we counted on Germany to make its contribution and its contribution is a Saar settlement. The Secretary said: "I plead with you to make the necessary contribution." He said that both he and President Eisenhower recalled the Chancellor's assurances given in Washington last April that the Chancellor would not permit the Saar to stand in the way of EDC.[5] They had confidence that the Chancellor would find the way since he was one of the world's ablest international statesmen.

Chancellor Adenauer replied: "I maintain and stand by what I told you and the President in Washington."

The Secretary said that this was all he wanted to know and that he would so inform the President.

The Secretary then said that he wanted to report to the Chancellor about the Spandau affair. The three Western Foreign Ministers had decided that it would be unwise to raise it with Molotov at the Council table. Accordingly it had been taken up with Molotov outside the Conference. Eden had done most of the talking to Molotov and had gone into the question of the disposition of the remains of prisoners who died as well as improving living conditions in the prison. Molotov had replied that he was not familiar with the details but would inquire of Semenov.[6] The Secretary said he could not promise that anything would come of this but an effort had been made.

Chancellor Adenauer asked whether publicity could be given to the fact that the matter had been taken up with Molotov.

The Secretary replied that he thought this would not be wise. We should wait at least for about a month and see what came of the request to Molotov. Adenauer said he supposed this was right.

Chancellor Adenauer then asked if the three Western Ministers had taken up with Molotov the question of German war prisoners who are held in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary replied that he had not taken up this question but that the three Ministers had let Molotov know that the Western High Commissioners would take up with the Soviet High Commissioner a number of measures designed to ameliorate the situation resulting from the division of Germany and the controls in the Eastern Zone and that we hoped something constructive could be done.

Ambassador Conant then briefly explained what the Western High Commissioners had in mind.

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[5] For documentation on Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington in April 1953, see Documents 177 ff.

[6] The conversation had taken place on the night of Feb. 17. The U.S. Delegation reported briefly on it in Secto 167 from Berlin, Feb. 18. (396.1 BE/2-1854)

The Secretary then referred to the German amendment to the constitution necessitated by EDC and asked when the parliamentary action would be completed. The Chancellor replied that he believed it would be done on Friday, February 26. The Secretary said he hoped Belgian ratification would soon be completed and mentioned that he had written Van Zeeland a long letter from Berlin which he hoped would be helpful in rectifying some of the latter's misapprehensions. [7]

The Secretary then mentioned that he had come away from the Berlin Conference with the impression that the Soviets were concerned about their relations with the Chinese Communists. The Chancellor said he had had interesting reports from missionaries returning from China. He hoped the U.S. would succeed in getting a foothold in China. Social conditions there were very bad. He added 500 million discontented Chinese represented a problem which could cause difficulties for all of us.

The Chancellor then said he had been asked by Washington whether it would be good to give food to the East Zone of Germany. He would like to. He said that the influx of refugees from the East Zone was increasing and that he would like to dam this influx so as to avoid a shortage of population in the East Zone. He said the U.S. had helped with the refugee problem and he hoped they could continue to do so.

The Secretary asked whether contributions of food would help keep people in the East Zone and thus prevent refugeeism. The Chancellor said this would be a great help and mentioned that cooperation between the Church authorities of the two zones was important both materially and psychologically in coping with the refugee problem.

The Chancellor mentioned he understood that a sub-committee of the Senate was considering the German property question and that favorable action on this was very important.

The Chancellor said he had only one final thing to say. Article 7, [paragraph] 3 of the Bonn Treaty involving the right of an all-German Government to make its choice had caused a great reaction in Paris. [8] With this in mind he would make a statement to the Bundestag next week saying that when an all-German Government was formed it was the strong intention of the Bonn Government to urge that the all-German Government maintain the EDC Treaty.

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[7] Not identified further.

[8] For text of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, see Document 51.

The Secretary said this would be very helpful and that he himself would take a similar line. If EDC came into being the judicial question of the right of an all-German Government to choose was incidental. If EDC was in existence and Europe united, obviously the all-German Government would opt for its place in the European community.[9]

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[9] On Feb. 25 Secretary Dulles briefed Ambassador Makins on his conversation with Adenauer. (Memorandum of conversation, by Merchant, Feb. 25, 611.62A/2-2554)

No. 528

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Jackson)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1954.

POST-BERLIN THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT SOVIET PSYCHE

If Berlin did nothing else, it removed quite a few question marks with respect to Soviet attitudes and policies toward the West.

We went to Berlin wondering if the so-called "New Look" had any sincerity behind it or could lead to any practical negotiated results.

We also wondered if the recent talk about Army ascendancy in the Kremlin was more than a rumor.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime was another big question mark.

Another vast "guess" area was how much the internal agricultural and economic stresses so clearly stated by Khrushchev might affect external Soviet policy.

We also wondered whether the death of Stalin had in any way affected the traditional Soviet inflexibility in negotiation, and if the passing of this almost Asian tyrant would permit top Soviet Foreign Office personalities to be more relaxed among themselves and in their relations with "foreigners".

To some of these questions some pretty clear answers emerged during the Berlin Conference. To others, the answers, although not completely clear, may be estimated with considerably more accuracy than before Berlin.

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[1] Attached to a copy of this memorandum in the C. D. Jackson papers at the Eisenhower Library was a cover sheet transmitting it to President Eisenhower and stating that another copy had been sent to the members of the Operations Coordinating Board.

The Soviet Delegation was unquestionably their first team. In the front row of the Soviet Delegation where Molotov, Gromyko, Malik, and Zarubin, with Vinogradov and Semenov being frequently consulted in the second row, and Sobolev, head of the Foreign Office North American Desk, always present.

The atmosphere between themselves seemed to be quite relaxed. The passing of notes and the whispered advice during the conferences was spontaneous and the advisers volunteered information and advice to Molotov just as easily as he turned to consult them.

Gromyko, who incidentally looked like death taking a holiday, was unquestionably the chief consultant-adviser, and frequently showed considerably less deference toward Molotov than, for instance, Frank Roberts toward Eden, or the top French toward Bidault.

During the social gatherings, whether in the Soviet Embassy or when we were hosts, the Soviet mood was one of great personal friendliness, sometimes verging on an almost pathetic eagerness to be liked personally even though professionally the gap between us was as great as ever.

Molotov, with Troianovsky at his side, was by far the most entertaining member of the Soviet group. Compared to the others, his humor was sharp, subtle, and fast, and he seemed to derive genuine pleasure from being able to throw the switch and have verbal fun.

On the other hand, none of the Russians ever really forgot the party line, and if they found themselves on the edge of any kind of personal admission, the party line reappeared very fast—in Molotov's case with an occasional twinkle; in the case of the others, with heavy-footed solemnity.

Anthony Nutting of the British Delegation reported that during one of his conversations with the Soviet Chinese expert, he was urging the Soviets to have the Chinese Communists relax their impossible attitude and regulations against British businessmen in China, who were being held as virtual prisoners because of the financial demands made upon them. Nutting reported that his Soviet vis-à-vis appeared about to say the equivalent of "Well, I'll see what I can do about it", when all of a sudden his face changed, he drew himself up, and said "If you would accept the Chinese People's Republic as a member of the Big Five, such matters could be more easily handled".

This policy of personal friendliness within a framework of unremittingly tough foreign policy, is about the only visible evidence of the hoped-for, or at least puzzled-over, "New Look" in Soviet foreign policy. Nowhere else could any sign of it be found. In fact, the whole Molotov performance in Berlin was, if anything, almost needlessly tough, and actually helped us not only to preserve Western unity, but to further our propaganda out of the mouth of Molotov rather than out of our own.

For instance, Molotov came to Berlin with quite a few potential customers—to name some of the important ones . . . [2] the East Germans, the West Germans, the German Socialists, Austria, French fears, French neutralists, British public opinion. It would have been a very difficult job to sell all of these customers, but it would not have been too difficult to select a few and sacrifice the rest.

Instead, day after day Molotov made absolutely no effort to sell or even salvage any of these possible customers, and wound up by having all Germans disappointed, if not enraged, with the German Socialists in such a quandary that their leaders didn't know what to do or say, and frequently contradicting themselves in print, with even *Le Monde* squirming in public, with the French so scared of losing NATO that they actually felt better about EDC, with the British by and large behind Eden, with all but the most doctrinaire neutralists on very rocky ground, and with Austria, the cheapest sale of all, dumbfounded and desperate.

Furthermore, when Molotov's early attempts to split the French and British away from us on the very touchy Asian and Chinese matter failed, Western solidarity won a tremendous victory, from which Bidault, Eden, and Dulles all derived new strength in their determination to stick together. And toward the end of the Conference, the three Western Ministers hardly needed any signal practice at all in order to compliment each other in reply to Soviet tactics.

Admittedly, my flat statement regarding Molotov's having lost all his possible customers is quite an oversimplification. The world press' during the period of the Conference was not 100% for us, nor were all Parliamentarians in Paris, London, Washington, and Bonn uniform in their reactions. There was criticism of what they considered Western intransigence and unwillingness to compromise, but on balance, I believe the oversimplification will stand up. It was interesting to note that some of Molotov's trial balloons on Asia and on the German referendum never took real root, and never held the headlines for more than 24 hours.

This ruthless and total disregard of public opinion and propaganda dividends on Molotov's part could not have been accidental. Soviet expert Bohlen several times said that this was a perfect illustration of the Soviet technique that although the Soviets give more thought to propaganda than anyone else, nevertheless when propaganda and policy come into conflict, propaganda is sacrificed without a second thought. The Molotov behaviour in Berlin certainly confirms the Bohlen thesis.

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[2] Ellipsis in the source text.

What, then, was this overriding policy point which controlled everything?

It was a military point. And whether the Soviet military dictated to the Soviet civilians, or whether the Soviet civilians thought that self-preservation indicated reliance on military considerations is not really important. Whoever thought of it first, the fact remains that military considerations controlled.

This was particularly obvious in the case of the Austrian Peace Treaty.

What was at stake here? Certainly the loss of 7-million easy-going Austrians without overwhelmingly important agriculture or industry could not be considered a major threat to the USSR. Furthermore, although the letter of Treaties with Hungary and Rumania called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from those two countries once peace was concluded with Austria, a simple invitation from the Hungarian and Rumanian puppet regimes to have Soviet troops remain would easily have taken care of that problem.

But Soviet military considerations and the Soviet military equivalent of "J'y suis; j'y reste" apparently dictated the absurdity of the Soviet position with respect to the Austrian Peace Treaty. Not a square inch of occupied or controlled territory was to be given up.

In the case of German unification and German elections, Molotov passed up the fairly easy opportunity to say that he could live with NATO but could not live with EDC. Had he done this, he would undoubtedly have scuttled EDC with the French and the Germans. Instead, he chose the most extreme position that could be taken, namely, that EDC must be abandoned, NATO must be dismantled, the U.S. must become nothing more than an observer in European affairs, and all possible regional defensive alliances must be forbidden.

Here again was an extreme military reaction without regard for political or propaganda consequences, inasmuch as by the statement of that position he got a horse laugh from the Americans, he really scared the French and the British, and he convinced German Socialists and neutralists that compromise on some middle ground was impossible.

Their military men told them that there is no way of appeasing themselves out of their problem—that if they grant the inch of Austria they will eventually be forced to grant the ell of Eastern Germany and all the European satellites. The flywheel of history can only turn in one direction at a time—therefore, they should hold on to what they have no matter what the cost in bitterness, seething discontent, and negative world opinion.

As to Soviet relations with Communist China, when we went to Berlin it was pretty generally agreed that Molotov would have to make a major pitch for the elevation of Communist China to the position of a full-fledged Big Five club member, but some of us felt that he would not carry it beyond the point at which he could say to the Chinese Communists, "I did everything I could for you."

Instead, he carried this proposal to the absolute bitter end. With the single exception of the Austrian Peace Treaty, there was no discussion of any item during the entire month into which Communist China was not injected at some time or other. Molotov even insisted that the Chinese Communists should participate in the discussions on the President's "atomic pool for peaceful purposes" proposal,[3] and it was not until 6 P M of the last day of the Conference that Molotov finally accepted our language for the final clause of the proposal for the Geneva Conference, which stated that the proposal did not imply recognition of Communist China.[4]

In other words, Molotov's solicitude for the social standing of his ally went well beyond the call of either friendship or expediency. For the first time since the war—in fact, since 1918—the Russian Soviets have to look over their shoulders at 400-million Chinese when they are negotiating with the West, and this may have important implications.

How Peiping will react to Molotov's failure to have them accepted in the club, how they will react to our underscoring that failure in the language of the final clause of the proposal for the Geneva Conference, is not yet known. It is to be doubted, however, that they will be pleased at the lack of performance on the part of their Russian ally, which always advertised itself as almost omnipotent.

What, then, is the composite Soviet picture emerging from Berlin?

It would appear that on the one hand the Soviet leaders are a group of men slowly relaxing in the absence of the whip of the Stalin tyranny—anxious to be liked as individuals, and eager to give every personal evidence of their desire to be accepted as human beings.

On the other hand, another tyranny is in process of forming, and that is the tyranny of fear that their expansionist conquests will melt away unless they are willing to impose almost absurd conditions for what they call the relaxation of world tensions. Everybody could really relax if the Soviet world extended from Kamchatka to the English Channel, and the U.S. promised to remain within its own continental limits.

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 326.

[4] For text of the agreement convoking the Geneva Conference, see FPM(54)86, part (a), Document 525.

Furthermore, these Soviet rulers haven't even begun to chew the China mouthful, let alone swallow it—but they know they've got something big and tough in their mouths, something that may prove troublesome and something that cannot be ignored.

And all of this against the backdrop of a very complicated and possibly dangerous internal agricultural and economic situation which has assumed sufficient gravity to force them to reverse the policy of decades and overnight to attempt to placate the peasant and the consumer.

This adds to their extraordinary fear, and is one more reason for no external relaxation. They do not feel that they can appease both inside and outside at the same time.

But here they are in a very real sense prisoners of their own slogans. If Khrushchev can say publicly, as he did last fall, that there is less livestock in the USSR today than there was under the Czars, he can afford to say it because some miraculous Soviet Plan will fix everything so that in 1954 there will be more livestock in the USSR than there was under the Czars. Similarly, a Plan can convert a factory from machine guns to nylons in a few months.

These things are not going to come about, and 1954 looms as a very important year in the Soviet scheme of things.

If, during 1954, we have the guts and the skill to maintain constant pressure at all points of the Soviet orbit, we will get dividends from such a policy. Furthermore, our pressure can take the form of much bolder harassment than we have yet felt advisable, the reason being that the chances of Soviet military aggression, at least during 1954, are probably lower than they have been for a long time.

At some time or other during 1954, the combination of external discontent and the fruits of internal unfulfilled appeasement will start working in our favor in a great big way.

If this is true—and I believe that it is true—the Berlin Conference will have been the most important and most successful encounter between the East and the West in ten years.[5]

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[5] On Mar. 2 the Department of State prepared a two-page commentary on Jackson's memorandum, which was drafted by the "Russian desk people." It concurred in the conclusion "that the only evidence of a 'New Look' in Soviet foreign policy revealed at the conference was the attempt of the Soviet representatives to appear personally friendly." The commentary went on to say that the Soviet position at Berlin was in the best Stalinist tradition and felt that undue stress should not be placed on the idea that the Soviet position was primarily military. The commentary concluded that it would be very dangerous to conclude that the Soviet Union was, because of internal or satellite difficulties, so weakened that it would "not under any circumstances resort to war." (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

No. 529

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 186th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, February 26, 1954

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Secretary of the Army; Mr. Smith for the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the report and discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers

Secretary Dulles indicated that he would not make his report in narrative form, even though this would be the most interesting way, but would single out those elements in the picture which would be of particular interest to the National Security Council.

The frequent meetings at Berlin provided an opportunity for the United States delegation to learn a great deal by direct contact—even with Molotov himself. Molotov had spoken with an evident show of personal authority. The Soviet Foreign Minister no longer appeared a mere subordinate, as he had when Stalin was alive. He appeared, comparatively at least, free to make his own decisions, with a minimum of reporting back to Moscow for instructions.

I. EUROPE

In the first instance, said Secretary Dulles, one thing was made crystal clear. There is no disposition on the part of the Russians to accept any terms which would relax the grip on the areas of Europe that they now control. They may pretend to be willing to relax this grip, but only as a means of extending it. This very shallow pretense deceived only those who wished to be deceived by it. Thus we anticipated before the meeting that we would be obliged to make certain very difficult decisions if the Russians actually offered the basis of a genuine settlement with regard to East Germany and Austria. In point of fact, however, we were not obliged to face such tough problems as the neutralization of a united Germany and an independent Austria. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future will we have to face up to the possibility that these countries will be neutralized. The Austrians were quite prepared to agree to neutralize their country if this proved the only way to secure a treaty and rid themselves of the occupation forces. They would have preferred to have incorporated their neutral status in a specific declaration, but if they had been pressed they would have even incorporated their neutral status in the treaty itself. However, the Soviets dismissed any and all such suggestions out of hand. At the last meeting at which the Austrians were present, their delegation strongly hinted Austria's willingness to neutralize itself.[1] Molotov brushed aside the hint in the most brutal fashion. Chancellor Figl and his colleagues walked out of the room almost in tears. The whole episode was shocking, but it was a clear revelation of Soviet intention. After killing the Austrian treaty the Soviets did try to give the corpse a decent burial by suggesting further study of the peace treaty at the Ambassadorial level. Secretary Dulles said that he prevented this decent burial by making it perfectly clear to the Soviets that he was unwilling to refer the problem to the Ambassadors until the Russians agreed to the removal of their forces from Austria.

The net result of this phase of the discussions was to make it clear that neutralization is no substitute for the European Defense Community, as many Western Europeans believed or would like to believe. A study of the record shows that the Soviets will not accept neutralization, and there is accordingly no use whatsoever to consider it as a substitute for EDC.

There was one other significant point, said Secretary Dulles, which came out in connection with the negotiations on Germany and Austria. The Soviets made no effort to play up to public opinion in these countries. Indeed, they appeared almost contemptuous of the thinking of the Germans and the Austrians. A trend in this direction had been apparent in the exchange of notes prior to the Berlin conference, but the trend became very clear at the conference itself. From this, Secretary Dulles deduced that the Soviets proposed to hold on to East Germany for a very long time and by means of force. They do not expect to depend on public opinion as a means of retaining their hold in these areas.

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[1] For a record of the last plenary of the conference, see Secto 176, Document 505.

In the course of the meeting it became apparent that Molotov increasingly focussed his efforts on the defeat of the EDC. In his mind this was the principal purpose of the Berlin meeting and the chief means to the end was to create disunity among the Western powers. Initially, Molotov's attacks on the Western powers had been of a very general nature, including East-West trade, U.S. bases in Europe, and NATO. At the end, however, he focussed his efforts almost completely on EDC. The line he took was that EDC was the great obstacle to a solution of European problems. If the Europeans would give up EDC, all these problems could be readily solved. Eden and Bidault grasped this very clearly.

The big Soviet move, then, was their all-European security plan.[2] This, said Secretary Dulles, was modeled on the Rio Pact and was represented by Molotov as a Monroe Doctrine for Europe which would exclude the influence of the United States. Molotov had indicated that 32 different countries would have membership in the pact, but it never was possible to get him to specify the actual countries. Since 32 independent states would obviously have to include not only the Soviet satellites but a number of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union, it was easy to deduce that the Soviets would have so rigged the European security organization as to ensure a working majority for themselves. The Soviet leaders, continued Secretary Dulles, really believe that the United States completely dominates the Latin American countries and that the Rio Pact is the instrument by which we effect this domination. Accordingly, they wish to use the Pact as a model for achieving their own domination of Europe.

While in a sense this all-European pact was the big Soviet move, back of it one could see their real conception of how the world should be divided. There were to be two great powers—the United States controlling the Western Hemisphere, and Russia dominating the Eurasian continent. As this conception became clear, Secretary Dulles said, he was at once reminded of the meetings between Hitler and Molotov at Berlin during the Nazi-Soviet collaboration. At one of these meetings Hitler and Molotov had discussed dividing up the world much in the fashion of Russia's present conception. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles was tempted to point out to Molotov that he had learned his lessons well from Hitler. With difficulty Secretary Dulles had refrained from saying so.

Molotov proved himself very clever and artful throughout the meeting. He is one of the shrewdest and wiliest diplomats of this century or, indeed, of any century. He spared no efforts to sow discord between the United States and its allies. One of the most potentially dangerous of these efforts related to the question whether or not a unified Germany was bound to remain a member of EDC. This could have posed a serious dilemma for us. Our general understanding with Adenauer is that legally, at any rate, a unified Germany could exercise the option of accepting the commitments of the present West German Government or rejecting them. This legal technicality was exploited by Molotov to prove that all the rest of the EDC countries were bound by their commitments but that Germany was free to do as it chose. In counteracting this Soviet line, Secretary Dulles took the position that while this was an interesting legal point to discuss, it was of no practical consequence. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles predicted that there would be repercussions of Molotov's argument when the French Parliament entered its discussions of ratification of EDC.

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[2] For text of this proposal, see FPM(54)47, Document 517.

Secretary Dulles said that we had learned a lot also with regard to the attitude of the British and French on the Berlin question. They are not nearly as convinced and determined as we are that it is essential to maintain the position of the Western powers in Berlin. Secretary Dulles said that he had tried very hard to induce Eden and Bidault to make public statements which would reassure the population of Berlin that it would not be abandoned. With great difficulty he did succeed in inducing Eden and Bidault, at the end of the conference, to make a call on the Mayor of West Berlin. Bidault had even been willing to make a very nice statement on this occasion. Nevertheless, the difficulties he encountered were significant. It was, for instance, particularly difficult to induce Eden and Bidault to reaffirm the specific language of the Tripartite Declaration of 1952 on Berlin. [3] The best that we could do, said Secretary Dulles, was to get the British and French Foreign Ministers to reaffirm the Declaration in very general language. Secretary Dulles himself made a specific reaffirmation, but his experience on this issue confirmed the doubts that had been expressed in the National Security Council meeting which had discussed our policy in Berlin prior to the Foreign Ministers conference. [4] Clearly, a difficult educational job remains to be done with the British and French on the importance of the Western position in Berlin.

II. ASIA

Molotov's big proposal with regard to Asia was, of course, to call for a five-power conference including Communist China. This proposal had been embodied in the Soviet note of last November,[5] in which the five-power conference was set up as a condition precedent to any discussion of German and Austrian problems at Berlin. After Secretary Dulles had made absolutely clear from the outset that he would have nothing to do with any conference including Communist China except as it related to the specific problems of a settlement in Korea and Indochina, Molotov backed down from his insistence on a five-power conference to discuss *world* problems. He then indicated his willingness to accept a five-power conference on *Asian* as opposed to world problems. When we refused this also, Molotov came up with a formula for a conference which would discuss Korean questions, *etc.* As we knew from experience, said Secretary Dulles, the "et cetera" was merely a trick to enable the Soviets to drag into the conference any and all Asian matters.

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[3] See footnote 2, Document 526.

[4] For a memorandum of this discussion on Jan. 21, see Document 343.

After much argument, we finally boiled down the terms for a conference to deal with Korea to pretty much what we ourselves wanted, namely, a free, independent and united Korea. The Soviets had tried to insert the term "democratic" into this formula, but since everyone was aware of the special meaning of this word in Communist mouths, we refused to accept it, together with the "etc.". The long and short of it was, therefore, that all the problems with respect to membership and agenda which we had encountered for so many months at Panmunjom, were finally settled. While it is very unlikely, concluded Secretary Dulles, that the Geneva conference would achieve a free and independent Korea, at least we did not lose anything by agreeing to take part in this conference. Secretary Dulles stated his belief that if we handled ourselves skillfully at Geneva—and he was sure we would—we should be able to make the same kind of gains that had been ours at Berlin. If the Communists turn down every decent and reasonable proposal which we make at Geneva, this will prove an asset to our cause in the long run.

The single most difficult issue with regard to Asia was, of course, Indochina. The French felt that it was politically indispensable for them to secure some reference to the possibility of a truce. Most of the French can't or won't understand why they must persevere in their struggle against the Communists after we have achieved an armistice in Korea. Bidault, however, clearly understands the great difference between the conditions for an armistice in Korea and those in Indochina. He has no illusions on this subject at all, but he also knows that the Laniel Government will fall if he cannot make some kind of gesture.

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[5] For the Soviet note of Nov. 3, 1953, see Document 280.

Molotov himself had not put forward any proposal for negotiations on Indochina. Indeed, for a long time he refused even to refer specifically to Indochina, and chose to play "very hard to get" on this subject. He played the game very smart, and at the end it was Bidault who was trying to force Molotov to include a reference to Indochina. Molotov had finally suggested that the formula include reference to Indochina in parentheses. When Bidault complained that it would be no use to take Indochina back to Paris in a parentheses, Molotov finally agreed to remove the parentheses. Secretary Dulles had made an earnest effort to include in the terms of reference for the discussion of Indochina, conditions relating to the good behaviour and decent intentions of the Chinese Communists prior to the meeting. These statements were acceptable enough to Bidault, but Eden became a problem. He did not wish to have the resolution contain any language which appeared to impugn the good faith of the Chinese Communist Government. In the end, the language with respect to Chinese behaviour was omitted from the resolution, although the condition can be read implicitly in the language if not explicitly. Secretary Dulles said he believed it to be apparent that if Bidault had not gone back to Paris with something to show on Indochina, the Laniel Government would have fallen at once and would have been replaced by a government which would not only have had a mandate to end the war in Indochina on any terms, but also to oppose French ratification of EDC. In general, said Secretary Dulles, the French are divided into two main categories—those who are prepared to write off Indochina but want France to join EDC, and those who wish to have France remain in Indochina, more or less as a colonial power, and are opposed to EDC. Furthermore, Secretary Dulles couldn't see the makings of a French government which would replace Laniel and continue the fight in Indochina. Accordingly, if we had vetoed the resolution regarding Indochina, it would have probably cost us French membership in EDC as well as Indochina itself. Our present position, therefore, at least offers the fair probability of salvaging both French membership in EDC and the continuation of the struggle in Indochina.

There had been no agreement, said Secretary Dulles, on the exact composition and form of the discussion on Indochina at the Geneva conference. It was his guess that we would encounter difficulties in this matter every bit as bad as those we have experienced in the past with regard to the composition of a conference to settle the Korean problem. For example, the French desire to keep out the representatives of the Associated States, lest their presence at Geneva also bring in Ho Chi Minh. Accordingly, both Bidault and Secretary Dulles are approaching the forthcoming Geneva conference with considerable equanimity. Secretary Dulles didn't believe that the French would push too hard for a negotiated settlement provided there was no real military disaster in Indochina prior to and during the conference. Moreover, the heat would be off when the fighting season ended in May. If the present French Government can hold on, and there was no serious military reverse or apparent military reverse, Secretary Dulles did not anticipate too much difficulty.

One of the most interesting aspects of the meeting was the light thrown on the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union. While this relationship was still obscure, it did seem clear that the Soviets do not feel in a position merely to hand out orders to Peiping. They treat the Chinese Communist regime as a partner who has to be consulted and, in certain instances, even restrained by persuasion and by economic pressures. It seems quite possible that the Soviet Union is worried over the possibility of new aggression by the Chinese Communists. The Soviets are anxious to avoid a major war, and they realize that the Chinese Communists are in a position to initiate such a war if they choose to do so. Secretary Dulles said that he had tried to make clear to Molotov that if the Chinese Communists used their military power for aggressive purposes they were bound to clash with the vital interests of the United States, and that he was not in a position to estimate the consequences of such a clash. It had seemed worthwhile to seize this opportunity thus to pressure the Soviets, who in turn might put pressure on the Chinese Communists to behave themselves.

Secretary Dulles warned that one could not be sure that the above was the correct diagnosis of the relations between the Chinese and the Russians, but from a number of impressions and little signs, this appeared at least to be a likely appraisal.

III. EAST-WEST TRADE

This issue was not discussed to the extent that Secretary Dulles had anticipated. The Soviets, of course, had dangled the bait and prospect of a greatly enhanced East-West trade before the British and the French, but Molotov had never come forward with any concrete proposal, as we feared he would, in his effort to create disunity among us. Indeed, the American delegation got together every morning at nine o'clock to try to figure out what bombshell Molotov would drop in the course of the day's discussion. But he wasn't as aware of our own weaknesses as we ourselves were, and accordingly could not exploit them to the degree which we feared. Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles had taken the opportunity to urge Eden not to retreat hastily from the agreed controls on East-West trade, but to remove the controls, if necessary, only gradually. Eden agreed to this. Incidentally, continued Secretary Dulles, in talking about this matter with Senator Capehart, he was astonished to have the Senator take the position that the United States would either have to loosen up on East-West trade or face the loss of all its major allies.

IV. ATOMIC ENERGY MATTERS

Secretary Dulles said that he had had two full talks plus a dinner talk with Molotov on the subject of the President's speech to the United Nations on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.[6] The next step will be the submission, through normal diplomatic channels, of a fairly elaborate statement of our plan to follow through on the President's proposal. Molotov had pointed out that if we were to have any conference on this subject, it would have to include Communist China. So, said Secretary Dulles, we can anticipate all the usual procedural hurdles before we ever get into a real negotiation with the Soviets on this subject. At every step the USSR invariably drags in Communist China, in order to convince the world that it is only our stubbornness on this issue which blocks the solution of all the great problems that afflict the world.

The French, and especially the British, are very anxious to get into these talks on atomic energy more fully. We hope to have our own plan completed soon, a statement which Admiral Strauss confirmed. Secretary Dulles said that he had already agreed that the British and the Canadians should be brought into the talks when they had reached a certain level, since they were actually engaged in the production of atomic weapons. The French, the Belgians, and the South Africans, as suppliers of raw materials, would have to be brought in at a different level. But in any event, said Secretary Dulles, we must move ahead on this front very rapidly if we are to avoid embarrassment.

Ambassador Lodge confirmed Secretary Dulles' position by noting that he was under constant pressure to get this matter before the UN Disarmament Commission.

Secretary Dulles explained that the disarmament plan to which Ambassador Lodge was referring was quite a different issue from the President's proposal with regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. He had made this distinction very clear in his discussions at Berlin, though the British had pointed out that if the two problems could be combined and submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission, the issue of Communist Chinese participation could be avoided. Secretary Dulles, however, doubted whether the Russians could ever be induced to agree to this procedure.

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[6] For a record of Secretary Dulles' two talks with Molotov on atomic energy matters, see Dultes 23 and 71, Documents 393 and 471.

The President expressed some doubt as to whether the problem was as urgent as Secretary Dulles seemed to think. Secretary Dulles replied that he believed world opinion was very anxious to hear the follow-up on the President's proposal, and he very much hoped that our own U.S. position would be clear in no more than three weeks.

The President, pointing out that the problem was a vast one to deal with at one blow, inquired whether it could not go forward in a series of phases. Secretary Dulles said that this might be possible, but that the matter had already progressed so far that it was more desirable to rely on the present plan and to complete this plan as a matter of urgency.

V. EDC

On his way back home, Secretary Dulles had talked with Chancellor Adenauer for an hour and a half.[7] The Chancellor was extremely pleased with the outcome of the conference and, oddly enough, expressed the most particular pleasure over the inclusion of the reference to negotiations regarding Indochina, since he thought that this would assist in bringing EDC into existence. Chancellor Adenauer's view, said Secretary Dulles, was a reflection of the widespread concern in Europe over the diversion of French military strength and the consequent difficulties which it posed for French ratification of EDC.

With respect to the status of EDC, Secretary Dulles indicated that he had reached an understanding with Bidault that the debate in the French Parliament would be pushed ahead at once and not await the conclusion of the Geneva conference. Whether Bidault would actually be able to deliver on this commitment was, of course, a serious question. Bidault had informed Secretary Dulles that four points needed to be clarified at once. Three of these were external—the Saar, the British relationship to EDC, and the U.S. relationship with EDC, with assurances that we will not pull our troops out of Europe when EDC is ratified and that we do not intend to terminate our membership in NATO when this option is presented to us at the end of the first twenty years. Secretary Dulles said that he would do what could be done to provide the desired assurances. The fourth point, which was internal to French politics, was how far and how fast to push for the European Political Community. The French Socialists were seeking commitments that the French Government would move ahead vigorously to bring the EDC into existence. Bidault pointed out, however, that if a French Government were to do this in order to gain Socialist support, it would involve a loss of votes from the right-of-center parties in favor of EDC.

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[7] For a record of Secretary Dulles' conversation with Chancellor Adenauer at Wahn Airport on Feb. 18, see the memorandum of conversation, Document 527.

The British, said Secretary Dulles, were apparently prepared to go quite far in making commitments to the French with regard to their own part in EDC. As far as the Saar was concerned, Secretary Dulles told Adenauer that he really knew very little about the problem and didn't know what the best solution was, but that he merely desired from Adenauer strong assurance that somehow or other the Chancellor would reach an acceptable agreement with the French on this subject. This, Secretary Dulles told Adenauer, was the German contribution to getting EDC ratified, comparable to the U.S. and British assurances to the French. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles asked the President for his approval for the designation by the Secretaries of State and Defense of representatives to work together over the next few days to see what could be formulated in answer to the French request for new assurances.

The President reluctantly agreed, indicating that the whole thing made him feel a little tired. After all that we have done to try to help Europe to help itself—and that, of course, was what EDC was—the Europeans come back to us seeking further commitments. They are absolute masters of the art of getting us to do for them things which they ought to do for themselves.

Secretary Dulles said that of course he agreed with the President that this was exasperating, but that after all, it was a big step for the French to submerge their national identity in the new European Defense Community. Moreover, he assured the President that we really would not have to do very much more by way of new assurances to the French than we have repeatedly said we would do in the past. Actually, all we need is a new package tied up with a new ribbon. Secretary Dulles said that he had pointed out to Bidault, who was seeking ironclad assurances, that there could be no question of a treaty or an executive agreement, since the deployment of United States military forces was a prerogative of the President and not of the Congress. The French seemed to understand this argument, and it really boils down to furnishing them something that looks like a new package, however old the contents may be. The whole issue was extremely critical from the standpoint of our own policy.

The President said he understood, but he was certainly getting sick and tired of being blackmailed into performing services for the French.

The President then inquired who actually was responsible for the formulation of the plans to follow through on his UN speech regarding peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Admiral Strauss replied that he had already prepared the Plan and that it had been cleared up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had had it under consideration for only one week.

Then the President inquired whose job it was to keep pushing to ensure progress, and Admiral Strauss replied that the primary responsibility was his. Secretary Dulles reminded Admiral Strauss to inform him at what point the British and Canadians were to be brought in.

Secretary Dulles then stated that this was about all he had to say with respect to the Foreign Ministers conference, except to point out the admirable performance of Bidault. The latter had done a much better job than Eden, who seemed to have lost some of his boldness and conviction, and who appeared to be seeking a compromise which would assure a political triumph when he returned home. Bidault, on the other hand, behaved courageously, as one who had burned his bridges behind him.

The President inquired, with respect to Secretary Dulles' conversations with Molotov, whether anyone ever got up and accused the Soviets of having their own EDC in the shape of the satellites which they held together by brute force. Secretary Dulles indicated that such remarks would have had absolutely no effect on the Russians.

The President replied that he rather wished that Secretary Dulles had made his allusion to the Hitler–Molotov discussions on dividing up the world. An occasional dig like that might scare the Russians into believing that we had a lot more information on this point than we actually had.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on the meeting of the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin.

b. Noted the President's directive that the Secretaries of State and Defense each designate a representative to prepare, for Council consideration at its next meeting, recommendations as to assurances which might be given the French, in connection with the European Defense Community, as to the retention of U.S. forces in Europe and continued U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

c. Noted the President's desire that the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, be responsible for expediting the completion of the report outlining the program to carry out the President's proposal in his speech to the United Nations on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for implementation.

No. 530

Editorial Note

On February 24 Secretary of State Dulles made a national address over radio and television giving his analysis of the Berlin Conference. For this address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 8, 1954, pp. 343-347. On March 3 Walter McConaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, in an address before the International Affairs Committee of the Women's National Republican Club, gave his analysis of the significance of the conference. For the text of his address, see *ibid.*, March 15, 1954, pages 402-406.

E. FURTHER EXCHANGES OF NOTES WITH THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION

No. 531

Editorial Note

Following the completion of the Berlin Conference three exchanges of notes with the Soviet Union took place during 1954 concerning European security and the German question. In a note dated March 31, the Soviet Union proposed that it join NATO and suggested that the United States might join its projected European Security Treaty. This proposal was rejected immediately in public statements and in a formal reply of the three Western powers dated May 7. For further documentation on this exchange of notes, see volume V, Part 1, pages 487 ff.

On July 24 the Soviet Union transmitted a second note to the Western powers, this time calling for a meeting to discuss collective security in Europe. The pact arising from such a meeting would include Eastern and Western Germany, would unite Germany, and would provide for the withdrawal of occupation forces. When no answer to this note was immediately forthcoming, the Soviet Union on August 4 proposed a four-power meeting for August or September to do the preliminary work for the security conference. The Western reply came on September 10. In it the

United States, the United Kingdom, and France agreed to a four-power meeting provided that the Soviet Union signed the Austrian Treaty and agreed to free elections in Germany as preconditions. For text of the Soviet note, the August 4 proposal, and the tripartite reply, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 20, 1954, pages 397–402. Documentation on the drafting of the reply is in file 396.1.

The Soviet Union responded with two further notes. The first, dated October 23, proposed a four-power conference to be held in November to discuss German unity, the withdrawal of occupation forces, and the calling of an all-European security conference. The second, dated November 13, issued invitations to a conference, which would open on November 29, to discuss the creation of a European collective security system. The Western reply, dated November 29, again asked for preconditions including the signing of the Austrian Treaty, a Soviet declaration on free elections for Germany, and a meeting of the four powers only after the Paris Agreements (see volume V, Part 1, page 684) had been signed. For the texts of the Soviet notes and the Western reply, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pages 901–907. Documentation on the drafting of the tripartite reply is in file 396.1. Since the Western powers had rejected the Soviet invitation, the European Security Conference that opened November 29 at Moscow was limited to the Soviet Union and its satellites with a Chinese observer.

Index for Parts 1 and 2 appears at end of Part 2.

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